WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A004000060001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 35
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 7, 2008
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 26, 1963
• Content Type: SUMMARY

26 April 1963
OCI No. 0277/63
Copy No. 78
WEEKLY SUMMARY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
State Dept. review completed
DIA review completed.
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
i'iLtivlas r c PLEASE RETURN TO
AGENCY ARCHIVES,
SECRET
-1 -'2 0'W--'7.aA downgrading and declassification
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Now, W
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(Information as of 1200 EST, 25 April 1963)
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SOVIET AND CUBAN MILITARY ACTIVITY 1
provide
at the Soviet armored camps with Cuban
troops at these installations.
MAY DAY PREPARATIONS IN HAVANA
Besides a Castro speech, the ceremonies are to
include a four-hour parade with 120,000 partic-
ipants--observed by over 100 foreign delegates.
CASTRO'S TRAVEL PLANS
The announcement of Castro's visit to Algeria in
May suggests he will make his projected trip to
the USSR--and possibly China--at that time.
PROSPECTS DIM FOR SUCCESS OF ANY SINO-SOVIET TALKS 3
Long and unpleasant sessions can be expected, with
only little apparent--and no real--forward movement
at the end. The propaganda war continues.
RUMANIAN POLICY DIFFERENCES WITH THE BLOC 6
Significant conflicts of interest are underlined
by reports of Rumania's dissatisfaction with the
role it is expected to play in the bloc economy.
EAST GERMANY HAS NEW DIFFICULTIES IN FIRST QUARTER 1963 7
The severe winter has added short-run setbacks to
East Germany's chronic economic problems; heavy
emphasis on raising labor productivity is expect-
ed to be a major factor in the drive to catch up.
USSR FIRST-QUARTER ECONOMIC RESULTS
Actual industrial growth--although at a rate only
slightly below average--was the poorest of recent
years, but most major goals were fulfilled.
DE-STALINIZATION IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA
Failure to announce the ouster of the unpopular
head of the Slovak party may reflect opposition
to hard-line Czech party leader Novotny's inten-
tion to undertake only token de-Stalinization.
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THE COMMUNIST WORLD (continued) Page
MODERNIZATION OF YUGOSLAV MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT 10
The appearance in Yugoslavia of Soviet surface-to-
air missile equipment and MIG aircraft indicates
the arms deal signed a little over a year ago in-
volved a sizable package of sophisticated weapons.
TENSIONS CONTINUE IN LAOS
Moscow thus far has withheld support for Western
efforts to restore the Laotian situation, and it
is uncertain whether either the neutralist or the
Pathet Lao commander will observe the present
truce on the Plaine des Jarres for long.
ARAB FEDERATION ROCKS JORDAN
Demonstrations extolling Nasir and Arab unity
helped bring down the 24-day-old Rifai cabinet,
and the threat of King Husayn's assassination
seems to have increased.
YEMENI DISENGAGEMENT PLAN APPROVED
While Cairo is preparing to withdraw some troops,
President Sallal faces mounting criticism from
heretofore friendly tribal and military elements.
BEN BELLA CONSOLIDATES POWER IN ALGERIA
The premier won an important victory over his
principal rival, Mohamed Khider, but remains
beset by grave administrative difficulties.
ADOULA STILL AT ODDS WITH CONGO PARLIAMENT
The premier's plans to recess Parliament and re-
train the army are meeting stiff opposition.
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FRANCE RESERVES DECISION ON INTERALLIED NUCLEAR FORCE 18
Paris may not try to block the IANF if it is present-
ed as a routine NATO development, but might veto the
idea if it is treated as something new and important.
WESTERN HEMISPHERE
TRINIDAD PREMIER PROMOTING CARIBBEAN UNITY 19
Williams, long ambitious to extend his influence
throughout the region, has apparently elicited
considerable sympathy for his aspirations to de-
velop a Caribbean economic and political bloc.
ARGENTINE REGIME REAFFIRMS ELECTION PLANS 20
It remains determined to hold elections on 23 June,
but the political parties continue to drag their
feet on choosing candidates and drafting platforms.
The Peronists' plans are more uncertain than ever.
ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL UNCERTAINTY IN COLOMBIA 21
President Valencia's failure to come to grips
with economic problems is costing his regime
public confidence.
INSURGENCY IN GUATEMALA 22
There is no proof that recent guerrilla activity
in eastern Guatemala--which the government claims
to have put down--is either a major outbreak or a
coordinated Communist-led effort.
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SOVIET AND CUBAN MILITARY ACTIVITY
at Holguin on 1 April. A Cuban
and a Soviet were performing
guard duty together. This pro-
vides the first reliable infor-
mation associating
at the Soviet armored camps wi-th
Cuban troops at these installa-
tions. New vehicle hardstands
were observed under construction
at the Artemisa and Santiago
de las Vegas camps, and increased
tank and truck activity con-
tinues at all four camps.
On 16 April, a Soviet
merchant ship armed with mobile,
four-barreled, antiaircraft
heavy machine guns was photo-
graphed in Cuban waters. A
Soviet merchant ship with
similar armament was photo-
graphed en route from Havana
to Caibarien, on 12 April,
and on 29 March two other
Soviet merchant ships were
reported to be armed. The
arming of Soviet merchant ships
in Cuban coastal waters is
believed to be in response to
the recent anti-Castro exile
raids on Soviet ships.
Only one Soviet passenger
ship left Havana during the past
week. The ship has a normal
passenger capacity of 340, and
at least 120 persons were ob-
served on board. No Soviet
passenger ships are in Cuban
ports or en route to Cuba.
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Preparations for large-
scale May Day celebrations in
Havana are well advanced. The
ceremonies will feature a four-
hour parade and a keynote
speech by Fidel Castro.
A recent Havana Radio an-
nouncement said 120,000 workers,
including more than 1,000
trained gymnasts, will take
part in the parade. Another
broadcast indicated that as
many as 106 delegates repre-
senting 53 organizations from
46 countries of Asia, Africa,
Oceania, and Europe will be on
Ahmed Ben Bella's an-
nouncement on 21 April that
Fidel Castro will come to
Algeria in May suggests that
the Cuban leader will make his
projected trip to the USSR at
that time. This is in line
late
March that he was planning his
Algerian visit in connection
with a trip to Moscow in May.
Moscow appears to be pre-
paring one of the most enthu-
siastic welcomes ever given a
foreign visitor. The Soviet
press, waxing eloquent over the
prospects of Castro's visit, has
been full of stories about the
Cuban leader and recounts of
the Bay of Pigs invasion.
Alexey Adzhubey, Khrushchev's
son-in-law, has publicly prom-
ised Castro a warm welcome,
26 Apr 63
hand. Included are all of the
countries of the Sino-Soviet
bloc, together with representa-
tives of the WFTU and other in-
ternational Communist-front
organizations.
