WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A004100060001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 29
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Sequence Number: 1
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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*0~ *464
19 July 1963
p No, 7 7
WEEKLY SUMMARY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
State Dept. review completed
d 1,
Oki
0
GROUP I Excluded from automatic
downgrading and declassification
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SECRET
(Information as of 1200 EDT, 18 July 1963)
MOSCOW TEST BAN TALKS
Belgian Foreign Minister Spaak received the im-
pression from Khrushchev that Moscow will not insist
that a partial test ban is contingent on the simul-
taneous signing of a NATO-Warsaw Pact nonaggression
treaty.
SINO-SOVIET TALKS DRAG ON
A complete deadlock has clearly developed, with
each side trying to make it appear that the other
is bent on disrupting Communist unity.
HANOI SHIFTS TOWARD PEIPING IN SINO-SOVIET DISPUTE
The July issue of North Vietnam's party journal
carries an attack on Khrushchev's policies.
PROSPECTS FOR COMMUNIST CHINA'S EARLY GRAIN CROP
The early grain harvest, which normally accounts for
about a fourth of total grain production, may be
smaller than last year.
CHINESE WRITERS GET IDEOLOGICAL GUIDELINES
The Chinese leaders apparently are attempting to
apply even stiffer controls than those already in
effect.
SOVIET RELATIONS WITH INDONESIA
The USSR appears to have granted Indonesia a
50-percent reduction in its annual debt payment
rather than the complete moratorium requested.
SECRET
19 July 63 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
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SECRET
KIM GAINS IN SOUTH KOREAN POWER STRUGGLE
The junta leader has given more authority to the
group behind former security chief Kim Chong-pil
and paved the way for his return from abroad.
BUDDHISTS TO MOUNT PRESSURE IN SOUTH VIETNAM
A decision by Buddhist leaders to increase pressure
on the government may bring intensified efforts by
various groups to overthrow Diem.
DEVELOPMENTS IN LAOS
Political and military sparring
and anti-Communists continues.
of Communist preparations for a
AREA NOTES
Iraq, Soviet Bloc - Syria
EUROPE
between the Communists
There are some signs
new offensive.
COMMON MARKET DEVELOPMENTS
The Common Market Council's agreement to open formal
contacts with Britain through the WEU removes a
source of friction on the continent.
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC
Dissatisfaction among certain military leaders with
President Bosch seems to be increasing, and he may
be heading for a collision with his most dangerous
potential political opponent.
BRITISH GUIANA DEVELOPMENTS
Prospects for agreement on a coalition government
are poor.
MILITARY TAKEOVER IN ECUADOR
The military junta which took over on 11 July was
in complete control within a few days.
19 July 63 CURRENT INTELLIGEENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
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SECRET
WESTERN HEMISPHERE (continued) Page
ARGENTINE PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE ILLIA 17
Although Illia had little national standing before
the campaign for the 7 July elections, he is
widely respected in his own and in other parties.
SECRET
19 July 63 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Page iii
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SECRET
MOSCOW TEST-BAN TALKS
Khrushchev's decision to
attend the 15 July opening of
the talks on a nuclear test
ban reflects the importance
the USSR attaches to these ne-
gotiations. His decision was
publicized on the eve of the
talks after Moscow had made a
series of gestures designed to
create a favorable atmosphere
for the Harriman-Hailsham mis-
sion. Since the talks began,
Moscow has maintained strict
secrecy on the details of the
discussions. The Soviet press,
however, has front-paged the
brief daily communiques noting
the "favorable atmosphere" at
the conference table.
Prior to the opening of
the talks the Soviet press car-
ried a spate of articles pegged
to the negotiations. The tone
of this press commentary was
generally optimistic, although
the authors issued the usual
warnings about "certain circles,"
particularly in West Germany
and the Pentagon, which seek to
obstruct agreement.
In his 8 July talk with
Belgian Foreign Minister Spaak,
Khrushchev conveyed the impres-
sion to the former NATO secre-
tary general that Moscow is not
making agreement on a partial
test ban contingent on the
simultaneous signing of a NATO -
Warsaw Pact nonaggression treaty.
Spaak told the NATO Council
on 12 July that while the Soviet
leader mentioned a nonaggres-
sion treaty, "it did not seem
to be of particular importance"
to him. Spaak stated that al-
though Khrushchev favored the
The Communist World
"idea," he was not as enthusias-
tic as Spaak had expected he
would be.
Spaak further noted that
the subject of disarmament was
the "most positive part" of the
conversation. According to
Spaak, Khrushchev appeared to
think it would be possible to
conclude a partial test-ban
agreement which excluded under-
ground testing.
