CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A003900010001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 38
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 28, 2008
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 28, 1962
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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CURRENT
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY
SUMMARY
COPY NO. 72
OCI NO. 0449/62
28 December 1962
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
--- -SECRET ~~~
Ai'EI,Y I FTF USE
ARMY review(s) completed.
GROUP I
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification
2- J2 S-2- -1,/
State Dept. review completed
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
28 December 1962
T H E W E E K I N B R I E F
(Information as of 1200 EST 27 Dec)
CUBAN DEVELOPMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 1
There continues to be no evidence that the USSR is
preparing to withdraw its armored forces from the four encamp-
ments in Cuba. Preparations are under way for a massive
military display on 2 January when the regime observes its
fourth anniversary in power. Fidel Castro is scheduled to be
the main speaker on this occasion. The recent publication
in a Havana newspaper of a particularly anti-Soviet Chinese
Communist newspaper editorial, I
suggests that Castro ma have some major political moves
under consideration. 25X1
CONGO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 3
Adoula, following a series of increasingly effective
attacks on his government, plans to recess parliament until
March. Tshombd continues to block the start of negotiations
on the Belgian proposal that Union Miniere make tax payments
to both Leopoldville and Katanga. Tensions between the UN
and Katanga are high and erupted into a military clash on
24 December outside Elisabethville.
JORDAN, SAUDI ARABIA,AND YEMEN . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . Page 5
Jordan and Saudi Arabia, which continue to support the
Yemeni royalists, are bitter over US recognition of the
republican regime in Yemen. Jordan has suggested that
Saudi Arabia join it in reappraising their pro-Western
orientation and in considering "the utility of dealings with
Communist bloc nations." Although it seems unlikely that
King Iiusayn's regime will in the final analysis turn to the
bloc, it may seek lesser ways to register its displeasure.
In Yemen, the military situation has not changed significantly
during the past week.
THE SITUATION IN LAOS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 6
Kong Le's recent criticisms of the Pathet Lao and
equally sharp Pathet Lao attacks on the neutralists re-
flect a serious deterioration in the relations between the
rival factions. Meanwhile, in response to a request from
the Lao Government, the International Control Commission
(ICC) will probably soon investigate charges that foreign
troops remain in Laos. The ICC protested the government's
severe restrictions on team operations, however, and
asserted its right to undertake future investigations on
its own initiative, free from government control.
SINO-MONGOLIAN BORDER TREATY . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . Page 7
The signing of a Chinese-Mongolian border treaty was
announced on 26 December at the same time as a boundary
agreement "in principle" with Pakistan was revealed. Peiping
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will use both to underscore its point that New Delhi's
intransigence is the principal obstacle to settlement of
Sino-Indian frontier differences. The new accord will
probably not budge the Mongolians from their pro-Moscow
alignment in the Sino-Soviet dispute.
TIGHTENING OF PARTY CONTROL OVER SOVIET CULTURE . . . . . Page 9
A "hard-line" policy for Soviet culture was laid down
by party secretary Leonid Ilichev at a recent meeting between
Soviet intellectuals and top party leaders. Signs of a
crackdown have been evident since Khrushchev's 1 December
visit to an abstract art exhibit, and Tlichev's statement
that experimentation in the arts will not be tolerated and
that the party is the only source of "truth" for the arts
apparently signals an end to the regime's toleration of a
trend toward liberalization during the past year. However,
the openly defiant reaction of liberal intellectuals to
the regime's efforts since early December to crack down
on culture will make it difficult for the party to reimpose
total control over the arts.
SOVIET FOREIGN TRADE PLAN FOR 1963 . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 11
For the first time in three years the USSR's annual
economic plan, recently presented to the Supreme Soviet,
failed to specify the planned percentage increase in total
foreign trade for the coming year. Soviet statements on
the subject appear to reflect uncertainties about the
course of trade, particularly with Communist China and the
industrial West. Soviet trade with the European satellites
probably will continue to expand and trade with under-
developed countries is scheduled to increase sharply.
TITO'S VISIT TO THE USSR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 12
During Tito's 4-21 December visit to the USSR, he and
Khrushchev apparently agreed on steps which they expect
will result in continuing expansion of their economic and
political relations and a gradual elimination of the issues
which admittedly still divide them. The similarity between
Soviet and Yugoslav foreign policies was repeatedly cited
in public statements. Obviously pleased by the red carpet
treatment given him, Tito has ordered that Yugoslavia "must
avoid everything that might disturb relations with other
socialist countries." Nevertheless, the visit may ag-
gravate divisive tendencies within the Soviet bloc.
