WEEKLY SUMMARY
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State Dept. review completed
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
DIA review
completed.
~~CRET
2
rf C~
GROl1P I Excluded fr~mautr,matic
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~~~~~
~~
~..J) ~'e,/ downgrading pn
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w w
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(Inf ormation as of 1200 EST, 6 February 1964)
THE COMMUNIST WORLD Page
SOVIET ATTITUDE AT GENEVA DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE
Moscow apparently believes that chances for early
agreement on major disarmament measures are practi-
cally nil but would like to reach some understanding
which would convey a sense of progress.
SOVIET AGRICULTURAL SITUATION ON EVE OF PLENUM
Weather conditions so far this season are similar to
those which caused last year's agricultural failure.
PEIPING RENEWS ANTI-SOVIET POLEMICS
Its latest assault is designed to counter Moscow's
charge that Peiping is "splitting" the Communist
movement and at the same time to encourage ,just such
action by anti-Soviet factions around the world.
HUNGARY INTRODUCES INTEREST CHARGE
This "capitalist" practice, which is soon to be
extended to East Germany, will have limited di-
rect effect but may lead to additional ref orms.
CZECHOSLOVAK ECONOMIC DIFFICULTIES
The regime is preparing to introduce remedial meas-
. ures which may cause popular dissatisfaction.
RUMANIA ENCOURAGING RELATIONS WITH THE WEST
Apparently motivated primarily by a desire to expand
trade, Bucharest has taken several steps to improve
its image in and relations with the West.
POSSIBLE NEW EAST GERMAN PARTY LEADER
Recent publicity on party affairs suggests that par-
ty secretary Erich Honecker has come to be regarded
as eventual successor to Walter Ulbricht.
EAST-WEST GERMAN TRADE AGREEMENT
The protocol continuing interzonal trade involves
concessions by both sides--economic in West Germa-
ny's case, political on the part of the Communists.
YUGOSLAV - WEST GERMAN TALKS MAY RESUME
Bonn and Belgrade are still seeking a basis for re-
suming talks, halted in July, to settle differences
involving Yugoslav war indemnification claims and
West German toleration of anti-Tito emigre groups.
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~'
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THE COMMUNIST WORLD (continued)
CHOU EN-LAI ENDS AFRICAN TOUR
His only diplomatic plum was Tunisia's agreement to
receive a Chinese Communist ambassador, but the trip
may have prepared the way for future advances by Pei-
ping and, for this reason, was probably a success.
COMMUNISTS MOVE AGAINST NEW SOUTH VIETNAM REGIME
There has been a marked step-up of Viet Cong activity
since the coup on 30 January, and there are signs of
a concerted Communist effort to discredit General
Khanh's government.
POLITICAL UNCERTAINTY IN AFGHANISTAN
The. King and ex-Prime Minister Daud are engaged in
a test of wills which centers on a proposed more
liberal constitution. Daud may try to recover his
dictatorial control.
THE CYPRUS SITUATION
The security situation on Cyprus has continued to
deteriorate, and anti-US and anti-British sentiment
has sharply increased. Negotiations have been re-
newed in London to find a compromise on the issue
of apeace-keeping force.
Page
AREA NOTE
On the Congo
13
MODERATES LOSING OU'P IN SOUTHERN RHOllESIA
White extremists are agitating for independence from
14
Britain now, while Africans seem increasingly prone
to use violence in their struggle with the white gov-
ernment and in their intramural disputes.
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EUROPE
DE GAULLE'S PRESS CONFERENCE
While his major immediate purpose was to facilitate
the transfer of Chinese representation in Paris, his
remarks on domestic matters may indicate same con-
cern about public criticism of his regime.
GREECE AGAIN PREPARES FOR ELECTIONS
Barring unforeseen developments over Cyprus, George
Papandreou's Center Union is expected to come out
ahead again in voting on 16 February. A period of
prolonged difficulty could ensue if he does not win
a working parliamentary majority.
DEVELOPMENTS IN THE PANAMA SITUATION
Panama's success in forcing OAS consideration of
its charges against the US will encourage Panama-
nian extremists, who want to prolong the impasse
between the US and Panama as long as possible.
VIOLENCE IN COLOMBIA
Communist-instigated urban terrorism may intensif
.iust before elections on 15 March
COMMUNIST-DOMINATED LATIN AMERICAN LABOR CONGRESS
The backers failed to achieve their primary goal of
establishing an organization representing a majority
of Latin American workers but did form a permanent
executive to pursue this objective.
INCREASING TENSIONS IN BRITISH GUIANA
Premier Jagan's party, which fears it may lose
control of the colony's government in new elec-
tions Britain has decreed, has apparently decided
to provoke violence in order to prevent them.
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The Communist World
uOVIET A":1'ITUDE AT GENEVA DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE
The Soviet attitude at the
Geneva Disarmament Conference has
underscored Moscow's apparent c on-
viction that there is relatively
little chance for agreement on
major disarmament measures in the
foreseeable future. Soviet lead-
ers seem intent, however, on ex-
ploring US proposals in the hopes
of reaching some understanding
which would convey a sense of
progress toward disarmament and
give the appearance of forward
movement in US-Soviet relations.
The nine-point Soviet memorandum
tabled on 28 January reflects
Khrushchev's decision to stress
"tension-reducing" measures ra-
ther than general and complete
disarmament.
Key Soviet advisers at the
conference have indicated that
there are common points "which
will facilitate discussion," and
Soviet chief delegate Tsarapkin
has expressed interest in prob-
ing aspects of the five-point
program submitted by the US, So-
viet commentators, meanwhile,
have avoided harsh criticism of
these proposals and have taken
the line that President Johnson's
"general formula" has yet to be
fully developed into "concrete
proposals."
A senior Soviet representa-
tive at Geneva recently confided
that the USSR has certain ideas
in the realm of "atmospherics"
on which agreement might be
reached. He thought that the
conference could easily adopt a
"symbolic resolution" calling
upon all states to reduce mili-
tary expenditures.
Tsarapkin told US dele-
gate Foster that the discus-
sion of measures to reduce
tension should begin with the
question of military budgets,
on which both countries had
already acted unilaterally.
He said there would be no need
for a formal agreement and the
US had only to accept the prin-
ciple of "mutual example."
