WEEKLY SUMMARY OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A004200050001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 37
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 9, 2008
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 4, 1963
• Content Type: SUMMARY

State Dept. review
completed
oCI: No, 0300/63
Copy No.
WEEKLY SUMMARY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
DIA review Referral Review by
completed. NGA
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SECRET
GROUP I Excluded from automatic
downgrading and declassifi cation
Approved For Release 2008/07/09: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04200050001-2
 25X1 Approved For Release 2008/07/09: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04200050001-2
Approved For Release 2008/07/09: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04200050001-2
 Approved For Release 2008/07/09: CIA-RDP79-00927A004200050001-2
SECRET
(Information as of 1200 EDT, 3 October 1963)
CUBA Page
CASTRO ON COEXISTENCE, SOVIET AID, AND ARMY COUPS
Castro's latest speech, touching on several themes
prominent in recent Cuban statements, explicitly
rejected Soviet moves toward "peaceful coexistence"
as long as US "aggression" toward Cuba continues.
REORGANIZATION OF CUBAN AIR DEFENSE SYSTEM
The pattern of missile-site relocations and fighter
redeployments suggests a shift from island-wide cov-
erage to point defense of major installations before
transferring the system to Cuban control.
GRAIN SITUATION IN THE COMMUNIST WORLD
Khrushchev has admitted publicly to the "rather
difficult position" of the 1963 harvest. It now
seems certain that the USSR will buy--for cash--
11 million tons of Western wheat in the next ten
months. Peiping will presumably need some five
million tons.
MOSCOW NAMES NEW MILITARY INTELLIGENCE CHIEF
The appointment of a former deputy secret police
chief to this position in the aftermath of the Pen-
kovsky case probably signals a security crackdown
which could lower morale and hamper Moscow's intel-
ligence collection effort at least temporarily.
SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS MAY BE APPROACHING NEW CLIMAX
There are growing indications that Soviet leaders,
perhaps believing that Peiping's rejection of the
test ban treaty has created a favorable opportunity,
are considering convening a new international Commu-
nist meeting. The Chinese would certainly challenge
the legitimacy of any conference which was organized
along lines they could not accept.
4 Oct 63 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE EEKLY SUMMARY
Approved For Release 2008/07/09: CIA-RDP79-00927A004200050001-2
 Approved For Release 2008/07/09: CIA-RDP79-00927A004200050001-2
SECRET
THE COMMUNIST WORLD (continued)
COMMUNIST CHINA'S NATIONAL DAY CELEBRATIONS
This year's 1 October celebrations--like the last
three--avoided the boasts of military and economic
strength which characterized the first ten.
CHINESE COMMUNIST LEADER VISITS NORTH KOREA
Liu Shao-chi apparently failed, however, in his
attempts to embroil the Koreans more deeply in
the Sino-Soviet dispute.
SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM
The government continues its efforts to improve
its image at home and abroad. The level of Viet
Cong activity has declined slightly from the 1963
high recorded the previous week.
COMMUNISTS INCREASING SUPPLY ACTIVITY IN LAOS
Routes from North Vietnam are being reopened with
the end of the rainy season, and this may presage
a resumption of military pressure on neutralist and
rightist forces.
CHALLENGE TO BEN BELLA REGIME IN ALGERIA
President Ben Bella seems to have sufficient assets
to contain--though not to liquidate--the dissident
movement in the Kabylie region, but the outbreak
there may encourage manifestations of opposition
to him in other areas.
CONGO PRESIDENT DISMISSES PARLIAMENT
The Adoula government evidently feared that oppo-
sition factions might rouse new disorders against
it and hopes now to wield firmer control over prep-
arations for parliamentary elections next year.
CYPRUS HEADING INTO NEW CONFLICTS
The Greek and Turkish communities on the island
are deadlocked over President Makarios' proposals
to revise the constitution and eliminate British,
Greek, and Turkish guarantees.
4 Oct 63 CURRENT INTELSEENC EWEEKLY SUMMARY Page ii
Approved For Release 2008/07/09: CIA-RDP79-00927A004200050001-2
 Approved For Release 2008/07/09: CIA-RDP79-00927A004200050001-2
1%W17 _V401t
SECRET
RESULTS OF RECENT EEC COUNCIL MEETING
The Council's proposal for settling the poultry
dispute with the US is inadequate, and dims hopes
for the "Kennedy Round" of tariff talks. Another
Council move was intended to elicit Soviet recog-
nition of the EEC as a trading unit. The Council
also discussed a proposed EEC-CSC-EURATOM merger.
THE FRENCH NUCLEAR SUBMARINE PROGRAM
Delays in the development of some components make
it unlikely that France's first Polaris-type sub-
marine can be deployed on station before 1971.
THREATS TO ITALIAN ECONOMIC STABILITY
The modest austerity program of the caretaker Leone
government will probably be inadequate to stabilize
the economic situation and could complicate Italy's
already delicate political situation.
15
GREECE PREPARES FOR PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS
The appointment of a nonpolitical caretaker
cabinet opens the way for the opposition's
participation in the elections and should
improve the general political atmosphere.
FINLAND'S CABINET CRISIS DRAGS ON
Efforts to resolve it still founder on the insist-
ence by President Kekkonen's Agrarian Party that
representatives of one of two rival trade union
federations be included in any new government.
CONTINUED DOMINICAN POLITICAL INSTABILITY LIKELY
The apparently well-intentioned efforts of the ci-
vilian triumvirate installed after the military coup
may be undermined by maneuvering and corruption on
the part of certain politicians and military leaders.
4 Oct 63 CURRENT INTEL IG~WEEKLY SUMMARY Page iii
Approved For Release 2008/07/09: CIA-RDP79-00927A004200050001-2
 Approved For Release 2008/07/09: CIA-RDP79-00927A004200050001-2
SECRET
WESTERN HEMISPHERE (continued) Page
MILITARY COUP IN HONDURAS 20
The armed forces chief led the coup on 3 October
apparently to prevent election on 13 October of the
presidential candidate of the ruling Liberal Party,
who he feared would curtail military influence.
COLORADO RIVER PROBLEM AFFECTS MEXICAN POLITICS 21
Mexico may initiate some form of legal action
against the US unless there is an immediate solu-
tion to the problem of the Colorado River's exces-
sive salinity when it reaches Mexico.
THE NEW ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT PARTY
While President-elect Illia appears moderate and
cautious, many members of his party harbor highly
parochial and uninformed attitudes on key issues.
22
4 Oct 63 CURRENT INTELIGWWEEKLY SUMMARY Page iv
Approved For Release 2008/07/09: CIA-RDP79-00927A004200050001-2
 Approved For Release 2008/07/09: CIA-RDP79-00927A004200050001-2
SECRET
CASTRO ON COEXISTENCE, SOVIET AID, AND ARMY COUPS
Fidel Castro's speech on
28 September, marking the third
anniversary of the formation of
the Committees for the Defense
of the Revolution, touched on
several themes prominent in re-
cent Cuban public statements.
