WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A004300090001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 28
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Sequence Number: 1
• Content Type: SUMMARY

GLN I KAL IN I LLLI(LN(L A(J N(,,.:Y
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
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RETURN TU R: ~.-;u~ . Gr:. ~ti )m?.k ~y
EDIATELY AFTER UPI
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(Information as of 1200 EST, 23 January 1964)
Page
FRENCH RECOGNITION OF PEIPING
The formal announcement may come next week, but an
exchange of envoys will probably await resolution
of French relations with Taiwan. Other governments
are watching the three-way diplomatic maneuvering
in the apparent hope that France will come up with
an acceptable "two Chinas" solution.
THE COMMUNIST WORLD
THE AFRICAN STUDENT PROBLEM IN THE SOVIET BLOC
The recent African student demonstrations in Moscow
reflect the problems the scholarship program poses
for bloc leaders--who seem to feel nevertheless that
the program's potential benefits for the Communist
world far outweigh the disadvantages evident now.
PEIPING'S DIVERGENT POLICIES TOWARD INTELLECTUALS
The regime appears. to be allowing more freedom for
China's few natural scientists, while tightening
controls over other intellectuals.
AREA NOTE 5
On Yugoslavia
NEW SOUTH VIETNAMESE REGIME STILL BOGGED DOWN
The regime has been unable to put increased drive
into the war against the Viet Cong, who continue a
relatively high rate of harassing and terrorist ac-
tivity to undermine the resistance of the rural pop-
ulation and the government's paramilitary forces.
VIET CONG FRONT HOLDS ANNUAL CONGRESS
The meeting was keynoted by the most optimistic
forecast seen to date of Communist prospects in
the war.
MANEUVERING CONTINUES IN LAOS
Premier Souvanna has met with Pathet Lao leader
Souphannouvong and now intends to make visits to
Phnom Penh, Hanoi, and Peiping. General Phoumi is
increasingly critical of the coalition arrangement.
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23 January 64 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 'i
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ASIA-AFRICA (continued)
AN AILING NEHRU AND THE INDIAN LEADERSHIP
Nehru's incapacitation has removed him from day-to-day
leadership for the first time in seventeen years and
seems certain to alter the established pattern of
leadership even if he recovers. The transition pe-
riod in prospect could stir political and communal
tensions that have been generally dormant for years.
(Published separately as Special Report cCT No. 0315/64A)
THE ARAB CHIEFS-OF-STATE MEETING
In an unusual display of harmony, the Arabs have
agreed on an essentially moderate reaction to Is-
rael's diversion of the Jordan waters. The results
of the meeting have enhanced Nasir's prestige.
SOVIET MILITARY AID TO EGYPT AND SYRIA
The value of aid to Egypt since the mid-1950s totals
over $1 billion, and shipments continue to arrive.
Political frictions with the Baathist regime have
not led Moscow to abandon its commitments to Syria.
WORSENING SITUATION ON CYPRUS
Leaders of all Cypriot factions predict early col-
lapse of the London conference and the probable
resumption of fighting.
EAST AFRICA IN TURMOIL
Repercussions from the coup in Zanzibar and the
army mutiny in Tanganyika have sharpened concern
for internal security in other capitals of the-re-
gion. Prospects for over-all cooperation among the
East African states have been blighted, as each
leader looks more cautiously at his neighbor.
DISCORD IN SCANDINAVIA OVER NUCLEAR-FREE ZONE PLAN 14
Efforts by Finland's President Kekkonen to promote
such a plan for Northern Europe are straining tra-
ditionally close ties among the four Nordic states.
AREA NOTES
On European Fisheries Conference and on Coal-Steel
Community.
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23 January 64 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY ii
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WESTERN HEMISPHERE Page
16
A &L-
Intense pressures for revision of the canal agree-
ments threaten to precipitate the resignation or re-
moval of President Chiari. Communists and pro-Castro
elements continue to stir up nationalist feelings.
CASTRO'S VISIT TO THE USSR
The exact purpose of the trip remains uncertain, but
the closing communiqud repeated past Soviet state-
ments of support for Cuba and indicated Castro's
support for the Khrushchev line on important ideo-
logical issues. A long-term trade agreement was
signed.
NEW STRIKES AND POLITICAL TENSION IN BRAZIL
The tension and pessimism generated by a series of
strikes last week reflect the continued widespread
suspicion of President Goulart's motives and suggest
the political situation is still far from stable.
25X1 11
25X1 I
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23 January 64 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY iii
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MW 3P_ UKI~l Nw-if
France plans soon to an-
nounce formal recognition of the
Chinese Communist Government,
possibly by the first of next
week
An exchange
of diplomatic missions, however,
will probably he held up pending
a resolution of French relations
with the Chinese Nationalist
Government.
French officials profess
to believe that Paris can rec-
ognize Peiping without admitting
Chinese Communist rights to
Taiwan and without the with-
drawal of Taipei's representa-
tives from Paris. Whether Paris
really believes that it can ex-
change diplomatic missions and
ultimately ambassadors with
Peiping while retaining relations
with Taipei is questionable.
Little is known about the actual
Paris-Peiping negotiations, how-
ever, and it cannot be excluded
that additional agreements have
been reached on specific points
of mutual interest.