Many of the attending
delegates are scheduled to re-
main in Havana for as lon as
three weeks.
saying that "all Russia" is
impatiently awaiting his
arrival.
not been matched by Havana.
fact treatment the regime is
giving the trip tends to give
the impression that Castro is
lukewarm to the whole idea.
There are, moreover, indications
that Castro still harbors a
smoldering resentment over
Soviet actions during the
missile crisis, that he rejects
the idea of being treated as a
satellite, but that he recog-
nizes Cuba's need for continued
Soviet aid.
Moscow.
connection with his trip to
A 21 April press report
from Tokyo suggested that Castro
might visit Communist China in
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
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PRCSPECTS DIM FOR SUCCESS OF ANY SINO-SOVIET TALKS
Peiping has not yet re-
sponded to the Soviet proposal
of 30 March that bilateral talks
take place in mid-May, but the
Chinese reportedly plan to send
a high-level delegation to Mos-
cow. The editor of a Hong Kong
Communist newspaper who had re-
cently returned froth the main-
land asserted that the delega-
tion would be headed by polit-
buro member Peng Chen, a logi-
cal choice in view of his
previous experience in talks
with the Soviet party on matters
at issue.
The prospect that talks
will soon be held, however, does
not make a resolution of dif-
ferences any more likely.
Communist powers generally do
not use negotiations as a means
of reaching a compromise between
extreme views. In their deal-
ings with the free world, both
the Soviet Union and China have
used negotiations merely as a
means of wearing down their
antagonist through constant
reiteration of a basic position.
Willingness to enter into nego-
tiations is propagandized as
an expression of good will on
the part of the Communist power;
failure to reach agreement is
pictured as a result of intran-
sigence on the part of the other
power.
only little apparent, and no
real, forward movement at the
conclusion.
Both parties appear to be
preparing for negotiations by
publicly setting forth their
views with little attempt to
minimize the enormous distance
between them. Technically both
sides are adhering to the agree-
ment reached in the recent
exchange of letters not to
engage in "polemics," but the
war of words continues. The
Soviet Union and China now
limit themselves to "principled"
affirmations, while more con-
tentious and directly insulting
attacks are presented by their
proxies.
The strongest recent anti-
Chinese statement came from S.
A. Dange, leader of the Indian
Communist Party, whose 32,000-
word indictment appeared as a
supplement to last week's issue
of the party publication New
Age. The Albanians took Elie
spotlight in the attack on
Moscow. A three-page Zeri I
Popullit diatribe on IS Apr- 1
was as abusive of Khrushchev
as anything Tirana had previously
published, and was followed up
by an article equally inimical
to Khrushchev, although ostensibly
in commemoration of Lenin's
birthday.
With two states both
schooled in this technique facing
one another over the negotiating
table, long and unpleasant ses-
sions can be expected, with
Current indications are
that the issues of Albania and
Yugoslavia--and their standing
as legitimate "socialist" regimes
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The Communist World
--will be among the most diffi-
cult in Sino-Soviet bilateral
negotiations. Moscow's altera-
tion of its May Day slogan con-
cerning Yugoslavia indicated
that Khrushchev is determined
not to give way on this issue.
The original slogan, published
on 8 April, did not mention
the socialist character of the
Yugoslav regime, whereas the
correction, published on 11
April, greeted the Yugoslavs
as building socialism, thus
paying them the same honor as
all the other Communist regimes.
The Chinese, however, con-
tinue to broadcast statements
insisting on the necessity of
uncompromising hostility to
"Yugoslav revisionism." On 16
April, People's Daily carried
extensive excerpts from a speech
given by North Vietnamese First
Secretary Le Duan on 13 March.
The belated publication of this
speech, which contained a sharp
attack on the Yugoslav party,
may have been prompted by the
Soviet correction of the May
Day slogan.
Khrushchev tried, in the
30 March letter to the Chinese,
to minimize the problem by char-
acterizing the issues as second-
ary ones. He has implied, in
recent speeches as well as this
letter, that acceptance by the
Chinese camp of Yugoslav
"socialism" would dispose Moscow
to temper its campaign against
Albania. The long Zeri I
Popullit article ofT- April
explicitly rejected any idea
of linking the Yugoslav and
Albanian questions, however.
Each side has demonstrated
that on the other issues which de-
vide them--peaceful coexistence,
war, the national liberation move-
ment, the Soviet role in the Cuban
crisis, the Sino-Indian border dif-
ficulty--there has been no softening
of its position. Each, in its Lenin
birthday anniversary speeches and
articles, has reiterated its own
"correct" interpretations of the
writings of Marx's prophet, Lenin.
Communications from the two great
Communist powers increasingly il-
lustrate that the dialogue between
them is a dialogue of the deaf.
One of the factors probably
contributing to Chinese obduracy is
the decline in Moscow's economic
leverage against Peiping. Last
year's trade between the two coun-
tries was no more than $650 million
--30 percent under the previous
year's figures and almost 70 per-
cent below the high mark of 1959.
The trade agreement for 1963 that
was finally signed in Moscow on
20 April after five months of nego-
tiation probably did not provide
for much further change in the
trade level. The Sino-Soviet eco-
nomic relationship now provides
relatively little that Peiping
cannot obtain elsewhere.
The agreement included a
separate protocol on debt repay-
ment which underscored Peiping's
determination to clear its economic
obligations to Moscow as quickly
as possible. The Chinese, who in
1961 had to have an extension on
their trade debt to the USSR, now
have proposed to make an advance
payment on their indebtedness.
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SELECTED SOVIET ECONOMIC DATA
PERCENTAGE INCREASES BASED ON OFFICIAL DATA
First quarter compared with
preceeding first quarter
Annual
Plan
1962
1963
1962
1963
GROSS INDUSTRIAL OUTPUT *
9.0
8.2
9.5
8.0**
INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTIVITY
5.0
5.4
6.0
5.6
CHEMICAL INDUSTRY *
15.0
17.0
15.0
17.0
PIG IRON
8.9
5.2
9.0
7.0
CRUDE STEEL
8.1
4.3
8.0
5.0
ELECTRICITY
13.1
17.0
13.0
11.0
GAS
30.9
19.0
24.0
17.0
PETROLEUM
11.7
11.2
12.0
10.0
CEMENT
12.6
11.1
13.0
10.7
FERTILIZER
8.1
15.0
13.0
16.2
AGRICULTURAL EQUIPMENT *
20.0
19.0
21.0
22.0
TRACTORS
0
21.3
9.0
13.0
REFRIGERATORS
23.2
12.8
22.0
8.0
WASHING MACHINES
43.2
29.2
40.0
24.0
COTTON FABRICS
0
1.0
1.0
2.0
MEAT ( State slaughtered
20.9
30.9
13.0
10.0
* Based on value of output; all others based on appropriate unit of production.
