CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A003900090001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 26
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 10, 2008
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: February 21, 1963
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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(CURRENT
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY
SUMMARY
State Dept. review completed
I I I
COPY N0. ~~
OC~ NO. 0268/63
21 February 1963
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
iii
USAF review(s) completed.
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
NAVY review completed.
~ ~ SECRET
~{l.l~iii~1 l~iJ 1~L'"v:sLJ ~,~.,.~
MMEDIAT~:LY AFTER US$ j
OB ~~7' - f~ ;~ RnX :~ Q' e
GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUM~IAR.Y
21 February 1963
T H E W E E K I N B R I E F
(Information as of 1200 EST 20 Feb)
SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY DEVELOPMENTS Page 3
Khrushchev's decision to withdraw "several thousand"
Soviet military personnel from Cuba probably was prompted
by his desire to remove a major irritant in US-Soviet rela-
tions which, in his view, might cause another flare-up of
the crisis and jeopardize prospects for new negotiations on
such issues as Berlin. The decision also suggests that
the main lines of Soviet-Cuban relations in the immediate
future finally have been worked out after protracted and
difficult negotiations.
At Geneva, the USSR has continued to stall on dis-
cussing a nuclear test ban, while urging other delegations
to press the US to reduce its terms for an agreement.
Moscow is maintaining its ambivalent attitude toward
the new Iraqi Government. While Foreign Minister Gromyko
affirmed the USSR's desire for friendly relations and the
Soviet Embassy in Baghdad stated that Soviet military aid
would continue, the Soviet party central committe sharply
denounced the new regime's suppression of Iraqi Communists.
SOVIET HEAVY BOMBERS FLY NEAR AZORES .. Page 6
In a further extension of overwater operations by
Soviet heavy bombers, twc TU-95s on 13 February overflew
a US Navy Task Group southeast of the Azores. The task
group included the guided-missile frigate Bainbridge
and the aircraft carrier Enterprise. Three mes in the
past month, US carrier unites-FaveT.~een the object of
Soviet aerial surveillance.
IA4PACT OF ADVERSE ~4'EATIiER ON BLOC ECONOMIES Page 7
Poor weather this winter--with its potential consequences
for the economy--is causing concern throughout the Sino-
Soviet bloc. It is too early to assess the effects on farm
output for the entire year, but it seems clear that an out-
standing performance is not likely, even if favorable
weather ensues. Unusually severe weather in Eastern Europe
is also causing serious problems for industry and is al-
ready threatening fulfillment of some of the 1963 economic
plans.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
21 February 1963
MIDDLE EAST DEVELOPMENTS Page 8
The new regime in Iraq, having repressed both Com-
munist and y~asimist opponents, is turning to somewhat
longer range problems, such as that of negotiating with the
Kurds. Differences within the government are likely to
become more pronounced, especially since non-Baathists are
showing resentment over the predominant role the Baathists
have taken thus far. Cairo continues to point to the Iraqi
coup as an example to be followed in assaulting "reactionary?'
Arab regimes.
FACTIONAL TENSIONS INCREASING IN LAOS Page 9
The rift between the Pathet Lao and the neutralist mil-
itary forces under Kong Le has deepened following the assassina-
tion of a key neutralist field commander. Kong Le has re-
grouped the bulk of his forces to improve his defense against
the Pathet Lao`s superior military strength. Premier Sou-
vanna apparently feels confident enough of his own position
to continue to accompany the King on his foreign tour.
SOUTH KOREAN CIVILIAN OPPOSITION Page 10
ian politicians. Pak may be counting on wrangling among
them to open the way for a new movement to draft him as a
Junta leader Pak Chong-huff's offer to withdraw from
politics gives civilian leaders an opportunity to take the
initiative in the transition to representative government.
However, long-standing factional disputes handicap the civil-
unity candidate for president.