The Chinese Communists,
playing for big stakes in the
matter of French recognition
are displaying a new diploma
flexibility and have thus far
remained silent in the face of
Western press speculation con-
cerning the "two Chinas" ques-
tion. Peiping, however, has
almost certainly not abandoned
its claim to be the only le-
gitimate government of China and
thus to hold sovereignty over
Taiwan. It is therefore very
unlikely to be willing to rec-
ognize even tacitly the exist-
ence of a separate government on
Taiwan by agreeing to the exist-
ence of two embassies in Paris.
Chinese willingness to
avoid the issue temporarily prob-
ably reflects confidence that,
while Paris need not break re-
lations with Taipei at the time
recognition of Peiping is an-
nounced, De Gaulle can be counted
on to force a Nationalist with-
drawal. Paris seems confident,
however, that it is under no
compulsion to push the Nationalists
out if they do not break relations
on their own volition.
The Chinese Nationalists
continue to assert officially
their unwillingness to maintain
diplomatic relations with France
if Paris recognizes Peiping.
Taipei, however, may refrain from
immediately severing relations
with Paris, in the hope that
Peiping would refuse to exchange
diplomatic missions with France
as long as the Nationalist mission
remains in Paris.
Broad political factors
appear to have induced the
French to act at this time. De
Gaulle probably sees a more rapid
evolution of events in Southeast
Asia opening the way for his
favored neutral and independent
status for the area, and he holds
that Peiping's acquiescence is
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required to bring it about. Paris
has long felt that the Chinese
Communists, as the de facto
government of a large and power-
ful state, have a legal right
to recognition, and that the
West can more effectively exploit
Sino-Soviet differences if it
is represented in both capitals.
Finally, by taking this initiative,
Paris is again demonstrating
its own power on the world scene.
No other nation has announced
an intention to follow the French
lead at this time, although many
are watching the three-way dip-
lomatic maneuvering apparently
in the hope that Paris can come
up with an acceptable "two
Chinas" solution. Canadian
Prime Minister Pearson,who saw
De Gaulle last week, indicated
that Canada may take another
look at its policy of nonrec-
ognition if Taiwan's independ-
ence can be maintained, although
another government official said
that Canada would take no action
prior to the US presidential
elections.
Domestic political pressures
for recognition of Peiping have
increased in Belgium and Japan,
but spokesmen for both nations
say that they do not intend to
recognize Peiping at this time.
\Paris has explicitly
discouraged the 13 Paris-oriented
states of the Afro-Malagasy Union
(UAM) from recognizing Peiping,
Several UAM states have al-
ready expressed their intention
not to follow the French lead--
a position based on the dual
considerations of showing their
independence of France and main-
taining relations with Taipei,
which in three UAM states pro-
vides modest technical aid.
Some of them, however, may be
influenced toward eventual
adoption of a "two Chinas" policy,
or even abandonment of Taipei,
by internal changes such as those
which occurred in Congo (Brazzaville)
and Dahomey last year.
Senegal alone of the UAM
states has extended recognition
to the Chinese Communists. This
has not led to the establishment
of diplomatic relations, however,
because the Senegalese Government 25X1
refused to break with Taipei--
which, in this instance, chose
to stand fast.
F__ _j
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24 Jan 64 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
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The Communist World
THE AFRICAN STUDENT PROBLEM IN THE SOVIET BLOC
Recent demonstrations by Af-
rican students in Moscow follow-
ing the death of a Ghanaian stu-
dent reflect some of the problems
the Soviet bloc will face as it
expands its educational program
for students from less developed
areas. The students have often
found it difficult to adjust to
the climate, the regimented life,
and the enforced indoctrination
which accompanies their education
in bloc countries. On the other
hand, elements of a nascent racism
have appeared in the bloc countries
themselves, as well as resentment
against the African students, who
receive disproportionately large
stipends and who pre-empt places
in universities that might be
filled by local youth.
As a result, there have been
a number of incidents of open dis-
crimination which are highly embar-
rassing to the Communist regimes.
The latest incident, with its ra-
cist overtones, has led to talk
among some African students of a
mass exodus from the USSR. Some
small groups have left and others
will probably follow, but no mass
exodus is likely.
Many of these students are in
the Soviet bloc because they can-
not obtain a higher education else-
where.
T us
they have Ti c oice to re-
main at bloc institutions and most
of them are probably willing to ac-
cept the hardships of life there in
n
scholarship program has paid off
order to obtain an education.
Those who are so dissatisfied that
they insist on leaving will be en-
couraged to do so by Soviet author-
ties because of their potential
bad influence on those who remain.
Those Africans who have left
the USSR have gone primarily to
West German institutions rather
than to any of the East European
countries, which have also been
the scene of incidents in recent
years. Attacks on African students
are relatively common occurrences
in Czechoslovakia, and African stu-
dents rioted in Bulgaria in Febru-
ary 1963.
With increasing numbers of Af-
rican students attending Soviet bloc
institutions, further incidents are
likely. Bloc leaders seem to have
decided, however, that the problems
created by such incidents are far
outweighed by the benefits the Com-
munist world derives from providing
large numbers of Africans with an
education. Reaction in Africa has
been moderate--the Moscow demonstra-
tions were barely mentioned by the
press in Guinea, Ghana, and Mali,
the three principal African coun-
tries involved in the scholarship
program. Moscow therefore can con-
tinue to attract large numbers of
students, from whom it can draw a
few sympathetic and politically
skilled potential leaders. These
are the individuals in whom the
bloc's real investment is made and
whose activity, upon returning
home, will determine whether the 25X1
i
practical, i.e., politicai,terms.