** Official Soviet plan not comparable with data on actual performance, and
the latter for various statistical reasons is biased upward.
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The Communist World
USSR FIRST-QUARTER ECONOMIC RESULTS
Soviet industrial growth in
the quarter just ended was the
poorest of recent years, although
output continued to expand at a
rate only slightly below average;
most major goals were fulfilled.
The slowdown can be attributed
both to the exceptionally severe
winter and to continuing problems
associated with planning and re-
source allocation. In addition,
the reorganizations of the past
year probably caused disruptions.
Because of the characteristic
brevity of first-quarter informa-
tion--and particularly this year
because of the weather--the Soviet
report is not a good basis for
analysis of resource shifts. As
usual no figures were given for
investment, consumption, trade,
and housing.
Aside from these obvious lim-
itations, the report strongly sug-
gests that the economy continues
to follow the lines affirmed by
the central committee plenum last
November: primacy for heavy in-
dustry, with emphasis on chemical
output and away from ferrous metals
and a promise of "proportional
development of light and heavy in-
dustry"--which apparently means,
in Communist jargon, limiting heavy
industrial and defense develop-
ment just enough to maintain mini-
mum improvements in the standard
of living.
A higher priority for the
chemical industry was clearly seen
in the report. Likewise, the re-
duced rates of increase in the
1963 plans for crude steel and pig
iron were reflected in actual per-
formance: output compared to the
fourth quarter 1962 showed an al-
most unprecedented absolute decline.
26 Apr 63
Industrial support for farming
appears also to have a higher prior-
ity. The production of agricultural
equipment slackened, but less than
machine building as a whole. The
announced increase for tractors was
the largest since 1954. Production
of chemical fertilizer increased at
a considerably higher rate than in
the first quarter of last year but
still not enough to meet the annual
and seven-year plans.
The Soviet consumer is still
low on Moscow's scale of priorities.
Light industrial and food industry
increases were both below last year's
rates. Cotton and woolen textiles
increased only marginally. Meat pro-
duction increased by almost one third
--possibly in response to the higher
procurement prices introduced last
year but also as a result of the
lack of fodder this winter which re-
sulted in distress slaughtering.
Consumer durables continued to in-
crease rapidly but at considerably
lower rates than last year; as
usual, production was woefully in-
adequate.
Moscow is apparently keenly
aware of the difficult situation
for the consumer which has developed
over the past few years of poor har-
vests and meager investment. In
response, however, the regime con-
tinues thus far to seek only re-
source-cheap methods of improve-
ment and to encourage additional
investment by local sources. Typical
is the reported announcement on 20
April that the consumer goods plan
had been revised upward by 1 billion
rubles (nominally, $1.1 billion).
There apparently was no accompanying
promise of supplementary national in-
vestment,and the items mentioned were
generally peripheral to the pressing
needs of the population.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
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SECRET The Communist World
RUMANIAN POLICY DIFFERENCES WITH THE
Significant conflicts of in-
terest between Rumania and the
USSR have been underlined by
reported disagreements over the
role Rumania is to play in the
economic development of the Com-
munist bloc.
asked to accept a decision of the
February 1963 CEMA Executive Com-
mittee that it must in effect
abandon plans for most major new
industries and concentrate on
petroleum products, fertilizers,
and agriculture. Rumanian repre-
sentative Birladeanu is said to
have refused.
Rumania's opposition to CEMA
policies is the strongest and most
open yet expressed by a satellite
country, suggesting that vital Ru-
manian economic interests are in-
volved. In the course of the party
plenum, First Secretary Gheorghiu-
Dej reportedly agreed to send a
letter to Khrushchev threatening to
withdraw Rumania from CEMA unless
the proposed plans were altered.
Recent Rumanian statements on CEMA
have ignored proposals for a higher
stage of economic cooperation voiced
at the Moscow Economic Conference in
June 1962 and have instead continued
to emphasize "coordination" and na-
tional sovereignty. Rumania has
reportedly opposed proposals to make
decisions of the CEMA Executive Com-
mittee binding and create a unified
planning organ proposed by Khru-
shchev.
His stand was officially
endorsed at the 5-8 March plenum
of the Rumanian party central
committee convened solely to dis-
cuss CEMA matters. Following the
plenum, a series of regional party
meetings was held to endorse the
regime stand, which is reported
to have received widespread popu-
lar support. Under these cir-
cumstances the Rumanian regime
will find it difficult to reverse
its position, although it appears
that Bucharest's political and
ideological loyalty to Moscow has
not altered.
Although CEMA has not expected
Rumania to halt all plans for new
industry, one major Rumanian griev-
ance has been Soviet reluctance to
help equip the mammoth Galati iron
and steel combine. Soviet assist-
ance, promised at the outset, has
not materialized. This has led
Rumania to purchase $42 million
worth of equipment for Galati from
France and the UK and to seek in
the West a basic oxygen converter
plant for production of crude steel,
also valued at $42 million, as well
as additional rolling-mill equip-
ment.
Signs of disagreement between
Rumania and the USSR on other matters
have also begun to show. In late
1962 a Rumanian party journal openly
attacked a Soviet historian for
failing to mention the important
part played by the Rumanian Commu-
nist Party in liberating Rumania from
the Germans. A marked departure
from normal procedures was notices
at the 1962 October Revolution cele-
brations in Bucharest, when only
two members of the top leadership
were present at the main celebra-
tion.
In a similar vein President
Stoica rather than Gheorghiu-Dej
led the Rumanian delegation to the
East Germany party congress in Jan-
uary. He voiced only moderate sup-
port for the USSR, was less critical
of the Chinese delegate's speech
than Bulgaria's Zhivkov, and made
no reference to Moscow's leading
role in the Communist movement.
Furthermore, Rumania is the only
bloc country which has not restored
party contacts with Yugoslavia.
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EAST GERMANY HAS NEW DIFFICULTIES IN FIRST QUARTER 1963
East Germany, in addition
to its chronic economic diffi-
culties, is facing a series of
acute short-run problems re-
sulting from the abnormally se-
vere winter. Publicly, however,
the regime is holding to its
original goals, at least in the
strategic sectors such as in-
vestments and exports, as a means
of exerting maximum pressure on
the workers. The heavy emphasis
on labor productivity has led to
the elimination of plan arrears
in a few enterprises, and is ex-
pected to be the major factor
in the drive to catch up.
