WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A004400100001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 33
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Sequence Number: 1
• Content Type: SUMMARY

WEEKLY SUMMARY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
SECRET
lowngradinq and dec{4ssi fi Ca tiori
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SECRET
(Information as of 1200 EDT, 30 April 1964)
THE COMMUNIST WORLD
PEIPING RESUMES THE OFFENSIVE AGAINST MOSCOW
Peiping
is
apparently encouraged by Moscow's failure to
obtain
wide
support for an international Communist con-
ference
to
discuss bloc unity. Rumania's most recent
display
of
independence will add to Peiping's confidence.
NEW SOVIET MOVES TO RESOLVE AGRICULTURAL PROBLEMS
Khrushchev's latest measures to combat farm problems,
including a top-level party commission to devise means
of strengthening the livestock sector, represent a new
departure in policy-making procedures and may presage
a fundamental shift in agricultural policy.
SOVIET ECONOMIC REPORT FOR FIRST QUARTER 1964
The official report, while indicating that industrial
output has recovered somewhat from the exceptionally
poor performance of the last quarter of 1963, is more
truncated than usual, probably because the regime is
concerned over the effect of adverse economic data.
THE LENIN PRIZE LITERARY COMPROMISE
The decision to award the Lenin Prize in literature to
a noncontroversial author suggests that Khrushchev, with
a full load of other pressing problems, is in no mood to
give his unmanageable intellectuals the green light again.
BULGARIA REVERTING TO HARDER POLITICAL POLICIES
Its more authoritarian domestic policies following a
liberalizing trend in 1963 may stem from fear of inter-
nal dissidence provoked by the Sino-Soviet dispute. The
new animosity for the West probably reflects the embar-
rassment engendered by the Georgiev espionage case.
PEIPING EXPANDING NEWS AGENCY OPERATIONS IN FREE WORLD
It recently negotiated an unofficial agreement with a
Japanese association for an exchange of newsmen
and is trying to enlarge the NCNA staff in Paris.
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SECRET
ASIA-AFRICA
DEVELOPMENTS IN LAOS
Leaders of the rightist coup have eased their pressure
for a reshuffle of the cabinet
AREA NOTES
On Indonesia-Malaysia and Syria
TURKEY AGAIN THREATENS ACTION AGAINST CYPRUS
Recent Greek Cypriot military successes, combined with
the failure of the UN forces to end the fighting, have
resulted in stronger pressure on the Ankara government
to use its own forces to support the Turkish Cypriots.
TANGANYIKA'S UNION WITH ZANZIBAR 11
Zanzibar's pro-Communist former foreign minister appears
to have been outmaneuvered by the speed with which the
new government was formed, but difficulties may yet arise
in administering the island.
BEN BELLA STRENGTHENS CONTROL IN ALGERIA
The Algerian President last week dominated the constit-
uent congress of the country's single party, the National
Liberation Front, and now is on a triumphal tour abroad.
SECRET
1 May 64 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
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EUROPE (continued) Page
PROSPECTS FOR EEC COMMON ENERGY POLICY IMPROVE 13
The European community's long search for a common energy
policy could end if its six members eventually implement
arrangements accepted last week which would determine both
the consumption pattern for various sources of energy in
the community and the level of coal, oil, and gas imports.
SPAIN REACTS TO ITALIAN BLACKBALL IN EEC
Italy's refusal to go along with Spain's application
for association with the EEC--although by no means the
only dissenting voice--has led Madrid to threaten Ital-
ian businessmen in Spain with economic reprisals.
DISSENSION IN FINLAND'S DOMINANT AGRARIAN PARTY
A Pravda attack on party chairman Sukselainen, possibly
intended by Moscow as an assist to President Kekkonen's
effort to unseat him, instead appears to have rallied
support to Sukselainen. An Agrarian split over this
issue could upset the delicate balance of Soviet-Finnish
relations.
WESTERN HEMISPHERE
CUBA'S NEW ANTI-US PROPAGANDA OFFENSIVE
Moscow has joined Havana in what appears to be a con-
certed propaganda and diplomatic campaign to put an
end to US overflights of Cuba.
PANAMA'S PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN
Progovernment politicians are resorting to time-tested
strong-arm tactics and chicanery in a desperate effort
to ensure a victory for government candidate Robles.
EFFECTS OF BRAZIL'S ANTI-COMMUNIST CAMPAIGN
The new regime's "cleanup" operation, now considerably
abated, has had far-reaching effects at all levels of
the government and the armed forces and has substantial-
ly reduced the threat of extreme leftist subversion.
POLITICAL VIOLENCE INCREASING IN BRITISH GUIANA
Violence incidental to the prolonged jurisdictional
strike among the colony's sugar workers is increasing
and may persist through the campaign for the general
-election later this year.
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WESTERN HEMISPHERE (continued)
AREA NOTES
On Dominican Republic and Venezuela
Page
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Y
SECRET
PEIPING RESUMES THE OFFENSIVE AGAINST MOSCOW
Peiping is confidently mov-
ing ahead with preparations for
another assault on Moscow. It
apparently is encouraged by Mos-
cow's failure to obtain wide-
spread support in its efforts
to organize an international
Communist conference to discuss
the question of bloc unity.
Having refrained from polemical
blasts for nearly a month, ap-
parently while they assessed
the weakness of the Soviet po-
sition, the Chinese now are re-
suming the offensive.
As in the past, the Chinese
are preparing the ground for
the next major attack by re-
printing anti-Chinese materials
published in the Soviet Union.
On 27 April they devoted six
pages in a specially enlarged
edition of People's Daily to
the full text of Mikhail Sus-
lov's report to the Soviet party
central committee last February,
the plenum resolution attacking
Peiping, and the polemical
Pravda editorial of 3 April.