In a 30 December interview,
Khrushchev called for "a policy
of mutual example in the cur-
tailment of the arms race" to
avoid the problems of verifica-
tion and investigation.
The USSR has also indicated
that some agreement might be
reached on destruction of ob-
solete bombers. The US has pro-
posed destruction of RB-47s and
Soviet Badgers. While Tsarapkin
has taken the standard position
that all bombers are obsolete,
he has not ruled out entirely
a discussion of this issue.
The Soviets are hinting,
moreover, that they will not
necessarily insist on abandon-
ment of Western plans for a
multilateral NATO nuclear force
(MLF) as a condition for reach-
ing agreement on a nondissemina-
tion pact. The deputy chief of
the Soviet delegation maintained
that the USSR wants a detailed
discussion of this question and
US assurances that the MLF will
not result in the proliferation
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A Soviet central committee
plenum on agriculture is sched-
uled to open on 10 February.
Uppermost in the minds of its
participants will undoubtedly be
the food shortages and discon-
tent caused by last year's
agricultural failure and an aware-
ness that weather conditions
thus far this season are again
relatively poor.
While it has been evident
for several months that grain
output dropped sharply in 1963,
the full effect on consumers is
only nvw becoming known. Recent
reports state that white bread
almost disappeared in many areas
last fall and was replaced by
dark bread of such poor quality
as to cause illness in some
cases. Bread riots and strikes
were reported in several areas,
and open expressions of dissat-
isfaction were fairly widespread.
Even allowing for exaggeration
and bias of the reports
fit rema nsns
clear that discontent over the
food situation has caused con-
siderable concern in Moscow.
Weather conditions similar
to those which adversely af-
fected the winter grain crop of
1963 have been noted for some
of the winter grain areas this
year, especially in the Ukraine
and Moldavia. While a record
area of about 111 million acres
of winter grains has been planted,
extremely dry conditions in the
fall in some areas reduced seed
germination and retarded plant.
development. Following the ab-
normally warm fall, the winter
grain areas have been subjected
to alternate thawing and freez-
ing. In some areas inadequate
snow cover has left the grain
fields exposed --a condition
conducive to winterkill,
On the other hand, it is
possible that a good grain crop
may be harvested from the New
Lands in 1964--although summer
weather is an important factor
for this area. Abundant fall
rains and heavy winter snows
have greatly improved moisture
supplies.
The forthcoming plenum--
chaired not by Khrushchev but
by the minister of agriculture
--apparently will consider
means of implementing programs
already announced rather than
new policies. Recent press
reporting on agriculture has
not mentioned possible policy
shifts. On the contrary, the
press has been preoccupied with
Lack of preparation for spring
sowing--neglect of farm machinery
and seed in storage. Several
recent reports have suggested
that some Soviet leaders would
like more free enterprise in
Soviet farming, but continuing
and increasing restrictions
on small-scale private agri-
culture---private plots and
peasant-owned livestock--sug-
gest there will be no move in
this direction.
The plenum will probably
discuss implementation of Khru-
shchev`s chemical fertilizer pro-
gram and may go into long-range
plans for irrigation--a poten-
tially multibillion-ruble pro-
gram which was mentioneu only
briefly at the December Alenum
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v, JLi (..lCl.l
Peiping continues to be con-
fident that the trend in the in-
ternational Communist movement
is very much in its favor. A
4 February Red Flag - People's
Daily article--Fie lates n-
s~aTrment in the serialized
answer to the Soviet party's
letter of 14 July 1963--is de-
signed to counter the charge
that Peiping is '.'splitting"
the movement, while at the same
time encouraging just such action
by anti-Soviet factions in
parties around the world. Pei-
ping appears to be trying to
provoke the Soviets into an
action which would place respon-
sibility for a formal split on
Moscow.
There is not much new sub-
stance advanced in the Chinese
argument, but its tone of arro-
gant certainty in the rightness
of the Chinese policies and of
disdainful contempt for the
weakness of the Soviet position
marks a belief that Peiping
has recovered an initiative it
lost when it was isolated by
its rejection of the nuclear
test ban treaty. The Chinese
openly charge that Soviet lead-
ers by their ultrarevisionist
policies have forfeited the
leadership of the Communist
movement and have even become
"anti-Soviet." Since part of
the Chinese argumentation iSi
that all parties are sovereign
and equal, Peiping does not
claim this lost leadership for
itself, but there is no mistaking
the implication in the article
of the long listing of precedent
for the dissident minority's
becoming the leader of a later
and more pure majority.
While the Chinese do not
yet appear ready to take the
next logical step of organizing
their present minority into a
new International themselves,
they clearly are prepared for
such a move if the USSR tries
to get a majority condemnation
of their conduct. In the mean-
time, they are content to rely
on their attacks on the Soviet
leadership, their subversive
efforts in other parties, and
the loosening of Soviet control
to improve their position.
This latest assault places
the Soviet leaders in a difficult
position. On the one hand, fail-
ure to respond to Peiping's
challenge to resume "public de-
bate" would tend to confirm the
Chinese charge that Khrushche~'s
appeal last October for a cessa-
tion of polemics reflected the
Saviet leaders' recognition that
the debate was "developing in a
way contrary to their wishes."
An all-out resumption of polemics,
on the other hand, would in effect
concede to the Chinese the advan-
tage of determining the ground
of battle. It would also require
Moscow to disregard the interests
of foreign Communist leaders who
have urged the Russians to avoid
an open showdown which would
sharply aggravate their own prob-
lems.
There are signs that Khru-
shchev's three-month moratorium
on polemics is coming to an end,
but it is not yet clear that he
will accept Peiping's challenge
for an all-out resumption of
"public debate." In addition to
Khrushchev's indirect attacks on
the Chinese during Castro's visit
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to the USSR last month, Pravda
on 30 January denounced Peiping's
reaction
to Khrushchev"s 31
December
proposal
for an inter-
national
agreement
renouncing
force in
settling
territorial
disputes.