On Cuba's attitude toward
the nuclear test ban treaty and
signs of lessening US-Soviet
tensions, Castro was more direct
and explicit than ever. He said,
in effect, that Cuba cannot go
along with Soviet moves toward
"peaceful coexistence" as long
as the United States continues
its policy of "aggression" to-
ward Cuba. He stated flatly
that "naturally we will not
calmly accept a situation in
which tensions decrease else-
where while they increase for
us.... We are glad when tensions
relax, but we cannot consider
ourselves at peace with an im-
perialism that triep to strangle
us more and more.... This situa-
tion will determine our policy
in the international arena, in
the United Nations and every-
where. It will determine our
stand on the nuclear pact and
toward the proposals on denu-
clearization."
Castro then emphasized
that Cuba "has its own stand"
which is dictated by its posi-
tion in the "anti-imperialist
struggle" and which, moreover,
derives from the unique origins
of the Cuban revolution and the
place it has in history. Here,
Castro seems to be telling the
Soviet Union that Cuban policy
is independent and cannot be
subject to Moscow's dictates.
Later in the speech, Castro
warned the Cuban people that
they must not become accustomed
to Soviet economic assistance
and must make every effort to
pay off its trade debt to the
USSR.
In another portion of
the speech, Castro stated that
the news of the Latin American
revolutionary struggle is "more
encouraging every day." Refer-
ring to the recent coup in the
Dominican Republic, he declared
that this demonstrates once
again that "there is only one
way, only one remedy"--the La-
tin American military class
must be liquidated and its
principal leaders executed.
SECRET
Page 1
Approved For Release 2008/07/09: CIA-RDP79-00927A004200050001-2
 Approved For Release 2008/07/09: CIA-RDP79-00927A004200050001-2
CUBA
Surface-to-Air Missile (SAM) Sites
Havana
PUNTA BRAVA x` e (R
AN JULIAN SAN AN
T: aining ite!~ C, DE
CAMAGUEY
0
a~
HOLGUINV
0 0
A NICARO
U_S, Naval Base
A New site
0 Unchanged site
0 Evacuated site
Estimated range
/4 MIG deployment
Approved For Release 2008/07/09: CIA-RDP79-00927A004200050001-2
Isle of Pines
 Approved For Release 2008/07/09: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04200050001-2
SECRET
25X1
A major reorganization of
the air defense system is in
progress in Cuba.
eight of the 24 sur-
ace-to-a r missile (SAM) sites
have been evacuated, including
one entire SAM regiment of four
sites and a support area in cen-
tral Cuba. To date, four of
the sites have been re-estab-
lished at other locations.
The pattern of relocations
indicates a shift from an is-
land-wide SAM coverage to point
defense of major cities and in-
stallations--in anticipation of
on-site training of Cubans in
SAM sites may be reduced in the
reorganization process and some
SAM equipment withdrawn from
the island.
MIG-21s have been de-
ployed from the San Antonio
de los Banos training base to
three other airfields for the
first time since March. At
the same time, MIG-15 fighters
have been deployed to San Julian.
While it is too early to deter-
mine whether these transfers
are permanent, the deployments
may be related to the over-all 25X1
reorganization of the air defense
system prior to transferring the
system to Cuban control.
SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Page 2
Approved For Release 2008/07/09: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04200050001-2
 Approved For Release 2008/07/09: CIA-RDP79-00927A004200050001-2
SECRET
Khrushchev now has admitted
publicly that the 1963 harvest
is in a "rather difficult posi-
tion" because of unfavorable
weather. This appears to be
a gross understatement. Total
grain production may be signifi-
cantly smaller than the medi-
ocre 1962 crop and the wheat
harvest may be especially bad--
down to an estimated 44 million
tons compared with last year's
estimated production of 57 mil-
lion tons. The Soviets need at
least 50 million tons of wheat
for domestic use and are committed
to export--mainly to the Euro-
pean satellites--4 to 5 million
tons.
Lagging production stems,
in part, from difficulties in
the New Lands, which the USSR
has come to count on for more
than a fourth of the total grain
harvest. Production there
slipped badly again this year
because of the weather, and
serious problems of a more perma-
nent nature may be developing.
Local newspapers are pointing
to a mounting problem of wind
erosion of the soil--one arti-
cle called it "national dis-
aster." Western analysts have
long pointed out that the con-
tinuous cropping of such mar-'
ginal land without offsetting
conservation measures could lead
to serious erosion and possibly
even dust bowl conditions remi-
niscent of the US during the
1930s. Adequate conservation
practices would take large
amounts of land out of culti-
vation, but without them a
dust bowl is a growing possi-
bility.
In either case the regime
is faced with the necessity of
raising land productivity
throughout the country. This
probably accounts, in part,
for Khrushchev's present emphasis
on rapidly increasing fertil-
izer production and introducing
irrigation on a large scale.
Grain conservation is
now the keynote in the Soviet
Union. The laws against feeding
bread and flour to animals are
being strictly enforced, and res-
taurants are no longer per-
mitted to give free bread with
meals; a kind of informal ra-
tioning is being practiced
in the stores, which are fre-
quently out of bread and flour.
It now seems likely that
the USSR will import at least
11 million tons of Western
wheat in the next ten months.
Although the largest single
contract, with Canada, allows
for credit, Moscow apparently
intends to pay cash for the
lot--almost $800 million,
including freight charges.
SECRET
4 Oct 63 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Page 3
Approved For Release 2008/07/09: CIA-RDP79-00927A004200050001-2
 Approved For Release 2008/07/09: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04200050001-2
SECRET
East European countries,
also affected by adverse weather,
require imports well"above
those of last year and now are
actively seeking them in France,
Canada, and the US. Only Ru-
mania, which is shipping 400,-
000 tons of grain to the USSR,
has a surplus.
As a result of the unprec-
edented recent Soviet purchases,
Communist China will face rising
prices for both wheat and freight
when it begins to negotiate con-
tracts for next year's deliv-'.
eries. None of its present.con-
tracts extends beyond the end
of January 1964. Harvest pros-
pects and, propaganda claims
during the i October National
Day celebrations--which implied
that agricultural and indus-
trial 'output 'has risen only
SECRET
4 Oct 63 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
slightly during 1963--suggest
that Peiping will again be in
the market for about five mil-
lion tons of grain.
Canada and Australia--the
source of 65 percent of China's
past.`.purchases--apparently have
set aside some wheat for "regular
customers." Canada is to ship
500,000 tons by the end of Jan-
uary and is committed under a
long-term agreement to make
available up to five million
tons between now and mid-1966.
France sold. Peiping about 700,-
000 tons in. the first half of
the year, and it too has.,a
long-term agreement with China
under which supplementary pur-
'chases may be made next year.
Page 4
Approved For Release 2008/07/09: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04200050001-2
 Approved For Release 2008/07/09: CIA-RDP79-00927A004200050001-2
SECRET
The Communist World
MOSCOW NAMES NEW MILITARY INTELLIGENCE CHIEF
As a result of the Pen-
kovsky spy case and other re-
cent setbacks for the Soviet
military intelligence service
(GRU), the Kremlin has assigned
Colonel. General Petr Ivashutin
as GRU chief. He replaces Gen-
eral Ivan Serov, who has re-
portedly been demoted and as-
signed to a relatively unim-
portant army command in Central
Asia.
For at least 20 years, Iva-
shutin has been a high-ranking
official of the secret police
(KGB) directorate for "counter-
intelligence in the armed for-
ces," a euphenism for the war-
time SMERSH ("death of spies")
organization. Now also known
as the Third Directorate of the
KGB, the unit has always acted
as the regime's watchdog over
the loyalty of the military.