The impressions Spaak re-
ceived appear to be supported
by an article in the 13 July
Moscow News, the Soviet English-
anguage weekly. According to
Ambassador Kohler, the article--
by E. Fyodorov, a former mem-
ber of the Soviet delegation
to the US-UK-USSR talks on a
test ban in Geneva--makes
"clearer than any statement
heretofore" that Moscow has
dropped its previous insistence
that a moratorium on under-
ground testing accompany a
partial test-ban accord and
that Soviet leaders do not in-
tend to insist on the simulta-
neous signing of a nonaggres-
sion pact and a partial test-
ban agreement.
The US ambassador noted
that Fyodorov focused on the
test-ban issue and treated the
nonaggression issue "casually"
as another proposal which would
"really make it possible to
lessen international tension."
Fyodorov argued that Khru-
shchev's 2 July proposal would
ban "all tests which can be
detected without the slightest
doubt."
SECRET
19 July 63 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
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CHRONOLOGY OF SINO-SOVIET TALKS
(MOSCOW TIME)
5 July
1430
Chinese arrive Vnukovo Airport
1630
- 1830
Preliminary meeting
Evening dinner given by Suslov
6 July
1000
Day's discussions opened
Length of sessions undetermined
7 July
Both sides take Sunday off
Chinese hold rally in Peiping honoring expelled
personnel
Day's discussions opened
Length of sessions undetermined
Soviet central committee attacks Chinese
9 July
Day-long recess taken
Chinese party issues reply to CPSU statement
10 July
1000
- 1300
Talks resume
1500
- 1700
Substantive issues rumored to have been discussed
for the first time
Concurrent meeting between lower level assistants
12 July
1000
Day's discussions opened
Length of session undetermined
14 July
People's Daily editorial provides first comment on
talks and attacks Soviets.
Both sides take Sunday off
15 July
1000
- 1330
CPSU open letter in Pravda attacks Chinese.
Talks resume
16 July
East-West test ban talks open in Moscow
Day-long recess taken
17 July
1000
Day's discussions opened
Length of session undetermined
Day-long recess taken
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SECRET W
Despite the increasingly
virulent and direct insults and
accusations from each party in
public, the secret Sino-Soviet
talks continue. During the
two weeks since the talks started
a distinct pattern has emerged:
four days of meetings a week
are spaced out by three days
in which the delegations work
individually. The Chinese
delegation has gone to the Chi-
nese Embassy on each of these
days of recess, apparently to
report to, and receive instruc-
tions from, Peiping.
Since a complete deadlock
has clearly developed in the
talks, their continuation indi-
cates the importance each side
attaches to not being the party
responsible for shattering this
last thin appearance of "unity."
Each side continues, however, to
make it appear that the other is
bent on disrupting the unity.
The Soviet central committee
letter of 14 July pointedly noted
that the "CCP representatives at
the meeting continue to aggravate
the situation." The 13 July
People's Daily: editorial, Pei-
ping s first and to date only
comment on the talks, accused
the Soviets of closing out the
negotiations before they even
started by "categorically re-
jecting" the views offered in
the 14 June Chinese letter and
stated "with heavy heart" that
the talks have not been con-
ducted calmly with a view to
easing relations.
The Soviet party, while
still unwilling to take the
first step in formalizing the
open rupture in their relations,
apparently has decided to try
to provoke the Chinese into
this action. Its 14 July letter
was the harshest possible con-
demnation short of a formal
break in relations. Directly
accusing the Chinese leaders of
virtually every major sin in
the Communist moral code, the
letter frankly deserted Marxist
argumentation in favor of a
strongly emotional appeal built
upon distortions of Chinese
positions.
The Chinese appear willing
to face the consequences of a
break if the Soviets cause it,
but they seem to feel that a
continuation of the present
situation is in their favor.
Their reiteration in the 13 July
editorial that further bilateral
talks could be held if one session
failed to resolve differences
suggests that they may be attempt-
ing in the talks to get the So-
viet party to agree to hold.
talks at some future but unspeci-
fied date, perhaps in Peiping.
SECRET
19 July 63
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vw~ SECRET W
The editorial went so far as to
assert that if differences can-
not be resolved this year, "they
can wait until next year."
The Soviet party may be
preparing further actions de-
signed to demonstrate Chinese
isolation and to,pre-empt a
probable Chinese demand for an
international Communist meeting
similar to those held in 1957
and 1960. The USSR clearly
does not want another meeting
that would give the Chinese a
platform for polemical attacks,
but ; a.t might sponsor one ' of
"f riend]ry" Communist parties
which could be relied on to
demonstrate overwhelming
port for Moscow within the world
Communist movement.
SECRET
19 July 63 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
The first secretaries of
all CEMA countries are reportedly
to gather in Moscow on 25 July,
and Hungarian leader Kadar and
Mongolian leader Tsendenbal have
already arrived..