The Pravda article probably
is the opening move in a new
campaign to discredit Peiping,
using the same tactics applied
HUNGARY INTRODUCES INTEREST CHARGE
Hungary now requires indus-
trial enterprises to pay a type
o:f interest charge on their fixed
and working capital. Although
introduction of this "capitalist"
practice will have only limited
direct effect, it reflects the
active search by bloc regimes
for ways to relieve pressing
economic problems. Moreover it
may lead to additional economic
reforms such as increased decen-
tralization.
The "capital use charge,"
imposed by Hungary on 1 January,
is employed also in Yugoslavia.
The East Germans intend soon to
introduce such a charge experi-
mentally, and other European
satellites are considering
similar actions. This charge
is tantamount to a 5-percent
annual interest charge on fixed
and working capital to be paid
initially from the profits of
enterprises and not passed on
to buyers. The purpose is to
improve the management of enter-
prise assets and reduce inven-
tories. Later, the Hungarian
regime plans to work the capital
charge into prices so that
planners at all levels will be
last summer on the issue of
Chinese rejection of the nuclear
test ban treaty. It remains
doubtful, however, that the
Soviet leaders believe they can
rally sufficient support within
the Communist movement for a
major response to Peiping's
scornful charge that the Soviet
warning last September of a
"mast resolute rebuff" was a
mere bluff.
better able to determine relative
costs of alternative products,
investments, and exports.
In the short run, opera-
tion of the economy is unlikely
to be affected much. There
should be some gain in eff iciency,
but the inadequate leeway allowed
enterprise managers means that
the basic problems characteristic
of a rigidly controlled bloc
economy will remain.
It is possible, however,
that introduction of the capital
use charge heralds broader re-
forms of the economic system.
Application of what is in effect
an interest charge is a major
ideological change. Moreover,
as prices come to reflect real
casts more closely, resulting in
more efficient operation of the
economy, the government probably
will be willing to decentralize
economic decisions to a greater
extent and to introduce appro-
priate reforms in the system of
incentives. The effects on the
economy could then be considerable.
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SEG'RET
The state of the Czecho-
slovak economy has become a po-
litical liability for party
leader Novotny and his col-
leagues, but some of the "re-
forms" to be introduced this
year may cause even greater
dissatisfaction among the
workers.
Economic achievement in
1963, as reflected in a recent
central committee resolution,
were particularly poor. In-
dustrial growth, after slowing
in 1961 and 1962, actually
dropped almost half a percent
last year. Investments fell
considerably. Basic economic
problems are at the root of the
decline, but production also
suffered from the confusion
and poor morale caused by the
absence of coherent economic
plans and policies.
The regime has allowed
widespread discussion of re-
forms in economic management,
which has brought forth bold
proposals to scrap many facets
of the planning system. Novot-
ny's rigid policy of tighter
state controls as a means of
solving problems has come under
strong attack. Economic policy
has been modified to stress im-
proved quality of products,
technological change, and in-
creased attention to require-
ments of purchasers.
These changes probably will
cause some improvement, but
measures planned to implement
them may spark discontent. For
example, regulations now being
drafted will prohibit disburse-
ment of state funds for inferior
products. A planned revision
of wage policy, although it would
provide greater material incen-
tives, would penalize both man-
agement and workers for inferior
production. Further resentment
may result from plans to trans-
fer at least 15,000 workers
(plus families) to factories
which are producing below capac-
ity. A more active role of the
party in controlling production
will accompany these new measures.
Largely because of ferment
in Slovakia over economic hard-
ship and long-standing politi-
cal grievances, development of
this region is to be accelerated.
The rate of increase planned
for 1964 industrial output
there, 7.2 percent, is nearly
triple the rate for the remain-
der of the country. Some pro-
duction is to be transferred to
Slovakia from the more developed
regions, and efforts to im-
prove living standards are ex-
pected.
The regime's efforts to
improve the economy not only
will be resisted by the in-
dividuals directly affected
but fall far short of demands
from liberal elements for a
fundamental change in the eco-
nomic system.
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SF, CRET
RUMANIA ENCOURAGING RELATIONS WITH THE WEST
The Rumanian regime has
recently taken a number of steps
to improve its political image
in and relations with the West.
It appears to be motivated
primarily by a desire to expand
trade .
A top Foreign Ministry of -
f icial has made it clear that
a relaxation of US trade poli-
cies would increase Rumania's
willingness to settle cases in-
volving dual US-Rumanian citi-
zenship and to get on with
negotiations on a new consular
convention, first proposed. by
the US in 1961. Another official
said on 14 January that Rumania
would be willing to finance im-
ports from the US by using gold
reserves and convertible cur-
rencies earned in Western
Europe.
The Rumanians have also
indicated an interest in having
the New York Times re-establish
a bureau in Bucharest, and seem
ready to make several hundred
copies of Western newspapers
available in the country's major
tourist areas. A survey pub-
lished in January emphasized the
Roman origin and character of
the Rumanian language.
Domestically the regime has
been stressing its growing "free-
dom of action" within the bloc.
Its independent attitude toward
the bloc economic organization
(CEMA) was given the status of
formal party doctrine in a
party textbook on economic pol-
icy published in December.
The relationship between
expanded Western trade and
Rumania's continued "independ-
ence" within the bloc was the
The Communist World
theme of a conversation which
politburo member Emil Bodnaras
arranged with US Minister Craw-
ford on 2? January. Bodnaras
stressed that no CEMA decision
affecting Rumania can be taken
without its approval.
A]_though he admitted to
Crawford that Rumania would give
"slight" preference to a bloc
country in placing its foreign
trade orders, the regime's main
concern was to obtain the best
product wherever it could be
found. "There are (Soviet bloc)
countries," he said, "which do
not share this view and have
argued with us repeatedly. We
simply have had to say no, no,
no, and no."
Rumania's unorthodox view
that all Communist countries
should be included in CEMA
activities--i.e., Communist
China, too--was defended by
Bodnaras when he said that cur-
rent political differences be-
tween some of them made it all
the more desirable to reduce
economic separateness. He went
on to note there would be more
examples of Rumanian "unorthodoxy"
in relations with. the bloc and
with the nonbloc world.
In an effort to impress
Crawford with the permanency of
Rumania's current policies,
Bodnaras took the occasion to
characterize the Rumanian polit-
buro as a cohesive and pragmatic
group whose members know what
they want for their country's
good. He concluded the dis -
cussion by saying that "as Lenin
once said, what is needed is to
combine Bolshevik organization
with American practicality."
