WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A004400090001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 33
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 29, 2008
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 24, 1964
• Content Type: SUMMARY

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
GROUP I Esecluded from automatic
downgrading and declassification
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OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
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M SECRET
(Information as of 1200 EST, 23 April 1964)
KHRUSHCHEV'S BIRTHDAY CELEBRATION
Moscow used the occasion to create the impression of
world Communist support for the USSR against the Chi-
nese, but made no attempt to represent the gathering
of high-level delegations as having resulted in con-
certed decisions on tactics for dealing with Peiping.
EDITING OF KHRUSHCHEV'S SPEECHES
The published texts of Khrushchev's speeches often dif-
fer considerably from his actual remarks, as most recent-
ly demonstrated in changes he ordered in speeches made
during his Hungarian visit and after his return to Moscow.
SOVIET POSITION ON FINANCING OF UN PEACE-KEEPING OPERATIONS 3
Moscow adamantly refuses to pay its share of the cost of
certain peace-keeping operations, believing its intransi-
gence will encourage other governments to resist US pres-
sure for automatic application of the UN Charter provision
depriving a member in financial arrears of its vote.
SOVIET CIVIL DEFENSE NOW EMPHASIZING RURAL PARTICIPATION 4
Planners have begun organizing civil defense detachments
in rural areas as the principal forces available for aid
to cities after an attack. Most such formations appear
to be still in the paper stage.
PEIPING BUYING MORE WESTERN GRAIN
Total grain imports in 1964 may ultimately reach last
year's level of 5.9 million tons worth some $350 million.
EAST GERMAN PARTY REACTS TO CULTURAL FERMENT
The regime, concerned about growing demands for intel-
lectual and cultural freedom and about the spread of
liberal ideas from East Germany's Communist neighbors,
will attempt to introduce tighter controls at a con-
ference of hand-picked intellectuals this week.
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Ift. SECRET IRWIF
THE LAOTIAN COUP
Leaders of the 19 April military coup in Vientiane have
apparently reached an accommodation with other military
leaders,and acknowledge Souvanna Phouma as premier.
VIET CONG MAINTAIN PRESSURE IN SOUTH VIETNAM
Saigon's reaction to the latest attacks was prompt but
costly. Pacification planning and clear-and-hold op-
erations are lagging.
LIMITED COMMUNIST ARMS AID FOR CAMBODIA
Defense Minister Lon Nol's recent visits to Moscow and
Peiping failed to elicit any offer by either Communist
power to assume the exclusive military aid role former-
ly played by the US in Cambodia.
SOUTH KOREAN POLITICAL STRAINS INTENSIFY
Student agitation against normalizing relations with
Japan has aggravated the factionalism within President
Pak's government and party.
Page
7
AREA NOTES
On Iran and Syria
NO EASING OF CYPRUS PROBLEM IN SIGHT
Intermittent clashes continue, and the UN mediator has
made no progress toward resolving the political issues.
PREMIER ADOULA'S PROBLEMS IN THE CONGO
Government forces are still trying to put down a new
outbreak of tribal unrest in the eastern Congo, and
the premier is in a political wrangle over procedures
for adopting a permanent constitution.
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'r SECRET w
ASIA-AFRICA (continued)
EEC DECISIONS ON ECONOMIC AND AGRICULTURAL POLICIES
The EEC Council's recent endorsement of proposals from
the supranational Commission for coordinating certain
economic and financial policies of the Six marks the
entry of community institutions into fields heretofore
almost exclusively the concern of national governments.
CLOSER PORTUGUESE TIES WITH FRANCE AND WEST GERMANY
Lisbon's interest in cultivating French and German good
will reflects both its irritation with the US attitude
toward its policy in Africa and its desire to find new
sources of military equipment.
WESTERN HEMISPHERE
THE NEW BRAZILIAN GOVERNMENT
The new cabinet is composed mainly of competent, pro-
Western technicians of centrist-conservative orienta-
tion. Its program appears aimed above all at stabiliz-
ing the shaky Brazilian economy.
PRE-ELECTION SITUATION IN PANAMA
Arnulfo Arias, twice deposed from the presidency and
strongly opposed by the entrenched oligarchy, is widen-
ing his lead in the current presidential campaign. This
could spark violence before the 10 May elections.
ARGENTINE LABOR UNREST
Labor's complaints, reinforced by a three-stage agita-
tion campaign, center on measures to reduce unemployment
and living costs, but also include political demands of
the Peronists and Communists.
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WESTERN HEMISPHERE (continued)
HAITIAN DICTATOR'S DELUSIONS OF GRANDEUR
Duvalier's campaign to perpetuate himself in office is
gathering momentum. He is expected soon to declare him-
self president for life--against no effective opposition.
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%we SE C'RE I '
Moscow used the ceremonies
attending Khrushchev's 70th
birthday on 17 April to create
the impression that the great
majority of the world's Commu-
nist parties stand with the
USSR against the Chinese Com-
munists. A Pravda editorial
on 19 April alb a the many
congratulatory messages and the
presence of high-level party
delegations from all Eastern
Europe (except Albania) and
Mongolia as a "vivid demonstra-
tion" of unity and support for
Khrushchev's leadership.
Although Khrushchev held
private talks with delegation
leaders, there were no attempts
to represent these consultations
as having resulted in concerted
decisions on tactics for dealing
with the Chinese. Moreover, the
absence of special representa-
tives from Yugoslavia, Cuba,
and other important foreign
parties suggests a Soviet de-
cision not to inflate the oc-
casion into a major Communist
gathering.