Ivashutin headed this direc-
torate from 1953 to 1958 and
supervised its work during
his subsequent five years as
first deputy chairman of the KGB.
Ivashutin's new appointment
suggests that he is being brought
in to conduct a security crack-
down which could temporarily
hamper Moscow's military intel-
ligence collection effort. This
sign of Kremlin distrust is
likely to lower both the morale
and the efficiency of GRU offi-
cers, particularly those who
regularly deal with foreigners.
At least in the GRU, and
perhaps elsewhere in the De-
fense Ministry, the appointment
could also increase the tradi-
tional antagonism of the military
toward the civilian secret police.
Ivashutin is reported to be
callous, overbearing, and con-
ceited--traits which are likely
to sharpen military resentment
of the KGB's authority to keep
all levels of the armed forces
under surveillance.
SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS MAY BE APPROACHING NEW CLIMAX
There are growing indica-
tions that Soviet leaders are
considering convening a new
international Communist meeting.
They may believe that Peiping's
rejection of the nuclear test
ban treaty has created a favor-
able opportunity for exploiting
this forum to further discredit
and isolate the Chinese.
Publication by Pravda
during the past week o appeals
by three small Western Communist
parties for such a meeting--
last convened in 1960--suggests
that Moscow will attempt to
rally a great majority of for-
eign parties in condemning
Chinese dogmatism, "splitting
activities," and attacks on
the Soviet leadershi .
Such a conference could
take place in connection with
the 7 November anniversary of
the Bolshevik revolution, when
SECRET
4 Oct 63 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Page 5
Approved For Release 2008/07/09: CIA-RDP79-00927A004200050001-2
 Approved For Release 2008/07/09: CIA-RDP79-00927A004200050001-2
SECRET
delegations from almost all
Communist parties customarily
gather in Moscow. Khrushchev's
tactics would probably center
on demands for a cessation of
open polemics, a ban on inter-
ference in the affairs of other
parties, and a revision of the
1960 Moscow statement which
would label dogmatism rather
than "revisionism" the "main
danger" to the Communist move-
ment. Moscow's interest in
asserting these points has
been foreshadowed in a Para-
guayan party statement published
in Pravda on 30 September, in
a speech by Poland's leader
Gomulka, and in other documents
and statements.
Hints that Moscow now
favors a new conference--a
departure from its previous
reluctance to give the Chinese
another forum for vilification--
may be designed to pre-empt a
Chinese initiative to convene
an international meeting in
Peiping,
A Soviet decision to pro-
ceed with a meeting organized
along lines which the Chinese
could not accept would indi-
cate that Moscow is deliberately
seeking to provoke the Chinese
into some action which the USSR
could represent as Peiping's
formal voluntary separation
from the Communist movement.
The Chinese would certainly
call into question the legiti-
macy of such a Soviet-spon-
sored conference and might
convene a rival meeting of
their followers in answer.
Peiping in fact appears
to be challenging the Soviets
to undertake some decisive
action which could then be
turned against them. The
third installment--published
25 September--of China's
answer to the 14 July Soviet
letter expresses an unre-
strained abomination for
Khrushchev as a traitor and
renegade, and Peiping's prom-
ise of more in this series can
only mean that more scurrilous
language will be used to
blacken the Soviet leadership.
For months a major portion
of the main Soviet press and
almost all of China's news
output have been devoted to
the exchange of progressively
more serious charges.F
In this
charged atmosphere some new
climax appears to be building
up and a possible international
Communist meeting might pro-
vide the occasion for it.
SECRET
4 Oct 63 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Page 6
Approved For Release 2008/07/09: CIA-RDP79-00927A004200050001-2
 25X1 Approved For Release 2008/07/09: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04200050001-2
Approved For Release 2008/07/09: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04200050001-2
 Approved For Release 2008/07/09: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04200050001-2
For the fourth consecutive
year, Communist China's National
Day celebrations on 1 October
avoided the boasts of military and
economic strength which character-
ized the first ten anniversaries.
The Chinese were instead defen-
sive about both domestic and for-
eign policies and cautious about
economic progress and prospects.
Chou En-lai tried to maintain
an optimistic tone by claiming that
there has been a "trend of general
improvement" in the economy since
the disaster years of 1959-61. How-
ever, he made no comparison between
1963 and 1962. Other propaganda
claims of increases in selected
sectors of the economy suggest that
agricultural and industrial out-
put has risen only slightly during
1963.
Chou promised only that China
would eventually overcome its many
difficulties. He made the expected
assertion that China intends to go
it alone, while defensively insist-
ing that it has many:.friends and is
not, as the Soviets charge, isolated.
Apparently to underscore this point
4 Oct 63
SECRET
SECRET
Peiping invited 2,000 foreign
guests to the celebrations. These
were mainly from Asian, African,
and Latin American countries and
did not include any important
figures. Last year there were
only 300 foreign guests.
For the fourth year in a row
no military parade was held. The
colorful civilian rallies were re-
viewed, as usual, by Mao Tse-tung.
The list of officials with
Mao on the rostrum suggests that
the number of active leaders may
have shrunk recently. Missing were
Li Fu-chun and Lo Jung-huan, who
had been important and fairly ac-
tive politburo figures until July,
abut who have not made public ap-
pearances since then, Lo, top
political commissar in the army,
has a record of illness and may
be sick. It is plausible to spec-
ulate, however, that Li Fu-chun,
the regime's top economic planner,
is out of favor because he expressed
reservations about the wisdom of
Peiping's present autarchical poli-
Approved For Release 2008/07/09: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04200050001-2
 Approved For Release 2008/07/09: CIA-RDP79-00927A004200050001-2
SECRET
Liu Shao-chi's visit to North
Korea from 15 to 27 September was
a new Chinese Communist effort to
tighten political, military, and
economic ties between the two re-
gimes. He apparently failed, how-
ever, in his attempts to embroil
the Koreans more deeply in the Sino-
Soviet struggle.
The communiqud issued on Liu's
departure stressed the identity of
current political views between Pei-
ping and Pyongyang, specifically
including "major questions which
have arisen in the international
Communist movement." Nevertheless,
it was a surprisingly brief document,
and avoided any elaboration of the
points of Sino-Korean political
affinity.
Pyongyang has always been care-
ful to make clear that its espousal
of Chinese-favored positions springs
from its own analysis of what is
best for Communist interests. For
this reason, Pyongyang may have
been chary of again officially join-
ing Peiping in a substantive commu-
niqud on the dispute so soon after
the strongly anti-Soviet communiqud
issued following the June visit of
Korean President Choe Yong-kon to
China.
Liu's trip was ostensibly to
return that visit. However, the
presence of high-ranking military
and ideological personnel in Liu's
party and of the Chinese minister of
foreign trade in Pyongyang the week
before Liu's arrival suggests that
major substantive matters were on
the agenda.
decided upon.
