CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

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SECRET
CURRENT
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY
SUMMARY
COPY NO. 74
OCI NO. 0265/63
1 February 1963
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
.IORI CDF Pages 1-3
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification
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THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECT-
ING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES
WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS,
TITLE 18, USC, SECTIONS 793 AND 794, THE TRANSMIS-
SION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO
AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.
This document MUST NOT BE RELEASED TO FOREIGN
GOVERNMENTS. In addition certain intelligence items con-
tained herein may be marked with specific dissemination
controls in accordance with the provisions of DCID 1/7.
Each item so marked must be controlled within the frame-
work of the limitation placed upon it.
The Current Intelligence Weekly Summary has been prepared
primarily for the internal use of the Central Intelligence
Agency. It does not represent a complete coverage of all
current situations. Comments and conclusions represent the
immediate appraisal of the Office of Current Intelligence.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
1 February 1963
T H E W E E K I N B R I E F
(Information as of 1200 EST 31 Jan)
. . . . . Page 3
Soviet commentators maintained a cautious stance last
week regarding developments in the nuclear test ban talks
and the Common Market. A Soviet official in Geneva hinted
privately, however, that Moscow believes progress toward
a test ban may open the way for renewed high-level nego-
tiations on a Berlin settlement. He reaffirmed the USSR's
desire for a "thaw" in East-West relations and suggested
that a foreign ministers' meeting to sign a test ban
treaty would provide a suitable opportunity for discuss-
ing other problems such as Berlin. (Secret No Foreign
Dissem)
SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 4
Communist China's first editorial comment on Sino-
Soviet issues since the East German party congress was no
less abusive than its propaganda before Khrushchev's call
for a cessation of polemics. The latest round in the
contest between the two nations has further demonstrated
the lack of common ground upon which they can stand.
(Confidential)
THE SINO-INDIAN BORDER DISPUTE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 5
The interpretations of the loosely worded Colombo
conference proposals made public in the past week by Peiping
and New Delhi provide little ground for discussions. New
Delhi is giving increasing play to the warmth and close-
ness of its relations with Moscow but, at Soviet request,
has promised to avoid publicity concerning the recent ar-
rival of four crated MIG-21 fighters in Bombay. (Secret
No Foreign Dissem)
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
1 February 1963
THE CUBAN SITUATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 7
With continuing Soviet military assistance and economic
support, the Castro regime appears to be concentrating on
an aggressive campaign of subversion in Latin America.
Havana has announced that about 400 Soviet agricultural
technicians are coming to Cuba over the next three months.
Castro's guerrilla training program for Latin Americans
is continuing, and Cuban leaders have given the impression
that they consider the possibilities for subversive action
to be especially promising in Venezuela. (Secret No Foreign
Dissem)
SOVIET ECONOMY IN 1962 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 9
Soviet heavy industrial development continued in 1962
to receive clear priority over consumer goods production
and agriculture. In general, trends of the preceding year
were maintained. There are signs of continuing difficulties,
particularly in investment in certain key industries.
(Confidential)
SINO-MONGOLIAN RELATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 12
There has been some cooling in Sino-Mongolian relations
as a result of Mongolia's role as Khrushchev's advocate in
Asia. However, Chinese aid programs continue, and Peiping
has not abandoned its practice of sending workers to labor-
short Mongolia. Ulan Bator is attempting to expand its
diplomatic contacts beyond its two quarreling neighbors by
pushing for recognition from nonbloc countries. (Confidential)
DEVELOPMENTS IN THE CONGO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 13
Joseph Ileo, Leopoldville's new minister-resident in
Elisabethville, has begun taking steps to reintegrate
Katanga. Ileo has made it clear that his mission is to
execute reintegration, not negotiate, and he is dealing
firmly with Katangan attempts to obstruct him. Leopold-
ville is pressing hard for the introduction of additional
Congo army forces into key cities in South Katanga, but is
presently resisting Baluba tribal pressures for changes in
Tshombe's government. Tshomb6, trying to re-establish
his authority, is insisting on rigid application of the
UN reintegration plan and is trying to enlist the UN to
referee differences between him and Leopoldville. (Confi-
dential No Foreign Dissem)
INSTABILITY CONTINUES IN TOGO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 15
The political situation in Togo has remained unstable
since the assassination of President Olympio in mid-
January. Behind Provisional President Grunitsky's weak
leadership, the diverse factions represented in the cabinet
and the military elements which staged the coup are in-
volved in a power struggle. Grunitsky's authority has
been undercut by the reluctance of countries in the moder-
ate African group to extend diplomatic recognition. (Secret
No Foreign Dissem)
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
1 February 1963
REFERENDUM IN IRAN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 16
The Shah's overwhelming victory in Iran's reform pro-
gram referendum on 26 January will encourage him to acceler-
ate reforms and possibly to advance the date of national
elections now planned for June or July. The regime mustered
a 99.9-percent affirmative vote, partly by intimidating
the mullahs, the landlords, and the National Front. They
appear to be demoralized temporarily, and probably have
lost many supporters. Trouble for the regime is in prospect
when workers and peasants find that progress toward im-
plementing the reforms is slower than they have been led
to expect. (Secret No Foreign Dissem)
INDONESIAN INTENTIONS TOWARD MALAYSIA . . . . . . . . . . Page 17
Indonesia has announced a policy of "confrontation"
with Malaya over the inclusion of the British Borneo ter-
ritories in the projected Malaysia Federation. It reportedly
is giving guerrilla training to both Indonesian and rebel
elements, and a monthly training capacity of five or six
hundred may have been reached. These moves have sharpened
British and Malayan concern over Indonesian intentions in
northern Borneo, and Britain has alerted troops in the
UK and the Far East for movement to Borneo. (Secret No
Foreign Dissem)
SOUTH KOREAN POLITICAL STRUGGLE . . . . . . . . . .
. . .
Page 18
Former security chief Kim Chong-pil has emerged
from
a fight for control of the new government party with
his
power
intact for the time being, if not strengthened.
