HINDU-MUSLIM COMMUNALISM IN THE INDIAN SUBCONTINENT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A004400010002-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 4, 2006
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: February 28, 1964
• Content Type: REPORT

OCI No. 0320/64A
Copy No. 725
HINDU-MUSLIM COMMUNALISM IN THE INDIAN SUBCONTINENT
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
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GROUP I Excluded from automatic
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28 February 1964
HINDU-MUSLIM COMMUNALISM IN THE INDIAN SUBCONTINENT
Seventeen years after the creation of the in-
dependent states of India and Pakistan, relations
between the Hindu and Muslim communities of South
Asia remain sorely strained. There is little hope
of improvement in the immediate future. The re-
cent resurgence of communal violence--which origi-
nated in political difficulties in Indian-held
Kashmir but quickly spread to both Indian and Pak-
istani portions of Bengal, more than a thousand
miles away--indicates that communalism still is
one of the major social and political plagues of
the subcontinent.
Over the years, South Asian communalism has
taken on an international aspect, since the multi-
tude of unresolved difficulties between the avowedly
Muslim state of Pakistan and the predominantly Hindu
state of India--the most glaring of which is the
Kashmir dispute--are essentially communal in origin
and have immediate impact on communal relations in-
side each country. Conventional diplomacy has not
eased these international strains, and each time
one of the international sores is rubbed, the old
fears, suspicions, and bitter memories are revived.
These in turn generate further incidents and domes-
tic pressures which serve to limit further the free-
dom of maneuver of the two governments.
Communal Background
The Hindu and Muslim com-
munities have not always been
at daggers drawn. During the
ten centuries since the first
Muslims appeared in South Asia,
there have been periods when
relations between Hindus and
Muslims seemed good. These pe-
riods often have been those in
which society itself seemed sta-
ble and social change was imper-
ceptible. The sense during
those periods that social dis-
tinctions and discriminations
were unalterable served to keep
a lid on tensions between the
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communities. On the other hand,
periods of ferment and change
have released communal passions.
The Indian subcontinent
has been going through such a
period of intense ferment since
the turn of the century. In
part this results from the gen-
eral assault on the cultural
institutions of both communi-
ties by Western ideas, institu-
tions, and values. Of particu-
lar importance, however, was
the development of an 'independ-
ence movement, most of whose
leaders espoused the Western
egalitarian concept of "one-
man-one-vote."
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Indian Muslims were quick
to grasp that they would, under
such a system, be relegated to
the status of a permanent elec-
toral minority. As early as
1909, they pressed the British
into accepting the idea of sep-
arate electorates, in which Mus-
lim candidates would be elected
by Muslim voters to seats spe-'
cifically reserved for Muslims.
The door was opened; recogni-
tion of Muslims as a separate
political entit
pave he way for
ie accep ance nearly forty
years--and hundreds of commu-
nal riots--later of the proposi-
tion that India's Hindus and
Muslims in fact constituted
"two nations" rather than one.
Present Status of
Minority Communities
Present-day India has about
50 million Muslims,a little
over ten percent of the total
population. Minority status
statistically is not a new ex-
perience for Muslims in India.
However, the original Muslims
established themselves a e
top of the social scale and
made liberal use of the Hindu
talents for commerce and admin-
istration that they found
available.
Now, however, after a long
slide, the Muslims in India are
at the bottom of the ladder.
The best of their leaders emi-
grated to Pakistan in 1947 and,
in many instances, the Muslims
still in India retain in Hindu
eyes the relatively low caste
stigma they had before their
ancestors were converted to
Islam. Differences in their
religious customs,their mar-
riage rites, and their cloth-
ing and eating habits continue
to set them obviously and
sharply apart from the Hindu
community. Moreover, long-
standing economic and educa-
tional disparities in favor of
Hindus, reinforced by 17 years
of insidious, albeit illegal,
discrimination on almost all
matters affecting their way of
life have left Indian Muslims
less able to cope with their
general environment than their
Hindu neighbors.
In Pakistan the Hindu mi-
nority is confined to East Pak-
istan (East Bengal), Here
prevails what is in effect
the counterpart of the situa-
tion in India. East Pakistan's
Hindus--about ten million strong
(10 percent of the country as
a whole, but 20 percent of East
Pakistan)--are at the bottom
of the social ladder and find
the rungs upward generally
barred to them. Their posi-
tion in fact is probably even
worse than that of the Muslims
in India, if only because of
the poverty of East Bengal
and because in Pakistan, which
makes no claim to the secular-
ism officially espoused by In-
dia, the cards appear more
openly and unalterably stacked
against them.