COMMON MARKET DEVELOPMENTS . Page 11
The diplomatic struggle over Britain`s role in th'estern
Europe has continued during the past week and become, if
possible, more complicated than before. There are still
efforts within the Common Market to devise an economic
and political alternative to Britain's full membership,
but London itself is skeptical that an acceptable formula
will be found. Within the past few days, there has been
a spate of rumors that Paris may be contemplating an initia-
tive of its own toward an EEC-UK accommodation which would
be linked with steps to strengthen the EEC internally.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
21 February 1863
THE ARGENTINE POLITICAL SCENE . Page 14
Increasing political maneuvering is further straining
Argentina's fragile stability. A key problem is the role to
be played by the Peronists, who comprise about one quarter
of the electorate, in the June general elections. This
issue has caused serious divisions among the Peronists them-
selves, as well as among other political and military groups,
PRE-INAUGURAL SITUATION IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC Page 15
President-elect Bosch, just returned from a two-month
trip abroad, has attacked what he calls "vested interests"
and may be preparing action that would lead to a major
political crisis. In a press interview, described by the
US Embassy as "disappointingly demagogic," he claimed
that he had obtained "three times as much aid" in Europe
as he had in the US. Bosch's remarks on the proposed
constitution, which he said should be "revolutionary," gave
an impression that he backs those features that appear
hostile to private property, business, and foreign in-
vestment. He is apparently already at sword's point with
members of the outgoing regime
INDONESIA'S CAMPAIGN AGAINST MALAYSIA Page 1
Week by week Sukarno is committing Indonesia snore
openly and more deeply to blocking the creation of a Malaysia
Federation out of Malaya, Singapore, and the British-con-
trolled Borneo territories. In Indonesian eyes, the pro-
posed federation appears to be part of another colonialist
scheme to prevent Indonesia from taking its rightful place
as the dominant power in southeastern Asia. At the same
time, the campaign against Malaysia serves Sukarno's domestic
political purposes by keeping the army busy with an external
problem and by taking public attention from chronic economic
difficulties.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY DEVELOPMENTS
Khrushchev's decision to
withdraw "several thousand"
Soviet military personnel from
Cuba, which was conveyed to the
US on 18 February, probably was
prompted by his desire to re-
move a major irritant in US-
Soviet relations which, in his
view, might cause a new flare-
up of the crisis and jeopardize
prospects for resuming negotia-
tions on such issues as Berlin.
His concern to prevent further
damage in his relations with
President Kennedy has been re-
flected in Soviet propaganda
which consistently distinguishes
between "sober voices" in the
US administration and "mad sena-
tors" who are ready to risk
World War III.
The Soviet premier had in-
formed President Kennedy on 20
November that Soviet ground com-
bat units in Cuba would be with-
drawn "in due course." The
three-month delay in carrying
out this commitment probably
was due partly to Moscow's wish
to avoid any appearance of a
further hasty retreat under US
pressure following the removal
of the strategic missiles and
the IL-28 jet bom~~-Lrs . Khru-
shchev probably felt also that
a further substantial reduction
in the Soviet military presence
in Cuba would seriously ag;ra-
vate the USSR's already strained
relations with the Castro regime.
The decision to withdraw
troops now suggests that the
main lines of Soviet-Cuban rela-
tions in the period immediately
ahead have finally been worked
out after a period of reassess-
ment in Moscow and difficult
negotiations with the Cubans.
The 1963 protocol to the Soviet-
Cuban trade agreement, involving
a new long-term credit to Cuba,
was signed in Moscow on ? Feb-
ruary. Moscow and Havana also
announced on 26 January that
the USSR, at Cuba's request,
had agreed to send 400 technical
specialists to Cuba during the
following two months.
The drumfire of Soviet
criticism of President de Gaulle
and Chancellor Adenauer continues.
Moscow is seizing on any develop-
ments which can be used to ex-
ploit differences among the
Western allies. Soviet propa-
ganda claims that Bonn has en-
dorsed US proposals for a multi-
lateral NATO nuclear force and,
at the same time, has refused
to divert arms purchases from
the US to France. Moscow al-
leges that Bonn's position has
displeased the French and that
British arms manufacturers will
be the losers in West Germany's
maneuvering between Washington
and Paris. Moscow continues to
expand on the prospects for in-
creased Soviet-British trade.
De Gaulle is coming under
increasingly direct Soviet at-
tacks. Izvestia's authorita-
tive commentator, N. Polyanov,
called upon the "people in the
Elysee Palace" to revise their
policies and to realize that
France's chances of attaining
a leading role in Europe will
not be enhanced by an attempt
"to restore the Carolingian
Empire which has long since
collapsed." Pravda charged on
19 February t amt De Gaulle now
has aligned himself with a class
which has always opposed an
alliance with the USSR.
The Soviet delegation at
Geneva has continued to stall
on consideration of a nuclear
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
test ban and to maintain its
"take it or leave it" attitude
on Khrushchev's offer of two or
three on-site inspections a
year. These tactics are aimed
at generating concern on the
part of other delegations,
particularly the eight neutrals,
over lack of progress in the
hope that they will increase
pressure on the US to reduce
its terms for a treaty.
Chief Soviet delegate
Kuznetsov has shown no interest
is scheduling a meeting of the
three-power test--ban subcommittee
of the 18-nation disarmament
conference.
The Russians have concen-
trated much of their attention
on Italy in seeking to brin
pressure on the US.
There have been no further
private Soviet hints that a com-
promise might be reached on the
number of inspections. Moscow
TASS, however, reported a sug-
gestion by the UAR delegate at
Geneva that the parties should
meet each other's positions half
way and agree to "four to five"
inspections.
