NORTH KOREA, COMMUNIST CHINA'S INDEPENDENT ALLY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A004400020002-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 8, 2006
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: March 6, 1964
• Content Type: REPORT

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6 March 1964
OCI No. 0321/64A
Copy No.
SPECIAL REPORT
NORTH KOREA, COMMUNIST CHINA'S INDEPENDENT ALLY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
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NORTH KOREA, COMMUNIST CHINA'S INDEPENDENT ALLY
Over the past two years, Pyongyang has emerged
as Peiping's strongest Asian supporter in the Sino-
Soviet dispute. Moscow, in retaliation, has attempted
to exact political concessions as the price for con-
tinued economic aid. North Korea's refusal to accept
these conditions has clouded prospects for future
Soviet economic and possibly military assistance.
Soviet aid in some economic spheres has apparently al-
ready been curtailed.
So far, the North Koreans have not backtracked
at all in their espousal of pro-Chinese positions.
They do appear, however, to be moving cautiously to
avoid further widening the substance of their dispute
with Moscow. In recent months, moreover, they have
taken pains to show that North Korea is not a Chinese
satellite and that their allegiance to Peiping stems
basically from consideration of their own national
interests.
North Korea Opts for Peiping
Pyongyang initially attempted
to remain aloof from the
Moscow-Peiping rivalry. Both
China and the Soviet Union had
played key roles in developing
and sustaining the Communist re-
gime in North Korea, and both
had retained a strong influence
in Pyongyang. The Koreans were,
nonetheless, distressed at the
magnitude of the de-Staliniza-
tion program in the Soviet Union,
and Pyongyang's party and state
chief, Kim Il-sung, looked with
particular concern on the re-
laxation of government restraints
over the Russian populace, view-
ing them as inimical to his own
strict, authoritarian controls.
Through a full-scale purge
of his rivals, Kim had estab-
lished a Stalin-like pre-emi-
nence of his own by 1960. Ile
had also managed to preserve
considerable independence of
action for his party, despite
the presence of numerous Soviet
and Chinese advisers. Fearing
that liberalization in Russia
would have an adverse impact
on the attitude of the Korean
people toward his regime, Kim
began to isolate them from So-
viet influence. Relays of Rus-
sian broadcasts in Korean were
suspended in 1961, and the re-
call of some North Korean stu-
dents studying in Soviet bloc
countries was begun.
During 1962, North Korean
concern with Moscow widened to
include the question of Soviet
foreign policy. Pyongyang began
to interpret some Soviet diplo-
matic moves as weak-willed con-
cessions to the West, and strong,
albeit indirect, criticism of
Moscow appeared in North Korean
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propaganda. Pyongyang--which,
like Peiping, views the US as
the main obstacle to attainment
of its goal of national reuni-
fication--began to see Peiping's
hard-line foreign policy stance
as more suited to its own in-
terests. Pyongyang felt that
the US military presence in
South Korea dictated a policy
of unyielding hostility. Soviet
action during the Cuban missile
crisis--the Koreans called it
a "capitulation" to the US--ap-
parently convinced Pyongyang
that the USSR could not be de-
pended upon to defend the in-
terests of its allies.
Korea's Present Position
Following the Cuban crisis,
Pyongyang expanded its support
of China to include all major
issues in the dispute. It did
attempt, however, to preserve
some freedom of maneuver in the
controversy. It refrained, for
example, from becoming fully
involved, as the Albanians did,
in the running propaganda ex-
change between Moscow and Pei-
ping. By and large, the North
Koreans seem to take a pragmatic ap-
proach to the dispute, quickly
commenting on issues of concern
to their own interests--espe-
cially the question of support
for the national revolutionary
movement--but not rushing to
defend the Chinese on every
point which arises.
Pyongyang has not commented,
for example, on the issue of
Sino-Soviet border friction
which has been repeatedly aired
by Peiping and Moscow. On the
other hand, Pyongyang wasted no
time in showing annoyance at
Moscow's failure, during the UN
session last September, to re-
peat its 1962 resolution on the
withdrawal of US troops from
South Korea, The elimination
of US influence from the South
and the extension'of Communist
control over the whole country
remair, Pyongyang's primary pol-
icy goal. Any suggestions of
Soviet softness toward the pres-
ence of US forces in Korea is
thus unacceptable to Kim's re-
gime. Pyongyang is, by contrast,
clearly grateful to Peiping for
its tough propaganda backing
against the US.
