SPECIAL REPORTS: GROWTH OF CHINESE INFLUENCE AMONG WORLD COMMUNISTS; KENYA MOVES TOWARD INDEPENDENCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A004000090003-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Sequence Number: 3
• Content Type: REPORT

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*Vd
17 May 1963
OCI No. 0280/63A
Copy No. 75
SPECIAL REPORT
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
GROWTH OF CHINESE INFLUENCE AMONG WORLD COMMUNISTS
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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17 May 1963
GROWTH OF CHINESE INFLUENCE AMONG WORLD COMMUNISTS
Although the group which Communist China now
leads is still a distinct minority in the inter-
national Communist movement, the Chinese party has
taken long strides out of a position where it once
stood. its ground alone. Since the time of the first
significant open Chinese challenge to Soviet policies--
roughly, the beginning of 1959--the Chinese have
gathered increasing strength in the movement. Each
turn of the dispute has brought them new supporters,
either whole parties or significant portions of
other parties. Each new attempt by Khrushchev to
force the Chinese into isolation has alienated more
Communist leaders and more of the rank and file, either
by the abrupt unilateral methods he has used or by
forcing them to make a choice--a choice which was
not always to Khrushchev's liking..
Peiping's Rationale
The meeting of international
Communist leaders held in Moscow
in late 1960 demonstrated the
difficulties which face Khrushchev
in his attempts to contain the
challenge of intransigent Chinese
views. After three weeks of
hard bargaining, including per-
sistent attempts by the Khrushchev
faction to browbeat the Chinese
and others into acceptance of
its way of looking at the world,
the statement which closed this
round of the struggle was one
which could be used by either
side to support its own views.
The document was more than some-
thing that the Chinese "could
live with." It was one which
they could use to good advantage
in the future.
Up to 1960 the Chinese
appear to have had limited aims
with regard to the international
Communist movement. They hoped
to gain enough support for
their views to influence the
foreign policies of the Soviet
Union, policies which they
regarded as inimical to their
own interests. They believed
that the Communist world should
have a leader who establishes
over-all policy, but who does
so in consultation with the
other important members of the
Communist camp. They looked
to the Soviet Union to be
that leader and visualized for
themselves a role as principal
adviser and co-formulator of
policies.
Since 1960, the Chinese
have gradually given up any
hope that they could influence
the policies of the Soviet
Union and thus the direction
the international Communist
movement takes, without them-
selves taking on the mantle of
leadership. They are therefore
now engaged in a deep and
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unremitting contest for doctrinal
leadership--a conflict which they
expect will be long and drawn
out, whose present may appear
uncertain but whose future is
assured.
This is the rationale be-
hind their insistence that they
are only "temporarily a minority"
as Lenin was only temporarily a
minority, in the Second Interna-
tional. The successes they have
scored in the past four years
in gaining adherents to their
doctrinal programs must serve
to strengthen their resolve
while at the same time it creates
new disquietude in Moscow.
The Asian Parties
The Chinese have made their
greatest inroad into formerly
Soviet-influenced areas in Asia.
Part of their appeal is a racial
one; despite their profession
of,doctrinal purity, they are
not above using racist propaganda.
in their search for supporters.
The support given by the New
Zealand Communist Party, however.
demonstrates that Peiping's
appeal can transcend racial lines.
Today the Chinese can be
considered the leaders of a
regional Communist sector em-
bracing all the important parties
of Asia and Oceania. From India
eastward, only the Indian, Austral--
ian,.and Ceylonese parties are
committed to the Soviet camp, and
they each have a strong pro-
Chinese minority. The early ad-
herence of Albania to the Chinese
camp, moreover, dramatically dem-
onstrated that Peiping'.s appeal
is not merely a geographic one.
The two most important
non-Chinese parties in the area
are those now in power--the
North Korean and the North
Vietnamese parties.
The North Korean party now
is clearly and deeply committed
to Peiping. In the early days
of the dispute, the North Koreans
attempted to maintain an uneasy
neutralism. Although attracted
to the Chinese views on a number
of issues either because of
geographic and racial affinities
or joint opposition to a common
enemy--the US--the North Koreans
were still tied to the Soviets
through residual psychological
pressures and economic and mili-
tary aid programs.
