WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A004000120001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 31
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 3, 2009
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 7, 1963
• Content Type: SUMMARY

*01110 I v une 19Fi.
OCI No. 0283/63
Copy No. 78
WEEKLY SUMMARY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
State Dept. review
completed.
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
ARCHIVAL RECORD
PLEASE RETURN TO
AGENCY ARC?- IVES
SECRET
GROUP I Excluded from automatic
downgrading and declassification
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SECRET
C O N T E N T S
(Information as of 1200 EDT, 6 June 1963)
CUBA
CASTRO'S REPORT ON HIS SOVIET VISIT
His speech reinforced the impression in the Cuban-
Soviet communique that Havana intends for the pres-
ent to concentrate on consolidating the revolution
and to avoid provocation of the United States.
SOVIET AND CUBAN MILITARY ACTIVITY
Cubans seem to be training in cruise-missile o -
erations at Campo Florido/
THE COMMUNIST WORLD
SOVIET BLOC GROUND FORCES EQUIPMENT
New equipment being issued is improving the fire-
power, mobility, and conventional combat capability
of Soviet and European satellite ground forces.
RUMANIAN OPPOSITION TO ECONOMIC INTEGRATION POLICIES
A high-level Soviet delegation which visited Ruma-'
nia from 24 May to 5 June apparently made little
headway in settling Soviet-Rumanian differences.
CZECHOSLOVAK REGIME EASES CULTURAL POLICY
A marked softening, if not reversal, of the hard-
line policy will probably encourage still more de-
mands for change, regardless of Moscow's position.
PROSPECTS FOR CHINA'S SUMMER HARVEST NOT GOOD
Because of unfavorable weather, the important
early grain crop will probably not exceed last
year's poor harvest; Peiping is purchasing more
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THE COMMUNIST WORLD (continued) Page
the officer corps over the slow pace of moderniza-
tion, as well as a feeling that political controls
hamper the armed forces' effectiveness. (Published
separately as Special Report OCI No. 0283/63A)
ASIA-AFRICA
LAOS TALKS MAY RESUME
While Premier Souvanna and Prince Souphannouvong
spar over arrangements, Communist military activ-
ity is increasing.
AFGHANISTAN RESUMES RELATIONS WITH PAKISTAN
This will strengthen the new regime of King Zahir
and Prime Minister Yusuf, open the Pakistani access
route to Afghan trade, and could allow the govern-
ment to ease its Soviet-supported military program.
RELIGIOUS LEADERS SPARK RIOTS IN IRAN
Opposition to women's suffrage and land reform
underlies the demonstrations, but the mullahs ap-
parently lack broad popular support and the secu-
rity forces seem ample to handle the disturbances.
INTERNAL PROBLEMS BESET YEMENI REGIME
President Sallal apparently sees union with Egypt
as the answer to financial difficulties and reli-
gious friction, but Nasir is unlikely to approve.
KENYATTA'S PARTY VICTORIOUS IN KENYA
As the country's first prime minister, Kenyatta
has named a well-balanced,comparatively moderate
cabinet to consolidate his victory and prepare
for independence early next year.
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Nod
SECRET
COMMON MARKET DISCORDS
EEC agricultural and foreign ministers made some
progress on minor problems at their 30-31 May
meetings in Brussels, but the Community remains
deeply divided on key issues.
WESTERN HEMISPHERE
SITUATION IN HAITI
Open mainifestations of resistance to the dictator
continue to decline, but any effort to implement
Duvalier's "self-sacrifice" economic program
could touch off new demonstrations.
CONTINUED STALEMENT IN BRITISH GUIANA
The general strike which began on 22 April has
become a test of political strength, with the
likelihood of violence increasing.
ELECTIONS STILL SET FOR 9 JUNE IN PERU
However, the military may still cancel or invali-
date them to prevent a victory by a leftist pres-
idential candiate.
ARGENTINE POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
Prospects appear improved for holding elections on
7 July as scheduled, but considerable uncertainty
still surrounds selection of key candidates.
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SECRET
CASTRO'S REPORT ON HIS SOVIET VISIT
Castro's 4 June report to
the Cuban people on his visit
to the Soviet Union added lit-
tle substantive information to
that contained in the 23 May
joint Cuban-Soviet communique.
His report does, however, re-
inforce the implications in the
communique that Cuba intends for
the present to concentrate on
the consolidation of the revolu-
tion and avoid provocations of
the United States. It also
seems apparent that the visit
has resulted in at least a
temporary resolution of Cuban-
Soviet irritations, and has
brought Cuba closer to Moscow's
side on a wide range of issues
in the Sino-Soviet dispute.
