WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A004300070001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 29
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 5, 2008
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 10, 1964
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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~~~~,~L ll'~ITELLIC~EI~I~` ~,~1~~.CY
State Dept. review completed
w^c~rno.nc~ na deelassa*rcotio~
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(Information as of 1200 EST, 9 January 1964)
THE COMMUNIST WORLD Page
KHRUSHCHEV ATTEMPTS TO SEIZE "PEACE" INITIATIVE
His 2 January proposal for an .international agree-
ment to renounce the use of force in settling terri-
torial disputes is a challenge to the West following
the Johnson-Erhard communiqud's stress on exploring
all avenues for bettering East-West relations.
NEW APPROACH MAY SAVE CZECHOSLOVAK LEADER NOVOTNY
Policies set forth at the December central committee
plenum suggest that a compromise was worked out be-
tween Novotny and his liberal opposition at the di-
rection of Moscow.
YUGOSLAV -WEST GERMAN RELATIONS AT NEW LOW
The Yugoslavs are incensed over Bonn's refusal to
pay their World War II indemnification claims and
over the sanctuary given anti-Tito Yugoslav emigrd
groups in West Germany.
PEIPING BUYS WESTERN INDUSTRIAL EQUIPMENT
Af ter long surveys of Western markets, the Chinese
Communists have begun buying oil production and re-
finery equipment and synthetic fiber and fertilizer
plants, but no massive purchases appear likely now.
PEIPING EXPECTS ANOTHER MEDIOCRE ECONOMIC YEAR
The stagnant economy has created a policy stalemate
which has left three -year-old slogans as the only
guidelines. Effective long-range planning remains
virtually nonexistent, as it has since 1958.
THE SITUATION IN LAOS
Premier Souvanna is pursuing his efforts to bring
the Pathet Lao back into active participation in the
government, while the Communists are maintaining mil-
itary pressure on neutralist forces in central Laos.
ARAB CHIEFS OF STATE MEETING
The conference may be the occasion for a display of
conciliation by Nasir, but it is unlikely to achieve
its stated objective: coordinated Arab action to
counter Israel's plans to use Jordan River waters.
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ASIA-AFRICA (continued)
THE SITUATION ON CYPRUS
The peace is precarious, and neither the Greek and
Turkish Cypriots nor the treaty-bound British, Greek,
and Turkish governments are optimistic that next week's
London conference can produce a new agreement between
the two Cypriot communities.
AREA NOTE 10
On Turkey
THE DAHOMEY-NIGER DISPUTE
The Niger Government's expulsion of some. 16,000 Da-
homeans is likely to cause serious internal problems
in both countries, but the international repercussions
of the imbroglio seem to have been contained.
CONGO'S RELATIONS WITH BELGIUM STILL STRAINED 12
GHANA MOVES FURTHER LEFT
Repercussions from the attempt on Nkrumah's life,
together with constitutional changes he had already
proposed, will hasten Ghana's conversion into a
one-party state evidently inspired by Communist
models.
EUROPE
NEGOTIATIONS OVER BERLIN PASSES CONTINUE
'.'alks to broaden the Christmas pass arrangement
are likely to be prolonged as bath sides try to
improve their bargaining position. Bonn fears
West Berlin may concede too much to East Germany.
DISSENSION IN THE ITALIAN SOCIALIST PARTY
The pro-Communist dissident faction opposed to the
party's participation in the government coalition
is preparing--despite the disapproval of the Com-
munists themselves--to form a separate party.
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EUROPE (continued) Page
RENEWED DISCUSSION OF EUROPEAN POLITICAL UNION 17
There is speculation that the success of the year-
end EEC negotiations on farm and trade policies
has improved the climate for discussion of political
union and that De Gaulle may offer or encourage
others to offer some new initiative.
WESTEI';N f3EMISP:-iEP,E
CASTRO'S ANNIVERSARY SPEECH
Its somewhat defensive air may stem from concern
over a possible change in US policy toward him
or fear of new hemispheric measures against Cuba.
WEAPONS DISPLAYED IN CUBAN ANN'IVEF,SARY PARADE 20
Every major type of Soviet weapon in Cuba was dis-
played, some for the first time, but only one--an
antiaircraft gun--was newly identified.
AREA NOTE
On Brazil
SECRET
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The Communist World
KHRUSHCHEV ATTEMPTS TO SEIZE "PEACE" INITIATIVE
Krushchev's proposal for
an international agreement to
renounce the use of force in
settling territorial disputes
is an attempt to grasp the dip-
lomatic initiative. He is also
trying to challenge the West
following the communigtl,d'by
President Johnson and Chancellor
Erhard stressing the importance
of exploring all opportunities
for improving East-West rela-
tions.
Khrushchev's messages, de-
livered to all heads of govern-
ment on 2 January, are intended
to generate an exchange of cor-
respondence with Western leaders;
it is unlikely that he antici-
pates formal negotiations in
the near future. The omission
of any specific proposals with
regard to the timing and level
of talks is, in fact, further
evidence that his messages were
aimed primarily at stealing a
march on the Western governments.
The Russians, however, undoubt-
edly believe this initiative
will provide an effective plat-
form for their disarmament pro-
posals in the Geneva talks which
reconvene on 21 January.
The USSR in the past has
indicated that it does not at-
tach great importance to the
form of a nonaggression agree-
ment. Khrushchev's proposal,
which incorporates the main
features of Moscow's long-stand-
ing formula for a NATO - Warsaw
Pact nonaggression treaty, ap-
pears designed to circumvent
Western objections that such a
treaty would involve at least
tacit recognition of East Ger-
many. It is also an extension
of Moscow's offer to the US
and Britain last fall of a uni-
lateral Soviet statement, to
accompany a nonaggression pact,
renouncing the use of force in
all international questions,
including Germany and West Ber-
lin.