How-
ever,
the factional struggle within the regime almost
cer-
tainly
will continue, with Kim's enemies biding their
time
for a new opportunity to attack his position. The open
struggle will make it more difficult for the regime to
maintain the facade of free elections this spring. (Secret
No Foreign Dissem)
THE POLITICAL SITUATION IN ITALY . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 19
The parliamentary debate occasioned by the Communists'
recent no-confidence motion in effect opened the campaign
for national elections to be called some time this spring.
Special attention in the debate focused on the new Italian
defense position announced by Premier Fanfani following
his Washington talks. The Nenni Socialists, in marked con-
trast to their position of a year ago, indicated no op-
position to a NATO nuclear force. (Confidential No Foreign
Dissem)
DENMARK'S FAEROE ISLANDS PROBLEM . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 20
The new coalition government in the semiautonomous
Faeroe Islands is expected to exert pressure on the Danish
Government to revise the Home Rule Law of 1948 and the
status of US and NATO defense facilities in the islands.
One of the two principal parties in the coalition wants
almost complete independence and removal of NATO installa-
tions. Danish officials will probably insist that special
elections be called before any drastic changes are made.
(Confidential)
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1 February 1963
BRAZIL'S NEW CABINET . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 21
Joao Goulart, who has recently received full pres-
idential powers, appears to believe that he can strengthen
leftist influences in Brazil without endangering the coun-
try's chances for sizable new economic aid from the
United States. He has increased the number of leftists
among his advisers as economic negotiations with Washington
are about to begin. Brazil is seeking aid to avoid de-
faulting on its international obligations this spring.
(Secret)
ARGENTINA'S FINANCIAL CRISIS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 22
The Argentine Government's present financial resources
are inadequate to meet either foreign or domestic obliga-
tions. It is giving priority to paying foreign debts to
encourage new aid from abroad in the present crisis. Meanwhile
both the government and businesses are behind in salary
payments, unemployment is growing, and living costs are rising.
The economic and social unrest are jeopardizing preparations
for the general elections scheduled for this June. (Secret
No Foreign Dissem)
THE CHINESE COMMUNIST NAVY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 1
The Chinese Communist Navy, although numerically stronger
than that of any other Asian country, is primarily a defensive
force. Its largest vessels are four obsolescent Gordy-class
destroyers acquired from the USSR before 1955, and no new
construction of major vessels is likely in China unless
Soviet assistance is resumed. The effectiveness of the
submarine fleet, the fourth largest in the world, is limited
by its apparent inability to engage in operations far from
its bases. (Secret No Foreign Dissem)
TURKEY'S FIRST FIVE-YEAR PLAN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 4
Turkey will be making its first systematic effort to
mobilize its resources when it officially puts its Five-
Year Plan for economic development into effect on 1 March.
By accelerating the rate of private and government invest-
ment, it aims to achieve a 7-percent annual growth in
GNP. Recommendations for new taxes to finance the plan
have been watered down, however, and an international con-
sortium's offer of aid has fallen far short of Turkish
hopes. Nevertheless, the Inonu government seeks early
visible accomplishments that will provide the psychological
stimulus necessary for the plan's success. (Confidential)
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In contrast to Moscow's public
insistence that it
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Moscow maintained a cau-
tious stance last week regard-
25X1 ing developments in the nuclear
test-ban talks and the Common
Market.
Moscow be ieves prog-
ress owar a test ban may open
the way for renewed high-level
negoti tions an a Re lin settle-
25X1 ment. the USSR's
desire tor a aw in East-
West relations and suggested
that a foreign ministers' meet-
ing to sign a test-ban treaty
would provide a suitable op-
portunity for discussing other
problems such as Berlin.
The Soviet press continued
to express optimism regarding
25X1 prospects for a test-ban treaty.
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said that
Common Market
Moscow has reacted along
familiar lines to the breakdown
of the UK-EEC talks in Brussels.
Soviet propagandists have described
it as a graphic revelation of the
inherent contradictions in the
NATO partnership and implied
that West Germany, acting out
of purely selfish motives, was
the principal advocate of com-
promise between France and Great
Britain. Soviet commentators
took much the same line they
followed in elaborating on
Adenauer's trip to France, claim-
ing that West Germany's sole in-
terest was in the acquisition
of nuclear :arms and that Bonn
would play )oth sides of the
Atlantic fe 1ce in order to
achieve this ambition.
The USSR has avoided strong
attacks on ?rench policy and di-
rect criticism of De Gaulle per-
sonally. Moscow has apparently
decided to avoid committing it-
self to a clear line of attack
pending further developments in
the Common Market issue and to
retain its freedom of maneuver
in any future discussions with
the French leader on larger
East-West issues.
although the USSR cannot ac-
cept 8 to 10 on-site inspections,
it might consider four such in-
spections "reasonable." He also
implied that Moscow would not
rigidly insist on the maximum
of three automatic seizmic
stations indicated in Khru-
shchev's recent letters to Presi-
dent Kennedy. A further hint
of flexibility was contained
in n encnnl remark by the
that the USSR "might compromise
on seven" inspections.
High-level Soviet officials,
however, continued to indicate
pessimism regarding an early
agreement. Soviet President
Brezhnev complained to Am-
bassador Kohler on 24 January
that US "delaying" was due more
to diplomatic than to technical
reasons.
Moscow reported without
comment President Kennedy's
order postponing underground
tests in Nevada during the
present talks. The Soviet
press has not repeated Gromyko's
21 January insistence on French
participation in a test-ban
treaty, but Moscow radio noted
it is not difficult to foresee
De Gaulle's "obstruction" of an
agreement.
Berlin and Germany
Although there has been no
significant authoritative com-
mentary on the Berlin and Ger-
man issues during the past week,
Soviet propagandists have at-
tempted to rebut alleged Western
assertions that the German question
has lost its urgency. Bloc com-
mentators continue to stress that
Khrushchev's latest proposals pro-
vide an acceptable "compromise"
solution tc the Berlin question,
and Red Star on 27 January claimed
that points of rapprochement are
beginning to crystallize in the
position of both sides."
Soviet propaganda carefully
avoids the question of whether the
US-Soviet discussions on these is-
sues should be resumed soon but, in
implicit allusion to the current
test-ban n?gotiations, points up
the intrinEic value of negotiations
in resolvirg outstanding East-West
differences. (SECRET NO FOREIGN
DISSEM)
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Communist China's first ed-
itorial comment on Sino-Soviet
issues since the East German
party congress was no less abu-
sive than its propaganda before
Khrushchev's call for a cessa-
tion of polemics.