Despite the hard winter,,
which has undoubtedly retarded
economic growth, industrial out-
put will continue to increase
this year, and the prospects for
fulfillment of some of the main
economic goals do not appear
hopeless. Through extraordinary
efforts, the brown-coal mines
overfulfilled their plan for
the first quarter. However,
output will have to be well
above plan in order to meet ex-
port commitments and replenish
reserves.
Output of electric power
rose during the quarter, although
not enough to meet the tremen-
dously increased demands. Some
industries--e.g., steel--are
lagging behind plan but are ex-
pected to catch up this summer.
However, where plans are ful-
filled, there will probably be
increases in production costs
and in prevailing worker dis-
satisfaction.
At the central committee
plenum in mid-April, Erich
Honecker, Ulbricht's heir appar-
ent, reported that first-quarter
gross industrial production
plans were 911 percent fulfilled.
His report inuicates, however,
in spite of his statements to
the contrary, that some parts
of the 1963 plan already have
been scaled down. For example,
backlogs in nonstrategic light
and consumer-goods industries
will be allowed to continue,
and some new products planned
for this year may not be in-
troduced at all.
(decree re-
portedly calls for reductions
in future production of consumer
goods and food supplies.
One factor preventing any
serious consideration of making
up for all lost production is
the transportation system. Pri-
ority given to transport of
coal and food this winter has
caused backlogs in rail trans-
port. There have been some
production slowdowns because
needed raw materials did not
reach the factories in suf-
ficient quantities.
The regime is trying to
squeeze higher levels of per-
formance out of the Reichsbahn
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by reducing turnaround time, by
increasing average loads per
car, and by extending use of
centralized loading and unload-
ing points. Waterway and truck
transport will be more inten-
sively used. These measures
will ease the situation some-
what, but any significant im-
provement is precluded by the
lack of sufficient rolling stock.
Construction plans for the
first quarter of 1963 were only
65 percent fulfilled, and short-
falls in investments were par-
ticularly large. Construction
plans usually are unrealistic
for the first quarter and are
almost never fulfilled, but the
lag is greater this year. Con-
struction of the big industrial
projects is plagued this year
by damages resulting from frost,
shortages of materials, lack of
workers, and poor planning.
In agriculture, the sit-
uation appears equally gloomy.
Honecker reported that the cattle
slaughter plan for the first
quarter had been fulfilled by
113 percent. However, beef and
veal comprise only one third of
total meat production in East
Germany, and pork, which ap-
parently is in shortest supply,
makes up most of the remainder.
Excess slaughter of cattle does
not make up for the sizable
shortfall in pork.
Moreover, there has been
a serious increase in animal
losses, especially of pigs,
caused by hoof-and-mouth disease,
frost, insufficient fodder, and
poor animal care on collective
farms, thus making any signifi-
cant improvement in livestock
production this year appear
doubtful.
The regime plans to im-
port more meat thy.s year than
last and if domestic production
should drop again this year,
may have to increase imports
even further in order to pre-
vent any serious reduction in
per capita consumption.
The burden of catching up
will be on the worker in the form
of longer workdays and increases
in labor productivity. The chief
means immediately available to
increase production is to intro-
duce planned step-ups in work
norms ahead of schedule. Double
and triple shifts, continuous
operation of machinery seven
days a week, and cancellation or
postponement of vacations are
other means. Wages are being
held steady or in some cases
being reduced.
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The Communist World
DE-STALINIZATION IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA
In an important but belated
de-Stalinization gesture in re-
sponse to internal party pressures,
hard-line Czech leader Novotny has
reportedly engineered the resigna-
tion of his long-time associate
Karol Bacilek. The 66-year-old
Bacilek has been until now the
highly unpopular first secretary
of the Slovak party and a member
of the presidium of the Czecho-
slovak party. He was minister for
national security during the noto-
rious purge in 1952 of former party
general secretary Slansky and his
followers for "national deviation"
and is said also to have played
a direct role in the purges of
Slovak "nationalists" between 1949
and 1954.
No official announcement of
the ouster has yet been made.
Local party officials throughout
the country reportedly were in-
formed of the action during meet-
ings from 10 to 12 April which dis-
cussed a recent party investigation
of the so-called Slansky trials.
The Slovak party, which has re-
sented having a Czech as first
"Alas, some people still incor-
rectly understand the criticism
of the personality cult...."
-Karol Bacilek, 14 January 1963
26 Apr 63
secretary, is likely to interpret
the move as a concession from
Prague and renew its efforts to
obtain greater autonomy for Slovak
affairs.
25X1
The absence of an official an-
nouncement of Bacilek's removal or
the findings of the investigation
may reflect opposition in the party
to Novotny's intention to undertake
only token de-Stalinization. Further
delay, however, will only encourage
In view of the widespread
dissatisfaction in Czechoslovakia,
particularly among the intellec-
tuals, the news of Bacilek's
ouster is likely to arouse hope
among the public, as well as de-
mands within the party, for truly
effective de-Stalinization. In-
deed there has already been a
rash of rumors that other top
leaders are to be purged and
numerous important victims of
the trials fully rehabilitated.
Novotny, however, clearly
has no such plan and would prob-
ably like to do no more than re-
habilitate some minor victims of
the Slansky trials--such as the
Slovak poet Novomesky, who was
readmitted to the Slovak Writers'
Association on 22 April. Novotny
probably hopes to play down the
significance of Bacilek's ouster,
thus minimizing public discussion
of the roles played by himself and
other top regime officials, notably
Premier Viliam Siroky, during the
1949-54 purge period. The regime,
is
already letting it be known a
there were mitigating circumstances
for Bacilek's "failure to control
the excesses of his ministry" dur-
ing the purges.
speculation and expectations and,
perhaps, create a situation which
will put Novotny's power to a test.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
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Trieste
T11 I
Vinkovci, ovi Sad0
.Zadar 4
,Sibenki
Banja Lukas B AJNICA Belgrad
,Doboj e
AIRFIELD HQ
ADRIATIC HQ Ejevo it- ,,Kragujevac
HR
ADRIATIC
Mostar. Nis
SEA o. Ploce Leskovac
,Dubrovnik YVVV
Major highway
Army Headquarters
Naval base
STRENGTH SUMMARY
GROUND 250,000 26 line divisions
NAVAL 29,000
Y U G O S L A V I A
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MODERNIZATION OF YUGOSLAV MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT
The appearance in Yugo-
slavia of Soviet-manufactured
surface-to-air missile (SAM)
equipment and MIG aircraft in-
dicates that the Yugoslav-So-
viet arms deal signed early
last year or late in 1961 in-
volved a sizable package of
sophisticated weapons. This
agreement apparently solved
one important problem in bilat-
eral trade--Yugoslav difficulty
in finding desired commodities
to import. The trade credits
Yugoslavia had accumulated
with the USSR probably have
been used up by military pur-
chases, And Moscow now may
have extended a military aid
credit to finance deliveries
of additional equipment.