The proposed agreement
provides that the absence of
recognition or diplomatic re-
lations should not be used as
a pretext for violating the
"territorial integrity of an-
other state." This provision
seems clearly aimed at afford-
ing increased protection for
East Germany against the alleged
"revanchist" ambitions of the
Federal Republic. In his letter,
Khrushchev struck out at those
"revanchist" circles which con-
tinue their "scheming for the
review of the equitable postwar
territorial settlement." The
proposal is also directed against
US policy toward the Castro re-
gime.
ghrushchev's letter also
appears to be a major Soviet
move to place the Chinese
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10 Jan 64 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
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Communists on the defensive in
both the Sino-Indian and Sino-
Soviet border questions. Moscow
charged last September that the
Chinese had "systematically vio-
lated" the Soviet frontier
since 1960, and warned Pei~7ing
that "artificial creation" of
territorial disputes would mean
"embarking on a very dangerous
path." In a blunt rebuke to the
Chinese, who base their border
claims on centuries-old agree-
ments, Khrushchev's letter point-
edly argued that "references to
history are of no help" in the
solution of border disputes.
The pressures of Moscow's
conflict with Peiping and past
Soviet support for wars of "na-
tional liberation" obliged
Khrushchev to hedge on an un-
conditional and global renuncia-
tion of the use of force. He
argued that "demands " for the
return of such territories as
Taiwan and West Irian are "un-
questionably just." Khrushchev
also endorsed the "sacred right" 25X1
of "oppressed peoples " to use
force to abolish "colonial re-
gimes . "
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NEW APPROACH MAY SAVE CZECHOSLOVAK LEADER NOVOTNY
The Czechoslovak party seems
to have adopted a new approach to
problems which had generated in-
ternal party pressures threaten-
ing to unseat hard-line party
leader Novotny. Policies set forth
at the December central committee
plenum suggest that a compromise
was worked out between Novotny and
his liberal opposition at the direc-
tion of Moscow.
Although the plenum was clearly
designed to set limits on criti-
cism of the regime, the party used
a liberal, Vladimir Koucky, to de-
liver the main address in an effort
to enlist the cooperation of the
intellectuals. As chairman of the
party's recently created ideolog-
ical commission, Koucky apparently
has assumed Jiri Hendrych's role
as chief ideology spokesman and,
possibly, as number-two man in
the party hierarchy. Koucky's
speech closely followed the firm
line laid down to the writers by
Hendrych last spring, but it was
unusually reasonable and realis-
tic, as well as openly critical
of economic, social, material,
and ideological insufficiencies
in Czechoslovakia. He cited a
number of extremely liberal and
boldly anti-Stalinist works as
examples of "acceptable" literary
attempts.
The use- of Koucky suggests
that Novotny agreed to let the
liberals handle the intellectuals
in a way which might prove more
effective in holding them in check
than his own angry threats and
appeals. Koucky's willingness to
serve Novotny in this fashion was
probably inspired by a warning
from Moscow that the factions of
the party must work together to
get Czechoslovakia back on its
feet without a change in leader-
ship.
Moscow's role in effecting
this at least temporary coopera-
tion between the liberals and
Novotny is also suggested by the
fact that a reported leader of the
liberals, Drahomir Kolder, escorted
Soviet President Brezhnev to
Bratislava--the center of opposi-
tion to Novotny--during Brezhnev's
recent visit to Czechoslovakia.
Novotny's reversal at the plenum
of his opposition to further re-
habilitation of Slovak victims of
the "Stalinist" purges also was
probably in response to a warning
from Moscow to cooperate with the
opposition or court loss of
Khrushchev's support.
The plenum resolution con-
tains no new proposals for the
economy and gives even less sup-
port to the liberals than did
Novotny in his recent speeches.
However, the fact that a.we11=
known liberal economist in speak-
ing to the plenum questioned the
effectiveness of Soviet-type plan-
ning and management in Czechoslo-
vakia's situation indicates that
the controversial economic debate
has extended to high levels of
government and will continue.
The enlistment of Koucky's
support suggests that whatever
compromise has been worked out
has assured Novotny's continuation
as party first secretary at least
for the time being. In view of 25X1
the strength of the liberals, how-
ever, Moscow may have succeeded
only in postponing the day of
reckoning for Novotny.
I
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SE C'RET
Yugoslav - West German re-
lations, which for the past
seven years have fluctuated be-
tween bad and tolerable, have
reached a new low since mid-De-
cember, Yugoslavia has sent
West Germany two diplomatic pro-
test notes, has begun a vigorous
anti-German propaganda campaign,
and now is preparing to air its
complaints before either the UN
or the participants in the 1945
Potsdam Conference,
Foremost in the Yugoslav
mind is the question of indem-
nification for World War II
losses, which the Potsdam Con-
ference agreed West Germany
should pay, Bonn has refused
to do so,claiming that Yugosla-
via, by virtue of its 1957 dip-
lomatic recognition of East Ger-
many, does not view West Ger-
many as the legal successor to
the Third Reich,
East Germany would prob-
ably not be any mare coopera-
tive if approached about in-
demnification, Although the
Potsdam Conference made it re-
sponsible far war reparations
only for the USSR and Poland,
it agreed last May to send tlu-
goslavia $]_7.5 million worth
of goads in connection with
use of Yugoslav labor in Ger -
many during the war. This
agreement, however, was reached
only after prolonged negotia-
tions, and neither side has
described it publicly ~s cover-
ing ind,emnificatior~,
From late b4ay to mid-July
last year, Yugoslavia and West
Germany conducted negotiations
on this and other economic ques-
tions, such as Bonn's opposition
to talks between Yugoslavia and
the Common Market, Belgrade
offered to consider the indem-
nification issue closed and to
make minor political concessions
if Bonn would provide it new
economic assistance in an amount
approximating the indemnification
claim. 3onn's counteroffer was
so low, however, that the Yugo-
slavs broke off the negotiations.