In his speech at the award
ceremony on 17 April, Khru-
shchev limited himself to in-
direct attacks on the Chinese.
He appeared concerned to re-
assure foreign parties that
Moscow does not intend to force
an early showdown with Peiping.
He said, "We must not burn our
boats in our relations with
those with whom we are not at
the moment in full unity." He
added that he would hold the
door open for "rapprochement
and understanding," but warned
that this must not be achieved
"at the expense of ignoring
principles."
Khrushchev continued to
avoid any reference to a world
Communist conference. The So-
viet ambassador in Budapest re-
cently attributed this silence
to "differences of opinion
among socialist countries on
the wisdom of such a meeting."
The most noteworthy do-
mestic aspect of the birthday
observances was the careful
effort to keep adulation of
Khrushchev within bounds so
as to provide a sharp contrast
with the slavish sycophancy
of Stalin on his 70th anni-
versary.
Khrushchev repeatedly
emphasized that the honors ac-
corded him were not for per-
sonal achievements and,
in his brief speech at the
award ceremony, made four ref-
erences to his role as a "member
of the working collective."
He was careful to recall the
measures to overcome the
Stalinist "personality cult"
and to restore "Leninist
principles" in party affairs,
pointedly noting that "this
has been done without the in-
terference of the surgeon."
A biographical sketch stressed
that Khrushchev has always
"followed the policies collec-
tively worked out" by the cen-
tral committee, the presidium,
and top government bodies.
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-4010, SECRET
EDITING OF KHRUSHCHEV'S SPEECHES
The texts of Khrushchev's
speeches published in the So-
viet press often differ consider-
ably from his actual remarks.
This was most recently demon-
strated in the changes he or-
dered in speeches he made dur-
ing his visit to Hungary and
following his return to Moscow.
The Hungarian speeches were
not broadcast live, and most
were heavily edited before pub-
lication. Such editing is cus-
tomary, and is designed prima-
rily to tighten Khrushchev's
rambling off-the-cuff style and
to put his homespun formulations
into standard Soviet jargon.
Other changes are sometimes
made for policy reasons. While
Khrushchev attacked the Chinese
Communists in his early addresses
in Hungary, his remarks at that
time were relatively restrained
and were not published in the
Soviet press. However, after
Moscow's counteroffensive against
Peiping began--with the publica-
tion on 3 April of Suslov's
speech at the February party
plenum--Khrushchev pulled all
the stops. Virtually discard-
ing his prepared texts, he heaped
invective on Peiping's leaders
and praised recent statements
by US leaders. He repeated the
performance at the Moscow recep-
tion for Gomulka on 15 April.
The official texts in these in-
stances contained very few al-
terations.
The Communist World
Khrushchev's habitual di-
gressions can usually be identi-
fied by comparing the official
and unofficial texts. Unoffi-
cial versions are obtained only
when Khrushchev is broadcast
live or when he is traveling
abroad and foreign newsmen are
present. Furthermore, he usu-
ally follows the prepared text
rather closely when addressing
his home audience on major pol-
icy issues, making it difficult
to determine whether the stereo-
typed phraseology was concocted
by his writers or by Khrushchev
himself.
Although most of Khrushchev's
speeches are probably ghosted,
there is no evidence that he
employs a permanent staff of
writers. The writing assign-
ment for each speech is likely
to be made on the basis of sub-
ject matter. Andrey Shevchenko,
his adviser on agricultural af-
fairs,may draft speeches in this
field.
The Hungarian speeches were
probably prepared by Pravda boss
Satyukov and party secretary
Andropov, both of whom accom-
panied Khrushchev. However, the
Communist lexicon is so filled
with bureaucratic verbiage and
so little information is avail-
able on the individual styles of
the writers that it is virtually
impossible to determine the au-
thorship of specific speeches .
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`.~
SECRET The Communist World
The USSR has adamantly re-
fused to pay its share of the
cost of UN peace-keeping opera-
tions in the Middle East and
the Congo. It believes an in-
flexible positon on this issue
will encourage other UN members
to resist US pressure for man-
datory and automatic application
of the provision in Article 19
of the UN Charter which deprives
a member of its vote in the Gen-
eral Assembly if its financial
arrears exceed its dues for two
preceding years.
The USSR, however, insists
that it has paid its "regular
dues," and Ambassador Fedorenko
recently protested a UN finan-
cial statement which listed the
USSR in arrears for the regular
budget. Soviet leaders probably
believe they can frustrate auto-
matic application of Article 19
by provoking a full-scale debate
in the General Assembly next
fall on the whole matter of the
UN budget.
The USSR's peace-keeping
debt is for operations author-
ized by the General Assembly
in accordance with the 1950
"Uniting for Peace Resolution"
empowering it to act when the
Security Council is hamstrung
by the veto. Moscow justifies
its refusal to pay on the ground
that this resolution is illegal
because it was not passed as a
Charter amendment.
These views have been re-
peatedly stressed by Fedorenko
and were set forth in a Soviet
Government statement of 21 March
which sought to give the impres-
sion that the USSR might leave
the UN if Article 19 were in-
voked against it. Moscow has
been quick to point out that
application of Article 19 re-
quires a two-thirds vote in the
Assembly and that more than a
third of the other members are
also in arrears to some extent.
Among the delinquents is
France, which will be subject
to legal sanctions in 1965 if
it continues to refuse to pay
its share of the Congo operation.
Moscow may be calculating that
French opposition to the US po-
sition, along with that of in-
fluential African countries,
will be sufficient to persuade
the US to adopt a formula more
acceptable to the USSR. How-
ever, there has been some indi-
cation that France now may re-
verse its position and pay up.
