WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A004000080001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 26
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 17, 2009
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 10, 1963
• Content Type: SUMMARY

10 May 1963
OCI No a 0279/63
Copy No. 79
WEEKLY SUMMARY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
State Dept. review
completed.
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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GROUP I Excluded from automatic
downgrading and declassification
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(Information as of 1200 EDT, 9 May 1963)
CASTRO'S TRAVELS
Now touring the USSR, Castro may next visit Swit-
zerland and possibly "some Scandinavian country."
Some reports indicate his projected trip to Alge-
ria has been postponed to late this year.
KOZLOV ILLNESS MAY PRESAGE USSR LEADERSHIP CHANGES
Formal announcement of Kozlov's removal, however,
seems requisite to a new appointment to the sec-
retariat signaling that a realignment is under way.
USSR AGAIN OVERHAULS CONSTRUCTION PROGRAM
Khrushchev's most recent criticism of the USSR's
construction problems was followed by construction
chief Novikov's cancellation of a US visit because
he is to rework construction plans.
10 May 63
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THE COMMUNIST WORLD (continued) Page
LAOTIAN SITUATION REMAINS PRECARIOUS
Prince Souphannouvong's refusal to go to Luang
Prabang to resume talks has further dimmed prospects
for a negotiated settlement.
SOUTH KOREAN POLITICAL MANEUVERING CONTINUES
No single group has established the organizational
support necessary to assure an easy transition to
representative government.
NEW CRISIS IN SYRIA
Actions against Nasirist elements have increased
the danger of clashes between rival army elements
and jeopardize Syria's political link with Egypt
and Iraq.
MOROCCAN PARLIAMENTARY ELECTION ON 17 MAY
The country's first national elections are being
hotly contested, but the King's supporters are
expected to win 80 to 90 percent of the seats.
AFRICAN HEADS OF STATE TO MEET AT ADDIS ABABA
The conference may result in merging of the rival
groupings of radical and moderate African states
into a general pan-African system patterned after
the Organization of American States.
AREA NOTES
Congo and Pakistan-Afghanistan.
10 May 63
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PROSPECTS FOR THE NEXT ITALIAN GOVERNMENT
Results of last month's election leave no practical
alternative to another government led by the Chris-
tian Democrats and backed by the Socialists.
NETHERLANDS PARLIAMENTARY ELECTION ON 15 MAY
The consensus is that the Catholic People's Party
will again form the nucleus of the next government,
but it is open to question which of the other par-
ties will make up the coalition.
HAITIAN-DOMINICAN TENSIONS CONTINUE
Both internal and external pressures against Hai-
tian dictator Duvalier are increasing, and Domin-
ican President Bosch remains determined to oust him.
POLITICAL MANEUVERING IN PERU INTENSIFYING
The junta insists elections be held next month on
schedule, but second-level officers are rumored pre-
paring to oust the junta, install a civilian-military
government, and postpone the elections indefinitely.
AREA NOTES
Venezuela and Nicaragua.
SPECIAL UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY SESSION
Although convened to discuss financing of UN peace-
keeping operations, this session will probably also
be forced to take up controversial colonial issues
and the subject of a nuclear test ban.
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SE CRE T
Fidel Castro, now nearing
the end of his second week in
the USSR, spent considerable
time during his first eight
days there in the company of
Khrushchev. On 6 May, he left
Moscow for a tour of the Soviet
Union, including Volgograd
(Stalingrad) and possibly por-
tions of Soviet Central Asia.
He continues to receive red-
carpet treatment.
The probability that Castro's
visit is more than a "good-will"
trip is strengthened by the
fact that two ranking Cuban
economic officials as well as
several senior military officers
are in his entourage. The
economic officials, at least,
have probably remained behind in
Moscow for talks.
During the week just prior
to his departure for the USSR
on 26 April, Castro was giving
serious consideration to visit-
ing one or more West European
countries before returning to
Cuba. He saw the Swiss ambassa-
dor in Havana twice during the
week and Swiss Foreign Minister
Wahlen has concluded from the
reports he received on these
visits that Castro definitely
plans to visit Switzerland,
Castro specifically stated that
he would expect to visit of-
ficials of the International
Red Cross in Geneva.
Castro also told the Swiss
ambassador that he was consider-
ing a visit to "some Scandinavian
country," and that he was think-
ing of extending his itinerary
to include a visit with Pope
John. None of these potential
hosts is known to have been
approached by the Cubans.