The chief Yugoslav negotiator
claims to have obtained agree-
ment in late September to reopen
the talks, but Germany appears
to be stalling. Its negotiators
have not yet arrived in Belgrade.
The Yugoslavs are also
exercised over the emotion-
laden issue of Croat emigre
groups in West Germany, where
Belgrade claims terrorists are
trained for operations in Yugo-
slavia. Belgrade was displeased
when the trial of a band of
Croats, charged with sacking
the Yugoslav trade mission in
Bann and murdering a Yugoslav
national in late 1962, was tem-
porarily postponed on 9 Decem-
ber. The Croats' defense at-
torneys, moreover, have begun
legal proceedings in West Ger-
many against Yugoslav Foreign
Minister Popovic, charging him
with atrocities against German
prisoners during World War II.
The German Foreign Ministry is
limited as to action it can take
in these matters, but apparently
is trying to have charges against
Popovic quashed.
The US Embassy in Belgrade
believes that the Yugoslavs
SECRE2'
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The Communist World
will wait a little longer before
pursuing the Potsdam or UN chan-
nels. A Yugoslav Foreign Minis-
try official has implied that a
crisis can be averted simply by
the arrival. in Belgrade of West
German negotiators. Neverthe-
less, neither side appears.
to have changed its basic
positions enough to permit
any substantial reduction
in bilateral anta~oni
PEIPING BUYS WESTERN INDUSTRIAL EQUIPMENT
Following long surveys of
Western markets, China has be-
gun buying oil production and
refinery equipment and synthetic
fiber and fertilizer plants.
Contracts for additional indus-
trial equipment are expected,
but no massive purchases appear
likely in the near future.
Peiping's purchases of
industrial plants in Western
Europe and Japan since mid-
19G3 total at least $60 mil-
lion. It has bought oil refin-
ing and drilling equipment and
a fertilizer plant from the
Netherlands, a synthetic ammonia
installation from the UK, and
a sizable synthetic fiber plant
from Japan. Just last month
China bought from Italy two
more fertilizer plants. Pei-
ping has also contracted far
oil refinery equipment from
Italy and reportedly will buy
associated petrochemical equip-
ment at a later date.
These plant purchases--
the first from the free
world since failure of the
"leap forward" in~1960--are
being made at a time when Pei-
ping's imports of industrial
plants from the USSR have fallen
to about $10 million from an
average of over $375 million in
1959 and 1960. There is little
prospect of Peiping's seeking
any renewal of major industrial
imports from this source, but
it will probably continue to
import limited quantities of
industrial products.
Currently a Chinese mission
is visiting French petroleum in-
stallations, and a French mis-
sion is in Peiping closing a
deal for chemical equipment.
Another Chinese delegation will
visit Japan this month to be-
gin negotiation for a second
synthetic fiber plant.
Peiping, in economic dif-
ficulties, suspicious of f or-
eigners, and having been sub-
jected to stringent Western trade
controls, is likely to move slowly
with purchases from the free
world. In view of its slim for-
eign exchange reserves and its
need for large quantities of
Western grain, it presumably
will continue to finance pur-
chases from nonbloc sources
through increased exports. It
may also redirect some items now
exported to the USSR to free
world markets and seek more me-
dium-term credits.
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Peiping's expectations for the
Chinese economy in 1964 appear as
modest as its claims for 1963. The
stagnant economy has created a pol-
icy stalemate which has left three-
year-old slogans as the only.cur-
rent guidelines. Effective long-
range planning has been virtually
nonexistent since the "leap for-
ward" was launched in 1958, and
the status of future plans is
clearly contingent on the currently
dim prospects for economic recovery.
Economic announcements in the
New Year statements and the recently
issued communiqud of the National
People's Congress (NPC) all reflect
forced optimism and appear to be
designed to bolster sagging domes-
tic morale as well as to put on a
brave front for the outside world.
The assertion that agricultural
output increased in 1963 compared
with 1962, for example, is not
borne out by the evidence available
of an improved agricultural situa-
tion are further belied by the fact
that Peiping is importing grain in
1964 at about the same rate as in
1963.
The Chinese acknowledged "ex-
ceptionally heavy floods and seri-
ous, prolonged drought" last year
but still claim that a "relatively
good harvestTO was gathered.
Policy guidelines for the
economy differ little from those
of early 1961 when agriculture
was first accorded its new prior-
ity and "consolidation and read-
justment" became the keynotes of
the depressed economy. The eco-
nomic "tasks" publicly set for
1964 are primarily exhortatory in
nature and reveal little about
the priorities to be assigned the
various economic sectors. Peiping
has also called for a large-scale
political indoctrination campaign
to overcome apathy and stimulate
enthusiasm for its economic pro-
grams even though similar cam-
paigns in 1963-had little effect.
Although China is in the sec-
ond year of the Third Five Year
Plan period, planning is still on
a year-to-year basis and no five-
year plan has yet been formulated.
In fact, Foreign Minister Chen Yi
told Japanese newsmen last autumn
that China was considering abandon-
ing the plan and shifting to one
of either seven ar ten years.
policy.
zation implicit in a ~o-it-alone
Chinese propaganda now is
dividing blame for the economic
difficulties almost equally be-
tween natural calamities and the
"perfidious" action of the Soviets
in withdrawing their technical aid.