Moscow's tough public
stance on the peace-keeping is-
sue appears to be aimed also at
inducing the US to be more forth-
coming in private overtures to
the USSR for a settlement of the
problem. Moscow has not yet re-
sponded to the 6 March joint
US-UK proposal which includes
the creation of a UN peace-keep-
ing finance committee in the
General Assembly weighted in
favor of the major powers. Al-
though the USSR has made clear
in recent private discussions
that it will remain opposed to
any suggestion that does not
uphold the Security Council's
predominant role in peace-keeping
efforts, it has not entirely
ruled out a compromise.
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SECRET
Soviet planners have begun
organizing civil defense forma-
tions in rural areas.
While the need to bring
rural areas into civil defense
preparations was mentioned as
early as 1958, not until 1962
did a major civil defense text
call for training rural reserve
detachments as the principal
forces available for aid to
cities after an attack. Service
in these units now is compulsory
for able-bodied adults.
The rural detachments are
to be under a local civil de-
fense headquarters. The detach-
ments appear to include a com-
mander, a deputy commander for
supply, radiation reconnaissance
personnel, and a variety of emer-
gency teams. Heavy equipment
utilized by the detachments in-
cludes tractors, bulldozers,
excavators, and a power crane.
Small items include gas masks,
protective clothing, hand tools,
radiation meters, stretchers
and medical supplies and iden-
tifying armbands.
A 1963 Soviet demonstration
exercise and a training film
indicate the way the units are
to function. Operations start
with a period of increased read-
iness when the rayon control
point is manned and the detach-
ment alerted. After the nearby
city is attacked, the detachment
(preceded by radiation monitor-
ing personnel) is to "march" to
the city. Subsequent operations
include reconnaissance, debris
clearance, and search and rescue
operations. Casualties are
evacuated to an initial medical
processing point. After com-
pletion of the mission, person-
nel, vehicles, equipment, and
clothing are decontaminated.
It appears
that many rura civ1 defense
detachments may be organized
only on paper, and that command
and unit training should be in-
itiated
this year. However,
even a
moderate
degree of
opera-
tional
readiness
probably
will
not be
attained
for a year
or
more.
(SECRET)
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SECRET
Chinese Communist grain pur-
chases in the free world so far
this year total almost 4 million
tons and may ultimately reach last
year's level of 5.9 million tons
worth about $350 million. Peiping
recently contracted to buy more
than a half million tons of wheat
from Australia, bringing purchases
there this year to 1.8 million tons.
The recent visit to Peiping
by Canadian former Agricultural
Minister Hamilton, who negotiated
the first Sino-Canadian grain sale
in 1961, makes another Chinese
grain deal with Canada appear
likely. So far in 1964 Chinese
purchases of Canadian grain total
only about 850,000 tons.
Peiping has bought unusually
large amounts of grain in Latin
America this year--at least 300,-
000 tons of wheat from Mexico,and
800,000 tons of grain from Argen-
tina--and may purchase still more.
It may also pick up small. amounts
of grain later this year in Afri-
can countries and in Western
Europe.
24 Apr 64
SECRET
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These excerpts are from an interview with Havemann published on I I March 1964
the Hamburg Echo am Abend. Two days laver Havemann was dismissed from his job
at Humboldt University and expelled from the East German party (SED). Simultaneously,
however, hr was demonstratively elected a full member of the East German Academy
of Sciences
Question: Did you foresee that your lectures would lead to such
,iolenr reactions?
Answer: "Foresee" is too mild a term. I had the intention of pro-
'i'cing precisely such an effect. Whot has been possible fora long
time in other socialist countries should also prevail in the GDR. I am
+ us to see hot all aspects of the degeneration typical of the Stalin
period be suppressed by open criticism and calling them by their right
No social order should permit such abuses to prevail for any
nome. length of time without recognizing them as such. In order to achieve
This goal, it is essential to encourage the citizens of the GDR to take
port in this discussion.
Question: You think there is a difference between the political
.+ed intellectual life of the GDR and the other socialist countries?
Answer: Don't you? I would describe the difference as follows:
In the GDR most communise officials think as I do. In other socialist
,?:nrries, people say if out loud.
Answer: Certainly. We Germans always do things very thoroughly,
.c,d that includes mistakes in the building of socialism.
Question: J. von Schniteler and other SED officials argue that,
because of special conditions in divided Germany, some developments
,vr,ich o matter of course in other socialist countries are im-
possible in the n GDR.
Answer: I recognize such special conditions, but draw the opposite
nclusion from them. More freedom must be given to the citizens of
the GDR than is granted inhabitants of Western countries. Only on such
,, basis can socialism regain its effectiveness and become successful.
Question: Sindermonn (a member of the East German Politburo)
,:hams that you want to throw dialectical materialism overboard.
Answer: There is no truth in that. I are not disenchanted with
the socialist idea but, as a convinced advocate, I demand the elim-
n:ation of Stalinism and dogmatism in all its manifestations. The
goal I advocate is a social order in which free socialism has been
n=olized. Se to dialectical materialism, I consider it the most ad-
vanced expression of philosophy.
Question: Some moments ago, we talked of the other countries
in the socialist camp. How close are your contacts there?
Answer: I have particularly close contacts with my colleagues
h: the Soviet Union. One of them, the philosopher Kedrov, is, so
to .speak, responsible with me for my series of lectures. I submitted
my views on various problems to him, and we established complete
Question: Is this also true with regard to the themes dealt with
.n your lectures?
Answer: Precisely. That gave me the green light to begin
Ihu series.