The Swedes and Finns have ex-
pressed themselves as being
unenthusiastic about a Castro
visit.
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The recent announcement
that Party Secretary Frol Kozlov
is ill may foreshadow the end
of his political career and
could presage a new round of
changes in the top Soviet leader-
ship. Well-placed Moscow
sources--including Khrushchev's
son-in-law Aleksey Adzhubey--
are suggesting that Kozlov will
not return to his job.
Kozlov was last identified
in public on 10 April. His
unusual absence from the Moscow
May Day celebrations touched
off a flurry of speculation con-
cerning his whereabouts and his
political status. On 4 May,
Pravda published a terse an-
nouncement by the party central
committee that Kozlov had. been
unable to appear on May Day "be-
cause of sickness." The nature
of his ailment has not been dis-
closed, but it is widely rumored
in Moscow that he has had a
cerebral hemorrhage, is partially
paralyzed, and will not be able
to resume work for at least
six months.
Noting the recent signs of
stress within the leadership,
the American Embassy in Moscow
has raised the possibility that
Kozlov's illness was politically
caused. A stroke could, for
example, have been precipitated
by the tension of political
infighting. It is also possible
--although less likely--that his
"ailment" is in fact entirely
political. There have been in-
dications for some time that
Kozlov has disapproved of cer-
tain of Khrushchev's domestic
and foreign policy innovations,
and earlier this year when there
were rumors of a leadership
crisis
Whatever the real reasons
for Kozlov's illness, it must
have forced Khrushchev's at-
tention to the succession prob-
lem once again. In these cir-
cumstances it seems unlikely
that he would relinquish any of
his own authority at this time.
The probability that Kozlov
is out of the running is cer-
tain to increase the friction
among the top contenders. There
are, however, no indications
as yet that his apparent incaipac-
itation has had any impact on
th' distribution of power within
the hierarchy. Two of the most
likely successors to Kozlov
in terms of background--Supreme
Soviet President Leonid Brezhnev
and Deputy Premier Dmitry Polyan-
sky--do not now occupy posi-
tions of political advantage.
The appointment of either
to the party's central sec-
retariat would signify that
he is at least a strong con-
tender, if not the actual
replacement. In any event,
formal announcement of Kozlov's
removal seems a prerequisite
for those changes in the
secretariat which would signal
that the realignment is under
way.
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SE CRE T
A recent move toward greater
centralization of control over
construction activities in the
USSR is apparently to be fol-
lowed by the "complete overhaul"
of the construction program.
Khrushchev's criticism of the
"disorder in construction" last
month was followed by abrupt
cancellation of construction
chief I. T. Novikov's planned
trip to the US with the explana-
tion that Khrushchev had put
him in charge of reworking plans.
While Khrushchev has frequently
expressed his concern in the
past, the emphasis in his re-
cent speech on punitive measures
and his criticism of top planners
by name strongly suggest that
personnel changes will be made
if improvement is not seen soon.
Although construction prob-
lems are chronic in the USSR, the
major one, that of unfinished
construction--which "freezes"
investment resources in place
on projects which have not yet
been put into operation--has be-
come more significant in the
last several years because of
mounting resource allocation
problems. Other weaknesses in-
clude wasteful practices in the
use of resources, late deliveries
of equipment, inefficiency of
organization and management at
construction sites, and lagging
production of building materials.
At the 22nd party congress
in October 1961, Khrushchev sug-
gested a moratorium on new con-
struction starts. A decree
published at that time was de-
signed to reduce their number,
strengthen the priority-projects
system, bring the construction
program into line with available
resources, and improve designs.
Plans for 1962 were cut back.
Only one new ferrous metallur-
gicalproject was scheduled, for
example, compared with 14 in
1961. The number of unfinished
projects on which construction
actually was to be continued
was apparently reduced sub-
stantially--in Kazakhstan by
half
However, plans were again
underfulfilled in 1962, with
the plan for especially impor-
tant projects suffering a greater
shortfall than the plan for those
of lower priority. These failures
apparently led to the extensive
reorganization of construction
begun in November 1962.
