WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A004200070001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 33
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 7, 2008
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 18, 1963
• Content Type: SUMMARY

*MW
OCI No. 0302/63
Copy No. 73
WEEKLY SUMMARY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
Navy review
completed.
State Dept. review
completed
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 25X1
ARMY review(s)
completed.
1i-XCORD
:'` '; R;T URN TO
AGENCY ARCHIVES,
GROUP I Excluded from automatic
downgrading and declassification
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(Information as of 1200 EDT,'17 October 1963)
CUBA Page
HURRICANE FLORA BATTERS CUBA
Although damage assessments are still tentative,
agriculture and transportation apparently suffered
far more than industry and the military.
THE COMMUNIST WORLD
SOVIET CHALLENGE TO WESTERN ACCESS RIGHTS IN BERLIN
2
Soviet interference with US and British convoys on
the autobahn appears aimed at drawing the Western
powers into talks on both access procedures and the
broader question of Western forces in Berlin.
CONTINUED RUMORS OF IMMINENT WORLD COMMUNIST MEETING
4
Rumors that Khrushchev will convene some kind of
international conference to deal with the Sino-
Soviet conflict continue to circulate in Moscow.
IMPACT OF HARVEST FAILURE WITHIN USSR
Moscow is taking steps to lessen the effects of the
harvest failure on the economy and reassure the
population that measures are being adopted to
avoid like failures in the future.
THE NORTHERN SEA ROUTE NAVAL CONVOY
This year's convoy, including both merchant and
naval ships, left the Murmansk area probably in
late August and arrived at the Bering Strait in two
groups on 27 September and 10 October.
VIEWS OF WESTERN DIPLOMATS ON COMMUNIST CHINA
They give a grim picture of a country very, slowly
recovering from economic disasters, a people who
remain in a state of "resigned apathy," and a lead-
ership which will probably become more rigid.
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ASIA-AFRICA Page
CHINESE COMMUNIST OVERTURES TO JAPAN
Peiping's trade overtures--accompanied by extensive
publicity for moves to improve relations with Japan
across the board--appear to be part of China's ef-
forts to expand its trade outside the bloc.
LIMITED BLOC ECONOMIC SUPPORT FOR INDONESIAN POLICIES
Neither Moscow nor Peiping is likely to provide
aid sufficient to offset problems arising from
Indonesia's severance of economic ties with Malaysia.
SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM.
The regime continues repressive measures against
potential opponents, while operations against the
Viet Cong continue without serious interruption,
MOROCCAN-ALGERIAN BORDER FIGHTING
Clashes along the undefined border probably will
continue, and possibly even break out in new areas,
pending negotiations to fix the frontier, but nei-
ther country has the resources for an all-out war.
SOMALI GOVERNMENT TURNS TO USSR FOR ARMS
Somali officials say they have an offer of $28 mil-
lion worth of Soviet military assistance. Somali
relations with Ethiopia are again deteriorating.
NEW PRESSURES ON LEOPOLDVILLE CABINET
Congo labor organizations are calling for a govern-
ment of "public safety,"
ITALIAN POLITICAL SITUATION ON EVE OF SOCIALIST CONGRESS 14
The 25-29 October congress will probably authorize
party leader Nenni to negotiate with the Christian
Democrats for direct Socialist participation in a
center-left government, but the obstacles to such
a government remain formidable.
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EUROPE (continued) Page
AUSTRIA'S DETERIORATING POLITICAL SITUATION
Increasing acrimony between Austria's two major par-
ties--the Socialists and the Peoples Party--threat-
ens to break up the coalition which has governed
the country since 1945.
BRITISH GUIANA POLITICS ON EVE OF INDEPENDENCE TALKS
The next round of talks opening on 22 October will
be marked by continued squabbling both within and
among the colony's three parties
POLITICAL POSITION OF BOLIVIAN PRESIDENT
Paz Estenssoro, who will visit Washington for two
days next week, is probably stronger now than at any
time since his election in 1960.
STATUS OF NEW DOMINICAN REGIME
Continuing political isdlat'ion
L ma e e new government's future increas-
ingly uncertain.
POSITION OF HONDURAN MILITARY GOVERNMENT
The regime, still seeking foreign recognition, is
being urged by other Central American governments
to restore a semblance of democratic government, but
has moved only slightly in this direction so far.