These documents were pref-
aced by a Chinese editorial
comment which promised rebuttal
"in due time," and repeated
familiar castigations of Russian
leaders in unusually scurrilous
language. Recent Soviet state-
ments were dismissed as nothing
but lies and sophistry which
"read like the abuses hurled by
a harridan in the street."
Once again Moscow is taunted
with its failure to deliver a
"resolute rebuff" to Peiping,
and the latest Soviet attacks on
China are turned off as "stuff"
not worthy of debate. Khru-
shchev--called noteworthy only
for his vulgarity and ridiculous
antics--is the target of mount-
ing scorn. His charges that the
Chinese are following Trotsky
are returned to quoque with the
implication that Peiping has
"relevant materials" which the
Chinese are prepared to publish
"when necessary" proving Khru-
shchev's involvement in Trotsky-
ite heresy.
The Rumanian central com-
mittee plenum documents pub-
lished on 26 April will add to
Peiping's confidence, and the
Chinese can be expected to ex-
ploit Bucharest's independent
stand. The Rumanian party em-
phasized the need to respect
basic principles of equal rights,
national sovereignty, and na-
tional and historical differences
of Communist states. Moreover,
it explicitly denied any party
the right to be "superior" or
the center of the international
movement.
These views, long a weapon
in the Chinese ideological ar-
senal, will probably be welcomed
and endorsed by Peiping in the
hope that the Rumanian example
will encourage further displays
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14W NOW
SECRET
of independence among Moscow's
other allies in Eastern Europe
and thus undercut the Russian
position even more deeply. The
Chinese will also be pleased by
Bucharest's call for "thorough
preparations" as a prerequisite
for a new international confer-
ence. The Chinese, still mi-
nority contestants in the strug-
gle with Moscow, probably want
to avoid a split which would
leave Peiping in control only
of a rump body and intend to
continue the fight at close
quarters until the balance has
swung in their favor.
Although Moscow continues
to republish calls by foreign
parties for a world Communist
meeting, the Soviet leaders are
apparently backing away from
efforts to organize a conference
for the purpose of condemning
Peiping. The Russians have
probably been taken aback by the
lack of enthusiasm for such a
meeting shown by a number of
parties. The failure of Yury
Andropov, who heads the central
committee department in charge
of relations with bloc parties,
to call for a world Communist
conference during his speech on
Lenin's birthday, 22 April, sug-
gests growing Russian hesitancy
to press for a showdown meeting
now. The Rumanian declaration
can only add to Moscow's mis-
givings.
The Russians are, however,
seeking to maintain their tough
public stance, and in a long
Pravda editorial on 28 April
attacked the entire basis of
Mao's position in terms of Com-
munist legality. At the same
time they are apparently trying
to shut the Chinese out of in-
ternational forums whenever
possible and to encourage other
Communist states to ostracize
Pei in
Khrushchev's call for new
"basic" measures to combat Soviet
agricultural problems is a clear
indication that the regime con-
siders the long-range outlook
for this sector of the economy
far from satisfactory. One
indication of the importance
Khrushchev attaches to his
latest scheme is the top-level
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SECRET lr
party commission he appointed
under presidium member Nikolay
Podgorny to work out measures
for strengthening the livestock
sector. This new departure in
post-Stalin policy-making pro-
cedures may presage a fundamen-
tal shift in farm policy.
The central committee
decree published on 23 April
implemented a 13 April Khru-
shchev memorandum, published
simultaneously, calling for
production of meat and dairy
products on "industrial" lines,
improvement of the system of
training agricultural workers,
and improvement of the work of
agricultural production admin-
istrations. Responsibility in
the last two fields was assigned
to established party and gov-
ernment agencies.
The Khrushchev memorandum
was evidently the one to which
he referred in Hungary in early
April. At that time he said
it would be concerned with new
efforts to shift farms from
multipurpose to specialized
production with increased mech-
anization, and with "large-
scale" investment in agriculture.
The memorandum as published,
however, stressed specialization,
improvements in management, and
more intensive use of Western
techniques and equipment but
played down investment with the
admonition that production be
increased with "minimum expendi-
ture.
Podgorny's livestock commis-
sion, which was given 30 days
to make its report, consists
of six other party presidium
members--including Brezhnev
Kosygin, and Mikoyan--and a
number of other high-level
Soviet and republic leaders.
The selection of Podgorny to
head such an august body is
further evidence of the high
stature he has achieved in re-
cent months. It strengthens
his position as one of Khru-
shchev's two or three most trust-
ed lieutenants.
The urgency of the live-
stock problem, suggested by the
high rank of the commission and
its short deadline, lends cred-
ibility to recent reports of
more wide-scale slaughtering of
pigs and cattle in 1963 than
Soviet figures would indicate.
The regime had admitted to a
decline of 42 percent in the
number of pigs and a 2 percent
decline in cattle.
Establishment of the blue-
ribbon Podgorny commission would
seem to imply that major reforms
are under consideration. The new
push for specialized farming
and "assembly line" livestock
production, for example, might
involve a major expansion of
the state farm system at the
expense of collective farms,
which Khrushchev has criticized
as "not accountable to anyone."
An across-the-board revamping
of the present wage incentive
system for farm workers is
another possibility.