A handy occasion for
25X1
25X1
the soviets to give an ostenta-
tious welcome to representatives
of the majority of parties of the
world which support them would be
the 60th-anniversary on 30 July
of the~party..congress'in which
Lenin led his so-called "majority" 25X1
--the Bolsheviks--into a split with
with the "minorit "--the Menshe-
v iks .
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HO CHI-MINH AND LIU SHAG-CHI DURING LIU'S MAY VISIT TO HANOI
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SECRET
The Communist World
HANOI SHIFTS TOWARD PEIPING IN SINO-SOVIET DISPUTE
Propelled by a combination
of external and internal pres-
sures, North Vietnam is apparently
discarding its pose of neutrality
in the Sino-Soviet conflict and
moving more openly to Peiping's
side. The July issue of its
party journal contains what is
for Hanoi a very strong attack
on Khrushchev's policies. It
was studded with Chinese formula-
tions and has been followed by a
comthentary in Hanoi's party news-
paper endorsing Chinese Communist
and North Korean condemnations of
the recent pro-Soviet World
Women's Congress in Moscow.
The North Vietnamese have
also joined North Korea in openly
attacking the validity of Mos-
cow-ordered economic specializa-
tion within the bloc. In a re-
cently translated 18 May speech,
militant party first secretary
Le Duan asserted Hanoi's inten-
tion to develop an all-round
economy based on heavy industry
and go it alone, if necessary,
in achieving this goal. Duan
flatly rejected a suggestion
apparently made by the USSR
that North Vietnam should "trans-
form its economy into a rural
area of the socialist camp" along
the lines of Moscow's "Asian
Socialist Republics." Others of
Duan's remarks suggest that Hanoi
has reached the point where it
is willing to countenance what-
ever Soviet economic pressure
might result from North Vietnam-
ese support of Chinese positions.
have probably been the strongest
factor in forcing Hanoi off the
fence. It clearly fears that
any Soviet-US political agree-
ments (as, for example, a nuclear
test ban) would seriously under-
cut external Communist support
of the Viet Cong insurrection
in South Vietnam--the success
of which is a prime national ob-
jective for Hanoi. With South
Vietnam doubtless in mind, the
party journal denounced Commu-
nistsso cowed by the fear of nu-
clear war that they will not go
all-out in conflicts where the
US chooses to use only conven-
tional weapons.
Hanoi's shift toward the
Chinese probably also reflects
a growth in the influence of the
extremist wing of North Vietnam-
ese party leaders. Possibly en-
couraged by Chinese pressure,
the pro-Peiping views of this
faction have become increasingly
open during the last few months,
while the wing of the party that
is inclined to favor Soviet views
has largely fallen silent.
The North Vietnamese have
traditionally demonstrated a
strong concern over the potentially
dire effects of a bloc split on
world communism, and such fears
doubtless continue to play a
major role in their thinking.
They have always shown a pench-
ant for temperate language, and
it is likely that the tones of
their propaganda on the dispute
will remain less harsh than North
Moscow's recent moves to-
ward apparent closer cooperation
and partial detente with the US
Korea's blatantl ro-Chinese
comments.
SECRET
19 July 63 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
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EASTERN
COMMUNIST CHINA
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SECRET
China's early grain harvest
may be even smaller than the
poor early crop brought in last
year. However, the early har-
vest normally accounts for only
a fourth of total grain produc-
tion, and the final level of
the 1963 harvest will depend on
weather conditions during the
remainder of the growing season.
Peiping's earlier optimism prob-
ably has been dimmed by the bad
weather over the past two months,
but it is not likely to make any
such admission as long as the
Sino-Soviet talks in Moscow
continue.
Since last fall Communist
China has suffered periods of
severe cold over large areas,
prolonged drought in the south,
and unseasonal heavy rains in
the east and central regions.
Prospects for the early rice
crop, which accounts for about
half the early grain harvest, are
worse than last year. Drought
conditions reduced both acreage
and yield in most of Kwangtung,
Fukien, Yunnan, Kweichow, and
southern Hunan. June rains in
Fukien were probably too late to
benefit the early rice crop.
Along the Yangtze River in
central China, floods in April
and May impeded transplanting,
and there were frequent reports
of seed rot and insect damage.
Conditions appear more favorable
in the important rice-producing
areas of the Szechwan Basin.
The winter wheat crop now
being harvested is not likely
to be much larger than last
year's, although moisture con-
ditions have been more favorable.