AREA NOTES
Argentina and Guatemala
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Hurricane Flora's week-long
rampage in the Carribean severe-
ly damaged most of eastern Cuba
and further darkened the island's
economic outlook. Although
damage assessments are still
tentative, agriculture and
transportation apparently suf-
fered far more than industry
and the military. The regime
is likely to blame the storm for
its economic troubles for months
and even years to come, even
though many of these problems
were well advanced before the
hurricane.
Oriente and Camaguey, the
two eastern provinces primarily
affected by Flora, are the lead-
ing agricultural provinces in
Cuba. They supply more than
half the farm produce consumed
on the island and account for
50 percent of the country's
sugar acreage.
Although damage to the
sugar industry cannot yet be
measured, the hurricane doubt-
less has harmed not only the
1964 crop but future harvests
as well. Large areas of cane
probably were destroyed by winds,
and thousands of acres of newly
planted cane probably were
washed out. Damage from flood-
ing has been severe and may be-
come worse. The forecast for
the next 30 days is for an
additional five to eight inches
of rain.
Damage has been equally
severe for other crops, many of
which were in or about to enter
the harvesting stage. Much, if
not most, of the coffee and
cocoa crops have probably been
destroyed. Most of the important
rice crop, at least half the
cotton crop, and up to 10 per-
cent of the corn crop have been
lost. The main producing areas
for other important products such
as bananas, peanuts, oranges, and
beans were all among the areas
hardest hit. Livestock losses
are reported to be heavy, but no
figures are available.
Housing, electric power,
communications, and transporta-
tion suffered severe losses.
Entire communities were washed
away and others were isolated.
Aerial photography shows exten-
sive damage to roads, railroads, and
bridges. All the rivers in Oriente
Province overflowed, and most
bridges in the affected areas
were washed out or cut off when
their approaches washed away.
Landslides have rendered many
roads and railroads impassable.
Considerable time, effort, and
materials will be required to
restore the transportation system.
Delay in moving sugar from fields
to mills may further reduce sugar
output when the harvest gets
under way in about three months.
25X1
gh winds, heavy
rains, and flooding almost cer-
tainly caused some damage to
industrial facilities, however,
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and production probably has been
curtailed by power failures and
transportation breakdowns.
Soviet military forces in
Cuba apparently were not serious-
ly affected by the hurricane.
There was considerable damage
to living quarters and probably
to some of the more fragile
equipment such as communications
and radar gear, but there are
no reports of Soviet casualties.
Some Cuban military installa-
tions suffered extensive damage
and there was a heavy loss of
supplies, but no aircraft or
naval vessels were lost. Many
Cuban troops probably will be
diverted from training and
counterinsurgency operations to
Soviet interference with
US and British convoys on the
Berlin autobahn appears to be
aimed at drawing the Western
powers into negotiations on both
access procedures and the broad-
er question of the status of
Western forces in West Berlin.
Soviet authorities now are
seeking to impose new procedures
for checking Allied convoys.
The USSR's initial tactic in
this regard appears to be an
attempt to establish a link
between the Western practice of
giving advance notification for
convoys over a certain size
(over seven vehicles in the US
case) and procedures governing
the dismounting of convoy per-
sonnel for a head count.. The
Soviet checkpoint commander
stated flatly to a British of-
ficial that all convoys of five
vehicles or more must agree to
dismounting. In a conversation
with a US officer on 15 October,
the Soviet commander claimed
that the US had agreed last year
to give advance notification for
convoys of more than five vehicles
and said this same procedure
should apply to dismounting. He
added that even if a truck con-
tained only one to five passen-
gers, they would have to dismount.
While the USSR almost cer-
tainly expects the US to reject
these demands, it probably hopes
that continued publicity rela-
tive to the ambiguity and dif-
ferences which exist between the
US and British convoy procedures
will tend to underscore the need
for negotiations to remove
"misunderstandings."
The USSR may have calculated
that a display of pressure on
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the sensitive Berlin access
question was necessary to induce
the US and Britain to disregard
French and West German opposi-
tion to negotiations on Berlin
at this time.
Moscow probably foresees
a protracted period of negotia-
tions and plans to follow a step-
by-step approach, using discus-
sion of access procedures as
an avenue for leading into the
central problem of the status
of Western forces in West Berlin.