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1 May 64 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
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SELECTED SOVIET OFFICIAL DATA C H ? ..;
ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE
in Preceding. Year
%o Increase (or i7etease
Compared" With,Sarne; Period
oil
Gas
Turbines
Chemical` Machinery
Agricultural Machinery
Cotton Fabrics"
Wool Fabrics
Refrigerators
Meat
Rutter
640428 3
5.4 ot. " 4;
141,
1 15 21X+
. Z
4-
ill "li :;. 14
j f
T2` 10 10
i- . ' :: 202 1 i1
X2(1 4
31 ` 4 1;3. . -11
* Figures Unavailable:
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ISE(,,1(Pd l "AW
The Communist World
SOVIET ECONOMIC REPORT FOR FIRST QUARTER 1964
The USSR's report on economic
plan fulfillment in the first
three months of 1964 indicates
that industrial output, while still
sluggish, has recovered somewhat
from the exceptionally poor per-
formance of the last quarter of
1963.
Production of nonmilitary ma-
chinery continued at a relatively
depressed level. While the output
of industrial raw materials has
recovered from the bad fourth-
quarter slump,the current tempo
is only about equal to the rela-
tively low annual rates of in-
crease in 1962 and 1963. There
is no indication of further ac-
celeration above these rates. The
poor performance in the civilian
machinery sector--apparently in
line with lower 1964 plans--may
reflect current disruptions in the
machine-building industry because
of diversion of plant capacity to
the production of chemical equip-
ment and the change-over to new
types of agricultural machinery
badly needed for the fertilizer
program.
The first-quarter plan report
is traditionally brief, containing
no investment, national product,
or agricultural data. The current
report, however, is even more
truncated than usual, probably re-
flecting the planners' concern over
the effect of adverse economic in-
formation.
Large increases over the first
quarter of 1963 were reported for
plastics, artificial and synthetic
fibers, and fertilizers and other
agricultural chemicals. The in-
creased production of farm chemi-
cals, even though lower than planned,
reflects the regime's efforts to
boost agricultural production. The
12-percent increase in the output of
chemical machinery, although well be-
low the tempo implied by the Khru-
shchev program announced last Decem-
ber, was more than double the rate
of increase achieved a year ago.
The stepped-up production of chemi-
cal equipment may be resulting in
less equipment for other uses. For
example, oil machinery output in-
creased only 2 percent and turbine ineut
production actually dropped
4 percent.
The accumulation of agricul-
tural difficulties is explicit in
the report. Meat processed at state
slaughterhouses dropped by 11 per-
cent from the first quarter of last
year. Meat processing during the
first part of 1963 was unusually
heavy, however, and this year's
lower output probably indicates
that most of the distress slaughter-
ing resulting from feed shortages
had occurred by the end of the
year. Butter production dropped
by about 12 percent and milk pro-
duction rose by only 2 percent.
The over-all situation for
the consumer has not improved ap-
preciably in the last three
months. As usual. large increases
were reported fox such major con-
sumer durables as refrigerators
and washing machines, but the
amounts produced continue to be
grossly inadequate to meet de-
mand. Textiles and shoes were
produced at a somewhat higher
rate than a year ago but the in-
creases were still small.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Page 4
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THE LENIN PRIZE LITERARY COMPROMISE
The decision to award the
Lenin Prize in literature to Alek-
sandr Gonchar, a relatively minor,
conservative, and noncontroversial
Ukrainian author, marks an attempt
by the Soviet leadership to dis-
courage the liberal intellectuals
who contend that de-Stalinization
has not gone far enough. Saddled
with a full load of other pressing
problems, Khrushchev apparently is
in no mood to give his unmanageable
intellectuals the green light again.
The burden of the problem
lies at Khrushchev's own doorstep.
Two years ago he encouraged the
publication of Solzhenitsyn's novel
about a Stalin era labor camp--
One Day in the Life of Ivan Deniso-
v Ech--which was evenTually no-ml
na ed for a Lenin Prize. The nomi-
nation, however, focused the at-
tention of the intellectual com-
munity on the question of who
should be blamed for the crimes of
the Stalin era, and a heated liter-
ary debate ensued.
The liberal writers insist
that these mass injustices were
the responsibility not only of
Stalin and his henchmen, but also
of those who obeyed their orders
and, to a lesser extent, of all
men who failed to protest the in-
justices. They gave their solid
support to Solzhenitsyn's novel as
an honest portrayal of the period.
Conservatives, following the
orthodox line, insist that the party
and the country remained morally
wholesome under Stalin despite his
"errors." They maintain that all
the guilty have been identified
and that it only remains to portray
the "true Communists" who retained
their faith through all adversities.
Their candidates for the prize in-
cluded Galina Serebryakova, who re-
turned from prison camp to complete
her trilogy on the life of Marx, and
Boris Ruchev, also a camp alumnus,
whose poems celebrate the party-
mindedness of camp inmates.
During the winter, the press
was flooded with letters about Sol-
zhenitsyn's hero and the various news-
papers and journals began to take
sides. Pravda and Kommunist carried
favorable icles, possibly be-
cause Khrushchev himself had author-
ized publication of One Day. By
April, however, the moodTiad
changed. A mounting preoccupation
with economic problems and the
fight with the Chinese Communists
apparently dictated the decision
that it would be disadvantageous at
this time to encourage the liberals
in their campaign for further
changes. A decision in favor of the
conservatives, however, might have
seemed to reverse Khrushchev's orig-
inal decision to publish One Day and
would, moreover, encourage the ul-
traconservatives, whom he has never
found sympathetic.
On 11 April, Pravda suddenly
discovered that So z enitsyn's
novel lacked "artistic" merit. Ten
days later, the prize was awarded
to Gonchar, who has played no part
in recent literary controversies,
and whose story of postwar village
reconstruction was unrelated to
the central issue of the contro-
versy.
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1 May 64 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
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BULGARIA REVERTING TO HARDER POLITICAL POLICIES
The Bulgarian regime, since
the turn of the year, has reverted
both to more authoritarian domes-
tic policies and to xenophobia for
the West--particularly the US. Al-
though the liberalizing trend ev-
ident for most of 1.963 was sanc-
tioned by premier and party boss
Zhivkov as part of the regime's
de-Stalinization program, this
year's reversal reflects the su-
perficiality of that posture.