Castro was effusive in his
praise of all things Soviet and
particularly of the organization
and efficiency of Soviet industry
and agriculture. By contrast,
he was unusually deprecatory of
Cuban progress and abilities in
the efficient organization of
production.
On economic matters, Castro
said Khrushchev himself had
suggested the increase in the
price Moscow pays for Cuban
sugar but revealed that the in-
crease agreed upon was only from
40 to 60 per pound, whereas the
world market price is in the
neighborhood of 120. The effect
will be to increase the balance-
of-payments support Moscow must
grant to compensate for the im-
balance in Cuban-Soviet trade.
Thus it is essentially a "book-
keeping" operation, although it
does increase long-term Cuban
indebtedness to the Soviet Union.
On military matters, Castro
said he had been highly impressed
during his visit to Soviet
missile installations and praised
Soviet weapons technology as
"the basis of superiority over
the imperialists." He made no
references to any Soviet promises
of future military assistance.
On the Sino-Soviet dispute,
the Cuban leader stated that he
had urged "the need for discus-
sions" to overcome differences
between world Communist parties.
He said,"We have to understand
the Soviets and the Chinese,"
but emphasized that Khrushchev
is working for "unity in the
socialist camp."
Soviet propaganda on the
results of Castro's visit con-
tinue to reflect the importance
the Soviet leaders attach to the
visit as a symbol of Cuban
support of Soviet views prior to
the Sino-Soviet bilateral talks
set for 5 July. Pravda.'s 26
May editorial singled -out the
Cuban-Soviet communique's
endorsement of Soviet peaceful
coexistence policies and its
appeal for Communist unity.
Pravda pointedly added its own
comment that coexistence is the
"only" correct policy and that
any "violation" of unity is a
disservice to world Communism.
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7 June 63 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
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SOVIET AND CUBAN MILITARY ACTIVITY
cruise missile
equipment, apparently from the
training facility at Campo
Florido, was observed set up
adjacent to the operational
cruise missile site at Santa
Cruz del Norte, 25 miles east
of Havana. The equipment was
apparently returned to Campo
Florido
This second apparent mobility
exercise within a month in-
volving the Campo Florido in-
stallation suggests that Cubans
are training in cruise missile
operations there
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7 June 63 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMAR Page 2
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SELECTED SOVIET GROUND EQUIPMENT DISPLAYED IN MAY DAY PARADE
MOSCOW, 1963
SS -1 (SCUD) SURFACE-TO- SURFACE MISSILE
T-55 MEDIUM TANK
(SIMILAR IN APPEARANCE TO T-62)
i
AMPHIBIOUS ARMORED PERSONNEL CARRIERS
(EIGHT WHEELED)
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SOVIET BLOC GROUND FORCES EQUIPMENT
confirmed the wide spectrum of com-
bat armament and equipment becom-
ing available to bloc ground forces.
Despite the obvious Soviet emphasis
on tactical nuclear weapons, mili-
tary planners have not neglected
development of conventional arms.
The highlight of a display in
May by the Group of Soviet Forces,
Germany (GSFG) was the first ap-
pearance in the field of a T-62,
the USSR's new medium tank. This
is the latest Soviet answer to the
'US M-60 and is further evidence
that Moscow recognizes the prime
importance of armor in either nu-
clear or conventional combat. The
T-62 mounts a 115-mm. smooth-bore
gun which uses armor-piercing am-
munition with the very high muzzle
velocity of 5,300 feet per second,
as compared with 3,300 for the
100-mm. projectile fired by the
earlier T-55. This significant
firepower increase allows the T-
62's gun to penetrate 4.5 inches
of armor under optimum conditions
at 60 degrees obliquity. Although
the new gun increases the tank
weight by a half ton (to 40.5 tons),
it does not materially affect the
tank's mobility.
The tactical surface-to-sur-
face SS-1 (Scud) missile, although
not a new weapon, was sighted for
the first time last month in the
GSFG. The Scud has a nuclear as
well as a conventional and chemical
capability up to 150 nautical miles.
Recent evidence has disclosed the
presence of SS-ls in both Czech
and Bulgarian ground units, strongly
suggesting that all satellites
now have or w
this weapon.