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The East German party lead-
ership, at a national conference
in Bitterfeld beginning on 24
April, will introduce a program
aimed at curbing growing demands
for intellectual and cultural
freedom. Even though the hand-
picked intellectuals at the con-
ference probably will approve
the program, the regime will
find it difficult to enforce
controls calling for a "national
art based on socialist realism,"
a line similar to that promul-
gated at the first Bitterfeld
conference in 1959.
The leadership is greatly
concerned over recent incidents
growing out of the objections
of many East German party intel-
lectuals to complete political
domination of cultural life.
It is particularly concerned
about the outspoken remarks in
a "treasonous" interview granted
to a West German newspaper by
a lifelong Communist scientist,
Robert Havemann (see excerpts
on facing page). Havemann's
boldness, in turn, undoubtedly
led participants in a congress
of the Union of Creative Artists
to criticize regime repressions
openly, despite repeated offi-
cial condemnations of his ideas.
East German press accounts sug-
gest that the concept of freedom,
contrasted with the "climate
of fear," has excited discus-
sions in many cultural centers
in the country.
Students from universities
in East Berlin, Potsdam, Griefs-
wald, and Halle have in recent
weeks publicly objected to re-
strictive political domination
of their curriculums and their
isolation from Western thought.
The regime is also con-
cerned about the spread of lib-
eral ideas from its Communist
neighbors. A politburo report
was published in February charg-
ing Czechoslovak party intel-
lectuals with spreading "revi-
sionist" theories in East Ger-
many. Hard-line party cultural
spokesman Alfred Kurella now
has publicly charged that Marx-
ism is being misinterpreted by
Communist writers in Poland,
Hungary, France, and Austria.
While the top party lead-
ership is increasingly concerned
over these problems, there are
indications that some confusion
and laxity at lower levels have
been partly responsible for
their appearance. Much of this
can be attributed to East Ger-
many's continuing dilemma: how
to improve the regime's "image"
and avoid isolation abroad,
while maintaining necessary
controls at home.
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THE LAOTIAN COUP
The situation in Laos in
the wake of the 19 April coup
remains confused, as the vari-
ous power elements maneuver
toward a resolution of the
government crisis. Vientiane
is outwardly calm, but this
appearance is susceptible to
sudden change under the
strained circumstances.
The coup committee, which
has been attempting to win the
support of key military and
political figures, apparently
has reached some sort of accom-
modation with the majority of
Laotian military leaders. Fol-
lowing a meeting in Vientiane
on 23 April between the coup
leaders--Generals Kouprasith
and Siho--and most of the
army's other general officers,
the revolutionary committee
announced that it would recog-
nize the continued existence
of the government of national
unity headeq by neutralist
Souvanna Phouma. The communi-
qud indicated, however, that
personnel changes would be re-
quired within the government
and referred to a "Permanent
Committee for National Defense"
which would "follow and closely
oversee the execution of gov-
ernmental tasks."
This move appears to have
the support of the leader of
Laos' rightist faction, General
Phoumi, who commented that his
generals apparently were exer-
SECRET
cising a moderating influence
on the army "hotheads." Phoumi
also indicated that the present
equilibrium among the three
factions would be maintained.
This is far from certain, how-
ever. A common bond between
the coup group and other army
leaders is dislike of the 1962
Geneva agreements on Laos, which
they claim work only to the ad-
vantage of the Communist Pathet
Lao.
undermine Souvanna's authority.
The Pathet Lao, apparently
waiting to see how the chips
fall in the current crisis,
have not attempted to exploit
existing divisions within the
anti-Communist ranks. Although
there are reports that resupply
convoys are continuing to move
into the Plaine des Jarres area
from North Vietnam, no major
actions have been initiated.
Outside Laos, Communist
reaction to the coup has been
relatively restrained, with
propaganda themes centering on
the need for the preservation
of the Souvanna coalition and
expressions of continued sup-
port for the Geneva agree-
ments. Recent Chinese propaganda
has called for a resumption of
tripartite talks among the fac-
tion leaders "as soon as possi-
ble." The Communists will
probably oppose strongly any
compromise solution which might
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SECRET
Communist military activ-
ity in South Vietnam last week
reached the highest level since
mid-February, shortly after the
Khanh coup, and is continuing
at an intense rate. Following
a five-day battle in the delta,
at least three other major ac-
tions occurred. The Viet Cong
staged two well-coordinated
attacks--apparently planned as
company-strength operations--
on government outposts in two
delta provinces. On 21 April,
they overran and destroyed a
Self-Defense Corps post in hard-
pressed Kien Hoa Province, south
of Saigon.
Government reaction to the
attacks was unusually prompt,
but it was also costly. Pri-
marily as a result of the pro-
longed clash in the delta, gov-
ernment casualties for 11-18
April numbered 1005--the highest
weekly total since the war be-
gan. Viet Cong losses of 713
killed or captured were only
slightly higher than the aver-
age for the past few weeks.
The government's clear-
and-hold operations in the
northern provinces appear to
be slowly gaining momentum, but
security conditions continue
to deteriorate in many parts of
this region. There has been
little improvement in clear-
and-hold efforts in the prov-
inces near Saigon and in the
delta. Inadequate numbers of
troops is the most commonly
cited reason for the lack of
progress, but it appears that
the absence of guidance from
local officials and of a clear
definition of authority for
civilian and military leaders
is also hampering efforts in
a number of provinces.
Pacification planning
remains at the formulation
stage in most areas. Corps-
level plans have been approved
in principle, but the plans of
at least two corps seem overly
ambitious and beyond present
capabilities, according to US
advisers. Province-level plans
are still being worked out.