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The Communist World
POSSIBLE NEW EAST GERMAN PARTY LEADER
The recent trend of public-
ity on East German party affairs
suggests that the question of
Walter Ulbricht's eventual suc-
cessor may have been resolved.
The choice, at least as far as
Ulbricht and the party (SED) are
concerned, appears to be Erich
Honecker, who serves not only
as a politburo member and party
secretary for security affairs,
but also as secretary to the Na-
tional Defense Council, Ulbricht's
main instrument for coordinating
party and-state action in crisis
situations.
Much less publicity has
been given to East Berlin party
boss Paul Verner, who has seemed
from time to time to challenge
Honecker's lead, The other ob-
vious candidates appear to be
out of the running for one rea-
son or another. Acting Premier
Stoph seems slated to replace
ailing Premier Grotewohl.. One-
time challenger Alfred Neumann
is tied down by his duties as
chairman of the National Eco-
nomic Council. Politburo mem-
ber Albert Norden, who reportedly
has fancied himself as a candi-
date, appears to be cooperating
with Honecker and Stoph.
Indications of Honecker's
ascendancy have come from var-
ious sources. In early Janu-
ary, at a ceremony commemorat-
ing the 45th anniversary of the
German Communist PartyyUlbricht
pleaded hoarseness and asked
Honecker to finish reading his
speech. The same day, the party
mouthpiece Neues Deutschland
reprinted a-1~'6' ar is e y
Honecker, then leader of the Com-
munist youth organization, which
lauded Wilhelm Pieck, titular
party leader at that time,
This apparent effort to
link him with Wilhelm Pieck--
traditionally supposed to have
been more moderate than Ul-
bricht--may be intended to
blur his role, as security
chief , of enf orcer of U1-
bricht's hard line. The same
motive may have prompted
Honecker 's remarks at the No-
vember central committee
plenum that something would
have to be done about the con-
sumer goods situation, At
least superficially he might
be more acceptable than Ul-
bricht to those West Germans
who have hopes of negotiat-
ing directly with the East
Germans .
Honecker,, now 51, apparently
has been content for the most
part to remain in Ulbricht's
shadow. Described as one of
the party's ablest leaders, he
has demonstrated strong admin-
istrative abilities. During
his career he has ruthlessly
pursued power and shown an un-
failing instinct for identify-
ing himself with the winning--
i.e.;,Soviet--side in important
policy decisions. If the USSR
desires the continuation of U1-
bricht's hard line, free of U1-
bricht's own personal involve-
ment with Stalinist excesses,
Honecker is the man, If a new
line is desired, some other
leader will have to be found.
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SECRET `~
The agreement signed on 21
January by East and West Germany
for 1964 enables interzonal trade
to continue on the same basis as
in recent years. East Germany
had been threatened with a loss
es~iimated at about $33 million
in 1964 as a result of West Ger-
many's new oil tax law. After
several months of negotiations,
West Germany agreed to pay
$18,750,000 in 1964 in partial
compensation for this lose. It
also agreed to postpone until
mid-1965 the annual settlement
of interzonal trade accounts,
a move which in effect provides
additional short-term credit to
East Germany. It is possible
therefore that trade will in-
cr~ase in 1964.
The protocol was not
signed until East Germany
dropped its demands that the
two negotiators sign as rep-
resentatives of the German
Democratic Republic and the
Federal Republic of Germany.
As is customary, they signed
as representatives of their
respective currency areas of
the German mark. In ante again
accepting this formulation--
which not only withholds dip-
lomatic recognition from the
Ulbricht re rime but reiterates
West Berlin's ties with West
Germany--the Communists con-
tradicted the "three Germanies"
nolicv which they are promoting.
A West German Foreign Minis-
try official is expected in Bel-
grade next week to determine
whether some basis can be found
for resuming discussions on out-
standing issues.
The previous round of talks
was brought to a halt by Belgrade
last July when the Germans failed
to meet Yugoslav demands for in-
demnification of World War II
losses. Subsequent diplomatic
probes proved so fruitless that,
by December, Belgrade was threat-
ening to take the issue to the
UN or to the signatories of the
Potsdam Agreement. Belgrade was
willing last summer to close the
book on indemnification if Bonn
would provide various forms of
credits roughly equivalent to
the $300 million indemnification
claim. Bonn now is willing to
give credits for roughly half
that much.
Belgrade has also demanded
that Bonn curb the activities
of the Ustashis, an emigre Croat
terrorist organization based in
West Germany. It is particularly
incensed over Bonn's postponement
of the trial of the Ustashis who
blew up the Yugoslav Consulate
in Bad Godesberg in 1962. Bonn
now promises to take action
against them and hopes that the
Yugoslavs understand the "tech-
nical reasons" for the trial's
postponement.
While Yugoslavia, anxious
to resume talks, will be inter-
ested in Bonn's new approach,
the West German offer is not
generous enough to produce a
quick final agreement.
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v ~"''
Conakry
SIERRA LEONFy
Algiers
21-27 December
Ivy
COAS".
AFRICA
DA MEY
NIGERIA
Tour of Communist China's
Chou En-Jai and Chen Yi
Recognizes Communist China
Recognizes Nationalist China
REPUBLIC
RWA
OF THE
CONGO
NORTI IGRN
R[IL)DESIA~
>7,
KENY
SOliTHLRN
RHC)L~ESIA
OF /
f
SOUTH AFRICA
'Cairo ^
14~ 1 lecember
UNITED
..ARAB
REPUBLIC
CHAD Khartoum'~_
27-30-January ~
SUZ?A1~ .~
CENTRAL AFRICAN
REPUBLIC
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SECRET -'~'-~'
Chou En-lai wound up his long
African safari on 4 February with-
out having scored any startling
immediate gains. His only diplo-
matic plum was Tunisia"s agreement
to receive a Chinese Communist am-
bassador; he may also see a pros-
pect that some of the African
nations now recognizing Nationalist
China may in time follow the French
lead in establishing relations
with Peiping.
The Chinese Communist premier's
seven-week foray into ten Ai'rican
capitals may have helped prepare
the way for future advances, how-
ever, and probably should be re-
garded as an over-all success.
