WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A004300130001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 32
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 2, 2008
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: February 21, 1964
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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25X1
Q 21 February 1964
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
State Dept. review completed
SECRET
GROI P 1 clvdsd Fr&m qu#on tc
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(Information as of 1200 EST, 19 February 1964)
THE COMMUNIST WORLD Page
SOVIET PLENUM'S EXTRAORDINARY SESSION 1
Indications are that, after its discussions on agricul-
ture, the central committee was informed of Khrushchev's
tactics for dealing with Peiping's latest diatribe.
SOVIET QUEST FOR CREDITS ELICITING LITTLE RESPONSE 1
London has confirmed its willingness to guarantee long-
term credits, but Bonn still refuses to underwrite any
credits to the bloc, and other European governments ap-
parently are awaiting specific purchase orders before
setting their policies.
EAST GERMAN DIFFERENCES WITH OTHER MEMBERS OF BLOC 2
East Germany, in publicly criticizing political and eco-
nomic policies elsewhere in Eastern Europe which it sees
as inimical to its own interests, is implicitly censur-
ing Moscow for tolerating such a situation.
EAST GERMAN MEASURES TO COPE WITH ECONOMIC PROBLEMS 3
Although Ulbricht has taken pains to give a liberal cast
to the "New Economic System" he says will be implemented
this year, the party shows no sign of loosening either
economic or political controls.
HANOI DISSATISFIED WITH SOVIET SUPPORT ON SOUTH VIETNAM 4
Following a high-level party delegation's recent visit
to Moscow, there are new indications that North Vietnam
is dissatisfied with the level and extent of Soviet po-
litical and diplomatic support for the war in the South.
STEPPED-UP COMMUNIST ACTIVITY LIKELY IN SOUTH VIETNAM
The Viet Cong will probably resume wide-scale military
operations, now that their seven-day self-proclaimed
cease-fire has ended. Terrorist activity against US
personnel continued during the military lull.
COMMUNIST MILITARY PRESSURE CONTINUES IN LAOS
Pathet Lao forces, presumably backed by North Vietnam-
ese elements, have initiated actions in the Plaine des
Jarres region as well as in areas farther south.
THE CYPRUS ISSUE
Fighting on the island slackened this week as the
question was taken up by the UN Security Council.
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ASIA-AFRICA (continued)
CHANGE OF P1iEMIERS IN PROSPECT FOR IRAN
The change should be smooth--with few, if any, shifts
elsewhere--and might offset some of the disillusionment
that has spread among the public as the Shah's reform
program has lost momentum.
TANGANYIKA AND THE EMERGENCY OAU CONFERENCE
Last week's meeting in Dar-es-Salaam of the Organiza-
tion of African Unity helped Tanganyika's President
Nyerere regain some prestige domestically, but seems
to have irritated officials of other African states.
FIGHTING CONTINUES ALONG SOMALI-ETHIOPIAN BORDER
Orders from both capitals to begin a cease-fire on 16
February have not stopped the border fighting, and each
side reportedly is reinforcing its troops in the area.
POLITICAL UPHEAVAL IN GABON
France intervened to calm the political storm arising
from an attempt to oust President Itiba on 16 February,
The ultimate outcome of the affair remains uncertain.
POLITICAL AGITATION IN BRAZZAVILLE
A recent tribal demonstration in support of imprisoned
ex-President Youlou has strengthened leftist elements
in the government and led the Massamba-Debat regime to
take a more hostile attitude toward the West.
Page
8
SPAIN MOVING TOWARD CLOSER RELATIONS WITH SOVIET BLOC
The Franco regime may hope to increase trade, to enhance
its international prestige, to demonstrate--as in its
Cuba trade policy--that it is not subservient to the US,
and possibly to collect collateral advantages such
as softening Mexico's heretofore inimical attitude.
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EUROPE (continued)
Page
HARDENING EEC POSITION ON TARIFF TALKS
West Germany, the EEC member most likely to benefit
from liberalized trade, now seems increasingly dis-
posed to support the EEC Commission's protectionist
formula for identifying tariff disparities.
STATUS OF NATO FORCE PLANNING EXERCISE
New efforts are being made to overcome disagreements--
mainly over strategy--which have blocked this effort to
estimate NATO force requirements for the period 1966-70.
PAPANDREOU PARTY WINS GREEK ELECTION
Its decisive victory should give Greece a stable gov-
ernment to deal with the Cyprus crisis.
WESTERN HEMISPHERE
THE
SITUATION
is no
ev ence a any anaman an leader is trying hard to
bring the country to a more moderate attitude.
CUBA AND THE US NAVAL BASE ISSUE
The regime has apparently relaxed military alert meas-
ures instituted after its action against the base's
water supply, and Cuban leaders continue to profess a
desire to reduce tensions with the US.
BRAZILIAN PRESIDENT PUSHING FOR SWEEPING REI ORMS
Goulart's chances of success do not seem much greater
now than in the past year or so, and there is much sus-
picion about possible ulterior motives--such as changing
the constitution to give him another term as president.
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WESTERN HEMISPHERE (continued) Page
SPURT IN COMMUNIST TRADE WITH LATIN AMERICA LIKELY IN 1964 20
Food shortages in China and.Eastern Europe have already
enabled MLxico and Argentina to dispose of large amounts
of last year's grain crop, and further sizable sales of
agricultural items appear likely.
UNITED NATIONS
FINANCING OF UN PEACE-KEEPING OPERATIONS
Efforts are being made--including early bilateral talks
between the US and the USSR--to find a new formula for
financing UN peace-keeping operations which is workable
and politically acceptable to both East and West.
