INDEPENDENT KENYA'S PROSPECTS UNDER JOMO KENYATTA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A004300020003-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 1, 2006
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: December 6, 1963
• Content Type: REPORT

lease 2006/05/24: CIA-RDP79-00927 804300020003-2
6 December 1963
OCI No. 0309/63B
Copy No. 71
SPECIAL REPORT
INDEPENDENT KENYA 'S PROSPECTS UNDER JOMO KENYATTA
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
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INDEPENDENT KENYA'S PROSPECTS UNDER JOMO KENYATTA
The future stability of Kenya, which becomes
independent on 12 December, will hinge largely on
Prime Minister Kenyatta's ability to control the
more radical elements in his party and to restore
economic confidence. In the two years since the
British released him from detention he has trans-
lated his position as the symbol of Kenyan national-
ism into an effective political leadership, but
diverse tribal and racial elements remain intensely
antagonistic barely below the surface. Personal
rivalries among Kenyatta's lieutenants are also
keen, based partly on their orientation to either
the West or the Communist bloc. Kenyatta's own
neutralist attitude toward international affairs
will probably permit a rapid increase in the in-
fluence of Communist countries in Kenya.
The Kenyan Population
Kenya's white minority,
although comprising less than
one percent of the country's
nine million people, is larger
than in any other African colony
south of the Sahara yet to attain
independence. Because of the
vital role the Europeans have
played in the country's primar-
ily agricultural economy, their
gradual withdrawal is already
having serious repercussions.
The somewhat larger Asiatic mi-
nority dominates the retail
trade, and will be vulnerable
to Africanization pressures.
The Africans themselves are
divided into some 40 distinguish-
able tribes, ranging from those
scarcely touched by modern civi-
lizationtothe energetic Kikuyu,
who have adapted to changing
conditions and gained the enmity
of others. Only the Somali
tribesmen in the Northeastern
Region, with ties to the Somali
Republic, pose an immediate se-
curity threat, however.
In the years of preparing
Kenya for independence, the
British tried to provide a po-
litical framework in which no
single authority, party, or tribe
could control the rest.
The complicated constitu-
tion provides for a modified
federal structure consisting of
central, regional, and local
governments. There are speci-
fied powers for the regions and
other powers shared between the
regions and the central govern-
ment. All residual powers go
to the central government, which,
by a critical preindependence
British decision, will also con-
trol the police, civil service,
and regional finances.
The trend, nevertheless, is
unmistakably toward rule by one
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ETHIOPIA
Moyale
KENYA
Giriama
Duruma
Mombasa
Digo jI
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party--Kenyatta's National
Union (KANU) , which is domi-
nated by members of Kenya's
two largest and politically
most active tribes, the Kikuyu
and Luo. KANU won an over-
whelming victory in last May's
preindependence elections and
has since consolidated its
position. The victory gave
KANU control of both houses
of the National Assembly--in-
cluding two thirds of the all-
important lower house--and
three of the six regional as-
semblies.
The opposition party, the
Democratic Union (KADU), is a
loose federation of political
groups representing the smaller
tribes formed largely out of
fear of Kikuyu domination.
Under strong European influence,
it has doggedly fought to pre-
serve the rights and identity
of tribal and racial minorities
in the face of persistent KANU
demands for a strongly central-
ized government. Although able
to win only 24 percent of the
popular vote, KADU captured
nearly half the seats in the
Senate--more than enough to
block senatorial approval of
constitutional amendments. This
KADU power is offset, however,
by the government's right to
submit to popular referendum
any amendments disapproved by
parliament.
Since June, when Kenya
attained self-government, KANU
has scored some impressive gains
in local elections in KADU
areas, and KADU defections have
increased KANU's majority in
the house to 75 percent. The
absence of basic convictions
among Kenya politicians is evi-
denced by the fact that three
of these aisle-crossers come
from the Rift Valley, whose
people have been the most pas-
sionate supporters of KADU and
its regionalist principles.