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24 Jan 64 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Page 3
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The Communist World
PEIPING'S DIVERGENT POLICIES TOWARD INTELLECTUALS
The Chinese Communist re-
gime appears to be allowing its
small corps of natural scien-
tists a growing degree of free-
dom, even though controls over
other intellectuals continue
to be tightened. Although not
entirely dropping its insistence
that scientists be "red" as well
as "expert," the party seems
to be showing increased recogni-
tion that natural scientists
can make genuine scientific
achievements only if political
interference is restrained.
During the past year more
Chinese scientists have attended
international meetings, where
they mingled freely with West-
ern and even US delegates.
Chen Yi told a
gathering of scientific re-
seachers in November that the
regime valued their services
highly and intended to increase
the budgetary allocation for
scientific research. Chinese
journals recently have been
printing unusually realistic
and jargon-free articles on
science.
At the same time, however,
the party is putting pressure
on social scientists to join
more actively in its fight
against revisionist Soviet
ideas. Party propagandist Chou
Yang, in a major speech to mem-
bers of the Academy of Sciences'
Philosophy and Social Sciences
departments, insisted that the
chief role of intellectuals
today is to engage in a system-
atic refutation of revisionism
"in all its manifestations."
He said philosophers, economists,
and historians should play
especially important parts. He
criticized historians, for ex-
ample, for wasting their time
writing sympathetically about
Confucianism when they should
be compiling a world history
from the Marxist-Leninist-Maoist
point of view or providing his-
torical proof of the inevitabil-
ity of the rise of Chinese com-
munism.
Party policy toward aca-
demic intellectuals has been
steadily hardening since the
fall of 1962. In 1961 and early
1962, academic circles had been
allowed to discuss subjects now
labeled "revisionist," but the
launching of a broad attack on
Soviet ideological positions in
September 1962 ended this period
of comparative freedom. Aca-
demic researchers have been told
they can still "bloom and con-
tend"--but only so long as they
stay within Marxist-Leninist
guide-lines as defined by Mao
and avoid liberal and revision-
ist ideas. Chou's speech marks
a new phase involving an upsurge
in politically directed "re-
search" undertaken to justify
current party lines.
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0 Ul [LTl
The Communist World
The pressure is increasing tertainment probably will be
made very cautiously.
on intellectuals in other fields
P
to push the party line and noth-
ing else. At a recent drama Peiping is clearly concerned
festival in Shanghai, high party that many educated Chinese, both
officials deplored the fact that
some people, including party mem-
bers, enjoyed plays depicting
bourgeois and feudal life.
Playwrights were sternly enjoined
to stick to themes of class
struggle and revolution. The
Peiping Workers' Daily on 14
January even '-on tradi-
tional Chinese opera for propa-
gating "feudalistic" themes,
although any attempt to curtail
this highly popular form of en-
Yugoslavia: The League of
Yugoslav Communists has begun
preparing for its eighth con-
gress, at which Aleksander
Rankovic, Tito's heir apparent,
will probably attempt to ensure
his succession when Tito finally
leaves the scene.
Considerable infighting
is apparently taking place.
Croatian party chief Vladimir
Bakaric, presumably one of those
attempting to block Rankovic,
told a US diplomat on 20 Decem-
ber that he dared not visit the
US because "a prolonged absence
from here on my part at this
juncture would not be good for
Yugoslavia."
On 25 and 26 December,
party leaders from the district
and republican organizations,
in and out of the party, are in-
different to the ideological
aspects of the Sino-Soviet dis-
pute. While the regime's effort
to reverse the trend will un-
doubtedly induce more comformity
to the party line, it may also
further alienate Chinese intel-
lectuals. Most find the freer
"revisionist" approach taken in
Eastern Europe and the USSR con-
siderably more attractive than
from the army, and from the cen-
tral administrative apparatuses
of the central committee and
mass-political organization met
in Belgrade to receive guidance
on the subjects to be discussed
at local party conferences,
which will elect delegates to
the congress. Not all the
speeches to the meeting were
made public, even though Rankovic
in his speech appealed for greater
press coverage of party affairs.
He also urged a party reorganiza-
tion, ostensibly to allow the
party to remove local leaders
who "incorrectly" intervene in
the affairs of other economic
and political organizations.
The party's central com-
mittee will meet next month to
set the date, place, and agenda
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The new South Vietnamese
Government is having serious
difficulties in trying to put
real drive into the war effort
against the Viet Cong. Through
a top-level military reorgani-
zation in early January, it
tightened its chain of command
and at least temporarily re-
duced the likelihood of an
early power grab by some indi-
vidually ambitious generals in
the junta. It has also stepped
up the pace of military oper-
ations. These,however, have
resulted in few significant
gains over the Viet Cong.
The Communists have launched
fewer military attacks in
recent weeks, but have main-
tained a relatively high rate
of harassing and terrorist
activity.in their continuing
effort to undermine the resist-
ance of the rural populace and
of government paramilitary
forces. In some critical delta
provinces close to Saigon, re-
cent surveys have indicated
that there is a fairly wide-
spread belief that the Communists
are winning the war. The gov-
ernment is trying to counter
this trend by an intensive
pacification and rehabilitation
program in one of these prov-
inces.
The government's political
efforts to rally support from
traditional opponents of the
ousted Diem regime are only
partially successful. Although
some leaders of the Hoa Hao and
Cao Dai politico-religious sects ` seriously as a result.
