THE FRENCH NUCLEAR STRIKE FORCE PROGRAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A004000110002-6
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Sequence Number: 2
• Content Type: REPORT

,,, 31 May 1963
OCI No. 0282/63B
Copy No. 77
SPECIAL REPORT
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
THE FRENCH NUCLEAR STRIKE FORCE PROGRAM
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SECRET
downgrading and declassification
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THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECT-
ING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE t?NITED STATES
WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS,
TITLE 18, USC, SECTIONS 793 AND 794, THE TRANSMIS-
SION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO
AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.
This document MUST NOT BE RELEASED TO FOREIGN
GOVERNMENTS, If marked with specific dissemination
controls in accordance with the provisions of DCID 1/7,
she document must be handled within the framework of
the limitation so imposed.
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NOW
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31 May 1963
Unshaken by increasing costs, delays, and the
prospect of early obsolescence of the Mirage IV
delivery system, France is pressing ahead with the
development of a nuclear "force de frappe." The
over-all cost of developing this strike force is
high, but probably not too great for the French
economy if present growth is maintained and infla-
tionary pressures are limited. To minimize cost
and meet the current timetable for the various
strike force elements, however, hard decisions must
still be made on what systems and what degree of
sophistication to shoot for.
French efforts to achieve
a nuclear strike force now
appear firmly centered on the
Mirage IV bomber with 50- to
60-kiloton fission weapons as
a first-generation system, and
on a force of nuclear submarines
carrying intermediate-range
ballistic missiles (IRBMs)
with thermonuclear warheads
as a second-generation system.
An article by Armed Forces Min-
ister Messmer in the May issue
of Revue de la Defense Nationale
gave at semioffi cial
notice that this is the path
the French are following. His
statement implied that other
possible delivery systems, such
* This article has been pre-
pared in collaboration with
the Offices of National Esti-
mates, Scientific Intelligence,
and Research and Reports. A
Special National Intelligence
Estimate on the French nuclear
program is scheduled for prep-
aration in June.
SECRET
as land-based IRBMs or air-to-
surface missiles, will not be
pressed to the point of devel-
oping an operational capability,
even though they could be achieved
earlier and at less cost than
the submarine-based system.
In short, the French appear
to have decided to concentrate
for reasons of cost and effec-
tiveness on certain aspects of
their program but have not
finally eliminated other poten-
tially promising projects.
Competition for the available
resources has not yet reached
the stage where final decisions
are necessary.
Mirage IV Aircraft
The Mirage IV aircraft,
despite its inadequate radius
of operation and other short-
comings, will remain France's
only means of delivering nuclear
weapons for the next five
years and possibly for an
additional one to two years.
Because of this,and because
resources have already been
expanded to meet aircraft
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NO FOREIGN DISSEM
ESTIMATED CUMULATIVE COSTS OF FRENCH WEAPONS SYSTEMS
(BILLION DOLLARS)
1962
1966 - 1969
1965-66 1969 - 1972
1959 1961
NUCLEAR PROGRAM
0.2=
MIRAGE IV BOMBER AIRCRAFT
o. 251
0.1-
AIR-TO-SURFACE MISSILE
0.2
INTERMEDIATE-RANGE BALLISTIC MISSILE
MISSILE-LAUNCHING SUBMARINE
630524 2
development and production-
line tooling costs, it is highly
likely that production of the
Mirage IV will be maintained
at the planned rate.
However, since maintenance
of the Mirage IV force on an
airborne alert would greatly
increase operating expenses,
Paris may choose to maintain
it at such a state of readi-
ness only in times of severe
crisis.
There is some evidence
that in order to increase the
Mirage IV's combat range and
survivability, the French have
considered development of air-
to-surface missiles. Reduction
of bomb size and weight would
also make some pod volume avail-
able for fuel. However, neither
of these schemes will yield suf-
ficient benefit to justify the
Messmer stated in his article that France's military
expenditures are absorbing 7.4 percent of its gross na-
tional product (GNP), calculated in terms of the cost of
the various factors of production (5.5 percent if calcu-
lated at current market prices). These expenditures, he
said, are to be held to a constant share of GNP although
they will increase in absolute terms by some one billion
francs a year until 1970.
