REGIONAL STRAINS THREATEN NIGERIAN FEDERATION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A004400060002-8
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
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• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Sequence Number: 2
• Content Type: REPORT

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Nwor v April 1964
OCI No. 0325/64A
Copy No. ; 1
SPECIAL REPORT
REGIONAL STRAINS THREATEIT NIGERIAN FEDERATION
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
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IA s ~ CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECT
tEFEN E OF THE UNITED STATES
OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS,
ONS 793 AND 794, THE TR,
cument k%JST NOT BE RELEASED TO FOREIGN
AFNT` , If marked with specific dissemination
in accordance with the provisions of DCID 1/7,
tment mu .t be handled within the framework of
an so moosed.
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3 April 1964
Three and a half years after independence, the
Federal Republic of Nigeria--Africa's most populous
country and the kingpin among the continent's mod-
erate states--appears headed for difficult times.
The release in February of the alleged results of
a politically important census has inflamed tradi-
tional antagonism between the conservative north-
ern Muslims, who are dominant in the central gov-
ernment, and the more Westernized non-Muslim south-
erners who are becoming increasingly impatient to
take control of the federal machinery. Parliamen-
tary elections are due later this year, and Nige-
ria's regionally based parties are already caught
up in intense maneuvering. The political tensions
are sharpened by popular dissatisfaction over the
slow progress of the government's economic develop-
ment program and over corruption among government
officials. Such social and economic ills seem
likely to induce growing numbers of Nigeria's "have-
not" masses to switth allegiance from traditional
parties to more radical leaders. Although integra-
tive and ameliorative forces are at work, the via-
bility of the Nigerian federation will be severely
tested in the coming months.
The Federal System
Nigeria's federal system
ensures extensive "states'
rights" to its four regions,
thereby providing the mutually
antagonistic major ethnic groups
some basic assurance against
"alien" control. The system
was laboriously fashioned under
British tutelege in the years
between World War II and 1960,
when Nigeria became an inde-
pendent member of the Common-
wealth.
This type of government
grew in part out of the British
colonial policy of "indirect
rule," which left largely un-
disturbed the network of highly
organized Muslim principalities
that London's early proconsuls
found in northern Nigeria. The
feudal hierarchy of militantly
Muslim emirs was allowed to
preserve its wide authority
there, and Christian mission-
aries who brought Western educa-
tion to other parts of Nigeria
were generally not permitted
in the "Holy North." As a re-
sult, the northern region fell
far behind the south in terms
of contact with the outside
world in general and with West-
ern political doctrines in par-
ticular.
Sensing this, the northern'
rulers, although convinced that
their religion and their Fulani-
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Hausa tribal traditions were
culturally superior, became
wary of close political connec-
tions with the Western-educated
and more nationalist-minded
southerners. By the early
1950s, as Britain became anx-
ious to accelerate Nigeria's
evolution to self-rule, fear
of possible southern domination
had increased, among most northern
leaders and further strengthened
their unity already assured by
common religion and tribal ori-
gins.
The southerners, on the
other hand, were by no means
united. All wanted independence,
but none was willing to take
second place to another. In
eastern Nigeria, the Ibo tribe
commanded the scene; in the
western region, the Yorubas
were predominant.
The British solution to
the problem was to allow the
development of separate, power-
ful regional governments, each
with its own parliamentary system
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and economic structure. In each
of Nigeria's three original re-
gions--a fourth was created last
year--a different one of the
country's three main tribal
groups ruled through its own
political party.
Federal institutions with
limited power were developed
simultaneously, but at a slower
pace. The key office of fed-
eral prime minister, for exam-
ple, was not established until
1957. Prior to the final pre-
independence elections in 1959,
executive positions at the fed-
eral level were shared among
the three major parties in a
''national" government.
Current Alignments
Since 1959, the once appre-
hensive northerners have managed
to keep the upper hand because
of their larger population,
their greater unity, and the
rivalry among the southerners.
The federal executive is con-
trolled by a two-party coali-
tion in which the dominant
voice is that of the conserva-
tive Northern People's Congress
(NPC)--the political vehicle of
the Muslim rulers. Their party
won a large plurality of the
312 federal parliamentary seats
in 1959 and has since gained,
through desertions from other
parties, a small absolute majority.