The acreage involved is probably
abnormally low again this year,
and damage from unseasonal cold
reportedly extended as far south
as northern Anhwei. Heavy rain-
fall caused severe damage to the
wheat in north, central, and
east China and in large areas
of Honan. The regime expects
only a "fair" crop in Shantung
but a relatively good one in
Szechwan.-
SECRET
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SECRET The Communist World
The Chinese leaders apparently
are attempting to apply even stiffer
controls than those under which
writers must now suffer. Concerned
that the more temperate approach to
society's problems instituted after
the collapse of the "great leap for-
ward" in 1960 has reduced militancy
and revolutionary elan in the coun-
try, the regime for several months
has been telling writers that they
should be propagating its ideologi-
cal viewpoints more fervently.
This was the central theme of
a national cultural conference this
spring, at which Chou En-lai and
other speakers demanded of the writ-
ers that they so infuse their work
with ideological content that it
will play a militant role in the
"class struggle" under way both at
home and abroad.
World Communist ideological
problems were a major topic at the
conference. The "degeneration" that
Peiping finds in "world socialist"
literature was held up itm ridicule and
severely condemned. Chinese writers
were told not only to keep bourgeois
and revisionist "nonsense" out of
their work but to step up their at-
tacks on "modern revisionism," the
Chinese term for Soviet ideological
and cultural viewpoints.
The conference also demonstrated
the regime's acute sensitivity to
China's disastrous economic situa-
tion. In describing the domestic
scene, writers are to soft-pedal the
regime's material accomplishments
and not to stress, for example, how
well everybody eats under the com-
mune system. Instead they are to
emphasize the social evils that
existed in pre-Communist society,
the current dangers of capitalist
and bourgeois influences in so-
ciety, and the bright future ahead.
Chinese writers have not only
the content of their work prescribed
for them, but the style as well.
Thus they have been enjoined to em-
ulate the "lively, fresh, and vig-
orous" writing of Mao Tse-tung
rather than strive for high liter-
ary quality or original style. Ex-
amples of bad and good styles of
poetry were recently cited by Tao
Chu, a dynamic and colorful re-
gional boss. Tao criticized people
who found beauty in the lines, "As
the music fades, the player van-
ishes, leaving only a few green
peaks in the river." He asked the
writers to compare these "sterile
lines",rwith Mao's style: ' "The
tall peaks tower above, the red
flag flutters in the wind."
The new restrictive policies
are rapidly being imposed. Pei-
ping's daily for intellectuals an-
nounced on 9 June that it was sus-
pending publication of its regular
literary feature page because of
its ideological shortcomings.
In justification of its further
tightening of literary discipline,
the regime has accused some writers of
insufficient loyalty to Peiping's
brand of socialism. This may re-
flect the existence of underground
and unpublished writings, since no
literature remotely critical of the
regime has appeared in print since
the short-lived Hundred Flowers move-
ment of 1957. For most Chinese writ-
ers, already docile and well-disci-
plined propagandists, the new guide-
lines, while useful for laying bare
the latest zigzag in propaganda pol-
icy, will serve chiefly to throttle
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19 July 63
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SECRET
The USSR's "sympathetic"
response to an Indonesian re-
quest to adjust annual debt pay-
ments appears to have taken the
form of a 50-percent reduction
rather than the complete mora-
torium requested. At the same
time, however, the USSR agreed
to permit Djakarta to import,
on credit, Soviet goods normally
paid for on receipt. Transac-
tions under this plan will be
financed from the $40 million
remaining unobligated under the
$250-million line of credit made
available in 1960.
Heretofore, Indonesia has
accrued some funds to meet its
debt obligation to Moscow by
limiting its imports from and
expanding its exports to the
USSR. Now, under the new credit
arrangement, Indonesia probably
can meet /its repayment obliga-
tion out of current exports to
the USSR without a drain on its
cash reserves. It may also try
to postpone a financial.crisis
by relying on the USSR for some
goods it now buys from other
suppliers for cash.
It is not yet clear that
Indonesia's other Communist cred-
itors will follow the Soviet
lead.
The total
Indonesian debt to the bloc now
stands at about $950 million,
Indonesia now owes the USSR
about $725 million and other bloc
countries and China about $230
million. The schedule under
the original credit terms called
for payments of about $75 mil-
lion a year in 1963 and 1964,
the Soviet share amounting to
just over half the payments in
each year.
In responding to Indonesia's
request, Moscow apparently had
to balance its desire for repay-
ment according to schedule--
in order to avoid complaints
from other aid recipients--
against its recognition that
the large quantities of arms
urged on Indonesia had been far
beyond Djakarta's capacity to
pay.
For its part, Indonesia,
which had blindly accepted
accelerated deliveries of arms
during the West Irian crisis,
has since attempted to restrict
Soviet military deliveries. The
emphasis now is placed on train-
ing in the use of military equip-
ment already in Indonesia and on
spare parts to maintain such
equipment.