The government has created
a new rural development commit-
tee, chaired by the two civilian
deputy premiers, subordinate to
the Central Pacification Commit-
tee, but its function is not
clearly delineated. There is
some danger that the growing
body of overlapping committees
and directorates will further
strain the uneasy alliance be-
tween military leaders and civil-
ian cabinet members.
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V"01111 SE UH.&I,
LIMITED COMMUNIST ARMS AID FOR CAMBODIA
Communist arms aid to Cam-
bodia will expand only moderately
as a result of Defense Minister
Lon Nol's recent swing through
Communist China and the USSR.
Both Moscow and Peiping are de-
liberately avoiding the exclu-
sive military aid role formerly
played by the United States in
Cambodia. Recent arrangements
suggest Cambodia's military es-
tablishment will be maintained
for some time by a hodgepodge
of Soviet, Chinese, and Czech,
as well as French and Yugoslav,
support.
The Chinese Communists en-
tered the military aid field in
Cambodia early this year by sup-
plying some 100 trucks and in-
fantry weapons for three bat-
talions. They may have offered
further token support during
Lon Nol's visit, but have con-
fined their public commitment
to vague gestures of solidarity.
In Moscow, aid discussions
with Lon Nol were confined to for-
malizing the expansion of a 1963
agreement under which the Soviets
have backed Cambodia's efforts to
achieve some air defense capabil-
ity. Four MIG fighters, two dozen
antiaircraft guns, and a few ra-
dars were delivered last year
Czechoslovakia also has re-
cently responded to Cambodia's
military aid requests, but prob-
ably with no more than a gift
of small arms.
SOUTH KOREAN POLITICAL STRAINS INTENSIFY
Recent student demonstra-
tions in South Korea have aggra-
vated the strains within Presi-
dent Pak Chong-hui's government
and his Democratic-Republican
Party (DRP).
Opponents of party strong-
man Kim Chong-pil, encouraged
by student attacks on him, are
making a concerted drive to
force him from power. They
contend that Kim's ouster would
deprive the opposition parties
of their biggest issue and would
quiet the students.
In an attempt to appease
Kim's critics, Pak has promised
DRP legislators a greater voice
in party affairs at the expense
of the secretariat controlled
by Kim. Pak recently rejected
demands by Kim's group for an
immediate cabinet shakeup.
SECRET
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See Inset A 1
MALDIVE ISLANDS
The Maldive Islands (population 90,000) have been a
British-protected state since 1887 under an elective
Sultan, with London responsible for defense and
international relations.
? Principal airfield o Other airfield Reef
Undersea contours of 250 It, and 5000 ft. are shown
~o to Go Go_ loo 120
err.rure mires
(Aden
'. , 1 / (tom 9
MALWVE '`Colombo
0__ -- SI Q p e
Gan
980,x-^seyoneue,
~~\ cos
OCEAN \ 91.
NOTE: Distances are in nautical miles and are approximate PNOTE Distances ore in miles and ore approximate Pert j
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SECRET
Such gestures, however, the concept of unification as
mean little so long as the an economic panacea. South
basic ties between Kim and Pak Korean security officials are
remain unshaken. Kim's enemies concerned that local leftists
appear to recognize that to get
rid of him, they must convince
Pak that his own position is
jeopardized by these ties. For-
eign Minister Chong Il-kwon,
one of the country's most astute
soldier-politicians, has stated
that he believes a showdown will
come within the next six weeks.
Meanwhile, student agita-
tion against negotiations for
normalizing relations with
Japan has been focusing to an
increasing extent on the govern-
ment's failure to improve eco-
nomic conditions. Influenced
by North Korean claims of eco-
nomic progress, some students
are showing growing interest in
are convincing the students that
reunification is the only solu-
tion because Japanese indemnity
payments will not last long and
US aid is declining.
Following a stern warning by
Home Minister Om Min-yong, students
refrained from demonstrating on
22 April--for the first time in
five days. Pak has indicated that
he is prepared to resort to martial
law if the students return to the
streets. He probably reasons that
firm action against the students
now will free his hands to deal
more effectively with the worsen-
ing situation in the government
camp.
Rising anti-British senti-
ment among the inhabitants of
the Maldive Islands, a British
protectorate in the Indian
Ocean, may jeopardize the UK's
military air route to the Far
East. Hostile demonstrations
have already been mounted
against Hulele airstrip. This
and the one on Gan are the only
British-controlled airfields
between Aden and Malaya.
The Maldivian prime minis-
ter has ordered the British rep-
resentative on Hulele to leave.
He indicated that no direct dis-
cussions with London will be
possible until Maldivian griev-
ances are settled and the is-
lands are given complete in-
dependence.
Other British officials
have been threatened with vio-
lence if they attempt to repair
the damage to the Hulele airstrip,
or fail to return to the islands
from the Seychelles a rebel
leader who participated in a re-
volt against the Maldivian Gov-
ernment five years ago. The
British believe these demands
may be a prelude to abrogation
of a 1960 agreement establishing
certain defense facilities and a
radio relay station in the Mal-
dives.
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SECRET
The British high commis-
sioner in Ceylon attributes anti-
British agitation to "third"
country interference. Indeed,
an American Embassy official
there suggests the possibility
that Indonesia, Communist China,
or the United Arab Republic may
be aiding and abetting the Mal-
divian Government in its efforts
to oust the British.