PARTY
TRIBAL
LEADER
FEDERAL
STATUS
REGIONAL
STATUS
REMARKS
BASE
Northern People's
Fulani-Hausa
Ahmadu Bello,
Senior partner of
Ruling party in
Parochially oriented;
Congress (NPC)
Sardauna of
governing coalition,
Northern Region
little appeal outside
Sokoto
absolute majority in
Northern Region
Parliament
National Covention
Ibo
Michael Okpara
Junior partner of
Ruling party in
Nationally oriented;
of Nigerian Citizens
governing coalition,
Eastern and Mid-
appeal throughout three
(NCNC)
controls 26% of the
Western Regions;
southern regions
seats in Parliament.
opposition in
Western Region
Nigerian National
Yoruba
Samuel Akintola
Less than 10% of the
Ruling party in
Appears to lack strong
Democratic Party
seats in Parliament
Western Region
support among Yorubas;
(NNDP)
oriented toward alliance
with NPC.
Action Group (AG)
Yoruba
Obafemi Awolowo
Less than 10% of the
Opposition
Appears to have strong
(imprisoned); acting
seats in Parliament
in
support among Yorubas;
leader is D.S. Adeg-
Western Region
oriented toward alliance
benro
with NCNC.
Nigerian Elements
Fulani-Hausa
Aminu Kano
Less than 1%of seats
NEPU is formally allied
Progressive Union
and minority
in Parliament
NCNC; UMBC has
with
(NEPU)
tribes in North-
Small minority parties
had ties with AG. The two
ern Region
in opposition to NPC
minority parties formed the
United Middle
Minority tribes
Joseph Tarka
Less than 3/ of the
3%
in Northern Region
Nigerian Progressive Front
Belt Congress
in Northern
seats in Parliament
last December.
(UMBC)
Region
Socialist Workers
None
Olatunji Otegbeye
No representation
Formed in August 1963 by a
pro-Communist group known
and Farmers Party
as Socialist Core; appears to
of Nigeria (SWFPN)
have little strength at present
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The junior coalition partner
is the National Convention of
Nigerian Citizens (NCNC), in
which the nationalistic Ibo
from the southeast predominate.
The NCNC won the second largest
number of seats in 1959.
The head of the NPC and
Nigeria's most powerful indi-
vidual figure is Sir Ahmadu
Bello, the political leader of
the Muslim emirs. His title of
Sardauna of Sokoto also puts
him second only to the aged
Sultan of Sokoto among the north-
ern religious leaders. An
aristocrat who is disdainful
of "infidel" southern politicians,,
the Sardauna has chosen to con-
tinue as premier of the North-
ern Region and to leave the
post of federal prime minister
to his party deputy, Sir Abuba-
kar Tafawa Balewa. The latter
has risen from a relatively
humble background and. lacks an
independent political base, but
he has won national respect
because of his ability and integ-
rity.. Sir Abubakar has proved
himself particularly adept at
effecting the compromises be-
tween northerners and southerners
which permit Nigeria, in its
present shape, to exist.
In its own bailiwick the
NPC's sway is almost complete.
Since independence, it has
squeezed out two minority par-
ties, neither of which now poses
a serious challenge to the
Sardauna's organization. The
NPC has had no visible strength
outside the north and, until
recently, showed little inter-
est in developing any. However,
as its leaders have gained con-
fidence, they have begun to move
away from a purely defensive pos-
ture and now seem to be making a
serious effort to develop support
in the south--so far with little
success.
The NCNC, on the other hand,
has always sought to project the
image of a dynamic national party
and, although Ibo-based, has had
the broadest national appeal of
all. Nigerian parties. It has
been the ruling party in the East-
ern Region since responsible gov-
ernment was introduced there,
and it now is also in power in
the Mid-Western Region created
last year. At least until very
recently, the NCNC also has had
a strong following in the Western
Region--the Yoruba stronghold--
and in the 1954 federal elections
won a majority of the Western
parliamentary seats. From Janu-
ary 1963 to February 1964, when
a number of important NCNC lead-
ers in the West defected to join
a new party, the NCNC participated
in a coalition which governed the
Western Region.
Founded in the 1940s as a
militant nationalist party, the
NCNC still contains many of the
more radical elements in Nigeria,
but has come to embrace leaders
holding widely divergent views
and attitudes. In recent years
this has resulted in a marked
deterioration of party discipline.
Since practically all elements
in the party are increasingly im-
patient with continued northern
domination of the federation,
however, they may in time be able
to submerge their differences.
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In the past five years,
since Michael Okpara succeeded
the US-educated nationalist hero,
Nnamdi Azikiwe, first as premier
of the Eastern Region and then
as head of the NCNC, the party's
internal problems have multi-
plied. Lacking the dynamism
of Azikiwe, who is Nigeria's
federal President, Okpara has
come under increasing fire from
within his party. Although his
retention of the NCNC leader-
ship apparently was not chal-
lenged at the party congress in
February, disenchantment with
Okpara is strong among members
of the educated elite and is
evidently growing among the
NCNC rank and file.