S equipment for at least one
six-launcher SA-2 site. Air
defense missiles, MIG aircraft,
and perhaps also recently ac-
quired Soviet air defense
radars (Big Bar, Spoon Rest,
and Flat Face types) may be
exhibited in Yugoslavia's May
Day parade, as the newly ac-
quired T-54 tanks and SU-100
assault guns were last year.
Delivery of this armament
strongly suggests the existence
of a general program designed
to modernize the Yugoslav mili-
tary establishment. Additional
SAM units for an air defense
system around Belgrade and
other key areas will probably
soon be delivered. Yugoslavia
probably now has a number of
MIG-19 fighters--possibly a
squadron of 12. In addition
to these, MIG-21s complete
with air-to-air missiles and
ground control equipment are
probably scheduled for delivery
as part of the air defense
package.
Although 40 percent of the
Yugoslav budget goes to defense
--one of the highest ratios in
the world--the military estab-
lishment is not modern and its
equipment is of mixed origin,
principally US, German, and
Soviet. The main function of
the air force is tactical sup-
port of the relatively well-
trained army, but its secondary
role of air defense has been
receiving increased emphasis
during the past year. Of its
approximately 400 tactical air-
craft, some 350 are US F-84 and
F-86 series fighters, of which
some 100 are F-86Ds. The latter
are gradually being integrated
into operational units and will
give the Yugoslav Air Force an
all-weather capability.
Large numbers of Soviet
technicians and instructors will
be required in Yugoslavia to
set up the air defense system,
and Yugoslav officers have been
training in the USSR. There are
indications that the Yugoslav
officer corps, which had bad
experience with Soviet advisers
prior to 1948, is unhappy over
the prospect of a new influx
and may even be attempting to
limit the number of Soviets
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SECRET
Asia-Africa
TENSIONS CONTINUE IN LAOS
Moscow's move on 23 April
to block agreement with Britain
on a joint appeal by the Geneva
co-chairmen (the UK and the
USSR) to the Laotian Government
underscores the Soviet leaders'
unwillingness to take any action
on Laos which might complicate
their problems in dealing with
the Chinese Communists at this
crucial stage in the Sino-Soviet
conflict. Ambassador Kohler in
Moscow has commented that the
renewed fighting in Laos has
confronted the Soviets with
precisely the sort of decision
they seek to avoid during this
period of delicate discussions
with Peiping.
Despite the uncooperative
Soviet attitude toward British
efforts to restore the situation
and Soviet charges that the US
is sabotaging the Geneva agree-
ments of 1962, it is unlikely
that the USSR has made a de-
cision to instigate, or even
acquiesce in, a resumption of
the Laotian civil war or to
seek to bring about the collapse
of Premier Souvanna's coalition
government. Aside from the
dubious advantages from Moscow's
viewpoint of such an abrupt
reversal of Soviet policy in
Laos, it remains uncertain how
much direct influence or con-
trol the USSR can exercise over
the Pathet Lao forces.
There have been several
indications since the Geneva
settlement last summer of
divergencies between the Pathet
Lao and their bloc mentors on
tactics toward Kong Le's
neutralists. The US Embassy in
Moscow suggests that the Soviet
Union finds itself more an
embarrassed victim of Pathet
Lao tactics than a confident
molder of history in Laos and
that it has been forced into
a position of covering up for
Pathet Lao policy which Moscow
does not fully approve.
During the first half of
April, Moscow maintained a rel-
atively cautious attitude and,
in contrast to Peiping and Hanoi,
devoted little propaganda atten-
tion to Laos developments. The
Soviet leaders also temporized
and sought to evade British
proposals for joint action by
the co-chairmen. Foreign
Minister Gromyko, however,
stressed to the British ambas-
sador in Moscow the importance
of cooperation between the co-
chairmen, and the Soviet ambas-
sador in Laos tried to appear
cooperative with the British
ambassador there and with the
International Control Commission
(ICC).
The USSR's attitude began
to stiffen in mid-April, however,
after Hanoi and Peiping issued
official statements on 15 and
16 April charging the US with
sabotaging the Geneva agreements
and protesting US "intervention"
in Laos. These formal charges
by China and North Vietnam
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Ban Song Hoc ? Muong Kheung
Muong Kassy
Vang Vieng
Ban Hin Heup4
`-, Pak Sane
TH A ,I L A N D
Nong Het
T Al)L"D
Phou Keng? Khay
Muong Phanh. 4..,,E Phong Savan
DES JARRES
Lat Houange - ? . Xieng Khouang
A O S
VIENTIANE
_Qng Kha
? Roar
Tract: or trail
E?
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SE CRE T
increased the difficulty and
dangers of Moscow's moderate
course. To avoid being isolated,
the USSR promptly adopted these
charges against the US and
shifted to a more obstructive
line with the British.
On 20 April, Gromyko handed
to Britain's Moscow ambassador
a draft message from the co-
chairmen to the Vientiane gov-
ernment and the three Laotian
factions appealing for a peace-
ful settlement in accordance
with the Geneva agreements.
The USSR made certain, however,
that Britain would reject this
draft by including a paragraph
which repeated some of Peiping's
charges against the US. After
Gromyko rejected Britain's
request that this paragraph be
deleted, Moscow published the
draft message on 23 April, thus
bringing to an end at least
this phase of the Western effort
to enlist Soviet support for
measures to restore the Laotian
situation.
Meanwhile, the military
situation in the Plaine des
Jarres appears to have stabilized
for the time being following
Prince Souphannouvong's agreement
on 21 April temporarily to halt
Pathet Lao offensive actions.
Neutralist commander Kong Le has
established a north-south defense
line to the west of his previous
headquarters at the Plaine des
Jarres airfield, which apparently
remains abandoned.
It is uncertain, however,
whether either he or the Pathet
Lao intends to adhere to the
truce for long. Both sides are
still maneuvering to improve
their positions, and sporadic
exchanges of artillery and mor-
tar fire continue. Souphannouvong
has refused to accept the
stationing of an ICC team any-
where in Pathet Lao territory,
and has also scuttled a tenta-
tive arrangement for ICC presence
at Kong Le's new headquarters
at Muong Phanh. As an interim
measure, the ICC is resorting
to daily flights to Muong Phanh.
For his part, Kong Le
has refused to accede to Pathet
Lao demands for the withdrawal
of rightist military elements
supporting him in the Plaine
des Jarres area. General
Phoumi has already covertly
airdropped two battalions to
reinforce the neutralists at
Muong Phanh, and is prepared
for open intervention should
the situation deteriorate.