As part of this strategy, the
Russians may envisage further
harassment of Western communi-
cations as a means of-underscor-
ing the issues they intend to
press as well as generating
pressure on the West to agree
to negotiations.
The Soviet Union may, in
fact, be preparing the way for
formally introducing demands
for Western payment for the use
of communications facilities on
East German territory.
In talks with US and Brit-
ish leaders this summer, both
Khrushchev and Gromyko referred
to the need for a new tariff on
Western military and civilian
rail transport, autobahn tolls
on Western military personnel
and cargo transport, and pay-
ment for the use of communica-
tion cables crossing East Ger-
many. The USSR almost certainly
would attempt to use negotiations
on these matters to press its
demand for Western respect for
East German "sovereign rights."
Moscow presumably intends
to maintain close control over
these harassments in order to
avoid 'irreparable damage to
the detente atmosphere. The
Soviet leaders, however, appear
to be operating on the assumption
that the US and Britain also
have an interest in preserving
this atmosphere and that this
situation affords the USSR
greater latitude for maneuvers
to draw the West into a new
round of Berlin talks.
Soviet press reports of
the incidents have sought to
minimize the seriousness of the
confrontation. Playing down
the challenge to the US and
British convoys, Izvestia claimed
that President Kennedy had ob-
served that the incident resulted
from a misunderstanding rather
than a deliberate provocation.
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CONTINUED RUMORS OF IMMINENT WORLD COMMUNIST MEETING
Rumors that Moscow has decided
to convene some kind of interna-
tional conference which would deal
with the Sino-Soviet conflict con-
tinue to circulate in the Soviet
capital.
Current rumors may have been
generated by the presence in Mos-
cow of two of the top Italian Com-
munist leaders. There are as yet
no indications that leaders of
other Communist parties are in the
USSR. The Portuguese party state-
ment published in Pravda on 24
September calling for a world Com-
munist conference, however, had
urged the creation of a commission
composed of "some" parties to con-
sider "practical questions linked
with the convening of a conference,"
and it is possible that such a meet-
ing is being held outside Moscow.
Khrushchev has not been in the cap-
ital since 11 September. He was
reported by the US Embassy to have
been seen on 7 October in Yalta,
where he often meets foreign guests,
and he was still in the Crimea on
17 October.
Foreign Communist parties con-
tinue to call for an international
meeting to discuss the problems
that plague the Communist movement.
Pravda on 13 October followed its
earlier re-publication of appeals
by three small Western Communist
parties for such a conference with
a reprint of a speech by French
party leader Thorez which asked
for a meeting. The Greek party's
resolution at the close of its
fifth plenum--publicized on 12 Oc-
tober--similarly contains a re-
quest for a meeting, while strongly
denouncing the Chinese. This sud-
den concerted attention to the issue
suggests that the rumors may have
some foundation.
Moscow itself has not yet
stated a position, but is making it
clear that any such Communist meet-
ing will be to condemn the Chinese,
not to try to find a way to live
with them. The latest issues of
both Kommunist, the Soviet theoret-
ical journal,and the World Marxist
Review,. another mouthpiece for
oet views, carry systematic in-
dictments of Chinese positions on
virtually every disputed point.
A more serious attack on Mao
Tse-tung's personal apostasy is
contained in the 11 October issue
of Izvestia, where, in the guise
of a c que of a Chinese book on
dialectical materialism, Mao's
pretensions to be the foremost con-
temporary Marxist theoretician are
torn to shreds. Izvestia ridicules
the idea that Mao ail s made any new
contributions to Communist theory
and claims that any new formulations
he has advanced are at variance with,
or a "falsification" of, true,
Marxist-Leninist thought.
Peiping has not seen fit to
comment on recent demands for a
meeting of Communist leaders, al-
though it would almost certainly
be aware of plans for one. It may
be holding its fire temporarily in
preparation for a showdown fight.
The Chinese continue to snipe at
Moscow but have issued no full-
dress polemical statement since
the blast at Khrushchev in the Red
Flag/People's Daily article of T6-
September on Yugoslavia. Instead
Chou En-lai took a careful line on
Sino-Soviet relations during his
interview with the head of Reuters
on 13 October, striking a pose of
statesmanlike restraint but giving
no ground on Peiping's differences
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The Communist World
IMPACT OF HARVEST FAILURE WITHIN USSR
The impact of the grain
harvest failure continues to
dominate Soviet internal affairs.