Recently, however, the
North Koreans have taken some
pains to show that while they
are ideologically aligned with
Peiping, they are not a Chinese
satellite. This was evident
last fall in the careful recep-
tion by Pyongyang of a visiting
delegation led by Chinese Com-
munist president Liu Shao-chi.
It was expected that the visit
would occasion a strong and
specific North Korean defense
of Peiping against Soviet at-
tacks. On the contrary, Pyong-
yang limited itself to pro for-
ma condemnations of revisionism,
and only one Korean official--
a member of the second echelon
--specifically defended the Chi-
nese against Moscow.
The conclusion of the visit
was marked by an unprecedentedly
terse communique, and there were
hints in the Chinese press af-
ter Liu's return that Peiping
was less than satisfied with
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the treatment of the delegation.
The Koreans waited a month fol-
lowing the visit before issuing
a statement reiterating their
political affinity with the
Chinese. Pyongyang probably in-
tended the delay as a demonstra-
tion that its policy of support-
ing Peiping was an independent
decision, not one forced by Chi-
nese pressure.
Since Liu's visit, both
sides have hinted at undisclosed
policy differences. These, in
part, may involve the North Ko-
rean decision to concentrate
during 1964 on the production
of consumer goods as an immedi-
ate economic goal. Pyongyang
has announed plans to channel
enough economic resources into
this effort to register a 35-per-
cent increase in consumer goods
this year. Peiping may well look
askance at this development since,
in the Chinese view, Communist
governments should keep tight
curbs on consumer satisfaction
in order to increase the re-
sources available for building
the all-important industrial
sector of the economy.
Pyongyang's decision to
concentrate on consumer produc-
tion during 1964 was a drastic
shift from its past emphasis on
development of heavy industry.
During 1963, however, the rate
of North Korean industrial de-
velopment had already begun to
slacken. According to statistics
released by Pyongyang, the in-
crease in gross value of indus-
trial output for 1963 was only
8 percent. This compares with
the 11 percent planned, and 20
percent claimed, for 1962.
The shortfall probably re-
sulted in part from problems in
the allocation of manpower and
material. However, it may also
have reflected a partial disrup-
tion in the flow of Soviet as-
sistance. For example, Moscow
has reportedly been stalling
on delivery of equipment for
key Korean thermal power proj-
ects.
Pyongyang has implicitly
accused the Soviet Union of us-
ing economic aid as a weapon for
imposing its political views,
and has also publicly rejected
the concept of an international
division of labor as espoused
by the bloc's Council for Mu-
tual Economic Assistance. Pyong-
yang has labeled it a Russian
scheme to perpetuate the back-
ward economic status of some
bloc countries and make them
mere economic appendages of the
USSR. Late in 1962, Pyongyang
publicly adopted a policy of eco-
nomic self-reliance and announced
that it was planning to build a
self-sufficient economy.
The North Koreans appear
to be uncertain about the pros-
pects of future Soviet assist-
ance in the industrial sphere.
The visit of a Soviet economic
delegation to North Korea last
summer apparently ended in noth-
ing more than a vague agreement
in principle to continue economic
cooperation. It appears,
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moreover, that the regime is no
longer seriously concerned with
fulfilling its seven-year plan
(1961-67) which was predicated
on a high level of Soviet eco-
nomic assistance. Its decision
to turn temporarily toward con-
sumer production may be a gap-
filling measure while it seeks
a long-range substitute for So-
viet aid and attempts to
straighten existing dislocations
in the economy.
In an apparent effort to
find alternate sources of supply
for goods formerly obtained from
the Soviet bloc, Pyongyang em-
barked during 1963 on a vigorous
but so far largely unsuccessful
program of trade expansion in
the free world. Recent trade
agreements with Western sup-
pliers involve some items for-
merly purchased from the USSR
and the European satellites.
Pyongyang apparently also de-
sires to develop new sources of
capital goods to aid industrial
expansion.
The North Koreans probably
also hope that wider diplomatic
recognition will come from their
expanded trade contacts. They
have been notably unsuccessful
so far in efforts to erase the
stigma of the Korean war by win-
ning recognition from non-Com-
munist countries. Only?five--
all in Africa--have recognized
Pyongyang, and none of these
maintains a resident ambassador
there.
Military Policy
There have been some indi-
cations that North Korean con-
cern over the present level and
future nature of Soviet aid ex-
tends to the sphere of military
assistance. Soviet-provided
equipment has long formed the
backbone of the Korean armed
forces. Pyongyang's air arm,
for example, is composed en-
tirely of Soviet-built aircraft.