At that time, construction
organizations previously sub-
ordinate to the sovnarkhozes
were established as independent
entities in the various repub-
lics or economic regions. The
State Committee for Construction
(Gosstroy) was reorganized and
Novikov named to head it. In
his latest speech, Khrushchev
proposed that all project lists
be examined by the Moscow offices
of Gosstroy and Gosplan.
Improvements can be ob-
tained this year if Novikov
has the authority and the
fortitude to cut and slash
projects, but the disproportion-
ately high percentage of un-
finished construction is likely
to persist for a number of
years. Khrushchev's proposal
for even more bureaucratic
centralization, by increasing
the burden on central planners,
may offset some of the gains
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Pathet Lao leader Prince
Souphannouvong's rejection of
a proposal by Premier Souvanna
to resume talks at a Council
of Ministers meeting in Luang
Prabang further dimmed the pos-
sibility of achieving a nego-
tiated settlement of the Laos
dispute.
Souvanna was already dis-
heartened by the 3 May shooting
at International Control Commis-
sion (ICC) helicopters near
Khang Khay and the intransigence
displayed by Pathet leaders dur-
ing the 2-4 May talks there.
These talks consisted primarily
of Pathet Lao polemics against
the United States, General Phoumi,
and the Kong Le neutralists,
with a personal attack on Sou-
vanna. The Pathet leaders in
effect repeated earlier demands,
including withdrawal of the ICC
from the Plaine des Jarres and
of all of Phoumi's Lao army
forces from so-called "liberated
territory," and reintegration
into the Kong Le neutralist
ranks of the pro-Pathet "true
neutralists" led by Col. Deuane.
The Pathet Lao's program
calls for first settling all
differences between themselves
and the neutralists, and then
for tripartite talks with Phoumi
to settle "national problems."
Among the latter the Pathet Lao
apparently envisage the establish-
10 May 63
ment of a tripartite commission
to revive efforts toward adminis-
trative integration, and the
replacement of Phoumi's security
force at Vientiane with a tri-
partite police force. Souvanna
has stated that the Pathet Lao's
intransigence indicates that
they do not intend to negotiate
but "want war, sooner or later."
The Pathet Lao, however,
have been using this interval
to reinforce their own positions.
Communist counteraction against
Meo units north of Xieng
Khouang town is in progress,
and more general attacks on
both Meo and neutralist
positions annear likely.
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SOUTH KOREAN POLITICAL MANEUVERING CONTINUES
Two years after its military
coup, South Korea remains em-
broiled in political turmoil with
no end of the conflicts in sight.
Since junta leader Pak Chong-
hui's promise to decide later
this year whether to allow elec-
tions for a new civilian govern-
ment or to submit to popular
referendum the question of con-
tinuing military rule, no single
group has established the organ-
izational support necessary to
assure an easy transition to
representative government.
General Pak's recent call
for a new pan-national movement
has clouded the future of the
Democratic-Republican Party (DRP)
which former security chief Kim
Chong-pil designed to give the
junta control over a successor
government. The new organization
is to absorb key elements of the
tarnished DRP. So far, however,
it has failed to attract the sup-
port of significant civilian po-
litical elements.
10 May 63
factional
squabbles have damaged the image
of civilian leaders as an al-
ternative to the present govern-
ment. Neither former prime
minister Ho Chong nor former
President Yun Po-sun has managed
to consolidate potential sup-
porters of his respective party.
Lesser parties are also subject
to divisive influences
Meanwhile increasing in-
flationary pressures are having
an unsettling effect on the
economy. The situation prob-
ably still could be stabilized
by firm government action with-
out serious strain or a reces-
sion, and the new chairman of
the Economic Planning Board
has already initiated corrective
measures. The junta leadership
has not yet made clear its
backing of these steps, how-
ever, and if Pak Chong-hui
decides to run for president,
he is likely to increase
public spending romote
his campaign.
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Recent action against
Nasirist elements in Syria by
the Baathist-dominated regime
have increased the danger of
clashes between pro- and anti-
Nasir forces in the Syrian
Army. The crisis jeopardizes
the future of Syria's political
union with Egypt and Iraq.
pro-Nasir
demonstrations in Damascus and
Aleppo on 8 and 9 May were for-
cibly suppressed by police.
Pressure by anti-Nasir ele-
ments in the Syrian Army appar-
ently forced the regime to dis-
miss or transfer over 120 offi-
cers in late April. This and
other moves by the Baathist re-
gime in turn caused the resig-
nations-of five pro-Nasir cab-
inet ministers, leaving the re-
gime under Baathist domination.