He made a favorable impression al-
most everywhere he went, and his
personal charm has probably done
much to increase respect for Pei-
ping among his hosts.
The generally cautious and con-
ciliatory tenor of Chou's approach
was calculated to win over moderate
Africans-newly come to power and
alarmed by Peiping's militant
backing of violent revolution.
His persistent efforts to present
Chinese and African interests as
identical seem likely to increase
support for China at the next
Afro-Asian conference.
Chows only serious mistake
was in Guinea when
he included a bitter attack on the
US and a pledge of "full support"
for Panama in a live radiobroad-
cast.
Last-minute cancellations by
Tanganyika, Kenya, and Uganda pre-
vented Chou from exercising his
personal diplomacy in these re-
cently independent nations.
The final communiqud issued
in Ethiopia referred only to
"normalization" of relations in
the "near future," although the
Ethiopians have been moving to-
ward formal diplomatic ties with
Peiping in recent weeks. Haile
Selassie may have put off Chou's
pressure fox immediate recognition
pending an assessment of the
Chinese visit to Somalia--a state
with which the Ethiopians have
long been at odds.
Little is known concerning
Chows contacts with leaders in
Somalia and Sudan, but the .final
communiquCs contained no surprises.
The Chinese carefully avoided
endorsement of Somalia's territo-
~ial claims on neighboring Ethi-
opia and Kenya.
Chou and his traveling com-
panion, Foreign Minister Chen Yi,
had been scheduled to stop in
Pakistan, Ceylon, and Burma on
the way home. Cancellation of 25X1
the three visits in East Africa
upset the itinerary, however, and
the Chinese have returned to
Peiping before setting out again
for South Asia in mid-February.
The interval will provide an
opportunity to discuss with other
leaders impressions gained in
Africa and the impact there of
French recognition. 25`25x1
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'-~ SECRET
COMMUNISTS MOVE AGAINST NEW SOUTH VIETNAM REGIME
There are signs that the
Communists are making a concerted
effort to discredit the regime
of South Vietnam's new leader,
Maj. Gen. Nguyen Khanh. As was
the case after the overthrow of
the Diem government in November,
it appears that there has been
a substantial increase in Viet
Cong activity since the 30 Janu-
ary coup, including several at-
tacks in company or battalion
strength. The Viet Cong's Lib-
eration Front on 31 January
called for an intensification
of guerrilla warfare, particu-
larly against strategic hamlets.
One reported target of recent
attacks was a complex of five
hamlets north of Saigon.
The pace of Viet Cong ac-
tivity had already been gradu-
ally intensifying in the three
weeks prior to the latest coup.
About ?0 percent of this activ-
ity has consisted of incidents
of harassment--sabotage of com-
munications, use of harassing
fire near provincial towns, and
attempts to terrorize strategic
hamlet inhabitants. Regular gov-
ernment army units have also been
ambushed with greater frequency.
General Khanh is moving
quickly to consolidate his con-
trol over the government and to
establish its legitimacy at home
and abroad. A rapid reshuffle
of the top military command con-
firmed the appointment as armed
forces chief . of Maj. Gen. Tran Thien
Khiem, who, as commander of the
III Military Corps around Sai-
gon, assisted Khanh's takeover.
Other officers playing key roles
in the coup have also been placed
in top staff posts or commands.
Khanh has secured the co-
operation of deposed junta chair-
man General "Big" Minh as "su-
preme adviser," a move designed
to lend prestige and an appear-
ance of legality to the new re-
gime. Khanh is also consult-
ing various civilian politi-
cians with the idea of forming
a "government of national union"
to replace the civilian cabinet
which presently continues in
a caretaker capacity.
There has been no evi-
dence of countercoup activ-
ity, but there are some signs
of public skepticism about
the new regime. A student
demonstration in Saigon on 4
February favoring the rein-
statement of General Minh re-
flects concern in some cir-
cles, particularly among the
Buddhists, that the new
rulers may revert to poli-
cies of the Diem regime. Com-
mentary broadcast by the Lib-
eration Front and Hanoi have
played up the new leaders' past
ties to Diem and sought to
exploit uneasiness in South
Vietnam over the ability
of the military to form
any stable government.
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7 Feb 64 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
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POLITICAL UNCERTAINTY IN AFGHANISTAN
A test of wills is develop-
ing between Afghanistan's King
Zahir Shah and farmer Prime Minis-
ter Daud, and the political atmos
phere ir.Kabul is filled with un-
certainty.
Daud, who ruled the coun-
try with an iron hand for nearly
ten years, is no longer content
to remain quietly on the side
lines as he did last spring and
summer after his sudden resigna-
tion. Since early last fall, he
has spurned the King's appeals
for support and has been vocally
criticizing the draft of a pro-
posed new constitution which
symbolizes the King's desire for
a more democratic government un-
der liberal leadership. By his
more open opposition, Daud has
encouraged his followers and
some political opportunists to
look far his return to power.
The relatively liberal
ministers in the present cabinet
depend entirely on the King for
political support, and their
confidence has been shaken by
Zahir's delays in pushing through
the new constitution. With his
encouragement, they had released
a number of political prisoners
during their first weeks in
power
Uncertainty in the govern-
ment has also grown as a result
of Prime Minister Yusuf's ill
health, which may take him out
of the picture. First Deputy
Prime Minister Malikyar is widely
regarded as close to Daud. He
could cause further trouble for
the King and his liberal sup-
porters if he becomes acting
prime minister.
The King remains the key
factor. If he remains firm,
the prospects are good for the
continued liberalization of the
government. Zahir's persistent
attempts, however, to find a mid-
dle way reasonably acceptable
to both reformists and Daud?s
conservatives make it difficult
far him to appear strong willed.
Many look on the King's efforts
as a sign of weakness, and some
tend to hedge their support far
him.
Daud may thus be encouraged
to step up his pressure to re-
stare his own brand of dicta-
torial control, possibly under
the guise of one-party "democ-
racy," and again to give Afghan
neutrality a strong pro-Soviet
flavor.
A critical point is likely
to be the presentation of the con-
stitutior, to Afghan tribal elders25X1
for their, annroyal sometime this
spring.