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SOVIET PLENUM'S EXTRAORDINARY SESSION
The Soviet central committee
plenum, after its scheduled dis-
cussions on agriculture, apparently
moved into an extraordinary session
in which the Soviet leaders may
have disclosed new tactics for deal-
ing with Communist China in the
aftermath of Peiping's bitter attack
of 3 February. On 14 February the
plenum was expanded to include an
array of important central and
regional officials concerned with
The Communist World
propaganda and ideology. After
Khrushchev spoke at the morning
session, additional sessions were
held and the plenum continued in-
to the next day. While Soviet
media did not reveal the subject
under discussion, there were re-
ports from both Communist and
Western correspondents that a
new letter to the Chinese was
read. Chief ideologist Mikhail
Suslov reportedly made a speech.
SOVIET QUEST FOR CREDITS ELICITING LITTLE RESPONSE
Response to the USSR's much-
publicized plans for a buying splurge
on credit has been slow. West Euro-
pean governments other than the UK
and West Germany--which already had
established credit policies toward
the USSR--apparently are not eager
to set policies until actual and
specific orders are under negotia-
tion. The prevailing attitude seems
to be that there will be plenty of
business for all. In addition to
usual purchases of plants and equip-
ment, the USSR proposes to import
at least $1 billion worth of chemical
plants in the next seven years. The
amount of additional credit required
is clearly more than any one country
would be able or willing to supply.
If the USSR hoped that its
credit breakthrough in the UK would
cause other countries to fall in
line, it has been disappointed.
Bonn is sticking by its refusal to
guarantee any credits for the USSR,
and there has been little agitation
in Paris or Rome to lengthen credit
terms since London reaffirmed that
it would guarantee credits for up
to 15 years. One reason for this
may be the apparent lack of resources
in France and Italy for financing
such credits. Moreover, Continen-
tal traders--the official attitude
in London notwithstanding--may
be skeptical of the British bank-
ing community's willingness to
extend such long-term credits to
the USSR. Deals for British
synthetic-fiber plants on long-
term credits are still reported
"imminent," but this has been the
story for several weeks.
Despite unwillingness to
establish a new credit policy on
hypothetical cases, Western govern-
ments undoubtedly will consider
any reasonable proposal made by
their industries or banks in re-
sponse to firm Soviet orders.
Some officials have admitted that
to secure Soviet business they
are willing to see banks or in-
dustrial firms extend longer term
credits and assume on their own
the risk which exceeds the period
of the government guarantee. It
is possible that eventually those
governments adhering to a five-
year credit limit will adjust
their guarantees to become effec-
tive on delivery of equipment
rather than at the time orders
are placed--a move equivalent to
extending the period to seven or
eight years.
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21 Feb 64 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMMARY
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EAST GERMAN DIFFERENCES WITH OTHER MEMBERS OF BLOC
Long-smoldering differences
between East Germany and some of
the other East European countries
were spelled out at the recent
Socialist Unity Party (SED) cen-
tral committee plenum and pub-
licized in the party daily on 13
February. East Germany, increas-
ingly concerned over the effects
liberalizing policies in these
countries could have on its own
internal stability, criticized
Czechoslovakia's de-Stalinization
program, castigated other--
unnamed--members of the bloc
whose economic policies are un-
dercutting East Germany's posi-
tion regarding West Berlin, and
implicitly censured the USSR for
permitting such a situation to
develop.
The politburo report to the
plenum, delivered by Candidate
Member Horst Sindermann, vigor-
ously attacked Prague for per-
mitting revisionist theories to
spread unchecked and for its re-
cent de-Stalinization measures.
In his criticism of current ideo-
logical trends that are causing
trouble in East Germany, Sinder-
mann charged that "revisionist
theories" advanced by Professor
Havemann of East Berlin's Hum-
boldt University "are interre-
lated with opinions that come to
us from Prague." He warned that
the SED distrusts all people who
advocate a "new Marxism."
In a clear reference to
Poland, Rumania, and Hungary,
Sindermann criticized bloc trade
agreements with West Germany that
include the "Berlin Clause"--
this, in effect, for purposes of
trade, recognizes West Berlin as
a part of the Federal Republic.
In a warning presumably directed
at Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria,
which are considering similar
agreements, Sindermann declared
that West German Foreign Minis-
ter Schroeder's "policy of mo-
tion" toward the Communist states
is aimed at exploiting economic
relations for political purposes.
East Germany's own trade arrange-
ments with West Germany, Sinder-
mann pointed out, are vestiges
of the four-power occupation of
Germany and greatly differ from
the agreements concluded by other
bloc countries.
The most unusual aspect of
the politburo report was its
clearly implied dissatisfaction
with the USSR for failing to en-
sure that the Eastern European
countries take into considera-
tion the SED's difficulties in
ideological matters and the Ger-
man and Berlin questions. The
East Germans evidently considered
it necessary to balance this
criticism with a blast at the
Chinese--which was probably also
intended to counter the SED's
hard-line critics of the re-
gime's coexistence policies.
In making its views public,
East Germany has taken a step
that could have more disruptive
effects on bloc unity than Ru-
mania's open opposition last year
to certain bloc economic policies.
Bucharest was opposing economic
policies still in the planning
stage, while the East Germans
are opposing political and ideo-
logical policies long accepted
by Moscow.