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24 Jan 64 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Page 6
have pledged allegiance, armed
followers of the sects have
not yet been committed to the
government forces. Buddhist
leaders have embarked on an
effort to make Buddhism a sig-
nificant social force; their
political support of the gov-
ernment remains lukewarm, and
future prospects are obscured
by apparent dissension in the
Buddhist leadership. Persist-
ent tension between some
Buddhists and Catholics is add-
ing to the government's prob-
lems.
Prime Minister Tho con-
tinues to be a target of criti-
cism from disappointed politi-
cians and from students, who be-
cause he was vice president
under Diem, see his retention
by the new leaders as a sign
that there has been no real
revolution. Fearing growing
agitation, the government is
tightening its controls in some
areas. Requirements for approved
political parties are stiffer,
and there has been a crackdown
on the more free-swinging news-
papers.
Last week the government
banned public demonstrations
to ward off possible disorders
by students in Saigon protest-
ing French proposals to neutral-
ize Vietnam. The government,
however, is extremely concerned
that the public mood may be-
come receptive to the idea of
neutralism, and that the morale
of the armed forces would slump
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The second congress of the
National Front for the Libera-
tion of South Vietnam (NFLSV)--
the Viet Cong's political arm--
was held recently in an undis-
closed "liberated area" of the
country and was keynoted by the
most optimistic forecast yet of
Communist prospects in the war.
It allegedly was attended by over
150 representatives of NFLSV or-
ganizations in South Vietnam.
Its confident tone was doubtless
aimed in part at bolstering the
morale of the Communist forces
but was probably also a rela-
tively accurate reflection of
the current view held by the
rebel hierarchy and by its spon-
sor, the Communist Party in
North Vietnam.
Front President Nguyen Huu
Tho said that a "new period full
of promise" has opened and the
situation has never been "so
bright." These remarks contrast
sharply with the sober picture
of rebel prospects set forth at
the first Front congress in
April 1962, shortly after the
Viet Cong began to feel the im-
pact of US military assistance
to the Republic of Vietnam forces
(ARVN). The Communist leaders
have clearly been heartened by
their successes during 1963, par-
ticularly in October and Novem-
ber. The congress was neverthe-
less careful to avoid implying
that an insurgent victory was
actually in sight, and it was
pointed out that the conflict
would continue for several years
at least.
According to Tho, the reb-
els' greatest victory in the
past two years has been their
success in defeating US airborne
attack tactics and downing ARVN
helicopters and winged aircraft.
The insurgents now are apparently
putting major stress on obtaining
light antiaircraft weapons and
training rebel units in their use.
Front leaders may feel the
conflict has advanced to the
point where additional effort
must be expended in connection
with the administration of Com-
munist-controlled areas in South
Vietnam. According to the com-
muniqud, the congress "settled
a number of problems of economic
construction and the livelihood
of the people." Recent reports
indicate that civil administra-
tive specialists are infiltrat-
ing from North Vietnam and dis-
persing to various Communist-held
areas of South Vietnam. The
congress revealed that the Viet
Cong also plan to put greater
stress on proselyting among re-
ligious sects and Chinese resi-
dents in South Vietnam. In the
case of the religious sects, they
probably hope to counter recent
government efforts to enlist
armed support by the sects
against the Viet Cong.
Front activities and in-
stallations abroad expanded some-
what during the past year, and
the congress called for greater
effort to win foreign support.
In a hint that the NFLSV intends
to project itself eventually
as the "legal" government of
South Vietnam--although probably
not before it has a firmer ter-
ritorial base--President Tho al-
leged that many governments al-
ready consider the Front a "real
government" and receive its dele-
gates as "real diplomatic en-
voys of the state."
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LAOS
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Luang Prabang
Lat Boouat an
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Vang Vieng
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THAILAND
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Laotian Premier Souvanna dent Phoui Sananikone. Accord-
Phouma met with Pathet Lao leader ing to Phoumi, Phoui is convinced
Prince Souphannouvong in Sam that the coalition has failed
Neua town last week end. The
two confirmed an agreement
reached by their spokesmen in
December which called for the
neutralization of the royal cap-
ital at Luang Prabang and for
the temporary transfer of the
coalition government to that
city from rightist-controlled
Vientiane. The two princes also
proposed a meeting including all
three factions to arrange for
the "details" of the transfer.
Right-wing leader General
Phoumi Nosavan has joined Sou-
vanna in suggesting that a tri-
partite conference be convened
at the Plaine des Jarres. Phoumi,
however, has expressed doubts
as to whether the Pathet Lao
would genuinely support the coa-
li~ion, even should the seat of
government be transferred to
Luang Prabang. While claiming
he does not oppose such a move
in principle, Phoumi.has indi-
cated that he would insist on
equivalent concessions from the
Pathet Lao, e.g., permission
for non-Communist elements to
move freely in territory now
under Pathet Lao control.
In recent conversations
with Ambassador Unger, Phoumi
has been increasingly critical
of the current coalition setup.
Although still professing loyalty
to the coalition concept, he has
indicated some sympathy for the
views of National Assembly presi-
and that the government must be
reorganized along lines which
would exclude the Pathet Lao
and provide for some sort of
territorial partition.
Souvanna, who only last
fall visited several capitals
of the fourteen signatories of
the 1962 Geneva accord in an
effort to maintain foreign sup-
port, has announced plans to
visit Phnom Penh, Hanoi, and
Peiping on a similar mission
during the next two months. He
indicated he would press Hanoi
to cease intervention in Lao-
tian affairs.