The Maldivian representa-
tive in Colombo has reportedly
Iran is continuing to nor-
malize its relations with the
Soviet Union. A civil air
agreement granting mutual air
and landing rights for regularly
scheduled aircraft, proposed by
Moscow last November, probably
will be signed shortly. Within
the past year agreements have
also been reached for a long-term
Syria: Overt opposition
to Syria 's Baath military regime
is increasing. Last week's vio-
lent disturbances in Hama--which
security forces put down only
with difficulty--have encouraged
opposition elements in other
Syrian cities. Merchants in
Damascus closed their shops on
19 April in a gesture of defiance
against the regime's socialist
measures, and similar moves have
occurred in Homs and Aleppo.
There have also been antigov-
ernment incidents in Damascus
schools.
The regime is generally
unpopular, and further disturb-
ances are virtually certain.
The bulk of the army is probably
briefed certain Afro-Asian
embassies on the situation.
He may, in fact, be solicit-
ing their aid in bringing the
Maldivian grievances before
the UN General Assembly's spe-
cial committee on colonial-
ism, a prospect to which the
British are resigned despite
their continued hopes of keep-
ing the dispute in a bilat-
eral framework.
Soviet credit to Iran and for
transit of commercial traffic
through each country. Soviet
propaganda against Iran has
moderated somewhat, but Moscow
continues to attack Iran's mem-
bership in CENTO and its bi-
lateral defense treaty with
the United States.
now disaffected and would of-
fer little real resistance to
a well-organized move against
the top leaders.
Syria's neighbors have
taken advantage of the con-
fused situation. Radio Baghdad
has carried inflammatory broad-
casts exaggerating the extent
of the disorder in Syria. Pro-
Egyptian newspapers in Beirut
printed florid accounts of the
shelling of mosques and vast
numbers of casualties. Syrian
Prime Minister Hafiz has re-
taliated by accusing Baghdad
and Cairo of instigatingthe
Hama disturbances.
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BULGARIA -.
'TALY ~, GREECE -
Ktima
{Paphos
- zoo
sr rES
A R
EGYPT )
1 Kormakit~ Temblos , yrenia 8oghaz
INICOSIA
Kokkina
Lefka Fama usta
Rizokatpa?so
CYPRUS
J 10 20
STATUTE MILES
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SECRET
The political aspects of
the Cyprus problem remain far
from solution, while intermit-
tent fighting continues. Greek-
Turkish relations have deteri-
orated rapidly during the past
week, and anti-Americanism ap-
pears to be spreading in Turkey.
A two-hour gun battle in
the eastern port city of Fama-
gusta on Wednesday was the most
serious clash in recent days.
Tension also remains high in
Nicosia, in the Kyrenia area,
and around Kokkina.in the north-
west. The Turkish Cypriots re-
main in control of the heights
above Kyrenia, and the Turkish
regiment still dominates the
Nicosia-Kyrenia road.
Efforts by UN Commander
Gyani to demilitarize a zone
of increasing tension in Nicosia
collapsed Wednesday when Turkish
Cypriot leaders declared that
earlier oral agreements concern-
ing the area were not being
honored. The plan called for
the removal of all forces and
fortifications from a sector
where there has been extensive
fighting. This problem report-
edly has been referred to Secre-
tary General Thant.
for talks with Greek officials.
He will continue on to London
and then to Paris, where he will
report to U Thant in late April
or early May. After recent talks
with leaders in Nicosia and An-
kara, however, Tuomioja has con-
fessed that he sees "no light at
the end of the tunnel." The
Turks insist that federation-or
partition is the only acceptable
solution; the Greek Cypriots are
just as adamant in insisting on
a unified government with the
right of self-determination--
which would allow for union with
Greece.
by such moves as deporting two
members of the Greek Orthodox
patriarchate. The Turks may
also attempt some kind of ac-
tion against Greek islands near
The US Consulate General
in Istanbul reports that the
dominant anti-Greek mood there
contains a strong undercurrent
of anti-Americanism. Deeply
embittered by their frustra-
tion and disillusionment over
Cyprus, the Turks are becoming
increasingly critical of the
United States for "letting
them down." They regard Greece
as the ultimate source of their
trouble, however, and are con-
tinuing to strike back at Greece
UN Mediator Tuomioja plans
to go to Athens this weekend
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EROON-
REPUBLIC
OF THE
CONGO
-??- International boundary
National capital
Province capital
IT! I?I
out
dORD
K?vu
UGANDA
i !u Kivu * ?:1.J j
N.
JRU 1 Swedish Mission?lBvnuNi
~aa< MANIEt A "',CENTRACH ~p 4[4 X
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SECRET Asia-Africa
Congolese Army forces are
trying to put down a disturb-
ance that broke out last week
in Bukavu, in the extreme east-
ern part of the country, while
in Leopoldville, Premier Adoula
faces a new controversy concern-
ing the adoption of a permanent
constitution.
Order has been restored
for the time being in Bukavu,
where a riot on 16 April re-
sulted in over 50 deaths. Some
35 miles to the south, troops
went to the rescue of a Swedish
mission surrounded on the same
day by hostile youth groups.
The mission was again attacked
on 21 April, and four soldiers
were seized.
The unrest, endemic to
this area since independence
in 1960, arises mainly from
tribal rivalries for power.
The extremist exile organiza-
tion, the Committee of National
Liberation (CNL), has recently
been reported trying to exacer-
bate these troubles from a post
in neighboring Burundi, so far
only by means of inflammatory
propaganda pamphlets.
fected has been restored to
central government control.
The UN still plans to with-
draw all its troops from the
Congo by the first week in
June, except for a 400-man Ni-
gerian police detachment.