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The Communist World N"Wr
The long-planned "New Eco-
nomic System" which Walter U1-
bricht says will be implemented
in East Germany this year is
designed to increase economic
efficiency by clarifying chains
of command, providing some mate-
rial incentives to management,
and improving quality and dis-
tribution of consumer goods.
Although Ulbricht, in remarks
to the recent party plenum
(published on 13 February), took
pains to make the program appear
liberal, the party has shown no
sign of loosening either economic
or political controls.
The party, for example,
will maintain a close watch over
the operations of the newly
strengthened industrial associ-
ations (VVBs). Each VVB includes
all enterprises in a particular
industry, and has authority under
the "new system" to allocate
specific plan tasks and distrib-
ute manpower, materials, wage
funds, investments, and credits.
This delegation of responsibility,
it is hoped, will leave central
authorities free to make over-all
plans and policy without inter-
vening in day-to-day VVB affairs.
Ulbricht apparently expects
the top managers of the VVBs to
become the new managerial class
of East Germany. Their income
will depend on economic achieve-
ment--in addition to their fixed
base salary, they will receive
large bonuses for fulfillment
and overfulfillment of VVB plans.
Nonmanagerial personnel, however,
will continue to be hard pressed
by rigorous work norms and al-
most stationary wage rates, de-
spite promises of bonuses and
extra leaves.
.'or both managers and work-
ers, wages and salaries are no
longer dependent solely on ful-
fillment of quantity norms, but
also on quality, production costs,
and productivity. Implementa-
tion of such a system is difficult
in Communist countries, and the
details of the program are still
far from clear.
Consumers have been promised
some improvement in the quality
and assortment of food and con-
sumer goods. Even though the
quantity is not to increase
significantly in the first half
of the seven-year plan period,
greater attention to consumer
demands should prevent continued
accumulation of unsalable stocks.
The regime has also promised to
try to solve distribution prob-
lems which have caused numerous
localized shortages.
The regime has been adver-
tising the development of the
chemical industry as the most
important task under the new
seven-year plan, but Ulbricht's
extensive comments on this subject
included no new policy state-
ments. He said East Germany
would send whole chemical in-
stallations to the USSR and would
continue to follow the Soviet
lead--in this case by increasing
its chemical industry 70 percent
by 1970. Achievement of this
plan goal is possible because
some of the petrochemical facil- 25X1
ities developed since 1958 are
to begin production in 1964
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`o" SECRET
The visit of a high-level
North Vietnamese party delegation
to Moscow from 31 January to 10
February has led to the disclosure
of new indications that Hanoi is
dissatisfied with the level and
extent of Soviet political and
diplomatic support for the war in
South Vietnam. The cold and formal
tone of the joint communique is-
sued after the delegation's re-
turn to Hanoi reflects the growing
strain in Soviet-Vietnamese re-
lations.
Hanoi appears to believe that
the conflict has entered a cru-
cial new phase which requires not
only intensified Viet Cong mili-
tary action, but also maximum
Communist political and diplomatic
pressure to force a change in the
US policy of active military sup-
port for the Republic of Vietnam.
The North Vietnamese mission to
Moscow probably urged this course
on the Soviet Union. A recent
article in the North Vietnamese
party journal suggests that the
delegation may also have asked
for a Soviet statement of firm
military support designed to de-
ter the US from large-scale di-
rect intervention in the war in
South Vietnam.
At a minimum, Hanoi would
doubtless like to see the Soviet
Union use its position as co-
chairman of the 1954 Geneva Con-
ference to give more aggressive
support to North Vietnamese
charges concerning US "interven-
tion" in South Vietnam. The North
Vietnamese probably also desire
Soviet initiatives designed to
spur international concern over
US policy in the war. Hanoi would
also welcome a further increase
in Soviet propaganda support.
The North Vietnamese appar-
ently do not expect the visit to re-
sult in a significant increase in
Soviet backing, however. In a 15
February editorial, Hanoi welcomed
the communique's renewed pledge of
general Soviet support on the war,
but declared that the pledge must
be translated into "practical
deeds" if it is to form a "val-
uable contribution" in the conflict.
The communique indicates that
ideological differences were also
a major topic of discussion. The
Soviets apparently made no head-
way in swinging Hanoi away from
its pro-Chinese stand in the Sino-
Soviet dispute. At the end of the
visit both sides submerged their
differences in a joint reaffirma-
tion of the equivocal Moscow
statements of 1957 and 1960. The
Chinese Communists--in a move
probably designed to show approval
of the North Vietnamese stand in
Moscow--gave the mission effusive
publicity and full red-carpet
treatment when it stopped in Pei-
ping en route home.
The outcome of the mission
will probably strengthen the hand
of the North Vietnamese party's
militant, pro-Chinese faction
which has long urged more vigorous
measures to bolster the Communist
position in South Vietnam. The
delegation was led by First Secre-
tary Le Duan, a leading spokesman
for this group. He and his follow-
ers, who have in the past openly
hinted at dissatisfaction with
Moscow's policies in the war, will
probably argue that Moscow's stance
during the visit proves that Hanoi
must continue to step up its own
participation in the war and co-
operate more closely with Peiping.
SECRET
21 Feb 64 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
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Communist guerrilla forces
in South Vietnam for the most
part observed their seven-day
self-proclaimed cease-fire dur-
ing the lunar new year holidays.
With the end of this period on
18 February, a gradual step-up
of Viet Cong activity seems cer-
tain, possibly including some
larger scale attacks in company
or battalion strength. A resump-
tion of anything approaching
the high rate of activity sus-
tained by the Viet Cong in the
ten days preceding their cease-
fire would be a dramatic indica-
tion that they can dictate the
pace of the war and would make
it even harder for the govern-
ment to gain the initiative.