The military situation in
the Na Kay area of central Laos
appears to have stabilized some-
what with the arrival of right-
wing reinforcements on the
plateau. Farther south, Com-
munist forces are pressing the
rightist garrison at Ban Houei
Sane, located near Route 9 just
west of the South Vietnamese
border.
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The Arab chiefs-of-state
conference on the Jordan waters
issue achieved an unusual degree
of harmony and gave a boost to
Nasir's prestige.
The conferees evidently
agreed on an essentially moder-
ate approach to the over-all
problem of Arab-Israeli rela-
tions. One of Nasir's prime
purposes in calling the meeting
had been to bring the Arab lead-
ers to this kind of common stand.
He had earlier said he was wor-
ried that some unilateral action
against Israel by one Arab state
--most likely Syria--might in-
volve the others in a conflict
willy-nilly.
A plan to deal with the
forthcoming Israeli diversion
of the Jordan River appears
to have been worked out. The
conference allocated about $12
million to meet the immediate
costs of a plan--requiring an
estimated 18 months--for cut-
ting off some of the Jordan's
headwaters. To back up the
plan the conference also decided
on a new joint Arab military com-
mand to be headed by Egyptian
army cniei it. Gen. xli All
Amir, with headquarters in Cairo.
Technically, the Arab plan
may be feasible. Its implemen-
tation, however, may well be
delayed for political reasons.
Neither Lebanon nor Jordan is
privately enthusiastic about
antagonizing the Israelis, and
political instability in Syria
could deter work on the project
itself.
Israeli Prime Minister
Eshkol has replied to the resolu-
tions of the Arab conference by
repeating that Israel is deter-
mined to safeguard its "vital
rights" and to resist "illegal"
Arab moves.
Nasir also gave at least
the appearance of conciliation
by renewing diplomatic relations
with King Husayn of Jordan and
by paying flattering attentions
to King Saud. Nasir may have
hoped the conference would make
possible an agreement with Saudi
Arabia and ease a settlement of
the Yemeni problem. Crown Prince
Faysal, who was absent, makes
the decisions for his country,
however, and his response is
likely to be cautious.
The kings and presidents
decided to make the conference
an annual affair. The next
session will be held in Alex-
andria in August,
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SOVIET MILITARY AID TO EGYPT AND SYRIA
Recent Soviet arms ship-
ments to Egypt and Syria under-
score the continued importance
of military aid in Moscow's rela-
tions with the Middle East. Both
Cairo and Damascus have been
prime recipients of Soviet arms
aid since the mid-1950s. The
program in Egypt is the largest
and most comprehensive the USSR
has undertaken in the non-Com-
munist world; to date it has in-
volved equipment and technical
aid worth more than $1 billion,
and is rivaled only by Soviet
military aid to Indonesia. New
deliveries to Syria indicate Mos-
cow is carrying out its military
commitments and probably is pre-
pared to expand them.
A steady si.ream of arms
shipments has gone to the Egyp-
tian port of Alexandria since
last October. Many of these
shipments included equipment for
Egypt's surface-to-air missile
(SAM) system, which may by now
consist of as many as a dozen
sites. As part of the same air
defense package, recent deliv-
eries also have included 25 MIG-
21 (Fishbed) jet fighters, bring-
ing Egyptian holdings of these
aircraft to around 85. Land
armaments frequently are deliv-
ered as well,
Soviet military aid activi-
ties in Syria have been hindered,
but not halted, by political
frictions between Moscow and
Damascus. Mutual hostility was
sharpened somewhat after the
Baathist takeover in Syria last
March. Nevertheless, the USSR
remains the primary source of
Syrian military supplies, and
military aid programed under a
1962 arms agreement has con-
tinued.
A Syrian arms purchas-
ing mission is likely to visit
the USSR sometime soon. Arms
talks apparently were scheduled
to take place in Moscow late
last year, but evidently were
postponed
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Leaders of all Cypriot fac-
tions predict an early collapse
of the London conference and
probable resumption of fighting.
An hour-long gun battle erupted
this week in western Cyprus be-
tween Turkish Cypriots and Greek
Cypriot police.
Turkish Cypriots continue
to move from mixed villages to
purely Turkish areas. Turkish
leaders claim the moves are vol-
untary and are designed to per-
mit the refugees to escape from
Greek Cypriot terrorists. Greek
Cypriots allege that many Turkish
peasants are being moved against
their will by armed bands of Turk-
ish Cypriot irregulars. The
Greeks may consequently try to
halt these movements.
In London, there has been
little progress despite intense
efforts by Commonwealth Rela-
tions Secretary Sandys. Greek
Cypriots continue to insist on
a unitary state with "certain
rights" guaranteed to the Turk-
ish Cypriots. Turkish Cypriot
leaders still speak vaguely of
segregation and a further con-
centration of the Turkish Cypriot
population as an alternative to
their first choice--geographic
partition.
i.rrival on Cyprus of Indian
General P. S. Gyani as the per-
sonal representative of UN Secre-
tary General Thant to observe the
peace-keeping operations has in-
volved the UN more directly in
the Cyprus controversy. Gyani
is slated to stay at least until
the end of February.
President Makarios as
repeatedly promised to take the
Cyprus case to the UN, should
the London talks fail. He is
assured of Soviet support in the
Security Council and probable
support from most of the Afro-
Asian nations, as well as the
Communist bloc, in the General
Assembly.