SECRET
19 July 63 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE ?WEEKLY SUMMARY
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SECRET
KIM GAINS IN SOUTH KOREAN POWER STRUGGLE
In reshuffling major posts
in the South Korean regime,
junta leader Pak Chong-hui has
concentrated power in the group
behind former security chief
Kim Chong-pil, and paved the way
for Kim's return from semi-exile
abroad.
The most significant change
announced on 12 July was the
appointment of Kim Hyong-uk, one
of Kim Chong-pills strongest
supporters, as director of the
South Korean Central Intelligence
Agency.
The shifting of
another Kim Chong-pil stalwart,
Chang Kyong-sun, to the chairman-
ship of the steering committee
of the Supreme Council for
National Reconstruction places
two hard-headed, ambitious
men with an anti-American bias
in key positions.
Kim's followers, who advo-
cate authoritarian and repressive
measures to keep the junta in
power, have exerted increasing
pressure for his return. The
way is now clear for Pak to bring
back his former right-hand man
at any opportune time.
Pak and Kim share a belief
in the need for strong measures
but Pak has been restrained by
concern over possible adverse
American reaction.
Civilian opponents of mili-
tary rule are likely to inter-
pret the rising influence of
Kim Chong-pills faction as proof
that the regime intends to rig
the elections, if they are held
at all. This may stimulate
moves toward opposition unity.
Three civilian parties announced
on 1.5 July that they were merging
to oppose Pak's presidential
candidacy. They might seek the
support of military elements
hostile to Kim Chong-pil.
SECRET
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SECRET
BUDDHISTS TO MOUNT PRESSURE IN SOUTH VIETNAM
A decision by Buddhist
leaders to step up pressure on
the government may have the
result of intensifying efforts
by various groups within the
government to overthrow Presi-
dent Diem. In announcing this
decision, the Buddhists charged
that the government had failed
to honor its 16 June agreement
to end religious discrimination.
They asserted that intimidation
of monks in the provinces was
continuing and that the terms
of the agreement were not being
extended equally to all Buddhist
sects.
Public demonstrations re-
sumed on 16 July with a gather-
ing of monks before the American
ambassador's residence in Saigon.
The demonstrators appealed for
"free world and US" intervention
and claimed that American weap-
ons were being used to suppress
Buddhism. Buddhist plans al-
legedly include further hunger
strikes and self-sacrifices by
burning or disembowelment.
A number of monks and nuns,
including the mother of a rank-
ing South Vietnamese scientist
and ambassador, are said to
have volunteered for suicide.
Diem apparently feels,
with some justification, that
continuing Buddhist agitation
is aimed at forcing a change of
government. There are signs
that he may react forcefully,
ordering police to curb demon-
strations, to interfere with
suicide attempts, or to make
arrests if suicides or disorders
occur. Ambassador Nolting has
reported that Diem seems tired,
resentful of what he regards
as misrepresentations and cal-
umnies against his regime,
and torn by conflicting pres-
sures and advice on handling
the Buddhist issue.
SECRET
19 July 63 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
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,, (d Placing Saly
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-,--+--r Railroad
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f? aMu: pien P'ingkuob~~~?OA
.. - (nPien (Kuo-te)
.. -* -nmg-mmg
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DEVELOPMENTS IN LAOS
Political and military
sparring continues between the
Communist and anti-Communist
factions. Discussions in
Vientiane between representa-
tives of the two groups remain
snagged on security arrange-
ments for projected talks at
the Plaine des Jarres airfield
between Premier Souvanna and
Pathet Lao leader Souphannou-
vong. While some compromise
agreement on this aspect may
be worked out, the intransi-
gent attitude shown by the
Pathet Lao in these advance
talks provides little room for
optimism over chances for a
wider negotiated settlement.
In demanding withdrawal of
rightist troops from the en-
virons of the Plaine des
Jarres airfield as a prereq-
uisite for- talks there, the
Pathet Lao are aiming at one
of their foremost objectives:
the cutting off of rightist
military and supply support for
Souvanna's beleaguered neutral-
ist forces..
Military action for the
past several weeks has been
light, consisting primarily of
sporadic artillery duels in
the Plaine des Jarres area.
There are signs, however, of
continuing preparations by the
Communist forces for increased
offensive action. There has
been persistent convoy activity
along the main roads feeding
into Laos from North Vietnam.
North Vietnam's shift toward
Peiping in the ideological dis-
pute with Moscow could portend
a more aggressive role in Laos--
and, via the eastern corridor
area of Laos, in South Vietnam
as well.
The rightist
and neutralist
factions, meanwhile, are attempt-
ing to strengthen
their
defenses.