The Sovi
grated antita
into their gr
the wire-guid
Swatter (guid
--recently se
are mounted o
cars--3 Snapp
per car. Bot
have the same
istics: the c
targets in th
yard range an
14-16 inches
An eight
armored perso
BTR-60P) has
replaced the
motorized rif
new vehicle w
capacity and
ity. In conj
engineer impr
and bridge eq
when complete
more plausibl
advance rate
(62 miles) ?pe
11 shortly receive
is have also inte-
k guided missiles
and units. Both
d Snapper and the
nce undetermined)
n in East Germany--
amphibious scout
rs or 4 Swatters
are believed to
general character-
pability to engage
500- to 2,700-
to penetrate
f armor.
wheeled amphibious
nel carrier (the
pparently now largely
utmoded BTR-152 in
e regiments. T#iis
11 increase lift
ross-country mobil-
nction with other
vements in ferry
ipment, this carrier,
y issued, will make
the Soviet planned
f 100 kilometers
day, despite numer-
ous water crogsings in Europe.
The issuing of this equipment
indicates that the Soviets are
continuing to improve and in-
crease their firepower, mobility,
and combat capability through a
sustained equipment modernization
program. This program implements
the Soviet tactical doctrine that
all ground forces on the nuclear
battlefield will have to count on
fighting as self-contained forma-
tions, capable of conducting sus-
tained combat, probably without
contact with other friendly units.
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The Communist World
RUMANIAN OPPOSITION TO ECONOMIC INTEGRATION POLICIES
A high-level Soviet party
delegation which visited Rumania
from 24 May to 5 June apparently
made little headway in resolving
the differences between Moscow
and Bucharest on certain Soviet-
sponsored economic integration
policies. The partial Russian
commentary so far available gives
no conclusive indication of the
outcome, but statements from Bu-
charest suggest little or no
change in the views of the Ru-
manian regime. Both sides, how-
ever, paid lip service to the con-
cept that the "socialist" coun-
tries are bound by common aims
and ideology.
Although the Soviet dele-
gation did not include any top
officials, of the Council for Mu-
tual Economic Assistance (CEMA),
it was led by presidium member
and Ukranian party Secretary
Nikolai Podgorny and included
Alexei Yepishev, former ambas-
sador to Rumania. Such direct
political intervention by Mos-
cow probably was designed totper-
suade Rumania that its national
economic interests and coopera-
tion with CEMA are not incompat-
ible.
Rumanian party First Secre-
tary Gheorghiu-Dej,,at a final
meeting with the delegation on
4 June,personally and publicly
endorsed the position of the re-
gime. This followed by six days
a speech by party Secretary
Ceausescu, also in the presence
of the Soviet delegation, at the
Brasov Tractor Works which made
it clear that Rumania remains ad-
amant.
Ceausescu said the Rumanian Work-
ers Party accepts Lenin's instruc-
tions that the development of
heavy industry is obligatory for
every country building socialism.
This statement is similar to one
published in the Bucharest City
Agitator's Notebook on 1 May.
Dej not only reiterated these
arguments but also stressed the
need to recognize national sov-
ereignty and independence--a ref-
erence earlier used in the com-
munique of the Rumanian party cen-
tral committee plenum in March.
Ceausescu also said, although
Dej apparently did not, that "equal-
ization of the level of develop-
ment of socialist countries is an
indispensable condition for the
construction of Communist society."
This view is shared by the Chinese
Communists, although it has never
been so explicitly stated even by
them. His resort to an ideolog-
ical argument similar to that used
in the past by Communist China in
its dispute with the USSR and his
reference to Lenin's instructions
may reduce the chance of compromise.
Publication of the full text
of Ceausescu's speech in Pravda on
31 May was Moscow's first public
admission of the existence of a
disagreement with Rumania.
Concern reportedly has been mount-
ing among the other satellites
about Rumania's obstructionist stand.
Additional information about the
hastily arranged Kadar-Gomulka meet-
ing on 16-18 May indicates that Hun-
gary and Poland may make joint ef-
forts to help resolve the conflict.
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CZECHOSLOVAK REGIME EASES CULTURAL POLICY
At the recent Writers Union
and Journalists Union congresses
in Czechoslovakia, the re-
gime, apparently in response
to pressure by the intellectuals,
showed a willingness to permit
at least the beginnings of real
de-Stalinization in the, arts.
In spirit and atmosphere these
congresses were highly critical
of the regime, and there were
repeated demands for an end to
"Stalinist" repression of the
arts.
Ignoring the hard-line con-
clusions of the 1959 writers
conference, the just completed
third congress of the Czecho-
slovak Writers Union reverted
to the liberal line taken at
its second congress in 1956.