Moscow is taking steps to lessen
its effect on the economy, and
reassure the population that meas-
ures are being adopted to avoid
like failures in the future.
Khrushchev's recent speech
at Krasnodar--in which he told
of the Soviet grain purchases
but also outlined a comprehen-
sive plan for ensuring "guaran-
teed harvests" through extensive
use of chemical fertilizer and
irrigation--is being given mass
distribution as a pamphlet.
An unusually large press
campaign in support of this plan
is under way, obviously calcu-
lated to impress the public with
the remedial action being taken.
In the first twelve days of Oc-
tober, Pravda, Izvestia, and
Sovetskayaaossiya (the princi-
pal paper of the Russian Re-
public) published nearly 70 ma-
jor articles, editorials, and
pictorial features--including
coverage of Khrushchev's Kras-
nodar speech and the related
Central Committee - Council of
Ministers' letter, both of which
dominated the papers on the days
they appeared.
The press has announced a
number of measures to conserve
the bread and grain supplies.
These include restrictions on
bread sold at stores, the sta-
tioning of Young Communist
League members as guards at
stores and warehouses, and a
vigorous campaign to discredit
the use of bread for livestock.
Late last month a national trade
union conference was called to
discuss means of checking on
grain distribution and storage.
This year's agricultural
failure apparently will have
a serious impact on the Soviet
livestock industry. Fodder
shortages are almost certain
to necessitate emergency slaugh-
tering of cattle. It seems
likely that the regime will
import feed grains before al-
lowing such measures to jeop-
ardize the future of the live-
stock industry. Even so, there
will be serious consequences--
slaughterhouses and refrigera-
tion facilities will probably
be overloaded and much waste
will occur.
. Possibly in connection with
present difficulties, several
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The USSR's Northern Sea Route
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The Range Instrumentation Ships CHAZHMA and CHUMIKAN
An F-ClassSubmarine
ILLEGIB
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top Soviet trade officials have
advocated new measures for solv-
ing the perennial deficiencies
in retail trade--goods and serv-
ices of poor quality and un-
suited to the needs of the con-
sumer. One trade official sug-
gested that light industrial
manufacturing firms be required
to develop their own retail
stores which would, presumably,
be more responsive to the cus-
tomers' wishes; another advo-
cated the creation of a national
specialized wholesale organiza-
tion; another would have bonuses
paid to workers in light indus-
try depend upon the salability
of their product.
There is no doubt that Mos-
cow is acutely concerned over
offsetting the poor harvest with
better performance in other con-
sumer-oriented areas. Prospects,
however, are meager for signifi-
cant improvement through admin-
istrative devices alone. The
last major administrative step
the government took to improve
retail trade was in 1960 when
it decreed that manufacturers
would sign binding contracts
with trade outlets to provide
goods of specified quality and
quantity. Soviet officials have
recently admitted that this law
has been largely ineffective.
The 1963 naval convoy
through the USSR's Northern Sea
Route has completed the arduous
eastward transit of Arctic
waters and now is in the Soviet
Far East. The convoy, which in-
cluded both merchant and naval
ships, left the Murmansk area
probably in late August and ar-
rived at the Bering Strait in
two groups on 27 September and
10 October.
Naval elements of the con-
voy consisted of two new long-
range F-class torpedo-attack
submarines, a naval tanker, two
ocean rescue tugs, two floating
workshops, and two new missile
range instrumentation ships,
the Chazhma and the Chumikan.
Most obese, including e
submarines and the range ships,
probably will be stationed at
the expanding complex of naval
bases in the Petropavlovsk area.
The transfers bring the number
of F-class submarines in the
Pacific Fleet to eight and
the number of range instrumen-
tation ships to six.
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VIEWS OF WESTERN DIPLOMATS ON COMMUNIST CHINA
A grim picture of the in-
ternal Chinese Communist scene
has recently been sketched by
two Western diplomats stationed
in China. They are considered
perceptive and sound observers
by the American consul general
in Hong Kong. Both describe a
country whose economic problems
are grave, whose recovery from
the years of disaster is very
slow, whose people remain in a
state of "resigned apathy"
despite incessant political in-
doctrination, and whose leaders
will probably become still more
rigid..