Since the Korean war, the regime
has put special emphasis on ad-
vanced military technology in
its bid to obtain armed superi-
ority over the UN forces in
South Korea. It has thus de-
veloped a large and versatile
air force, now fifth largest
in the bloc, and more than
double the size of Seoul's.
There were broad hints in
Pyongyang propaganda in December
1962 that the Soviet Union had
threatened to curtail its mili-
tary assistance program to Ko-
rea, thus putting additional
political pressure on Kim's re-
gime. Shortly afterward, Pyong-
yang declared it necessary to
channel more domestic resources
into the maintenance and develop-
ment of its military establish-
ment. In September 1963, the
regime admitted that this policy
had contributed to its industrial
slowdown.
Niuscow is almost certainly con-
tinuing to supply defensive
equipment, possibly under
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long-standing contract
If an over-all curtailment
in the delivery of Soviet mili-
tary equipment occurred, arms
aid from Communist China could
fill the gap to some extent.
Even with Chinese assistance,
however, Pyongyang's over-all
military potential would prob-
ably decline well below present
levels, and it would have great
difficulty over the long pull
in maintaining a sufficient
military counterpoise to the
UN forces in South Korea.
South following the ouster of
the Rhee government in 1960.
So far, North Korean ef-
forts to capitalize on south-
ern instability have achieved
little in the way of tangible
results. Even less successful
have been Pyongyang's efforts
at covert subversion in the
South. Tight police and mili-
tary security there have largely
negated attempts to infiltrate
the government and set up an
underground Communist party.
At present, the development of
a base from which to conduct
a Viet Cong - type insurgency
in South Korea seems well be-
yond Pyongyang's capabilities.
Policy Toward South Korea
Despite the strengthening
and modernization of North Ko-
rean forces during the past ten
years, Pyongyang by itself still
lacks the capability to reunify
the country by force. It has
nonetheless gone ahead with a
program designed to lay the
groundwork for the eventual ex-
tension of Communist control to
the South. This program in-
volves a continuous campaign
of political and propaganda sub-
version intended to shake South
Korean faith in the Seoul gov-
ernment and in the durability
of US support. Pyongyang pushed
this approach with particular
vigor to take advantage of the
political instability in the
There have been signs re-
cently of growing public apathy
and discontent in North Korea.
The situation apparently stems
from the tightness of regime
controls and the general drab-
ness of life. A rising crime
rate is reported, including mis-
appropriation of public funds
and black marketeering. Juve-
nile deliquency'has also ap-
peared, especially among the
youth repatriated during the
last four years from Japan.
The possiblity of serious
public unrest appears remote.
The public security forces doubt-
less still constitute an all-
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pervasive and effective police
system. Moreover, the regime
should have little difficulty
in continuing to provide the
basic necessities of food and
livelihood for the relatively
small population. The regime
is, however, concerned over pub-
lic attitudes, and has recently
embarked on a series of propa-
ganda campaigns designed to spur
the populace to more conscien-
tious support of its goals.
So far, there are no signs
of flagging elan in the party
ranks. On the surface at least,
the party seems satisfied with
Kim Il-sung's leadership and
with the progress made under his
policies. Kim and most of his
chief lieutenants are still
young enough to look forward to
ten or fifteen years of active
political life. A shakeup in
the top-level leadership in the
party is thus unlikely in the
foreseeable future.
Pyongyang will probably
continue its political alignment
with the Chinese Communists,
while remaining cautious in ex-
panding the ground of its own
differences with Moscow. Frus-
tration of North Korean irreden-
tist aims toward South Korea by
the US presence there would also
appear to rule out any relaxa-
tion in Pyongyang's hostile
policy toward the US. 25X1
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6 March 1964
OCI No. 0321/64B
Copy No.
ALGERIA'S MOUNTING TROUBLES UNDER BEN BELLA
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
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Ahmed Ben Bella has made little progress in
coping with Algeria's massive problems during his
18 months in power. Unemployment is rampant, many
Algerians are underfed and without adequate housing,
and Ben Bella's popularity is waning. He has secured
his own position, however, by steadily tightening his
control over the reins of government. Ben Bella
recognizes that for the present the Algerian economy
must depend on France, but he is moving toward close
ties with Communist countries in keeping with his
proclaimed socialist orientation. Some of his ad-
visers evidently would like to speed this movement.