Since then the government also
has shut down two local news-
papers sympathetic to Nasir
and has barred the entry of
Egyptian newspapers.
In a statement broadcast
by Cairo radio, one of the ex-
ministers has charged that these
developments result from the
failure of efforts to form a
national front in accordance
with the 17 April Cairo proc-
lamation on unity. A top-
level Syrian delegation which
went to Cairo to discuss the
effect of Syrian developments
on the new federation returned
to Damascus on 8 May without
reaching any conclusive result,
possibly because Nasir is still
en route back to Cairo from
his visit to Algiers.
Cairo radiobroadcasts have
stepped up pressure against
the Damascus government, claim-
ing that "all the people of all
classes" in Syria are calling
for the downfall of the Baath-
ist regime. The Baath's elim-
ination of Nasirists in Syria
would appear to make a collision
between Nasir and the Baath un-
avoidable, although both sides
want to avoid one. If they do
collide, prospects for a mean-
ingful federation would collapse.
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V
SE CRE T
The 17 May election for
the lower house of Morocco's
first parliament is the first
of a series of seven scheduled
through early October to pro-
vide Morocco with representative
local, provincial, and national
institutions under the con-
stitution adopted in December.
Although supporters of the
King are expected to win 80
to 90 percent of the 144 seats,
the two leading opposition
groups--the right-wing Istiglal
and the leftist National Union
of Popular Forces (UNFP)--are
waging hard campaigns.
The King reasoned that by
holding national elections as
the first of the series he would
clearly demonstrate his strength
on broad national issues and
find it relatively easy to win
support in subsequent contests.
He may also have believed that
giving opposition forces only
a month to prepare for the most
significant contest would pre-
vent them from developing a co-
herent attack on sensitive issues
such as foreign bases and
Morocco's orientation between
the East and West.
Although the two major
opposition groups considered
boycotting the elections--as
the UNFP did in the constitutional
referendum in December--both
have submitted candidates in
all constituencies. Several
leaders of the illegal Com-
munist Party are running as
independents. These candidates
will in most instances meet the
formidable competition of those
selected by the proroyalist
Front for the Defense of Con-
stitutional Institutions.
The opposition has been
concentrating its attack less
on issues than on an individual,
Ahmed Reda Guedira, director
general of the Royal Cabinet
who holds portfolios of both
interior and agriculture.
Guedira was principally re-
sponsible for organizing the
government's party and, as in-
terior minister, for arranging
election procedures. Both
the Istiglal and the UNFP charge
that he has fixed the elections
--although the US Embassy dis-
cerns no glaring instances of
gerrymandering.
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IVORY
COA57
31ERAA
LEONE'.:._..
tIeERFA
OAr0Mre
J NIGERIA
AFROQ
Casablanca Charter States
Lagos Charter States
10 MAY 1963
REPUBLIC
Or THE CONGO
uAR
(1tP4)
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Nov
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Leaders of African states of
both the moderate and radical group-
ings will hold a summit conference
in Addis Ababa from 23 to 25 May.
A meeting of foreign ministers to
set the agenda is to begin on 15
May.
This all-African gathering,
which promises to be the largest and
most spectacular of its kind since
the first one in Accra in 1958, has
been in preparation for over a year.
It developed directly from the
series of meetings sponsored since
1961 by the grouping of moderate
states formalized last December by
a charter signed in Lagos, Nigeria.
Concurrently, certain adherents of
the more militant 1961 Casablanca
Charter, notably Guinean President
Sekou Tourd, have played an impor-
tant role in fostering a rapproche-
ment between the two groups as divi-
sive issues, such as the Congo, have
receded.
Most if not all of Africa's 32
independent states--excluding South
Africa, which was not invited--will
be represented by their heads of
state or government. Acceptance of
the newly elected regime of Togolese
President Grunitsky, which is still
not recognized by most African states
and is strongly opposed by Tourd,
will be discussed at Addis and may
provoke sharp controversy. Selected
African nationalist leaders from
dependent territories will apparently
be permitted to participate in all
sessions, but non-African observers
will be admitted only to the public
opening and closing ceremonies.
