TRENDS OF COMMUNIST INSURGENCY IN SOUTH VIETNAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A004300080003-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 3, 2006
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: January 17, 1964
• Content Type: REPORT

Release 2006/05/24: CIA-RDP79-00927A004304680a81?ar y 1964
OCI No. 0314/64B
Copy No.
SPECIAL REPORT
TRENDS OF COMMUNIST INSURGENCY IN SOUTH VIETNAM
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
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17 January 1964
TRENDS OF COMMUNIST INSURGENCY IN SOUTH VIETNAM
During 1963 Communist insurgency in South Viet-
nam regained the momentum which it had lost after
mid-1962. The Viet Cong were altering their tactics
to cope with the Diem government's vigorous pacifi-
cation programs and were progressively intensifying
their guerrilla effort. Following Diem's overthrow
in November, the Viet Cong, demonstrating a high
capability for widespread coordinated activity, made
significant gains in the countryside. They have
proven adept in countering new government efforts with
improved combat techniques of their own, are mounting
an intensive political effort, and are receiving a
steady supply of weapons and trained guerrilla spe-
cialists from North Vietnam. While the new govern-
ment in Saigon is aware of the seriousness of this
Viet Cong challenge, it is moving slowly in revamping
its pacification tactics and programs, and the war
promises to be a prolonged contest of attrition, en-
durance, will, and morale.
Operational Trends in 1963
The recrudescence of the
Viet Cong insurgency is appar-
ent in operational statistics
from Saigon. Trends which
appeared to be favorable to the
government forces after mid-
1962 seem to have been reversed
by mid-1963. After mid-July,
the rate of Communist-initiated
incidents and attacks increased
by one third over the first
half of 1963, and exceeded the
average level of such activity
sustained during 1962. While
the number and scale of armed
attacks declined in 1963, this
probably reflects in part an
increased emphasis on small-
scale terrorism and propaganda
activity by guerrilla troops.
Since July also, the gap
between government and Viet
Cong casualties has narrowed
significantly. Casualties among
Viet Cong forces have remained
at about the same levels, but
government casualties as re-
ported from Saigon increased by
more than one third after mid-
year, and the total for the
year was almost two thirds above
that for 1962 (see chart). In
addition, desertions from the
government forces during the
first ten months of 1963 num-
bered 27,000, mostly from among
paramilitary troops. It is not
known how many of these joined
the Viet Cong. There were some
3,000 military defectors from
the Viet Cong for all of 1963.
The ratio of weapons losses
turned dramatically in favor of
the Viet Cong in the latter part
of 1963. For the year as a
whole, the Viet Cong in effect
gained some 3,000 weapons, a
threefold increase over their
gain in 1962. On the basis of
equipment normally held by Viet
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THE WAR IN SOUTH VIETNAM:
COMPARATIVE STATISTICS
I
""A4" s p. _...O.
1962 -
CASUALTIE$
TOTALS 1962 1963
Govemmenl 20,280
3320
Fa
Vier Cong 30,673 28,383
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Cong forces, this would arm as
many as 12 regular battalions,
40 district guerrilla companies,
or 150 local "self-defense"
platoons. Captured weapons are
the major source of equipment
for the Viet Cong.
Hanoi Revamps Policies
The slackened pace of
Viet Cong guerrilla activity
in the latter part of 1962 and
early 1963 reflected Communist
concern over the new situation
created by the vast increase
in US military assistance in
South Vietnam. There is evi-
dence that morale among the
Viet Cong sagged, their cadres
became confused and disheartened,
and their efforts lost momentum
in the face of the difficulties
posed by this new dimension in
the war.
By early 1963, however,
Hanoi apparently had developed
new policies and programs.
Gearing their plans to a long
and arduous struggle and empha-
sizing as always its political
aspects, the Communists modified
their combat techniques and
accelerated the development of
the Viet Cong military forces,
while pushing political and
psychological warfare programs
aimed at strengthening their
"popular base" in South Vietnam.
Their policy seems, in effect,
to have entailed the launching
of a direct counteroffensive
against the government's key
pacification effort--the
strategic hamlet program.
Viet Cong Strength
There has been a marked
growth in the organizational
strength and firepower of their
tactical units. The regular
forces are estimated at about
23,000 to 25,000, and irregular
forces at 60,000 to 80,000.
Some 15 new regular battalions
averaging about 400 men each
were identified during the year.
The Viet Cong evidently
have been able to offset their
combat losses by an effective
replacement system. Relying
only in part on infiltration from
the North, the Viet Cong levy
replacements from local guerrilla
units, which in turn make up their
losses by recruitment among the
peasantry. In areas under their
control, the Communists have
relatively unrestricted access
to half a million physically
fit males of military age. The
Viet Cong are also able to re-
cruit to a considerable extent
in villages ostensibly controlled
by the government, and from
among the large number of de-
serters from the government
forces.