Peiping is anxious, however,
not to alienate potential sup-
porters, many of whom felt that
Khrushchev's appeal made sense.
The North Vietnamese, for ex-
ample, who have attempted to
maintain a balanced position
between the two antagonists,
hailed "the proposal by Com-
rade Khrushchev... that polemics
be stopped."
With this in mind, Peiping
is discrediting the truce pro-
posal as merely a hypocritical
grandstand play accompanied by
action designed to aggravate
rather than terminate the con-
troversy. A long People's
Daily editorial on 27 January
charged Khrushchev and his sup-
porters with paying only lip
service to bloc unity while
planning the chorus of boos and
catcalls directed at the head
of the Chinese Communist del-
egation to the East German
congress. This charge of a
deliberately staged demonstra-
tion probably is a valid one and
will carry weight with many of
Peiping's supporters who wit-
nessed the event from close range.
The editorial goes beyond
a disparagement of Khrushchev's
sincerity to insist on impossi-
ble conditions for a truce.
As Peiping presents the case,
the attitude toward Yugoslavia
is central to the issue, and
the Chinese will refuse to join
in the "sham unity" that implies
any toleration of bloc amity
with Belgrade. The "real unity"
demanded by Peiping would thus
permit it to continue implicit
attacks on Soviet policies by
means of explicit attacks on
"Yugoslav revisionism."
To keep their position on
record, the Chinese are giving
wide circulation to the 27 Jan-
uary editorial. It has been
reprinted as a pamphlet, and
it is being rebroadcast
to domestic and foreign audiences.
There were 80 such broadcasts--
13 in Russian--on 27 January
alone.
In addition, Peiping is
continuing to circulate other
recent polemical editorials from
People's Dail and Red Flag,
which have been gathered into a
pamphlet in Chinese and other
languages. The Chinese domestic
audience has also been informed
by extracts in People's Daily of
speeches at the East German party
congress that were explicitly
critical of Peiping. The effect
has been to impress on the Chinese
people the fact of their compara-
tive isolation in the bloc. By
noting in the 27 January editorial
that Sino-Soviet relations have
reached "the brink of the prec-
ipice," the Chinese leaders have
alerted their followers to the
possibility of new dramatic
developments.
The next move is in the
hands of the Soviet leaders.
They may feel that their best
strategy is to continue to
maintain the high and principled
stand Khrushchev adopted at the
East German congress and to
stress the necessity for a
pause in the polemics. In this
way, they could take credit for
trying to maintain "unity" in
the face of Chinese intransigence
without impairing their freedom
to institute policy moves--
like the reported delivery of
MIGs to India--directly contrary
to Chinese interests.
On the other hand, the
insults to Khrushchev in the
27 January editorial may goad
the Soviets into taking the
line that Peiping's display of
dogmatism in the face of their
generous offer left them no
choice but to point out the
dangers the Chinese pose for
the whole international Com-
munist movement. In either
event, the net result of the
latest round in the contest
between the two nations set
in motion by the East German
congress has been a further
demonstration of the lack of
common ground upon which they
can stand. (CONFIDENTIAL)
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
THE SINO-INDIAN BORDER DISPUTE
The interpretations of the
loosely worded Colombo Con-
ference proposals made public
in the past week by Peiping and
New Delhi are largely incom-
patible and provide little com-
mon ground for productive dis-
cussions.
Although the Chinese
accept these proposals "in
principle," they make it clear
that they will insist on two
major modifications to which
the Indian Government cannot
agree.
Chou En-lai's formal reply
to Prime Minister Bandaranaike
and Peiping's follow-up editori-
al on 28 January preclude the
return of Indian forces to
large areas in the North East
Frontier Agency (NEFA) vacated
by the Chinese. The Colombo
proposals, as "clarified"
during the Bandaranaike mission
to New Delhi and discussed in
the Indian Parliament, would
permit the return of Indian
military forces to the McMahon
line everywhere except in the
Dhola and Longju areas.
The second of Peiping's
modifications excludes Indian
civil administration from the
proposed demilitarized zone in
Ladakh and from Bara Hoti,
Longju, and the Dhola area.
The Colombo proposals called
for a one-sided Chinese pull-
back in Ladakh and would have
permitted a return of Indian
civil administration to many
positions from which the Chinese
had driven New Delhi's forces
last fall.
As a compensating gesture,
Peiping has offered to take
"another step forward on the
road of reconciliation" by
waiving the right to set up
civil administration in certain
disputed border areas. Peiping
Boundary shown on Chinese Communist maps I N D I A
Boundary shown an US and Western maps
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1 Feb 63 WEEKLY REVIEW
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
also announced on 28 January
that its troop pullbacks would
"soon be completed along the
entire border," at which time
Chinese forces would be "far
behind" the line of 8 September
1962--which New Delhi has de-
clared is one essential condition
for negotiations.
The Indians, aware of Pei-
ping's terms earlier this month
through diplomatic channels, had
flatly called them unacceptable.
Both Peiping and New Delhi
probably look forward to a pro-
tracted deadlock on the border
issue and a long period of dip-
lomatic jockeying and propaganda
exchanges. The Afro-Asian nations
will probably continue their ef-
forts at mediation, although
new initiatives will probably
be individual rather than
collective. Indonesian Foreign
Minister Subandrio has just
visited New Delhi, and Cambodia's
Sihanouk is visiting India prior
to a trip to Peiping.
On a related aspect of the
Sino-Indian border dispute, New
Delhi is giving increasing play
SECRET
to the warmth and closeness of
its relations with Moscow. R.K.
Nehru, secretary general of
India's External Affairs Min-
istry, returned from the USSR
on 26 January after a week of
wide-ranging talks with Soviet
officials. Included in the
topics discussed, according to
the Indians, were prospects
for increased trade, Soviet
aid for India's Third (1961-66)
and Fourth (1966-71) Five-Year
Plans, details concerning the
establishment of the "MIG factory"
in India, and possible Soviet
help for other Indian defense
industries. Nehru also in-
vited Deputy Foreign Minister
Firyubin and Defense Minister
Malinovsky to visit India.