Prime Minister Kenyatta
Jomo Kenyatta, who was im-
prisoned as a Mau Mau leader,
became KANU's president after
his release in August 1961. He
has spent most of his 65 years
working for the Kikuyu cause,
and is the embodiment of Kenyan
nationalism. An orator and a
man of great personal magnetism,
he is the only Kenyan who might
be able to instill in his divided
countrymen some real sense of
national unity. He reportedly
joined the Communist Party in
1930 and later attended the Lenin
Institute in Moscow, but his
earlier extremist and violently
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antiwhite attitudes appear to
have moderated.
Since taking power in June,
Kenyatta has proved to be a
stronger, more decisive leader
than many observers had expected.
He has endeavored to create a
feeling of national purpose to
override traditional tribal
rivalries, and his statements
have done much to allay the
fears of white settlers and
Asian merchants. The skeptics
fear, however, that his conduct
during this transitional period
is merely a mask to ensure early
independence. By expertly tai-
loring his remarks to suit his
audiences, Kenyatta has succeeded
in building up confidence in his
moderation, statesmanship, and
good intentions. At the same
time he has avoided committing
himself on a number of contro-
versial issues. Thus he con-
tinues to be largely an unknown
quantity.
Kenyatta's 16-man cabinet
is a comparatively moderate
group, well representative of
the country's tribes and re-
gions. The prime minister
has
balanced the various KANU
fac-
tions with
evident success
and
preserved
full flexibility
for
eventually
designating his
heir
apparent.
The 33-year-old Tom Mboya,
KANU's capable secretary gen-
eral, is the only figure in
Kenya, other than Kenyatta, who
has a national political follow-
ing. He is the top contender
for the post of foreign minister
after 12 December. As minister
of justice and constitutional,
affairs, he has been responsi-
ble for negotiating with Brit-
ain the final matters relating
to Kenya's' constitution.
Mboya is a Luo, but he
finds his greatest strength
among the new, urbanized Afri-
can "proletariat." He is former
head of the Kenya Federation of
Labor and the Ministry of Labor,
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and his labor backing is the
foundation for his political
success. However, Mboya's
Western connections expose him
to charges of UK-US domination
and, together with his driving
ambition and arrogant manner,
have earned him many personal
enemies.
Mboya's bitterest opponent
is Oginga Odinga, the strongly
pro-Luo vice president of KANU.
Oginga,who now heads the Minis-
try of Home Affairs, has long
sought also to be Kenya's first
minister of defense and may be
shifted to that post.
Oginga's political influ-
ence and strength depend on a
continuation of the patronage
he dispenses in the form of
Communist money and scholar-
ships. He is no ideological
convert--but an opportunist
whose association with the Com-
munist bloc has stemmed directly
from his long-standing political
feud with Mboya, and his yearn-
ing for the distinction of for-
eign sponsorship to match that
of his younger rival. Oginga,
51,is typical of the old-style
African politician who owes his
position more to age and tribal
status than to intellectual
merit and ability. In the past
eight months there have been
reports that the Communists--
both Soviet and Chinese--have
been reappraising their rela-
tionship with him, but so far
there is no indication that
they have replaced him as their
chosen instrument.
Kenyatta is closer to
Oginga, from whom he has re-
ceived financial support, than
to the ambitious Mboya, whom
he does not really trust, but
he could not tab either as his
successor without risking de-
struction of the party. He
opposes Oginga on tribal, rather
than ideological, grounds.
Kenyatta's current choice
as his understudy and probable
successor is a fellow Kikuyu,
James Gichuru, the 49-year-old
minister of finance and economic
planning. Intelligent and able
but without strong personal
ambitions, Gichuru is considered
a moderating influence among the
Kikuyu and with KANU--where he
is generally identified with
the Mboya faction.
Joseph Murumbi, 52, whose
position is minister of state
in the Prime Minister's Office,
is another figure of rising
influence. Although he is a
Goan-Masai half-caste educated
in India, and is therefore un-
likely to become the next prime
minister, he is a hard-working,
able executive. Because he has
had experience in Somalia, he
has been Kenyatta's principal
aid in handling the Somali prob-
lem and might become foreign
minister if Mboya is passed
over.