ALBANIA'S DOMESTIC SITUATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 14
The Albanian leadership, with the economic and politi-
cal support of Communist China, has been able to maintain
internal stability since the USSR severed all relations
with Tirana a year ago. Despite mounting Soviet bloc pres-
sures as evidenced at recent Communist congresses, there
is no sign of any rift in the ruling hierarchy over the
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pro-Chinese, anti-Soviet line, and little indication of
popular unrest. The large and efficient security apparatus
has dealt quickly with the few centers of real or potential
disaffection. Despite claims of satisfactory growth in
the economy, difficulties in agriculture and in construc-
tion are being encountered.
COMMON MARKET AND NATO DEVELOPMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . Page 15
The UK-EEC accession talks have been adjourned until
mid-January. Bonn and Paris, despite some apparent misgivings
in both capitals, have agreed on detailed arrangements for
special bilateral consultation. The Macmillan talks with
President Kennedy in Nassau have made the military-implica-
tions of closer European unity an immediate issue rather
than a matter for consideration after the completion of the
Brussels talks.
PROBLEMS IN EXTENDING SPANISH-US BASES AGREEMENT .
Page 17
The Spaniards may be considering asking for political
guarantees in return for extending the US bases agreement,
which expires in September 1963. Madrid would prefer con-
tinued US military and economic aid on something like the
former scale, but failing this the government may feel
that it must have some political gains to 'show. There is
some evidence that a proposal for an entirely new form of
US-Spanish treaty relationship may be in the wind.
POST-ELECTION SITUATION IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC . . . . Page18
The chances for peaceful and orderly transition to con-
stitutional government in the Dominican Republic have been
substantially improved by the heavy victory of the Dominican
Revolutionary Party in the national elections on 20 December.
President-elect Juan Bosch will take office on 27 February.
He has indicated that he plans a reformist domestic policy
and a "dynamic, different, and democratic" foreign policy
not unfriendly to the US. Various groups that had been
plotting to seize the government will probably lie low, at
least for the time being.
COMMUNIST ACTIVITIES IN PERU . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 20
Communist agitators were clearly responsible for the
recent violence by striking miners in La Oroya and by Indian
tenant-farmers near Cusco. The governing junta, however,
has charged the anti-Communist APRA with complicity in the
incidents at La Oroya and continues to neglect action to
curb the Communists. The junta appears to consider APRA a
greater danger to its position than the Communists. Continued
outbreaks of violence may create such political instability
that the junta will cancel the elections promised for June
1963.
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DE GAULLE'S CONTROL OF FRENCH NATIONAL POLICY . . . . . . Page 1
National policy in France is conceived and formed by
President de Gaulle. Invested by the constitution with
broad executive powers, he exercises close direct control
in foreign affairs and military matters, and follows the
political if not the economic aspects of the Common Market
with great alertness. Even his closest long-time associates,
whose views are close to his own, have only limited op-
portunity to influence his decisions.
NORTH KOREA'S ARMED FORCES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 6
North Korea's 330,000-man army is the third largest
and its air force the fifth largest in the bloc. These
forces have been maintained and improved by Soviet aid.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Aerial photographs of the
four Soviet armored group en-
campments in Cuba
reveal no
evidence of an impending with-
drawal of the personnel or equip-
ment located there. From 200
to 250 vehicles, including about
35 tanks, remained at each site
on 22 December, and continuing
construction of barracks-type
buildings was observed at the
encampment near Artemisa in east-
ern Pinar del Rio Province.
Cuban military units evi-
dently are continuing to prepare
for what promises to be a mili-
tary display of unprecedented
size at the Castro regime's
celebration on 2 January of its
fourth anniversary in power.
Photography
has revealed
more than 200 tanks and several
hundred other military vehicles
practicing parade formations
in a staging area near Havana.
the build-
up of military ve is es in this
area is for purposes of drilling
for thr parade. The purpose
of the mammoth military show
being planned may well be to
impress Cubans as well as for-
eign observers at the celebration
with the Castro regime's own
military capabilities and to
attempt to soften the impact
of the Soviet removal of offen-
sive missiles and jet bombers
from Cuba.
Premier Castro is scheduled
as the main speaker for the 2
January event. He has used
such occasions in the past for
major policy announcements.
His prolonged official silence--
his last public speech having
been delivered on 1 November--
has heightened speculation that
on 2 January he will speak on
a topic of particular signifi-
cance. Castro had been sched-
uled to address a sugar workers'
meeting on 19 December, for
which he had been widely ad-
vertised for weeks as the fea-
tured speaker. Minister of
Industries Guevara appeared in
Castro's place at the last mo-
ment,while Castro himself paid
a visit, as he frequently has
done in the last two months, to
the University of Havana.
the re-
gime's new Political machine,
the United Party of the Social-
ist Revolution (PURS), will be
announced. The "election" of
members of this organization
from among the ranks of Cuba's
most "revolutionary-minded"
citizens and the country's
"most exemplary" workers has
been going on for some time,
and the 2 January occasion
would be a logical one for the
official inauguration of the
PURS.