In playing up these develop-
ments, the Indian Government
has omitted--at Moscow's request--
any publicity concerning the
arrival of four crated MIG-
21 fighters in Bombay this
week, although the Indians
can be expected to make the
most out of the news once
it becomes known. (SECRET
NO FOREIGN DISSEM)
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Military Developments
the crates arrived by sea during
the period immediately prior
to 11 January or if they had
been in storage in Cuba for
some time.
ports that on 14 January Cuban
army and militia members visited
farm owners in a wide area just
southeast of the city of Havana.
The owners were told that the
government needed their land
Soviet Economic Support
The Cuban trade delegation
which had been in Moscow since
mid-December negotiating details
on Cuban-Soviet trade for the
coming year now has left for its
next stop in Communist China.
There has been no indication of
what has been agreed upon.
Moscow announced on 26 Jan-
uary that, at Havana's request,
it is sending some 400 special-
ists to Cuba during the first
three months of the year. The
specialists are to include agrono-
mists, zootechnicians, agricul-
tural machinery operators, agri-
cultural economists, and veter-
inarians, and are to spend a
year in Cuba helping to improve
crop production, animal husbandry,
and farm mechanization.
Internal Developments
Cuban press and radio re-
ports indicate a resurgence of
small-scale insurgent activity.
The Castro regime, however, is
in no immediate danger from the
activities of the active opposi-
tion. While most Cubans are
probably dissatisfied with the
regime, only a small minority
actively resist it. Various
forms of passive resistance,
such as work slowdowns, however,
are probably more widespread.
Cuban leaders continue to
show concern over worker apathy
and the threat that labor pro-
ductivity will not reach planned
levels. At a 27 January cere-
mony honoring "outstanding"
workers, Che Guevara publicly
referred to the "symptomatic
and alarming" fact that many
Cubans "do not work hard enough."
He said that many of the same
young Cubans who have shown them-
selves ready to fight courageously
on the battlefield in defense of
the fatherland do not show the
same spirit when it "becomes
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necessary to perform obscure
and boring daily tasks" on the
production front. Guevara de-
clared that the working class
must learn that the two kinds
of sacrifice are equally im-
portant in the "building of so-
cialism."
In this speech Guevara also
stated--with his characteristic
frankness--that there are no
more spare parts for the factories
in Cuba which came from the
United States, and that Cuba
has reached "a more or less
critical point" in this respect.
Indications continue to
multiply that the Castro regime
has embarked on a more aggres-
sive program of subversion in
Latin America since last fall's
missile crisis.
Bias Roca, Cuba's senior
veteran Communist leader, de-
livered a public address on 23
January in which he praised the
Venezuelan "people" for their
present struggle against the
"tyranny" of President Betan-
court. He expressed Cuban ap-
preciation for the acts of sab-
otage committed in the Vene-
zuelan oil fields during the
crisis last fall. He used this
as an example of "proletarian
internationalism" and stated
flatly, "We shall continue to
give our support, each day in
greater proportions, to the
Venezuelan people."
In his references to Vene-
zuela, Roca was even more spe-
cific than Fidel Castro had been
in two recent speeches singling
out the "people's struggle" in
Venezuela for special mention.
Roca concluded his speech by
declaring that when the Vene-
zuelan revolution takes place,
then "all Latin America will be
ablaze." He declared that the
"victory of Venezuela will give
Cuba a tremendous boost...we
will have a nation on the con- 25X1
tinent to back us."
o er rep-
resentatives rom Central Americp5X1
had discussions with Che Guevara
during their stay in Cuba.
Guevara told them that they must
prepare for united and simul-
taneous revolutions in all of
Central America. Any idea that
they can gain power by other
means is a myth, Guevara said,
and no Communist Party has ever
come to power through elections.
Guevara described the tactics
being used in Venezuela as an ex-
ample for the Central Americans.
Cuban officials appear to
be gathering detailed informa-
tion from Latin Americans un-
dergoing guerrilla training in 25X1
Cuba to aid Cuban planning and
support of guerrilla cam ai ns
e other countries. 5X1
recently returned from
guerrilla training in Cuba re-
ports that he and some 150 of
his countrymen training in Cuba
were asked to answer a 58-point
questionnaire.
Questions covered a wide
range and included military,
political, and geographic sub-
jects, as well as means for
legal and illegal entry into
the country and methods by which
foreigners can buy property and
establish commercial firms in
the country. Questions on
the feasibility of guerrilla
warfare covered drop zones suit-
able for air supply of guerrilla
bands. (SECRET NO FOREIGN DIS-
SEM)
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Soviet heavy industrial de-
velopment continued in 1962 to
receive clear priority over con-
sumer goods production and agri-
culture. In general, trends of
the preceding year were main-
tained. There are signs of
continuing difficulties, partic-
ularly in investment in certain
key industries, in the selected
data released by the Soviet Gov-
ernment on 26 January.
Industry
Industrial output is claimed
to have increased by 9.5 percent,
very slightly above the 1961
rate. As usual, the greatest
increase was in group "A, So-
viet jargon for the bulk of
heavy industrial output. The
seven percent increase claimed
for the group "B" industries,
mainly consumer goods, is a
shade higher than the 1961 rate,
but there are many signs in the
report and elsewhere that 1962
was a poor year for the Soviet
consumer.
Soviet gross industrial
production indexes, moreover,
give an inflated picture of
actual performance--they con-
tain certain technical biases
and reflect considerable double-
counting of goods produced. For
this reason, it is b9lieved the
increase in 1961 was only 7.6
percent, rather than the 9.2
percent claimed by the USSR.
The 1962 claim was probably
similarly inflated.