As the opposing positions
hardened, however, it was less
and less possible for the Korean
leadership to avoid a choice,
and the choice they have made
is to support Peiping. Soviet
recognition of this has been
apparent in the treatment ac-
corded a North Korean military
delegation to Moscow last fall
and subsequent developments which
suggest the Soviet Union is at-
tempting to apply economic pressure
through a refusal to supply
new military aid.
The North Vietnamese-party
also moved carefully roug
the beginning months Of the
Sino-Soviet dispute in an at-
tempt to maintain a delicate
balance between the two major
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parties. More wary than the
North Koreans of exchanging
Soviet patronage for Chinese
direction, and more adroit at
picking a path down the middle,
the North Vietnamese have con-
tinued throughout the dispute
to display a cautious neutralism.
Recently, however, particularly
in the last two months, Viet-
namese pronouncements have taken
on a distinct Chinese cast and
have been prominently reprinted
by the Chinese.
The speech by First Secre-
tary Le Duan on 13 March, a re-
cent editorial in the party news-
paper Nhan Dan, and the resolu-
tions ofaa recently held central
committee meeting all suggest
that the North Vietnamese may
be preparing to jump off their
tightrope onto the Chinese side.
It is still too early to tell,
however, and the Vietnamese may
well balance these statements
with more pro-Soviet ones as they
have in the past.
The Indonesian Communist
Party (PKI) is the largest in
The non-Communist world and as
such represents an important
prize for each side. Before the
22nd Soviet party congress in late
1961, the leadership of the party,
represented mostly by General
Secretary Aidit, had been able
to fight off the sentiment of
the majority of the rank and file
and of a number of politburo mem-
bers, and had avoided giving
clear support to Chinese views.
With Khrushchev's unilateral at-
tack on Albania, however, and
his quickening rapprochement with
~Vd
Yugoslavia, the pro-Peiping
majority acquired better
weapons with which to impose
its views.
Aidit, in what appears
to be a maneuver to maintain
his leadership rather than a
conversion, now, has bowed to
the pro-Chinese majority, and
the PKI has taken up a position
contrary to Moscow's on the
issues of Albania, Yugoslavia,
the Sino-Indian border dispute,
the Cuban crisis, and the
necessity for an international
Communist meeting. On domestic
affairs, however, the PKI con-
tinues to use tactics with
which the Soviet Union agrees.
Despite the generalized Chinese
demands for more revolutionary
militancy, there is no indica-
tion that the realistic Chinese
do not also agree with the PKI's
moderate domestic tactics.
The Japanese Communist
Party likes to present itself
as neutral in the dispute be-
tween the USSR and China'and
for some years was able to
suppress discussion within the
party and to avoid a clear
choice in public pronouncements.
Within the last year, however,
while still giving the impression
that it wishes there were no
dispute to add to its own prob-
lems, it has swung into the
Peiping camp. It has repub-
lished Chinese attacks on
Nehru, endorsed the Chinese
border claims, published Mao's
collected works, reprinted
Chinese speeches, refused to
attack Albania, given no support
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for the Soviet handling of the
Cuban crisis, refused to carry
in the, Japanese edition of
the World Marxist Review arti-
cles a ac inngg t^he iine'se point
of view, and attacked Yugoslav
"revisionism."
One of the reasons for
the leadership's pose of 11neu-
tralism" is the existence within
the party of a strong under-
current of pro-Soviet thought
among a significant number of the
rank and file. Defections from
the party have occurred recently,
with its stand on the Chinese
side cited as the reason. The
leadership, therefore, is moving
slowly and seeks to present it-
self as a possible mediator of
the dispute. The evidence
suggests, however, that as a
mediator it would attempt to
settle the dispute in Peiping's
favor.
The Indian Communist Party
is another deeply divided party,
but in this case the majority
of the present leadership are
moderate nationalists, who have
condemned the Chinese attitudes
and support the Soviet Union.
