AFGHANISTAN UNDER KING ZAHIR SHAH

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A004100110003-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Sequence Number: 3
• Content Type: REPORT

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23 August 1963
King Zahir Shah of Afghanistan arrives in the
United States for a state visit on 4 September. He
comes at a time when his country is moving toward
a new consitutional experiment, and when its gov-
ernment, nominally under Prime Minister Yusuf but
dominated by the King, still is somewhat insecure.
Zahir is keeping himself well informed of the po-
litical activities of his cousin, former prime
minister Daud, who resigned in March and who is the
chief threat to the King's plans for a more liberal
regime. However, limited measures of liberaliza-
tion have been received favorably by most, although
not all Afghans, and Zahir has felt it safe to
visit West Germany in early August as well as to
make his trip to the US.
The 49-year-old monarch is well disposed toward
the West, and he has been looking forward to his
first visit to the United States. He recently told
an American visitor that Afghanistan and the US are
"close spiritual cousins." The extension of the
US invitation to him last February reportedly con-
tributed to the new-found self-reliance and deter-
mination that culminated shortly thereafter in his
taking the leadership of the government into his own
hands .
The Ffing's New Position
The King took power
Tram Daud in reaction to'
Daud's dead-end policy to-
ward Fakistan. Daud's
efforts to pressure Paki-
al issues (~ushtooni-
stan) had succeeded in
provoking Karachi to the
point where the Afghans
had to abandon transit
rights to the sea through
Pakistan. This greatly
increased Afghanistan's
economic dependence on
its northern neighbor, ~_ ,~ ,~
the USSR. King ZAHIR
It was widely be-
lieved by Afghans at the
time that there was no
alternative leader capa-
'ble of filling Daud's
shoes. Zahir has always
been somewhat retiring
personally. He had
seemed content to let his
uncles and cousins wield
power after he ascended
the throne following his
father's assassination
in 1933. However, he
shave some behind-the-
scenes influence, and
through the years he gave
a sympathetic hearing to
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Prime Minister YUSUF
complaining tribesmen even
though he might not actually
secure redress for their griev-
ances. His acceptance of Daud's
resignation thus came as a sur-
prise--probably to Daud as well
--and Afghan political elements
are still assessing Zahir's
power and determination.
Zahir is aware that he is
nat yet firmly in control and
is trying by various measures
taimprove his position. He
hopes that his programs for
political liberalization and
for economic development will
give him increased popular sup-
port. Behind the scenes, he
is working hard to establish
control aver the army, the chief
focus of power in Afghanistan.
The traditional solidarity
of the present royal family, of
which Daud is a member, works
in favor of the King. Members
of the family seem to want to
keep their differences within
the family unless the issue ap-
pears to be of fundamental im-
portance. However, Zahir clearly
realizes that his government
must build a mare solid record
of achievement before its posi-
tion will be appreciably strength-
ened.
King Zahir with then Prime Minister Daud.
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The King's new government
has not made drastic changes
in domestic policy, but it has
brought new methods and a dif-
ferent emphasis. The royal
family is agreed that if it is
to maintain itself in power,
it must bring a measure of or-
derly progress to Afghanistan.
baud gave top priority to eco-
nomic development but also
pushed ahead in the more ex-
plosive field. of social reform.
The Zahir=Yusuf government is
continuing these basic policies,
but it is putting first priority
on encouraging the evolution of
Westernized political institu-
tions. Along with this has come
new encouragement to private
economic enterprise in place of
the statist emphasis of the
previous regime.
Practically all Afghan
leaders also believe that under
present circumstances their
country's independence is best
maintained by a neutral course
in international affairs. This
course was endangered by Daud's
obsession with the Pushtoonistan
question. The removal of Daud
and the ring's more moderate
approach made it possible for
Pakistani President Ayub to of-
fer substantial concessions,
and agreement was reached last
May to reopen the border. This
in turn reopened the main door
to the West. The easing of the
Pushtoonistan campaign has also
been welcomed. by Afghanistan's
non-Pushtoon minorities--Tajiks,
Uzbeks, Mongoloid Hazaras, and
others--who together comprise
a majority of the population.
While the King prefers to
rule with a lighter hand than
did Daud, he faces the same prob-
lem of maintaining balance in
Afghan politics. He must avoid
alienating major sections of
society by going too fast--or
too slow--as he presses polit-
ical and social changes.
The major change that the
Zahir-Yusuf government has intro-
duced during its first six
months in power is a relaxation
of Afghanistan's police state
atmosphere. A number of polit-
ical prisoners whose police rec-
ords did not reveal the reason
for their arrest have been re-
leased. This step was acclaimed
by the liberally inclined. intel-
ligentsia, who are increasingly
important influences on working-.
level government and on urban
popular attitudes.
The press has been en-
couraged to publish articles
critical of the government, al-
though Afghan journalists re-
main careful not to overstep
the bounds of discretion, and
Kabul University has been en-
couraged to hold a genuinely
free election to select a new
faculty head. The latter develop-
ment seems to have overshadowed
several recent municipal elec-
tions, which apparently were
still rigged as before.