The celebration could
also provide a suitable occasion
for the announcement of some
change affecting the course of
the revolution itself, although
there are no clear indications
that such a decision has been
made or what its nature might
be.
There are signs that a
revision of Cuba's policy re-
garding the Sino-Soviet bloc
at least has been contemplated.
On 17 December the Havana
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
newspaper Revolucion, one of the
three major Cuban dailies, fea-
tured prominently a verbatim
translation of a bitterly anti-
Khrushchev editorial appearing
on 15 December in the Chinese
Communist party organ People's
Daily. All Cuban newspapers
usually have taken pains to avoid
publicizing the Sino-Soviet
dispute but have generally given
greater coverage to the Soviet
Union than to Communist China.
The appearance of the 17 Decem-
ber article suggests that Castro
at least condoned if he did not
nrd r it-- inclusion in Revolution
Cuban economists are con-
tinuing to work out the details
of Havana's economic agreements
for 1963 with bloc countries.
The first stage of Soviet-Cuban
economic negotiations for next
year was completed in Moscow on
18 December, but there is little 25X1
indication of the results
achieved. A joint communique
published on 20 December stated
that full agreement was reached
on "basic" trade issues, includ-
ing the level of exchange, credits,
transportation, and "other impor-
tant questions." Carlos Rafael
Rodriguez, head of the Cuban
mission, left for home via Prague
on 19 December, while the rest
of the delegation, headed by
Minister of Foreign Trade Alberto
Mora, remained in Moscow to com-
plete negotiations there. The
delegation is scheduled to go
on to Peiping to negotiate the
Cuban - Chinese Communist trade
pact for 1963.
Before leaving Moscow,
Rodriguez expressed satisfaction
with the preliminary talks,
citing in particular the "under-
standing" shown by the USSR to-
ward questions of credits and
deliveries of "most important
commodities." The final commu-
niqud,' rather than stating that
Soviet-Cuban trade will increase
next year, says that there was
agreement on a "broadening" of
trade. Originally scheduled to
reach some $750 million in 1962,
total Soviet-Cuban trade this
year probably fell short of this
figure by $75 million to $100
million because of Cuban export
deficiencies. Soviet aid almost
certainly will be required to
sustain the volume of trade in
1963.
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WEEKLY REVIEW
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
After much hesitation and Adoula's continuation of parlia-
indecision Premier Adoula has mentary salaries and Mobutu's
decided to recess the Congo support of the move should pre-
Parliament until March. A state-! j vent any serious anti-government
ment to that effect has been demonstrations.
drafted and presumably will be
issued in a few days.
Opposition attacks on the
government have become increas-
ingly effective since late No-
vember. The unanimous resolution
by the lower house on 21 Decem-
ber calling for release of the
leftist former Stanleyville
leader, Antoine Gizenga, and a
near-censure of a second one of
Adoula's ministers, apparently
convinced the premier he must
make a decisive move if the gov-
ernment were to stay in office.
Adoula's reluctance to re-
cess parliament is evident in
the draft order. It contains
no criticism of the opposition
and clearly states that parlia-
ment is only being put on vaca-
tion, not dissolved, and that
the next session will resume in
The latest effort to get
Tshombe to end his secession is
at a standstill. The Belgian
proposal that Union Miniere
(UMHK) henceforth split its ex-
port tax payments and foreign
exchange earnings between Ka-
tanga and the central govern-
ment--accepted by Tshombe on
12 December--is stalled over
the arrangements for negotia-
tions on its details.
Tshombe maintains that only
the Katangan government, not
UMHK, is competent to discuss
the payment plan,and he has
vetoed a UN invitation to the
Belgian head of the Katangan
National Bank and local UMHK
financial officials to begin
discussions in Leopoldville.
The bank official refuses to go
without Tshombe's approval, and
UMHK officials insist they can-
not expose their facilities and
personnel to Katangan retalia-
tion by taking unilateral action.
Tshombe charges that U Thant's
call for an economic embargo
against Katanga, and US and
March. In the interim, Adoula UN intentions to impose a solu-
says, the government will concen-' tion by force, as indicated by
trate on solving the Katangan the visit of a US military mis-
problem and revising the Congo sion to the Congo, have changed
economy. the previous atmosphere of detente.
Congo army troops in Leo-
poldville were alerted on 23
December and restricted to bar-
racks, but Adoula dropped earlier
plans to arrest 19 opposition
deputies. Outcries from the
opposition are certain, but
UN Under Secretary Bunche
told US officials on 20 December
that were it not for fear of
jeopardizing the impending ne-
gotiations on the payment plan,
the UN would have already de-
manded that Tshombe remove
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CURRENT INTELL7nENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Katangan roadblocks around Elisa-
bethville.
