RUMANIAN SUSCEPTIBILITY TO SOVIET BLOC PRESSURES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A004100060002-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 26, 2006
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: July 19, 1963
• Content Type: REPORT

OCI No. 0289/63A
Copy No. 77
SPECIAL REPORT
226/05/24: CIA-RDP79-00927A00410009400Rd July 1963
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
RUMANIAN SUSCEPTIBILITY TO SOVIET BLOC PRESSURES
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
25X1
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19 July 1963
RUMANIAN SUSCEPTIBILITY TO SOVIET BLOC PRESSURES
Rumania's relations with Moscow and the Eastern Euro-
pean countries face an uncertain future. Their develop-
ment depends to an important degree on how the USst
decides to deal with Bucharest's opposition to cer-
tain Soviet-backed CEMA policies which would limit
Rumania's industrial development. So far efforts
within the CEMA Executive Committee, and at least
two hi h-level efforts by the Russians
have
failed to bring about a change in Rumania's posi-
tion or a compromise. Should Rumania remain ada-
mant, the USSR might eventually feel it necessary
to bring pressures--other than military--to bear,
even at the risk of failure or of damage to its
relations with other European satellites.
Bucharest has been care-
ful until recently to keep its
dispute with Moscow within
close bounds. It has made clear
that it remains committed to
the political and ideological
policies of the Soviet bloc.
By and large the Rumanian re-
gime, as one Rumanian diplomat
recently said, has been "play-
ing games" with Communist China
and Albania to strengthen its
bargaining power vis-a-vis the
other CEMA members.
Within the last month
Bucharest has taken steps that
must have heightened Khrushchev's
concern about the direction in
which the Rumanian regime is
moving. The Rumanian party
daily was the first--and until
14 July the only--one in the So-
viet bloc to publish a summary
of the 14 June Chinese Commu-
nist letter, and on 30 June
party first secretary Gheorg-
hiu-Dej failed to join his satel-
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lite colleagues in attending
the birthday celebration of
East German leader Ulbricht.
Unless Moscow accedes to
Rumanian demands or can achieve
a compromise solution, it
may feel compelled in time to
bring pressure on Bucharest,
if only to assert its authority
before the rest of Eastern
Europe. While the pressure
tactics open to Moscow are
varied, they are either of
limited efficacy or risky from
the point of view of the USSR's
broadest interests. They in-
clude psychological, economic,
clandestine, and military pres-
sures.
It is unlikely that mili-
tary force would be used and
none of the remaining forms of
pressure, either singly or in
combination, would be certain
to bring about what the USSR
would regard as a salutary
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change in the Rumanian attitude.
Moreover, their use could pro-
voke unfavorable reactions else-
where in Eastern Europe, pro-
vide further reason for the
Chinese Communists to attack
the USSR, and weaken the recep-
tiveness of the underdeveloped
countries to Russian overtures.
Initially Russian pressure
on the Rumanians might be in
the form of subtle psychological
snubs such as restriction of
formal diplomatic contacts and
possibly some reduction in
semiofficial party relations.
Furthermore, Moscow might at-
tempt to persuade other bloc
countries to slight the Ruma-
nians--either in their press
and radio, or in other ways.
Some form of polemical. attacks
might follow.
Evidence that Moscow may
already have begun to apply
pressure through the satellites
appeared on 1 July when the
East German party organ omit-
ted any mention of Rumanian
birthday greetings to Ulbricht
in a list of those from the
Soviet bloc under a headline
"Greetings from Friends." In-
stead Bucharest's message ap-
peared the following day sand-
wiched between the Chinese and
North Vietnamese greetings under
the title "Congratulations
From All the World." The East
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Germans were the first to at-
tack Albania openly, in a
speech by Ulbricht in December
1960 to a party central com-
mittee meeting.
Psychological and propa-
ganda pressures of this sort
are none too effective,however,
as has been demonstrated in
the Albanian and Chinese Com-
munist cases. Moreover, in the
case of Rumania, such pressures
might only serve to upset some
of the other Eastern European
countries who can anticipate
that they may find themselves
some day in the same position
as Bucharest.
Economic Sanctions
The USSR is not in a posi-
tion to exert effective eco"
nomic pressure against Rumania
to gain its political ends,
i.e., force it to abandon its
opposition to certain CEMA
policies.
If Moscow were to sever
all or a major portion of its
trade ties with Bucharest, the
Rumanian economy would suffer
considerable temporary setbacks,
but the standard of living
could probably be maintained
not far below current levels.