10 May 63
Proceedings and final resolu-
tions will, as usual, focus heavily
on the twin themes of anticolonial-
ism and African unity. Specific
attention is certain to be directed
to Portugal's African domains,
Southern Rhodesia, and South Africa.
Some of the participants, notably
Ghana's Nkrumah, apparently intend
to press for expanded material aid
to embattled "freedom fighters."
Nkrumah has made a strong bid
to steer the conferees toward early
organic unity by circulating a
scheme for a "Union Government of
African States." However, any steps
taken at Addis to institutionalize
the unity urge are more likely to
develop from proposals formulated
for the Ethiopian Government by
Chile's ambassador to the Organiza-
tion of American States (OAS),
Manuel Trucco. He counseled the
Ethiopians not to advance the Lagos
Charter as an initial working docu-
ment--a tactic likely to invite
early friction with the Casablanca
states--but to focus attention
instead on a series of draft res-
olutions and statutes on noncon-
troversial topics which he has pre-
pared.
Such drafts provide for perma-
nent inter-African functional commit-
tees for economic-social, educa-
tional-cultural, and scientific-
technical cooperation. Other Trucco
drafts deal with peaceful settle-
ment of disputes, reciprocal assist-
ance, and a general secretariat--
and possibly other organs--based on
applicable OAS and UN articles.
As a final step, agreement would
be sought on a common charter for
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SE CRE T
Congo: After trying vainly
for weeks to obtain a UN "um-
brella" for his army retraining
plans, Congolese Premier Adoula
on 3 May formally requested that
Belgium, Canada, Italy, Israel,
and the US do the job directly.
The plans are likely to be at-
tacked not only in Leopoldville
but in the special session of
the UN General Assembly sched-
uled to begin on 14 May. Arab
and other Asian and African
members of U Thant's Congo
Advisory Committee maintain that
the presence of Israel and the
NATO affiliation of the other
countries would prejudice Congo-
lese neutrality. In the face of
their protests the secretary
general has been unwilling to
accept a coordinating role for
the UN. The UN's new Congo
chief, Max Dorsinville, never-
theless maintains that Thant has
not completely barred a UN "um-
brella" role.
Pakistan-Afghanistan: The
Pakistani and Afghan governments
10 May 63
are seeking to restore diplomatic
and consular relations and to re-
open the border to Afghan trade
crossing Pakistan. Pakistan's
President Ayub reacted favorably
to the resignation in early March
of Afghan Prime Minister Daud,
chief figure in Afghanistan's dis-
pute with Pakistan over the Push-
toonistan question.
To speed restoration of re-
lations, Ayub has authorized Iran
to inform the Afghans they will
be permitted to reopen all the
offices they maintained in Paki-
stan before the break in relations
in September 1961, including the
important consulate in Peshawar.
The new regime in Kabul under
King Zahir and Prime Minister
Yusuf wants to restore the tradi-
tional access route through Paki-
stan to free-world markets and
has agreed to early negotiations.
Both sides have moderated their
propaganda to pave the way for
talks under the Shah's good of-
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Christian Democrats
Communists
Socialisto
Liberals-
Neo-Fascists
Monarchists
Republicans
Others
TOTAL
SENATE
Christian Democrats
Communists Socialists
Liberals
Social Democrats
Neo-Fascists.
Monarchists
Republicans
South Tiroleans
Others
TOTAL
Votes
11,763,418
7,763,854
4,251,966
2,142,053
1,874,379
1,569,202
536,652
420,746
135,444
272,555
30,730,269
10,208,524
6,993,604
3,856,088
2,059,452
1,739,880
1,694,832
428,167
223,421
RESULTS OF ITALIAN PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS
%:
Seats
Votes
%
Seats
38.3
260
12,520,556
42.3
273
25.3
166
6,704,763
22.7
140
13.8
87
4,206,777
14.2
84
7.0
39
1,047,073
3.5
17
6.1
33
1,345,334
4.6
22
5.1
27
1,407,550
4.7
24
1.7
8
1,436,654
4.8
25
-'' 1.4
6
405,767
1.4
6
0.4
3
133,495
0.5
3
0.9
1
379,502
1.3
2
100.0
630
29,587,471
100.0
596
37.2
133
10,782,262
41.2
122
25;5
85
5,701,019
21.8
60
14.0
44
3,683,806
14.1
35
7.5
19
1,024,309
3.9
4
6.3
14
1,135,151
4.4
5
6.2
15
1,119,873
4.3
8
1.6
2
1,350,201
5.2
7
0.8
-
369,192
1.4
-
120,250
0.5
2
760,186
3.2
3
Votes
%
Seats
Votes
-% -
Seats
10,863,032
40.1
263
12,741,299
48.5
305
6,121,551
22.6
143
131
3,441,388
12.7
75
817,404
3.0
13
1,004,889
3.8
19
1,223,209
4.5
19
1,858,346
7.1
33
1,582,727
5.8
29
526,670
2.0
6
1,855,807
6.9
40
729,174
2.8
14
438,027
1.6
5
652,477
2.5
9
122,792
0.5
3
124,385
0.5
3
232,235
2.3
494,625
1.8
2
26,698,172
100.0
590
26,268,912
100.0
574
N OTE: Parliament last year pas:
a constitutional amendment to increase
the number of directly electedSenators
to 315 and the number of Deputiesto
what will be an established ceiling of
630.