The gradual evolution of
larger and better equipped
regular Viet Cong forces is
reflected in the confirmed
creation of five regiments, each
with a strength of 1,500 to
2,000 troops. Three of these
units are in the northern high-
lands near the coast, and two
are in Viet Cong base areas
north of Saigon. There is
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evidence that two others are
being formed in the Mekong Delta
area. These regiments, which
appear to be destined for an
increasing scale of mobile war-
fare, include signal, engineer,
intelligence, and other special-
ized support units. In addition,
they possess heavy weapons bat-
talions equipped with 57-mm.
and 75-mm. recoilless rifles,
90-mm. bazookas, mortars, and
antiaircraft machine guns. Some
of these weapons are of bloc
manufacture.
These personnel are virtu-
ally all former southerners who
have been serving with the North
Vietnamese Army, have received
special training courses,'and
have been sent south in apparent
response to specific requirements
formulated to develop a planned
force structure. In several
instances, new battalions have
been formed by integrating an
infiltrated cadre group of about
130 men with existing local
guerrilla units.
The improved capabilities
of the Viet Cong regular forces
have also been apparent in the
continuing refinement of their
military command structure.
Captured documents provide evi-
dence of this.
The development of Viet
Cong military capabilities is
made possible by the continued
influx of cadres and heavy
weapons from North Vietnam.
Intelligence on infiltration is
spotty, but there is firm evi-
dence that at least 1,700 per-
sonnel arrived from the North
during 1963. Others may also
have infiltrated, but as in
past years, it will be months
before all the evidence is in.
The confirmed arrivals consist
largely of unit cadres--platoon,
company, battalion, and higher
level command and staff elements--
heavy weapons specialists, and
other technicians.
Although the Communists
continue to rely largely on
captured or locally manufactured
weapons and ammunition, increasing
numbers of bloc-manufactured
weapons and ammunition are being
found in all areas of South
Vietnam. Large quantities of
explosives have been seized on
river craft while being smuggled
to Viet Cong bases from Cambodia.
Supplies to the Viet Cong are
brought in overland through
Laos and Cambodia, as well as
by sea. The scope of this
logistical support was illus-
trated in the seizure in De-
cember of a Viet Cong ordnance
dump south of Saigon containing
almost 300,000 rounds of small-
arms ammunition, mostly of
Chinese Communist manufacture.
Combat Techniques Modified
While strengthening their
military forces, the Communists
have sought to modify their
combat techniques both as to
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perfect their attack capabilities
and to reduce their vulnerability
to government military operations.
Armed attacks now are focused
almost exclusively on "soft"
targets such as strategic hamlets
and small outposts manned by
paramilitary forces. Simulta-
neous attacks on adjacent govern-
ment positions, aimed at dis-
rupting mutual support arrange-
ments, have been effectively
combined with ambushes of re-
inforcing troops.
At the same time, Viet Cong
regular units are fortifying
their operational bases to re-
duce their exposure to govern-
ment air and artillery attack,
while increasing the cost in
casualties to government forces
engaged in clearing operations.
They have also progressively
improved their antiaircraft
techniques, particularly for
defense against helicopter-borne
assaults. The improved combat
effectiveness resulting from
these tactical shifts is evident
in the narrowing of the casualty
ratio. A boost in guerrilla
morale resulting from this new
posture is suggested by a marked
reduction in Viet Cong defections
since mid-1963.
Political Effort Intensified
The Viet Cong have not
ignored the strengthening of
their "political base," which
they regard as the most important
factor in their insurgency.
Although intelligence on this
phase of the struggle is meager,
captured documents provide evi-
dence that the Viet Cong expend
more energy on political and
psychological warfare than on
military operations, and prob-
ably obtain more decisive
results.
A Communist provincial
committee document captured in
late summer clearly reflected
an intensified effort to expand
the various mechanisms through
which the Viet Cong strive to
mobilize the masses behind their
war effort. The "Liberation
Youth" movement and various
peasant associations, women's
leagues, guerrilla veterans,
and groups--in addition to the
Communist Party apparatus--are
all components of the broad
Viet Cong political front, the
National Liberation Front for
South Vietnam. This apparatus
provides political administration
of Communist-held areas and
reaches clandestinely into those
held by the Saigon regime. Cov-
ering only a single month, the
document revealed an impressive
rate of activity, even if its
details are exaggerated.
Through a wide range of
propaganda activities--meetings,
conventions, demonstrations,
"whispering campaigns"--the
Viet Cong seek to gain the
sympathy and support of the
masses. They have their own
civic action programs, such as
a campaign to encourage planting
of fruit trees to increase
peasant income, designed to
demonstrate their interest in the
peasants' economic livelihood.
The Viet Cong endeavor to iden-
tify the peasants with the in-
surgency by organizing their
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energies in producing simple
war implements, digging trenches,
sabotaging. roads, establishing
informant nets, and other such
tasks.
The Communists also main-
tain an intensive proselytizing
program aimed at government mil-
itary.and paramilitary personnel
and their. dependents. These
efforts at persuasion are com-
plementedby a campaign of se-
lective terrorism designed to
cow, the stubborn or to convince
the. apathetic.