Despite the week's military
lull in the countryside, the
Viet Cong further stepped up
terrorist activities directed
against American personnel. Of
about 15 reported grenade or
bombing incidents since the 30
January coup, all but three have
been against installations used
or frequented by Americans,
mostly in or near Saigon. This
campaign seems designed to
weaken the resolve of the US
and to encourage doubts about
the capabilities of the new
Khanh regime.
General Khanh, meanwhile,
is trying to assert firm con-
trol and to rally new support
from rural areas. He and other
top commanders have traveled to
provincial towns and to military
units in the field to demonstrate
their personal interest in con-
ditions outside the capital.
Khanh told the US consul in Hue,
for instance, that he felt pre-
vious Saigon regimes had neglected
that important northern coastal
town.
The new government appar-
ently is considering steps to
broaden local participation in
its top-level councils. Khanh
indicated publicly that he plans
to reorganize the Military Rev-
olutionary Council, the country's
ostensible executive authority,
and introduce representatives
designated by combat units. An-
other high-ranking general has
stated that the composition of
the civilian advisory Council
of Notables will be changed,
with some of its members elected
by provincial councils.
US officials, however,
report that there is still
considerable uncertainty in
rural areas, and that a lack
of urgency and clear direc-
tion is evident in many of the
most critical provinces. In
some of these, pacification
programs have been at a vir-
tual standstill as a result of
the changeovers in Saigon and
the new year holidays.
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LAOS
CHINA
Road
____ Track or trail
-~~ Railroad
NUTH
VI ENTNAM
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COMMUNIST MILITARY PRESSURE CONTINUES IN LAOS
Communist forces continue
to exert pressure against gov-
ernment positions in several
areas of Laos. Perhaps hoping
to exploit the confusion and de-
moralization resulting from the
recent rout of rightist and neu-
tralist forces from the central
plateau region northeast of
Thakhek, Pathet Lao forces--
presumably backed by North Viet-
namese elements--have initiated
actions in the Plaine des Jarres
region as well as farther south
in the vicinity of the provin-
cial capitals of Thakhek, Savan-
nakhet, and Pakse.
The action on the Plaine
des Jarres has been limited to
stepped-up artillery exchanges
between the opposing forces.
To the southeast, Communist
forces--long virtually isolated
in the vicinity of Xieng Khouang
town and resupplied only in-
frequently by convoys along
Route 4--have been successful
so far in a drive to clear
rightist and neutralist forces
from commanding positions in
the neighboring hills.
North and east of Thakhek,
where Communist forces are with-
in striking distance of the Me-
kong, the situation appears to
have stabilized at least tempo-
rarily. Right-wing forces have
regrouped and have taken up de-
fensive positions along the
ridges on the eastern edge of
the Mekong valley. While Com-
munist forces have mounted small-
scale probing actions against
some of these positions, it seems
unlikely that they would at the
present time be inclined to risk
a major move into the valley it-
self. They probably fear such
a move might precipitate a sharp
response from the SEATO powers.
Farther south, Pathet Lao
and North Vietnamese units have
been reported active in the area
east of Savannakhet along Route
9. South of Pakse, there have
been reports of substantial Com-
munist troop concentrations along
the Mekong River, and fighting
has been reported in the area.
Concerned over the de-
teriorating situation, Pre-
mier Souvanna has requested
the International Control Com-
mission to send a team to in-
vestigate charges that the
Pathet Lao have violated the
cease-fire in the Thakhek area.
However, the commission is
still hamstrung by the Polish
member's insistence on prior
approval from the Pathet Lao
for any investigation and by
the Indian chairman's reluc-
tance to undertake action on
a majority basis. It has
therefore failed so far to
disnatch teams to the area.
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Isolated acts of violence
continue in many parts of Cyprus,
but there have been no major
clashes in several days. Leaders
of both the Greek and Turkish
Cypriots appear aware that vio-
lence initiated by members of
their communities could be detri-
mental to their respective po-
sitions at the UN, where the
Security Council this week began
consideration of the Cyprus issue.
The UN observer on Cyprus,
Indian General Gyani, was suc-
cessful in arranging a cease-
fire in the town of Polis in
western Cyprus early this week.
Prior to a visit by Gyani to
Limassol, scene of widespread
fighting last week, the Greek
Cypriots made strenuous efforts
to give the city the appearance
of complete normality. As a
result of these indications of
Gyani's influence, the British
will probably attempt to have
him participate more actively
in the future.
The resident manager of
the American-owned Cyprus Mines
Corporation, largest employer
and largest producer of foreign
exchange on the island, has
recommended to his headquarters
that mining operations be sus-
pended. The manager has indi-
cated that dependents and non-
essential personnel will be
evacuated. This shutdown would
add about 1,000 more workers to
the already large ranks of the
unemployed.
The Turkish government and
press welcomed the 16 February
landslide election victory of
George Papandreou and his Cen-
ter Union party in Greece on the
assumption that Athens now will
have a stable government to
deal with the Cyprus issue.
There have been rumors in Athens
that Papandreou might make some
dramatic move--such as proposing
a "summit meeting" with Turkish
Premier Inonu--in an effort to
prevent a possible Greco-Turkish
war over Cyprus.