* The Communists and Socialists ran joint lists
in the 1948 national elections.
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Western Hemisphere
PROSPECTS FOR THE NEXT ITALIAN GOVERNMENT
Communist gains and Chris-
tian Democratic losses in last
month's general election leave
Italy still without a practical
alternative to a government led
by the Christian Democrats and
backed by the Nenni Socialists.
It seems assured that the Chris-
tian Democrats will be more de-
pendent on both socialist par-
ties in any such regime. The
immediate outlook, however, is
for the establishment of a care-
taker government to hold the
fort until after the Nenni So-
cialists' convene their party
congress, probably in July.
Opponents of Premier Fan-
fani within the Christian Dem-
ocratic Party and among its co-
alition partners blame him for
the "distastrous" election re-
sults, and are urging that he
resign. Fanfani and his center-
left adherents point out, how-
ever, that the preferential vot-
ing (whereby voters express
their preference among a list
of candidates offered by the
party of their choice) seem to
have run strongly in their fa-
vor and against right-wing
Christian Democratic leaders.
There is an even more striking
trend favoring those in Nenni's
party who approve of the center-
left. In any event, prolonged
negotiations on the government's
make-up are in prospect follow-
ing the resignation of the Fan-
fani cabinet when Parliament
reconvenes on 16 May.
open to question: it may be a
reinstallation of the present
government, one constructed un-
der the same formula but with
another prime minister, or a
minority government of Christian
Democrats alone. A return to
the old four-party centrist
coalition including the now-
strengthened Liberals, or re-
course to alliance with the
neo-Fascists seems most unlikely
at this time.
The embassy comments that
in view of the increased strength
of Nenni's "autonomous" wing in
the Socialist parliamentary del-
egation, the possibility of a
Socialist return to a close work-
ing relationship with the Com-
munists is more remote than ever.
Similarly, the reported strength-
ening of the parliamentary rep-
resentation of the Christian
'Democrats' left wing improves
chances of keeping the "opening
to the left" alive. Giuseppe
Saragat's Social Democrats, who
made substantial gains in the
elections, are indicating an in-
tention to use their influence
to keep a center-left govern-
ment in power.
However, the Socialist left
wing and the Christian Democratic
right, despite apparent defec-
tions from both to other parties,
will work to block the formation
of such a government.F
What sort of caretaker ar-
rangement will be worked out is
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The parliamentary election
in the Netherlands on 15 May is
not expected to produce any sur-
prising shifts in voter senti-
ment. The Catholic People's
Party (KVP), the dominant ele-
ment in the government coalition,
and the opposition Labor Party
will probably each win about
one third of the 150 seats in
the lower chamber. The remain-
der will be divided largely among
the Liberals and the two princi-
pal Protestant parties.
The pre-election campaign-
ing has focused on purely domes-
tic issues. Little has been
said about foreign and defense
policies, since there is a
broad measure of agreement on
these matters among the non-Com-
munist parties. Efforts by the
small Communist Party and paci-
fist elements to bring into
question the Netherlands' affili-
ation with NATO and its military
cooperation with West Germany
have had little response.
The consensus is that the
KVP will again form the nucleus
of the next government, but it
is open to question which of the
other parties will make up the
coalition. Earlier it had been
assumed that Labor, which has
been in opposition since 1958,
would once again be taken into
the cabinet, but the failure
of Labor's campaign to catch
fire thus far has lessened the
prospects for such a development.