The tightened security con-
trols probably represent a hedge
against possible dissidence pro-
voked by the Sino-Soviet dispute
as well as a reaction to more fre-
quent displays of public dissatis-
faction. There is also evidence
that hard-line party elements have
been prodding the regime and that
it was embarrassed by the Georgiev
espionage case which broke late
last fall.
Reflecting the tighter con-
trols imposed in recent months,
the telling of political jokes
has been made an offense punishable
by up to five years' imprisonment;
deportations from the larger cities,
especially Sofia, have been stepped
up; fear of contact with foreigners
has been exacerbated by the press
and by direct police warnings to
individuals; and the militia guard
has been doubled at the legations
of the United States and Turkey,
the countries protrayed in recent
"spy" trials as the most dangerous
to Bulgaria. Furthermore,the min-
ister of interior has publicized
the need "to strengthen the organs
The Communist World
of the dictatorship of the pro-
letariat."
The Bulgarian regime contin-
ues to pay lip service to a for-
eign policy of "peaceful coexist-
ence" while its actions make
this slogan meaningless except
for formally correct interstate
relations. Although diplomatic
personnel of the United States'
NATO allies--the French, British,
Italians, and Turks--have also
noted an increased chill in re-
cent weeks in their dealings with
Bulgarian officials, US-Bulgarian
contacts have been particularly
restricted.
Would-be visitors to the US
Legation are invariably questioned
by the militia stationed there
and are frequently turned away
despite strong protests from the
US minister. In addition, the
regime has taken steps to control
US Legation contacts with Bulgar-
ian officials by insisting that
all appointments be made through
the Foreign Ministry's Diplomatic
Service Bureau.
Despite this renewed author-
itarianism, however, there is no
firm evidence indicating Zhivkov
faces serious dissidence inside
the party, even though there is
constant scheming within the hier-
archy and jockeying for lesser po-
sitions. Zhivkov enjoys Khrushchev's
strong public support, as evidenced
by the recent $333-million Soviet
credit to Bulgaria and the extrav-
agant reception accorded Zhivkov
during his February visit to Moscow.
L May 64
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PEIPING EXPANDING NEWS AGENCY OPERATIONS IN FREE WORLD
Peiping is pressing its
efforts to expand the net of
New China News Agency offices
in the free world. The Chine
have recently negotiated
an unofficial agreement
with an Japanese newspaper
association for an exchange of
newsmen. They may conclude a
similar arrangement with the
Canadians soon, and are attempt-
ing to enlarge the existing NCNA
staff in Paris.
NCNA reached the agreement
with the Japanese on 19 April,
during talks with Japanese Lib-
eral Democratic Party leader
Kenzo Matsumura. The agreement
provides for an exchange of up
to eight reporters by each side
before 10 June. Since the.Ja-
panese did not insist on recipro-
cal treatment, their newsmen
will operate under close restric-
tion, although the NCNA staff
in Japan will enjoy complete
freedom of movement.
The recent Chinese setback-In
Brazil, where two NCNA corre-
spondents and seven trade offi-
cials were jailed in early April
on espionage charges, has proba-
bly weakened Peiping's bargain-
ing position and made it more
anxious than ever to establisha
new foothold in North America.
In addition, Peiping may be
counting on the current swing
in Canadian public opinion favor-
ing recognition of Communist
China to pave the way for ex-
panded NCNA activities later on.
Peiping apparently in-
would increase Chinese capabili-
ties for propaganda work in Eu-
rope and Africa.
en s to make Paris a major cen-
ter of political activity, and
the augmented NCNA staff there
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1 May 64
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Napo NOV
SECRET
The leaders of the right-
wing coup in Laos appear for
the moment to have eased their
pressure for a reshuffle of Pre-
mier Souvanna's cabinet.F -
Rightist General Phoumi,
on behalf of Souvanna, this
week called on absent cabinet
members to reassume their seats
in the cabinet. Pathet Lao
leaders, concerned over their
safety in Vientiane and probably
suspecting a rightist maneuver
to ease them out of the govern-
ment, have dismissed Phoumi's
summons as mere "propaganda"
and have called for a return
to precoup conditions.
Pathet Lao chief Souphannou-
vong has accepted Souvanna's bid
for new talks between the two
Leaders. Souphannouvong did
not, however, specify either a
time or a place for the meetings;
in the past these matters have
been agreed upon only after pro-
tracted negotiations. Souphannou-
vong's intransigence caused the
collapse of the tripartite talks
earlier this month. The premier,
who proposed neutralist head-
quarters at Muong Phanh for the
meeting, expressed his hope
that Souphannouvong would be
prepared to take a reasonable
line.
The military situation on
the Plaine des Jarres appears
quiet following several probes
by the Pathet Lao against rightist
and neutralist positions north-
east of Muong Phanh. In other
areas, however, Pathet Lao forces
appear to be taking advantage
of the confusion in non-Commu-
nist ranks and are pressing
attacks against rightist and
neutralist units in the mountains
east of the plain.
To the south and south-
east of the Plaine des Jarres,
a battalion nominally subord-
inate to Kong Le has joined
with the Pathet Lao and dissi-
dent neutralists. In other
actions, the Pathet Lao have
once again occupied Ban Nong
Boua Lao, east of Savannakhet.
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1 May r-.1 PTTPPT'?%PP TMTWf.T.TC.F.M(9 W1?1 Wf.V STTMMARV Pnge 8
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Indonesia-Malaysia: Re-
acting to Malaysian Prime Min-
ister Rahman's sweeping elec-
toral victories on 25 April,
Indonesian President Sukarno
has ordered an intensification
of his anti-Malaysia policy in
all fields.