Rates for most basic indus-
tries were virtually unchanged
from 1961. Chemical output ad-
vanced by a percentage point above
the preceding year's increase,
while ferrous and nonferrous
metallurgy and the machine-build-
ing production rates dropped very
slightly. Output plans for gas,
oil, and electric power were
overfulfilled. Pig iron and
steel goals were slightly under-
fulfilled. This pattern prob-
ably reflects implementation of
the policy first discussed by
Khrushchev nearly two years
ago, laying more stress on
SOVIET PRODUCTION STATISTICS
1960 1961 1962
GROSS INDUSTRIAL F uWi 9.6 9.2 9.5
PRODUCTION w w
LABOR PRODUCTIVITY U 5.3 4+ 6
(INDUSTRY) f a Z
STEEL
(MILLION METRIC TONS)
01L (M. M. T.)
GAS (BILLION CUBIC METERS)
ELECTRIC POWER
(BILLION KILOWATT HRS.)
MINERAL FERTILIZER (M.M.T.)
U.S.
1960 1961 1962 1963 1962
(Plan) (Preliminary)
65.3 70.8 76.3 80 89
147.9 166.1 186 205 360
47.2 60.9 75.2 88 385
292.3 327.6 369 407.9 1004
13.9 15.3 17.2 20 33.1
(1960)
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INCREASES IN SOVIET INVESTMENTS
( in % over preceding year )
TOTAL (STATE
CENTRALIZED)' 10.'7 13.2 10.1
AND METALWORKING 39 23 14
ELECTRIC POWER
STATION S
chemicals, oil, metallurgy, and
machine building--doing poorly.
Light industrial investment in-
creased only eight percent com-
pared with a planned 33.5 per-
cent. As usual no information
was released on military programs.
Industrial labor productiv-
ity increased by six percent after
having slackened during the im-
plementation of a shorter working
week in 1960 and 1961. Produc-
tivity in construction was also
greater than in the two previous
years., but was still below plan.
' ABOUT THREE-QUARTERS OF ENTIRE INVESTMENT OUTLAYS.
EXCLUDES PRIVATELY FINANCED HOUSING, COLLECTIVE-FARM
INVESTMENT, AND SMALL-SCALE CAPITAL IMPROVEMENTS
ACCOMPLISHED WITH LOCAL FUNDS. IN 1962 TOTAL INVESTMENT
HAS PROBABLY INCREASED AT A LOWER RATE THAN INDICATED
FOR STATE-CENTRALIZED, AS IT DID.IN 1961.
synthetic materials and less
on the output of the ferrous
metallurgical industry.
Moscow's economic report
gives some hints of the dif-
ficulties which have inspired
two major reorganizations in
less than a year. These dif-
ficulties--in the areas of
planning, supply, and invest-
ment--stem from the mounting
competition for resources for
the military programs, for in-
dustrial development, and for
maintenance of an acceptable
level of consumption. There
is little in the report to
suggest that these problems
abated in 1962. A higher rate
of introduction of new fixed
capital suggests that the policy
undertaken late in 1961 to con-
centrate investment resources
on those projects nearing com-
pletion has had some success.
However, investment data, al-
though sketchy and ambiguous,
show some priority sections--
Agriculture
Despite considerable lip
service from Moscow to the needs
of agriculture, nothing in the
report suggests that its priority
was raised substantially in 1962.
The output of mineral fertilizer
was slightly above the annual
target but too low to meet
Seven-Year-Plan goals or the
actual requirements of Soviet
farming. The production of
farm machinery continued to in-
crease fairly rapidly, although
tractor production increased at
a lower rate than in 1961. State
investment in agriculture in-
creased 22 percent, but at least
a part of the increase resulted
from the transfer of collective
farms to state-farm status and
adds nothing to total agricul-
tural investment.
Production results in ag-
riculture were mediocre in 1962,
despite a fairly large increase
in acreage at the expense of
fallow land and land in grass-
rotation. The report claimed
a record grain harvest of nine
billion goods (147 million
metric tons), but Western ex-
perts after an extensive study
of acreage, crop, and weather
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
information--estimate it at about
115 million tons--well below the
record 1958 crop. There appar-
ently was a fair increase in meat
production, encouraged by the
higher prices for meat introduced
in mid-1962 and by the prospect
of feed shortages this winter.
The potato crop was the worst
one in over a decade.
Consumer Goods and Housing
Other features of the 1962
economic performance may also dis-
hearten Soviet consumers. The
output of light industry increased
only four percent comparedwith f ive
percent the preceding year. Pro-
duction of cotton fabrics did
not increase at all. Production
of all kinds of textiles rose two
percent. Retail trade turnover,
although somewhat improved over
1961, was below plan.
The urban housing program,
for the third year in a row, was
substantially underfulfilled.
Taking into account the 1963
plan,it now appears that the
urban housing construction will
fall about ten percent short of
the Seven-Year-Plan goal. Like-
wise, rural housing is badly
behind schedule.
Foreign Trade
Soviet foreign trade turn-
over amounted to $13.1 billion in
1962, an increase of approximately
$1.3 billion or 11.5 percent over
the 1961 level. This was the
largest increase in several years
and resulted largely from a 17-
percent increase in trade with
CEMA countries and a 30-percent
increase in trade with nonbloc
underdeveloped countries. Moscow
gave no data on trade with China,
but apparently there was some
decline in 1962.
Competition With the US
One of the main propaganda
features of Moscow's report is the
self-styled "competition" with
the United States, which, as in
the past, is presented in terms
highly favorable to the Soviets.
For example, the claim that
Soviet industrial production has
reached 63 percent of the US level is
based on statistical methods
which give a strong upward bias
to Soviet efforts. No comparisons
between two countries with dis-
similar economies can be entirely
fair or unbiased, but Soviet
industrial production is in fact
believed to be less than half that
of the US. (CONFIDENTIAL)
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Since the Cuban crisis last
fall, Mongolia's advocacy of
Khrushchev's views has brought
it to the point of open criti-
cism of the Chinese. Always a
dependable supporter of Soviet
foreign policy, Mongolian party
chief Tsendenbal has emerged
more and more in recent months
as Khrushchev's Asian spokesman.
Tsedenbal has given all
appearances of accepting this
role with enthusiasm. At a re-
cent party ideological conference
in Ulan Bator, he reiterated
Moscow's explanation of its
Cuban policy, in effect defend-
ing it against Chinese charges
of appeasement. Disparaging
those "who cling to obsolete
formulas" and do not display
flexibility in face of changed
world conditions, the Mongolian
leader labeled as "irresponsible
and conceited" Peiping's "ground-
less criticism" of the USSR's
policy. He pointedly charged
the Chinese with "incorrect
and extremely harmful actions"
in egging on the Albanians.
