DE GAULLE'S LATIN AMERICAN POLICY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A004400030002-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 29, 2006
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: March 13, 1964
• Content Type: REPORT

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13 March 1964
OCI No. 0322/64A
Copy No.. 56
SPECIAL REPORT
DE GAULLE'S LATIN AMERICAN POLICY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
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De Gaulle's visit to Mexico from 16 to 19 March
and to South America in the fall are billed as exer-
cises intended mainly to promote closer French eco-
nomic ties with Latin America. Economics, indeed,
will be on De Gaulle's mind during these travels,
but will be subordinate to his pursuit of subtler,
longer range political objectives. He will be aim-
ing to reassert French presence in an area where the
culture of France already has great prestige and
probably hopes to encourage Latin Americans to as-
sert their national independence more forcefully.
If, as a consequence, the US is obliged to concern
itself more with problems of the Western Hemisphere,
all well and good so far as De Gaulle is concerned.
As he probably sees it, such a development would
give him a freer hand to operate elsewhere.
Origins of Current French
Policy in Latin America
France has always played
an important cultural role in
Latin America.simply because
the educated classes there have
traditionally admired French
civilization. Paris has sought
to make the most of this situa-
tion. Of the 563 persons it
has assigned to its aid mis-
sions in Latin America, 418 are
designated as cultural-assist-
ance personnel. The majority
of them serve as secondary-
school teachers whose main func-
tions are to expand French lan-
guage instruction and to main-
tain a French "presence."
Since World War II, France's
cultural position has declined
somewhat. This is due in part
to the increasing interest in
technology as compared with the
humanistic culture with which
France has long been associated.
The Drench are acutely aware of
the trend and are energetically
trying to build an "image" of
France as a modern, technologi-
cally advanced society without,
at the same time, losing any of
the flavor of the old tradi-
tions. De Gaulle will probably
give this line heavy play dur-
ing both his trips this year.
Sharpening French interest
in Latin America has been ap-
parent since 1962 when De Gaulle
sent out a fact-finding mission
under Jean Chauvel, a trusted
adviser. The mission, which
visited seven countries, came
up with a cautious recommenda-
tion for an expanded French eco-
nomic and technical assistance
program in the area. More French
study teams have followed, and
on 14 January 1964 the govern-
ment's Commission on Foreign
Assistance published a report
urging a broadening of the
French aid program outside the
franc zone. This was followed
by De Gaulle's statement at his
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31 January press conference an- World Bank had turned the proj-
nouncing France's desire to de- ect down. They have also put
velop closer economic relations about $50 million into Peru's
with Latin America. iron and steel industry and ap-
De Gaulle's trip to Mexico
--which will also permit brief
visits to the French overseas
departments of Guadeloupe, Mar-
tinique, and French Guiana--is
technically in repayment of
President Adolfo Lopez Mateos'
visit to France last year. The
choice of Mexico as De Gaulle's
starting point, however, also
reflects a desire to squeeze
every political advantage out
of France's cultural influence
there and out of Mexico's tra-
ditional concern over its "in-
dependence" from the US.
De Gaulle has been invited
to visit almost all the other
Latin American countries in
the fall. His itinerary, which
has not yet been completely
firmed up, presently includes
Argentina, Uruguay, Brazil,
Peru, Ecuador, and Colombia.
France's Economic Position
In Latin America
France's present economic
interests in the area are modest.
In 1962, total French invest-
ments in Latin America amounted
to only $350 to $400 million'
proximately $15 million into
Chilean copper mining. More
recently, Paris agreed to guar-
antee up to $10 million in pri-
vate French credits to finance
a variety of Panamanian indus-
trial enterprises; about a quar-
ter of this has already been al-
located.
Mexico, which is carried
in French books as a good in-
vestment risk because of its
economic and political stabil-
ity, was the recipient in 1963
of one of Paris' largest eco-
nomic commitments outside the
franc zone. This was a package
deal, involving government-guar-
anteed credits and government
loans amounting to $150 million,
granted primarily for purchase
of French equipment for Mexico's
petrochemical and sugar in-
dustries. The agreement also
established joint commissions
whose functions are to recom-
mend development projects Paris
might undertake to underwrite
and to make periodic reviews
of the relations between the
two countries in the commercial,
financial, and technical fields.
in no country did they account France plays a relatively
for as much as 10 percent of the small role in Latin America's
total foreign investment. foreign trade. In 1962, France's
exports totaled about $297.7
French investors have million, and its imports about
generally favored the larger, $304.6 million. Even in the
more industrially advanced countries where it is economi-
countries such as Brazil, Ar- cally strongest, it had a lower
gentina, Colombia, Peru, Vene- proportion of their total foreign
zuela, and Chile. Some years trade than did Britain and West
ago the French provided a $25- Germany.
million credit for Colombia's
Paz de Rio steel mill after the
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Plans for Increased
Economic oopera ion
De Gaulle can therefore be
expected to convey France's in-
terest in expanding trade with
Latin America. In this, he
would be impelled in part by a
desire to correct the recent
slippage in France's over-all
balance of trade and payments.
The technique for stimu-
lating trade that Paris is most
likely to use is the one of of-
fering more government-guar-
anteed credits to cover pur-
chases of French commodities,
which will increase competition
with US exports to Latin America.
In terms of additional French
aid, the $150-million agreement
with Mexico may have exceptional
significance. The choice of
Mexico and the form of the Mexi-
can package is important because
it demonstrates that France will
probably orient its approach
along the conservative line of
concentrating on countries which
are good credit risks and em-
phasizing loans over grants.