The Harvest of Independence
Algeria's economy was close
to chaos when the country became
independent in July 1962, and
matters have continued to dete-
riorate. More than half of the
country's labor force of 3.5
million is unemployed; one fifth
of the population survives only
because of American relief opera-
tions. Salaries and wages of
those lucky enough to be employed
by the government or in the mil-
itary forces are paid irregu-
larly. By the end of 1963, in-
dustry was reported operating
at only 30 percent of capacity
and,even with last year's good
harvest, the vast majority of
agricultural workers continued
to eke out a bare existence.
Part of the difficulty re-
sults directly from the exodus
of French administrators and
businessmen. Few Algerians have
the skills to fill the gap. The
economy has been further dis-
rupted by rapid nationalization
of two thirds of all agricultural
land and the haphazard seizures
of many small businesses. While
Ben Bella has wanted to move
more slowly, he has bowed to
pressures for acceleration.
Last spring, although committed
to nationalize only vacated
agricultural properties, the
government seized other substan-
tial holdings when apprised that
local leaders were about to take
matters into their own hands.
The cooperatives which were
hastily organized to manage
these properties have in only a
few instances produced up to
expectations.
The government's efforts
to show the mass of Algerians
some of the fruits of independ-
ence frequently conflict with
the need to stimulate new busi-
ness. Ben Bella now finds him-
self caught between conflicting
demands from economic advisers
--including some Communist as-
sociates. Many urge him to
honor provisions in last year's
nationalization laws which call
for dividing profits among the
workers. On the other hand,
leaders of the General Union of
Algerian Workers (UGTA), Algeria's
only labor federation, believe
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that the workers in nationalized
enterprises should be content
just to have jobs, forgo their
profit-sharing rights, and thus
permit earnings of operating
enterprises to be used to reopen
other potentially' profitable ones.
As a pacesetting example, the
600 workers in a tJGTA-directed
bakers' cooperative recently de-
cided that their profits of some
$120,000 would be:used to reopen
two plants which could employ
dozens of workers. The dispute
over disposition of profits has
stirred bitter personal animosi-
ties and opened some possibly
serious rifts among the regime's
supporters.
The government's failure to
show significant progress has
cut sharply into Ben Bella's
popular standing.; In contrast
to the spontaneous adulation he
received at the time of inde-
pendence and when he achieved
power, the regime now has to
drum up crowds tohear him. On
one recent occasion, buses ap-
proaching the forum where Ben
Bella was making a major address
were required to discharge all
passengers to constitute an audi-
ence. Most soon slithered away,
while those who remained were
apathetic to his pronouncements.
The unemployed have publicly
reacted to the regime's failure
to provide enoughjobs; a dem-
onstration in Oran in January
appears to have seriously dis-
turbed Ben Bella. While he is
normally conciliatory toward his
critics, this time he threatened
to "break the backs" of the
bourgeoisie,counterrevolution-
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aries, speculators, and all the
"numerous animals" who attack
his revolution.
Ben Bella,who is premier
as well as President, seems in
little danger from active op-
position, however. He has elim-
inated from his regime many in-
dividuals whose views conflict
markedly with his own. He has
imprisoned a few would-be op-
position leaders or otherwise
restricted their activities,
but has avoided creating a martyr
by executing any of them.
Ferhat Abbas, the moderate
former president of the Constitu-
ent Assembly who had jumped on
the Ben Bella bandwagon in mid-
1962, retired to semioblivion
a year later when the two dis-
agreed on the form of govern-
ment to be provided by the con-
stitution. Hocine Ait Ahmed,
who shared with Ben Bella the
early leadership of the Algerian
rebellion and nearly six years
of imprisonment, resigned from
the Constituent Assembly to lead
the Kabylie Berbers into open
defiance when the assembly failed
to respond to his warnings against
personal dictatorship. Ait Ahmed
has been virtually isolated in
the rugged and populous Kabylie
area since the defection of Col.
Mohand ou el Hadj, his principal
lieutenant.
So far the potential op-
position has remained ineffec-
tive and fragmented largely be-
cause individual opposition lead-
ers are unable to compromise
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their differences and concert
their activities.
Ben Bella relies heavily on
the National Liberation Front
(FLN) to consolidate his control.
This coalition of nationalist
groups, which was formed to di-
rect the fight for independence,
is named by the constitution as
the country's only legal politi-
cal organization. The FLN is
charged with determining national
policy, and Ben Bella, as secre-
tary general of its political
bureau, has gathered power to
himself.