Peiping may have offered new
inducements in an effort to stiffen
North Korean opposition to the USSR
in the Sino-Soviet conflict. Neither
regime, however,has given any clue as
to what concrete proposals were dis-
cussed or what action, if any, was
SECRET
4 Oct 63 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Page 8
Approved For Release 2008/07/09: CIA-RDP79-00927A004200050001-2
 Approved For Release 2008/07/09: CIA-RDP79-00927A004200050001-2
*40 *41
Ssu-maa
Phofr'I a
Kho
Muon p
.frpsIS ?
a~rg Viengi, '
0
Ban Hinq VIENTI
Heup idl
-V'gntiane
NAMTHA r
- Road
-- Track or trail
Airfield
Jh~
Ban Ta Viang
PIaine des r b
Jarres _
' Sala Nong Pet
Phanh hang Khay
Phong Savan
~" PLAINE ~Muong Pha
? r JARR S
Let Houang>
p 4s
Phlu
Xiang Khouang
Then mg
Muon 'a
Soul ' Xieng
ong
J XIENU--K-NOUAVG
uTha - -,
hors -:A
Thant
Hoe
_ M.Uar
Ubon
( t SAVANNAKHET
she ne
SaJannakhet } Muon9
Phine
?0
,Qua`g Tri
Approved For Release 2008/07/09: CIA-RDP79-00927A004200050001-2
 Approved For Release 2008/07/09: CIA-RDP79-00927A004200050001-2
SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM
SECRET
The Diem government is making
efforts to redress its image both
within and outside South Vietnam and
to portray itself as firmly in con-
trol. While the National Assembly
elections on 27 September provided
no true gauge of the government's
support, they were conducted with
a minimum of Viet Cong harassment
and, seemingly, with heavy voter
participation.
President Diem's scheduled ad-
dress to the opening of the new as-
sembly on 7 October may provide a
further test of his' willingness to
carry out his promises to the Bud-
dhists. He may use the occasion to
urge swift removal--which he has
said must be an assembly act--of
a long-standing ordinance which
discriminates against Buddhist
organizations. Diem made a rela-
tively moderate radiobroadcast on
28 September, urging the country
to get on with pressing'tasks in
the "interest of the entire nation,
not the selfish interests of a
group or minority."
The level of Viet Cong activity
declined slightly last week from
the 1963 high recorded the previous
week. The number of larger scale
Viet Cong attacks in September--3
of battalion and. 17 of company size
--was the greatest for any month
since June 1962. While most of this
action occurred in the delta prov-
inces, the northern part of the coun-
try also suffered an increased 25X1
number of attacks, aimed partly
at securing rice from the fall
harvest.
COMMUNISTS INCREASING SUPPLY ACTIVITY IN LAOS
With the advent of the dry sea-
son, Communists forces have resumed
large-scale convoy operations into
Laos along the recently reopened
Route 7. indi-
cate a substantial infusion of
troops and supplies during the
past two weeks. Pathet Lao forces
in the Plaine des Jarres area were
short of supplies. during the mon-
soon period, particularly since earl
August when Meo guerrilla units
sabotaged the supply route with
explosives.
Renewed convoy activity has
also been reported in south-
central Laos along Route 12, an-
other key resupply route leading
from the North Vietnamese border
to the Nhommarath-Mahaxay area.
These movements may presage
a step-up in Communist military
pressure against right-wing and
neutralist forces deployed in for-
ward positions. Recent maneuvers
by the Pathet Lao to improve its
political position proved fruit-
less.
While neutralist and right-
wing forces appear fairly well dug
in on the western edge of the
Plaine des Jarres, non-Communist
forces near Route 8 in the Nhommarath
region are disorganized and would
probably be unable to hold out -
against even moderate enemy pres-
sures.
Premier Souvanna, following his
recent'address to the UN General As-
sembly and talks with Presidents
Kennedy and De Gaulle,.plans visits to
Britain and the USSR--coguarantors of
the Geneva agreements on Laos--be-
fore returning to Vientiane later
this month. Souvanna's neutralist
military chief, Kong Le, is also 25X1
scheduled to return to Laos this
month following a two-month stay
in the Soviet Union.
SECRET
4 Oct 63 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Page 9
Approved For Release 2008/07/09: CIA-RDP79-00927A004200050001-2
 Approved For Release 2008/07/09: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04200050001-2
%W "Ifto
MADEIRA
ISLANDS
cro.~.~
CANARY ISLANDS .
ci w,Ej l7
SPANISH
f
SAHARA
MAURITANIA
Nouakchott
(U.K.) .-aim euta csp.~ ,,,/ Kp5YLIt-
Melilla f,,TS.
Locale of
recent incidents
A L G E R
MALI
25X1
Approved For Release 2008/07/09: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04200050001-2
 Approved For Release 2008/07/09: CIA-RDP79-00927A004200050001-2
SL+' (JRI1 I
CHALLENGE TO BEN BELLA REGIME IN ALGERIA
Ahmed Ben Bella, who on
20 September began a five-year
term as Algeria's first Presi-
dent, is faced with the most
direct challenge to his authori-
tarian control since he bested
his opponents in the struggle
for power last year. He seems
to have sufficient military and
police strength to contain the
Berber dissidents who staged a
public rally in Tizi Ouzou on
29 September to demand the
formation of a new Algerian
government. However, the
boldness of the Berbers' action
could encourage manifestations
of opposition to Ben Bella in
other chronically depressed
areas.
The rally was attended by
some 4,000 Berbers of the Kabylie
region and apparently was or-
ganized by Hocine Ait Ahmed,
one of the original leaders of
the Algerian rebellion and long
a fellow prisoner with Ben Bella.
Ait Ahmed broke with him in 1962
and now wants to re-establish
the collegial leadership that
prevailed in the rebel movement
before its victory.
Ait Ahmed is backed by Col.
Mohand ou el Hadj, whom Ben
Bella has relieved of command
of the Seventh Military Region,
of which Tizi Ouzou is the
center. He may also have the
backing of Belkacem Krim,
also a Berber and another of
the original rebel leaders.
Krim's recent arrival in Morocco
probably inspired Ben Bella's
charge that the Moroccans are
supporting the Berbers by cre-
ating incidents along Algeria's
western border.
Ou el Hadj's immediate
subordinates support Ben Bella.
The colonel, however, has
rallied a reported 3,000 of
his former troops--nearly the
full complement of his command,
which was organized in nine
infantry battalions armed with
artillery and heavy mortars.
Most of the,men in these forces
were local guerrillas whom Ou
el Hadj commanded during the
seven-year rebellion. They
are believed to be fit, alert,
and more effective than the
average Algerian soldier. They
could defend the mountainous "
Kabylie indefinitely but would
be incapable of advancing on
Algiers.
Ou el Hadj may have allied
himself with Ait Ahmed in re-
action to recent command
changes imposed by Algiers.
Some subordinate officers were
transferred and a number of
ex-guerrilla companies were
replaced by Algerian Army regu-
lars in an attempt to bring
the Seventh Military Region
more under Algiers' control
and to reduce Ou el Hadj's
independence of action. The
government is using similar
tactics in other areas where
loyalty is doubtful, and it
may face similar reactions
if its action is not rapid
and effective.
SECRET
4 Oct 63 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Page 10
Approved For Release 2008/07/09: CIA-RDP79-00927A004200050001-2
 Approved For Release 2008/07/09: CIA-RDP79-00927A004200050001-2
SECRET
The dispute between the
Congo's government and parlia-
ment over the latter's refusal
to restrict itself to constitu-
tion making ended abruptly on
29 September when President Kasa-
vubu prorogued the legislature.