While these allegations against
the Soviets have served the purpose
of rationalizing Peiping's present
policy of self-reliance, there has
been a defensiveness in propagating
this policy which suggests concern
over the long delay in industriali=
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Tom' firs
LAOS
Jones k~ '
enp
Dt~n ~jen Pb
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Pak~dt ............... Kam
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Seno 9 Pha Lane Tchepo
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SECRET `'"'~
Prospects remain dim for an
early easing of tensions among
the Laotian factions. Premier
Souvanna and Pathet Lao leader
Souphannouvong are still unable
to agree on a venue for talks
designed to resolve differences
between the neutralists and the
Communists.
A preliminary agreement
reached by these two factions
last month on the neutralization
and demilitarization of Luang
Prabang has run into stiff op-
position from rightist leader
Phoumi Nosavan. Phoumi insists
that the Pathet Lao first agree
to similar concessions, such as
the neutralization of Sam Neua
or freedom of movement within
territory under Pathet Lao con-
trol.'
Souvanna, nevertheless,
seems ready to persist in his
efforts to bring the Pathet Lao
back into full participation
in the government, He has
accepted an "invitation" to visit
Sam Neua town during the latter
part of January. Souvanna denies
that this visit will be the
occasion for a formal meeting
with Souphannouvong but has
acknowledged that he expects
to see him there. The premier
may hope that renewed personal
contact with his half-brother
--there has been none since
last April--might in some way
improve relations between the
factions they lead.
There are some indications
that the Pathet Lao are consider-
ing the establishment of a
"true neutralist" government if 25X1
negotiation h Souvanna rove
fruitless.
suc a governmen
might a ed by left-wing neu-
tralist cabinet members Khamsouk
Keola and Heuane Mong Kholvilay
and that it would be supported
by troops under General Khamouane
Boupha, military commander in
Phong Saly Province, and the
dissident neutralist military
leader, Colonel Deuane. Both
Khamsouk and Heuane have left
Laos; Khamsouk at last report
was in Peiping and Heuane in
Phnom Penh.
On the military scene, Com-
munist forces are continuing
their pressure against right-
wing and neutralist positions
in central Laos. Following the
recapture of Lak Sao and Kam
Keut in late December, Communist
troops have moved south on Route
8-A, possibly to pressure opposi-
tion forces from their positions
in the Na Kay area and eventually
link up with Pathet Lao units
which have been pushing north
from Nhommarath. Control over
Route 8-A would substantially
improve Communist resupply ca-
pabilities. Farther north, an
attack in late December by right-
wing regular and Meo guerrilla
forces against Tha Lin Noi and
Xieng Khouang town was sharply
rebuffed b Communist forces.
25X1
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ARAB CHIEFS OF STATE MEETING
The Arab chiefs of state
meeting on the Jordan waters
problem will convene in Cairo
on 13 January. All thirteen
members of the Arab League will
attend. King Idris of Libya
will not appear in person, how-
ever, and although King Saud may
attend, Crown Prince Faysal will
serve as Saudi Arabia's actual
representative. The meeting is
expected to end on the 16th,
the beginning of the Moslem fast-
ing month of Ramadan.
There is little expectation
that any workable program will
be agreed on for countering
Israel's plans to begin drawing
on the Jordan River waters this
spring. There has been little
real advance planning on the
Arab side, although the Arab
League has given some considera-
tion to complicated and extremely
costly schemes to divert the
headwaters of the Jordan. Pri-
vate remarks of some of the Arab
leaders have supported the gen-
eral impression that the meet-
ing is largely for show. The
participants will probably pre-
sent an assortment of proposals
which will be left to subsequent
lower level meetings to work out.
Nevertheless, Arab propa-
ganda organs are concentrating
heavily on the meeting. Their
treatments range from the rel-
atively restrained approach of
Cairo media--reflecting Nasir's
desire to avoid an open Arab-
Israeli clash--to the shrill.
belligerency of the Syrian press
and radio, always the vanguard
of anti-Israeli verbalists.
Nasir is stressing the de-
sirability of nonmilitary action.
He is expec e o
advocate a joint Arab effort to
use indirect economic warfare--
e.g., withholding oil--to make
Israel's Western "supporters"
apply pressure on Tel Aviv.
Nasir is elso reported to
be planning to use the meeting
to display a new posture of con-
ciliation toward his Arab neigh-
bors. There is some chance that
his prospective face-to-face
encounter with Crown Pz?ince
Faysal might help ease the
situation in Yemen. A personal
assurance from Faysal that Saudi
Arabia did not intend to stir
up further opposition to Yemen's
Nasix-backed republican govern-
ment could encourage Nasir to
speed reduction of Egyptian
troop strength in Yemen. The
threat of potential Arab-Israeli
trouble and the consequent need
for Egyptian military readiness
on that front could also serve
as a face-saving device to cover
an E yptian ullback in Yemen.
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A precarious peace has
been maintained on Cyprus de-
spite occasional acts of vio-
lence, and. the British have ob-
tained the grudging cooperation
of all parties. Helicopter
.patrols by British, Greek, and.
Turkish troops have visited
many parts of the island and
efforts have been made to send
food to communities where sup-
plies were running dangerously
low.
In Nicosia, many of the
barricades and roadblocks hastily
erected during the intercom-
munal fighting in late Decem-
ber had been removed. by 9 Janu-
ary. There has been no attempt
as yet, however, to have the
irregular farces on either
side turn in their weapons, and
it appears likely that those
previously manning the barri-
cades have merely pulled back
a short distance.
and of the three nations which
are directly tied to Cyprus by
treaty--Britain, Greece, and
Turkey. The British are pro-
posing a very general agenda
in an effort to prevent pro-
cedural disputes. None of the
parties. involved is optimistic
that a new agreement can be
reached.