Chinese leaders are report
edly far from optimistic be-
cause of continued population
growth and the lack of any
prospect for substantial pro-
duction increases in the next
few years. To solve popula-
tion problems, authorities in
Shanghai are advocating late
marriage and sterilization,
with fairly severe sanctions--
involving income and housing--
applied to those who marry too
early or have too many children.
This program is unlikely to
have much success, however.
In agreement with most for-
eigners who have traveled in
North China during the last two
months, the diplomats report
that extensive flooding per-
sisted for an unusually long
time, and, as a result, agri-
cultural prospects appear only
mediocre for yet another year.
Industry gives the impression
of "great" technical difficul-
ties, redundant labor, and much
idle capacity.
The British consul in Shang-
hai, a Chinese-speaking officer
who apparently has more freedom
than diplomats in Peiping to
maintain local contacts, believes
that most people have learned
by now to "coexist" with the
regime. They pay little atten-
tion to ideological matters,
judging the regime instead on
the basis of what it is doing
for them materially, and are
therefore dissatisfied because
they believe the regime is not
doing enough.
A Western ambassador sta-
tioned in Peiping agrees that
more material incentives are
necessary to bring peasants
and ordinary workers out of their
lethargy, but feels there is
still some residual idealism
among middle level officials
such as plant managers.
The ambassador expects
China's policies--both internal
and external--to become tougher
and less flexible before they
are eventually moderated. He
foresees no softening of policies
during the political lifetime
of Mao Tse-tung. He thinks
that in the immediate post-Mao
period, "hard-liners" like party
General Secretary Teng Hsiao-
ping will eclipse moderates
like Premier Chou En-lai. More-
over, he believes that the next
generation of leaders, now 35
to 45 years old, will prove
even less flexible than the
present group, because they are
even more ignorant of the outer
world and were developed within
a completely indoctrinated
bureaucrat .
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ITs-4 IAPAN
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CHINESE COMMUNIST OVERTURES TO JAPAN
The Chinese Communists are
making a renewed bid for in-
creased trade with Japan
or over a year Peiping has been
actively exploring the possibil-
ities for expanded nonbloc trade,
and the latest overtures to Japan
appear to be part of this effort.
As a secondary objective, the
Chinese probably hope to stir
up trouble in US-Japanese re-
lations and in Tokyo's dealings
with Taipei.
trade agreement. Their present
tactics are in marked contrast
to previous efforts to extract
political concessions from the
Japanese by using trade as a
lever--efforts which resulted
in an almost complete rupture
of trade and cultural relations
in 1958.
China-Japan friendship month.
Association and launched a
Chinese proposals for in-
creased Sino-Japanese trade
have been accompanied by ex-
tensive publicity for moves to
improve relations with Japan
across the board. Within the
past month, Peiping has organ-
ized a China-Japan Friendship
Sino-Japanese trade, now
running at approximately $100
million per year, accounts for
only about one percent of Japan'
foreign trade. Despite the Chi-
nese efforts to expand trade,
the limited potential of the
China market makes it likely
that trade with Peiping will
remain a negligible share of
Japan's total trade.
Peiping's latest moves Carr
forward the "soft line" on trade
with Japan which the Chinese ini-
tiated in the fall of 1962 when
they negotiated the Liao-Takasak
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The Soviet bloc and Communist
China are unlikely to provide
significant or effective economic
aid for Indonesia in solving prob-
lems apt to arise from Djakarta's
action in cutting off economic
relations with Malaysia- They
may, however, offer some economic
assistance as a political gesture.
No source of meaningful aid is
yet in sight.
By severing relations, Indo-
nesia has lost Malaysia's con-
siderable entrepot services and
processing facilities, and a
market which received--legally and
by smuggling--some 50 percent of
its exports last year. Most of
these goods were re-exported.
Although the Indonesians--
apparently referring to aid in
general--claim the USSR has al-
ready offered all they need "to
carry out economic confrontation
against Malaysia," it is unlikely
that the USSR will be drawn too
deeply into this dispute in view
of wider foreign policy considera-
tions.