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Iran's Prime Minister Amir
Asadollah Alam, who has long ex-
pressed the desire to step down,
is expected to be replaced in
late February or early March by
Hasan Ali Mansur. The transi-
tion should be smooth with few,
if any, shifts in other cabinet
posts. A change of leadership
however, may offset some of the
disillusionment that has spread
among the public as the govern-
ment's reform program has lost
momentum.
Mansur is the wealthy and
ambitious son of a former prime
minister. From 1957 to 1959 he
was under secretary for economic
affairs. He is regarded as a
moderate who apparently believes
in cautious implementation of the
Shah's reform pro ram.
The US Embassy has expresse some
doubts about Mansur's qualifica-
tions, but in his previous govern-
ment position he at least demon-
strated an ability to develop a
competent staff.
Mansur's appointment may be
part of a new political experi-
ment by the Shah--creation of a
fashionable "one-party system"
to replace the official pro-
government party and official
opposition party which seem to
have outlived their usefulness.
Mansur is head of the Progressive
Center Group, a kind of political
club which he recently renamed
the New Iran Party. Presently com-
posed primarily of men of wealth
and connections in Tehran, the
party has been organizing "cells"
in the capital in an effort to
broaden its base. Its ultimate
objective is to "go to the coun-
try." Since it clearly has re-
ceived the Shah's tacit blessing,
the party has attracted sup-
porters in parliament and now
includes about 150 of the 195
members.
The recently concluded extra-
ordinary conference of African
foreign and defense ministers in
Dar-es-Salaam enabled Tanganyikan
President Nyerere to regain among
his countrymen some of the pres-
tige he had lost during the Jan-
uary mutiny of the Tanganyikan
Army. His standing in African
international circles has suf-
fered, however.
Nyerere, invoking the
charter of the Organization of
African Unity (OAU), called the
conference to deal with the
"emergency in East Africa."
The meeting gave its approval
to the Tanganyikan Government's
request in January for British
troops to put down the mutiny;
it also sanctioned Nyerere's
efforts to obtain African
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troops--Algeria, Nigeria, and
Ethiopia have been approached so
far--to replace the British.
By obtaining international
approval of the British presence,
Nyerere has blunted internal
criticism of his call for help
and has bought time in which to
try to set up a loyal indigenous
security force. He himself called
the conference "incredibly suc-
cessful," and there seems little
doubt that it did help to re-
furbish his domestic image.
Other African leaders, on
the other hand, have tended to
regard Nyerere's call for the
conference as unnecessary and
a result of panic. Some of them
apparently feel they were dra-
gooned into bailing Nyerere out
of a situation he should have
been able to handle himself.
Many believe that the issue could
have been postponed until the
regular OAU foreign ministers'
meeting on 24 February. Other
East African leaders, particu-
larly Ugandan Prime Minister
Obote, feel that Nyerere has
reduced their maneuverability
in dealing with the British mili-
tary presence in their own coun-
tries.
Orders from both capitals
to observe a cease-fire beginning
at 1200 hours on 16 February have
not stopped the fighting along
the Somali Ethiopian border.
Each side has charged the other
with new aggressions--the Somalis
listing 12 specific areas--and
each is reportedly reinforcing
its troops along the border.
All field commanders con-
cerned may not have received the
cease-fire order by the appointed
time. There are also indications
that commanders--particularly
Ethiopian--may be continuing the
fight on their own initiative.
Ethiopian troops in the Ogaden
region are said to be "bellicose"
after months of harassment by
dissident Somali tribesmen.
The 4,500-man Somali Army
has been heavily reinforced by
hastily armed "volunteers," and
these elements may be difficult
to control. Moreover, there is
no indication that Mogadiscio's
cease-fire order was intended
to be--or could be--applied to
dissident Somali tribesmen within
Ethiopia. The US Embassy in
Mogadiscio points out that the
arms distributed to the "volun-
teers" will never be recovered,
and predicts that Ethiopia will
have more trouble in the Ogaden
during the next six months than
during the last six.
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The ultimate result of the
political upheaval that ousted
Gabonese President Mba on 18
February was still unclear as
of noon the following day. At
that time, it appeared that
French troop movements in the
capital city of Libreville had
taken place, aimed at influenc-
ing the situation. No reaction
was yet reported, however, from
the various elements which had
committed themselves to Mba's
ouster--particularly the Gabo-
nese Army officers who spear-
headed it.
According to press reports
from Paris, official sources
there stated on the morning of
19 February that French forces
in Gabon had begun "operations
to restore order" on the basis
of the "cooperation accords"
signed by the two countries in
1960. About 200 French troops
were stationed in Gabon before
reinforcements were flown in on
18 February from Congo (Brazza-
ville), the Central African Re-
public, and Senegal.
These Paris sources report-
edly also labeled the original
coup, which probably was in-
spired by Gabonese politicians
against whom Mba moved last
month, as a "military rebel-
lion of limited character" and
said that Paris continued to
recognize Mba as the legitimate
authority.
Concurrent radio announce-
ments from Libreville claimed
the "revolution" had already
been foiled and that Mba, who
had earlier been forced to re-
sign and was imprisoned by the
rebels, had resumed control.
A Gabonese Army captain broad-
cast this announcement, which
also conveyed the impression
that the local gendarmerie--pre-
viously reported associated
with the rebels--had turned the
tables on Mba's foes.
One press report from Paris
alleged that Jean Aubame, Mba's
principal rival, who was named
on 18 February as the head of
a provisional government, now
had "refused to accept office."
There are some indications,
however, that French representa-
tives in Gabon may be maneuver-
ing behind the scenes to ar-
range a compromise whereby Au-
bame would be included in a re-
vised government.