These correct state rela-
tions were exemplified by the
signing of a border treaty in
late December. It probably mat-
tered little to the Mongolians
that the Chinese motive in ar-
ranging the treaty at that time
was to place India in a bad light.
For their part, the Chinese were
probably under no illusions that
their accommodation on the border,
along which the number of inci-
dents has been increasing, would
budge Ulan Bator from its pro-
Soviet orientation.
Tsedenbal, who went to Pei-
ping to sign the treaty, gave
the Chinese no reason to enter-
tain any such hope. In return
for the fanfare with which he
was greeted, Tsedenbal dis-
comfited his hosts at a public
rally in Peiping by hailing Mos-
cow's "sensible compromises"
on Cuba. His remarks reportedly
caused the audience of 150,000
to "buzz with surprise" and were
greeted by Chinese leaders on
the rostrum with impassive
silence.
State relations with Pei-
ping, however, remain outwardly
correct, although Mongolian of-
ficials admit privately there
has been some cooling. The most
conspicuous form of Chinese as-
sistance, the use of Chinese
workers for big construction
projects around Ulan Bator, ap-
parently continues. Labor-short
Mongolia has employed as many
as 10,000 of these workers at
one time. Mongolian officials
have told recent foreign visitors
that workers from China who com-
pleted their tours of duty in
the past year have all been re-
placed by the Chinese.
The Mongolians describe
their position, wedged in be-
tween the USSR and Communist
China, as "overpowering," and
take advantage of every op-
portunity to cultivate foreign
diplomats and plump for recogni-
tion. Their record--recognition
by 14 non-Communist countries--
is far better than that of the
other Asian satellites. Recogni-
tion last week by the United
Kingdom--the first from a West
European country will no doubt
be exploited as an example to
be followed by other states.
(CONFIDENTIAL)
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Joseph Ileo, the Congolese
Government's recently appointed
minister-resident in Katanga,
has begun what may prove to be
a long and difficult period of
reintegrating the province. He
has privately described his
mission as one of an executor
of integration. While he has
begun talks with Tshombd, Ileo
has made it clear that he does
not intend to get bogged down
in involved negotiations with
the Katangan leader. He said
soon after his arrival he would
not tolerate Katangan obstruc-
tionist tactics, and on 28 Jan-
uary he ordered the arrest of
directors of the former Katangan
National Bank who had been in-
structed not to divulge infor-
mation on the bank's operations.
Ileo does not intend to
adhere to the letter of U Thant's
reintegration plan, according to
several sources. He is said to
feel it has been "overtaken by
events."
Leopoldville appears at
least temporarily to have dropped
the idea of convening a special
session of the combined North-
South Katanga Assembly as a
means of ousting Tshombd, or
reshuffling his government. Ileo
has said that such a move would
be illegal, since North Katanga
has been established by the
Congolese Parliament as a sepa-
rate province and this situation
could be changed only by new
parliamentary action. Adoula
may be waiting to establish a
firmer grip on the province
before moving against Tshombd.
Anti-Tshombd Baluba tribal
pressures for a combined session
remain strong, however. Bertin
Mwamba, president of the Congo-
lese Chamber of Deputies, main-
tains that North Katanga is too
poor to get along on its own.
He apparently is willing to let
Tshombd remain, but wants to oust
some of his ministers. On the
other hand Isaac Kalonji, presi-
dent of the Congolese Senate,
opposes reunification of Katanga,
even though he wants to oust
Tshombd.
The behavior of central
government officials in Elisabeth-
ville has alarmed both UN and
Belgian officials. UN officials
are trying to rein in Leopold-
ville's politicians and to limit
the number of the carpetbagger
horde until the detailed work
of reintegration is completed.
Foreign Minister Spaak says
he fears that replacing Tshombd
would provoke tribal outbreaks
and violence, although he says
Brussels is not seeking to
retain Tshombd "in perpetuity."
Leopoldville is continuing
to press for the introduction
of more Congo National Army
(ANC) troops into South Katanga.
Ileo and General Mobutu have
succeeded in persuading UN offi-
cials to permit ANC soldiers to
patrol with UN troops in Elisa-
bethville, and they now are press-
ing for the extension of mixed
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
patrols to the key mining town
of Jadotville, Kolwezi,and Ki-
pushi. Mobutu wants to send
another ANC battalion to Elisa-
bethville, and one each to
Jadotville and Kolwezi. UN offi-
cials, although fearful of the
European reaction, have appar-
ently agreed to the gradual
introduction of three or four
more ANC battalions.
Tshombd has moved quickly
to reassume his mantle of Ka-
tanga's provincial president.
He has held a series of cabinet
meetings, has toured the African
communes of Elisabethville an-
nouncing nouncing that he is the sole
authority in Katanga. and
called in selected mem-
ers o the Katanga Assembly to
remind them he is the legally
elected president and to warn
them to remain loyal. In a
letter to Adoula on 27 January
he asked what the exact functions
of Ileo were. Tshombd said that
neither he nor his government
SECRET
wanted any "conflicts of com-
petence" to arise.
The central thread running
through Tshombd's actions since
his return is strict application
of the U Thant plan. He has now
offered to send his officers to
Leopoldville to take an oath of
allegiance as provided in the
plan. He protested to the US
consul on 26 January that the
takeover of the Katangan banks
was not consonant with the UN
plan, and several times repeated
that either the plan should be
applied as written or Leopold-
ville should declare it null
and void.
The Katangan leader now is
seeking to involve the UN in
resolving his differences with
Leopoldville. On 24 January
he asked Thant to appoint
a special UN representative to
settle "certain problems" which
had arisen "in application of
your plan." (CONFIDENTIAL
NO FOREIGN DISSEM)
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
INSTABILITY CONTINUES IN TOGO
The political situation
in Togo remains basically un-
stable following the assassina-
tion of President Olympio in
mid-January. Behind Provisional
President Grunitsky's weak
leadership the diverse factions
represented in the cabinet and
the military elements who staged
the coup are involved in a power
struggle. Grunitsky's authority
has been further undercut by
the reluctance of most countries,
especially those in the moderate
African group, to extend diplo-
matic recognition.