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26 Apr 63 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
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v
Dead
Sea
UAR
(EGYPT
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SINAI
PENINSULA
Member of the newly proclaimed
United Arab Republic
STa u MILES
p 80 too
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SECRET
ARAB FEDERATION ROCKS JORDAN
Jordan is experiencing its
worst crisis in years in the wake
of the agreement by Egypt, Iraq,
and Syria to federate. Although
King Husayn probably will be able
to ride out the present storm,
the threat of his assassination
seems to have increased.
Demonstrations extolling
Nasir and Arab unity became ri-
otous in Jerusalem and other
towns in West Jordan on 20 April
and were suppressed only by
army intervention. Prime Min-
ister Samir Rifai's 24-day-old
government fell the same day on
its first vote of confidence.
The debate preceding the vote
featured charges that Rifai's
steps to arrange a rapprochement
with the new federation were in-
sufficient. Husayn promptly
dissolved the chamber, and in-
stalled a caretaker government
under his uncle, Sharif Husayn
ibn-Nasir, with instructions to
prepare for new elections in
four months.
In fact, Husayn is exer-
cising virtually direct control.
The government has arrested nine
deputies and some leaders of the
outlawed Arab Nationalist Move-
ment who are accused of having
significant roles in fomenting
the disturbances. Undeclared
martial law has not prevented
further demonstrations from
breaking out in Amman and other
towns on the East Bank, as well
as in West Jordan.
These events are indica-
tive of the sharp resurgence in
yearning for Arab unity that
has been stimulated among Jor-
danians by the Cairo negotia-
to exert continuing pressure on
the Jordanian regime. In addition,
there has been a broadening of
the gulf between the predominantly
East Jordanian supporters of the
King and his numerous Palestin-
ian opponents from the West Bank,
who have long resented their sub-
serviences to the monarchy.
Externally, Husayn's regime
is more isolated than ever from
the revolutionary nationalists
of Egypt, Syria, and Iraq. Cairo
propaganda has stepped up its
campaign against Husayn--its
clandestine radio calling Rifai's
fall "preparatory to Husayn's
overthrow." It has called on
Jordanians to destroy the monarchy
so that Jordan can become the
"fourth region" in the new fed-
eration, and addressed a special
appeal to the army to join the
"revolutionary caravan." With
only slightly more restraint,
Cairo's overt broadcasts speak
of the inevitable establishment
of "the people's rule."
Cairo also charges that
"Husayn seeks the protection of
Israel." The Israeli radio tends
to support this by repeating Ben-
Gurion's warning of last fall
that Egyptian control of Jordan
would constitute a serious threat
to which Israel could not remain
indifferent. Egypt's clandestine
radio, in response, has urged
Jordanians not to be deterred by
the Israeli threat, for "we Arabs
are capable of crushing Israel
within a few hours if it should
attempt a new adventure." Bagh-
dad radio has used the same
tions. This popular mood promises I
26 Apr 63
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY
SUMMARY Page 13
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i~1I
SECRET
Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and
Yemen have all orally notified
Secretary General Thant of their
agreement to his plan for disen-
gagement of foreign forces in-
volved in the dwindling Yemeni
fighting.
Egypt apparently is pre-
paring for an initial troop
withdrawal. A Cairo paper has
reported that the first group
of returning Egyptian troops
will arrive on 26 April aboard
the ships Misr and Sudan.
The way now is paved for
the dispatch of a UN inter-
mediary to supervise the disen-
gagement process.
President Sallal, meanwhile,
is encountering increasingly
heavy criticism from both mili-
tary and tribal elements who
claim that his rule is dictato-
rial.
26 Apr 63
The USSR is apparently
stepping up its assistance to
Yemen. The Soviet ship Gruziya,
which arrived in Hudaydah on
18 April, reportedly landed a
large number of Soviet techni-
25X1
25X1
April. The group probably
and agricultural development.
includes technicians who will
assist in the repair and moderni-
zation of Yemen's airfields,
and specialists expected in
connection with other Soviet
aid projects, such as housing
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w4w V
SE CRE T
BEN BELLA CONSOLIDATES POWER IN ALGERIA
Premier Ahmed Ben Bella
has taken several steps to
tighten his control of Algeria,
but he remains beset with grave
administrative problems.
On 18 April he forced his
principal rival, Mohamed Khider,
to resign as secretary general
of the political bureau of the
National Liberation Front (FLN),
the country's only legal politi-
cal organization. Ben Bella
considers the party to be a
nucleus of loyal militants
advising the government, whereas
Khider has viewed it as an
initiator of policy, with the
government as its executive or-
gan. When Khider sought to
convoke an FLN congress to re-
view the draft constitution
prior to its consideration by
the Constituent Assembly, he
provoked a crisis. Two of the
other three bureau members
backed Ben Bella, who himself
assumed Khider's former post.
Ben Bella seeks to estab-
lish control over the disor-
ganized and somewhat ineffectual
party as he already has imposed
his influence over the labor
and students' organizations.
Army support seems assured,
thanks largely to Ben Bella's
close relationship with his
defense minister and army chief
of staff, Col. Houari Boumedienne.
Khider remains a member of
the five-man political bureau,
where he can continue to exert
pressure for closer ties with
the Middle Eastern Arabs and
a return to Islamic tradition-
alism. Moreover, he probably
has not abandoned his desire
for supreme political power
and may try to merge the
country's disaffected elements
to attack Ben Bella's domestic
and foreign policies.
For the moment, Ben Bella's
control has been further strength-
ened by the resignation of two of
Khider's followers, the ministers
of information and of posts and
telecommunications. The premier
merged the two portfolios and
placed them under an able and
energetic protege of Boumedienne.
Nevertheless, the govern-
ment is composed largely of third-
raters, and its administrative
difficulties have been compounded
by the removal of Foreign Minister
Mohamed Khemisti--critically
wounded in an 11 April assassina-
tion attempted. Despite Ben
Bella's recent successes, he
probably lacks the intellect
and ability to run the country
effectively. The popular acclaim
he has won on recent visits
throughout Algeria has con-
tributed to a strong Messianic
drive. As his frustrations
increase, he may more frequently
act impulsively, as in recent
nationalization moves and his
invitation to Castro to visit
Algiers.
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~sr gay I r UGANDA
vom8~erv I1 ;~..
4 %amina
ANGOLA
R"Iroad
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SE CRE T
Asia-Africa
ADOULA STILL AT ODDS WITH CONGO PARLIAMENT
Premier Adoula's recent
cabinet reshuffle has not eased
his problems with the rambunctious
Congo Parliament.
Irrespective of membership
in the new government, the
deputies are bitterly protesting
Adoula's plan to recess Parlia-
ment. On 17 April the lower
house moved, with only three
dissenting votes, to amend the
constitution to provide that
Parliament could not be recessed
without the consent of both
chambers. Adoula won a sub-
sequent motion of no confidence
in the senate over this issue,
but it remains a live one.