As part of an earlier program
to develop resources on a produc-
tion-sharing basis, the Soviet
Union reportedly has offered some
rubber-processing facilities,
but such an offer would take con-
siderable time to implement. The
Soviet bloc may also take addi-
tional token imports of Indonesian
rubber, but it is unlikely to
shift substantial purchases from
the reliable and efficient Malay-
sian market--from which it bought
about 220,000 tons last year.
Imports by the Soviet
bloc--mainly 130,000 tons of
rubber--amounted to about 5
percent of Indonesia's total
exports in 1962. Additional
bloc purchases would probably
be largely under a barter arrange-
ment and, like the production-
sharing schemes, would not add
hard currencies to Indonesia's
limited foreign exchange earn-
ings.
Prospects that the Soviet
bloc will extend other meaning-
ful economic assistance also
appear dim. The USSR has avoided
outright cash gifts, but as a
gesture, it may offer Djakarta
additional long-term economic
credits. However, to date, In-
donesia has drawn only about
23 percent of available Soviet
bloc credits.
Unlike Moscow, Peiping may
grant a small cash gift as it
has elsewhere this year, but
substantial economic assistance 25X1
from Peiping in the near future
is not likely. Normal trade
gives only limited opportunity to
support Indonesia. Presently
China takes only 6 percent of
Djakarta's exports, mostly rubber.
Since the Chinese also receive
large amounts of rubber from Ceylon
under a long-term agreement, they
probably can absorb little more.
Trade in other products, such as
agricultural goods,tin, or crude
oil would have little economic
basis.
Furthermore Peiping is ap-
parently unwilling to make. any
significant change in its Malay-
sia trade, which earned China
about $70 million last year,
Peiping's second largest source
of foreign exchan e.
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The Diem regime continues
to take repressive measures
against potential opponents.
Police last week picked up
the brother of President Diem's
personal physician after re-
portedly finding'pro-Buddhist
tracts and printing equipment
in his home. The government's
administrative delegate in the
southeastern provinces reported
the arrest of his aide, al-
legedly on grounds that the
latter was "too pro-American."
A Vietnamese interpreter at-
tached to the US aid mission
was also reported to have been
arrested on unknown charges.
On 14 October, however,
the government released a sen-
ior vice president of South
Vietnam's strongest trade union,
the General Confederation of
Vietnamese Labor (CVTC), who
had been secretly arrested on
7 October. This was apparently
in response to an ultimatum
from the CVTC president, Tran
Quoc Buu, who was threatening
an open break with the govern-
ment if it did not free the
official. The government pre-
sumably feared possible reper-
cussions from domestic or in-
ternational labor circles, par-
ticularly during the visits
of UN-sponsored observers, who
are scheduled to depart for
South Vietnam on 21 October.
There are further signs
that Diem and his brother Nhu
are preparing to face a long
period of strain with the US.
Saigon's English-language press,
which reflects the views of
Nhu and his wife, has continued
to charge that US agencies in
Saigon are trying to undermine
the Diem regime.
Joint US-Vietnamese counter-
insurgency activities, however,
are continuing without serious
interruption. Viet Cong activ-
ity in the first week of Octo-
ber declined in most areas of
the country, following five
weeks of more intensified enemy
militar acion
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-? Algiers
CIBRA ,-, i'
Ceuta (sp.) 6 ..
(U.K.) >.
1 ~_.__ / n...,.. KF
MADEIRA
ISLANDS
(Port.)
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Clashes along the Moroccan-
Algerian border probably will
continue, and incidents may well
develop in new areas, pending
negotiations for at least an
informal delineation of the dis-
puted frontier between Tindouf
and Colomb-Bechar. Neither Al-
geria nor Morocco commands the
resources for an all-out war on
the other, and officials of both
countries have indicated they
have no desire to go this far.
and the Morrocans,
Even if some accommodation
is reached regarding the bor-
der, the suspicions with which
the Moroccan and Algerian gov- 25X1
ernments regard each other cer-
tainly will increase. Each can
be expected to encourage and
support subversion against the
other. No relationship has
been proven yet between the
Kabylie dissidents in Algeria
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w VW
REPUBLIC
Mogadiscio
p
SOMALI TRIBES
in
EAST AFRICA
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The Somali Republic, trying
to strengthen its defenses
against its archenemy, Ethiopia,
has accepted a Soviet offer
of $28 million worth of mili-
tary assistance. Somali Army
commander General Daud led the
mission which obtained Moscow's
help. According to Prime Minis-
ter Abdirascid, Soviet assistance
is to be used generally only for
short-term training. However,
the large amount of the offer
suggests that a variety of So-
viet military equipment will be
supplied as well.