Nigeria's present diffi-
culties are compounded by the
fact that, from the beginning,
the Yorubas of the Western Re-
gion have been excluded from
the national governing coali-
tion. After the 1959 elections,
in which the Yorubas' Action
Group (AG) antagonized the NPC
by waging a vigorous but futile
campaign in the north, the
progressive AG was relegated
to the role of principal opposi-
tion in the federal legislature.
Its ambitious top official, chief
Obafemi Awolowo, and other AG
leaders soon began to display
signs of growing frustration.
These feelings were intensified
by their suspicion--not alto-
gether unfounded--that the fed-
eral coalition partners were
bent on destroying the AG. Against
the wishes of conservative party
elements, led by Western Region
Premier Akintola, Awolowo and
his cohorts began to advocate
more radical policies and to
resort to demagoguery.
Tensions within the AG led
to an open split in 1962, and
a major crisis in the Western
government led the federal gov-
ernment to declare a state of
emergency in the region. After
a period of direct federal rule,
during which the conservative
faction formed a new party,
Akintola was restored as regional
premier, with a coalition which
included the local NCNC.
Awolowo, meanwhile, had
been charged with complicity
in what was alleged to be an
AG coup plot against the fed-
eral government. Eventually
convicted of "treasonable felony,"
he now is serving a ten-year
sentence. He nevertheless seems
to have retained the allegiance
of the bulk of the Yoruba masses,
while Akintola's faction, which
now has merged with NCNC ele-
ments to form yet another re-
gional party, has not gained
widespread popular support.
Thus political frustration re-
mains high among the Yorubas,
and there is a continuing pos-
sibility of violence in the
Western Region that also in-
fects national politics to
some degree.
In February, north-south
political tensions were again
bared with the release of the
results of a new national census
conducted last year. It was
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Population Figures
Implied Growth
Present Alloc.
Proposed Change
(millions)
Rate
of Seats in Fed.
of Alloc.
CONFIDENTIAL
1952 to 1963
Parliament
on Basis of
1963 census.
1952 1962* 1963
NORTHERN
16.84
21.9**
29.8
5.1%
174
167
REGION
EASTERN
7.22
12.3
12.4
5.2%
73
69
REGION
WESTERN
59
4
10.6
10.3
7.5%
62
58
REGION
.
MID-WESTERN
1.49
***
2.5
5.0%
14
REGION
LAGOS
.27
.45
.68
8.5%
3
4
TOTAL
30.42
45.3
55.7
5.9%
312
312
* Figures never released;
census nullified
** After "verification,"
raised to 30.25 by
Northern authorities
anticipated that the census
would be used to redistribute
the seats in the federal Par-
liament among the four regions.
On the basis of a 1952-53 popu-
lation count, made under Brit-
ish auspices, the northern re-
gion was allocated 174 of the
312 seats, and all but a hand-
ful of the 174 now are firmly
held by the NPC. The outcome of
the new census has thus become
a critical matter both to the
northern defenders of status
quo and to the restless south-
erners.
*** No interpolated 1962 figures
available for Mid-Western Region,
which was part of Western Region until 1963.
A census held in 1962 was
nullified even before the re-
sults were announced, after a
bitter controversy developed
over charges of overcounting in
all regions. The recently pub-
lished figures also appear to
reflect sizable inflation in all
regions, but particularly in
the north.
The new controversy over
the census has touched off a
major political uproar which
may seriously, perhaps even
fatally, damage prospects for
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NIGERIAN POPULATION EXPLOSION
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preserving Nigeria's unity.
The strongest adverse reaction
has come from NCNC militants,
particularly those in the East-
ern Region, where Premier Okpara
and his legislature have flatly
rejected the results and there
has been muttering about seces-
sion. Okpara is demanding a
meeting of all regional premiers
with federal Prime Minister
Balewa to attempt to work out
a solution. Mid-Western Region
Premier Osadebay, also a member
of NCNC, has likewise refused
to accept the announced figures,
although his public posture on
the subject is much less intran-
sigent than Okpara's. Radical
youth elements, both within
and outside the NCNC, have
staged protest demonstrations.
In the unsettled Western
Region, the census announcement
produced a sharply divergent
reaction among the leaders and
led to a major realignment of
political forces. Premier
Akintola's acceptance of the
results precipitated a split in
the ranks of his NCNC coalition
partners, most of whom joined
.his new grouping, the Nigerian
National Democratic Party (NNDP).
The rest of the regional NCNC
promptly announced a "working
agreement" with the Action
Group in the West.