If the other three coalition
parties--the Liberals and the
two Protestant parties--hold
their own in the election, the
present coalition probably will
be retained.
10 May 63
LOWER HOUSE OF PARLIAMENT
(SECOND CHAMBER)
Catholic People's Party
49
Christian'
Historical Union
(Protestant)
12
Anti-Revolutionary P
(Protestant)
14
Liberals
19
4 itical Reformed Party
(Protestant)
One of the first problems
the new government will have to
face is whether or not to par-
ticipate in the proposed NATO
multilateral nuclear force
(MLF). Dutch officials have
indicated they felt priority
should be given to creating
the Interallied Nuclear Force
(IANF) as being the most realis-
tic short-term approach. On
balance, however, The Hague is
believed to be sympathetic
toward the proposal for a
MLF but is reportedly having
difficulty convincing Dutch
military leaders of its feasi-
bility-,
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Western Hemisphere
Tension between Haiti and
the Dominican Republic remains
high, but the pushing and haul-
ing now is mostly on the diplo-
matic level. The OAS investi-
gating team is preparing to re-
turn to Haiti with a broadened
mandate to perform "whatever
service is necessary" to settle
the dispute.
Dominican President Bosch
is incensed because the OAS has
not decided to take strong ac-
tion against Haitian dictator
Duvalier. He has told the US
ambassador he will refuse the
commission permission to enter
his country, and if they arrive
unannounced he will make a pub-
lic speech "saying things they
have never heard from a presi-
dent." The ambassador says
that Bosch feels "betrayed"
and endangered politically.
Internal as well as exter-
nal pressures on Duvalier are
still on the increase. His le-
gal term as president expires
on 15 May
The in-
creasingly bold attacks mounted
by his enemies in recent days,
notably by followers of Clement
Barbot, lend some credence to
these reports. Just what effect
these pressures are having on
the dictator is not yet clear.
Dominican armed forces re-
main poisad along the border.
.Bosch's tactic so far, however,
has been to use the "Haitian
crisis" to gain political ad-
vantage at home.
Latin American embassies
in Port-au-Prince are apparently
concerned over the possibility
that the regime will retaliate
against them for granting asylum
to large numbers of Haitians
escaping Duvalier's terror.
Duvalier has given the OAS
guarantees for the safety of
political refugees, probably
in hopes of forestalling either
the establishment of an OAS
"presence" or a Dominican inva-
sion. A few asylees have al-
ready left the country. There
is no certainty, however, that
Duvalier will permit all asylees
to leave or that he will oust
relatives of the late Dominican
dictator Trujillo--for whom he
personally ordered visas.
The Haitian Government had
received from Dutch authorities
landing rights for a flight
from Haiti to Curacao, but
canceled the flight on 8 May.
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POLITICAL MANEUVERING IN PERU INTENSIFYING
Four presidential candidates
are campaigning vigorously for
elections which the Peruvian mili-
tary junta has repeatedly claimed
will be held on 9 June as sched-
uled.
an air of unreality pervades the
political scene.
One of the first acts of the
junta when it seized power in July
1962 following the June elections
was to promise to hold new elec-
tions a year hence. The military
leaders believed that the plurality
of votes won in 1962 by their
perennial foe, APRA leader Victor
Raul Haya de la Torre, was the
result of a "massive fraud." After
re-registering all the eligible
voters to eliminate "fraudulent"
registrations, the junta is con-
vinced that APRA now can be deci-
sively defeated.
APRA and its leaders are undis-
mayed. In fact, they welcome the
rerun as an opportunity to prove
that their near victory in 1962
was genuine. Furthermore, with
10 May 63
Western Hemisphere
the number of candidates reduced
from seven to four, APRA members
are confident that Haya will win
more than the minimum of one
third of the total vote required
for election to the presidency.
Like Haya, two other candi-
dates are holdovers from 1962.
Ex-dictator Manuel Odria is run-
ning for his own party, the National
Union for Odria (UNO), and ex-
architect Fernando Belaunde is the
candidate of a coalition of his
Accion Popular and the Peruvian
Christian Democrat Party (AP-PDC).
Both UNO and AP-PDC claim to be
reformist, non-Marxist, and ac-
ceptable to the military and the
oligarchy.