In the nonmilitary field,
Moscow and the European satel-
lites have already extended some
$63 million in grants and credits
to the republic, and over 300
bloc technicians are at work
there on various development
projects. In addition, Peiping
has offered over $20 million in
economic assistance
The Soviet
airline,Aeroflot, has recently
been granted full rights at
Mogadiscio, the Somali capital.
As a result of the Somali
military deal with the USSR,
both Germany and Italy are likely
to re-examine their own rela-
tively modest plans to assist the
Somali Army. If these plans are
dropped, the Somalis could expect
no significant help from any
other Western European nation.
They are still embroiled in a
dispute with the UK and Kenya
over territorial claims; dip-
lomatic relations with the UK
were broken last March. France
maintains close relations with
Ethiopia. The bloc probably
would not rush in to fill the
vacuum completely, however, out
of concern for its relations
with Ethiopia and Kenya.
Meanwhile, Mogadiscio's
emotional involvement with the
dissident Somali tribesmen in
the Ogaden region of Ethiopia
is again leading to serious
friction with that country.
Somali press and radio are venom-
ously attacking the Ethiopian'
regime. Frontier incidents
occurred along the Ethiopian-
Somali border on 11, 12, and 15
October, leaving several dead
on both sides.
The incidents provoked riot-
ing in Mogadiscio on 13 October,
partly because the populace be-
lieves that the government has
not taken a sufficiently strong
stand. The Ethiopian Embassy
and other foreign--even Soviet--
personnel were attacked, but
extensive damage was. prevented
by the effective action of the
Somali police.
The situation both on the
border and in the capital re-
mains tense.
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Congolese Premier Adoula's
government has escaped serious
criticism for proroguing parlia-
ment last month, but the action
has left the cabinet itself as
the sole target for public resent-
ment over corrupt and ineffec-
tive administration. During the
past two weeks, the government
has come under increasingly heavy
fire from labor unions
The premier is en
route home via Europe from the
UN sessions in New York.
The labor organizations
applauded the dismissal of par-
liament, but their leaders,
frustrated by chaotic economic
conditions, now call for a
government of "public safety"
composed of "honest and respon-
sible men." The labor spokes-
men say they do not contemplate
a general strike to enforce
these demands, but threaten a
kind of political strike by
refusing to participate in draft-
ing a new Congo constitution un-
less the government is changed.
The impact of their threat
lies in the fact that there are
no other mass political organi-
zations, Leopoldville govern-
ment circles, moreover, are
acutely conscious of the fact
that labor unions were the
force behind the overthrow last
August of the other Congo govern-
ment across the river in Brazza-
ville.
Thus the threat by Leopold-
ville unions
as
led to frantic maneuvering by
the politicians. Moreover,
there is no guarantee that the
unions will not eventually try
a general strike. Should they
do so,- serious disorders would
seem likely. Such disorders
not only would provide further
ammunition for the anti-Adoula
groups, but might reveal that
the government's control over
the army is less than firm.
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Europe
ITALIAN POLITICAL SITUATION ON EVE OF SOCIALIST CONGRESS
The Socialist party congress
of 25-29 October will probably
authorize party chief Pietro
Nenni to negotiate with the
Christian Democrats for direct
Socialist participation in a
new center-left government. The
obstacles to the formation of
such a government, however, are
formidable.
Although Nenni's faction
seems likely to maintain its
majority during the congress,
dissension within the faction
may develop afterward during
Nenni's negotiations over the
terms for collaboration with the
other parties. National eco-
nomic policy is likely to be the
most critical issue. Riccardo
Lombardi, Nenni's heir opponent,
may disrupt these discussions,
as he did those last June, if
he is dissatisfied with the
understanding Nenni reaches with
the Christian Democrats on eco-
nomic and social measures P
Despite the Socialists'
private assurances that they
will not ask for unreasonable
public expenditures in the near
future, Christian Democratic
leader Aldo Moro has expressed
doubt about the Socialists'
readiness to assume governmental.
responsibilities in the present
difficult economic situation,
which may cause his own party
.to propose a "wage pause" or
other austerity measures. He
has told the US Embassy that
his party can make no conces-
sions other than "for appear-
ances" beyond those embodied in
the Nenni-Moro accord of last
June, which Lombardi rejected.