Turkish naval and air
forces remain concentrated in
the Mersin-Adana-Iskenderun
area of Turke across from
Cyprus.
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Internal power relation-
ships in Tanganyika and Zanzi-
bar remain fluid and confused in
the wake of the armed eruptions
there. Kenya and Uganda are
nerviously reappraising their
own internal security, since
they too face uneasy situations
in which Communist representa-
tives and sympathizers are ac-
tive. On 23 January, Ugandan
troops mutinied against their
British officers.
Kenyan Prime Minister Ken-
yatta is being urged to crack
down on the freewheeling leftists
in his government and may post-
pone the scheduled departure of
British troops beyond 1964.
In Tanganyika, the radical
nationalist minister of external
affairs and defense, Oscar Kam-
bona, appears to have strength-
ened his position relative to
that of President Nyerere. For
two days after the army mutiny
erupted on 20 January Kambona
was the government for all prac-
tical purposes. Nyerere is back
at the helm, but his whereabouts
during those crucial days has
not been explained satisfactorily.
It appears that he remained
at his office-residence behind
military guard. His brief, un-
informative speech on the even-
ing of 21 January was atypical
and left many questions unan-
swered. The extra guard detail
on his house was not removed,
and he did not resume full com-
mand for at least a day after
the mutineers had returned to
their barracks.
The ambitious Kambona
has always supported Nyerere
publicly, but within the one-
party government they have been
uneasy rivals. Kambona's in-
fluence may have increased dur-
ing Nyerere's frequent visits
to foreign capitals. Apparently
he has not kept Nyerere fully
informed on all his activities,
particularly on his support for
Zanzibari and southern African
nationalists.
An aggressive leader with
strong racial feelings, Kambona
almost certainly disagrees with
the pro-Western, nonracial pol-
icies of his moderate, hitherto
popular President. Kambona ad-
vocates the expulsion of Euro-
peans considered hostile to Af-
rican interests and had planned
to replace all British officers
by the end of 1964--a move that
Nyerere may well have disapproved.
Kambona, moreover, has met
continual frustrations in his
efforts to obtain from Western
countries training and materiel
for his proposed air force and
expanded army. In the past he
has had frequent and cordial
contacts with the Soviets and
Chinese Communists. He would
probably turn to them now for
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rr V&W
EAST AFRICA
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military aid, if he could cir-
cumvent Nyerere.
The troops who mutinied in
Dar-es-Salaam for higher pay
and the immediate dismissal of
British officers had some legiti-
mate grievances. A private's
pay is below the city minimum
wage, and Nyerere's directive
of 7 January calling for an end
to discrimination against non-
African citizens in the govern-
ment could have been interpreted
as a slowdown in Africanization
of the officer corps.
While other ministers were
under arrest or otherwise indis-
posed during the mutiny's first
hours, Kambona was active in
hustling British officers to
the airport and urging the sol-
diers back to their barracks.
Tanganyikan officers were ap-
pointed to the top army commands
without Nyerere's concurrence.
The army has become a political
force to be reckoned with, and
Kambona may believe he can use
it to his own advantage--and to
the ultimate detriment of West-
ern interests.
In Zanzibar, the power
struggle continues. The most
recent cabinet shuffle suggests
that the pro-Communists have
strengthened their influence at
the expense of the genuine Af-
rican nationalists. President
Karume's lack of education and
organizational ability will prob-
ably bring him increasingly un-
der Foreign Minister "Babu's"
Communist influence.
At the same time, the other
political leaders are still try-
ing to limit the role of "Field
Marshal" Okello and his Cuban-
trained thugs. Tanganyikan
police--flown to Zanzibar at
the request of Karume and Babu
--have had some success in dis-
arming Okello's henchmen and
disbanding his military head-
quarters. Okello's gun-brandish-
ing had kept him in the f ore-
front since the day of the re-
volt, and his inflammatory
broadcasts contributed to the
anti-Arab violence, which may
have caused over 2,000 deaths.
Kambona has told the US
ambassador in Dar-es-Salaam that
Karume and Babu have also asked
Tanganyika for technicians to
restore essential services and
want to discuss union with
Tanganyika in the near future.
Kambona has long believed that
Zanzibar should be under Tan-
ganyika's wing. Babu and Zanzi-
bar Vice President Hanga have
just visited the Kenyan and
Ugandan capitals, presumably
seeking support there also.
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Europe
DISCORD IN SCANDINAVIA OVER NUCLEAR-FREE ZONE PLAN
Efforts by Finland's Presi-
dent Kekkonen to promote his
plan for a nuclear-free zone in
Northern Europe are straining
traditionally close ties among
the four Nordic countries.
Kekkonen's plan--put for-
ward in a speech last May--
would have each of the four
countries formally reject nu-
clear weapons and declare all
of Northern Europe a nuclear-
free zone. He has maintained
that such an arrangement would
merely confirm an existing
situation: Finland is forbidden
by treaty to acquire nuclear
weapons; Norway and Denmark,
although members of NATO, ex-
pressly prohibit such weapons
on their territory in peacetime;
and Sweden is still agonizing
over the politically explosive
decision of whether to author-
ize development of an independ-
ent nuclear capability.
Scandinavian leaders insist
nevertheless that the formal
declaration Kekkonen seeks
would benefit only the Soviet
Union and bind them to a course
of action which would leave them
no leverage or bargaining power.
Despite strong denials by
Kekkonen and other Finnish of-
ficials, moreover, the suspicion
persists Kekkonen is fronting
for Moscow.