This type of political
campaign is conducted on a
massive scale., overtly in areas
held by the Viet Cong and cov-
ertly in government-held areas.
Its effectiveness is difficult
to measure, but is evidenced in
the lack of active popular sup-
port for the government's coun-
terinsurgency programs in many
rural areas.
Viet Cong Difficulties
Despite their renewed ef-
fort,.the Viet Cong continue
to be faced with two serious
problems: a continuing short-
age of food supplies in their
sparsely populated base areas,
particularly. the highlands,
and the. difficulty of maintain-
ing morale under the harrowing
conditions of a resistance
movement operating against
forces with superior military
capabilities. Their already
difficult food problem in the
mountain areas and swampy delta
redoubts has been made more
serious by the government's
pacification programs, which
have restricted Communist food
requisitioning efforts.
As a result, the Viet Cong
have continued to divert combat
elements to production of food,
and many of their attacks are
conducted primarily to seize
food from defended villages.
Viet Cong morale has consistently
been lower in the highlands than
elsewhere because of these and
other difficulties.
The government's increas-
ing use of artillery and air
strikes has also made life ex-
tremely difficult for the Viet
Cong military forces.
Captured documents and
prisoner interrogations reflect
continuing concern over the mo-
rale problem. However, the
drop in Viet Cong desertions
since last July, together with
a decreasing response to the
government's guerrilla amnesty
program, suggests that Viet Cong
morale has, on the whole, im-
proved.
Effectiveness of
Government Programs
The renewed Viet Cong ef-
fort developed in the face of
the Diem government's vigorous
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counterinsurgency programs, which
began to take effect in 1962.
In addition to stepping up the
tempo of its tactical operations,
the government followed through
on other measures to improve
its military posture.
and economic improvement pro-
grams necessary for gaining the
support of the people against
the Viet Cong were only begin-
ning when the Diem government
was overthrown.
New tactics emphasizing
ambushes, night patrols, and
widespread small-unit actions
have been instituted. Psycho-
logical operations have been
increased, with stress on the
amnesty program inaugurated
last year to win over Viet Cong
adherents. The government's
territorial command structure
has been revised and refined,
concurrently with the deploy-
ment of an additional division
to.the Communist-infested Mekong
Delta. The training of paramil-
itary forces--notably the ham-
let militia, Citizens' Irregu-
lar Defense Groups, Combat Youth,
Self-Defense Corps, and Civil
Guard--has continued.
The Diem government's key
pacification effort--the stra-
tegic hamlet program--progressed
steadily during 1963 except in
the delta area, where it suf-
fered serious reverses in sev-
eral provinces. By the end of
October, some 8,300 of these
hamlets had been built, contain-
ing 77 percent of the rural pop-
ulace. Most of these were estab-
lished in areas already under
government control, but in some
areas the program had been over-
extended. It had emphasized
the initial physical security
aspects, while political, social,
Hamlet defense elements
often fought well when attacked,
but the training of hamlet mil-
itia lagged behind the construc-
tion program. Only about one
third of the hamlets had armed
defense elements. The Viet Cong
exploited this condition, com-
bining armed attacks with in-
tensive propaganda, sabotage,
and terrorist activities designed
both to shake the confidence of
inhabitants in inadequately sup-
ported hamlets and to try to
demonstrate the continuing in-
security of the populace even
inside protected ones. These
overt activities were supple-
mented by equally intensive
subversive pressures.
The Diem regime's political
modus operandi blunted the over-
all effectiveness of the govern-
ment's counterinsurgency effort.
Under Diem, the efficiency of
key programs was hindered by
frequent shifts in the assign-
ment of province chiefs and by
bureaucratic bottlenecks. Par-
ticularly in its conflict with
the Buddhists and students, the
Diem government alienated im-
portant segments of the urban
populace and made itself vulner-
able to Viet Cong exploitation
of these difficulties in rural
areas.
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Although Saigon's new mil-
itary rulers are fully cognizant
of the enormous problems con-
fronting them, they have moved
slowly in developing new poli-
cies and programs while consol-
idating their control. Diem's
pacification programs have vir-
tually ground to a halt while
the new regime replaces key
personnel at the province and
district levels. This month
the top military command struc-
ture has been improved, an ad-
visory council intended to
mobilize civilian political tal-
ents has been set up, and the
government is showing awareness
that it has limited time in
which to get moving.
It remains to be seen how
the new government in Saigon
will check the momentum of the
Viet Cong drive in the delta,
rally popular support, defeat
the Viet Cong's military forces,
limit their access to and sup-
port from North Vietnam, and
gradually destroy the Communist
political and subversive appara-
tus. The Viet Cong have contin-
ued to show the resourcefulness,
adaptability, and determination
which has characterized their
nearly continuous involvement
in guerrilla fighting since
1945. They forced the French
to withdraw in 1954 after nine
years of bloody struggle, and
there is no evidence that the
change of government in Saigon
has caused them to lose heart
for the struggle now. The pros-
pect at best is for a prolonged,
grinding test of endurance,
will, and morale. 25X1
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