Iraq
Moscow is maintaining its
ambivalent attitude toward the
new regime in Baghad. On the
one hand, the Soviet party cen-
tral committee statement pub-
lisped in Pravda on 17 February
condemned the regime's "mass
reprisals" against Iraqi Commu-
nists and pointed out that this
"bestial reaction" contradicts
the policies proclaimed by the
new government. The Soviet
Embassy in Baghdad, on the other
hand, publicly denied that the
USSR had protested suppression
of the local Communists. The
embassy spokesman professed to
have "no worry about the future,"
indicated that Soviet military
aid will be continued under the
agreements signed with the (lasim
regime, and claimed that the new
government had made it clear
that it wants this aid to be
continued.
The central committee state-
ment was similar to earlier So~-
viet statements protesting the
banning of the Algerian and
Tunisian Communist parties in
that it avoided any direct at-
tack on the Iraqi Government
and contained no warning that
governmental relations would be
affected. In denying that this
statement constituted Moscow's
official view, the Soviet
Embassy in Baghdadtook refuge
in the old canard that "Pravda
doesn't represent the of i~
views of the Soviet Government."
Gromyko expressed the "official"
line when he told the Iraqi
ambassador just prior to
Soviet recognition that the
USSR wishes to have friendly
and cooperative relations with
the new Iraqi regime.
The clandestine Communist
radio in East Germany is con-
tinuing its violent assaults
on the new regime as "vicious
fascist elements" and urging
the Kurds to join other anti-
regime forces in opposing the
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
government. Moscow radio felt
moved on 18 February, however,
to deny a Reuters report that
it is interfering in Traq's
internal affairs by calling
on the Kurds to rise against
the new regime.
The Soviet leaders used
the state visit of King Savang
and Premier Souvanna Phouma of
Laos to emphasize the USSR's
constructive role in the
Laotian settlement as evidence
of its constant "striving for
peaceful coexistence." Soviet
propaganda gave extensive
coverage to the six-day visit,
and Moscow radio for the occa-
sion ran an 11-day series of
special broadcasts to South-
east Asia.
The joint communique is-
sued at the end of the visit
endorsed standard Soviet posi-
tions on general disarmament,
banning nuclear weapons and
their transfer to nonnuclear
powers, and liquidation of
foreign military bases. The
statement expressing hope that
the Sino-Indian border dispute
will be settled "peacefully by
talks" presumably was included
on Soviet initiative since the
Laotians have shown no previous
interest in this question.
the Soviet Union
remains willing to help India
meet some of its ur ent military
requirements.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
SOVIET HEAVY BOMBERS FLY NEAR AZORES
Soviet heavy bombers con-
tinue to extend their area of
overwater operations. On 13
February, two TU-95 (Bear) four-
engine turboprop bombers over-
flew a US Navy Task Group south-
east of the Azores which includ-
ed the guided-missile frigate
Bainbridge and aircraft carrier
Enterprise.
This is the first time that
Soviet bombers are known to have
flown south of Iceland and the
flight may have been the longest
ever made over water by such
Soviet aircraft--a round -trip
distance of about 6,100 nauti-
cal miles (n.m.)from the north-
western USSR. Heretofore, So-
viet interest in the movement of
US carrier task forces has been
most evident in the North pacific
Bear aircraft may have
flown a search mission for the
task group on 12 February.
US fighter pilots based in Ice-
land visually identified them
as Bears. One of the three
bombers apparently turned back
shortly after passing Iceland.
The other two continued to the
soutrwest
~ These
aircraft could have flown to
and from the Azores area
Early that afternoon, the
Bainbridge's radar picked up
two aircraft at about 180 n.m.
to the northeast, heading to-
ward the task group. When they
were about 70 n.m. away, one
aircraft was at an altitude of
32,000 feet and the other at
10, 000 feet . The first flew
over the Bainbridge at high
altitude and was not sighted.
The other, however, passed over
the Bainbridge and Enterprise
below a l~(~foot overcast and
was visually identified as a
Bear with a red star on the fuse-
lage and wings.
Both aircraft then turned
and flew off to the north. About
three hours later they were de-
tected as 25X1
they headed probably toward the
northwestern USSR via the Nor-
wegian Sea. US fighters based
in Iceland made visual contact
with the Bears some 150 n.m.
east of ice land.
February.
The Soviets appear to be
heightening their interest in
the movements of U S carrier
units. For the third time in
a month carrier units have been
the object of aerial surveillance
--the Kitty Hawk in the North
Pacific ~rom~-January to 3
February, the Enterprise in the
South Atlantic on 12/13 February,
and the Princeton in the North
Pacific from 13 through 16
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
IMPACT OF ADVERSE WEATHER ON BLOC ECONOMIES
Poor weather this winter--
with its potential consequences
for one economy--is causing
concern throughout the Sino-So-
viet bloc. It is too early to
assess the likely effects on
farm output for the entire year,
but it seems clear that an out-
standing performance. is not
likely, even if favorable weather
ensues. In addition to agricul-
tural problems, unusually severe
weather in Eastern Europe is
causing serious problems for
industry and is already threat-
ening fulfillment of some of
the 1963 economic plans.