At a meeting last week in
Copenhagen of the economic com-
mittee of the Nordic Council,
Danish Foreign Minister Haekkerup
sharply denounced the Kekkonen
plan ana criticized Finland's
role in furthering Soviet for-
eign policy objectives. He
maintained that the proposed
discussion of the plan during
the council's meeting in Stock-
holm next month will complicate
Denmark's foreign relations by
raising doubts about its loyalty
to NATO. Haekkerup's sensitiv-
ity may stem also from concern
among leaders of his Social
Democratic Party--facing elec-
tions this year--that there may
be further defections to Den-
mark's "national" Communist
party--the Socialist People's
Party--which is vigorously push-
ing Kekkonen's scheme. In Nor-
way also, Prime Minister Gerhard-
sen's Labor Party fears that a
similarly constituted "national"
Communist party will prove to
be increasingly attractive to
Labor's restive left wing.
Sweden's Social Democratic
government faces not only elec-
tions this year but also a quad-
rennial party congress at which
the acquisition of nuclear
weapons will be a principal
issue. The government's embar-
rassment is all the more acute
because the Kekkonen proposal
closely resembles the plan put
forward by former Foreign Min-
ister Unden at the UN in late
1961 calling on countries with-
out nuclear weapons to abstain
permanently from acquiring them.
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_
_WW - - w
European Fisheries Confer-
ence: The 16-nation gathering
has adjourned its London ses-
sions until 26 February, having
drafted a new agreement on fish-
ing limits which nearly all par-
ticipants have agreed to recom-
mend to their governments for
approval. Coastal states would
be given exclusive fishing rights
in a six-mile zone measured from
base lines. A further zone of
six to twelve miles would remain
open to fishing by participating
countries which have tradition-
ally fished those waters. Un-
less special arrangements were
made, the latter provision thus
would exclude the Russian and
Coal-Steel Community: The
decision of the CSC High Author-
ity to direct the member states
to raise steel and pig iron tar-
iffs has important political im-
plications for the CSC as well
as for the Kennedy Round tariff
negotiations. Fearing Paris and
Bonn might unilaterally raise
tariffs, the High Authority felt
compelled to invoke its treaty
powers in order to protect its
position and maintain at least
a facade of community harmony.
Failure now of any of the mem-
bers to comply with the decision
would be a harsh blow to the
already weakened supranational
basis of the CSC. It appears
that all six will comply, al-
though the Dutch have hinted
they may take the issue to the
Community Court of Justice.
Polish trawlers,whose governments
are not among the 16 participants
and which have only recently
been fishing close to British
coasts in growing numbers.
Only Iceland and Norway
have expressed reservations
concerning the draft agreement,
and Norway's may be met by a
minor amendment. If, as now
is expected, final agreement is
reached by June 1964, this will
probably content Britain and
prevent it from carrying out its
past threats to extend its ter-
ritorial limits as well. F
Despite CSC assurances
that quotas would be provided
for traditional suppliers, the
US, Austria, Sweden, and Japan
expect a reduction in their
exports. The US also believes
a tariff hike on so important
a product as steel hardly sets
the stage for a general reduc-
tion in tariffs. However,
spokesmen for French industry
have recently taken the position
that CSC products could be in-
cluded in the Kennedy Round
only if the Six have a single
tariff level--a condition which
would be met for most steel prod-
ucts at least if the other five
all raise their steel tariffs
to the Italian level as the
High Authority now has recom-
mended.
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Panamanian President Chiari
remains under intense pressure
to persist in his effort to
secure a complete revision of the
canal agreements with the United
States.
The Communists and
pro-
Castro
elements, as well as
poli-
ticians
looking toward the
na-
tional
elections scheduled
for
Maya are at work to keep feeling
inside the country stirred up.
If the growing economic and polit-
ical pressures on Chiari are not
alleviated soon, he may resign
or be ousted.
In an effort to put pressure
on the US, Panama's ambassador
to the UN, Aquilino Boyd, indi-
cated to Ambassador Stevenson on
21 January that his country will
not weaken its insistence that
the US agree to negotiate a new
treaty. He said that President
Chiari has reached "the point of
no return" on this issue, and
complained that he himself is
being criticized at home for
taking too "soft" a line with
the US.
Boyd also asserted that he
has instructions to find out
whether "non - Latin American
countries" would support a call
for a special session of the
General Assembly if Panama's
present effort to convene on OAS
foreign ministers' meeting falls
through.
Juan de Arco Galindo, presi-
dential candidate of Panama's
leading opposition coalition (OA),
made a comparatively temperate
public appeal in a 22 January TV
speech, but he still called for
a new canal treaty.
The Panamanian Communist
party (PdP), caught short by
the recent outbreak of violence,
is probably making preparations
to exploit any future opportu-
nities. PdP President Hugo
Victor left on 21 January for
Moscow. The pro-Castro Vanguard
for National Action (VAN), which
incited much of the violence
among students, has gained
new impetus from its success in
pressing Chiari into his ada-
mant position. The VAN is
expecting further support from
Cuba.
Bankers in Panama report
that the economic situation
continues to deteriorate and that,
in the case of the First National
City Bank branch in Panama alone, 25X1
$5 million of foreign deposits
had been sent out of the country
as of 22 January.