Three new secretaries, all lib,
erals, were elected. Hard-line
Chairman.Ivan Skala retained
his post, but not without es-
pousing some of the liberals'
causes.
Representing the party,
Jiri Hendrych delivered a mild
speech, the gist of which was
"we trust you to help us build
communism." After lengthy and
somewhat apologetic remarks on
the economy, Hendrych reminded
the writers of their duty to
educate the youth and to fight
bourgeois idealism. From the
writers' point of view his
most promising remarks were
his warning against publicly
ostracizing an individual who
comes under literary or polit-
ical criticism, and the state-
ment that writers are "not ex-
pected to illustrate slogans
and appeals" even though they
must "not be isolated from the
main stream of political life."
A heated discussion fol-
lowed in which leaders of the
union were criticized for failing
to oppose past campaigns against
various writers. There were
repeated appeals for more con-
tact with Western intellectuals,
if only to "know the enemy," and
for an end to repressive measures.
Traditional hard-liners jumped
on the bandwagon of liberaliza-
tion but came in for criticism
nonetheless.
Both the Czechoslovak and
Slovak journalists congresses
reflected the same line in their
appeals for a freer press with
less "direction from above."
The Slovaks, as at their own
writers congress in April, were
more outspoken in their demands
than the Czech journalists and
even criticized them for not
going far enough.
This marked softening, if
not reversal, of party leader
Novotny's hard-line cultural
policy may have stemmed from
growing pressures upon him at
home to liberalize--regardless
of Moscow's position. The lively
discussions at the Writers Con-
gress and Hendrych's response.
containing repeated appeals for
moderation, cooperation with the
party, and devotion to socialism
indicate that the regime's new
position is by no means unan
imously approved or 100-percent
liberal. The regime, however,
did nothing at the recent con-
gresses to stop the growing crit-
icism, and its,promise not to
punish artists guilty of "in-
correct"political views will
tend to encourage still more
demands for change.
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7 June 63 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
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W SECRET
The Communist World
PROSPECTS FOR CHINA'S SUMMER HARVEST NOT GOOD
China's early grain crops
--which normally supply one
fourth of its total annual
grain production--will probably
be no better this year than
last year's poor harvest be-
cause of unfavorable weather
and the failure to expand
acreage.
Despite favorable planting
conditions for winter wheat, the
regime apparently did not main-
tain even last year's below-
normal acreage. Although
weather conditions for this
wheat were generally good
through the winter, spring
weather has included cold waves,
dryness in the northern part of
the wheat belt, and excessive
rain in the southern portion.
While Peiping claims that
the.wheat crop is growing bet-
.ter than in the past two years,
it has displayed considerable
concern that waterlogging may
interfere seriously with the
harvest. Heavy rains through-
out the last months in the
area of the Huai and Yangtze
rivers have brought water levels
up to flood stage in some areas.
Heavy monsoonal rainfall is
normal in this area during
June and July.
Severe and prolonged
drought in South China may al-
ready have caused losses in
the early rice crop. Addi-
tional losses are certain if
there is further delay in the
arrival of the monsoon rains.
Coastal areas in southeast China
are suffering one of the worst
droughts in history; Hong Kong
has had only 2.5 inches of rain
this year compared with a normal
25 inches for the period. The
drought has already delayed
transplanting of rice, and
resultant delays in harvesting
will interfere with the care-
fully balanced schedule for
planting of intermediate and
fall crops.
In the meantime, Peiping con-
tinues to purchase grain from the,
West: A new contract was signed
on 31 May with Australia for 1.2
million tons of wheat, bringing
total Western contracts for de-
livery this year to approximately
4.5 million tons. This figure may
be raised after a Canadian grain-
selling mission completes its sched-
uled meeting with the Chinese this
month. Peiping has the option of
buying 1.5 million tons of grain
from Canada on the basis of an
existing agreement which runs
through the end of this year.
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7 June 63 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
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Premier Souvanna has ac-
cepted a proposal by Pathet Lao
leader Prince Souphannouvong for
resumption of talks at the
Plaine des Jarres airfield, but
they have not yet agreed on
arrangements.
Souvanna has rejected
Souphannouvong's conditions that
a Pathet Lao guard force be
present, that Kong Le release
certain Pathet Lao prisoners
beforehand, and that neutralist
ministers come to Pathet Lao
headquarters at Khang Khay for
preliminary discussions. In his
answer Souvanna pointed out that
he did not have a security de-
tachment at the previous meetings
at Khang Khay, and that prelim-
inary details could be handled
by Pathet Lao representatives
stationed in Vientiane.