Extreme cold and heavy
snowfall in Eastern Europe have
increased the requirements for
fuel and power in industrial
plants and homes at a time when
rail and water transport of fuel
have become more difficult.
Water supplies have been reduced,
some power lines have broken,
and coal mining has been slowed.
Some factories have been forced
to shut down or to curtail pro-
duction, and some schools and
other institutions have been
closed.
Restrictions have been
imposed on the use of electricity
in factories, households, and
other establishments, and measures
have been taken to ensure the
movement of coal and other pri-
ority freight by rail. Con-
struction and transport workers
and troops have been used to
clear roads and rails.
Severe cold in the sat-
ellites has made the distribution
of already short fodder more
acute, and there are some reports
that livestock have frozen to
death. Although the heavy snow
cover may have protected winter
grain from freezing, a sudden
thaw could result in substantial
flood damage.
Weather conditions this
past fall and winter have also
been unfavorable in the USSR,
particularly for the important
winter grain crop--about 30
percent of the annual total.
In some of the principal winter
grain areas, drought and low
temperatures during the fall
months combined with sudden
thaws and heavy rains later
in the winter to cause damage
which might prove substantial.
Considerable reseeding is likely
to be required this spring.
The livestock sector may
also be suffering setbacks.
Severe cold is complicating
the task of stretching already
inadequate feed supplies to
cover record numbers of live-
stock, a condition that could
lead to distress slaughtering.
In the Far East, both Com-
munist China and North Vietnam
have complained of worsening
drought conditions this winter.
Peiping has characterized the
drought in North China as "the
worst in 40 years" and has said
that it is getting "worse with
each passing day." Kwangtung
Province, in South China, is
also suffering from abnormally
dry conditions, according to
Peiping, and cultivation of
the early crops is already run-
ning into difficulties.
The main threat to the wheat
crop in North China will come
in about two months when the
wheat emerges from its dormancy,
but rice and miscellaneous grain
crops in South China are in
more immediate danger because
they mature earliex. Weather
observations from US sources
substantiate the Chinese reports
of unusually dry weather and
indicate that rainfall in
Kwangtung during December was
only about six percent of normal
fo~~ that month.
Authorities in North Viet-
nam have admitted that the
worsening drought is causing
"major difficulties" in wide-
spread areas. Hanoi has further
revealed that peasants "in a
number of areas" have become so
discouraged over persistent
drought conditions that they have
given up the struggle and left
the farms for other employment.
With the 1963 crop year off to
a poor start, Hanoi faces a
continuing tight food supply
after three consecutive years
of mediocre harvests.
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The new Iraqi regime,
having repressed Communist and
Qasimist opponents, faCES a
number of other, somewhat longer
range problems which require
immediate attention. Among
the most important of these is
its relations with Mulla Mustafa
al-Barzani's rebellious Kurds.
A settlement of Kurdish relations
with the Iraqi state is likely
to be difficult, since the
country's new rulers must con-
tinue to pose as Arab nationalists
who will not sacrifice Arab
"interests."
The regime has taken pains
to pull a blanket of "positive
neutralism" over its naked re-
pression of local Communists.
Foreign Minister Shabib and
Minister of State Hazim Jawad
in press conferences have
stressed the country's excellent
relations with the USSR and
alleged that the quarrel with
local Communists is that they
were Qasim supporters. The
regime has ignored broadcasts
by the clandestine Peyk-e Iran
radio in Leipzig. This radio,
operated by the Iranian Com-
munists, has called for a con-
tinued Kurdish rebellion and
has characterized the Iraqi re-
gime as "an oppressive, blood-
thirsty, and atrocious enemy"
brought to power by a "black
fascist coup."
Non-Baathist elements have
expressed some resentment over
the Baathist predominance in the
government, and sharp disagree-
ment within the regime is likely
once its component groups begin
to discuss longer range aims and
policies. The fear of a resur-
gence of the Communists will
tend to keep Baathist and non-
Baathist nationalists from a
complete falling out, however.
Publicly, Cairo continues
to cite the Iraqi coup as an ex-
ample to be followed by people
under the remaining "reactionary"
regimes in the area. The clan-
destine Cairo radio has stridently
called upon the Jordanian Army to
rise against the "throne of trea-
son" and to destroy King Husayn in
his palace.
In Syria, meanwhile, demon-
strations for "unity" with Iraq
have been held in the wake of
Syrian Foreign Minister Mahasin's
15 February declaration in favor
of "federation" with Iraq. The
Syrian press has also reacted
favorably. The Iraqis are ap-
parently embarrassed by the Syrian
overture and have limited themselves
to expressions relating to general
Arab unity and protestations of
their high regard for Nasir's UAR.