The political bureau has
four other members. Hadj ben
Alla, the FLN's chief organizer
and president of the Constituent
Assembly, is the party's second
most powerful figure. He over-
sees the work of a central di-
rection committee which is charged
with executing top-level party
policies. Two other members of
the bureau are Mohamed Khider
and Rabah Bitat, who until last
spring were its prime movers but
have since lost influence. The
fifth member, Mohamedi Said, a
deputy premier, also apparently
does not count for much in the
decision-making processes.
Ben Bella continues to de-
lay holding a long-promised FLN
national congress to set guide-
lines for a "national politico-
socio-economic philosophy." Last
fall he said that it would be
held by March, although it is
not likely at this stage to take
place before April at the earli-
est. He said also that all ele-
ments of political opinion would
be represented on the planning
committee, whereas in fact none
of the regime's critics is a mem-
ber of the body.
Position of the Army
The army, whose backing en-
abled Ben Bella to achieve power
in September 1962, remains the
backbone of his regime. Despite
its demonstrated inadequacies
during the border conflict with
Moroccans last fall, the army has
been the principal force for main-
taining internal order, both
against such dissidents as the
Kabylie Berbers and against ur-
ban demonstrators.
The army's commander, Col.
Houari Boumedienne, as deputy
premier and defense minister,
is Ben Bella's top lieutenant.
He is also the most likely con-
tender for ower
Just as he has broken with
other associates, Ben Bella is
probably looking for the proper
time to eliminate Boumedienne.
Apparently as a step toward
this end, in October he appointed
a veteran guerrilla chieftain,
Col. Tahar Z'biri, as army chief
of staff.
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Z'biri is reported to be an
antagonist of Boumedienne, as
are Col. Chaabane ;and Col. Mohand
ou el Hadj, who also were brought
into the general staff hierarchy
last fall. It remains unclear
what part each is playing in a
reorganization ofthe Algerian
military structure now under way.
Relations With Communist Bloc
Ben Bella's effort to bal-
ance his country between East
and West has tilted Algeria mark-
edly toward the East. He pro-
claims that Algeria is neither
Communist nor anti-Communist and
is developing its'own unique form
of Arab-Islamic socialism. Never-
theless he placesthis Algerian
socialism "in the'tradition of
the great revolutionary experi-
ments of the twentieth century
pioneered by the Soviet Union,
Communist China, Yugoslavia, and
Cuba."
Many Algerian leaders, in
addition to being grateful for
Communist assistance in the
struggle for independence, evi-
dently believe that their situa-
tion is similar to the earlier
stages of development of those
Communist countries. Ben Bella
has frequently expressed affec-
tion for their leaders, particu-
larly for Castro., In recent
months, he and most government
officials have even affected the
Cuban leader's mode of attire.
Algeria's demonstration of
friendship has brought it sub-
stantial economiccredits and
some military aid; from Communist
countries. Moscow has granted
a long-term credit of $100 mil-
lion, Communist China $50 mil-
lion, Yugoslavia $20 million,
and Bulgaria $6 million. Sev-
eral hundred technicians from
Communist countries have gone
to Algeria. For dramatic im-
pact early this year, the USSR
presented Ben Bella with an IL-
18 command aircraft; its ten-
man Soviet crew will remain in
Algeria for a year to train an
Algerian crew. Algeria has also
exchanged many official and un-
official delegations with bloc
nations.
Much of the Algerian Army's
equipment is of Soviet manufac-
ture, although in large part ob-
tained from Egypt. Last fall
Algeria obtained armor and artil-
lery direct from the USSR as well
as from Egypt and for the first 25X1
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Several
hundred Algerian naval and air
personnel are receiving train-
ing in the USSR and the European
satellites.
Algerian officials fre-
quently appear unhappy with
their experiences with Commu-
nist personnel, however
The propaganda value of
Bulgarian doctors, for example,
has been reduced because of
language difficulties.
Ben Bella is at the same
time permitting continuation of
some military training by West-
ern countries: France is con-
ducting a training program for
several hundred military tech-
nicians in Algeria, while ten
Algerian naval cadets are un-
dergoing long-term training in
the UK.
Most importantly, Ben Bella
has shown a keen appreciation
of Algeria's continuing reliance
on France for trained personnel
and for financial assistance.