The party, however, has a strong
minority whose leftist sectarian
views are completely in line with
those of Peiping. At the moment,
many of this faction are still
in Indian jails, put there by
Nehru for opposing the govern-
ment's line on the border issue.
They will be out some day, how-
ever, and the prospect is that
they will create a great deal
of difficulty for the present
leadership if it maintains its
present course. If they cannot
move the party in the direction
they wish, they may possibly move
out of the party and form an-
other which, within India, will
mirror the Chinese.
Australia
The Australian party reflects,
the shifting nature of alliances
and demonstrates that all changes
of one view for another have not
been in Peiping's favor. The
leadership of the party, like
that of the neighboring New
Zealand party, was strongly pro-
Chinese until late 1961. Since
then, the dominant sentiment
shifted to the Soviet side,
while the New Zealand leadership
has more firmly supported the
Chinese.
In February 1962, an internal
struggle over the Sino-Soviet
question was resolved in the
Australian party in favor of the
USSR and led to the resignation
of the leader of the pro-Peiping
faction. The Soviet Union can
count the outcome of the factional
struggle in the Australian party
as its only significant success
in the Far East.
Africa and Near East
All important parties in
the Arab world are firmly pro-
Soviet. Communist parties in
non-Moslem Africa are as yet
weak, and they play little role
in the international-movement.
Such parties as there are appear
to be Soviet motivated,' but there
is significant sentiment for
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Chinese views among left-wing
radicals in Africa. The predom-
inance of Chinese influence in
the Afro-Asian Peoples Solidarity
Organization (AAPSO), for example,
reflects this sentiment.
Developments in the past
year suggested that Chinese views
had gained ground in the secre-
tariat of AAPSO, and the direc-
tion taken by AAPSO's third
conference in Tanganyika in
February 1963 indicated that they
now. dominate it. This was
driven home at the end of April
when Soviet supporters at the
Afro-Asian Journalists Confer-
ence were blocked by the Indone-
sian chairman in an attempt to
seat the USSR as a working mem
ber rather than an observer.
Latin America
In Latin America, the major-
ity of the Communist parties are
overtly in the Soviet camp.
Although the leadership remains
pro-Soviet, however, there are
clear-cut splits rising out of
the rank and file almost every-
where--splits between the
cautious and the impetuous, be-
tween those in control and their
younger critics. These divisions,
rooted in local intraparty strife,
have been widened by the Sino-
Soviet dispute.
Even the leaderships of the
various parties are not identical
in their backing of Moscow. Sup-
port varies from very strong in
Guatemala, Uruguay, Colombia,
Chile, Bolivia, Argentina, and
others, to more lukewarm in
Honduras and Haiti, to doubtful
in Ecuador and Venezuela.
And there are special
cases, like that of the Brazilian
party. Here the leadership of
the official and more traditional
Communist party is firmly pro-
Soviet, but it must tread care-
fully because of the existence
of a dissident Communist party
whose policies of leftist revolu-
tion are close to the Peiping
line.
In Mexico, the Communist
Party (PCM) now is engaged in a
factional quarrel over the Sino-
Soviet question
the recent postponement of the
14th Extraordinary Party Congress
from-July to October appears to
reflect a concern on the part of
the party leadership that a
congress held now might break
down over the Sino-Soviet issue.
In addition, as is occurring
in many countries in Latin America,
a Communist splinter group in
Mexico consistently maintains a
more militant outlook than the
official PCM and is probably
being supported' from Peiping.
Recent developments indicate that
the controversy over the Sino-
Soviet dispute within the Mexican
Communist movement is probably
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growing more bitter rather than
ameliorating.
Cuba has always been an
enigma in the Sino-Soviet dis-
pute. Within the Cuban regime
there are a number of important
figures who view the world much
as the Chinese view it. Never-
theless, Cuba remains heavily
dependent on the Soviet Union
for economic and political
support. It suffered a serious
blow to its pride in October,
however, and therefore has a
stake in attempting to appear
independent of the Soviet Union.
The result has been a distinct
shift in the nature of Cuban
discussions of the dispute with-
in the Communist world.