Leaders of Syria's feuding
Baathist factions are attempting
to establish close ties with their
Iraqi brethren. Michel Aflaq's
group, which follows a moderately
pro-Nasir line, is likely to be
favored by the Iraqis over Akram
al-Hawrani's strongly anti-Nasir
faction.
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O Airfield
Road --- Track or trail
.,;, ..,._.,. Province boundary
1n, a arcs
21 FEBRUARY 1969
action connected with Ketsana's
death would be delayed pending
the return in mid-March of King
Savang and his party from their
tour of countries which signed
the Geneva agreements on Laos.
Premier Souvanna contemplated
returning to Laos immediately
after he learned of the assassi-
na?ion, but he apparently now
feels sufficiently reassured
to accompany the King throughout
the remainder of the tour.
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The rift between neutralist
and Pathet Lao forces in Laos
has deepened and become more
open since the assassination on
12 February of Kong Le's field
commander in the Plaine des
Jarres, Colonel Ketsana. Neu-
tralist spokesmen have publicly
accused the Pathet Lao of the
killing, although the reaction
of Kong Le, the neutralist mili-
tary leader, thus far has been
generally restrained.
The Pathet Lao's military
position is considerably stronger
than Kong Le's and for better
defense he has concentrated his
troops in the northern and west-
ern portions of the Plaine des
Jarres. Token neutralist forces
remain as far east as Ban Ban,
but Kong Le probably controls
only the area extending from
the Plaine des Jarres airfield
west to Muong Soui ~n Route 7.
Neither Kong Le nor the
Pathet Lao leaders appear to
be planning major military
moves at this time, although
the heightened tensions between
them could precipitate a clash.
Neutralist bTinister of the
Interior Pheng Phongsavan has
indicated that any punitive
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Junta leader Pak Chong-huff's
offer of 18 February to with-
draw from politics in order to
stabilize the political situation
in South Korea gives civilian
leaders an opportunity to take
the initiative to assure a peace-
ful transition to representative
government.
In return for this with-
drawal, General Pak has demanded
assurances from all leading
civilian politicians that they
agree to uphold the principles
of the revolution and that the
participants in the military
government be safeguarded
against retaliation. Pak would
continue to head the government
until elections are held later
this year and has pledged that
he would carry out impartially
the return to civilian rule.
Pak's terms are likely
to be acceptable. Until the
old-line politicians now re-
entering political life sort
themselves out, however, they
will have difficulty taking
advantage of the offer. The
civilian leaders are divided by
long-standingfactional dif-
ferences and personal distrust.
Their initial efforts to organize
a unified opposition party have
faltered over the problem of
choosing a party leadership.
each graupfearsthat it would
be shut out of real influence
unless its man secured the top
post. None of the major groups,
however, has closed the door
to further negotiations.
Ho Chong appears to be the
most likely figure around whom
the politicians might coalesce.
He is a former Rhee lieutenant
who broke with the ex-president
after serving as acting prime
minister in 1951-52. As mayor
of Seoul in 1957-59 Ho gained
considerable popular px?estige
for his honesty and ability.
His performance as head. of the
provisional government that
took over after Rhee's ouster
in 1960 further enhanced his
stature.
Ho has made some efforts
to unite the elements opposed
to the military regime, and he
recently called for another
attempt to form a coalition
party. His efforts probably
are being undercut by former
president Yun Po-sun
~ I As a com-
promise, the major contending
groups may remain independent
but settle on a joint candidate,
possibly Ho, for this spring's
presidential elections. Such
a development would appreciably
improve prospects for a peace-
ful transition to the new
government.
At the same time, however,
there is a possibility that
Pak's offer is less than sincere
and that he expects the civilian
leaders to fail in their attempts
to organize. He may believe that
in such a situation he would
be the only acceptable choice
to head the new government.
Pak's withdrawal will be
a severe blow to the regime-
sponsored Democratic-Republican
Party, which now lacks any
other potential candidate of
comparable stature. Party leader
Kim Chong-pil is attemtping
to preserve his organization
and his position in it by
placing his supporters in key
posts but his own future is
in doubt. The party could be
counted on to lead a move to
draft Pak if a favorable oppor-
tunity arose.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
COMMON MARKET DEVELOPMENTS
The diplomatic struggle
over Britain's role in Western
Europe has continued during the
past week and become--if possi-
ble--more complicated than be-
fore. There are still efforts
within the Common Market to de-
vise an economic and political
alternative to Britain's full
membership, but London itself
is skeptical that an acceptable
formula will be found.
Within the past few days,
there has been a spate of rumors
that Paris may be contemplating
an initiative of its own toward
an EEC-UK accommodation which
would be linked. with steps to
strengthen the EEC internally.
Despite the strong lead
taken by Bonn and Brussels and
the basic similarity of their
proposals for effecting an in-
terim arrangement for Britain,
anything like an agreed position
among the "friendly five" has
yet to emerge. Belgian and
Dutch officials have held several
meetings in order to reconcile
their differences, but there
has been no coordination with
Bonn. London is maintaining
its bilateral contacts with both
endeavors, but has been disap-
pointed by the results so far.