Communist military activity,
meanwhile, has been stepped up,
and Kong Le's position on the
Plaine des Jarres is further
threatened. Communist pressure
is concentrated against neu-
tralist positions at Lat Bouak,
on the northern edge of the
plain, and against Phou The-
neng, a hill commanding Route
4 near Lat Houang on the southern
edge. Capture of these positions
would improve Pathet Lao
capability to move against Kong
Le's bases at Muong Phanh and
Muong Kheung.
The Communists have also
increased pressure on Kong Le
garrisons in south-central Laos.
Although direct clashes have not
yet occurred, Communist intimi-
dation has led to withdrawal of
Kong Le forces from Muong Phine,
while the position. of other neu-
tralist troops at Mahaxay and
Nhommarath is also in jeopardy.
The morale of Kong Le's forces
both in the Plaine des Jarres
and elsewhere is low.
The USSR continues to sup-
port Pathet Lao efforts to
paralyze the International Control
Commission (ICC) and to blame
the US for the deteriorating
situation. Moscow agreed to
the 29 May co-chairman's appeal
for negotiations among the three
Laotian factions only after
gaining British consent to a
formula designed to strengthen
Communist insistence that all
important ICC decisions require
both unanimity within the
commission and the consent of
the Laotian coalition govern
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Afghanistan -Pakistan
PUSHTOON TRIBAL AREA
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Asia-Africa
AFGHANISTAN RESUMES RELATIONS WITH PAKISTAN
The resumption of relations
between Afghanistan and Pakistan
after a 21-month break was an-
nounced on 28 May. This should
strengthen the new regime of
King Zahir.and Prime Minister
Yusuf in Kabul and help it re-
turn to a more balanced neu-
tral position between the West
and the bloc.
The agreement provides for
the re-establishment of consu-
lar and trade as well as diplo-
matic relations, all of which
had been demanded by Kabul.
The Afghan Government now will
again allow Afghan trade with
the free world to use the nat-
ural Pakistani route rather
than require it to go through
Iran or the Soviet,Union--a
move Afghan trading interests
will welcome.
The improvements in rela-
tions with Pakistan will give
Kabul less reason to,channel
resources into its military
establishment. This could help
restore a more cautious approach
to Soviet military assistance
programs, which include military
training. However, Kabul prob-
ably will continue to avoid
any abrupt actions which might
raise doubt about its relations
with the USSR.
The fall in March of the
Pakistan-baiting Daud regime
set the stage for the agreement
by allowing Pakistan to ease
its own line toward Kabul. Once
negotiations got under way, the
Ayub government agreed to
Kabul's principal term
j Pakistan hopes that the
agreement will encourage favor-
able trends in Kabul, and is
using it to underscore its own
flexibility on regional disputes
in contrast to India's alleged
obstruction of progress regard-
ing Kashmir.
The two countries thus
side-stepped the dispute which
led to the break in relations
in September 1961--Afghanistan's
demands that the Pushtoon tribes
living on the Pakistani side
of the border be given the
right of self-determination.
Although the new Afghan regime
has obtained a settlement es-
sentially on the same terms set
by the Daud government, it will
still have to cope with die-hard
supporters of Daud's Pushtoon-
istan campaign who may continue
to agitate on the issue.
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The rioting that began in
Tehran on 4 June and has spread
to other Iranian cities arises
out of religious opposition to
two key elements of the Shah's
reform program--women's suffrage
and land redistribution. The
direct leadership is provided by
religious leaders (mullahs) of
the Moslem Shiite sect, but it
is likely that other opposition
groups, such as landowners and
University of Tehran students,
have had a hand in the demon-
strations.
The tension between the
government and the fanatic ele-
ment among the clergy has been
growing in recent months, with
clashes between mullah-led
crowds and government forces
occurring in several cities. The
government was forewarned that
trouble could be-expected during
the annual month-long period of
religious mourning that began
on 25 May. It decided, however,
to permit religious processions
and gatherings and even anti-
government statements in sermons
as long as the Shah was not per-
sonally attacked. Meanwhile, a
strong effort was made to split
the mullah leadership and win
over influential Shiite person-
alities to the government's
cause.