The flavor of Cuban leaders'
speeches after the missile
crisis--although couched in what
appears to be neutral language--
was deliberately favorable to
the Chinese. A reflection of
the Soviet concern over this
situation can be seen in Castro's
present visit to the USSR. The
Soviet leaders are clearly
hoping to use this visit not
only to emphasize their deter-
mination to protect Cuba against
US pressures but to strengthen
their position with Castro
within the context of the Sino-
Soviet dispute.
Western Europe
Within the Western European
Communist parties, as well as
within the US and Canadian par-
ties, Moscow's writ generally
continues to run. There is pro-
Chinese sentiment among some
of the rank and file of most
of the parties, most markedly
in the British and Belgian
parties, but the leadership of
the Western European parties
still fully supports Moscow
in its dispute with the Chinese.
The Sino-Soviet dispute,
however, has another effect
here, which, while not disposing
these parties to Chinese in-
fluence, yet stores up future
difficulties for the Soviet
Union. For, against the back-
ground of schism in the inter-
national Communist movement
and a concomitant weakening
of Soviet authority, an oppor-
tunity has arisen for various
parties to assert their national
individuality if they wish. In
addition, Moscow's willingness
to accept divergencies along
the "road to socialism" in order
to envelop Yugoslavia in a more
loosely structured bloc allows
strong parties elsewhere to op-
pose Soviet insistence that
what is good for Moscow is also
good for them.
The Italian party is the
best example of the early develop-
ment of this tendency to disre-
gard Moscow on occasion, while
supporting the Soviet party
fully in the dispute with China.
On the question of the Common
Market, the Italian party has de-
veloped an approach which fits
its needs better than the out-
right Soviet rejection. The
Italian theory of "structural
reform" is another deviation
to fit the Italian scene; in
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absolute terms, it is far more
revisionist a doctrine than
anything the Yugoslavs are doing.
The Soviet Union is willing
to permit this type of experi-
mentation within the national
parties, if these parties will
fully support Soviet foreign
policy aims and tactics. As the
national parties become more
and more accustomed to forming
their own ideas on some policies,
however, Soviet control is
bound to become weaker and the
structure of the Communist world
increasingly loose.
Eastern Europe
This willingness to defy
Moscow on vital issues of na-
tional interest while supporting
Soviet foreign policy guides
and an anti-Chinese line is not
restricted to Communist parties
outside the bloc. Rumania has
recently stood up for its own
economic development plans in
the face of an attempt by the
Soviet Union to promote,joint
planning through the Council
for Mutual Economic Assistance
(CEMA).
The Rumanian refusal to go
along with CEMA plans was indi-
cated in its central committee
resolutions of early March.
China, although realizing that
Rumania is far from ready to
give it overt support, neverthe-
less has reprinted these resolu-
tions in its party press, prob-
ably as an indication to the
Rumanians that it stands ready
to aid them if desired. Rumania
has also expressed its dissatis-
faction with the Soviet Union's
policies by returning its ambas-
sador to Albania, and it is the
only satellite regime to raise
the level of its trade with
China this year.
Although Rumania cannot
soon be expected to shift its
allegiance from Moscow to Peiping,
it is the existence of the Sino-
Soviet dispute that allows room
for regimes such as the Rumanian
to exercise independent judgment
in the face of Soviet disapproval.
The Soviet Union still com-
mands the support of the large
majority of the international
Communist movement. Only in
Asia have the Chinese made sig-
nificant inroads and developed
a position' of influence which
could i'e translated into a fol-
lowing willing to form a new
international. In other areas)
with the exception of the AIba-
nian party, the Chinese now can
only boast of sentiment in their
favor, of minority pro-Peiping
factions in Communist parties
otherwise oriented, and of future
prospects.
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Moreover, no organizational
ties are known to have developed
between China and the parties
now supporting it. China's ap-
peal is based on its interpreta-
tion of the basic doctrine; at
some future date those parties
now supporting this interpreta-
tion might shift to a position
of greater independence of both
major centers or even back to
the Soviet Union.
On balance, however, Khru-
shchev must be deeply concerned
by the attraction of so many
parties to the Chinese positions.