The reports of an impend-
ing French initiative--which
have been noted in Paris, Brus-
sels, and Bonn--have aroused
considerable interest largely
because of De Gaulle's (and
Adenauer's) past references to
the possibility of a UK-EEC
association arrangement. Some
of these reports have Paris
offering Britain a "commercial
treaty"; others allege that a
more far-reaching EEC -UK associa-
tion, preceded by some kind of
monetary agreement, is envisaged.
It has also been suggested that,
to limit the political signifi-
cance of British association,
a similar status would be offered
to the other Outer Seven members.
In any case, according to
the reports, any arrangements
made with the UK would be accom-
panied by measures to strengthen
the EEC internally. This is
variously interpreted to mean
institutional reforms or early
adoption of the EEC Commission's
"action program" to accelerate
the achievement of full economic
union.
Even if such an initiative
materialized, it would be diffi-
cult to judge its purpose. Al-
though obstructionist opposition
among the other five to "business
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CUftftENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
as usual" in the EEC has tended
to evaporate, there would none-
theless be considerable opposi-
tion to accelerating the EEC's
projected tariff cuts and in-
stitutional changes--especially
at the risk of widening the gap
with Britain. It is therefore
conceivable that De Gaulle--
if he desires to proceed with
the rapid organization of the
Continent--may sooner or later
find it expedient to make a
gesture both to Britain and
to those of the Six who have
long been devoted to such ideas
as institutional reform.
It is also conceivable,
however, that the French are
floating such rumors for more
immediate tactical reasons.
The French press has quoted
"authorized official sources"
as saying any association
agreement with Britain would
have to be preceded by EEC
ratification of the African
association convention and
settlement of outstanding prob-
lems regarding the EEC's common
agricultural policy.
The US Mission to the EEC
has also noted with special
interest press reports that Paris
believes "financial arrangements"
would have to be the first part
of any agreement with Britain.
Although "the problem of the
sterling area" was never serious-
ly considered in the Brussels
talks, the mission observes, the
French have seemed to regard this
issue as a reserve "trump card"
to prevent a UK-EEC agreement.
In any case, it continues
to be evident that Britain will
have difficulty in matching the
superior diplomacy which Paris
has always brought to its Euro-
pean policy.
At the 18-19 February meet-
ing of the Outer Seven ministers,
Austria announced its intention
to pursue its bid for associa-
tion with the EEC, despite the
resolve of the other members to
resume talks with the Common Mar-
ket only when France gives guar-
antees of good faith. Vienna
has long been convinced of De
Gaulle's special sympathy for
Austria--a sympathy he has also
managed to convey to Copenhagen.
Denmark's economic need for a tie
with the Common Market is scarce-
ly less pressing than Austria's.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Increasing political ma-
neuveringis further straining
Argentina's fragile stability.
A key problem is the role to
be played by the Peronists, who
comprise about one quarter of
the electorate, in the June gen-
eral elections. This issue has
caused serious divisions among
the Peronists themselves, as
well as among other political
and military groups
Various non-Peronist
political parties are compet-
ing for Peronist support in a
national front, counting on the
government to keep the Peron-
ists from presenting candidates
for top government posts. To
curry Peronist favor, represent-
atives of seven political
parties demanded in late January
that the government remove the
legal ban against open Peronist
political activity. These par-
ties correctly anticipated that
the government would maintain
the ban, which, if lifted, would
jeopardize their own fortunes.
The Peronists are exploiting
this opportunistic gambit, and
are claiming that 80 percent
of the electorate support their
demands to campaign on an open-
ly pro-Peron ticket.
The armed forces have
made clear that they will not
accept return of the Peron dic-
tatorship, but will agree to
the Peronists' campaigning on
a basis of Peronism without
Peron.
It is unlikely that Peron
would feel bound by any commit-
ment A spokes- 25X1
man for Peron in Madrid has
denied that Peron agreed to any
electoral deal, and indicated
that instead Peronists would
follow a strategy of "contin-
gency planning" until the elec-
tions. This apparently could
involve recourse to revolution-
ary action if it appeared likely
to succeed. Such a possibility
may have been discussed at a
meeting of several Peronist
leaders in Montevideo--only
five days after the Buenos Aires
agreement. The Montevideo
meeting included Dr. Raul Matera,
Peronist chief in Argentina,
and reportedly Luis Albamonte,
who favors a revolutionar line
and aid from Cuba.
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PRE-INAUGURAL SITUATION IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC
President-elect Basch of
the Dominican Republic, just
returned from a two-month trip
abroad, has attacked what he
calls "vested interests" and
may be preparing action that
would lead to a major political
crisis. In a press interview,
on 17 February, described by
the US Embassy as "disappoint-
ingly demagogic," he claimed
that he had obtained "three
times as much aid" in Europe
as is the US.