Under the Evian Accords of March
1962 which paved the way for Al-
gerian independence, France
pledged financial aid in the
amount of some $200 million an-
nually for three years. This
year it will provide $30 million
in technical assistance, plus
$160 million in other aid, of
which half must be used to pur-
chase French goods. Present in-
dications are that France will
sharply curtail assistance when
the three-year period expires
next year.
Ben Bella also realizes
that France is an important out-
let for Algeria's excess man-
power and an important tradi-
tional market for its exports.
At the present time, there are
more Algerians in France (nearly
500,000) than French nationals
remaining in Algeria (about 180,-
000). More than 80 percent of
Algeria's trade is with France.
In his effort to maintain
cordial relations with France,
Ben Bella has been notably reti-
cent about French atomic tests in
the Sahara. Algerian media have
made no mention of France's most
recent test, and Ben Bella has
taken no steps to carry out the
threat he made last spring, in
response to agitation aroused by
a test series at that time, to
renegotiate the Evian military
clauses. He also has indicated
that he does not intend to na-
tionalize Algeria's petroleum re-
sources, but is insisting that
Algeria have preponderant con-
trol over a third pipeline which
is to be constructed to move Al-
gerian crude.
Ben Bella, moreover, is pro-
moting ties with other Western
nations, and has concluded ne-
gotiations for economic develop-
ment aid from Britain, West Ger-
many, and the US. The Algerians
are also seeking to diversify
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their trading relationships in
Europe, especially by extending
contacts with other Common Mar-
ket countries. 'Ben Bella, in
fact, would like special as-
sociation arran,ements with the
Common Market, if not actual
membership.
despite the current air of rec-
onciliation. Bourguiba, for
his part, has alleged Algerian
complicity in an assassination
attempt against him. Differ-
ences have been smoothed over
in recent months, but Bourguiba
probably will still look askance
at his larger neighbors.
Position Among African States
Of all foreign leaders,
Nasir appears to be the one who
has made the greatest impression
on Ben Bella. Fen Bella's con-
cept of nonalignment appears
close to that of Nasir. Although
some misadventures during Nasir's
visit to Algiers last May tem-
porarily disturbed the relation-
ship, Egypt responded with alac-
rity to Algeria''s requests for
aid last fall when the Kabylie
dissidence and the border fight-
ing with Morocco broke out.
Ben Bella's aspirations
to the leadership of a federated
North Africa have fallen far
short of fulfillment, however.
Relations with the two leaders
whose cooperation would be nec-
essary,, Tunisia's President
Bourguiba and Morocco's King
Hassan, have been beset with
mutual suspicion and recrimina-
tion. Hassan suspects that
Ben Bella supports Moroccan re-
publican elements, some of
which have taken refuge in Al-
geria, Bitterness from last
fall's border clashes will trou-
ble relations for.some time,
Ben Bella has continued
helping liberation movements
in the African dependent areas,
mainly Portuguese, by furnish-
ing arms, training facilities,
and some funds. He recently
reiterated his willingness to
send some 10,000 Algerian troops
to assist in the liberation of
Portuguese Africa. Despite
these steps, he has not received
the continent-wide recognition
as an African statesman that
he apparently covets.
Unless removed by assassina-
tion or incapacitated by serious
illness, Ben Bella seem likely
to maintain his pre-eminent power
position and may even tighten
his authority. There is, how-
ever, a vast reservoir of un-
solved problems which would-be
rivals could exploit, and a fur-
ther loss of popularity seems
indicated as the economy con-
tinues to flounder. In any
event, dissident groups will
continue to appear and inter-
mittent disorders seem likely.
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Meanwhile, there is the like-
lihood of a further leftward
drift.
many of his advisers are much
more prone than Ben Bella him-
self to cultivate the friend-
ship of Communist states. Among
them are Mohamed Harbi, editor
of the Communist-oriented Rev-
olution Africaine and leading
theorist of the regime, Michel
Raptis, architect of the worker-
management policy, and Mohamed
Lebdjaoui, a government and FLN
official who emerged as spokesman
during the visit of a high-level
delegation to the USSR. Despite
Ben Bella's desire to keep open
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the doors to the West, pres-
sures from such advisers are
likely to increase his already
heavy reliance on bloc sources
for technical and financial as-
sistance.
Further clarification of
Ben Bella's intentions may soon
appear. In addition to his cur-
rent visit to Belgrade (5 to 12
March), he has indicated that
he expects this spring to visit
the Soviet Union, where he is
likely to conclude arrangements
for use of the $100-million
credit.
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