Syria: Tension is still
high following more than a week
of merchant strikes in major
Syrian cities. Most shops in
Damascus, Aleppo, Homs, and
Hama were closed down after the
Hama disturbances two weeks ago
in protest against the Baath re-
gime's socialist policies. The
strike, joined by professional
groups and artisans, seems to
have been a genuine popular
expression of anti-Baath senti-
ment.
Regime leaders were divided
on the question of how to han-
dle it.
Prime Minister Hafiz tried
Rahman's Alliance Party
won 89 of 104 parliamentary
seats and gained control of
10 of the 11 state legisla-
tures involved in the election.
These gains were at the expense
of minor pro-Indonesia parties.
Rahman waged his campaign
largely on the theme that a
vote for the Alliance was a
vote against Sukarno.
to avoid violence. After at-
tempts to negotiate with mer-
chant delegations failed, how-
ever, Hafiz issued a decree ef-
fective on 30 April authorizing
court-martial for merchants who
refused to open their shops.
Most establishments seem to
have yielded to the threat, at
least for the moment.
Antiregime activity will
certainly continue, however.
Opposition groups are apparently
still disorganized but their
leaders presumably hope to in-
tensify antiregime feeling--
particularly within the army--
and thereby spark an anti-Baath
coup.
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Kormak Temblos
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TURKEY AGAIN THREATENS ACTION AGAINST CYPRUS
Recent Greek Cypriot mili-
tary successes in the fighting
near Kyrenia, combined with
failure of the UN forces to
end the fighting, have led to
a new threat of Turkish mili-
tary intervention.
NATO Secretary General
Stikker, who visited Ankara and
Athens this week in an attempt
to prevent further deterioration
in Greek-Turkish relations, has
said that Turkish Premier Inonu
told him he was prepared to or-
der an invasion on 28 April.
Inonu told Stikker he had de-
cided to await further develop-
ments, however, and appeared
pleased when the commander of
the UN forces on Cyprus, General
Gyani, issued a thinly veiled
denunciation of the Greek Cyp-
riot offensive.
The Turkish Government has
been under growing domestic pres-
sure to take a strong stand on
Cyprus. It fears a major at-
tack on its policies from the
opposition Justice Party in the
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parliamentary debate expected
in the next few days. The gov-
ernment also fears that military
officers, frustrated over the
Cyprus issue, might attempt a
coup d'etat.
UN forces on the island
may in fact be taking a firmer
stand in the face of provocations
from either side. On 30 April
Swedish troops returned Greek
Cypriot fire directed at them
and disarmed the irregulars who
engaged in the attack. This is
the first time UN troops had
taken such action in Cyprus.
The chief of staff of the
Greek Air Force viewed the de-
terioration in Greek-Turkish re-
lations with considerable alarm
on 29 April but appeared more
relaxed the following day. Re-
connaissance aircraft are con-
tinuing special, patrols over
the Greek islands off the Turk-
ish coast
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TANGANYIKA'S UNION WITH ZANZIBAR
Zanzibar's pro-Communist
former Foreign Minister Babu
appears to have been outmaneu-
vered by the swiftness of Tan-
ganyika's absorption of Zanzi-
bar, but the new United Repub-
lic effected on 27 April may
still face serious problems of
implementation.
Tanganyikan leaders appa-
rently convinced former Presi-
dent Karume and Vice President
Hanga that union with Tangan-
yika was the only way to pre-
vent Babu and his pro-Chinese
Arabs from gaining complete
control of Zanzibar. Karume
appears to have given little
thought to the practical de-
tails of such a union, and may
not even have realized the ex-
tent to which he was surrender-
ing Zanzibar's sovereignty.
Moderate Tanganyikan min-
isters have assumed responsi-
bility for Zanzibar's police
and army, but in return Presi-
dent Nyerere has given the Zan-
zibaris heavy overrepresentation
in the new government. Several
pro-Soviet extremists are among
the Zanzibaris in the cabinet,
but Nyerere expects that pro-
Communist elements will be
"smothered" in Tanganyikan
nonalignment.
Under the new arrangements,
Zanzibar has become in effect
a region of Tanganyika, but the
new government may have trouble
administering the island. Ka-
rume will be under strong pres-
sure to resist Tanganyikan
"domination" of Zanzibar's af-
fairs. Babu's militants are
not yet disarmed and Communist
sympathizers still control in-
formation media and other key
posts.
Among the immediate unre-
solved political issues are
the disposition of Soviet arms
on the island and the future
of the foreign missions. Mos-
cow's and Peiping's embassies
will probably be downgraded to
consulates. Despite Tangan-
yika's close ties with Bonn--
vvhere Foreign Minister Kambona
iLs about to discuss military
and economic aid--East Germany
may keep at least a "trade mis-
sion." Zanzibar leaders are
pressing Nyerere not to cut
ties
Soviet comment suggests con-
tinued caution regarding develop-
ments in Zanzibar. Not having
committed its prestige to the sup-
piDrt of the revolutionary regime,
Moscow is free to work for close
tries with the new government and
may hope to gain favor by giving
t h,.e impression of approving the
union. To date, Peiping has
avoided comment, merely reporting
f actually, the formation of the
union and new cabinet.
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President Ahmed Ben Bella
has emerged with enhanced au-
thority from Algeria's first
major political conclave and
now is further increasing his
domestic prestige by an extended
visit to the USSR, Bulgaria,
Czechoslovakia, and Egypt.
Ben Bella appears to have
dominated every aspect of the
proceedings of the constituent
congress of the National Libera-
tion Front (FLN), which met in
Algiers from 16 to 22 April.