He charged the deputies and sena-
tors with "default" of their
responsibilities and said a spe-
cial constitutional commission,
from which they would be excluded,
would be named to draft the con-
stitution. The decision was
made by Kasavubu, Premier Adoula,
and army chief General Mobutu,
and was carried out smoothly.
Adoula and Mobutu appear
confident they can make the move
stick, and they seem determined
to deal vigorously with any at-
tempts by the opposition to in-
cite new disorders. Adoula told
Ambassador Gullion that he had
lost patience because parliament
had spent its time trying to at-
tack the government, incite in-
surrection, and mount intrigues.
He said he would cut parliamen-
tary salaries to "subsistence"
and would govern by decree until
the constitution was promulgated;
elections would follow "immedi-
ately" after a constitutional
referendum.
One immediate reason for
the move appears to have been
recent antigovernment activity
by the Lumumbist and Gizengist
factions. In mid-September,
the government uncovered a plot
to free leftist Antoine Gizenga
from his island prison of Bou-
labemba, where he has been since
January 1962. Gizenga's former
representative in Cairo, Pierre
Mulele, reappeared in the Congo
in mid-September to organize
the plot. On 25 to 27 Septem-
ber, Lumumbist and Gizengist
party leaders staged "free
Gizenga" demonstrations in Leo-
poldville, alleging that Gi-
zenga was seriously ill or dead.
Gizenga reportedly had been on
a partial hunger strike since
17 September; he was found to
be in satisfactory condition by
a team of doctors on 24 Septem-
ber and is said to have resumed
eating.
The government may also
have believed that this was a
propitious time to crack down
on the opposition. Besides
constitution building, it is
looking ahead to parliamentary
elections next year. Both pro-
and anti-Adoula forces are
endeavoring to build "national"
parties out of the profusion
of factions, and the present
leadership is particularly ea-
ger to keep a tight hold on
the government apparatus during
this period.
SECRET
4 Oct 63 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Page 11
Approved For Release 2008/07/09: CIA-RDP79-00927A004200050001-2
 Approved For Release 2008/07/09: CIA-RDP79-00927A004200050001-2
'111111100 1000
CYPRUS
Selected road
4 OCTOBER 1963
MILES
POPULATION
TM,ks more tt;o;; 2091,
Approved For Release 2008/07/09: CIA-RDP79-00927A004200050001-2
 Approved For Release 2008/07/09: CIA-RDP79-00927A004200050001-2
SECRET v
CYPRUS HEADING INTO NEW CONFLICTS
There is growing danger
that Greek and Turkish Cypriots
will again turn to violence in
their chronic communal disputes.
Leaders of both communities
openly admit that they expect
armed clashed "sooner or later.
the American ambassador of his
extreme pessimism over the pos-
sibility of any agreement be-
tween himself and Makarios. He
warns that if the Greek Cyp-
riots attempt a unilateral
revision of the constitution,
the result will be ignored by
his community. Turkish Cypriot
leaders view the present docu-
ment as their best guarantee
against eventual Greek domina-
tion. Kuchuk, for the first
time since 1958, has privately
voiced the opinion that the only
answer to the present impasse
may be either to partition the
island or to exchange popula-
tions--the Turkish Cypriots in
Cyprus for the Greeks still
resident in Turkey.
President Makarios con-
tinues to call for revision of
the Cypriot constitution, abro-
gation of a treaty with Britain,
Turkey, and Greece, and removal
of Greek and Turkish troops sta-
tioned on Cyprus at the time of
independence. He terms "harm-
ful" or "unworkable" consti-
tutional provisions which grant
to the Turkish minority the
right to veto certain legisla-
tion, to have its own munici-
pal governments, and to hold a
specific proportion of civil
service jobs.
Makarios wants to change a
treaty calling for the Turkish
and Greek troops and to abrogate
outright one permitting Greece,
Turkey, and Britain to intervene
jointly or unilaterally to
prevent violation of the 1959
agreements. These provisions
Makarios now calls an "unaccept-
able infringement of sovereignty."
Should he be rebuffed by Ankara,
Athens, and London in his effort
to alter the settlement, as he
probably will be, he has indi-
cated that he will act unilater-
ally.
Vice President Kuchuk, a
Turkish Cypriot, recently told
The large and well-organized
Communist party (AKEL), mean-
while, stands to profit from
Greek frustrations, Turkish
fears, and the probable develop-
ment of a controversy among
three NATO partners. While
Makarios maintains cordial
relations with AKEL, some other
Greek Cypriot leaders are becom-
ing concerned by recent Communist
gains. As long as the communal
dispute remains the major issue
on Cyprus, however, it appears
unlikely that any anti-Com-
munist campaign will be likely
to generate much interest or
support among Greek Cypriots.
SECRET
4 Oct 63 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Page 12
Approved For Release 2008/07/09: CIA-RDP79-00927A004200050001-2
 Approved For Release 2008/07/09: CIA-RDP79-00927A004200050001-2
%W SECRET
Europe
RESULTS OF RECENT EEC COUNCIL MEETING
At its 23-26 September
meeting, the Common Market
Council of Ministers took up
a number of long-standing is-
sues, including the poultry dis-
pute with the US, relations
with the USSR, and the proposed
merger of the EEC with EURATOM
and the Coal-Steel Community
(CSC).
By offering a reduction of
only 1.3 cents per pound in the
poultry levy--and this condition-
al on US relinquishment of fur-
ther negotiating rights--the
council dimmed hopes for any
early settlement of this issue.
The US had previously made it
clear that even an uncondition-
al reduction of this size would
be unacceptable. Although EEC
spokesmen have since urged the
US to participate in further
bilateral talks, they have in
fact held out little prospect
that a compromise can be reached,
Nor have they been respon-
sive to US proposals that GATT
be asked to pronounce on the
size of any "compensatory with-
drawal" of tariff concessions
the US would be justified in
making.
EEC Commission officials
continue to express grave con-
cern over the "political ef-
fects" of the poultry dispute
on US-EEC relations, particular-
ly with reference to the forth-
coming "Kennedy Round" of tariff
talks. Although the EEC appears
to be slowly approaching a
single position on how tariffs
on industrial items should be
reduced, no such agreement on
agricultural trade is in sight.
As for EEC-USSR relations,
the Council,decided to offer
Moscow Community-wide tariff
concessions on three export
items of some importance to the
USSR. In return, the EEC re-
quested Soviet abandonment of
past claims for most-favored-
nation treatment from EEC
members individually and--in
effect--tacit recognition of
the Community as a trading unit.
There is considerable doubt
that the USSR will accept the
offer--which, in the opinion
of some EEC officials, would be
a step toward, the Community's
adoption of a common commercial
policy toward the bloc, perhaps
leading ultimately to a single
trade agreement between the EEC
and the USSR.
The Council also called
for a report by the end of 1963
on proposals for a fusion of
the executives and the councils
of EEC, CSC, and EURATOM. This
report in itself will be only
one of the preliminaries to
moves toward future merger of the
three communities, but Community
sources believe it will lead to
some useful rationalization of
the Community institutional
structure in the meantime.