Meanwhile differences have
arisen between Adoula and the
150-member commission which has
just completed drafting the
long-awaited constitution. The
commission insists that the
document be submitted directly
to a national referendum within
a month, and that an interim
government then be installed
to prepare for and hold parlia-
mentary elections. Adoula has
reserved the right to make
changes in the draft, however,
and the commission threatens
to campaign against the consti-
tution if it is amended in any
way.
Adoula may try to undercut
the commission by bringing some
of its members into his govern-
ment.
The army also has appar-
ently contained Pierre Mulele's
rebellion in Kwilu Province,
east of Leopoldville, although
disturbances there continue,
and little of the territory af-
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SECRET
The EEC Council of Minis- eral Commission proposals first
ters at its mid-April session put forward in July 1963. A
adopted precedent-setting meas-
ures designed to coordinate the
economic and financial policies
of the six member states and to
stabilize the business cycle on
a community basis. Its endorse-
ment of proposals drafted by
the EEC's supranational commis-
sion marks the entry of commu-
nity institutions into fields
which, although covered by the
EEC treaty, have heretofore
been almost exclusively the con-
cern of the national governments.
The 14-point program to
counteract inflation is geared
primarily to stabilize prices
and control production costs
by restraining demand, increas-
ing the effects of competition,
and liberalizing import policies.
Only relatively minor substantive
changes were made by the minis-
ters in the Commission's pro-
posals, indicating widespread
agreement on the seriousness of
the current inflationary trends.
Although the Council did not
utilize its treaty powers to
issue the program as a "direc-
tive," the unanimous approval
it received increases pressure
on member states to conform with
its provisions. Moreover, the
Commission is authorized to pro-
pose further measures in the
event the situation worsens.
Looking toward longer
range community cooperation,
the Council also approved sev-
committee under the Commission's
supervision has been authorized
to consult with the governments
of the Six and attempt to con-
cert their economic policies.
The budgetary policies of the
Six will similarly be subject
to the scrutiny of a committee
which will examine the effects
of national budgets on the EEC
as a whole. A Committee of Cen-
tral Bankers has also been es-
tablished to formalize consulta-
tions among the monetary insti-
tutions of the Six, and the gov-
ernments are requested to con-
sult among themselves before
altering exchange rates or their
international monetary policies.
This progress was not
matched, however in the area of
agricultural policy, where the
stalemate over grain prices con-
tinues. The West Germans re-
mained intransigent in their op-
position to any lowering of
their cereal prices--which uni-
ficiation of present EEC grain-
price levels would require. At
least one of the Germans' "prior
conditions" for their agreement
would modify the EEC treaty--in
this case by excluding grain
prices from the majority voting
rule effective on most questions
after 1 January 1966. Such an
exception might set a precedent
which could lead to a general
weakening of the community's in-
stitutional development.
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lqmw
SECRET
Some observers neverthe-
less believe that the German
presentation does not exclude
the possibility of a negotiated
solution later this year. The
issue will be debated further
at a meeting of agricultural
ministers on 28 and 29 April
and at a Council session on 8
and 9 Ma .
CLOSER PORTUGUESE TIES WITH FRANCE AND WEST GERMANY
Portugal in recent months
has been working to develop
closer relations with France
and West Germany. Lisbon seems
to be particularly interested
in acquiring military equipment
from these countries for use in
its colonial holdings in Africa.
been behind Lisbon's move ear-
lier this month permitting
France to establish a missile
tracking station in the Azores.
A Portuguese desire to cultivate
French good will was also im-
plicit in Foreign Minister
Franco Nogueira's recent state-
ment that there now is a need to
re-evaluate NATO.
Portuguese interest in mil-
itary materiel for Africa is
more explicit in Lisbon's ef-
forts to collaborate with West
Germany. Implementation of
last October's agreement giving
the Germans military training
and logistics facilities in
Protugal has moved forward. A
base for the training of jet
pilots and a hospital are to
be completea in 1965 at Beja
in southern Portugal. Existing
facilities for the maintenance
of German aircraft now are to
be extended, and a Portuguese
contract to manufacture muni-
tions for Germany has been
broadened. Bonn is providing
long-term, low-interest credits
to finance these projects.
In connection with the orig-
inal deal, the Portuguese pur-
chased a number of Harvard
(limited combat) and Dornier-
27 (liaison) aircraft--presumably
for use in Africa.
Portugal's interest in
closer connections with Paris
and Bonn reflects also an in-
creasing irritation with the
US attitude toward its colonial
policy. Lisbon has been partic-
uarly annoyed at measures to
prevent the deployment of mili-
tary equipment of US origin to
Africa.
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SECRET
Western Hemisphere
Brazil's new President,
Humberto Castello Branco, has
selected his cabinet and has
turned to the business of formu-
lating firm political and eco-
nomic policies for his adminis-
tration. At first glance, the
new government appears deter-
mined, above all else, to pur-
sue a program aimed at stabiliz-
ing the shaky Brazilian economy.
Ambassador Gordon's over-
all impression of Castello Branco
is extremely favorable. In their
initial conversation, which the
ambassador described as "a most
auspicious beginning" the Presi-
dent left no doubt that he was
a man who knew where he was go-
ing. Among other things, he dis-
played a warm attitude toward
the US and the need for close co-
operation in the Alliance for
Progress.
Elsewhere, Castello Branco
and other government leaders
have stressed the need for so-
cial and economic reforms, and
for effective public investment
planning. Implicit in this ap-
proach is the assumption that
substantial external financial
aid will be forthcoming.