The Greek Cypriots, sup-
ported by the government in
Athens, still insist on basic
changes in the constitution
which would. provide for majority
rule on Cyprus, although they
state that minority rights will
be guaranteed., under UN supervi-
sion if necessary. They also
demand. that Cyprus be made fully
independent with no special
status for Turkey or Greece,
but they propose to maintain
Commonwealth membership and a
special treaty.,relationship
with Britain.
Contact between the Greek
and Turkish sectors of the
capital is maintained only by
non-Cypriots. Turkish Cypriot
civil servants have refused to
return to their jobs--either
out of fear of Greek Cypriots
or on instructions from Turk-
ish Cypriot, leaders. A de
facto autonomous government
appears to have been created
in the Tur:~ish sector with its
own police force, hospital,
postal service, radio station,
rationing system, and curfews.
The next step is a con-
ference, to open in London
next week, of representatives
of the two Cypriot communities
The Turkish Cypriot leader,
Vice President Kuchuk, has re-
peatedly called for partition
of the island on the ground that
recent events prove the two com-
munities are wholly incompatible.
the basic Turkish de-
mand may a for s ome form of
federation--rather than geo-
graphic partition--including
precise guarantees for Turkish
Cypriots, Turkish Cypriots and
Turkish representatives at the
conference can be expected to
oppose strongly any attempt to
limit Turl~ey's special role.
Britain, meanwhile, appears
concerned that its peace-making
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role may be difficult to drop.
Over 2,000 British troops have
been sent to Cyprus since .late
December, causing a serious
drain on British reserve forces
at home. The British--with
Greek, Turkish, and Cypriot ac-
quiescence--have proposed that
Secretary General Thant send
a personal representative to the
island to observe the cease-fire.
The concentration of Turkish
armed forces in the Mersin-
Iskenderun area of southern Turkey
Turkey: The coalition govern-
ment recently formed by Turkey's
Republican Peoples' Party (RPP),
led by Prime Minister Inonu, and
a group of independents will face
great difficulty in providing
effective leadership. The cab-
inet gained votes of approval
from only 225 deputies in the
450-seat Grand National Assembly.
It must therefore rely on con-
tinued support from the RPP's
erstwhile coalition partner, the
New Turkey Party, aver which
Inonu has no control. He can ex-
pect almost no support from other
parties .
The former French African
territory of Niger, independent
since 1960, is in process of
expelling some 16,000 citizens
of neighboring Dahomey, another
former French area which has
traditionally provided the en-
trepot facilities for Niger.
continues. While Premier Inonu
and the chief of the Turkish
General Staff have emphasized
that no invasion of Cyprus is
contemplated as long as the
peacekeeping operation is ef-
fective, there is growing evi-
dence that both the armed serv-
ices and the public would de-
mand unilateral Turkish military
intervention in Cyprus if major
clashes were resumed and the
Turkish Cypr is suffered heav
casualties.
The weakness of the new
government--Inonu's third coa-
lition effort since 1961--and
the civilian politicians' evi-
dent inability to form any other
government with the present dis-
tribution of seats in the assembly
increases the probability of
early elections. The military
leaders, however, may oppose
elections, because the Justice
Party, successor to the pre-
revolution Democrat regime of
Menderes, is likel to ewer e
victorious.
While the international reper-
cussions--which have included border
closings, a complaint to the UN,
and threats of war--seem to have
been eased, the population trans-
fer is likely to cause serious
internal difficulties for both
countries.
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~..~ ~
Agades. ~'-VGR
~._ ?Do~ ~ ,. ~._ LL _~_
Kandi~
~AH~MEY
,g ?~ ex
;~arakou.
~?mos
~*NfAMEY
_LOME ~.-_Wc
Port ~b
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Niger President Diori decided
to expel the Dahomeans last fall,
after three of his own people had,
been killed in rioting which accom-
panied the overthrow of Dahomey's
President Maga, with whom Diori
had close ties. The expulsion was
actually ordered in December. The
real basis of Niger's antipathy
toward Dahomey rests, however, on
the fact that the Dahomeans, as
better educated coastal people long
in contact with Europeans, had come
to occupy many of the prestigious
and better-paying clerical posi-
tions in former French West Africa.
Niger's people now want the
jobs for themselves. Diori's ab-
rupt action, however, has nearly
immobilized the Niger bureaucracy.
In desperation, he has called for
all citizens "who can read and
write" to come to the capital to
fill the vacancies left by the
ousted Dahomeans.
Diori probably was prompted
by a desire to improve his leader-
ship image and shift attention
from internal difficulties. He
recently was forced to negotiate
with an insubordinate army captain
in order to avert a major crisis.
The episode showed the fragility
of Diori's government and probably
encouraged others to plot against
him .
Dahomey, for its part, faces
a grave problem in trying to absorb
its repatriated nationals--most of
whom are accustomed to relatively
high wages --into an economy already
plagued with widespread unemployment.
The country's economic difficulties
may be further compounded by the
closing of the Dahomey-Niger border.
An order to this effect was issued
in late December by the harassed"
and inexperienced leader of Dahomey's
provisional government, Colonel
Soglo, but now apparently has been
rescinded. Its enforcement would
result in a considerable revenue
loss for Dahomey,inasmuch as commer-
cial traffic to and from Niger ac-
counts for about two thirds of the
total tonnage handled by Dahomea's
port and railroad.
