FRANCE'S POSITION IN TROPICAL AFRICA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A004200060003-9
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Sequence Number: 3
• Content Type: REPORT

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TATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES
MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAW
, SECTIONS 793 AND 794, THE TRANSMI
VELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO
ORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.
cement MUST NOT BE RELEASED TO FOREIGN
ERI-IMENTS. If marked with specific dissemination
15 in accordance with the provisions of DCID 1,17,
ment must be handled within the framework of
on so i rnoosed .
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France's claim to global power status rests to
a considerable extent on the influence it continues
to wield in the territories it formerly ruled in
tropical Africa. Paris has manipulated a variety of
economic, military, and cultural ties to maintain
its presence in these now-sovereign states, and there
are some indications the French would like to expand
their influence into neighboring areas. The French
position in this part of Africa, however, seems likely
to suffer somewhat as a result of the recent associ-
ation agreement between the EEC and the 14 pro-French
states of the African and Malagasy Union (UAM). It
may be further undercut by a move last August to sub-
merge the UAM in the larger Organization of African
Unity (OAU).
In the long run, the cul-
tural and technical agreements
France has with most of its
former African territories are
perhaps the most effective as-
surance of continuing the French
presence there. While many Af-
rican leaders have mixed feel-
ings about continued French cul-
tural dominance in their,coun-
tries, their educational sys-
tems, their civil services, and
local technical facilities are
largely controlled by French
teachers and technicians.
French influence is partic-
ularly pervasive in education.
In the UAM states and Mali, 80
percent of the secondary-school
teachers are French. In addi-
tion, four regional universities
have been recently established
in the UAM states, with French
assistance.
Under a number of agree-
ments with the UAM states, the
French Ministry of Cooperation
provided 5,000 technical assist-
ance personnel to various sub-
Saharan African countries. With-
out these specialists it is
doubtful that most of the states
in question would be able to
carry on day-to-day operations
effectively.
Military Links
For the present, France's
military ties with the UAM
states appear to transcend all
others in importance. These
ties give France the exclusive
right to form, supply, and train
an indigenous force in each re-
public. Moreover, they grant
France base and troop-stationing
rights in all UAM states except
Upper Volta. Also, Paris is
obligated to answer any call
for assistance to restore order
in the Ivory Coast, Niger, Chad,
Gabon, Madagascar, and Congo
(Brazzaville).
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CLASSIFIED MATERIAL ON REVERSE OF PAGE
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More than anything else
it was this obligation that
motivated De Gaulle to accede
to President Youlou's request
for French troop reinforce-
ments during the Brazzaville
upheaval last August. De
Gaulle probably reasoned that
nothing less would preserve
confidence among the other
African regimes that France
would redeem its promise to
assist in the event of inter-
nal disorders.
The Brazzaville episode,
however, may have raised sec-
ond thoughts in France as well
as in the UAM states about
their mutual security manage-
ments. French policy now seems
to be aimed at distinguishing
between situations requiring
the use of French military
forces to maintain law and
order and those involving their
use to maintain an unpopular
local regime. While UAM re-
actions to the limited French
intervention in Brazzaville
have been generally favorable,
some African leaders, noting
that the French action did
not save Youlou, now may find
the pacts less appealing. In
addition, there is widespread
sensitivity to charges of fos-
tering neocolonialism, and
these states may be increas-
ingly disinclined to tolerate
French forces on their soil.
In any event, the pros-
pects seem to be that Paris
will soon be withdrawing some
of the 43,000 military per-
sonnel it presently has sta-
tioned in the UAM states. As
a consequence of the Brazzaville
coup and the earlier one in
Togo, the French commanders
of the defense forces in those
countries have already been
replaced by indigenous offi-
cers. The French, however,
intend to train and equip a
mobile force, based in France,
capable of quick deployment to
Africa.
A strong deterrent to any
extensive curtailment of France's
military commitment to African
countries is its suspicion of
US intentions. France fears
that US military assistance to
the UAM states is designed to
lessen their dependence on Paris.
Paris argues that even minimal
American assistance is likely
to trigger an arms assistance
race with the USSR, force the
receiving country to maintain
costly equipment it does not
need and cannot afford, and
leave France obliged to pay
the bills. Paris also opposes
any arrangement providing for
US training of UAM military or
police officers.
Until recently, a sizable
portion of French aid to UAM
states has been for budgetary
subsidies. This program, how-
ever, is being gradually phased
out, because of difficulties
in obtaining parliamentary
approval and misgivings that
such subsidies encourage fiscal
irresponsibility.
French economic interests
in Africa are, nevertheless,
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preserved by a variety of other
assistance programs which, in
1.963, will cost France more
than $1 billion. Included in
this outlay are several gener-
ous loans and grants. At the
same time France assures most
of its former sub-Saharan ter.-
r,itories guaranteed markets for
their tropical products, often
at prices considerably above
the world market. The UAM
states, in turn, reciprocate
by reserving large portions of
their markets for French prod-
ucts. This is accomplished by
granting French goods tariff
preferences and exempting them
from cumbersome licensing pro-
cedures.