The question of bringing all
the Community institutions into
a si"gle European "capital" is
still a very delicate one, and
any thoroughgoing merger would
reopen the three Community
treaties to amendments--including
those designed to trim away
supranational powers.
SECRET
4 Oct 63 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Page 13
Approved For Release 2008/07/09: CIA-RDP79-00927A004200050001-2
 Approved For Release 2008/07/09: CIA-RDP79-00927A004200050001-2
SECRET %we
Europe
THE FRENCH NUCLEAR SUBMARINE PROGRAM
The French Navy continues
to give highest priority to
the design and construction of
a nuclear-powered, Polaris-
type submarine, a project ab-
sorbing over half of the Navy's
1963-64 research and develop-
ment funds. Despite public
claims that the first submarine
will be available in 1969 or
before, delays in the develop-
ment of some components make it
unlikely that the first nuclear
unit can be deployed on station
before 1971.
Construction of a land-
based, prototype nuclear pro-
pulsion plant for the submarine is
encountering some delays. Its
reactor was to have been operat-
ing by the middle of this year,
but production of some of the
reactor components was slowed
by a serious fire at one of
the plants late last year and
it now appears that the reactor
will not become operative until
early in 1964. No major prob-
lems are reported on the con-
struction of heat exchangers,
turbines, or reduction gearing.
A hull begun in 1957, and
originally intended for the
first French nuclear submarine,
is now being equipped with a
conventional diesel power plant,
and will be used as an experi-
mental missile test platform.
Work is being completed on a
center section for this hull
containing at least four and
perhaps eight launching tubes.
This boat will probably be
launched next year, but the
test missiles are not likely to
be available until 1965 or
1966, which will in consequence
delay underwater testing of
missiles and guidance systems.
France is also evidently
making adequate progress in
developing a two-stage, solid-
fuel missile with a 1,000- to
1,500-mile range. A series of
tests of solid-fuel rockets
planned for the next two years
--using some components of
this military missile--will
provide additional information
for the military program. Al-
though early French guidance
systems are likely to be in-
accurate by US standards, they
will probably be sufficient
for the oft-stated French goal
of a weapons system for use
against population centers,
25X1
if
progress with warhead minia-
turization can be assumed, all
components of the weapons sys-
tem can be available and an
operational submarine can be
at sea in 1970. About a year
more would probably be required
for sea trials before the first
submarine went on station.
Current French plans call for
the production of three nuclear
submarines, each with 16 mis-
siles.
SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Page 14
Approved For Release 2008/07/09: CIA-RDP79-00927A004200050001-2
 Approved For Release 2008/07/09: CIA-RDP79-00927A004200050001-2
%MW SECRET
TthtEATS TO ITALIAN ECONOMIC STABILITY
Although business in general
is booming in Italy, prices are
steadily rising, and the balance-
of-payments problem has become
grave. The modest austerity
program which caretaker Premier
Leone has presented to Parliament
will probably be inadequate to
stabilize the situation, and it
may also complicate the already
delicate problem of forming a
'center-left coalition.
The cost of living has risen
about 8 percent in the past year,
with price indexes going up faster
in the first half of 1963 than
during the comparable period of
1962. The average take-home pay
of Italian workers is still con-
siderably lower than in the other
EEC countries, however, and or-
ganized labor is pressing for
additional wage increases. Since
there is a shortage of labor in
several fields, and unemployment
is low--about 2.5 percent of the
labor force--the unions are in
a strong bargaining position.
The wage-price spiral is
weakening the competitive position
of Italy's export sector, which
in recent years has been a main
contributor to the country's
rapid economic growth. The ex-
panded imports the government
has encouraged to hold prices
down helped wipe out Italy's
customary balance-of-payments
surplus last year, and this year
the payments deficit may well
reach one billion dollars. This
is causing increasing concern on
the part of central bank author-
ities, although official reserves
... Europe
of about $3.5 billion are large
enough to cope with the situa-
tion for the present.
The measures proposed to
Parliament last month are de-
signed to reduce the balance-
of-payments deficit, curb in-
flation, increase productivity
and restrict certain types of
consumption. They entail a
10-percent cut in the budget
deficit, tax inducements for
modernization of factories,
more low-cost housing con-
struction, and increases in sales
taxes on luxury goods.
These measures are much less
extensive than informed observers
had expected, however, and their
impact on the economy is not likely
to be decisive. The Christian
Democrats look to the Socialists
for eventual participation in a
center-left coalition--a consid-
eration.which inhibits the Leone
government from pressing for re-
ally effective restraints on wages.
Even now, the Socialists are tak-
ing the line that the Leone govern-
ment's program favors the wealthy
clasp and fails to meet the needs
of workers and farmers.
coalition.
reconstituting a center-left
Italian conservatives
blame the country's economic
problems on the policies of
the previous Fanfani center-left
government, and warn that another
government like it would injure
the economy still more. These
conservative interests are
certain to try to exploit eco-
nomic strains in an effort to
scuttle negotiations aimed at
SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Page 15
Approved For Release 2008/07/09: CIA-RDP79-00927A004200050001-2
 Approved For Release 2008/07/09: CIA-RDP79-00927A004200050001-2
SECRET W
Europe
A major step toward re-
solving Greece's three-month-
old political crisis has been
taken with King Paul's accept-
ance of Prime Minister Pipine-
lis' resignation. This was
a major concession to the larg-
est opposition party, the non-
Communist Center Union (EK),
which threatened "militant
abstention" if elections were
carried out by the Pipinelis
government.
The new caretaker govern-
ment, which will preside over
general elections on 3 November,
is headed by the president of
the Supreme Court, Stylianos
Mavromichalis, and consists en-
tirely of nonpolitical figures.
Its installation opens the way
for all three major parties to
participate in the elections--
the right-of-center National
Radical Union (ERE), under
former Premier Constantine
Karamanlis; the EK, under George
Papandreou; the right-wing Pro-
gressives, under Spyros Mark-
ezinis; and the Communist-dom-
inated United Democratic Left
(EDA) under John Passalides.
Since the disputed election
of 1961, Greek politics have
been unusually bitter, and the
opposition parties have fre-
quently refused even to partic-
ipate in parliamentary sessions.
Last June, Karamanlis suddenly
resigned after a dispute with
the King over a proposed royal
visit to Britain. While rela-
tions between the royal family
and Karamanlis had become in-
creasingly strained, he may have
seized on the dispute as an
opportunity to clear the polit-
ical atmosphere.
Karamanlis and the King
agreed on career diplomat Pipine-
lis as the interim prime minister
to conduct elections. However,
Pipinelis, a member of ERE and a
minister in the last Karamanlis
government, was immediately at-
tacked by the EK and other op--
position parties as not really
neutral. Eventually, even part
of the ERE press called for a
completely nonpolitical figure.
Both Karamanlis and the King are
known to feel that an election
without EK participation would be
meaningless and would intensify
political instability. 25X1
Kara -
man s remains the most popular
figure in Greece, and most ob-
servers predict another electoral
victory for the ERE. The party
may lose some of the 180 seats
that it has held in the 300-member
parliament, since the provisions
of the new electoral law and nor-
mal popular disenchantment with
any party in power for eight years
would tend to work against it.
Leadership of the EK is badly
split, but the success of Papan=
dreou's "unrelenting struggle" to
force new elections may attract
enough support to increase its
representation.