Grunitsky is seriously
handicapped by his lack of a
real political base and the
fact that he is widely regarded
by Africans as a French stooge.
He is further inhibited by fear
of the military junta, which is
drifting into a more assertive
role, sometimes even acting
independently of the provisional
government. Grunitsky reportedly
indicated recently that his
relations with the military
leaders, who themselves are
confused and frightened by the
hostile reaction to the coup,
were becoming increasingly
difficult.
Among the contending
domestic political groups,
Finance Minister Meatchi's
northern-based Democratic Togo-
lese Peoples' Union (UDPT) ap-
pears to be in the ascendancy
within the provisional regime.
Meatchi, who is believed to be
receiving support from Ghana,
has been formally designated to
take over in the event of Grunit-
sky's absence or inability to
act.
Elements of Olympio's
Togolese Unity Party (UT), in
which southern Ewe and Mina
tribesmen predominate, are
also attempting to reassert
themselves. As the sole legal
party for a year prior to the
coup, the UT has the only ef-
fective national organization.
However, it is questionable
whether this party, which is rep-
resented in the present coali-
tion regime by Labor Minister
Kutuklui, can long survive
Olympio's death. Kutuklui, a
spokesman for impatient younger
elements in the party, reportedly
is attempting to take control
from the more conservative older
leaders, many of whom now are
in exile.
Grunitsky has reiterated
his government's pledge to
hold free elections, but so far
no date has been set. The
American Embassy in Lome believes
they are not likely to materialize
soon unless the UT drops its
opposition to Grunitsky's plan
for prior agreement by all parties
on a single list of candidates.
This device is clearly aimed
at preventing the UT from prof-
iting from its present electoral
strength in the country. For
the present, all political
meetings have been banned.
Only Ghana--which many
African governments suspect
was behind the coup--and Senegal
have announced unqualified rec-
ognition of Grunitsky's regime.
Dahomey has accorded de facto
recognition. It now seems likely
that other African states will
continue to defer any formal
action pending a report by the
five-country mission of inquiry
which the moderate Monrovia
powers decided to sent to Togo
at their 24-26 January conference
at Lagos.
Grunitsky has said he is
prepared to receive the mission,
but opposes as unrealistic the
conferees' call for the prompt
release of the imprisoned
ministers of Olympio's govern-
ment and for punishment of the
assassins. Prior to the Lagos
meeting, Grunitsky indicated
to the French ambassador that
if general recognition were de-
layed much longer he would assume
other states lacked confidence
in him and would simply "take
off" for his former refuge in
Dahomey. (SECRET NO FOREIGN
DISSEM)
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
REFERENDUM IN IRAN
The overwhelming approval
of Iran's reform program in the
referendum on 26 January will
encourage the Shah to accelerate
the program and possibly to
advance the date of national
elections now planned for June
or July. The regime now believes
it can override any attempts in
a new parliament to obstruct
reforms. The Shah has been
ruling without Parliament since
May 1961.
The referendum sought ap-
proval of six proposals: redis-
tribution of large landholdings
to peasants, a requirement that
20 percent of industry's profits
be shared by the workers,
nationalization of forests,
broadening of the franchise,
distribution of shares in gov-
ernment-owned industry to reim-
burse dispossessed landlords,
and use of military draftees to
teach reading and writing in
backward areas.
The regime mustered a
99.9-percent affirmative vote,
partly by intimidating the op-
position. Some opponents of
reform were jailed before the
voting began. The use of blue
ballots to signify a negative
vote prevented secrecy, and bus-
loads of pro-reform demonstrators
cruised through Tehran. Inten-
sive security measures and dis-
plays of military force imposed
calm during the balloting.
The spectacle of women
voting for the first time failed
to provoke the expected reli-
gious protest. The women's vote
was not included in the final
tally, however.
The standing of Minister
of Agriculture Hasan Arsanjani
appears to have been enhanced.
Already popular for his key
role in pushing land reform,
he was responsible for organiz-
ing sizable peasant demonstra-
tions which upset the plans and
strategy of those opposing the
Shah's reforms.
The opposition forces--
the mullahs, the landlords and
the National Front--appear to be
demoralized temporarily and prob-
ably have lost many supporters.
The protest demonstrations they
sparked were overwhelmed by those
the government staged. However,
they can be expected to claim
that the referendum was invalid
because of rigging. The National
Front, which favors reform but
not under the Shah's auspices,
now intends to concentrate its
attack on the Shah personally.
According to its moderate leader,
Allahyar Saleh, it will charge
that the Shah has profited from
land sold to the peasants and
will demand that such profits
be distributed to them.
The National Front may
begin to compete with the regime
in offering workers and peasants
more than the Shah can deliver.
The reforms and promises of
further reforms have raised high
hopes which would turn to dis-
illusionment in a few months
as the government encounters
complex administrative and
financial problems in carrying
out its program.
When elections are held,
the regime's opponents may again
seek to provoke disorders in
view of the futility of com-
peting at the well-scrutinized
ballot boxes. (SECRET NO FOR-
EIGN DISSEM)
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tories. "Confrontation" does
not appear to imply a direct
use of force.
SUMATRA BORNEO
Indonesia's policy, an-
nounced on 20 January, of "con-
frontation" with Malaya over the
inclusion of the British Borneo
territories in the proposed Ma-
laysia Federation has sharpened
British and Malayan concern over
Indonesian intentions in the
northern Borneo territories.
In declaring the policy, Indo-
nesia's Foreign Minister Suban-
drio denounced Malaya as an ac-
complice of "neo-colonialists"
and "neo-imperialists" and for
pursuing a hostile policy toward
Indonesia.
Steps to carry out Indo-
nesia's new policy will probably
include anti-Malayan propaganda
activity in Indonesia, accusa-
tions that Malaya encourages
illegal economic and political
activity directed against Indo-
nesia, harassment of Malayan
shipping by Indonesia's anti-
smuggling patrol craft in the
Straits of Malacca, and harass-
ment of Malayan diplomatic and
consular personnel in Indonesia.