After independence Kenyatta
is likely to grasp the reins
of government firmly as an
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increasingly more authoritarian
leader. He may become impatient
with any element of society
which he believes is acting ir-
responsibly or is failing to
work for the good of the state,
and his objectives will coin-
cide with those of Oginga and
the radical elements of KANU.
Recent agitation within
KANU for government control of
the trade union movement is in
line with Oginga's past futile
efforts to undermine the Kenya
Federation of Labor--the base
of Mboya's power. In this cam-
paign Oginga has had financial
backing from both the USSR and
Ghana.
Any criticism of the gov-
ernment by the press or the
independent radio and television
networks is certain to bring in-
creased government control.
Achieng Oneko, the minister of
information, broadcasting, and
tourism, said in October that
"all media of information must
uphold the activities, the
plans, and the needs of the
state to create the true Afri-
can image." A Luo and one of
several old-guard extremists in
the present cabinet, Oneko was
Kenyatta's private secretary
and co-defendant in the 1952
Mau Mau trial. and has long been
one of Oginga's closest asso-
ciates.
Economic Plans
The Kenyatta government
talks of creating a socialist
society. It nevertheless
recognizes the need to retain
and attract private capital,
and publicly welcomes foreign
investment which "genuinely"
contributes to the country's
economic well-being. For
basic industrial and commer-
cial enterprises, in any case,
it appears to be thinking in
terms of joint participation
by government and private in-
vestors rather than outright
public ownership.
At present, however, the
economy is suffering severely
from the departure of thou-
sands of Europeans who fear
what may ensue after independ-
ence. The monetary economy
is essentially owned and man-
aged by European and Asian
immigrants and depends on them
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for consumption as well as pro-
duction and investment capital.
Their leaving has caused a grad-
ual shrinking of economic activ-
ity and serious unemployment.
Kenyatta's stress on the
need for a nonracist society
in which foreign skills can be
retained has slowed the exodus
for the moment, but the Asians
in particular will probably be
subjected to increasing demands
for Africanization of their
jobs. A moderate government
would do much to restore eco-
nomic confidence and attract
private foreign capital, but
for some time to come Kenya
will need outside financial
support. Its present budgetary
deficit is about 14 percent of
total spending, and its adverse
balance of payments will persist
as long as the country imports
twice as much as it exports.
This year the British Government
is contributing about $18 mil-
lion directly to meet the budget
deficit and is also providing
$29 million for development.
In addition, it is estimated
that the presence of British
forces and their dependents
contribute some $28 million
annually to the colony's econ-
omy.
Kenya's economy depends
partly on the country's main-
tenance of its close links with
neighboring and already inde-
pendent Uganda and Tanganyika.
At the present time the currency
and common services such as
railroads, airlines, posts, and
telegraphs are jointly managed.
Efforts to build these ties
into a political federation
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have not borne fruit, however.
Kenyan and Tanganyikan leaders
had hoped to federate by the
end of this year, but the Ugan-
dans, who had the least to gain
from the arrangement, blocked
any rapid progress. The ques-
tion probably will be discussed
further, but the best chance
for federation appears to have
been lost, and in the absence
of any such political bond a
steady erosion of the coopera-
tive economic arrangements may
transpire.
Foreign Relations
Although Kenyatta pro-
fesses a belief in "positive
neutralism" and a desire to
keep the cold war out of Kenya,
his anticolonial bias and his
earlier Marxist proclivities
suggest that there will be few
barriers to a rapid build-up
of Communist representation in
Kenya after the British depar-
ture. The Kenyan Government
is already seeking formal ties
with the Communist countries
as a counterbalance to those
with the West.
Kenya plans to impose a per-
sonnel limit on all non-Common-
wealth embassies. In Tanganyika
a similar limitation has had the
effect of increasing the ratio of
Communist representation, as the
Western embassies have become out-
numbered. The six Communist coun-
tries which have embassies in Dar-
es-Salaam, Tanganyika's capital, can
be expected to move quickly to es-
tablish themselves in Nairobi as
well. TASS and the New China News
Agency have recently set up perma-
nent offices there--outside the
anticipated quota.