Adoula has told US Embassy
officials that even if both
chambers passed the amendment,
President Kasavubu would not
promulgate it as a law. Adoula
may, however, find himself in
a situation where he is faced
with giving in, or backing up
his refusal with force. In any
event, new attempts to block
him on this and other issues
seem likely.
One such issue--the dispute
over the long-contemplated re-
training program for thq Congo
Army--is intensifying. Adoula's
plans include heavy representa-
tion by NATO among the training
countries--Belgium, Norway, and
Italy--and participation by
Israel. The Lumumbist youth
group has protested training
"by NATO" and called on Parlia-
ment to stop the plan.
The program also continues
to encounter heavy opposition
from the African, Asian, and
Arab members of the UN's Congo
Advisory Committee in New York,
despite the Congo Government's
pleas that it has the sovereign
right to choose whom it wishes
to retrain the army.
In the meantime, U Thant
and the UN field commanders
have agreed to reduce UN forces
in the Congo to a maximum of
7,500 men by the end of June.
Six of the eight planned combat
battalions are to be stationed
in Katanga. The other two would
be based in Leopoldville and in
either Luluabourg or Albertville,
leaving most of the turbulent
eastern Congo to the notoriously
indisciplined Congo Army.
The US consul in Elisabeth-
ville notes that while Tshombd
continues to be personally
popular, changes are being in-
stituted in Katanga which are
weakening his political power.
A younger group of Katangan
leaders--less responsive to
Tshombe's control--is emerging
and gradually assuming more
authority. The consul feels
also that the Katangan members
of the national Parliament
and ministers in the central
government are now less re-
sponsive to Tshomb6 than pre-
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W
SECRET
FRANCE RESERVES DECISION ON INTERALLIED NUCLEAR FORCE
De Gaulle used a nation-
wide radio-TV speech on 19 April
and a subsequent tour of north-
eastern France to re-emphasize
the need for an independent
French nuclear force. He prob-
ably intended to remove any
doubts that French resolve is
weakening, although he admitted
that the cost of the national
force would be high. He indi-
cated that the government may
ask Parliament, when its spring
session opens on 30 April, for
a supplementary budget appro-
priation.
De Gaulle again called the
Atlantic alliance "indispensable"
and said French defense would
be "linked" with that of its
allies. However, he avoided
specific mention of the Inter-
allied Nuclear Force (IANF) or
other NATO nuclear force pro-
posals.
French officials generally
remain skeptical of the military
worth of the IANF and view it
primarily as a political device
to head off the development of
national nuclear forces. Be-
cause of the IANF's political
overtones, Paris apparently will
reserve a final decision on
whether to participate with its
own NATO-assigned units, or
attempt to delay the creation of
the IANF.
Francois de Rose, civilian
deputy to the chief of staff
of national defense and the
man assigned by Foreign Minister
SECRET
26 Apr 63 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Page 18
Couve de Murville to study the
effect of the IANF, has told
the US Embassy in Paris that
his report concludes there is
nothing in the substance of the
IANF proposals France cannot
fully support. He emphasized,
however, that he did not know
what De Gaulle's reaction to his
report would be.
De Rose, Francois Seydoux,
France's NATO permanent repre-
sentative, and Etienne Burin
des Roziers, De Gaulle's top
personal aide, have all warned,
however, that France's attitude
toward the IANF will be governed
by the way in which it is pre-
sented. De Rose said it was ex-
tremely important to avoid any
action which might impress De
Gaulle as instituting a radical
or new procedure requiring action
by Paris. He was particularly
concerned that the British would
try to blow up the IANF into some-
thing it is not.
In the same vein, Burin des
Roziers reportedly told the British
ambassador in Paris that France
would probably not try to block
the IANF so long as it is pre-
sented as a routine NATO devel-
opment, but that the French
NATO delegate would probably
veto the proposal if it were
treated as something new and
important. The French position
will probably not be decided
until shortly before the Ottawa
foreign ministers' meetings on
22 May.
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BRITISH WEST IflDI?S GROUPInGS
}
CUBA
CAYMAN IS.
Ae
JAMAICA
(Independent)
The British Nest Indies Federation, inaugurated in 1958,
consisted of ten units Jamaica and its dependencies, Trini-
dadand Tobago, Plus Barbados, Grenada, St. Vincent, St. Lucia,
Dominica, Montserrat, Antigua, and the Nevis -St. Christopher -
Anguilla group. British Guiana, British Honduras, the British
Virgin Islands, and the Bahamas were never included. The fed-
eration war dissolved in 1962 because Jamaica seceded and
Trinidad preferred separate independence to leading the federa-
tion in either its then existing form or in various alternative
forms under discussion...
Jamaica received Its independence on 6 August 1962, and
its dependencies (the Cayman, Caicos, and Turks islands) re-
verted to British sovereignty at their own request. Trinidad
and Tobagobecane independent as a unit on 31 August. The re-
maining eight members of the defunct federation have been dis-
cussing a Song themselves and with Britain the for.nation of a
"Little Eight federation; a conference on the subject is set
for 26 June In London. Grenada's real aim, however, is to
unite with Trinidad-Tobago, but Trinidad has rejected this
idea primarily because Grenada would be an economic liability.
British officials believe that Grenada's reluctance to
participate in the larger grouping will continue nevertheless,
and that the London conference will result in creation of a
self-governing "Little Seven" without f 11 independence for
some time,
,,CAICOS IS.
TURKS IS.
STATUTE MILES 400
26 APRIL 1963
33300
MITI DOMINICA N PUERTO
REPUBLIC RICO -VIRGIN IS.
(U (UK) ,Anguilla
St. Christopher., Antigua
Nevis
Montserrat
Dominical m
St. Lucia &,6
St. Vincent, c Barbados
tia:
Grenada.if 3e
=Tobago to
' TRINIDAD)
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TRINIDAD PREMIER PROMOTING CARIBBEAN UNITY
Trinidad's Prime Minister
Eric Williams appears to be
making some headway in efforts
to develop a Caribbean economic
and political bloc. His po-
litical position at home is
strong, and he has long been
ambitious to extend his influ-
ence throughout the region.
Williams has frequently dis-
played emotional instability
as well as an anti-US bias;
the other side of his complex
character, however, shows a
man of high intellect possess-
ing strong anti-Communist con-
victions.
Since the collapse of the
West Indies Federation in 1962,
relations among Jamaica, Trini-
dad, and British Windward and
Leeward Islands have been dis-
tant. Williams subsequently
undertook a series of moves
calculated to tighten inter-
Caribbean relations.