France's action in Gabon
contrasts sharply with its re-
fusal last year to help leaders
of Congo and Dahomey when they
were ousted.
Paris
may also have been influenced
by the recent British interven-
tions in East Africa and by the
special importance to France of
its economic interests'in Gabon,
which is the source of uranium
as well as of a profitable tim-
ber industry.
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21 Feb 64 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
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ANGOLA
(PORT.).'..':'.
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Asia-Africa
POLITICAL AGITATION IN BRAZZAVILLE
A recent demonstration by Within the regime, the
tribesmen in support of ex-Presi-I leftist faction--led by Commerce
dent Youlou has ushered in a j Minister Aimd Matsika, a trade
period of increased tension in
the Brazzaville Congo and pro-
duced a notably more hostile
attitude toward the West on the
part of moderate President Mas-
samba-Debat's regime. Leftist
elements within the government
have already strengthened their
position as a result of the in-
cident and seem likely to profit
from any further disturbances
the tribesmen may foment.
The 7 February demonstra-
tion in Brazzaville was touched
off by rumors that Youlou, a
chief of the Lari tribe, had
been executed. Youlou in fact
is still in prison, and the
tribal move was put down quickly
--with casualties--by government
security forces. Their prompt
and effective action suggests
that Massamba is probably in
no immediate danger of being
overthrown, at least by a
tribal reaction.
In the aftermath of the
demonstrations, however, con-
fusion mounted. Under leftist
inspiration, a "people's militia"
and youth "vigilance groups"
were formed and charged with
ferreting out "counterrevolu-
tionaries." Massamba has since
moved to bring the leftist-in-
clined youth groups under his
own control by the appointment
of an activist youth leader--
presumably loyal to him--as
head of a newly created govern-
ment commission for youth and
sports.
unionist who has long had Com-
munist ties--reportedly began
maneuvering for more important
cabinet posts. Militant union-
ists already hold positions of
control in the National Assembly.
The leftists have also ap-
parently convinced several of
the moderates in the regime that
the Lari demonstration was West-
ern-inspired. Massamba-Debat
himself on two separate occa-
sions denounced unnamed "foreign
embassies" for urging the Lari
on. At a mass meeting on 8
February, the US, France, and the
UK were specifically denounced by
youth leaders for complicity in
the incident.
The French have been appre-
hensive over Massamba's apparent
inability to control the activ-
ist elements in his own camp and
over the effect on his government
of the presence in Brazzaville of
exiles from the Leo oldville
Congo
Although the
French stood aside when Youlou
was ousted last August--main-
taining that they would not in-
tervene on behalf of an unpop-
ular ruler--they have kept open
the possibility that they might
use their forces stationed in
Congo in support of Massamba
should they become convinced
that leftists are planning to
oust him.
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SPAIN MOVING TOWARD CLOSER RELATIONS WITH SOVIET BLOC
The Franco regime is work-
ing toward the establishment of
closer relations with the Soviet
bloc. Aside from possible eco-
nomic advantages, its aim is
to demonstrate Spain's interna-
tional acceptability for the
benefit of the regime's critics
at home and abroad.
Madrid and Moscow will
resume diplomatic relations by
1 April, according to the
Spanish ambassador in Paris,
who has handled the negotiations
with his Soviet colleague. Pre-
viously, the Spanish Government
had insisted on repayment of
some $570 million of gold sent
to the USSR by the Spanish Republi
can government during the civil
war, but Spanish officials re-
cently indicated this is no
longer a precondition to rec-
ognition.
Negotiations for diplomatic
recognition are reportedly also
under way between the Spanish
and Czech embassies in Paris.
Czechoslo-
vakia, Po an , an one other
E
satellite will probably be per-
mitted to set up trade offices
there soon. The government's
desire to prepare the public
for such steps is probably
behind recent speculation in
the controlled Spanish press
about closer relations with
the bloc.
For several years Spain
has been trading on a semiof-
ficial basis with most of the
European satellites, and expanded
markets there would somewhat
offset--both economically and
in international prestige--
Spain's exclusion from the Euro-
pean Economic Community. The
Spanish Government may also
see in closer bloc relations--
as in expanding trade with Cuba
--a counterweight to possible
charges at home that it is sub-
servient to Washington in permit-
ting the berthing of Polaris
submarines at the US naval base
at Rota. The first of these
submarines is en route from its
previous base in Scotland.
There may also be a feel-
ing in Spanish official circles
that resumption of diplomatic
relations with the USSR would
have collateral advantages--
for example, in softening Mex-
ico's dislike of the Franco
regime. In recent weeks the
Spanish press has campaigned
for an early renewal of ties
with Mexico, where the Franco
regime has never had more than
an unofficial mission. Despite
Madrid's long-standing interest
in this matter, it seems unlikely
that Mexico--which has national
elections in July--will respond
favorably any time soon.
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HARDENING EEC POSITION ON TARIFF TALKS
On the eve of further pre-
paratory talks in Geneva for
the Kennedy Round tariff nego-
tiations, the EEC position ap-
pears to be hardening. European
journalists and diplomats--pos-
sibly reflecting views expressed
by the EEC Commission--are pes-
simistic about the chances for
sizable tariff reductions, and
some maintain that the US will
not be able to begin the nego-
tiations in May as scheduled.
West Germany, the Common
Market country most likely to
benefit from liberalized trade,
now seems to be increasingly
disposed to support the EEC
Commission's formula for identi-
fying tariff disparities--a
formula which the US believes
favors EEC protectionism.