Presumably the objects of such
a policy are to draw interna-
tional attention to the area,
to goad Malaya into action
against which Indonesia might
retaliate, and to encourage anti-
Malaysia elements in Malaya,
Singapore, and the Borneo terri-
Malaya's Prime Minister
Rahman nevertheless claims to
have information that Indonesia
is preparing to infiltrate guer-
rillas into Brunei in the very
near future in order to rekindle
the abortive revolt staged
there in December. Rahman warns
that only a strong show of
force in the area by the British
will deter Indonesia.
Since the December revolt
in Brunei was crushed, Indo-
nesian army outposts in Borneo
reportedly have been ordered
to assist those rebels who have
made their way to the border
and to regroup them inside
Indonesian territory. A com-
munications post is to be es-
tablished in East Borneo to
maintain contact with rebel
leaders on the other side of
the border.
Guerrilla training areas
for both Indonesians and rebel
elements are reported operating
in Indonesia near the North
Borneo and Sarawak borders. A
monthly training capacity of five
or six hundred may have been
reached. In mid-January, both
Subandrio and National Security
Minister Nasution told American
officials that if "independence
seekers" in the North Borneo
territories request military
training, Indonesia will
comply. (SECRET NO FOR-
EIGN DISSEM)
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Kim Chong-pil, controver-
sial second man in the South
Korean regime, has emerged from
a fight for control of the
government-sponsored Democratic-
Republican Party with his power
position intact, if not stronger
than ever. His official position
in the party is still undecided,
and he may exercise control
from behind the scenes.
The junta intends to use
the party--which Kim organized
--to control the new "civilian"
government scheduled to come
into being after elections this
spring. Senior officers in the
junta feared that if Kim con-
solidated his control of the
party they would be frozen out
of any share in political power.
On 21 January a retired marine
lieutenant general, Kim Tong-ha,
led a move to remove Kim Chong--
pil from the party.
The political crisis that
ensued demonstrated once again
the close ties between junta
leader Pak Chong-hui and Kim,
Pak's decision to allow the
party sponsoring committee to
resolve the issue of party
leadership signaled the defeat
of Kim's opponents. Kim had
placed on this committee civil-
ians responsive to his control
and former members of the South
Korean Central Intelligence
Agency, which he had headed.
Assurance that the army
leadership would support the
move was a key influence in
Pak's decision favoring Kim.
Subsequently, Pak confirmed
the government party as the
new locus of political power
by warning the junta council
to stop meddling in politics.
He stated he would no longer
tolerate discussion of party
affairs in the council, even
if he had to disband it.
The support of the civilian
members of the party committee
is enabling Kim to pose as the
champion of civilian supremacy
in politics. He also appears
to have isolated his enemies in
the army for the time being.
His success, however, could
make him a possible target for
assassination--a device not
unusual in Korean politics. Pak
may be exposed to the same
danger.
The military forces are
likely to remain the key factor
in the political situation for
some time to come, and power
seekers will have to obtain
backing among the armed forces.
For the time being some of
Kim's opponents probably will
go along with his leadership
of the party, awaiting a time
when factional shifts in the
military will give them another
chance to challenge his posi-
tion. Others may align them-
selves with civilian politicians
opposed to the regime and use
their inside knowledge of
government scandals, including
Kim's financial deals, to
attack the party during the
election campaign.
In any event, the open
strife surrounding the
struggle for control of the
party will make it increasingly
difficult for the junta to
maintain the facade of free
elections and return to
representative government.
The regime's narrow base of
public support makes it sensi-
tive to criticism. An indi-
cation of declining support
could cause the Pak-Kim forces
to impose repressive measures
that might provoke violence by
students or other disaffected
elements. (SECRET NO FOREIGN
DISSEM)
SECRET
1 Feb 63 WEEKLY REVIEW Page 18 of 22
Approved For Release 2006/09/28: CIA-RDP79-00927A003900060001-5
 Approved For Release 2006/09/28: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03900060001-5
SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
THE POLITICAL SITUATION IN ITALY
The parliamentary debate in
Italy occasioned by the Commu-
nists' recent no-confidence motion
served to launch the campaign
for national elections to be
called sometime this spring.
Special attention focused on the
new defense position announced
by Premier Fanfani following his
Washington talks.
able electoral line, the Commu-
nists emphasized the government's
The Communist motion was
defeated 292 to 173 in a show-
down vote between government
and opposition parties, with
the Nenni Socialists abstaining
as usual. Indicating their prob-
administrations. Communist chief
Togliatti also charged Fanfani
with embarking on a dangerous
defense policy involving exten-
sion of Italy's participation
in the use of nuclear arms.
Nenni, for his part, deplored
the Christian Democrats' fail-
ure to meet all program commit-
ments but reiterated support
for the present government and
declared that his party expect-
ed a revival of the center-left
experiment after the elections.
monopolies and to set up regional
is that "nuclear proliferation"
is to be reduced by removal of the
30 obsolescent Jupiter missiles
from Italian soil and by Italian
!participation, instead, in a
(Mediterranean but non-Italian-
based NATO nuclear force. In this
1connection the US Embassy in Rome
I considers it significant that
INenni, on whose parliamentary
!following the government depends
for a viable majority, took note--
without expressing opposition--of
Fanfani's statement approving such
a force, whereas a year ago the
Socialists were publicly opposing
a NATO nuclear arm. Nenni, despite
the effect his statements might
have on his electoral supporters
,
failure to carry out its promises !even praised the results of Fan-
to take action against private ;fani's Washington visit.
There were numerous state-
ments by party leaders deploring
De Gaulle's EEC policy, with
Social Democratic leader Sara-
gat declaring that "De Gaulle will
pass and Europe remain." Premier
Fanfani called the Paris-Bonn
treaty a particularism harmful to
Europe and NATO. Further such
sentiments are likely to be voiced
during Prime Minister Macmillan's
long-scheduled visit to Italy from
1 to 3 February.
The government, seeking to
As announced by Fanfani, avoid further no-confidence
the government's defense position motions, will probably try for
f early adjournment of parliament
Independ?nn of which majority
ore Rightht,, I. fh? Senoe, 0
are directly e1-bed and 5 are
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