Bosch's remarks on the pro-
posed constitution, which he
said should be "revolutionary,"
gave an impression that he backs
those features that appear hos-
tile to private property, busi-
ness, and foreign investment.
He is apparently already at
sword's point with members of
the out oin re ime,
The embassy comments that
Bosch's comments on the consti-
tution "can only have succeed-
ed in frightening the business
and propertied classes." In
general, his remarks appeared
to clash with, and may damage
the fruits of, his own efforts
in the US and Europe to get de-
velopment aid for the Dominican
Republic.
The majority of Dominicans
favor, or have become reconciled
to, the need for social and eco-
nomic reform. Members of the
propertied classes and conserv-
ative-minded leaders of the
outgoing administration, how-
ever, were deeply alarmed over
the new constitution draft's
lack of specific guarantees for
property rights and over its
broad framework--which if fully
used would amount to a radical
reform.
21 Feb 63
Officers of the armed forces
':, almost unanimously expressed
a their apprehensions that the
proposed constitution would
discourage foreign investments
necessary to the country's eco-
nomic progress, and many of the
military termed it a "Communist
document." The armed forces,
although they still appeared
disposed to support the incom-
ing government at the time of
Bosch 's return, have been put
on their guard and will be alert
to any trend they consider like-
ly to lead to the left. Wide-
spread reports that Bosch may
give important positions in his
government to some of the sev-
eral extreme leftists and per-
sons with unsavory reputations
who have been seen in his en-
tourage will increase apprehen-
~ Sion among the military.
Military leaders also are
expressing increased concern
over the role of Brigadier Gen-
eral Antonio Imbert and Luis
Amiama--the two survivors of
the group which assassinated
dictator Trujillo--in the rapid
growth of the national police
force and over the force's ef-
forts to acquire weapons of a
variety more properly associated
with the mission of the armed
forces. The military officer
corps objects to the large ex-
penditures by the police, which
in turn reduce budget alloca-
tions needed by the armed forces
to complete their transformation
into small but well-equipped
and trained units.
Despite the complaints of
the military, which they will
probably raise with Bosch when
he takes office, Imbert espe-
cially does not appear ready 25X1
to relinquish the power that he
has gained as a member of the
outgoing regime.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUM1dARY
Bosch's unstable tempera-
ment has already caused compli-
cations in pre-inaugural plan-
ning. Upon his election last
December, he apparently had few
plans worked out in detail for
taking control of the govern-
ment. One of the purposes of
his trip abroad appears to have
been to gain time to formulate
policies for his administration.
Bosch's lieutenants, the
leaders of the Dominican Revo-
lutionary Party (PRD), were
given only broadly outlined in-
structions on what to do in his
absence. For the inaugural
they were told to include "no
receptions, decorations, or
military." Bosch added, "Now
we have the people's inaugural."
A large and heterogeneous col-
lection of the hemisphere's
political moderates and members
of the democratic left have
been invited to attend. Bosch
ordered, however, that officials
representing dictatorships and
legally questionable regimes
were not to be invited, even if
this resulted in breaks in
diplomatic relations. Among
the several governments that
did not receive official in-
vitations is Argentina.
With the Dominican military
relegated to the background,
security preparations for the
inauguration have proved diffi-
cult to arran e.
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INDONESIA'S CAMPAIGN AGAINST MALAYSIA
As the fifth largest coun=
try in the world and with
strength unequaled in Southeast
Asia, Indonesia appears to be
increasingly obsessed by the
idea of great-power status.
President Sukarno ar~d other
Indonesian leaders regard as
inimical any development which
might retard Indonesian expan-
sion. Such a development is
the proposed Federation of Ma-
laysia, which is to be composed
of Malaya, Singapore, and the
British territor~.es of Sarawak,
Brunei, and North Borneo, and
is scheduled to be formed by
this August.
~on,~
ao.~Eo
Sukarno, who sees himself 25X1
as a divinely inspired leader
who will lead "his people" to
national unity, apparently is
also dreaming of presiding over
a new Indonesian empire. His
favorite character in the Hindu
epic drama, to which he is
devoted, is the "warrior king."
A significant factor in
expansionist thinking apparently
is the belief that Indonesia
ultimately will have to defend
itself and the surrounding area
against Chinese Communist in-
fluence or even attack.
Indonesian interest in the
Borneo territories as a logical
area of expansion is stimulated
by geographic contiguity, his-
toric claims, and ethnic ties
with two of the area's princi-
pal groups--the Malays and the
indigenous tribes people.