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~ SECRET
The security situation on
Cyprus continued to deteriorate
during the past week. Sporadic
gun battles broke out between
Greek and Turkish Cypriots in
many parts of the island, and
British military forces were
on frequent alert to prevent
new clashes in Nicosia.
International attention
now is focused on London, where
negotiations have been renewed
following President Makarios'
rejection of the Anglo-American
proposals for sending an inter-
national force from NATO coun-
tries to Cyprus. His rejection
was qualified by requests for.
clarification of several points
and by acceptance of the concept
of an international force.
British and American officials
are to meet with the Cypriot
foreign minister in London on
7 February to try to arrive at
a compromise.
Meanwhile, the United Na-
tions appears likely to become
more directly involved. The
Greek Cypriots have insisted
that any peace-keeping force
sent to Cyprus must have some
direct relationship to the UN.
They have warned that failure
to work out an agreement on
this issue will result in an
immediate appeal to the Security
Council. Makarios has stated pri-
vately, however, that he will
consult the US and UK prior to
making such a move. On 5 Feb-
ruary, Secretary General Thant
cut short his African tour to
return to New York because of
the Cyprus problem.
Makarios' rejection of the
proposals has been accompanied
by growing anti-British and
anti-American demonstrations by
Greek Cypriots, including the
explosion of two bombs on 4 Feb-
ruary outside the US Embassy.
The minister of interior has
assured Ambassador Wilkins that
every possible means would be
taken to ensure the safety of
American lives and property.
In Ankara, Turkish offi-
cials, while privately disparag-
ing;Makarios' "blackmail" tac-
tics, officially have adopted
a wait-and-see attitude. For-
eign Minister Erkin, however,
has warned publicly that as
long as the stalemate over a
peace-keeping force continues,
Turkey retains its right to
intervene unilaterally on Cy-
prus. The US air attachd in
Ankara reports that in the area
of southern Turkey where armed
forces have been concentrating
since late December, there is
a belief that some Turkish "show
of force" is being contemplated.
He also reports that naval ships
have been plying back and forth
between the two Turkish ports
nearest Cyprus.
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~..~ ~
Republic
of the Congo
C~? National capital
* Provincial capital
_~~~? Undefined boundary
? Area of unrest
~LEOPOLRGILLE ?'
itenge
,~sx ~
e~rC C~NGC~~CEN RAL #I
73ou>,~fa,~des bout been inrrrpolaierf Jrom axis iir~,g map.v
nra~A inxel(iX erzi< rePorl.t, on.1 ure not defin ilit~e.
7 FEBRUARY 1984
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SECRET v
In Athens, the US ambassa-
dor states that it is hard to
convey the depth of popular
feeling against the Turks which
now prevails. The army attachd
reports a similar attitude--
combined with deep distrust--
among the Greek military. Fear
that the US may support Turkey
in future negotiations or other
action in relation to Cyprus has
led to a bitter press campaign
against US policy on the part of
virtually all newspapers in
Athens. Large but orderly dem-
onstrations against the Anglo-
American proposals for Cyprus
have taken place in both Athens
and Thessaloniki. T~iere continue
to be reports of Greek military
movements in the eastern Aegean.
Como; Although battalion-
sized reinforcements have been
flown to the area of rebellion
in the Congo's Kwilu Province,
government troops appear to be
doing little more than holding
their own against the insurgents.
The uprising has spilled over
into neighboring provinces to
the north, east, and south of
Kwilu.
The rebels, purportedly
led by radical Pierre Mulele,
have succeeded in interrupting
the flow of mineral traffic
going from Katanga to the Congo
seaport of Matadi. This week
Unilever Corporation plantations
in the Kwilu area, which produces
much of the palm oil that is the
country's most important agricul-
tural product, began to evacuate
European personnel.
If unchecked, the rebellion
may attract new adherents among
Premier Adoula's opponents,
possibly including sympathizers
in the army itself. Furthermore,
leftist exiles in the neighbor-
ing Brazzaville Congo, although
badly fragmented, may be able
to capitalize on the situation
if the rebels expand their gains.
SECRET
7 Feb G4 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
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OUTHERN HODESIA
R
~~~~~~~~ ~~~o~~-A
g`~~~" l.~uing'stOne~ *SALISIiUNY
tGA. '' ...~.
/i;T [t7E Nfl
'93884
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~' JL~ GKL' 1
Both the white and the Afri-
can communities in Southern Rho-
desia are gradually drifting away
from moderation, and the chances
of peaceful political evolution
seem to be diminishing.
On the white side, extremism
takes the form of agitation for
a unilateral declaration of in-
dependence from Britain. The
colony's whites, who now number
225,000, have controlled their
own internal affairs since 1923,
and Britain's power to intervene
in any field has been strictly
limited since 1961.
Last April, Prime Minister
Winston Field's government pledged
itself to work for independence
under present constitutional ar-
rangements, which give the colony's
3.8 million Africans only an inef-
fective minority representation
in the legislature. Britain, on
the other hand, has said that in-
dependence will be withheld until
there is majority--i.e., African--
rule, albeit with minority guar-
antees.
The attitude of Field himself
and his closest associates is not
entirely clear. They seem to have
come to realize that Southern
Rhodesia's present autonomous
status is the best they can real-
istically hope for, since a uni-
lateral declaration of independ-
ence would give a further jolt to
the recession-ridden economy and
would largely isolate the terri-
tory politically.
the African states cut loose
from Britain in recent years.
This idea is periodically encour-
aged by influential members of
Field's own party who apparently
believe that South Africa would
come to the rescue of an inde-
pendent Southern Rhodesia. As a
result of these pressures, Field,
who has never been willing to
make many concessions to African
nationalism, seems constrained
to be even less flexible in ne-
gotiations with the British and
the Africans than he might other-
wise be.
This trend toward white in-
transigence has a counterpart
among the Africans. African na-
tionalists have gradually become
conditioned to violent methods
both by the heavyhandedness of
the police and by the intimida-
tion and gang warfare which the
Africans themselves have practiced
since the nationalist movement
split last July. The police ac-
tivities are part of the govern-
ment's strategy--so far success-
ful--of keeping the nationalists
disorganized by persistent har-
assment.