While backstopping
the
neutral-
ists in the Plaine
des
Jarres
remains a priority task, General
Phoumi seems alert to the danger
of overcommitting his forces
in that area to the detriment
of defense of southern Laos where
a build-up of Pathet Lao and
North Vietnamese forces continues.
The key towns of Attopeu and
Saravane.particularl are under
Communist threat.
Another important effort
under way is the rehabilitation
of Souvanna's neutralist mili-
tary establishment, which has
been seriously weakened by long-
standing supply problems and
inefficient organization.
Souvanna, in consultation with
General Phoumi, recently estab-
lished a special staff in
Vientiane to coordinate all
aid to the neutralist forces.
Kong Le's expected departure
abroad for medical treatment may
facilitate reform measures con-
templated by this new staff under
the leadership of General Amkha,
a professional officer of long
experience. Kong Le, although
a symbol of neutralist resist-
ance to Communist pressure, has
shown serious limitations as
a senior commander.
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Iraq: The Baathist regime
is now including Christians in
its policy of reprisal against
hostile elements in the Kurdish
area.
Six Christians with Com-
munist affiliation were shot
in Iraq's largest Christian
village on 2 July, with the
whole village forced to witness
the execution. A large number
of clerics were arrested for
burying the dead and the church
was closed. During the same
week five Christian villages
were destroyed by aerial
bombing. Because of.past regime
actions against them, many
Christians have come to feel
that their only hope for sur-
vival lies in cooperating with
the Kurds. Two to four thou-
sand of Iraq's 300,000 Chris-
tians are already said to be
supporting Mulla Mustafa al-
Barzani and these latest actions
will force even more into active
opposition to the government.
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19 July 63
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Page 12
Soviet Bloc - Syria: Clan-
destine radio programs from
the Soviet bloc have now begun
to attack the Syrian Baathist
regime and have accused it of
carrying out bombing raids
against Iraqi Kurds. Since the
8 March coup, the Baathist
regime has refrained from attack-
ing the bloc and has not emulated
its Iraqi brethren's all-out
repression of local Communists.
Nevertheless, a bloc broadcast
has charged the Syrian Baath-
ists with carrying.out "torture
operations" against "democratic"
forces in Syria, wrecking the
land reform program, and sell-
ing themselves to the imperial-
ists.
Simultaneously, bloc
clandestine broadcasts to Turkey
have for the first time since
the outbreak of war in Kurd-
istan accused Turkey of oppress-
ing its Kurdish minority.'
The broadcast was not directly
tied to the Iraqi Kurdish
rebellion.
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COMMON MARKET DEVELOPMENTS
The agreement to open formal
contacts with Britain reached by
the Common Market Council at its
10-11 July meeting has raised cau-
tious hopes that progress may be
resuming within the community.
There is no expectation. that the
agreement will lead to early talks
on Britain's actual membership,
but it does remove a source of
friction which had become a reason
--as well as an excuse--for delay-
ing decisions on other issues.
Both the French and the "other
five" appear to have given ground
in reaching the compromise to con-
sult with the British,in quarterly
seven-nation meetings of the (West-
ern European Union (WEU) . These
meetings will be outside the com-
munity's institutional framework
and far less frequent than the
!'five" had wanted. However, it is
apparently the understood purpose
of these meetings "to prevent a
widening of the gap between the UK
and the EEC." The "European eco-
nomic situation" will be a perma-
nent agenda item, and when it comes
up for discussion the EEC Commis-
sion will participate.
How much practical effect
these arrangements will have will
depend--as the US mission has ob-
served--on how much both sides put
into them. Neither Macmillan nor
any possible Conservative successor
appears in position to undertake
a major European initiative during
the term of the present Parliament,
and Britain's Labor Party leader-
ship remains generally cool toward
the EEC. Among the Common Market
countries, even Britain's most
ardent friends appear to anticipate
no more than a holding operation.
The compromise on Britain is
primarily significant therefore as
additional evidence that, despite
its serious problems, the com-
munity may be recovering some of
the momentum it lost when the UK-
EEC accession talks collapsed in
January. On 1 July the member
countries effected without diffi-
culty another of the periodic tar-
iff adjustments which have brought
the EEC approximately two thirds
of the way toward a full customs
union--well ahead of the treaty
schedule. Moreover, the proposals
recently advanced by the EEC Com-
mission for coordinating national
monetary, fiscal, and budgetary
policies are of considerable im-
portance and prospects are favor-
able for their early approval.
While the agricultural problem con-
tinues to be vexing, the EEC Com-
mission is at least showing signs
of attempting to find a "community
solution"--as the EEC treaty in-
tended it to do.