The development of new Communist
parties is likely only in under-
developed areas where Chinese
influence now is greatest, and
the result will probably there-
fore be more Chinese-oriented
parties. In those areas where
Soviet influence is greatest,
the trend appears to be toward
the assertion of ever more in-
dependence of view and action.
It is with good reason that Khru-
shchev and his colleagues appear
today more concerned with the
problems within the Communist
world than with any other single
issue.
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Copy No. 75
OCI No., 0280/63C
SPECIAL REPORT
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
KENYA MOVES TOWARD INDEPENDENCE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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17 May 1963
KENYA MOVES TOWARD INDEPENDENCE
Kenya's tribes this month will elect the
African government that is to lead them to inde-
pendence, possibly in 1964. Although the British
will retain ultimate authority during a transitional
period, the Kenyans will be responsible for all
government functions except foreign affairs and
internal security under a complex constitution
which is a compromise between a strong central and
a looser federal system. Mindful of the deep racial
and tribal cleavages and anxious to reduce the
chances of postindependence civil strife, the Brit-
ish have sought to provide a political framework
in which no single authority, party, or tribe could
control the rest. A solution must also be found
to the problem of Kenya's Northeastern Region,
whose Somali inhabitants are pressing, against the
opposition of Kenya's politicians, for union with
the neighboring Somali Republic.
Kenya's Political Alliances
The elections, which are
to be held from 18 to 26 May, are
being contested by two major
political parties: the Kenyan
African National Union (KANU)
and the Kenyan African Demo-
cratic Union (KADU).
Their competition is in-
tense--occasionally violent--
as each appears to believe that
whoever wins could control the
government for a generation.
Both parties are uncertain al-
liances of mutually distrustful
tribes and self-seeking poli-
ticians.
KANU, the more radical of
the two, is controlled almost
completely by members of Kenya's
two largest and politically most
active tribes, the Kikuyu and
Luo. It was formed in early
1960--when Kenya's governor
first allowed colony-wide
parties--by mingling several
local parties. KANU favors a
strongly centralized government
and talks of creating a social-
ist society, but it appears to
be thinking in terms of joint
participation by government and
private investors rather than
outright public ownership; it
claims to favor foreign invest-
ment. KANU's leaders enjoy
the friendship and support of
the continent's pan-African
leaders.
Jomo Kenyatta, who has
been imprisoned as a Mau Mau
leader, became KANU's president
after his release August
1961. He has spent most of his
65 years working for the Kikuyu
cause., and is still the symbol
of Kenyan nationalism. An
orator and a man of great
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personal magnetism, he is the
only Kenyan who might be able
to instill in his divided
countrymen some real sense of
national unity. He reportedly
joined the Communist Party in
1930 and later attended the
Lenin Institute in Moscow, but
his earlier extremist and vio-
lently antiwhite attitudes ap-
pear to have moderated. He
is almost certain to be Kenya's
first prime minister, but he
is not a decisive leader and
lacks organizational ability.
After independence the younger
politicians may attempt to
relegate him to a largely cere-
monial role, such as president
of a republic in which real
power would lie in the prime
ministry.
The top contender for real
leadership of KANU is Tom
Mboya, its general secretary
and a successful leader of
his own local party in the
1957 elections and of KANU in
the 1961 voting. Mboya is the
only political leader, other
than Kenyatta, who approaches
national stature. Although a
Luo, he finds his greatest
strength among the new, urban-
ized African "proletariat." His
labor union career--he was
formerly head of the Kenya
Federation of Labor and now is
minister of labor--is the founda-
tion for his political success.
However, Mboya's Western con-
nections expose him to charges
of US-UK domination and, to-
gether with his driving ambition
and arrogant manner, have earned
him many personal enemies.
Mboya's relationship with
Kenyatta is an alliance of
convenience. Kenyatta needs
Mboya's political brain and
Mboya needs Kenyatta's prestige
and the support of his Kikuyu
tribe.