With tempers rising on both
sides, however, these tactics
risk provoking new outbreaks
instead of preventing them. The
chances of interracial violence
would be further increased if
Field's government decided to
yield to its right wing and de-
clare the colony independent.
The notion of a "Boston tea
party," however, is immensely
popular among the whites, who con-
sider themselves far better equipped
for independence than are most of
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"''' SECRET '"~
Europe
DE GAULLE'S PRESS CONFERENCE
De Gaulle's major immediate
objective in his 31 January press
conference was to facilitate the
transfer of China's representa-
tion in Paris from the National-
ists to the Communists. Although
sharply critical of the Commu-
nist regime, he acknowledged
Peiping's control over "almost
the whole of China" and relegated
Chaang Kai-shek to the status of
an honored comrade-in-arms.
In effect, De Gaulle's
statement rejected both Chiang
Kai-shek's claim to represent
China and the "two-Chinas" formu-
lation opposed by Peiping, but
took account of the fact that
Taipei is not under Pei in 's
control.
De Gaulle also adverted to
his idea that Southeast Asia
should be a "neutral" region, and
to his belief that it is necessary
to have China's acquiescence to
accomplish this by treaty. He
apparently envisages the states
of the area as buffers comparable
to the Eastern European satel-
lites of the USSR.
De Gaulle did not mention
Thailand in this context. The
omission may have been intentional
to allay SEATO fears. Foreign
Minister Couve de Murville, how-
ever, recently told Ambassador
Bohlen that France wishes to
achieve the neutralization of
Thailand also.
De Gaulle spoke at length on
domestic matters, which may have
indicated some concern about pub-
lic criticism of his regime. His
lengthy .defense of the institu-
tions of the Fifth Republic sug-
gests that the efforts of the
forces behind the presidential
aspirations of Gaston Defferre,
Socialist mayor of Marseilles,
are having some effect. De
Gaulle refused to make any
commitment about his own plans
for 1965. Although many French
journalists nevertheless in-
terpreted his cryptic state-
ment on this point as tanta-
mount to a declaration of his
candidacy for re-election, it
seems unlikely that De Gaulle
would deliberatel ti his
hand.
7 Feb 64 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMbtARY
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SECRET
On 16 February, for the
second time in slightly over
three months, Greece will elect
a parliament.
The 3 November elections
gave no party a majority of the
300 seats in parliament. The
slightly right-of-center National
Radical Union (ERE), which had
ruled Greece for over seven
years, won 132 seats with 39 per-
cent of the popular vote, while
the middle-of-the-road Center
Union (EK) gained a surprise
success, taking 138 seats with
42 percent of the vote. The
Communist-front United Democratic
Left (EDA) cbtained 28 seats
with 14 percent of the vote.
The small rightist Progressive
Party elected only two deputies
with less than 4 percent of the
vote.
Following those election:
ERE leader Constantine Karaman-
lis quit politics in disgust
and retired to Paris, while the
75-year-old EK leader, George
Papandreou, became premier.
Papandreou, however, wan his
confidence vote on 24 December
only with the help of EDA. Re-
~ecting Communist support, he
resigned after calling on King
Paul to proclaim new elections.
He nevertheless used his 50
days in power to announce plans
to ameliorate the living con-
ditions of farmers, workers and
white-collar groups, and to be-
gin a program of educational
reform.
The LRE was reluctant to
go to the polls again since
Papandreou seemed to be riding
a tide of personal popularity
which would bring him bigger
gains than those he made in
November. Moreover, ERE's nev,
leader--personally chosen by
Karamanlis before his departure
--is Panagiotis Kanellopoulos,
a dignified 61- ear-old o -
cian
On 11 January, the ERE anal
the Progressives announced an
agreement to cooperate in the
elections, but the Progressives
have not been very active.
The Communists, faction-
ridden and short of funds, plan
to run candidates in only 31. of
the 55 electoral districts.
They urge EDA supporters else-
where to vote for -the EK.
Questions of economic pol-
icy still loom large in the
campaigning, but Cyprus has be-
come a more significant issue
than it was last November. The
EK is denouncing Karamanlis for
signing the 1959 London-Zurich
Agreements which gave Cyprus
its independence, and the ERE
is attacking Papandreou for
refusing to forego elections
and form a government of na-
tional unity during the crisis.
The Communists hope to profit
from any anti-NATO, anti-US
feeling stimulated by develop-
ments on the island.
Barring unforeseen develop-
ments over Cyprus, most observers
believe the EK will come out
ahead again. Unless the EK wins
155 seats, however, the govern-
ment probably would still be un-
stable and a period of deepening
political difficulties might en-
SECREI~
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_`r
~~
SECRET
DEVELOPMENTS IN THE PL~NA112A SITUATION
Panama's success in invoking
the Rio Treaty in the OAS --de-
spite a lack of enthusiasm among
most other Latin American coun-
tries for the tactic--will fur-
ther encourage extremists in
Panama. Pro-Communists believe
that their ability to influence
the Chiari government is strength-
ened by every event which pro-
longs the Panamanian-US impasse.
Panama on 4 February managed
to convoke the Council of the
OAS as an Organ of Consultation
to consider charges of aggression
against the US. Its OAS ambassa-
dor said this was a great vic-
tory and. that the "trial" had al-
ready begun. However, a consen-
sus appears to exist that Panama
cannot substantiate its charges.
Mexico has been leading of -
forts, so far without success,
to establish a f ive-nation com-
mittee to investigate the allega-
tions, seek resumption of diplo-
matic relations, and mediate re-
vision of the canal treaty.
Use of the OAS to force
treaty revisions is considered
dangerous by Chile. Colombia
and Venezuela also oppose Panama
on this point, and Peru can be
expected to join them. Bolivia,
Ecuador, and others who resent
existing treaties are of course
pleased by the precedents which
have been set by Panama.
Except on the part of the
opposition parties in Peru, there
seems to be no strong sentiment
in Latin America for internation-
alization of the canal nor for
its removal from US control. The
idea of limited treaty modif ica-
tions is widely accepted, but
thinking in some capitals is
likely to be influenced by the
realization that treaty revi-
sions could bring higher rates
for use of the canal. Panama's
specific objectives regarding
control of the canal are not
clear, but Panamanian officials
do not seem anxious to take
over its operation now and have
consistently apposed both in-
ternationalization or inter-Ameri-
canization.