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WAMP `.Y LUnL.1 Western Hemisphere
The bland Soviet-Cuban
communique of 22 January pro-
vided no more explanation of the
purpose of Castro's 10-day
visit than the brief Soviet an-
nouncement on the day of his
arrival. It repeated most of
the main points in the joint
statement issued at the end of
his long visit to the USSR last
spring and made the usual claim
that he and Khrushchev reached
"complete unity of views" on
all questions discussed.
Although the communique
contained no indication of
agreement on specific Soviet
or Cuban moves to exploit the
Panama crisis, it denounced US
policy toward Cuba and US actions
in Panama. Khrushchev and
Castro strongly supported Panama's
"just demand" to establish its
sovereignty over the Canal
lone and the Panamanians' right
to revise or abrogate the
"unjust agreements" imposed by
the US. While this formula
could be applied to Cuba's
demand for the return of the
Guantanamo naval base, the
communique did not mention Guan-
tanamo specifically. Khrushchev,
however, reaffirmed the Soviet
Union's full support for Cas-
tro's "five points" of November
1962, the last of which was a
demand for US evacuation of
the base.
In contrast to the cautious
wording of the communique, Khru-
shchev's rambling speech at
Kalinin on 17 January in Castro's
presence welcomed Cuba's strug-
gle for the "liquidation of the
American military base in Guan-
tanamo." He said the "land in
Guantanamo is Cuban land and it
must belong to Cuba." Khrushchev,
moreover, specifically endorsed
the right of all peoples to use
force in expelling the "imperi-
alists from their land." These
remarks raise the possibility
that Castro, in exchange for
his backing of the Soviet posi-
tion on several key issues, ob-
tained Khrushchev's promise to
support some future Cuban moves
against US positions in Cuba
and elsewhere in Latin America.
The communique recorded
Castro's support for Khrushchev
on three important points at is-
sue with the Chinese Communists.
On the nuclear test ban treaty,
he went further than ever be-
fore in characterizing the treaty,
together with the agreement
banning orbiting of nuclear
weapons, as a "step forward to-
ward peace and disarmament."
He also aligned himself with
the USSR in claiming that the
peaceful coexistence policy has
brought about a'"certain easing
of international tension."
Castro's most important concession,
however, was his endorsement
of the Soviet interpretation
of the pronouncements of the
Moscow Communist conferences
of 1957 and 1960 and his specific
approval of recent Soviet measures
to "liquidate" disagreements
and strengthen the unity and
cohesion of the international
Communist movement.
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The only specific agreement
announced was a long-term trade
agreement under which the USSR
will pay its current fixed price
of six cents a pound for Cuban
sugar during the period 1965-70.
This was hailed as a "reliable
guarantee" to the Cuban economy
against damaging fluctuations of
sugar prices on the world market
and US "economic sabotage."
Although the agreed price
is considerably below current
world prices, these will almost
certainly fall in the next few
years. Moreover, the volume of
Western Hemisphere
Cuban sugar exports to the USSR
is scheduled to increase only
gradually, in accordance with
planned production increases.
Trade plans suggest Cuba will
ship little more than a million
tons of sugar to the USSR this
year--about the same as in 1963.
This will again allow Cuba to
profit from high world sugar
prices and to continue to expand
its trade with the West. Soviet
cash payments for 200,000 tons
of Cuban sugar annually were
apparently eliminated by the
new agreement, probably because
of the relatively large cash re-
serves the Cubans have built up
through exports to the West.
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Veow J'1:' G'KK 1 '
Western Hemisphere
NEW STRIKES AND POLITICAL TENSION IN BRAZIL
The tension and pessimism
generated by a series of strikes
in Brazil last week reflect con-
tinued uncertainty and widespread
suspicion of President Goulart's
motives. While the atmosphere
has calmed temporarily, the epi-
sode suggests that the political
situation is still far from sta-
ble.
The reactions were sparked
by a three-day strike of public
utility workers in Guanabara
(city of Rio de Janeiro) that
began on 14 January. These
strikers were later joined by
streetcar workers and govern-
ment employees in both Guanabara
and several neighboring states.
By 17 January, the strikes had
virtually ended, after private
business agreed to demands for
a 100-percent wage increase,
and the government agreed to
give certain civil servants a
bonus amounting to a month's pay.
Guanabara Governor Carlos
Lacerda, Goulart's archenemy,
bitterly attacked the govern-
ment and blamed Goulart for the
walkouts. He accused Goulart
of preparing to establish a "syn-
dicalist" or "popular" govern-
ment "along totalitarian lines."
At the height of the strikes,
25X1
pro-Communist
Governor Miguel rraes of Pernam-
buco expressed the opinion that
Goulart intended to perpetuate
himself in power. Arraes, who
had been in contact with Goulart,
stated that the President "does
not want elections," and that he
intended to stay in office after
his term expires in January 1966
despite the constitutional bar
to his re-election.
For his part, Goulart seems
unwilling--or unable--to come up
with effective and constructive
policies that would earn public
confidence in his administra-
tion. He seems to regard him-
self as a kind of national ar-
biter of pressures from right
and left, and his objective ap-
pears to be to maintain his per-
sonal power and influence. He
is still closely identified
with the left and relies heavily
on his leftist, ultranationalist
advisers.
incumbent.
ers momentum and diverts at-
tention and pressure from the
Barring some unconstitu-
tional move on his own part or
a sudden deepening of the cri-
sis in the economy, Goulart
appears to have a good chance
of continuing in office until
his term expires. His posi-
tion could improve as the presi-
dential election campaign gath-
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