~ Soglo's other gestures, which
!have included propaganda attacks
on Niger and a complaint to the UN
(Security Council, have also been
made against a background of in-
ternal difficulties. The Dahomey
provisional government's new con-
stitution received an overwhelming
popular endorsement on 5 January,
and elections are to be held on
19 January. However, political insta-
bility seems certain to continue in
the months to come in view of the
fact that militant labor unionists
and ambitious military leaders have
entered the political arena .
France, with extensive economic
and cultural interests in both Dahomey
and Niger, has worked behind the
scenes to bring representatives of
the two countries together. A bi-
lateral ministerial conference,
finally held last week, recommended
the reopening of the border and a
number of other steps designed to
reduce tensions. If these efforts
work, the dispute probably can be 25X1
smoothed ever by one of the African
regional organizations without se--
riousl 'involving the UN.
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Strains in relations be-
tween Erussels and Leopoldville
have been growing since early
last month. The difficulties
center on differences aver a
settlement of the preindepend-
ence Belgian and Congolese debts
and holdings, the amount of cur-
rent Belgian financial aid to
the Congo, and Belgian irrita-
tion over Congolese Premier
Adaula's bypassing of a Western
consortium in awarding a refinery
project to the Italian oil com-
pany ENI. Efforts by Belgian in-
terests--apparently including
High-level officials--to get
Adoula to take Katanga's ex-
President Tshomb~ into the cen-
tral government and the friendly
reception recently given Tshomb~
in Brussels have further com-
plicated the picture.
Last week Adoula publicly
chastised Brussels for "foot-
dragging" in the financial ne-
gotiations and for obstructing
Congolese efforts to obtain aid
from other Western sources. Ap-
parently to underscore his ir-
ritation, Adaula flew last week
to Bonn to talk to 4Yest German
.businessmen about a more exten-
sive investment program in the
Congo.
Tshombd has returned to
tvIadrid from Belgium, where he
had talks with a wide assort-
ment of Belgians--officials,
politicians, businessmen, and
former supporters and advisers.
On Leopoldville's noxth-
ern flank, the anti-Adoula
leftist exile group in Braz-
zaville--the Committee of Lib-
eration (CNL), headed by
Lumumbist Christophe Gbenye
--has yet to make any moves
~ Nor is there firm
evidence that the CNL has
received the financial as-
sistance and arms it has
been seeking abroad.
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escape from assassination will make
his actions more unpredictable than
ever. However, an acceleration of
his regime's evolution toward total-
itarianism and an expansion of its
already numerous ties with the Com-
So far, Ghana's controlled
press and radio have refrained
?rom suggesting the direct in-
ern governments as was charged after
the grenade attack on Nkrumah at
Kulungugu in August 1962. General
reference to "imperialist networks"
have appeared, however, and a major
propaganda effort implicating the
US may eventually develop. Almost
certainly, Nkrumah's
suspicions of a Western conspiracy
have been deepened, especially in
with the British-nurtured police.
For the present, Ghanaian
media, guided by members of the
relatively small pro-Communist
coterie which has increasingly
gained Nkrumah's ear, have been
the "enemy from within." This
emphasizing the need to root out
sharpens further a campaign which
has been in high gear since October
for a purge of all "counterrevolu-
tionary" elements, The pro-Commu-
nists are demanding a "socialist
renovation" of virtually all insti-
tutions and practices inherited
from Britain--including Parliament,
the judiciary, the foreign and civil
services, the military establish-
ment, and the educational system.
Ilkrumah, angered by the acquit-
tal last month of three former as-
sociates charged with complicity
in the Kulungugu affair, had been
moving in this direction even be-
fore the 2 January attack. After
imposing legislation enabling him
to void special court decisions,
he used language which seemed to
endorse the extremists' line to an-
nounce a referendum for late Janu-
ary on two proposed constitutional
amendments.
One change will abolish what-
ever independence the judiciary
still retains. The other specifi-
cally names Nkrumah's Convention
People's Party, now officially de-
fined as the "vanguard of the
people" and the "leading core of
all organizations," as Ghana's one
national party. Such formal consti-
tutional status for the party, along
with the phraseology employed, is
evidently inspired by the Communist
world's one-party model and at pres-
ent would be unique in Black Africa.
No significant open opposition
is anticipated, and the regime will
ensure that the official outcome
of the vote is heavily favorable.
However, disenchantment with the
Nkrumah regime on the part of still 25X1
important but unorganized moderate
elements can be expected to s read
and deepen.
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NEGOTIATIONS OVER BERLIN PASSES CONTINUE
West Berlin leaders, under con-
siderable restraint from Bonn and
Allied officials in Berlin, are
moving ahead cautiously in an effort
to reach an accord with East German
authorities on renewing the Christ-
mas pass agreement in broader form.
Some 1.24 million visits were made
by West Berliners to East Berlin
during the 17-day pass period, and
both sides have publicly endorsed
an extension. However, each is at
present seeking primarily to im-
prove its bargaining position and
the negotiations are likely to be
prolonged.
The West Berlin negotiator,
Horst Korber, met again with East
German state secretary Wendt on 3
and 4 January to exchange views
on a permanent pass arrangement.
Korber made no apparent effort to
reach an agreement prior to the
5 January cutoff of visits, and he
indicated there was no need for a
quick East German response to West
Berlin's newest proposals.
The West Berlin bargaining
paper, as presented by Korber,
calls for permanent rather than
one-day passes--to be made avail-
able to all West Berliners rather
than dust to those claiming rela-
tives in the Communist sector, and
to be processed in West Berlin by
local postal officials rather than
East German postal officials. The
West Berlin proposals suggest re-
storing limited direct telephone
communication between the two sec-
tors of t}~e city. In addition,
at Bonn's insistence, the paper
inchides as a "general basic prin-
ciple," although not as a require-
ment, a request that East Berliners
be permitted to visit West Berlin.