WEn
IVCW GUtNtA
U~d.r lW Adnlnl./rafbn
unrll /.,y.y
INDONESIA
AND THE
PROPOSED FEDERATION
OF MALAYSIA
33030
Djak aita
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
The Indonesians' emotions
on the Borneo issue are the
more intense because the revolu-
tionary philosophy and emotional
bias of most of Indonesia's'
leaders and of much of the In-
donesian public are almost dia-
metrically opposed to the out-
look of Malaya's leaders. In-
donesian foreign policy, although
officially nonaligned, has strong
anti-Western undertones. Malaya
still associates itself closely
with the West, and the backers
of the Malaysia concept intend
that the federation adopt a
similar posture. Malayan Prime
Minister Rahman in particular
appears to Djakarta to be a
tool of the British.
Domestically, the anti-
Malaysian campaign serves
Sukarno much as did the campaign
to take over West New Guinea.
Perhaps most important, it
channels the energies of the
anti-Communist army and the
Communist Party toward a common
goal. Sukarno retains his pre-
eminent position in great part
by balancing off these two major
internal power factors, and he
has long insisted that in the
interests of national unity
he wants them to work in the
same direction rather than
counter to each other. An anti-
communist army which is not pre-
occupied with external military
operations apparently poses in
Sukarno's mind. a threat to his
personal position, to national
unity, and to his political
aspirations.
At the same time Sukarno
almost certainly believes that
by pursuing an anti-Malaysia
policy he is keeping ahead of
the local Communists, who have
been pressing the issue them-
selves through propaganda in
Indonesia and through agents of
their own in Borneo.
Direct bloc encouragement
of Indonesia's Malaysia policy
has not been firmly documented.
Moreover, Indonesia's
massive purchases of arms,
chiefly from the Soviet Union,
made it possible for Sukarno
to settle the West New Guinea
dispute in his favor and have
enabled him to strike his pres-
ent attitude toward Malaya.
Indonesia may well cite its
anti-imperialist policy on
Malaysia as an argument to per-
suade the USSR to reschedule
and extend payments on Djakarta's
$650~million debt for arms
purchases.
An ever-present motivation
for all Sukarno's external ad-
ventures is the need to divert
attention from Indonesia's
chronic economic problems--
problems for which he has little
taste and less talent.
Indonesia's Timing
The timing of Indonesia's
moves and the change in Indo-
nesia's policy from the vaguely
stated and generalized opposition
to Malaysia last fall to intense
hostility in mid-January seems
to have resulted from a series
of factors.
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of 1958 and Malayan expansionist 25X1
designs on Sumatra at that time.
He added that Rahman's hostility
toward Indonesia indicated that
he might be "a tool of interna-
tional conspiracy" against
Indonesia .
Sukarno stated in a 12
February speech that Indonesia
considers Malaysia as "encircle-
ment of the Indonesian Republic
...the product of the brains
and efforts of neocolonialism"
meant to protect the economic
investments of the imperialists.
He reiterated Indonesia's sym-
pathy with the "struggle of the
people of North Borneo."
Indonesian Military Moves
January, Subandrio announced
Indonesia's policy of "con-
frontation" against Malaya--
all opposition short of war.
At that time he denounced
Malaya as an accomplice of the
neo-colonialists and imperial-
ists and accused the Malayan
Government of hostility toward
Indonesia.
Since then the level of
vituperation has risen almost
daily. Subandrio warned. on
11 February that incidents and
even war with Malaya might
follow the establishment of
the Malaysia Federation. He
catalogued a series. of un-
friendly acts by Prime Minister
Rahman which included active
support of Indonesian rebels
in the provincial rebellion
In mid-January both Subandrio
and National Security Minister
Nasution told American officials
that if "independ.ence seekers"
in the North Borneo territories
request military training,
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Indonesia would comply. Indo-
nesian ground forces in Indo-
nesian Borneo consist of eight
infantry battalions, one of
which is a commando unit.
On 30 January Indonesia
announced that it was carrying
out air and naval patrols of
its sea borders with Malaya,
and its land boundaries with
British Borneo.
limited extent in their anti-
Malaysian policies. The Philip-
pine Government allowed Azahari
to depart. Indonesia has promised
to respect the Philippine claim
to North Borneo if the inhabit-
ants prefer Philippine adminis-
tration to some other arrange-
ment. The Philippines took a
pro-Indonesian position at the
London talks of 28 January to
1 February. This apparently
resulted, however, not from
any prearrangement with Djakarta
but from an independent assess-
ment in Manila that Indonesia is
the coming power in southeastern
Asia .
Philippine Involvement
Djakarta and Manila appar-
ently are collaborating to a
Whether Malaysia is es-
tablished or not, Indonesian
strategy over the next few
years appears from a number of
reports to be first to foster
and support an indigenous
independence movement in
non-Indonesian Borneo; later
either to establish there
puppet states subservient to
Indonesia or to absorb the
area directly; and eventually
to topple the liberal govern-
ment of Prime Minister Abdul
Rahman in Malaya itself in
favor of a "progressive"
leftist government sympathetic
and probably subservient to
Indonesia. ~
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