The fourth candidate, ex-
engineer Mario Saiaame Boggio, who
presents himself as the candidate
of the "responsible left," is spon-
sored by a loosely organized party
formed for the purpose and known as
the Union of the Peruvian Public
(UPP). He has no chance of winning
on his own, but has let it be known
that he is available as a com-
promise candidate for APRA support
if APRA is outlawed by the mili-
tary.
HAYA
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Western Hemisphere
Venezuela: Army and na-
tional guard officers are increas-
ingly disturbed by the gradual
breakdown of law and order in
Venezuela due to Communist hit-
and-run violence and by the appar-
ent inability of civilian author-
ities to deal with the problem.
Sentiment to have the military
assume a greater role in suppress-
ing Communist terrorism has al-
most certainly been fed by last
week's sabotage of a military com-
missary and the unending terrorist
attacks on armed forces personnel.
Communist leaders, whose
strategy all along has been to as-
sume they could ride to power on
a wave of popular dissatisfaction
generated by a military move to
topple the Betancourt regime, see
many advantages in the present sit-
uation
Failing to precipitate a mili-
tary overthrow, Communist efforts
would appear to have as a second-
ary objective the creation of
conditions which would compel the
government to suspend constitu-
tional guarantees, and perhaps
cancel the presidential elections
set for next November. In doing
so, they would hope to shatter
:10 May 63
public confidence in Betancourt's
coalition government as well as
to prevent the installation of a
similar regime as its successor.
Nicaragua: The new admin-
istration of Rene Schick Guti-
errez, who succeeded Luis Somoza
Debayle as President of Nicaragua
on 1 May, is likely to be reason-
ably competent and honest. Schick
has indicated a determination to
govern in his own right even if
it means resisting Somoza pres-
sure. There will probably be no
change in Nicaragua's pro-US
orientation.
Although several of the cab-
inet appointees are relatively un-
known in Nicaraguan politics, most
appear to be men of integrity.
The two holdovers in the cabinet,
the ministers of foreign affairs
and labor,are both experienced and
able. There seem to be only two
leftists in important positions:
Pedro Quintanilla, secretary to
the presidency, and Andres Garcia
Perez, minister of economy.
It is still too early to pre-
dict what kind of relationship the
new President will have with Gen-
eral Anastasio (Tacho) Somoza,
who has been retained as chief of
the national guard, the country's
only military force. So far, there
has been no evidence that the gen-
eral has applied pressure on Schick
or his government. None of the
cabinet members is a close friend
of Tacho, and some have opposed the
Somoza leadership of the ruling Na-
reasons in the past.
tional Liberal Party for various
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World Organizations
The UN General Assembly
is scheduled to convene in
special session on 14 May to
discuss financing of UN peace-
keeping operations. It will
probably also take up such
other potentially explosive
issues as Southern Rhodesia,
the retraining of the Congolese
Army, and the absence of an
agreement on a nuclear test ban.
Financing of UN operations
such as those in the Congo and
Palestine has been haphazard.
The UN has relied primarily on
voluntary contributions from
the more affluent members--
chiefly the United States. To
regularize this financing and
also to ensure that peace-
keeping expenses are more
equitably shared, the United
States will push for a formula
which would obviate its paying
more than its regular assess-
ment of 32.02 percent of UN
expenses. However, prospects
for a financially workable
formula which all UN members
will honor now seem remote.
The Afro-Asian bloc appears
intent on using the special
session to spotlight colonial
issues. One of these will be
Britain's refusal to press
Southern Rhodesia to allow
increased African participation
in the colony's government.
Afro-Asian members of the Congo
Advisory Committee are also
likely to question the legality
of plans for NATO countries and
Israel to train the Congo Na-
tional Army. They assert that
such training, even though
requested by the Adoula govern-
ment, would be neocolonialism..
In addition to these colo-
nial issues, the eight nonaligned
nations at the Geneva disarma-
ment conference are thinking
about submitting the problem
of a ban on nuclear testing to
the special session in the
hopes of breaking the impasse
between the US and USSR on the
number of inspections needed
to enforce an effective test
ban. These countries contend
there is no alternative to
such a move in view of the
failure of a compromise at
Geneva.
The addition of these
controversial items to the
already tricky problem of
financing will result in pro-
longed, bitter, and probably
inconclusive debate.
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,... s.i ... aa ar a
.c F.!' R P. T
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