The EDA suffered a major defeat
in 1961, when its share of the pop-
ular vote fell to 15 percent from
nearly 25 percent in the previous
election. This year the Communist-
dominated party appears to be in
a good position to make at least a
partial comeback. The security
services are not harassing EDA mem-
bers 25X1
anywhere near as much as before,
and there are continuing economic
problems on which it can capitalize.
SECRET
4 Oct 63 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Page 16
Approved For Release 2008/07/09: CIA-RDP79-00927A004200050001-2
 Approved For Release 2008/07/09: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04200050001-2
IF Is
SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC AGRARIAN PARTY PEOPLE,
PARTY Paerv
53
38 14 NSfRyAT/VpS
CO
3?
SOCIAL _.. _ uBFRAIS
OLBLOCRATIC ]3 LIBERAL
OPPOSITION -- UNION
2 200 SEATS
~. C.OYEWNMFNT PARTICS
Approved For Release 2008/07/09: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04200050001-2
 Approved For Release 2008/07/09: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04200050001-2
SECRET
Europe
Efforts to resolve Fin-
land's month-old cabinet crisis
continue to founder on the in-
sistence by President Kekkonen's
dominant Agrarian Party that
representatives of one of the
two rival trade union federations
be included in any new govern-
ment.
A number of non-Communist
leaders have been trying to
assemble a new coalition since
30 August, when Prime Minister
Karjalainen and his coalition
cabinet resigned after its
three extra-parliamentary
representatives of labor with-
drew in a dispute over economic
policy. The four non-Communist
parties which made up the
coalition are in general agree-
ment on policy, but the Agrar-
ians' insistence on including
labor has proved to be the
principal obstacle.
The problem of labor rep-
resentation is complicated
not only by the political ri-
valry between the Social Demo-
crats and their left-wing
splinter--the so-called Skog-
ists--but': also by the paral-
lel split in union ranks which
has resulted in the formation
of two separate trade union
federations. The previous
government secured "labor
representation" by assigning
three cabinet posts to indi-
viduals identified with the
trade union federation con-
trolled by the Skogists and
Communists. Kekkonen and the
Agrarians continue to shun all
cooperation with the Social
Democrats on grounds that they
do not support Finland's offi-
cial policy of friendship with
the Soviet Union.
The Agrarians, as the
party closest to Kekkonen and
commanding the largest bloc
of seats in parliament, have
played the principal role in
the maneuvering to form a
new government. The insistence
by the Agrarians on labor's
participation reflects not
only their wish to broaden
their base of support, but
also their reluctance to bear
the onus of the unpopular
economic decisions the new
government may be compelled to
make in the coming months.
Kekkonen has thus far
avoided intervening directly
in the crisis, except for his
recent proposal that an all-
party government, including
the Communists, be formed.
This proposal was promptly dis-
missed by the non-Communist
parties, including the Agrarian
leadership, which is well aware
that such a development would
split their own party. Now
that all practical possibilities
for resolving the crisis have
been explored without success,
the stage would appear to be
set for more decisive inter-
vention by Kekkonen within the
limits imposed by the realities
of Finland's domestic political
situation. His immediate ob-
jective is likely to be the
reconstitution of Karjalainen's
majority coalition, including
the labor representatives, but
if this fails his only alterna-
tives would be a four-party
coalition without labor or a
nonpolitical cabinet of civil
servants.
SECRET
Page 17
Approved For Release 2008/07/09: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04200050001-2
 Approved For Release 2008/07/09: CIA-RDP79-00927A004200050001-2
`' SECRET
AREA NOTES
Europe
Spain: Although the recently
agreed five-year extension of
the 1953 US bases agreement
gives Spain a considerably
smaller quid pro quo than it
had been hoping for, Franco is
reported by the US Embassy to
be "extremely pleased." The
emphasis in the joint declara-
tion on the "close working
relationship" between Spain
and the US seems to have satis-
fied Madrid's desire to gain
international respectability
through a "political" commit-
ment from the US.
The negotiations on
stationing Polaris submarines
SECRET
4 Oct 63 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Page 18
Approved For Release 2008/07/09: CIA-RDP79-00927A004200050001-2
 Approved For Release 2008/07/09: CIA-RDP79-00927A004200050001-2
SECRET
Europe
under
direct
US
command
at the
Rota naval base have not
been
completed. In December
1962
Vice President Munoz Grandes
had authorized their berthing,
subject to further talks on
the safety and liability fac-
tors involved. Unless the
Spaniards resort to delaying
tactics, these talks should
be completed in time to accom-
modate the first of the sub-
marines, the Proteus, early
next year. Tfie-Spanish Govern-
ment still refuses to allow
any NATO-assigned submarines
to be berthed there
Western Hemisphere
CONTINUED DOMINICAN POLITICAL INSTABILITY LIKELY
With an eye toward early
resumption of relations with
the US and key Latin American
countries, the new Dominican
regime is working hard to win
acceptance as a responsible
civilian government free from
military pressure or political
partisanship.
Several hundred Dominicans
arrested in the wake of the
25 September military coup have
been released, and the pro-
Castro, Communist-infiltrated
14th of June Political Group
(APCJ)--the only extreme leftist
party with a significant pop-
ular following--has been at
least temporarily excluded
from the government's ban on
Castro-Communist parties. No
serious antigovernment violence
has occurred so far
Despite the government's
announced intention to under-
take immediate economic reforms,
US Embassy officials in Santo
Domingo foresee continued polit-
ical manuevering and personal
corruption emanating from certain
new cabinet members and mili-
tary leaders--actions which
could undermine the apparently
well-intentioned efforts of the
ruling triumvirate. Several
of the new rightist cabinet
members are best known for
their political and personal
opportunism, and certain mili-
tary leaders, including the
air force and navy commanders,
will probably continue with
their profiteering, barring a
crackdown by their colleagues.
SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Page 19
Approved For Release 2008/07/09: CIA-RDP79-00927A004200050001-2
 Approved For Release 2008/07/09: CIA-RDP79-00927A004200050001-2
SECRET
Western Hemisphere
Colonel Oswaldo Lopez, chief
of the Honduran armed forces, led
forces under his command in a coup
early on 3 October. The move was
made despite strong pressures by
US diplomatic and military officials
in Honduras to persuade him and
President Villeda to guarantee the
continuation of constitutional gov-
ernment and the holding of orderly
elections on 13 October.
Early indications were that
the coup involved some violence in
Tegucigalpa, the capital. Chances
of widespread disorders and civil
strife had not been ruled out by
midmorning, when it was still not
clear how far the Villeda govern-
ment and the ruling Liberal Party's
presidential candidate, Modesto
Rodas Alvarado, would go in trying
to rally their own armed supporters
to oppose the military.
The revolt in effect is aimed
at preventing the election of Rodas
on 13 October. Although Lopez has
expected some armed resistance by
Rodas' Liberal supporters, he is
said to believe he can control the
situation. There is evidence that
he has solicited support from
Nicaragua and El Salvador and that
he expects to receive immediate
recognition from them as well as
from the Peralta military regime
in Guatemala.
Lopez, who has been under
heavy pressure from some of his
subordinates to act, stated before
the coup that it had the full sup-
port of the armed forces, who favor
the opposition Nationalist Party.