Mboya's bitterest opponent
is Oginga Odinga, the Communist-
tainted, strongly pro-Luo vice
president of KANU. Most politi-
cians would be happy to see
Odinga's faction relegated to
the periphery of Kenya politics.
His future influence will de-
pend largely on the outcome of
his electoral battle with the
Mboya faction in Luo-dominated
Nyanza Region. There is no
Communist party in Kenya, but
a few pro-Communist Africans
like Odinga are politically
active. They are not influential
on a colony-wide scale, and
their sympathies for the bloc
have probably not worked to
their advantage. Thus far Sino-
Soviet blandishments appear to
have had little effect on the
hard core of Kenya's educated
elite.
KADU, a loose federation
of political groups representing
the smaller tribes, was formed
largely as a reaction to KANU.
Its organizers fear an independent
Kenya dominated by the energetic,
progressive Kikuyu. Under strong
European influence and the able
but unspectacular leadership of
Ronald Ngala, it has doggedly
fought to preserve the rights
and identity of tribal and.
racial minorities against pos-
sible encroachment by the central
government.
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The result of this struggle
is the 300-page, overcomplicated
constitution, which provides
for a modified federal structure
consisting of central, regional,
and local governments. There
are specified powers for the
seven regions and other powers
shared by both the regions and
the center. All residual powers
go to the central government.
The British commissions
which defined the new regions
and voting constituencies gave
rural areas--often with sparse
and ignorant populations--a
heavy overweighting in repre-
sentation, while the settled,
educated, and politically con-
scious Kikuyu areas were short-
changed.. At one time it ap-
peared that KADU and its elec-
toral ally, the African People's
Party (APP) might be able to
form a coalition government.
The APP is a Kamba tribal group-
ing formed by Paul Ngei, a
former Mau Mau leader, whose
defection from KANU was finan-
cially induced by KANU's
opponents.
African Government
Some 2.5 million Kenyans
have registered to vote on 715
candidates for the regional
assemblies for the Senate and
House of Representatives. Al-
though the sizable number of
independent candidates makes
any predictions hazardous, it
appears that KANU will win con-
trol of at least three regional
assemblies and the Senate. In
the all-important lower house
it will almost certainly win a
majority, possibly two thirds
of the 112 seats being contested.
The elections are likely
to be followed by a large-scale
political reshuffle, particularly
if KANU wins an overwhelming
victory. A number of independ-
ents will declare for KANU, and
some candidates who ran as APP
or KADU in order to get elected
may switch allegiance to KANU.
KANU in any case will almost
surely have the right to form
a government. The size of KANU's
victory will determine whether
Kenya's two-party system will
survive and whether the consti-
tution will be changed to sat-
isfy KANU's demands for a gov-
ernment with a strong executive.
Another question of great
importance is whether the mod-
erates in KANU eliminate some
of the more violent, racist,
ex - Mau Mau elements. Kenyatta's
chances of forming a moderate
government will be greatly en-
hanced if the racists can be
excluded. Kenyatta also report-
edly intends to include repre-
sentatives of the smaller tribes
and other races in his cabinet,
a move which might reduce the
strength of tribalism.
One of the stabilizing
factors in the postelection
period will be the realization
by Kenyan leaders that they
must make their government work
or Britain is likely to delay
independence. Considering the
enormous number of technical
and financial measures required
under the new constitution, and
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given the fact that at least
six months are needed to put
the new regions on a going
basis, most Kenyan leaders do
not expect independence before
early 1964.
A deteriorating economic
situation will complicate the
new government's task. The
departure of thousands of
Europeans--from- a monetary
economy essentially owned and
managed by European and Asian
immigrants and depending on
them for consumption as well
as production and investment
capital--has caused serious
unemployment and a gradual
shrinking of economic activity.
A stable African government
would do much to restore eco-
nomic confidence, but for some
time to come Kenya will need
British Government assistance
($18 million this year) to meet
its budgetary deficit.
Kenya enjoys a favorable
balance of trade with Uganda
and Tanganyika, and the new
government can be expected to
continue to participate in the
regional organizations through
which the currency and common
services of these three states
are jointly managed. Uganda
and Tanganyika have discussed
a joint diplomatic service and
combined military establishment
and only await the formation
of an African government in
Kenya before progressing further.