After a dispute between
local security forces and a group
of religious demonstrators in
the shrine city of Meshed in
northeast Iran resulted in the
death of a policeman, the
government reacted by arresting
the spiritual leader of the
Shiites, Ayatollah Khomeini,
and a number of his closest
supporters. The massive demon-
strations which partially
wrecked the Tehran bazaar on
5 June were initially in response
to his arrest.
Although the mullahs have
incited the bazaar crowds of
the larger centers to violence,
they appear to have' little real
support among the Iranian people
generally, who voted overwhelm-
ingly for the Shah's program in
the 28 January national refer
endum. Iranian officials seem
convinced that Egypt's Nasir
is behind the planning and or-
ganization of the rioting.
Military and security
forces seem ample to cope with
the disturbances, although their
leaders will need to use them
more effectively than they have
done with tribal insurgents.
Both gendarmerie and military
units used against the Tehran
rioters on 5 June appeared '
willing and well disciplined,
and their loyalty seems un-
questionable.
The Shah is evidently
determined to deal harshly
with the leaders of the dis-
turbances, but if the trouble
intensifies to the point where
it seems to threaten general
internal security he might
seek to temporize or come to
terms with the opposition.
His tactic in this case might
be to find a scapegoat, per-
haps Prime Minister Alam, whom
he could dismiss.
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INTERNAL PROBLEMS BESET YEMENI REGIME
The Yemeni republican govern-
ment is beset with a growing num-
ber of internal problems--primari-
ly financial difficulties and
religious frictions--which it ap-
parently hopes to ease by uniting
with Egypt. President Sallal now
is in Cairo probably making a
strong plea to Nasir, who is re-
luctant to assume Yemen's problems.
Dissatisfaction within the
regime with Sallal's leadership
has also been increasing.
On 25X1
26 May, the governmen arrested
several civilians and military per-
sonnel on charges of plotting, and
at least three were executed and
dragged through the streets.
The Yemeni disengagement agree-
ment remains bogged down in the UN
pending Soviet agreement to forego a
formal Security Council meeting to
approve the UN inspectior operations
in Yemen. The long delay has less-
ened considerably the chances of suc-
cessfully implementing the plan.
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KENYA
Tribal names shown in Red
ZA142I BA
^ N(U K.)
13457 35 \d 4f 4,0
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KENYATTA'S PARTY VICTORIOUS IN KENYA
Kenya's first prime minis-
ter, Jomo Kenyatta, appears to
be moving rapidly to consoli-
date his party's overwhelming
victory in the late May.elec-
tions and to prepare his coun-
try for independence early next
year.
Kenyatta's National Union
(KANU) won control of both
houses of the National As
nearly two-thirds of
the all-important lower house--
and three of the six regional
assemblies selected. The rival
Democratic Union (KADU), with
24 percent of the vote, suc-
ceeded in preventing KANU con-
trol of the three regions in-
habited by the lesser tribes and
in winning enough seats in the
Senate to block any.post-inde-
pendence constitutional change.
Kenyatta will probably proceed
cautiously to avoid inciting
KADU's tribes to violence, lest
independence be delayed.
The 15-man cabinet is a Ca-
pable, comparatively moderate
group, well representative of
the country's tribes and regions.
The 65-year-old Kenyatta has
balanced the various KANU fac-
tions with evident success and
preserved full flexibility for
eventually designating his heir
apparent. KANU's capable secre-
tary general, Tom Mboya, named
to the relatively insignificant
Ministry of Justice and Consti-
tutional Affairs, will neverthe-
less be responsible for consti-
tutional and independence nego-
tiations with the British and
laying the groundwork for an
east African federation. Commu-
nist-tainted opportunist Oginga
Odinga received the Ministry
of Homes Affairs--stripped of
its police and internal se-
curity functions.
The British governor has
"delegated responsibility" for
his reserved powers--foreign
affairs, defense, and internal
security--to Kenyatta. Joseph
Murumbi, as Minister of State
at the Prime Minister's Office,
will probably play a major role
in these sensitive areas.
Murumbi, a Goan-Masai half-
caste educated in India, re-
cently rose to prominence as
KANU's treasurer. An able or-
ganizer, he was largely re-
sponsible for KANU's unexpected
cohesion during the campaign.
KANU leaders are likely to
regard. their election victory
as a mandate for early consti-
tutional change. KANU would
like to curtail the powers of
the regional assemblies and
simplify the present, almost
unworkably complex constitu-
tion. Mboya expects to go to
London on 12 June to arrange
for a final, pre-independence
constitutional conference this
fall.
KANU is also strongly
committed to forming a federa-
tion with Uganda and Tanganyika.