Cooperation between Panama's
Communist party (PdP) and a Cas-
tro-supported revolutionary (VAN)
group evidently is continuing
in student and propaganda of -
forts to keep anti-US national-
istic fervor at a high pitch.
PdP leaders reportedly believe
that continued pressure on Presi-
dent Chiari to remain adamant
toward the US may cause the
Panamanian "elite" to turn on
the government and thereby pro-
vide the opportunity for left-
ist-led revolution.
A rally called by student
leaders for 9 February will
probably foreclose any chance-
stand in the near future.
SECRET
? Feb 64 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Page 17
25X1
25X1
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Next 1 Page(s) In Document Denied
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~ SECRET ,.+
Communist-instigated ter-
rorism in Colombian cities, a
major political problem of the
National Front government in
1963, is likely to intensify in
the period immediately preced-
ing the 15 March congressional,
departmental, and district elec-
tions. The security forces,
are concentrating on the
a1 rge~y nonpolitical banditry
parties have been responsible
for the bulk of the terrorism,
although rightist members of ex-
dictator Rojas Pinilla's ANP
party have also been active. In
the past six months, a newly
formed organization, the FLN,
modeled after the Venezuelan
FALN, has also made its appear-
ance. As in Venezuela, student 25X1
elements are thought to be among
the most active terrorists.
25X1
2~x~i
Urban terrorist activity
was much more intense in 1963
than in the years immediately
preceding, and particularly so
during the latter half of the
year. In contrast to the long-
continued violence in rural areas,
the urban terrorists have pri-
marily attacked property rather
than persons. Urban terrorism
has usually been timed to coin-
cide with events of national
significance. Targets have in-
cluded official and semiofficial
installations, prominent Colom-
bian personalities and business
firms, and foreign, particularly
US, personnel and installations.
Recently, the terrorists have
been using more powerful explo-
sives and bombs, and it seems
likely that this portends an in-
creased level of activity.
Extremists of the leftist
MOEC, FUAR, and MR:L Vanguardia
Intensive antiterrorist
operations in rural areas
have reduced the death toll
from 2,909 in 1962 to 1,984
in 1963. The situation is
expected to continue to im-
prove as a result of equip-
ment and training of antiguer-
rilla forces furnished by the
US. pn 29 January, however,
bandits attacked a bus in
Santander Department killing
16 persons and wounding 9.
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SE C'RET
COMMUNIST-DOMINATED LATIN AMERICAN LABOR CONGRESS
The constituent congress
of the Single Center of Latin
American Workers (CUTAL), which
was held in Brazil from 25 to
28 January, failed to achieve
its primary objective--the es-
tablishment of a hemisphere-
wide labor organization which
could claim to represent a ma-
jority of Latin American workers.
A skeleton executive committee
was established, however, and
the meeting provided its Commu-
nist backers with a propaganda
platform.
The congress got off to a
bad start when hostile popular
demonstrations prevented it from
convening in Bela Iiorizonte, the
original site. It was saved
from complete failure largely
through the efforts of the Bra-
zilian Government and Brazilian
Communist labor officials who
helped the delegates obtain a
meeting site and transportation
The Brazilian Ministry of Labor
provided f financial assistance
for 'the delegates' accommoda-
tions. Financial aid came also
from the Cuban Revolutionary
Workers Central and the Moscow-
directed World Federation of
Trade Unions (WFTU).
Delegates from labor unions
in almost all Western Hemisphere
countries, including delegates
from some of the European posses-
sions in the Caribbean, were pres-
ent, some 300 in all. Czech-
oslovakia, the USSR, East Ger-
many, Yugoslavia, British Guiana,
and France sent observers.
The establishment of a
permanent executive committee--
which plans to open an off ice
in Santiago, Chile--will enable
the organizers to assert that
CUTAL is in actual operation.
This will justify efforts to
gain the adherence of national
labor confederations in compe-
tition with non -Communist hem-
isphere labor movements. Cuba
has long wanted to replace the
defunct WFTU-affiliated Con-
federation of Latin American
Workers (CTAL) with a iiavana-
oriented organization.
It seems unlikely, however,
that CUTAL can attract even lim-
ited. support. Latin American
labor historically has been un-
enthusiastic about area-wide
labor organizations. CTAL's
poor showing indicates that an
openly Communist-dominated move-
ment has even less appeal.
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SE C'RET
Western Hemisphere
INCREASING TENSIONS IN BRITISH GUIANA.
The People's Progressive
Party (PP?') of British Guiana's
Premier Creddi Jagan has ap-
parently decided, rafter a period
of indecision, ~.u try to pre-
vent new electi:s+~,s from being
held under the proportional
representation system Britain
decreed at the constitutional
conference last October. The
PPP fears it will lose control
of the government if the elec-
tion takes place.
Increasing aggressiveness
on the part of the PPP has been
evident in many quarters. With-
in thr. pas ~: two weeks over 370
acre., o~ cane fields worth
approximately $350,000 have
been burned by PPP activists.
The apparent purpose of this
arson campaign is to induce
sugar producers to recogr~i~e
on7 v ,ne PPP-sponsored su~?ar
wok~u,ers' union.
A march on Georgetown,
the colony's capital, has been
organized by the PPP's Progres-
sive Youth Oxganization (PYO),
and is picking up momentum. Two
teams of PYO members are moving
through the countryside urging
villagers along the route to
join the demonstration. The
marchers expect to reach George-
town on 8 February and Jagan
is to address the group on 9
February.
Although Forbes Burnham's
opposition party, the People's
National Congress (PNC), has
advised its largely Negro sup-
porters to ignore provocation
by the predominantly East In-
dian PPP, the danger of renewed
racial violence is high. On
2 February PNC demonstrators
clashed outside-'PPP headquar-
ters with PPP supporters and
shots were fired. Moreover,
there are reports that PYO mem-
bers intend deliberately to
create as many incidents as
possible to force the British
to fire on them.
Britain now has one crack
battalion of Grenadier Guards
--about 700 men--in the colony.
The police are on the alert
throughout the country, and re-
inforcements have been sent
to the more troublesome areas
along the r^?~*'? ^~ the march.
SE C'.RET
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