The ultimate development of an
East African federation may be
slower, although KANU has pub-
licly endorsed the idea.
The Somali Frontier Dispute
The most pressing political
problem awaiting solution by
the new Kenya government is
the status of the Somali-inhab-
ited Northeastern Region. This
low-lying, hot, semidesert area
--isolated from the rest of Kenya
by distance and natural condi-
tions--supports about 100,000
pastoral Moslem nomads (roughly
two per square mile) whose fore
bears pushed westward from the
Somali hinterland before 1900
in search of water and grazing
land. British administrators
have since been able to stem
Somali expansion and prevent
their domination of other tribes
by restricting tribal movement
within specified grazing bound-
aries--a policy that has kept
the area of Somali concentration
remote from Kenya's political
and economic development.
Since 1960--when the neigh-
boring Somali Republic attained
independence--there has been a
political awakening in northeast
Kenya and an upsurge of party
activity and propaganda on the
future status of the area. The
largest secessionist group has
received guidance and material
support from the Somali Govern-
ment, which seeks to unite all
Somalis under one flag.
Last November a British
survey found that the people
living within the Somali graz-
ing area were almost unanimous
in their desire to join the
Somali Republic and to avoid
participation in any preinde-
pendence constitutional
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development in Kenya. The western
boundary of the new Northeastern
Region follows the boundary of the
grazing area and separates the
Somalis from the other tribes of
the former Northern Frontier Dis-
trict. In forming this region the
British avoided a final decision
on the Somalis' future--lest the
repercussions delay Kenyan inde-
pendence--but created an adminis-
trative unit whose eventual seces-
sion would not affect Kenya as a
whole. Any final settlement is
likely to be based on this bound-
ary, although the Somali Govern-
ment will publicly claim a greater
area.
In the course of the current
election campaign both KANU and
KADU leaders have said. they oppose
giving up any part of Kenya--a
position which most African leaders
outside Kenya support in the reali-
zation that secession might set an
undesirable precedent in their own
countries, where boundaries are
colonial creations cutting cross
tribal areas. On the assumption
that an independent Kenyan govern-
ment will be less inclined to
listen sympathetically to Somali
claims, the Somali Government is
urging the British to settle the is-
sue in its favor before Kenyan inde-
pendence.
In February, news that Kenyan
security forces had taken action
against prosecessionist Somali
demonstrators provoked a riotous,
government-sponsored demonstration
in Mogadiscio, the Somali capital,
and led Somalia to break relations
with Britain a month later. In
line with Mogadiscio's campaign for
self-determination, 33 Somali chiefs
in Kenya have resigned their admin-
istrative duties in protest against
British policy, and no candidates
from the Northeastern Region are
standing in Kenya's elections.
This boycott is intended to per-
suade Kenyan leaders of the hope-
lessness of retaining the area
without the consent of the people.
As a consequence, direct British
rule will probably have to be
continued in the Somali region
during Kenya's period of self-gov-
ernment.
London, anxious to avoid
the active involvement of British
troops, is putting pressure on
Kenyan ministers not to take a
rigid stand which might prejudice
the position of the future Kenyan
government and is trying to per-
suade them that secession would
be in Kenya's best interest.
British officials have emphasized
that the determination of the
Somalis to secede could--with a
minimum of outside support--result
in a prolonged guerrilla war and
severe economic drain on independ-
ent Kenya.
Governor MacDonald is con-
vinced that eventually the North-
eastern Region will have to go to
Somalia, but political circum-
stances in Kenya require that he
move cautiously. Some of the coun-
try's moderate politicians recog-
nize the need for an eventual ac-
commodation with Somalia, but their
public attitude is likely to remain
uncompromising until after the elec-
tions. If the new government is
unable to reach a settlement,,Brit-
ain will have to decide by the time
Kenya attains independence whether
to retain the Northeastern Region
and ultimately let it join the
Somali Republic as a self-governing
unit or whether to relinquish it
to become a festering security
nroblem within-Kenya's borders.
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