These limited gains, however,
have not yet made the EEC an easy
entity to deal with--as the effort
to organize the Kennedy Round of
tariff negotiations continues to
demonstrate. In recognition of
the EEC's difficulties over farm
policy, the talks on how to or-
ganize the bargaining on freer
trade in agricultural products have
been postponed until fall. A de-
fault is also in prospect with re-
gard to agreement on the tariff
negotiating plan for trade in the
industrial sector for which the
GATT ministerial meeting last May
fixed a 1 August deadline. The
EEC has seemed to feel under no
great pressure to keep to this sched-
ule, and while comparatively more
forthcoming in recent weeks, its
views on such substantive issues 25X1
as the old tariff disparities ques-
tion still sharply diverge from those
of the US.
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Western Hemisphere
Dissatisfaction among cer-
tain military leaders with
Dominican President Juan Bosch
seems to be increasing, and he,
also may be heading for a colli-
sion with his most dangerous
potential political opponent.
Bosch's current diffi-
culties began on 9 July, when
leaders of his Dominican Re-
volutionary Party (PRD) in the
Senate initiated., with biparti-
san support, a bill which
would remove Bosch's most feared
opponent, Antonio Imbert, and
Luis Amiama Tio--the only sur-
vivors of the group that assas-
sinated Trujillo--from the po-
lice general start. The bill
would also severely reduce the
powers of police chief Belisario
Peguero, an Imbert crony. Bosch
has hitherto avoided a direct
attempt to curb Imbert's in-
fluence on the police, but PRD
congressional leaders, apparently
encouraged by aggressive party
president Angel Miolan, decided
to force the issue.
The bill could provoke a
reaction against Bosch by Imbert
and his friends. Bosch himself
seems to fear this since he is
lukewarm toward the bill, which
would give effect to the provi-
sion of the new constitution
which makes him commander-in-
chief of the police. He is
probably also piqued at Con-
gress' invasion of his decision-
making domain. He probably
distrusts the intentions of
Miolan and his followers.
Miolan, a would-be successor to
Bosch, would like to establish
the PRD permanently as the
dominant political force in
the country.
The tension generated by
the police bill has been
heightened by coup rumors re-
sulting from a private meeting
of Bosch with leaders of the
armed forces at their request
on 13 July.
The public
clamor arising from the inci-
dent compelled General Victor
Elby Vinas Roman, minister of
the armed forces, to call a
press conference to deny ru-
mors of military plotting.
US Embassy officials at
Santo Domingo consider these
rumors highly exaggerated,
but the situation is uneasy.
In addition to the potential
threat to Bosch from an angry
Imbert, and from extreme anti-
Communists in the armed forces,
restlessness among certain mili-
tary leaders has increased as
a result of recent congressional
discussion of moves to end
widespread corruption in the
armed forces.
Prolongation or an increase
in these stresses might push
Bosch, who is inclined to over-
react to pressure, to take some
precipitate action. He might
even consider resigning if faced
with an ultimatum by the armed
forces.
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Western Hemisphere
Although Premier Jagan and
opposition leader Forbes Burnham
have agreed to continue talks
on, Colonial Secretary Sandys'
proposal for a coalition govern-
ment, prospects for any agree-
ment are poor. Sandys declared
in Parliament on 17 July, after
a brief visit to the colony, that
if the leaders of the two warring
racial groups failed to reach
agreement, the British Government
would have to settle outstanding
issues on its own authority.
petroleum supplies from this
source once these were sold.
Permits for the distribution
of Western oil now on hand are
being denied so that the govern-
ment can make a profit from
selling its bloc supplies.
The government will have
a deficit of over $5.5 million
by the end of August. Jagan
is seeking a loan from Britain
and in a cordial conversation
with the US consul general on
17 July again inquired about
the possibility of US aid.
Sandys also said he intended
to reconvene a conference on the
colony's future constitution and
independence date not later than
October. Burnham told the consul
general a few days ago he expected
that the talks would achieve
nothing beyond convincing London
of the necessity of imposing a
referendum on proportional repre-
sentation. Jagan's refusal to
concede opposition demands for
proportional representation was
the central reason for the break-
up of the previous conference
last November. Governor Grey
told the consul general that the
trip had made Sandys realize how
confused the colony's situation
is.
An additional shipment of
Soviet-supplied petroleum prod-
ucts arrived on a Cuban tanker,
the Cuba, on 15 July, but a
regime spokesman claimed they
would not import additional
The Soviet vessel Mitshurinsk
sailca from Havana on 15 July, 25X1
bound for Georgetown with flour
and other unidentified cargo.
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THE CUADOREAI\ JUNTA
RAMON
CASTRO
J IJON
Junta leader, had been top officer of the
Ecuadorean Navy. Supported Arosemena
against military critics who favored coup
in May 1962. Anti-Communist, oppor-
tunistic, nd
does little work. According to the US
ambassador, he is easily influenced and
unlikely to be a strong personality.