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The Kenyan cabinet agreed
Last July that contacts with
the bloc countries must be in-
creased and strengthened as soon
as possible. A Kenyan ministe-
rial-level trade mission recently
visted East Germany, Czechoslo-
vakia,Rumania, Yugoslavia, Hun-
gary, Poland, and the USSR in
search of a market for Kenya's
surplus coffee and pyrethrum.
The delegation found that sub-
stantial sales were likely only
on a balanced-trade basis, but
the countries visited agreed
to send delegations after inde-
pendence to survey Kenya's needs
and potentials. The Kenyan
agricultural minister has stated
that his country intends to pro-
vide trade openings for the
Eastern Europeans by restrict-
ing Japanese imports.
In Yugoslavia and Poland,
the Kenyan mission discussed
technical aid, particularly for
agricultural cooperatives. Al-
though they found the terms ex-
pensive, agreement is likely
after further negotiation. These
two countries were the first to
sign both trade and aid agree-
ments with Tanganyika.
The number of Kenyans
traveling to the bloc is increas-
ing. In the past few months,
Oginga has organized several
tours to the USSR and Communist
China for large delegations of
KANU politicians and labor
As of last July there
were a out 400 students in the
bloc, according to Kenyan Govern-
.;ient records, but the actual
number may be as high as 700.
Oginga's staff--which in-
cludes representatives in London
and Cairo--has made the arrange-
ments for most students reaching
the bloc during the past four
years. He has usually by-passed
the Kenyan Government's student
processing mechanism and has
often acted without official
KANU approval. In September
1962 Kenyatta was moved--either
by Kikuyu pressure or by a desire
to counterbalance Oginga's
rising personal influence--to
obtain on his own initiative
scholarships from Bulgaria for
some 60 Kikuyus\
ough y 50
percent o the enyans in Com-
munist countries are Kikuyu,
while only 25 percent are Luo.
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. The most pressing security
issue facing the Kenyatta govern-
ment is the status of the Somali-
inhabited Northeastern Region,
an isolated, semidesert area
claimed by the Somali Republic.
Kenya recognizes Somalia's
interest in the area, but has
refused its demand that the
region be administered jointly
or by the UN pending further
negotiations. The boycott of
last May's elections by the
region's nomadic inhabitants--
who appear almost unanimous in
their desire to join the Somali
Republic--left the region with-
out local government. Because
of Somali dislike for the African
Bantu, Kenyatta plans to retain
there some 30 British administra-
tors and hopes to launch an ex-
tensive development program in
this area--where political and
economic progress has lagged
far behind the rest of Kenya.
The determination of the
Somalis to secede could--with
a minimum of outside support--
result in a prolonged guerrilla
war and a severe economic drain
on independent Kenya. The
campaign may have already begun.
In November groups of well-armed
Somalis conducted at Least ten
raids into the Northeastern
Region from safe havens across
Somalia's border. The imminent
delivery of Soviet arms to the
Somali Army will make the older
British and Italian arms avail-
able for guerrilla operations
and increase the likelihood of
serious clashes within Kenya.
enya
also can be expected to seek a
navy and air force of its own
and new arms to expand its 2,500-
man army.
The 5,000
British troops in Kenya are
scheduled to leave within the
next year, but in view of the
Somali threat, the Kenyatta gov-
ernment may wish to slow their
departure--both to utilize
British training facilities and
to avoid the resulting disloca-
tion of Kenya's economy.
As KADU strength declines
in the future, the principal
threat to Kenya's political
stability--apart from the Somali
problem--will be the growth of
disunity within KANU. Given the
fluidity of Kenyan politics, a
power struggle between the
Kikuyu and the Luo also seems
inevitable. Already there is
agitation among the Kikuyu for
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a greater share of the politi-
cal spoils which they consider
their due, while the Luo re-
main particularly sensitive to
any advantages, real or imagined,
which go to the Kikuyu.
Kenya's stability therefore
will depend not only on Kenyat-
ta's agility to overcome tribal-
ism, but also on his agility in
balancing intraparty Mboya-
Oginga factional rivalry, which
already has East-West overtones.
The course that Kenyatta takes
will depend, in the final anal-
ysis, on the degree of in-
fluence which the extremist
elements of the party are
able to exercise over him.
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