In return, East German nego-
tiator Wendt presented a letter
from Acting Premier Stoph asking
that preliminary consultations
be undertaken between Mayor Brandt
and East German Deputy Premier
Abusch--which in Western eyes
would elevate the talks from an
acceptable technical to an unac-
ceptable political level.
In addition, Walter Ulbricht
in a 3 January speech indicated
that any new agreement on passes
must ensure that East Germany not
suffer any economic losses as a
result. While he may have been
thinking in terms of the pre-Wall
refugee loss, he undoubtedly was
also referring to the losses which
Bonn's new oil tax law will in-
flict on East Germany. It is also
quite likely that he meant to hint
to West German authorities that
long-term credits from Bonn are
expected in exchange for a pass
agreement. Ulbricht earlier had
indicated in an interview with
the West German magazine S1-.ern
that his regime was intere-step in
long-term credits for capital goods.
Bonn, which is not a partic-
ipant in the Berlin talks, has
to-ken an official attitude of ap-
proving any new agreement which
does not damage the political or
legal fabric of Berlin. However,
Foreign Ministry officials in
private, and a growing number of
editorial commentators in public,
have expressed apprehension that
the West Berlin city administra-
tion, guided by the "flexible"
Mayor Brandt, is willin to 0
too far.
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Europe
Pro-Communists in the Ital-
ian Socialist Party (PSI) who
object to party leader Nenni's
collaboration with the Christian
Democrats a.n the government co-
alition are preparing to form
their own party. The Communist
Party itself is opposed to such
a move, and the PSI dissidents,
who apparently have not obtained
all the support they expected
throughout the PSI as a whole,
may postpone a final decision.
The dissidents, led by
Tullio Vecchietti and Lelio
Basso, have chosen the name
"Italian Socialist Party of
Proletarian Unity (PSIUP)."
Their faction nominally con-
trols about 30 percent of the
PSI membership. The other PSI
left-wing faction, led by
Luigi Bertoldi and Nello Mariana,
commands the support of perhaps
ten percent of the PSI member-
ship and has opted to support
the Nenni position. Even if
the PSIUP group, at its meeting
this week end, should decide on
secession, an announcement will
probably be delayed until the
Bertoldi-Mariana followers hold
their convention on 15 January.
The consequences of a
secessionist move are difficult
to forecast with any precision.
In a showdown, some left-wingers
who now sympathize with PSIUP
positions would probably try to
find some face-saving way to
avoid leaving the PSI. Although
Nenni would be most unlikely to
do anything that would compromise
his commitments to the coalition,
he might try to buy-off some of
the extremists' supporters with
patronage promises. A struggle
is in progress for control of
those party federation and pro-
vincial headquarters where the
Nenni forces now lack a clear
majority. PSIUP leaders seem
to be weaker in certain of these
than they thought, and the Nenni
forces are getting stronger support
from the party base than was ex-
pected.
The leaders in the PSIUP
movement have persisted in their
attitude against the wishes of
the Italian Communist Party (PCI),
which has hitherto been one of
their main sources of financial
support. The PCI is worried
that an extreme left-wing group
of the kind being proposed would
attract dissatisfied elements
among its own membership.
Although
th~l now seems res gned to the
loss of its "Trojan horse" with-
in the PSI, it can be expected
to make extensive efforts to
dominate the dissident group.
If the pro-Communists do
secede from the PSI and Nenni
need no longer placate them, he
will have somewhat more elbow
room in collaborating with his
coalition partners on certain
policies. He will be anxious,
however, to underline some of
his party's political and ideo-
logical differences with the
other coalition parties to re-
assure PSI members that their
party has not been "captured"
by the Christian Democrats.
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RENEWED DISCUSSION OF EUROPEAN POLITICAL UNION
Common Market observers
believe that the success of the
year-end EEC negotiations on
agricultural and trade policies
has improved the climate for
discussion of political union,
and some of them expect that De
Gaulle will sooner or later offer
or encourage others to offer
new initiatives in this area.
De Gaulle, in his New Year's mes-
sage, cited the "union of Europe"
as one of the "major tasks" of
French policy, but elucidated
only to the extent of saying
that "regular and organized co-
operation" should be developed
among the six EEC countries.
According to reports cur-
rent in Brussels, De Gaulle is
considering a formula for a
European "confederation " with
a parliament and an executive
which would gradually assume in-
creasing powers over the next
few years. This would be done
in such a way as to preserve
the independence of the member
states, but the powers given
the confederation would still
be broad enough to encourage
the partisans of a supranational
Europe. Some more specific pro-
posal may come out of De Gaulle 's
press conference later this
month, and he may use this occa-
sion of his Februaxy meeting
with Italian President Segni to
explore the ground further.
De Gaulle's objectives at
this time would be to disarm
domestic critics of his European
policy, lessen French isolation
in Europe, and gain acceptance
for the concept of a "Europe
of States" under a formula
which would be difficult for
the other Common Market members
to challenge.
Interest among the EEC
countries in political union
is balanced, however, by skep-
ticism regarding France's will-
ingness to make concessions to
their viewpoints. Belgian For-
eign Minister Spaak, who in
early December proposed his own
scheme for a European political
commission, has said more re-
cently that he still awaits
French concessions to the idea
of supranationality. German
officials have also taken a
skeptical position and maintain
that progress toward political
unity depends on further reso-
lution of EEC agricultural
questions and progress in the
Kennedy Round of tariff negotia-
tions.