Within the government it-
self, the National Assembly,
long relegated. to a rubber-stamp
role, 'for the first time has
held hearings on various parts
of the budget, instead. of merely
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Principal Tribal Groups
Pushtu-speaking Pushtoons
Persian speaking Pushtoons
Other Persian-speaking tribes
Hazara
Uzbek
Tajik
Others
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accepting it as a whole, Several
bills have been amended by the
cabinet along lines suggested
by the assembly.
In the bureaucracy, a
spirit of initiative has bloomed
in certain ministries and de-
partments, and a new coopera-
tion between ministries reflects
a freedom among government offi-
cials that had not previously
existed. The effects of the
new look in the bureaucracy has
been severely limited, however,
by the shortage of competent
Afghans to replace any but the
most venal of the old guard.
Zahir and. Yusuf have
promised Afghanistan a new writ-
ten constitution. A committee
is to report its recommendations
sometime this fall to the Na-
tional Assembly, which is to
suggest any changes in the
draft canstitution. The King,
who presumably will be heavily
engaged in its development, re-
portedly hopes to put it in
force in early 1964.
However, no one, probably
not even the King, yet has a
clear idea of how far liberal-
ism should go. Except among
a few ultraliberals, no revolu-
tion of rising expectations is
yet in evidence in Afghanistan,
and many educated, Afghans main-
tain a guarded cynicism toward
promises of constitutional democ-
racy.~ Moreover, officials
whose careers were tied to au-
thoritarian rule, Moslem re-
ligious leaders, and other con-
servative elements fear the
prospect of the changes that
may follow. Even so, most Af-
ghans clearly favor the changes
made so far.
The most dramatic achieve-
ment of the young regime so far
has been to get the border with
Pakistan reopened. This bene-
fited Afghan merchants and con-
sumers and reduced Afghan de-
pendence on Soviet good will.
King Zahir cannot afford
politically to abandon the Push-
toonistan campaign entirely,
but he is not emotionally com-
mitted to it. He admits that
"some mistakes have been made
by both sides," and. speaks of
having "blunted. the sword."
Kabul's anti-Pakistan propaganda
in fact has been. partially muted
since Zahir took over, and the
King apparently does not intend.
to encourage armed agitation in
Pakistani tribal territory.
Relations with other non-
communist countries, especially
with the United States, have
generally improved. Afghan
officials seem to speak more
freely and frankly with American
representatives than they have
in recent years. An Afghan
parliamentary delegation re-
ported back enthusiastically
about a visit to the iTS last
July.
At the same time the new
government has been careful to
reassure Moscow that it does not
envision any fundamental change
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in Afghanistan's relations with
the USSR. One gesture: the
-King has invited Soviet Presi-
dent Brezhnev to visit Kabul in
October, shortly after he returns
from the US. The new government
presumably wall continue to seek
Soviet economic assistance and
to avoid calling into question
basic Afghan-Soviet relations,
such as have developed through
the Soviet military assistance
program.
The USSR has committed
nearly $500 million worth of
econamic assistance to Afghan-
istan, and the Afghans are
utilizing this aid at the rate
of 40 to 50 million dollars per
year. ,The Afghan economy now
is receiving as much foreign aid
--from both bloc and free world
sources--as it can absorb. The
scope of Soviet aid programs
consequently has not been ex-
panded during the last two years,
although press releases have
been designed to make follow-up
agreements sound like increased
aid. This propaganda, however,
has had the political effect of
affirming Soviet support for
the new government.
Many critics of the Daud
regime had become concerned
over the growth of .the Soviet
presence in Afghanistan, where
there are now over 2,000 Soviet
technicians. However, the main
immediate result of Soviet eco-
nomic assistance has been to
help the Afghan royal family
to strengthen its image as a
benefactor of the people.
The chief danger at present
from the Soviet aid program is
in the possible growth of pro-
Soviet orientation among the
several hundred Afghan army and
air force officers being trained
in the USSR. Soviet intelligence
also must be presumed to have
subverted at least a few of
these trainees.
Zahir is reported. concerned
about the long-run dangers of
possible Soviet inroads in the
officer corps. Nevertheless,
he has reportedly approved. send-
ing same 200 additional officers
to the USSR for training.
The most the King's regime
is likely to do in reducing
its military dependence on the
USSR is to look for alternative
sources of supply for limited.
amounts of equipment and train-
ing. Tentative inquiries have
been directed at the Swedes
about equipment. During his
visit to the US, the King may
show interest in increased mili-
tary training opportunities for
Afghan officers in the United
States.
King Zahir has made it
clear that he does not plan
further expansion of his army,
which in recent years has been
enlarged from 54,000 to about
90,000 men. Since Afghan ap-
petites for. more advanced weap-
ons have already been whetted
by previous deliveries of armor,
jets, and. radar, the King's con-
servative plans could become a
point of friction with the army
and air force. Soviet instructors
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