After a period of retrench-
ment industrial growth would
be resumed. The length and
severity of the retrenchment
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PERCENTAGE
OF TOTAL
RUMANIAN
TRADE
TOTAL FIGURES =
VOLUME OF TRADE
TURNOVER IN
$1,024
1961
~mm~iiiij pi
pprove or eUease'- / 1
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would depend on the extent of
satellite participation in
Soviet-imposed sanctions and
on the amount of Western as-
sistance that could be ob-
tained by Rumania.
Although during the past
three years Rumania has been
rapidly expanding its trade
with Western Europe while re-
ducing its dependence on Mos-
cow, Soviet trade nonetheless
still comprises 40 percent
of Rumania's total foreign
trade. Trade with the entire
Soviet bloc comprises about
two thirds of Rumania's total
foreign trade.
The Galati steel combine,
the country's largest indus-
trial project, is one example
SAILING IN BUCHAREST
The Rumanians Want More
A RUMANIAN RESORT HOTEL
of Bucharest's growing economic
contacts with the West. This
mammoth combine is being built
exclusively with equipment
acquired in the West and is
no doubt designed to reduce
Rumania's reliance on steel
imports from the USSR.
All of the major imports
required by Rumania would be
available in Western markets,
and the potential market in
the West for Rumanian exports
allows the country a consider-
able flexibility in shifting
the direction of its foreign
trade. Although any sudden
and major redirection of ex-
ports would cause significant
economic losses, roughly one
third of the goods which Rumania
currently exports to the Soviet
bloc could be quickly sold in
Western Europe. Within the
first year, Rumania should be
able to sell in the West at
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APOSTOL
A Possible Contender
least 40 percent of the goods
now sold to the Soviet bloc.
No Soviet credits are cur-
rently being drawn upon by Ru-
mania and no commitments for
future credit have been made.
Credits from other European
satellites now being utilized
by Rumania are small and are
not significant in the domestic
investment program.
Clandestine Capabilities
In any effort to promote
a "palace coup" to overthrow
the Rumanian leader, Moscow
would have to cope with a
tightly knit Rumanian hier-
archy which is believed loyal
to Gheorghiu-Dej. Dej, more-
over, is a seasoned politician
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who has skillfully weathered
the Kremlin's many twists and
turns since the late 1940's.
In addition, the Rumanian leader,
in his resistance to CEMA, has
aroused the full support of the
people by appealing to their
nationalism and desire for eco-
nomic well-being.
The presence of numerous
Russian advisers in Rumania,
however, puts the Soviets in a
good position to unseat Gheorgh-
hiu-Dej. From what evidence
exists, Soviet influence in
the Ministry of the Interior
and in the armed forces is ex-
tremely high. In addition,
there is little possibility
that the Rumanian people--un-
like the Hungarians--would en-
gage in an anti-Soviet uprising,
since submissive habits have
GHEORGHIU - DEJ
The Defiant One
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Lvov' CARPATHIAN MILITARY DISTRICT
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been ingrained for centuries
by continued subjection to many
kinds of foreign domination.
The USSR probably would
Y_F>t find it difficult to lo-
cate and exploit a Judas in the
regime leadership. The most
likely candidate would probably
be Gheorghe Apostol, politburo
memuer and deputy premier, who
is reported to be eager to re-
place Dej and waiting for the
right moment.
No matter who might be
chosen, installation of a puppet
to replace Gheorghiu-Dej would
probably result in a serious
split in the party, which could
make it even less responsive to
Soviet wishes.
Military Force
Dej is probably pursuing
his case in the realization
that Khrushchev would not wish
to unleash troops on Rumania
because of the disastrous ef-
fect this would have on world-
wide Communist and non-Commu-
nist opinion.
Given Khrushchev's intem-
perate nature, however, some
sudden decision to use force
cannot be ruled out. In this
case, the USSR could quickly
move in some of the 23 divisions
now stationed in Hungary and in
the Carpathian and Odessa mili-
tary districts. The Black Sea
Fleet and sizable tactical air
elements could also be quickly
brought to bear.
No Soviet troop units have
been stationed in Rumania-since
July 1958. The Soviet military
liaison mission in Bucharest,
however, with six general of-
ficers and at least 30 other high-
ranking Soviet officers, has a
direct hand in major Rumanian
army policy decisions. It
seems unlikely that Rumanian
forces would resist a Soviet
invasion.
Bucharest will continue
to exploit Moscow's need for
support in the Sino-Soviet
dispute as it tries to gain
acceptance for its position
in CEMA and to retain the
right of independent national
economic planning. Unless
Moscow offers concessions,
a course it may be contem-
plating, no easy solution is
likely.
lsucn otters
may a made at the next meet-
ing of Soviet bloc first
secretaries, reportedly to
be held in Moscow late this
month.
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