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JAMMU
AND
KASHMIR
I Statue in.uepuIc
PAKISTAN
Karachi
C H I NA
AKISTA
Dacca. 7
MA.MARA SHIMA
AND10A
f AAL:F:;M
Kashmir and the Relic
In India most public ques-
tions take on some communal
overtones, whether they involve
the distribution of public funds
or the creation of job oppor-
tunities or the balancing of
electoral tickets. On some is-
sues, however, the communal as-
sociation may be only remote,
at least initially. Such was
the case recently in Indian-
held Kashmir where the mysteri-
ous theft of a much revered Is-
lamic relic-purportedly a hair
from the head of the Prophet--
INDIA
AND
PAKISTAN
triggered widespread riots.
The local rioting was not es-
sentially communal. Except by
Pakistan, no Hindu complicity
in the act was alleged; Hindus
and Sikhs, in a characteristic
display of reverence for things
deemed holy, joined Muslims in
mourning the loss; and the vio-
lence that shook the capital
city of Srinagar was intra-
Muslim, directed mainly at the
discredited political machine
of former Kashmiri Prime Minis-
ter Ba.kshi Ghulam Muhammad.
Yet because the Kashmir
problem is basically an extension
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of the unresolved communal prob-
lclm throughout the subcontinent,
any serious threat to stability
there touches on sensitive com-
munal nerve endings elsewhere.
The state population is pre-
dominantly Muslim, but most of
it has been under Indian con-
trol since 1948 when the then
ruling Hindu maharaja acceded
to India. For New Delhi, the
continuation of Indian rule in
Muslim Srinagar has an impor-
tance which goes beyond Kashmir's
strategic location. It rein-
forces the principle that India
is not a Hindu, but a secular
state and denies the validity
of the concept that Hindus and
Muslims are "two nations." Any
gain for the "two-nation" idea
would have serious implications
not only for simply maintaining
law and order but, from a purely
political point of view, for
preserving peaceful Hindu co-
existence with Indian citizens
of the Muslim or any other non-
Hindu community.
For Pakistan, continued
Indian control of the bulk of
Kashmir is a denial of the idea
which is the very basis for Pak-
istani's separate existence.
Pakistan, therefore, has always
stressed the point that Indian
authority in Kashmir is Hindu
authority resting solely on
Hindu bayonets. Any instability
on the Indian side, whatever
its origin, thus is susceptible
of exploitation by Pakistan
along communal lines.
Repercussions in Bengal
Subsequent developments in
Bengal emphasize the sensitive-
ness of the communal implica-
tions inherent in the Kashmir
dispute and the ease with which
communal violence can erupt.
Demonstrations in East Paki-
stan, called a week later to
protest the theft of the relic,
quickly developed into anti-
Hindu violence. The Pakistani
authorities acted to suppress
it, but not before the communal
fever, carried by press and
refugee accounts, had swept
across the border into the
Calcutta area of India. Sev=
eral days of severe rioting
and pillage occurred in Cal-
cutta and surrounding areas of
West Bengal. The Indian auth-
orities' initial application
of force was neither quick nor
substantial enough to contain
the disorders. Only the im-
position of near-martial law
and the arrival on the scene
of several thousand troops
brought the situation under
control.
No sooner had the rioting
subsided in Calcutta, however,
than new and more widespread
violence erupted in.East Paki-
stan, fanned again by refugee
accounts of what had happened
on.the Indian side. This time
the destruction was far greater
than that caused by the pre-
vious outbreaks, and the Paki-
stani Government had to make
a major effort to prevent these
disturbances from dwarfing the
Calcutta affair.
The potential for renewed
violence in Bengal remains high.
The over-all death toll probably
exceeded a thousand; other thou-
sands have been injured, made
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homeless or destitute. Still
others in large numbers fled
across the border--Hindus to
India, Muslims to East Paki-
stan. Both governments are as-
sisting their minority communi-
ties to re-establish themselves.
New Delhi, while hoping to
avoid encouraging any mass ex-
odus of Hindus from East Paki-
stan, has responded to Bengali
pressure to liberalize some-
what the immigration process
for Hindus who desire to move
to India.
An additional complication
on both sides, but especially
in the Calcutta area, is the
economic turn the rioting took.
Previous outbreaks of communal
violence in Calcutta--even the
massive riots of the late 1940s
--had taken the form mainly of
personal attacks. In recent
disorders, the main targets of
the roving mobs were the dwell-
ings and shops rather than the
persons of the minority com-
munity.