Messmer said also that expenditures for the nuclear
strike force currently amounted to less than 13 percent
of the military budget and would not exceed 25 percent
by 1970. He noted that the military budget for 1963 is
18.5 billion francs ($3.8 billion) -- or, on a basis for
international comparison, 20.5 billion francs ($4.2 bil-
lion).
Calculations based on US military program concepts,
however, suggest that France's "force de frappe" is more
burdensome than indicated by Messner--perhaps even twice
as costly. (SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM)
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necessary effort. Within the
limitations of the existing
Mirage IV design, in-flight
refueling is the most practical
method of range extension. At
best, the Mirage IV weapons sys-
tem falls short of French re-
quirements.
Submarine Program
The development of a sub-
marine-launched IRBM is closely
related to that of the "Diamant"
satellite booster--the first
two stages of which presumably
could also serve as a land-based
missile--and even that of the
earlier sounding rockets used
in the French space program.
At this particular stage of
French missilery, benefits for
both the military and space
programs can be derived from
further development of the
"Diamant's" liquid-fueled
first stage.
As the various programs
continue to develop, however,
they will become less inter-
woven and could result in
heightened direct competition
for available resources and
technicians. Pressures for
decisions to cut back the pro-
grams less directly beneficial
to the submarine missile pro--
ect will mount. However, the
collateral technical benefits
for French science and industry
of the missile and space pro-
grams in general--which the
government has publicly empha-
sized--would probably militate
against dropping completely
those programs not directly
related to the Polaris-type
submarine system.
In any case, curtailing a
land-based IRBM program would
not result in substantial over-all
savings in the short run since
most of the initial cost would
be in research and development.
At the same tire, if Paris hopes
to have its submarine system
on schedule, it must not slight
development of those technical
items, such as the complex
navigational system, peculiar
to the nuclear submarine. Per-
fection of some of these items
could cause further difficulties
and delays.
Nuclear Weapons
The development of nuclear
warheads and higher yield bombs
is far and away the most expen-
sive aspect of the French strike
force program, and the conquest
of the technical problems involved
is the controlling factor in the
acquisition of a complete, second-
generation system. As in the
case of missile development,
the road along which the French
nuclear program must travel is
well defined. Where on the
road France may wish to stop
or, at least, pause, is less
certain.
There is every indication
that France will press ahead
with the development of a 1,500-
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pound submegaton thermonuclear
warhead that would be compatible
with the submarine-launched
missiles. Such a weapon prob-
ably could not be achieved until
the early 1970s, assuming that
there is no decrease in testing
and developmental efforts.
Although resources avail-
able to the nuclear program
could be concentrated on the
development of a thermonuclear
weapon to the detriment of
peaceful uses for energy and
fission weapons, much of the
expenditure in the latter two
fields has already been made,
and little would be saved by
such a move. The plutonium
production facility at Marcoule
is in operation. At least
seven tests of plutonium weapons
have been completed, and
achievement of a 1,500-pound,
100-KT weapon is probably within
reach by about 1967.
Furthermore, the develop-
ment of a fission warhead of
this size would be compatible
with the anticipated submarine-
launched IRBM and would serve
as an interim warhead until a
thermonuclear warhead of appropri-
ate weight and dimensions could
be developed. A warhead of
this yield probably would
satisfy French requirements for
a weapon to be used against
population centers.
Competition for Resources
The various elements of
the French nuclear weapons system
program have not yet been
unacceptably competitive in terms
of available resources and man-
power. Moreover, because both
missile and nuclear weapon de-
velopment stages are sequential
in character, resources can for
some time be spread among several
projects without jeopardizing
progress toward the attainment
of the principal objectives.
However, hard decisions remain
to be made on what degree of
sophistication and power is
acceptable for each weapons
system. (SECRET NO FOREIGN
DISSEM)
SECRET
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