Even if his negotiations with
the Socialists are successful,
Moro is seriously concerned
that Social Democratic leader
Giuseppe Saragat might at some
point "precipitate an insoluble
crisis by one of his sudden
changes of heart."
Conservative Christian
Democrats will try to take ad-
vantage of the economic situa-
tion to exact conditions which
would be unacceptable to the
Socialists. Although the out-
come of the negotiations will
not hinge on foreign policy
issues, Conservative Christian
Democrats and the right-wing
parties are also using Lombardi's
recent attack on the multilateral
nuclear force proposal to claim
that the Socialists would dan-
gerously alter Italy's foreign
policy. It might be necessary
to convene a Christian Demo-
cratic congress to get the
party as a whole to accept an
alliance with the Socialists.
There is a strong probabil-
ity that the Communists and neo-
Fascists will initiate violence'
as they try to block the forma-
tion of a center-left govern-
ment. Using some legitimate
economic issue, they are likely
to create disturbances in which
Socialists would feel impelled
to demonstrate with the Commu-
nists. Such joint action would
be exploited by opponents of
Socialist - Christian Demo-
cratic rapprochement: to but-
tress their claim that the
Communists and Socialists remain
politically united, and that
formation of the center-left
would permit Communist penetra-
tion of the ve n
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i y.h,'RJ`1\ET
AUSTRIA'S DETE11I1RA'i'ING POLITICAL SITUATION
Increasing acrimony between
Austria's major parties--the So-
cialist,,:; and the Peoples Party--
threatens to break up the coali-
tion of the two which has governed
the country since 19!'5. A new
Socialist coalition with the small
ri ;ht'ist pan-German Liberal
Party would probably be even less
stable than the present govern-
ment and might bring a revival
of the sharp political animosi-
ties which in the prewar era re-
sulted in violence between the
Socialists and their present coa.l.i-
Lion partners.
in the inm udiatu postwar
period, the Socialists and the
Catholic, centrist People's Party
felt compelled to bury 1heir
enmities in the face of Soviet
occupation of the eastern sec-
tion of the country. After the
Russians left in ltib , however,
maintenance of the coalition be-
came progressively more dii_1:1culL
and was notably so a.' tear they
bitterly contested 1962 elections.
Friction has been .Lncreasin;.
in the coalition for some months.
Last spring the Socialists used
Liberal, support to score a par-
liamentary victory over their
coalition partners in preventing
Otto Iiabsburg's return to Austria.
Last montu, the P ople's 1';crty
elected a:; chai.rnt.cn Josef Klaus,
who has for some i..ime been noted
as less concilia i ory to the
Socialist; than firs predecessor,
Chancellor Gorba g a . Gorbach
will probably be replaced fairly
soon as cuancel_icr--possibly by
Klaus--if the co:i iition lists.
The i,ibera.l [arty has in the
past sought all :i ,i rice with the
more conservative People's Party
but was reebuffe(t :aecause of the
unsavory reputai,on of some of
its membership. Now Socialist
leaders are dic.grin;' with the
Liberals and secs, to be carrying
their parity with, ;.hen desl)l ie t kdi-
tional anLipathy I.owarcl the
Liberals.
A;c~?iaiic_,. Liberal coalition
would be divide: on many issues.
In the economic phere, fur ex-
ample, ScIcialisst party ch:ii.rman
Pittermar has be n pressing for
greater trade w.ih the Soviet bloc--
which in the fir L. hall oi 1963
accountec for l5 per ent of
Austria'. totai ,;ports. Socialist:;
have alsce been .i.;unthusia.;tic
about thc EEC t des.irece by more
conservat ive Au rians. i`he
Liberals oppose renter ..rode
with the bloc a u are among the
stron;;e i or opou its of t ; cis with
Fu.rthermor'. any coarit_con
excludin; the P,. :;ale's Party
would be somewha? disturb,..ng to
various !,usines.: groups wluich have
come to ook or% hat parts as their
voice in the g - rnment. The like-
lihood o! trocii_~ i from this quarter
would be increa- d if the sLowdown
in cconol~ic act.i !ity noted thus
I'