Even without a new initia-
tive, however, prospects are
good for some strengthening of
the European institutional
structure. The EEC Commission
has won general acclaim for its
skill in helping to effect the
year-end agreement on farm and
trade issues, and its influence
is likely to increase. Under
this agreement, the European
Parliament is to have a share
in the control of the large
community-wide support and
guidance fund set up under the
EEC's common agricultural policy.
In addition, the Six have re-
portedly reached an agreement
on the merger of the executives
of the EEC, EURATOM, and the
Coal-Steel Community. 25X1
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Western Hemisphere
CASTRO'S ANNIVERSARY SPEECH
Fidel Castro's speech on 2 Jan-
uary before the mass rally in Havana
on the occasion of the fifth anni-
versary of his revolutionary victory
was the least provocative, mildest
major address he has delivered in
more than six months. He sought to
inspire confidence in the strength
and stability of his regime and
show moderation in his international
policies.
Ignoring overwhelming evidence
to the contrary, Castro stated that
the Cuban economy is in excellent
condition and progressing faster than
those of Latin American countries
receiving Alliance for Progress aid.
He quoted liberally from a recent
New York Times editorial in an at-
tempt to s ow that now even the
"imperialists" are beginning to
understand that the Cuban revolution
is here to stay. He sought to
demonstrate that US efforts to weak-
en his regime have had the opposite
effect, and that the US attempt to
isolate Cuba from the free world
has been unsuccessful and self-
defeating. He repeated his regime's
desire to expand trade contacts with
"all countries of the world."
Castro devoted considerable
time to praising the policy of
"peaceful coexistence" and expressed
his readiness to accept a "normal-
ization" of US-Cuban relations. He
said nothing new in this respect,
however. and made it clear that any
rapprochement with the United
States would be on his own terms
and that, in any event, Cuba can
wait indefinitely since continued
US enmity would not affect Cuba's
progress. He was surprisingly mild
in his attack on the US for the
recent exile attack on a Cuban
torpedo boat, for which he blamed
the CIA acting with presidential
authority. Even this was in the
context of his discussion on the
possibilities of improved US-
Cuban relations, and he expressed
hope that "the US leaders will
see through the errors and
stupidities of their policies."
In a rather pointed impli-
cation that failure of the US
to change its hostile policy
against him might lead to Cuban
counteraction, he declared that
"the imperialists must know that
we shall try to hurt them just
as much as they try to hurt us."
Castro was also unusually
mild in his references to the
"anti-imperialist revolution"
in Latin America. Whereas in
a number of speeches since
last July he has come close to
exhorting Latin Americans to
rise up against the "imperialists,"
he stated in the anniversary
speech that it is up to the
people of each country to decide
whether or not to follow the
revolutionary path. He stated
that neither the United States
nor Cuba has the right to send
arms to another country of the
hemisphere, but his references
to South Vietnam in this context
carried the implication that if
the United States can interfere,
so can Cuba.
Although Castro said nothing
really new for him, the generAll y
conciliatory tone of his address
may reflect the advice which the
S~>viet leaders are believed to
have been pressing on him. At
the same time Castro assumed a
somewhat defensive air which may
stem from concern over a possible
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SECRET Western Hemisphere
change in US policy toward him.
to have been appre,ensive
that President Kennedy's death
might lead to an even harder
US position. He also may well
fear that the discovery of m??~--
tary equipment of proven Cuban
origin in Venezuela late last year--
a subject now under OAS inves-
tigation--might provide a pre-
text for new hemispheric measures
against him.
WEAPONS DISPLAYED IN CUBAN ANNIVERSARY PARADE
Castra's anniversary speech was
preceded by an hour-long military
review in which every major type
of Soviet weapon in Cuba was dis-
played. Snapper antitank rockets,
FROG tactical rockets, and T-54/55
tanks were shown publicly for the
first time, supporting other indi-
cations that these weapons from the
former Soviet armored camps have
been transferred to Cuban control.
-Komar boat missiles, transferred
to the Cubans last August, were also
displayed for the first time.
Brazil: President Goulart, in
his New Year's address, discussed
two basic problems--Brazil's un-
settled internal socio-economic
conditions and its foreign debt--
but he failed to enunciate clearly
any positive programs for dealing
with them.
Goulart stressed the urgent
need for basic administrative,
agrarian, electoral, and fiscal
reforms,.blaming Brazil's ills on
the existing "archaic structures."
Without being specific, he hinted
that reforms will be executed
despite opposition and possibly
even despite constitutional re-
straints. At the same time, he
SA-2 surface-to-air missiles
--on which Cubans have been train-
ing since last summer--and coastal
defense cruise missiles were
displayed again this year. The
only newly identified weapons 25X1
were 18 tank-mounted, twin 57-
mm. self-propelled antiaircraft
guns.
denied that he will attack the
present legal order.
In calling for a new exter-
nal economic policy, Goulart
expressed mild optimism regarding
the possibilities of rescheduling
foreign debt payments. He indi-
cated no intention of acceding to
demands of the extreme left that
he declare a moratorium on foreign
debts. Rather, he emphasized
that "concrete negotiations will
begin immediately" to reschedule
a portion of the approximately
$1 billion in obligations due
over the next two ,years. He ex-
pressed confidence that Brazil 25X1
could count on the "cooperation
matter.
of the U~ Government" in this
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Approved For Release 2008/06/05 :CIA-RDP79-00927A004300070001-9
 Approved For Release 2008/06/05 :CIA-RDP79-00927A004300070001-9
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Approved For Release 2008/06/05 :CIA-RDP79-00927A004300070001-9