The military feared that Rodas
would curtail the influence of the
army and build up the power of the
Civil Guard, which is in effect
the military arm of the Liberal
Party. The tension between the
military and Rodas has been fos-
tered by the candidate himself,
who remained aloof from high rank-
ing officers and refused to clarify
his intentions toward the military.
A forceful politician who has
not displayed a tendency to com-
promise, Rodas is believed to have
favored resisting a coup. In a
conversation with US Ambassador
Burrows on 30 September, he said
the Liberal Party would prepare
to oppose the army. There have
been recent reports that arms are
being distributed to Liberal Party
followers.
The strong emotional partisan-
ship of both Liberals and National-
ists, the availability of arms to
both sides, and the political involv-
ment of the military and the Civil
Guard could bring further violence.
Military leaders probably will try
to justify their coup on the basis
of their constitutional duty to
guarantee free and orderly elections.
They might also attempt to vindicate
themselves by charging that the
government was penetrated by
Communists.
Nicaraguan President Rene
Schick admitted to US Ambassador
Brown on 1 October that, although
General Anastasio Somoza had pre-
viously indicated a desire to sup-
port a Honduran military coup, the
Nicaraguan Government had decided
not to assist in any way. Julio
Rivera, President of El Salvador,
also indicated that his government
would not encourage the Honduran
military. On 3 October, Schick told
Brown he would issue a statement
deploring the coup and offered
his cooperation with the US.
SECRET
4 Oct 63 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Page 20
Approved For Release 2008/07/09: CIA-RDP79-00927A004200050001-2
 Approved For Release 2008/07/09: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04200050001-2
AW
vk~o
pSan Bernardino
_sXLos Angeles
UTAH
ImY~~/O!".e-J
son Diego Va lty`
0 39_ 100
MILES
34027
Tucson
0
SONORA
Approved For Release 2008/07/09: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04200050001-2
 Approved For Release 2008/07/09: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04200050001-2
SECRET
Western Hemisphere
COLORADO RIVER PROBLEM AFFECTS MEXICAN POLITICS
The Mexican Government may
initiate some form of legal
action against the US unless
there is an immediate solution
to the problem of the Colorado
River's excessive salinity when
it reaches Mexico. The onset
of the dry season in the Mexican
State affected--Baja California--
in October produces peak demand
for irrigation water, and Presi-
dent Lopez Mateos and other
senior officials have recently
been emphasizing that they be-
lieve the US is committed to
measures this fall to lower
the Colorado's salinity to
acceptable levels. In addition
to its concern over this year's
severe reduction in crop acreage,
the, Lopez Mateos administration
is also anxious about political
repercussions.
In commenting on the Mexi-
can attitude, the US Embassy
at Mexico City states that in
the absence of a prompt solution
to the salinity problem, Lopez
Mateos may feel compelled by
domestic pressures to seek a
remedy in the International
Court of Justice, or in a US
federal court. Mexico might
also enter a complaint in the
Organization of American States
or the UN that its riparian
rights have been injured by the
US. In any event, the resulting
publicity would, in the embassy's
opinion, cause a sharp deteri-
oration in US-Mexican relations.
The embassy also believes that
Mexico's case in any court,would
be a strong one.
The government is evidently
trying to keep a rein on public
emotions surrounding the issue,
which are potentially explosive,
and has clamped a tight lid on
public discussion of the sit-
uation. Its motive in doing
this probably is related to
plans for the selection by
November of the ruling party's
next presidential candidate.
Lopez Mateos probably fears
that influential pro-Communists
like former President Cardenas
and former Baja California
governor Maldonado will exploit
public indignation over the
Colorado to demand a hand in
making the nomination, which
in Mexico is tantamount to
election.
It is also possible that
Lopez Mateos' own apprehension
over any increase in peasant
unrest caused by the water
dispute might lead him to choose
a leftist successor. Although
at present he seems to favor
the selection of a moderate,
he has long tended to over-
estimate the actual influence
of the far left in Mexico, He
might be persuaded that a left-
ist would be in a better posi-
tion to defend Mexico's inter-
ests before world opinion in
pursuing the Colorado case.
The situation also carries
the threat of a new effort by
Communist-led political and
labor groups to attract peasant
support and develop their assets
in Baja California, already
better organized than in the
rest of Mexico.
SECRET
4 Oct 63 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Page 21
Approved For Release 2008/07/09: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04200050001-2
 Approved For Release 2008/07/09: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04200050001-2
SECRET
THE NEW ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT PARTY
While Argentine President-
elect Illia appears to be a cau-
tious and moderate politician,
many members of his party--the
People's Radical Civic Union
(UCRP)--harbor some highly paro-
chial and uninformed attitudes
on key issues.
The UCRP, slightly left of
center, is out of touch with many
present-day realities, partly
because it has been in opposition
for so long. For the same reason
it lacks men with the experience
and knowledge necessary to cope
with Argentina's complex economic
and political problems. Illia
himself has a keen political sense
and will give the party stronger
leadership than it has had in the
past, but he too lacks executive
experience on the national scene.
For the last 25 years he has been
a practicing physician in a small
railroad town in central
Cordoba Province.
Dr. Julio Cueto Rua,
a Conservative Party
leader, journalist, and
former professor of law
in the United States, has
expressed concern to US
officials in this regard.
He is one of a number of
well-informed Argentines
undertaking an "educa
tional campaign" designed
to break down some of the
traditional suspicions
and misconceptions prev-
alent in the UCRP. The
cated to democratic prin-
ciples.
Despite its lack of
experience and small
plurality of 26 percent
of the national vote, the
UCRP is firmly based both
at the national level and
in most of Argentina's 22
provinces. It controls
i the administration of the
federal capital and the
!governorships of 13 prov-
inces in which more than
80 percent of Argentina's
population lives. Its
72 seats in the 192-membe:
Conservatives were among Chamber of Deputies con-
the diverse political parties-- ILIA/titute by far the largest bloc
including neo-Peronists and So-
cialists--which supported Illia
in the electoral college after
his party won a plurality in the
7 July elections.
Cueto Rua is particularly
concerned that the Illia govern-
ment will annul contracts with
US petroleum companies and the
Investment Guaranty Agreement,
which the UCRP campaign platform
promised to change. He foresees
strong pressures on Illia from
extreme nationalists and leftists
both inside and outside the UCRP,
who insist that Illia must up-
hold the platform.
Because Illia is likely to
find it hard to resist these
pressures without support from
outside the UCRP, Cueto Rua and
other center-oriented leaders
are discussing how such support
can be provided. Cueto Rua has
urged that the US show patience
and forbearance in dealing with
the new government, which he
believes is made up of honest
and highly motivated men dedi-
5 October.
among the 24 parties represented
there. In the senate, the more
important congressional body,
the UCRP has 23 of 46 seats,
and will probably gain an abso-
lute majority in a special elec-
tion for one remaining seat on
SECRET
4 Oct 63 Approved For Release 2008/07/09: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04200050001-2 ge 22
 25X1 Approved For Release 2008/07/09: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04200050001-2
Approved For Release 2008/07/09: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04200050001-2
 Approved For Release 2008/07/09: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04200050001-2
C4 T n Tf T T
Approved For Release 2008/07/09: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04200050001-2