Ile Gaulle is unlikely to
stress the subject of military
assistance. However, the French
have sold arms throughout the
world, and Argentina has been
an important buyer in the past.
The French would be willing to
supply more military equipment
to other Latin American states
although rather strict credit
terms are likely to be main-
tained. Paris has no intention
of assuming the full burden of
supplying any Latin American
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military establishment, but
it would look upon even lim-
ited arms sales as contrib-
uting to the recipients'
independence from the
Us.
Any increase in France's
aid to Latin America probably
will be primarily concentrated
on scientific and technical as-
sistance--partly to minimize the
cost. The agreements for the
peaceful use of atomic energy
which France concluded with
Brazil and Argentina in 1962
and 1963 are examples of this
approach.
De Gaulle is known to pre-
fer programs aimed at training
indigenous peoples to help them-
selves, and has pointed to the
need for the developing coun-
tries to improve their scien-
tific knowledge. Hence, he
will probably offer to send
more technical assistance teams
and secondary-school teachers
to Latin America, and to in-
crease the quota of Latin Ameri-
can students in France.
Finally, De Gaulle is
likely to encourage the Latin
American governments to draw
up comprehensive economic de-
velopment programs for them-
selves, but with a French ac-
cent. In particular, he will
probably offer assistance in
training cadres in interested
Latin American countries in the
French technique of flexible
planning, as a way of aiding
these countries in working out
development plans.
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Political Aims
For De Gaulle, of course,
political aims take precedence
over economic objectives. It is
probably too facile an analysis
to surmise that De Gaulle's
prime objective in Latin America
is to bind adherents to a "third
force." Even if he were not
faced with the problem of in-
creasing instability in Africa,
where France has extensive com-
mitments, his limited economic
resources would make him cau-
tious about indiscriminate
pledges of aid in another area
that is susceptible to sudden
political upheavals. He is con-
fident, however, that France
can draw some advantage from
fishing in troubled Latin Ameri-
can waters.
It is likely that the
greatest advantage De Gaulle
may hope to derive from increas-
ing France's "presence" in
Latin America is the prospect
that it might help bring about
a redirection of United States
policies. He has made clear
his conviction that the Atlan-
tic alliance is breaking down
and that US primacy should be
more restricted to the Western
Hemisphere. By the same token,
he stakes out a similar posi-
tion for France in Western Eu-
rope. Therefore, he probably
reasons, wrench political in-
fluence in Latin America should
be used to encourage situations
that promise to absorb Washing-
ton's attention in its "natural"
sphere of influence and away
from Europe.
This approach is implicit
in his reputed insistence that
France is a model for countries
determined to make a show of
"independence." In a speech
last September, for instance,
he went so far as to say that
the underdeveloped countries
should detach themselves from
the big power blocs. He is not
saying "rally to France," but
rather "look to your own inter-
ests," confident in the belief
that France stands to gain if
the "satellites" of the two
great powers become increasingly
self-assertive.
There is presently no rea-
son to believe that De Gaulle
is contemplating a visit to Cuba
on either of his trips. How-
ever, France is increasing its
trade with Cuba; the latest fig-
ures show that French-Cuban trade
during the first nine months of
1963 amounted to one third more
than for all the preceding year.
The prospects are that
trade between the two countries
will continue on the upswing.
This is because Paris is moving
away from its policy of cooperat-
ing with the US to the extent of
restricting trade with Cuba to
cash sales. Paris is yielding
increasingly to pressure from
industrialists for government
credit guarantees on exports to
Cuba.
The French have also shown
less willingness recently to
defer to US wishes concerning
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the landing rights of Cubana
Airlines in Guadeloupe. Paris
has denied some landings while
allowing others, and no firm
pattern has emerged.
The Mexican visit seems
bound to produce a considerable
propaganda success for De Gaulle.
In recent years, no European po-
litical figure of his stature
has made a state visit to that
country, and it is being awaited
with great local anticipation.
De Gaulle's recent global policy
pronouncements, have produced a
flood of unofficial statements
from Latin American countries
proclaiming him "the savior of
the free world." Moreover, a
French Foreign Ministry official
has asserted that De Gaulle would
be hailed as the "liberator" dur-
ing his South American tour.
There is no doubt that De
Gaulle's views, particularly
those offering a third alterna-
tive to the two power blocs, will
go down well with the Mexicans.
He will probably strike this
theme hard in his Mexican speeches
and tailor his remarks to appeal
to Latin America as a whole.
France, nevertheless, has
considerable ground to cover be-
fore it can achieve a major
"presence" in Latin America.
Standing in the way of a massive
French trade and aid program are
such important limiting factors
as Paris' current policy of budg-
eta,ry.str.ingency,its shortage of
technical assistance personnel,
its extensive African commitments,
and its difficulties in interest-
ing private French capital to in-
vest in Latin America.
De Gaulle probably will
stress the advantages of a firmer
connection with France as pos-
sibly leading to profitable ties
with the Common Market and EEC
members such as West Germany or
Italy.
De Gaulle may also promise
French support for Latin American
interests in the United Nations
Conference for Trade and Develop-
ment which opens in Geneva on 23
March. At every opportunity he
is likely to emphasize the vir-
tues of foreign aid extended by
European countries with no po-
litical ambitions in Latin Amer-
ica, and to draw attention to
its value in providing a counter-
balance of sorts to the dominant
US position in the area.
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