According to the constitution
the F.LN is the country's only
political party, establishes
national policy, and controls
the activity of the national'
assembly and the government.
The party's governing bodies,
as established by the congress,
are so unwieldy, however, that
they are not likely to interfere
with the near-absolute authority
of Ben Bella, newly elected
FLN secretary general.
The 80-member FLN central
committee contains a solid
majority of loyal followers of
Ben Bella, but only a token
number of the regime's intel-
lectuals. Most potential op-
position leaders have been ex-
cluded. The committee may
serve as a political training
ground, but in the meantime,
as a continuing body of the
congress, it can provide a
"people's" endorsement for Ben
Bella's policies.
The influence of vice
premier and Defense Minister
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Boumedienne, who as army comman-
der poses the greatest potential
threat to Ben Bella's control,
is stronger in the 17-member
political bureau than in the
central committee. Even here,
however, the five-man Boumedi-
enne clique is offset by four
anti-Boumedienne former guerrilla
commanders. Most of the other
eight members are probably loyal
Ben Bellists.
The illegal Algerian Com-
munist Party, which had attempted
to obtain recognition as an
entity within the FLN, was de-
feated in this effort at the
congress, and the FLN took over
the pro-Soviet Communist daily
Alger Republicain, the best and
most widely read newspaper in
the country.
assistance.
Accompanied by four cabinet
members, the army chief of staff,
and some 30 lesser officials,
Ben Bella departed on 25 April
for Moscow, where he will be
the first nonbloc chief of state
to share the limelight during
May Day celebrations. While
there, he may sign agreements
committing much of the $100-
million credit advanced to Al-
geria last fall. Whatever proj-
ects the Soviets undertake, how-
ever, Ben Bella will insist
that Algeria remain nonaligned,
and he will almost certainly 25X1
continue to rely mainly on
France and the West for economic
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After nearly seven years
of false starts and setbacks,
the European Coal and Steel
Community (CSC) may finally be
on the road toward establishment
of a common energy policy. The
CSC Council on 21 April approved
a comprehensive list of proposals
which, if implemented, would have
far-reaching implications both in
and outside the community. The
arrangements these proposals en-
visage would eventually determine
not only the consumption pattern
for various sources of energy
within the framework of the Eu-
ropean communities but also the
level of CSC imports of coal,
oil, and gas.
Designed to ensure secure
sources of cheap fuel to meet
fast-rising demands, the pro-
posals also hope to guarantee
lair competition among coal,
oil, and nuclear fuels, without
unduly disrupting existing in-
dustries. The most important
break-through made last week re-
lates to the future of the coal
industry, which has been the
chief stumbling block in the
past. Heretofore the important
coal producers, notably Belgium
and West Germany, have been at
loggerheads with the large energy
importers--Italy and the Nether-
lands--over the amount of pro-
tection to be afforded the in-
creasingly uncompetitive coal mines..
Both sides now have accepted a
compromise calling for "generally
degressive" protective aid for
coal--a vague wording which begs
the question of how long sub-
sidies for coal will persist, but
which at least recognizes that
the coal industry must eventually
reconcile itself to increased
competition from cheaper energy
forms.
The US Mission believes
that the old cycle of "agree-
ment in spring, disagreement in
fall" could recur on the energy
question. An ominous considera-
tion is a rising coal stockpile
which CSC members may endeavor
to protect despite their com-
mitments last week not to do
so. Other factors in the Eu-
ropean energy picture, however
--the discoveries of huge nat-
ural gas fields in the Nether-
lands and under the North Sea,
the availability of Saharan oil
and gas, and the prospect of
competitive atomic energy as
early as 1968--will make it in-
creasingly difficult to defend
state aids to high cost coal
mines, and weigh in favor of a
common energy policy.
It is too early to tell
what impact a common energy
policy will have on outside
suppliers such as the US and
Middle Eastern countries.
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SPAIN REACTS TO ITALIAN BLACKBALL IN EEC
Italy's refusal to go along
with Spain's application for as-
sociation with the Common Market
(EEC) has led Madrid to threaten
reprisals. Although Italy is by
no means the only EEC country to
reject Spain, the Spanish com-
merce minister recently called
in a number of Italian business-
men in Madrid to denounce their
government's attitude.
The intemperance of the
Spanish reaction appears to re-
sult in large part from Madrid's
strong desire for European accept-
ance, particularly in the econom-
ic field. It considers EEC as-
sociation an essential aspect
of its efforts to liberalize
the Spanish economy and, as such,
an urgent foreign policy objec-
tive.
Italy's attitude is moti-
vated primarily by strong dis-
like of the Franco regime.
While all the coalition parties
oppose accepting Spain in the
EEC, both the Saragat and the
Nenni Socialists are particularly
hostile to the idea. The US
Embassy observes that the Nenni
Socialists have problems enough
in justifying their participa-
tion in the coalition without
exposing themselves to Communist
and dissident Socialist charges
of being soft on Franco. A
secondary factor in Italy's
attitude is that certain of its
agricultural exports, such as
citrus fruits and< olive oil,
are in competition with Spain's.
The only give in Italy's posi-
tion appears to be some will-
ingness to consider in principle
EEC trade agreements with Spain.
Italy's exports to Spain
amounted to less than 2 percent
of its total exports in 1963.
Spain's exports to Italy rose
from 2 percent to 4 percent of
its total exports during the
first nine months of 1963, and
imports from Italy'to more than
5 percent of all Spanish imports.
Spain's threats against
Italy have had an irritating
effect on the West Germans, who
heretofore have supported Madrid's
association with the EEC. Bonn
officials now indicate that they
might not be inclined to back
further discussions toward this
end so long as there was "a
Spanish fist on the table."