First he established closer
ties with Dutch Surinam. On
a visit to Jamaica in mid-Feb-
ruary on other matters, Williams
negotiated an agreement for
the exchange of high commis-
sioners and the establishment
of working parties to discuss
matters of mutual interest.
Williams also visited British
Guiana and persuaded Prime
Minister Jagan to retain an
interest in the continuation
of a regional university.
;Williams' efforts were assisted
by his acceptance of a new rice
trade agreement on Guianese
terms.
After talks with leaders of
Barbados and Antigua, Williams
announced on 3 April that
a meeting of the heads of govern-
ments in the West Indies area
should be held, possibly in
June. He proposed an extensive
agenda covering a wide variety
of economic, political, and cul-
tural matters of common concern.
The main purpose of the meeting,
however, is apparently to for-
mulate a joint approach to the
US for economic aid. On 23
April Williams claimed publicly
that the leaders of Jamaica,
Barbados, and even British Gui-
ana were cooperating in his plan
for closer Caribbean ties.
Williams is
generally respected in the Car-
ibbean area for his academic
and political attainments. He
apparently has elicited not only
considerable sympathy for his
ideas but a measure of acquies-
cence in his leadership as well.
There is some disagreement, how-
ever, about the desirability of
closer cooperation with Commu-
nist-oriented British Guiana.
Williams' role is particularly
significant at a time when Ja-
maica--the other state most
capable of area leadership--
seems uninterested in taking
up the challenge.
In Jamaica, Williams' crit-
ical attitude toward the US may
have struck a responsive chord
among certain ministers who
feel the US is indifferent to
Jamaica's aid needs, and might
undermine in the long run Prime
Minister Bustamante's strong
support of the US.
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The Argentine Government,
still determined to hold gen-
eral elections, is maintaining
strong security measures to dis-
courage any efforts to interfere.
The present schedule calls
for the political parties to
submit their lists of candidates
by 6 May, for general elections
on 23 June, and for turning over
power to the new government on
12 October. A maximum delay of
two weeks in both the 6 May
deadline and the 23 June elec-
tion date may be granted, how-
ever, since the political par-
ties continue to drag their feet
on choosing candidates.
their objective of a freely
elected government not dominated
by the Peronists.
The armed forces' investi-
gation of those involved in the
rebellion is proceeding at a
measured pace. All but three
navy flag officers have been
cashiered or jailed, and disci-
plinary action has been taken
against 15 to 20 air force of-
ficers. At least 300 junior
officers from the three services
are under arrest or investiga-
tion. Almost 70 officers fled
into exile following the revolt,
but some of these have returned
voluntarily.
So far, only the People's
Radicals (UCRP) and the Chris-
tian Democrats--probably the
third and fifth largest polit-
ical groups--have formally named
presidential candidates. Some
other non-Peronist groups are
just beginning discussions on
the possibility of cooperating
to nominate a single candidate,
but individual party candidacies
seem more likely.
Negotiations for a national
front, including the Peronists'
Popular Union (UP) party, are
no nearer to completion than
they were before the 2-6 April
rebellion aimed at preventing
the elections. Since then the
UP's plans have become even
more uncertain. It now is pro-
testing the government's efforts
to persuade the UP not to pre-
sent candidates for the presi-
dency or some governorships.
Army sources have indicated to
the US army attache that they
are losing their former confi-
dence that they can achieve
Between 1,000 and 2,500
armed civilians are estimated
to have participated in the re-
bellion in Cordoba. Most of
these have escaped arrest, and
this element is a source of con-
siderable concern to government
officials, who fear further
deterioration of the political
situation might prompt a renewal
of their antigovernment activ-
ities.
The government, meanwhile
has responded to complaints oil
official corruption and Commu-
nist infiltration by ordering
the arrest of a number of for-
mer officials and leftists con-
nected with Rogelio Frigerio,
adviser to ex-President F -
dizi.
(These arrests
could prove to be another un- 25X6
settling factor in the politi-
cal situation.
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Western Hemisphere
Colombian President Valen-
cia's failure to come to grips
with an unhealthy financial
situation is causing his regime
to lose public confidence. Lack-
ing strong direction, the Na-
tional Front coalition govern-
ment is encountering diffi-
culties in promoting the sta-
bilization and development pro-
grams to which it is committed
under the Alliance for Progress.
Symptomatic of Valencia's
inaction have been the uncoor-
dinated and often conflicting
efforts of his cabinet ministers.
Labor Minister Betancur's suc-
cessful drive for excessive
wage increases, for example,
not only accelerated inflation
but severely damaged Finance
Minister Sanz' austerity pro-
gram. The loss of momentum in
the administration's campaign
for new revenue legislation--to
finance a ten-year-development
program--is another sign of
executive lethargy.
Internal tensions in the
Liberal Party--partner with
Valencia's Conservatives in the
National Front coalition--are
adding to the atmosphere of
uncertainty. The recent resigna-
tion of Carlos Lleras as party
chief and the rise of a new
left-wing Liberal faction--the
Gaitanista Movement--promise
to introduce a new element of
friction between Liberals and
Conservatives.
However, the appointment
this week of several new cab-
inet ministers who served under
former Liberal President Alberto
Lleras may ease interparty dif-
ferences. In any event, the
Liberal and Conservative leaders
probably see no feasible alter-
native to the National Front
and are likely to keep the
coalition intact.
Developing, nonetheless,
is an uneasy feeling that an
extension of the present trend.
could lead eventually to a
military coup. For the pres-
ent, however, there is no
evidence that the military are
considering such a move.
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Western Hemisphere
The counterguerrilla activ-
ity mounted in eastern Guatemala
last week by the new military
government appears to be pri-
marily an attempt to tighten
general security in that area.
Small rebel groups have operated
sporadically in the mountains
there for over two years and
are a potential rallying point
for various dissatisfied groups.
Although at least one of
the rebel groups, led by ex-
lieutenant Yon Sosa, is known
to have received Cuban financial
support last year, there is no
proof at present that the cur-
rent guerrilla activity is
either a major outbreak or a
coordinated Communist-led effort.
Guatemalan Communist Party
leaders, nonetheless, are re-
liably reported to have decided
recently to employ armed struggle
to resist the Peralta regime's
stiff a,itisubversive decrees.
They are said to look upon the
recent skirmishing in the Zacapa-
Izabal area as a prelude to a
"declaration of war" by the
guerrillas. The party, however,
is disorganized and the guerrilla
groups which the Communists claim
to have joined probably are not
yet prepared for sustained opera- 25X1
tions.
Guatemalan Army
unit's discovery of guerrillas
on a training exercise may have
precipitated the fighting that
began on 18 April. Government
forces, supported by tanks and
planes, claim to have routed
the rebels, but this is prob-
ably an exaggeration.
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