Among the measures under
urgent consideration are tax re-
forms and plans to ~~^e the
huge federal payroll. A moderate
SECRET
24 Apr 64 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
land reform bill was approved by
Congress shortly after Goulart's
overthrow.
The new cabinet is composed
mainly of competent, pro-West-
ern technicians of centrist-con-
servative political orientation.
Most of the members have had
long experience in their respec-
tive fields. The minister of
justice, for example, is Milton
Campos, a highly regarded senator
with a distinguished legal back-
ground. Foreign Minister Leitao
da Cunha and Finance Minister
Bulhoes, holdovers from the cabi-
net of interim President Mazzilli,
are both highly respected career
officials. Appointed to the new
and presumably vital post of
minister of planning is Roberto
Campos, a brilliant economist
who until recently had been am-
bassador to the US.
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SECRET
Western Hemisphere
Arnulfo Arias, twice deposed
from the Panamanian presidency,
is widening his lead in the
country's current presidential
campaign. This could spark vio-
lence before the 10 May elections.
Arias, described by Ambas-
sador Vaughn as an "egocentric
mystic who regards himself as
a man of destiny," is popular
among the poorer classes and
has become a symbol of the
widespread and growing popular
resentment against Panama's
entrenched oligarchy. The oli-
garchy, which is divided between
two presidential candidates, is
nearing desperation and is likely
to go to almost any length to de-
feat Arias.
There have already been
shooting incidents between fol-
lowers of Arias and those of
Marco Robles, the government
candidate backed by the larger
segment of the oligarchy. More
serious violence seems to be
in the offing. Indeed, US
Ambassador Vaughn reports that
he cannot discount the possi-
bility of a popular uprising
if the government uses its con-
trol of the election apparatus
and the security forces to pre-
vent an Arias victory.
The ambassador also be-
lieves the erratic and unpre-
dictable Arias would run a
one-man, badly managed admin-
istration. Robles' victory,
on the other hand, would mean
a prolongation in power of the
same elements who have ruled
Panama since independence.
An Italian trade promoter
with Communist business and polit-
ical connections has proposed
to the Chiari government that
the Chinese Communists be per-
a free port in Panama. Chiari's
response is not known, but he
has taken this proposal under con-
sideration as well as a companion
offer by the Italian to finance
a Panamanian mission to explore
trade possibilities in Asia in-
cluding mainland China.
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Western Hemisphere
ARGENTINE LABOR UNREST
The picture of political
tranquility in Argentina is
deceptive. Deep dissatisfaction
within the labor movement, fanned
by extremists, could lead to a
new round of open unrest.
In response to rank-and-
file complaints over severe un-
employment and high living costs
the General Confederation of
Labor (CGT) in mid-January
adopted a three-stage agitation
campaign to force the government
to take action to counter these
persistent problems of the past
several years. The final stage
of this campaign calls for labor
to occupy all factories and busi-
nesses for 24 hours ii ine gov-
ernment does not meet the CGT
demands.
These center on reactivat-
ing the economy, but also in-
clude political demands which
would in effect legalize the
Communist Party and permit for-
mation of a new party headed by
Juan Peron. This would counter
the trend toward "Peronism with-
out Peron" which some of the
ex-dictator's own disciples as
well as the government are try-
ing to encourage. The Peronist
movement remains badly split.
Moderate labor leaders
are uneasy over this injection
of politics into CGT activities.
They are also worried that the
threat to occupy plants and
factories, although presently
in "suspension," will eventually
be used by extremists to pro-
voke violence.
The independents who hold
half the CGT's executive posi-
tions suspect that some Peron-
ist leaders may be seeking spe-
cial political advantages in
their pressure tactics. The
Peronist bloc, for example,
recently pushed through a CGT
resolution which "rejected the
social policy imposed by the
government." The independents
say this was a Peronist maneu-
ver intended to rupture current
negotiations with the govern-
ment, and they are threatening
to walk out to form a separate
confederation. In the past,
such threats have had a chasten-
ing effect on CGT pronouncements,
since the bulk of Argentina
labor will unite only in support
of action aimed at ameliorating
economic grievances.
Although badly divided
among themselves, Peronist?
extremists will probably not
be deterred from revolutionary
plotting. Argentine authorities
have reason to believe that
some of these Peronists may
have links with the small groups
of Communist guerrillas recently
discovered in Salta and
Cordoba provinces.
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1JL' .4.L .L' 1
Western Hemisphere
HAITIAN DICTATOR'S DELUSIONS OF GRANDEUR
Haitian dictator Francois
Duvalier is expected soon to
issue an official statement de-
claring himself president for
life. Press releases of 2 April
reporting that he had already
done so proved to be premature,
but his campaign to perpetuate
himself in office has been ga-
thering momentum for some weeks.
There has been no visible op-
position and
the campaign is headed
for sort of climax before
10 May.
Haitian people are grumbling
The politically apathetic
and discontented, but they are
disunited and thoroughly cowed
by the secret police. The exiles
who "invaded" Haiti last summer
from the Dominican Republic are
still a fragmented, ineffective
force.
Duvalier has recently been
calling himself "Chief of the
Revolution" rather than president.
Also, in a speech before the leg-
islature on 16 April, Jean Julme,
president of that body, stated
that the "people have taken the
firm decision that Duvalier be
president for life." "Revolu-
tions," he added, "make their
own laws; the will of the ma-
jority is the supreme law."
Allusions to Duvalier's dei-
fication continue to appear in
the local press.
This tableau, which appeared twice in recent issues
of the Port-au-Prince Oedipe, reads: "People,
believe in him. I chose him. Peace in Haiti to
men of good will. "
24 Apr 64
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CF('R F. T
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