Kenyatta has already met with
their prime ministers to discuss
continued economic cooperation,
the creation of a combined mili-
tary establishment and eventual
union.
political
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Europe
The basic conflicts in
the Common Market continued to
be evident at the 30-31 May
meetings of the EEC agricultural
and foreign ministers in Brussels.
Progress was made on lesser is-
sues, such as relations with
Latin America, Turkey, and
Iran, but on the key questions
of relations with London and
Washington, the Community re-
mains deeply divided. On in-
ternal problems, such as agri-
culture, nationalist and protec-
tionist sentiments are major
obstacles to further integration,
and the institutional machinery
creaks and groans under the
weight of the decisions it has
to produce.
The 30 May decision of the
agricultural ministers to in-
crease the import levy on poul-
try--despite strong US pressures
for a reduction--is indicative
of these strains. The action
was apparently taken without
clearance with the foreign
ministers. Subsequent attempts
to reduce the levy were vetoed
by West Germany, evidently be-
cause the EEC's poultry policy
heretofore has permitted sub-
sidized Belgian., and French poul-
try to invade the German market.
The growing predominance
in EEC affairs of "technical"
ministers of the member coun-
tries and the corresponding
decline in the influence of the
foreign and economic ministers
and of the "independent" EEC
Commission has been increas-
ingly recognized in the EEC as
a dangerous trend. The technical
ministers have shown themselves
not only highly responsive to
pressures from national inter-
ests and lobbies, but also lack-
ing in appreciation of the EEC's
responsibilities to the outside
world. However, West German
Foreign Minister Schroeder, who
has proposed measures to cor-
rect the situation, did not
attend the Brussels meetings,
nor did such ardent integration-
ists as Spaak of Belgium and
Luns of the Netherlands.
Developing frictions be-
tween France and West Germany
were especially evident in the
widely publicized clash be-
tween Erhard and Couve de Mur-
ville over a German proposal
for formalized consultations
between the UK mission in Brussels
and the permanent delegations of
the six EEC countries. Although
Couve held that such arrange-
ments would give'London undue
influence over EEC policy, Er-
hard adamantly insisted on aspecial relationship for Brit-
ain--making it clear that,
until it is established, Bonn
might stall indefinitely on
farm policies of interest to
France.
The desire to avoid a gen-
eral fiasco probably accounts
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y
Europe
for some headway being made
on other issues. The minis-
ters did, for example, agree
to propose the establishment
of "contact' groups" between the
EEC and the Latin American
missions accredited to the Com-
munity. Despite Greek ob-
jections, the ministers also
agreed on the terms of an
"associat*on" offer to. be made
to Turkey. The offer includes
preferential entry into the
EEC for several export items
of importance to the Turks--an
approach which the EEC is pro-
posing also to take with Iran,
and which has been cited by
the US mission in Brussels as
evidence of an EEC tendency to
wink at the'most-favored-nation
principle.
The ambiguities in Bonn's
European policies in general
and the'views of Erhard in par-
ticular were also a disquieting
feature of the Brussels pro-
ceedings. An ardent advocate
of freer world trade, Erhard
was.helpfulat the, recent GATT
ministerial meeting in,op-
posing the EEC's more protec-
tionist forces.: He is also
admired both inside and outside
the Community for his apparent
willingness to "stand up to
Moreover, Erhard has a long
record of support for a pref-
erential industrial free trade
area in Western Europe and an
equally long record of opposi-
tion to a fully integrated eco-
nomic union of the Six. He
is no friend of the Common Mar-
ket experiment, which he con-
siders too narrow and too prone
to plan on the French model.
As recently as 27 May, he told
Ambassador McGhee that, he thought
the EEC should be comosed of
"free and equal nations" and
that trade and tariff negotia-
tions are too important to be
entrusted to the "bureaucratic"
EEC Commission. From the stand-
point at least of opposing the
development of tighter Com-
munity institutions in Brussels,
De Gaulle may find in Erhard
an ally rather than an enemy.
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Western Hemisphere
Open manifestations of do-
mestic resistance to the Duval-
ier government continue to de-
cline, but there has been no
letup in hostility toward the
regime,
The populace's deeply
ingrained fear of government
repression is evidently pre-
venting any substantial overt
expression of opposition at
this time, however.
Further unrest among do-
mestic elements could be provoked
if Duvalier implements the
plan he announced on 22 May for
an elaborate "self-help" economic
development program. This so-
called "Plan of Urgency" is to 25X1
be based primarily on financial
and other "self-sacrifices" by
the people and the business com-
munity. Duvalier has also made
it clear that he would accept
foreign aid from any source if
no strings were attached.