This shift within the West-
ern Region may foreshadow an
eventual new alignment at the
federal level along progressive-
versus-conservative lines.
There appears to be a chance
that the NPC will arrange a
coalition with the NNDP, and
that the NCNC and AG will join
in opposition. National NCNC
and AG leaders reportedly have
already concluded an agreement
to come into effect when the
parliamentary elections are
formally announced. The threats
of secession which were breathed
immediately after the release
of the census results have re-
ceded, and Nigeria's political
leaders now appear convinced of
the necessity of avoiding tacti-
cal actions which might lead to
the breakup of the federation.
A basic realignment of coalition
partners, however, would seem
on a longer view to increase the
chance of a deep and permanent
north-south split, since it
would tend to place all the
northerners, plus a few conserv-
ative westerners, on one side
of "the carpet" and at least
the vast majority of the "pro-
gressive" southerners on the
other.
Economic Problems
Strengthening Radicals
Nigeria's growing economic
problems, and their social and
political consequences, may
eventually prove even more
troublesome than the current
political tensions. Economic
development is keyed to an elab-
orate six-year plan (1962-68)
which aims at preserving the im-
pressive four-percent growth rate
achieved in the decade before
independence. The plan calls
for a gross investment of $3
billion over the six-year period,
with $1.8 billion put into the
public sector. Foreign aid com-
mitments so far have reached
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approximately $470 million, in-
cluding $225 from the US and
lesser but still substantial
amounts from Britain, West Ger-
many, and Italy.
The Nigerian economy, how-
ever, is not expanding at the
projected rate. Unemployment,
for example, has risen sharply
in the past three years; accord-
ing to conservative estimates
some 15 to 20 percent of the
labor force is idle now. Part
of the trouble lies in the fact
that private foreign investment
has dropped off sharply since
1961. Widespread corruption
at all levels of both the fed-
eral and regional governments
--manifested in blatantly osten-
tatious living standards on the
part of most government minis-
ters--is also having adverse
effects.
This situation is leading
to increased social pressures
with clear political implica-
tions. Last fall, Nigeria's
badly splintered labor movement
formed a joint action committee
which, by threathening a gen-
eral strike, forced the govern-
ment to establish a commission
to review the wage structure.
Unless the government moves
effectively, Nigeria's discon-
tented and frustrated elements
may be attracted in increasing
numbers to radical movements
such as the Socialist Workers
and Farmers Party of Nigeria
(SWFPN) organized last summer
by pro-Communist youth leaders.
The party reportedly has re-
ceived funds from Moscow, where
it is said to be regarded as
an embryo for an eventual reg-
ular Communist Party. Linked
with the SWFPN are the WFTU-sup-
ported faction of the Nigerian
labor movement and the Communist-
controlled Nigerian Youth Con-
gress. Although these leftists
at present do not constitute a
significant force, they can be
expected to press their efforts
to develop and dominate a broad
national front of the discon-
tented.
Foreign Relations
Within the framework of an
avowed foreign policy of non-
alignment, Nigeria has generally
sought to maintain strong ties
with the West, its primary source
of economic aid. At present,
the government is attempting to
negotiate an association with
the EEC.
Relations with Communist
countries, in contrast, have
been minimal. Poland reportedly
extended a credit of $42 million
last summer and conducted studies
on the possibility of supplying
industrial plants for the North-
ern Region, but as yet no Com-
munist aid has been forthcoming.
However, the disappointing show-
ing of the development program
is stimulating pressure on the
Balewa government to seek sub-
stantial assistance from the
USSR.
Nigeria is most anxious to
play a prominent sole in intra-
African affairs and represents
a strong moderate influence in
the Organization of African Unity
(OAU) founded at Addis Ababa
last year. In opposition to the
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more radical states, notably
Ghana, Nigeria's present govern-
ment leaders believe African
unity must be approached gradu-
ally through a process which
stresses economic and technical
cooperation. Nigeria partici-
pated in the UN military opera-
tion in the Congo and recently
agreed to provide troops for
Tanganyika. Lagos has also
taken a moderate stand on is-
sues regarding South Africa and
the Portuguese colonies, even
though this has subjected the
government, and especially Ex-
ternal Affairs Minister Wachuku,
to considerable domestic criti-
cism.
This kind of foreign policy
seems to demand the present fed-
eral structure and something
like the present mix of conserv-
atives and nationalists to sup-
port it. A breakup of the fed-
eration and a drastic realign-
ment would pose serious dangers
and problems for Africa generally,
as well as for Nigeria. (SECRET
NO FOREIGN DISSEM)
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