France exercises a strong
influence over the financial
affairs of the UAM states. By
virtue of their membership in
;he franc zone, they give France
control over their money and
credit, gold and currency re-
serves, and allocation of their
foreign exchange. Management
of these affairs rests with the
directors (many of whom are
French) of the three central
banks located in Africa and the
French managers of their local
branches.
Guinea, which is not a
member of the UAM, recently
settled most of its financial
differences with France. Franco-
Guinean economic relations had
been poisoned since March 1960,
when President Tourd withdrew
Guinea from the franc zone.
The rapprochement can be
attributed to Guinea's disil-
lusionment with bloc aid efforts
and its steadily deteriorating
domestic economy.
The OAU and the EEC
Some threat to French in-
fluence is implicit, however,
in recent developments which
have brought into question the
cohesiveness of the UAM as an
organization. Last August at
a meeting of the Organization
of African Unity foreign min-
isters in Dakar, three non-UAM
states--Ghana, Nigeria, and
Guinea--pressed a motion to
dissolve the French-oriented
grouping.. While this partic-
ular move failed, the UAM's
continued solidarity is far
from assured. Not only is it
likely to be the object of
similar attacks in the future,
but a serious threat to its
existence stems from internal
dissensions, particularly ri-
valry between Senegal and the
Ivory Coast.
The French are troubled
by these developments, but not
dismayed. They are confident
that the UAM nations have a
basic community of interests,
buttressed by their attachment
to French culture and values.
Therefore, the French think
they will tend to form a dis-
tinctive grouping even if amal-
gamated with a larger entity,
such as the OAU.
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A greater threat to French
influence may be the UAM states'
tie to the EEC. Under the UAM-
EEC agreement, the preferential
trade terms the UAM states have
extended to France are also
granted to the other Common
Market states. Despite a no-
discrimination clause, French
dominance of UAM trade is fa-
vored by the linking of about
one third of French aid allo-
cation to Africa to the pur-
chase of French supplies.
France's EEC partners will
probably demand, and receive,
a quid pro quo for the aid they
are funneling into the European
Development Fund (EDF) in sup-
port of projects in the UAM
states.
Nevertheless, Gallic pre-
eminence in the aid field will
be guaranteed by the likelihood
that EEC development programs
in French Africa will be admin-
istered by French personnel.
This is logical since France is
the only EEC country with broad
experience in large-scale as-
sistance programs in Africa.
France's Relations With
on-French Africa
France has made little ef-
fort to expand its influence in
the English-speaking states in
Africa, but there are indica-
tions it intends to broaden ties
with former Belgian territories.
Rwanda, for instance, has been
accepted in the UAM, and has
initialed two assistance agree-
ments with Paris. The Leopold-
ville government has a technical
and cultural agreement with Paris,
negotiated last July. Latest
figures show that about 250
Congolese students studying in
France, and some 50 French teachers
and technicians have assumed posi-
tions in the former Belgian Congo.
Meanwhile, there have been uncon-
firmed reports that France is
planning to provide Leopoldville
with legal, military, agricultural
and financial advisers.
France's relations with non-
UAM African states have been
deeply embittered by the nuclear
tests in the Sahara. Ghana im-
posed economic sanctions on France
in 1960 and Nigeria broke diplo-
matic relations with Paris in 1.961.
Since Nigeria's commercial output
probably exceeds that of the 14
UAM states combined, French busi-
ness interests have been exerting
strong pressure on the government
to resume diplomatic relations,
but De Gaulle insists the initi-
ative must come from Lagos.
Thus far France has been
reluctant to support African
initiatives against white rule
in Africa. Indicative of this
is the fact that Paris has re-
fused to stop shipment of arms
to Portugal or South Africa.
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French influence in tropi-
cal Africa, under attack from
the more extreme African nation.-
alists, is likely to be reduced
somewhat in the days ahead. How-
ever, the closeness of the
economic cultural and military
ties that Paris has so carefully
nurtured over the years makes
it improbable that France's pre-
eminent role in its former
colonies will be seriously im-
pared.
France, however, can be ex-
pected to look for ways of mini-
mizing the losses to French in-
terests which might otherwise
result from sudden changes in
UAM governments. The need for
such a policy was driven home
by the overthrow of the Youlou
regime. The French are also
concerned that UAM countries
will get the idea that they can
move to reduce French influence
with impunity. This outlook was
encouraged by Mali's withdrawal
from the franc zone last year
without penalty, and more re-
cently by Paris' failure to cut
its aid to Algeria following
the nationalization of French
property there.
France will also continue
the effort to expand its influ-
ence in Africa beyond the con-
fines of the UAM, but its
chances of success are presently
slight. Nor are the prospects
much better over the long run
as long as Paris continues its
atomic testing in the Sahara
and extends tacit support to
Portugal and the Republic of
South Africa. (SECRET)
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