The strong defense by the
EEC of its disparity-identifying
formula may be an effort to obtain
a bargaining lever for negotiat-
ing the smaller tariff cut or
winning concessions on other
issues.
STATUS OF NATO FORCE PLANNING EXERCISE
New efforts are being made
to overcome the difficulties
which have kept the NATO Force
Planning Exercise (NFP) at a
virtual impasse since last No-
vember. This exercise--origi-
nally approved last May--is in-
tended to produce force estimates
for the period 1966-1970, taking
into consideration not only the
specific forces required by
NATO's strategic posture, but
also the national resources
available to meet them.
Disagreements over strate-
gic doctrine, and particularly
over the question of timing in
the use of nuclear weapons, are
the main cause of the delay.
The French have been especially
forthright in rejecting the US
concept of a "flexible response"
to aggression in Europe in favor
of a more immediate nuclear
retaliation, the so-called "trip-
wire" approach. There is gen-
eral agreement that the differ-
ences over strategy are so
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NOW SECRET
Europe
divisive that they should not be
raised in NATO forums for the time
being--even though it is recognized
that they necessarily must be
faced in due course. This would
be attempted only after the Defense
Planning Committee, after further
analysis of NATO defense needs,
has been able to ascertain more
clearly how these needs can be
met with available resources.
There nevertheless seems to
be a consensus that the NFP exer-
cise should go forward if at all
possible. Secretary General
Stikker has suggested that the
NATO commanders put forward tenta-
tive sets of force goals for 1970
based on their estimates of the
nature of the enemy threat, their
particular missions, and, without
specific reference to it, the
PAPANDREOU PARTY WINS GREEK ELECTION
George Papandreou's moderate
pro-Western Center Union (EK) won
a decisive victory in Greece's 16
February elections. In contrast
to its slim plurality in last No-
vember's election, the EK captured
at least 170 out of 300 seats in
parliament. According to near-
final unofficial returns, the mod-
erately conservative National Rad-
ical Union of former Premier Kara-
manlis, allied with the small Pro-
gressive Party, retained less than
110 seats. The Communist-dominated
United Democratic Left won about
20.
The desire of many Greeks for
a stable government to deal with the
Cyprus issue was probably the most
important, although not the only,
strategic guidance set forth in
past NATO directives.
In late January, French offi-
cials were still insisting that
the North Atlantic Council must
first decide on alliance strategy.
However, Stikker has since sug-
gested that the council's direc-
tive on the NFP exercise be modi-
fied to authorize his "pragmatic"
approach. This may give the
French a face-saving basis for
reversing their stand when the new
proposals are presented to the
Defense Planning Committee in the
near future. In addition, Stikker
proposes to invite the defense min-
isters to attend a special meeting
of this committee in April in
order to have a high-level review 25X1
of the situation and to point up
the importance of the NFP exercise.
factor in Papandreou's victory.
The new government may align
itself more closely with Cypriot
President Makarios than did the
caretaker regime. Late in the cam-
paign, the EK came out strongly
against the Anglo-American plan for
an international police force drawn
from NATO countries. Cyprus aside,
the EK will probably continue the
policy of close collaboration with
Washington, but may move more ener-
getically than did Karamanlis to-
ward improvin relations with the
Soviet bloc.
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Western Hemisphere
25X11
There is no evidence)
that President Chiarl or other
Panamanian leaders are making
any real effort to bring the
country to a more moderate at-
titude.
a conference of
Tat n American foreign ministers
may be necessary as a last ef-
fort to prevent Panamanian
charges against the US from
passing to the United Nations.
Chiari and other conserva-
tives have done nothing to pre-
vent Communist elements from
manipulating the current wave
of nationalism because they are
afraid of appearing less than
nationalistic themsleves.F_
The CDNS now is well estab-
lished as the leading voice of
Panamanian nationalism. Busi-
ness groups, however, are with-
drawing from it on the grounds
that the Communists exert exces-
sive influence in CDNS decisions,
although this influence has been
obvious from the committee's in-
ception under the leadership of
rabid nationalist Jorge Illueca.
The Panamanian ruling group con-
tinues to minimize the increas-
ingly evident moves by Communists
to consolidate their new advan-
tages in labor, student, and
other groups, and remains pri-
marily concerned with its own
search for a presidential slate
to defeat Arnulfo Arias in the
May elections.
As a means of keeping juris-
diction over the Panama prob-
lem within the OAS, some Latin
American countries may favor a
foreign ministers' conference.
Venezuela and Argentina have re-
cently suggested such conferences
on other topics.
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Western Hemisphere
CUBA AND THE US NAVAL BASE ISSUE
Cuba has apparently re-
laxed the military alert meas-
ures instituted after the ac-
tion against the US Naval Base
water supply on 6 February.
High-altitude photography
revealed the return of
most of the troops and equipment
that had been moved out of the
largest military base in eastern
Cuba on 7 and 8 February.
Cuban leaders continue to
profess a desire to reduce ten-
sions with the United States.
SECRET
ing concern over the dismissals
of Naval Base workers, he stated
that, if he could be given an
indication of how many workers
would be fired, he could avoid
having to draft a "strong note
of protest" to the US.
Meanwhile, Cuban propaganda
over the "brutal" dismissals
has been strident, and the US
is being accused of arbitrarily
violating the rights of the
workers. The statements mini-
mize the effect on the Cuban
economy of the loss of the wages
of these workers. The regime
has appropriated 300,000 pesos
to pay the dismissed workers
and has promised them appro-
priate jobs.