Had been functional senator for the armed
forces and head of the Ecuadorean War
Academy. Distinguished career in the
army, has served as military attache in
Argentina and Chile. Reported to be
intelligent and cultured. The US
ambassador reports Gandara has real
stature both in and outside the armed
forces and is likely to be influential in
the junta.
MARCOS GANDARA
ENRIQUEZ
GUILLERMO FREILE POSSO
Had been commanding general of the
Ecuadorean Air Force. Attended let
school in England and staff school in
the US.
He can
be expected to see opportunities to
enhance his position in the junta.
attache in Peru 1960-62. Toured army LUIS
installations in US in 1963. The US
ambassador considers him anti-Communist, CABRERA
pro-American, honest, dedicated to consti-
ity, but unlikely to be forceful or decisive.
tutional SEVI LLA
Had been commanding officer of the
Ecuadorean Army. Commanded various
military regions 1953-58. Military
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Western Hemisphere
MILITARY TAKEOVER IN ECUADOR
A military junta took over
the government of Ecuador in a
near-bloodless coup on 11 July,
sending President Arosemena and
Vice President Varea into exile.
Within a few days, the
junta was in complete control of
the country. It has outlawed
the Communist Party and rounded
up about 150 Communists and
leftist extremists. Appointment
of a mixed military-civilian
cabinet is nearly complete and
the junta has issued a call for
a constituent assembly to approve
a new and "more liberal" con-
stitution. The junta has pub-
licly declared its intention to
return the nation to an elected
civilian government in less
than two years.
Reactions to the new junta
range from enthusiastic approval
by parties of the right and
center to guarded acceptance by
the parties of the democratic
left. Communists and leftist
extremists stated their opposi-
tion immediately after the coup,
but their efforts to organize
demonstrations and a general
strike have been thwarted.
According to press reports,
Pedro Saad, secretary general
of the Communist Party (PCE),
and other high ranking PCE
officials were arrested on 15
July. An "activist" faction is
now in control of the PCE, al-
though the leaders are in hid-
ing, and it may attempt terror-
ist acts and possibly guerrilla-
type action. The armed forces
can contain and eventually de-
stroy any guerrilla units the
extremists are presently capable
of putting into action, but con-
trol of urban terrorism will
be a continuing problem.
The members of the new
junta disclaim any desire for
personal political aggrandize-
ment. According to the US am-
bassador, however, several of
the known members of the new
government are opportunists,
and may in time fall out with
their less venal colleagues.
With the exception of'
Venezuela and Costa Rica, most
Latin American nations seem to
be ready to recognize the new
government.
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19 July 63
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Western Hemisphere
ARGENTINE PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE ILLIA
Dr. Arturo Umberto Illia is
the leading candidate for elec-
tion by the presidential electors
.on 31 July. Illia (pronounced
Eel-yee-ah) is highly respected
for ibis political integrity both
by his own People's Radical Civic
Union (UCRP) and by opposition
party leaders.
Until the campaign for the
7 July general elections, Illia
had little national standing,
having concentrated his political
activities for the past 35 years
in central Cordoba Province.
He came into national prominence
in the 18 March 1962 elections,
when he was the only UCRP candi-
date to win a gubernatorial post.
Illia, a practicing physi-
cian, was born in 1900 in
Pergamino, Province of Buenos
Aires
jt11ia has been in local
politics since 1936. In 1948
he was elected a national deputy,
serving until 1952. He was
acting as a member of the UCRP
national committee when on 10
March 1963 a national assembly
of party leaders elected him
UCRP presidential candidate.
Illia adheres closely to
the traditional nationalistic
Radical party platform with,
some modifications. He has
long been an advocate of the
decentralization of political
power and responsibility. Up-
holding the UCRP platform, Illia
advocates annulling the petroleum
contracts--many with US companies--
which ex-President Frondizi
negotiated to help develop oil
resources.
Illia admires the US, and
has stated publicly on at least
one occasion that he considers
the US "truly democratic." He
felt that US policy was wrong
in forcing Cuba out of the OAS
--believing Castro wanted to
escape the bonds of inter-
American treaties--but believes
the October 1962 crisis was a
victory for the free world. He
believes that Communism must be
fought with ideas and deeds,
and has stated publicly that
as president he would permit
the Argentine Communist Party
to operate legally.
Illia has consistently
worked for reunification of the
UCRP and the Intransigent Rad-
ical Civic Union (UCRI), which
split in 1957 over the issue of
Frondizi.'s leadership. UCRI
leaders have already made over-
tures for cooperation looking
to unification of the two parties.
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