In the Calcutta area this
reflects the large element of
hooliganism which pervaded the
disorders. Hoodlums off the
streets--"goondas" available
to the highest bidder--obviously
exploited the disorders for
their own gain and pleasure;
they also acted as agents for
unscrupulous landlords seeking
to dislodge Muslim tenants and
for such extremist right-wing
Hindu parties as the Bharatiya
Jan Sangh and the Hindu Maha-
sabha.
Communal Parties and Prospects
Political parties organ-
ized on communal lines continue
to flourish in some parts of
India and will continue to ex-
ploit such violence as took
place in Calcutta. Such par-
ties, however, do not have wide-
spread influence throughout the
subcontinent despite the depth
of Hindu-Muslim feeling.
In Pakistan there is little
future for communal parties; nor
are there any issues which they
can meaningfully exploit... In
West Pakistan, where there are
few Hindus, the only parties
that could function would be
Muslim oriented, but the commu-
nal issues they could work with
are primarily ones involving
Pakistan's relations with India,
and on these there is a general
consensus. Pakistan's party of
independence continues to have
considerable influence, not as
the communal party which sought
a separate state for India's
Muslims, but rather as the re-
juvenated vehicle of Ayub Khan's
rule.
The only place where
Hindu parties could function
meaningfully would be in East
Pakistan, but the martial law
period and the continuing close
rein which the national and pro-
vincial governments keep on po-
tential troublemakers in East
Pakistan has to a considerable
degree prevented Hindus from
acting as a political bloc.
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In India, ruled since in-
dependence by Jawaharlal Nehru's
secular and still overwhelm-
ingly predominate Congress
Party, the secular stance of
the government has left an area
open to exploitation by com-
munal parties. The Muslim
League continues to function
in some areas, although except
in the south Indian state of
Kerala, its influence is mini-
mal. Its presence in Kerala,
however, adds one more element
to the complex mix of caste
and communal considerations
which complicate that state's
political situation. Anti-
Muslim feeling among the Con-
gress Party's local organiza-
tion and the secular dicta of
Congress' national organs--
proscribing cooperation with
communal parties--are a major
factor in the continuing divi-
sions in the non-Communist
camp in Kerala in the face of
a renewed Communist drive for
a return to power there in the
next elections.
The Hindu communal parties
are considerably stronger, es-
pecially in north India where
India's Hindus and Muslims live
in closest proximity. Both
the Jan Sangh and the Hindu
Mahasabha are. outgrowths of
the Hindu renaissance of the
second. half of the 19th cen-
tury--a reaction to the imposi-
tion of Western culture--and
both are staunch defenders of
traditional Hindu values and
institutions. Despite recent
efforts by some younger ele-
ments in the Jan Sangh leader-
ship to broaden the base of ,
the party's support by toning
down the anti-Muslim character
of the party's program, both
parties are generally anti-
Muslim in their activities
and. attitudes.
Jan Sangh is much the
stronger of the two, running
well in several states in the
1962 elections and forming the
opposition in the state as-
sembly of India's most popu-
lous state, Uttar Pradesh.
Regional considerations, how-
ever, plus the fact that Hindu-
ism itself is extremely di-
verse, have prevented even the
well-organized Jan Sangh from
capitalizing fully on the ex-
tent of communal feeling among
India's masses. It is doubt-
ful that any one party could
capture national power on a
communal platform, although it
is equally true that each
party, however secular its
ideological bent, exploits the
communal question in its~day-
to-day operations--Congress
Party minions included.
In fact, it has been .
Nehru's immense personal pres-
tige and his commitment to a
secular state that have been
the. principal counterweight
to more conservative sentiment
within his own party on
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communal matters. However well
motivated Nehru's successors
are on this score, they will
be more identifiably Hindu in
their demeanor and their em-
phasis on secularism will carry
considerably less weight. It
will be up to them to reassure
India's Muslims that Congress
government will not, in the
post-Nehru period, be trans-
formed into a Hindu government,
while making it clear to Hindu
extremists in the Congress it-
self as well as in the communal
parties that excesses will not
be allowed.
Of special importance in
this regard will be the neces-
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sity for finding a workable al-
ternative to the present po-
litical vacuum in Indian-held
Kashmir. An over-all solution
of Indo-Pakistani aspects of
the Kashmir problem is prob-
ably no more possible in the
present uncertain period of
Nehru's convalescence than it
was when he was healthy, but a
movement toward more internal
autonomy for the Indian-held
portion seems inevitable.
Whatevr'r develops, every In-
dian leader involved in the
Kashmir problem will have the
communal considerations, lim-
itations, and potential re-
percussions foremost in his
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