While the "Plan of Urgency"
appears to have been initiated
largely for propaganda purposes,
it might involve moves by the
regime to impose new tax bur-
dens and extract additional
"voluntary contributions" from
the populace. Such efforts
could backfire by touching
off more antigovernment dem-
onstrations.
CONTINUED STALEMATE IN BRITISH GUIANA
A settlement of British
Guiana's general strike, which
began on 22 April, may be in
the offing although considerable
difficulties,persist. As of
5 June no date had been set for
resumption of negotiations
between the government and the
Trades Union Congress, and both
sides are fearful of further
compromises in a struggle that
has become a test of political
strength.
Things have not gone well
for Premier Jagan. Not only
does he seem to have lost ground
among elements who have been
his staunchest supporters, but
on 30 May he and three of his
followers were suspended from
Parliament for the rest of the
session for insulting the speak-
er. He was unable to reverse
this suspension by legal ac-
tion.
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Jagan is thus technically
without a parliamentary major-
ity but as premier he can, with
the governor's permission, re-
gain control by proroguing Par-
liament and then calling a new
session. He could also call
new elections. In any 'case,
his opponents seem to be at a
loss as to what to do in.the event
Jagan should lose office.
Meanwhile, the threat of
violence is increasing. The
governor has banned large public
meetings, and some 300 persons
were arrested on ,2 June in an
Western Hemisphere
effort to prevent further
clashes between Negroes and
East Indians like the one that
occurred last week during the
funeral of one of Jagan's min-
isters.. The police are be-
coming concerned over the in-
crease in incidents and believe
it is only a matter of time
before.a major interracial clash
occurs. Violence could also
flare up again in connection with
the imminent arrival of two ships
from Cuba bringing food and fuel
which Jagan would use-to gain
olitical advantage,
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All outward signs seem to
indicate that Peru's elections
will be held on 9 June as sched-
uled, although rumors persist
that the military will either
cancel or postpone them at the
last minute. Election officials
are putting the finishing touches
on the administrative arrange-
ments, while the candidates con-
tinue to campaign in earnest.
Peru's 9 June a ections: one road leads -to cancellation of the elections
by the army, another straight ahead to an elected government, and the
third to annulment of the elections if the results are not satisfactory to
the army.
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In the electioneering, there
has been a minimum of political
horse-trading as all four presi-
dential candidates have preferred
to go it alone. There seems to be
an equal chance that either Fernando
Belaunde, an opportunistic ex-arch-
itect, or Haya will win the neces-
sary one-third of the total vote
to qualify for the presidency. If
neither qualifies, or in case of a
tie, the selection of a president
will be up to the new congress.
Whether the military will go along
with the verdict remains to be seen.
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Western Hemisphere
ARGENTINE POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
Argentina's prospects for
holding general elections on 7
July as scheduled appear to be
improving. Top military lead-
ers are continuing special se-
curity measures and have reit-
erated their determination to
see the elections through. The
tension that had been building
up during the Peronist-sponsored
"Protest Week" has subsided af-
ter the one-day general strike
on 31 May, which climaxed the
protest, passed without violence.
A great deal of uncertainty
still surrounds the selection
of some key candidates. Ex-
president Frondizi's Intransi-
gent Radical Civic Union (UCRI),
now headed by Oscar Alende, is
threatened with a split over
the selection of a presidential
candidate. A party meeting has
been under way in Cordoba this
week to try to decide whether
to stand by the UCRI's earlier
nomination of Alende or to
switch to Vicente Solano Lima.,
the candidate just announced
by the Peronists' Popular Union
(UP) Party. As of March, Aleude
commanded majority support in
the UCRI
There is strong military
and civilian pressure to block
Solano Lima on grounds that he
would be a mere tool of Peron,
Frondizi, and the latter's ad-
viser, Rogelio Frigerio.
Whatever the UCRI decides
will affect the political for-
tunes of the Peronists, since
the UCRI and the UP are the only
important members of the seven-
party National and Popular
Front. While not formally
registered as a political
grouping, the front members
believe that by working together
they stand a good chance of
electing enough presidential
electors to control the electoral
college.
In any case, Argentina's
electoral system does not bind
electors to vote for the candi-
date of their party, so an ele-
ment. of uncertainty will remain
until the electoral college
meets on 31 July.
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