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Western Hemisphere
BRAZILIAN PRESIDENT PUSHING FOR SWEEPING REFORMS
Under the slogan that 1964
is to be the "Year of Reforms,"
Brazil's President Goulart has
begun another campaign to mobi-
lize support for a reform pro-
gram. His chances of success
do not seem much greater now
than in the past year or so,
and there is a good deal of
suspicion about possible ulte-
rior motives.
Goulart has endorsed the
so-called "popular front" pro-
gram recently put forth by ex.-
Finance Minister San Tiago
Dantas. This program--now pub-
lic--recommends in part consti-
tutional amendments which would
enfranchise illiterates, per-
mit enlisted men in the armed
forces to run for public office,
and authorize payment in bonds
for expropriated property.
Dantas also proposes restora-
tion of legal status to the
Communist Party, establishment
of government monopolies in for-
eign exchange and the coffee ex-
port trade, and extensive agrar-
ian reforms.
Goulart reportedly has
sent the proposals to all lead-
ing political groups and has
discussed them with church and
military leaders. In a public
statement, the Communist Party
endorsed the plan's general ob-
jectives but urged even stronger
action.
There is considerable pub-
lic concern that Goulart may in-
tend to use the Dantas program
as a basis for inciting public
clamor for a plebiscite on re-
forms. Such a plebiscite might
also include a provision setting
aside the constitutional prohibi-
tion against Goulart's continu-
ing in office beyond his term.
A move in this direction is pre-
dicted by leaders of his Brazil-
ian Labor Party in the state of
Bahia. Goulart successfully em-
ployed a plebiscite last year to
restore full executive powers to
the presidency after Brazil's
brief experience with parliamen-
tary government in 1961-62.
On balance, the proposed
measures seem to be designed
primarily to enhance the re-
gime's acceptability, especially
on the left. Even if some of
them were enacted, lagging pub-
lic confidence in Goulart's gov-
ernment would probably not be
greatly strengthened.
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Western Hemisphere
SPURT IN COMMUNIST TRADE WITH LATIN AMERICA LIKELY IN 1964
This year a new record
probably will be established for
trade between Communist countries
and Latin America (excluding
Cuba). Shortages of foodstuffs
in China and Eastern Europe al-
ready have enabled Mexico and
Argentina to dispose of about
$125 million worth of grain from
last year's excellent crops, and
further sizable sales of agri-
cultural items appear likely.
China, which usually pur-
chases only token amounts of
cotton in Latin America, has
agreed to buy $25 million worth
from Mexico for 1964 delivery
and is interested in purchases
from Brazil as well. Both China
and Czechoslovakia are negotiat-
ing for substantial quantities
of meat. These sales will more
than compensate for the reduc-
tion in trade with the USSR,
which has already been forced to
reduce its wheat export commit-
ments to Brazil and is giving
no encouragement to Latin Ameri-
can trade missions in Moscow.
Total trade in 1964 will
probably pass the $340-million
peak established in 1955 when
the Communists made a concerted
effort to increase economic re-
lations. The lack of a real
economic basis for this trade,
however, resulted in a drop to
about $200 million by 1957.
Since then trade has risen grad-
ually, to $300 million a year,
but prospects are poor for a sus-
tained significant increase.
Argentina and Brazil, which
have been responsible for the
largest part of Latin American
trade with the Communist world,
will be joined by Mexico this
year. On the basis of contracts
already concluded, Mexico's share
of this trade should increase
from just a few million dollars
recently to about $65 million in
1964.
There continues to be a
basic difference in Soviet and
East European trade motivation.
The satellites make efforts to
expand long-term markets, while
Moscow's interest appears to be
in maintaining a political pres-
ence.
East European trade missions
and representatives of Communist
trading corporations travel ex-
tensively in Latin America. Most
recently a Bulgarian group, led
by high-ranking officials, spent
six weeks in Brazil, Argentina,
Uruguay, and Chile. The bloc
countries also hold trade fairs
and exhibitions periodically.
China recently held a six-week
exhibition in Mexico which, al-
though it did not produce any
immediate orders, is being moved
to Chile and possibly to Brazil.
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FINANCING OF UN PEACE-KEEPING OPERATIONS
Negotiations between the
US and the USSR are scheduled
to take place in the near fu-
ture on the complex problem of
finding a new formula for fi-
nancing the UN's peace-keeping
operations. What is needed is
a workable formula which is
politically acceptable to the
USSR and the West and which
satisfies the demands of the
more influential UN members
for a greater say in the con-
trol and mounting of such opera-
tions.
The 1950 "Uniting for
Peace" resolution gave the Gen-
eral Assembly sweeping powers
to act in crises when the Secu-
rity Council was paralyzed by
the veto. Since then the growth
of the assembly from some 50
to over 100 members has resulted
in a situation in which the
UN's major financial contrib-
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Page 21
utors might have to pay for
operations set in motion by a
majority of members who contrib-
ute the least.
Numerous plans have been
put forward to get around this
problem. The one most likely
to be adopted--first by the ma-
jor powers and later by the as-
sembly as a whole--will prob-
ably leave the initiation of all
peace-keeping operations with
the Security Council, as is now
the procedure, but, in the event
the veto sends the issue to the
General Assembly, the major
powers will keep control of the
operation through a Peace-keep-
ing Finance Committee set up by
the assembly and weighted in
favor of the major powers. Pre-
sumably, a power which fundamen-
tally objected to a peace-keep-
ing operation would not be as-
sessed for it.
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