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DISSENSION IN FINLAND'S DOMINANT AGRARIAN PARTY
A 6 April Pravda article
attacking a number of alleged
anti-Soviet "reactionary" poli-
ticians in Finland is having
widespread repercussions in
that country. Particularly con-
cerned is President Kekkonen's
own Agrarian Party, whose chair-
man, Vieno Sukselainen, was
among those singled out.
The USSR, which had never
before attacked a top Agrarian
leader, may have felt that its
attack on Sukselainen would help
the Kekkonen faction--the so-
called "K-liners"--retain control
of the increasingly restive party.
In an effort to make the attack
more convincing, the Pravda
article used Sukselainen's -recent
appearances at Estonian emigre
festivities in the US and Sweden
to accuse him of undermining
Soviet-Finnish relations.
Kekkonen dislikes Sukse-
lainen and looks on him, rightly
or wrongly, as a potential com-
petitor as well as a rallying
point for the sizable but dis-
organized anti-Kekkonen element
which has long chafed under the
arbitrary direction of party
affairs by the K-liners. Publi-
cation of the Pravda article
coincides with reported efforts
by the K-liners to unseat
Sukselainen and replace him with
a more pliant and amenable chair-
man at the Agrarians' June con-
gress.
The K-liners apparently
had already designated Vice
Chairman Virolainen and Ahti
Karjalainen, the former premier
and a Kekkonen protegd, as ac-
ceptable candidates for the
chairmanship. They may now have
to move more slowly, however,
since the Pravda attack has
evidently had the effect of
rallying support to Sukselainen.
Even beforehand, Sukselainen
commanded a large following,
especially among the Agrarian
parliamentary group. There is
also a very real risk of a split
in the Agrarian Party if the K-
liners offend the moderate ma-
jority by appearing to move in
tandem with the Soviet Union
against Sukselainen.
A diminution of Agrarian
strength resulting from a split
would not only be a blow to
Kekkonen's prestige and author-
ity, but might also have an
impact on relative party
strengths. The Social Democrats,
who now are in the process of
healing their own longstanding
breach, would profit. The
Communists would probably be the
principal beneficiaries, espe-
cially in the remote northern
and eastern areas where the
Agrarians have been their
principal competitors.
Moreover, given the Agrar-
ians' identification with Fin-
land's policy of maintaining
close, friendly relations with
the USSR, any significant weaken-
ing of the party's or Kekkonen's
position would be viewed with
considerable concern in Moscow.
The USSR previously has not hesi-
tated to intervene in Finnish do-
mestic affairs when it felt its
own interests might be directly
affected.
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Western Hemisphere
CUBA'S NEW ANTI-US PROPAGANDA OFFENSIVE
The Soviets are supporting
Cuban efforts--initiated by Cas-
tro in his 19 April speech--to
arouse international alarm over
dangers posed by the US over-
flights. Moscow apparently hopes
to increase the political costs
to the US of continuing the
flights and eventually induce
Washington to curtail or termi-
nate them.
Castro's speech was followed
up by two strong Cuban notes to
the US and by a 23 April letter
to the UN Secretary General "warn-
ing the world" that the US would
be responsible for any threat to
peace resulting from US "provoca-
tions" and violations of Cuban
sovereignty. Cuban propaganda is
also emphasizing the Guantanamo
Naval Base issue, but Castro's
main interest now is probably to
stop the overflights.
After the US announced that
the flights would continue and
warned against interference with
them, Moscow responded on 24 April
with an Izvestia "Observer" arti-
cle--aut or a ve but short of
a government statement or diplo-
matic note. The article endorsed
Cuba's right to "take the neces-
sary measures" to end these opera-
tions and denounced the flights
as illegal and as a contravention
of the US-Soviet "agreement" end-
ing the 1962 missile crisis. In
reaffirming Soviet support, how-
ever, Izvestia simply repeated
the standard formula that the
USSR will "side with Cuba" in the
event of a "treacherous attack"
and avoided any commitment to
specific countermeasures. The
article also attempted to under-
cut any US move to hold the So-
viet Union responsible for Cuban
actions by pointing out that the
weapons in the hands of the Cubans
"are the property of the Cuban
people."
The immediate aim of the
Soviet and Cuban pressures is
probably to prepare the ground
for formal diplomatic action at
the UN--which Castro has served
notice he intends to initiate.
Moscow and Havana may believe
that the threat of such action
will encourage the US to consider
some form of negotiated settle-
ment of the overflight issue.
It is unlikely that the So-
viet leaders are concerned that
Castro might shoot down a US air-
craft soon after he secures con-
trol of the surface-to-air mis-
sile (SAM) system, but they can-
not ignore the risk that trans-
fer of these weapons will in-
crease his-ability to embroil the
USSR with the US. They therefore
will probably persist in efforts
to induce the US to stop over-
flights while at the same time
seeking to restrain Castro from
direct clashes with the US.
Cuban personnel probably
are now capable of manning,
operating, and controlling
the air defense system, al-
though they probably are not
yet able to perform all the
necessary maintenance j-_
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PANAMA'S PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN
Progovernment politicians
in Panama are resorting to time-
tested strong-arm tactics and
chicanery in a desperate effort
to ensure a victory on 10 May
for government presidential
candidate Marco Robles.
National guard orders to
collect all private firearms
and stop the clandestine arms
traffic evidently have not ex-
tended to the heavily armed
groups of thugs guarding Robles
and other politicians opposing
the front-running candidate,
Arnulfo Arias. On the other
hand, the police are under or-
ders to "crack down hard" on
possible attempts by Arias'
henchmen to challenge govern-
ment control of the ballot boxes.
If the Arias forces per-
sist, however, the government
may call on the electoral tri-
bunal to use its statutory power
to nullify elections in local-
ities where there have been
"acts of violence sufficient
to affect voting results."
The government might conceiv-
ably foment violence deliber-
ately if ballot-tampering prom-
ises to prove insufficient to
defeat Arias.
Western Hemisphere
The government coalition's
last-minute attempts to gain
support against Arias are help-
ing the Communists and other
leftist extremists. They de-
cided some weeks ago that an-
other president representing
the traditional ruling elite
would suit their purposes bet-
ter than Arias, who has based
his campaign on growing popu-
lar resentment against the
oligarchy.
Among those who may have
made deals to help defeat Arias
in return for government favors
or promises of assistance are
Norberto Navarro, a Communist-
approved extremist presidential
candidate; Ramon Pereira, owner
of vituperative and irresponsi-
ble Radio Mia; and pro-Communist
labor adviser Carlos Ivan Zuniga.
The striking United Fruit Com-
pany banana workers' union, which
is dominated by Zuniga, has an-
nounced that its members will
demonstrate in Chiriqui Province
on 1 May against Arias, claiming
that he will destroy the trade
unions if he is elected. There
may also be a Cuban-sponsored
May Day demonstration in Colon,
another likely area for moves
to cut down Arias' popularity.
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The Brazilian Government's
intensive "cleanup" operation,
now considerably abated, has
had far-reaching effects at all
levels of the government and
the armed forces and has sub-
stantially reduced the threat
of extreme leftist subversion.
However, there has been vir-
tually no punitive violence,
and the emphasis has been on
gathering evidence to demon-
strate the corruption of the
Goulart regime and to bring
legal actions against subver-
sives.
A number of senior officers
of all the armed services are
under arrest, and over a hun-
dred have been removed from
active duty. The mandates of
more than 40 federal congress-
men, representing several parties,
have been canceled; their polit-
ical rights and those of more
than a hundred others have been
suspended. A number of high
officials under Goulart are under
arrest, and many others have
fled into exile or political
asylum. At least two state
governors have been impeached,
and several mayors and other
local officials have been re-
moved.
The "cleanup" appears to
have left the Communist Party
(PCB) temporarily confused and
off balance, and there is evi-
dence of differences among its
leadership as to the future
party line. The enduring ef-
fects may not be great, however,
at least in Sao Paulo State,
which has the heaviest concen-
tration of PCB members. Party
chief Luiz Prestes is still at
large, and few of the central 25X1
committee members or important
regional committeemen have been
a rehended.
The army, alert to the pos-
sibility of organized subversive25X1
activities by the CPB or other
groups, has taken special se-
curity measures.
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SECRET Western Hemisphere
POLITICAL VIOLENCE INCREASING IN BRITISH GUIANA
Violence incidental to
the prolonged jurisdictional
strike among British Guiana's
sugar workers is increasing
and may persist through the
campaign for the general elec-
tion later this year.
At latest count, 12 per-
sons have been killed, and well
over a million dollars' worth
of cane has been destroyed in
the two and a half months since
leftist Premier Cheddi Jagan's
union (GAWU) called the strike.
GAWU seems to be losing its bid
to gain sole bargaining rights
with the sugar producers and
nearly 60 percent of the normal
work force is back on the job,
but the violence GAWU instigated
now is developing into wide-
spread clashes between East
Indians and Negroes.
Last week, racial violence
was so extensive west of George-
town, the capital, that the
governor called up the 600-man
volunteer force. This force is
inadequately trained for mob
control but is being used ini-
tially for guard duty to free
about 30 of the regular 1,500-
man police for deployment to
areas of racial clashes. Un-
less the political leaders--
and particularly the Jagan re-
gime--take more effective ac-
tion than they have thus far
to restrain their followers,
there is likely to be a further
deterioration of law and order,
possibly requiring the interven-
tion of British troops.
The Colonial Office in
London will probably not sched-
ule the Guianese elections
until after the British general
elections in October. Voter
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Western Hemisphere
registration in the colony is
set for $ May through 6 June.
Jagan's party is increasingly
fearful of losing if, as Lon-
don intends, the election is
held under proportional repre-
sentation rules. It has tried
to persuade the British Labor
Party to oppose such a plan,
but the Laborites, while criti-
cal of the government's plan,
have not said they would try
to alter it if Labor were to
take office after October.
The Dominican Republic's
provisional government as un-
dertaken the politically dan-
gerous austerity program nec-
essary to put the country's
financial house in order. On
23 April the regime imposed new
taxes on a wide range of im-
ported goods. It also accepted
an "offer" from military lead-
ers to give up the armed forces'
privilege of importing consumer
goods duty free. Further re-
forms are said to be in the off-
ing.
Initial public reaction to
the new taxes--which strike
hard at the government's conserv-
ative supporters in business--
has been relatively mild, and
the move aimed at curbing wide-
spread armed forces smuggling
has brought highly favorable
comment. However, the regime
will need to mobilize public
support in order to withstand
the pressure from politically 25X1
powerful vested interests against
these and future austerity meas-
ures.
Venezuela's President Leoni
believes that s government's
protest about shipment of Cuban
arms to Venezuelan terrorists
will be rejected by the OAS.
During a conversation with the
US ambassador in Caracas on 24
April, he based his prediction
on a relaxation of cold-war ten-
sions he believes has occurred
in recent weeks, and on what he
interprets as changes in US
policy toward Latin America.
SECRET
1 May 64 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
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Page 21
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w
SECRET
Western Hemisphere
SECRET
1 May 64 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Page 22
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 25X1 Approved For Release 2008/04/24: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04400100001-4
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Approved For Release 2008/04/24: CIA-RDP79-00927A004400100001-4
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Approved For Release 2008/04/24: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04400100001-4