T
b
UN
i
t
th
ens
ons
ween
e
e
and Katangan forces were further
increased by a military clash
on 24 December in which a UN
helicopter was downed by Ka-
tangan gunfire and an Indian
crew member killed. When the
Indian commander of UN forces
in Elisabethville brought up
a reinf.orcedlndian battalion,
the Katangans returned the heli-
copter and the crew. Bunche
warned Tshombe that this would
be the last time the UN would
"waste time" in protesting and
negotiating such incidents.
Soviet propaganda has
attacked the US military mis-
sion to the Congo as an attempt
to assure a political solution
favorable to-US interests.
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V d
a nia
Ni~we
fJ nla ['%T A T
FEDERATION OF RHODESIA
AND NYASALAND
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REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
JORDAN, SAUDI ARABIA, AND YEMEN
US recognition of the
republican regime in Yemen has
caused predictable bitterness
in Jordan and Saudi Arabia,
which continue to support the
Yemeni royalists.
undertake a joint reappraisal.
Faysal probably will welcome
the proposal.
The Jordanian Government
has threatened to reappraise
its pro-Western orientation
and to consider "the utility
of dealings with Communist
bloc nations." Prime Minister
Tal told US Ambassador Macomber
that Jordan might accept Soviet
aid missions as a prelude to
the establishment of formal
diplomatic relations with the
USSR.
Although King Husayn's
regime is unlikely in the final
analysis to jeopardize vitally
needed American aid by turning
to the bloc, Ambassador Macomber
believes Husayn and Tal never-
theless may search for lesser
ways to show their displeasure.
Tal said it apparently was
essential to increase their
"nuisance value" to get the
US to pay attention to their
views.
Tal indicated he has sent
a message to Saudi Prime Min-
ister Prince Faysal suggesting
that their two governments
Both governments are con-
vinced that the US action will
encourage Nasir to foment and
support revolutions against
them. New sharp verbal attacks
on the Saudi and Jordanian mon-
archies, as well as the UK, by
Nasir and Prime Minister Salal
of the Yemeni republican gov-
ernment will reinforce Saudi
and Jordanian determination to
continue aiding the Yemeni
royalists.
The military situation
in Yemen has not changed signifi-
cantly during the past week.
The UAR has resorted to night
bombing of Yemeni royalist supply
lines and positions. Although
pro-royalist villages have
been destroyed, the Imam's
forces appear to have suffered
little damage from these forays.
Tribal loyalties continue to
shift.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Relations between the
Pathet Lao and the neutralists,
never smooth, have deteriorated
seriously in recent weeks.
Kong Le, the neutralist leader
once sympathetic to Pathet Lao
policies, has charged that the
Pathet Lao are not Lao national-
ists, but in fact the "same
thing as the Viet Minh." He
even struck out at Foreign
Minister Quinim Pholsena,
nominally a neutralist though
in fact a consistent supporter
of the Pathet Lao position,
accusing him of having abandoned
neutralism and being pro-Com-
munist.
Pathet Lao military command-
er Singkapo has added fuel to
the fire with his charges that
Kong Le troops have been harass-
ing villagers. As a result,
Singkapo claimed, many neutral-
ist troops had been turning to
Colonel Deuane--a pro-Pathet Lao
neutralist involved in the
November downing of a plane
resupplying Kong Le's forces--
who was "following a straight
path."
Meanwhile, there are in-
dications that the International
Control Commission (ICC), in-
active since the expiration of
the troop withdrawal period on
7 October, will soon send teams
to investigate charges that
foreign troops--Nationalist
Chinese and North Vietnamese--
remain in Laos. The coalition
government on 19 December called
for inspections at Long Kou, a
village east of Sam Neua Town,
and Ban Thone Pheung, situated
near Ban Houei Sai in north-
western Laos.
The request stipulated
that the inspections should be
restricted to the "limits of the
village" and last only two
days. In its response to the
Lao Government, the ICC, while
noting that it was prepared to
conduct the requested investiga-
tions on the basis outlined,
insisted upon its right to
conduct future investigations
on its own initiative, free of
government control.
Operating under such
stringent restrictions, it is
not likely that the inspection
teams will come up with much in
the way of positive evidence.
At Long Kou, the almost certain
evacuation of North Vietnamese
troops, coupled with the
villagers' fear of subsequent
Pathet Lao reprisals, should
make it very difficult for the
teams to unearth any significant
information.
drive them out.
On the other hand, the
inspection at Ban Thone Pheung
may well produce evidence
supporting charges that Chinese
Nationalist troops are present
in the region. Small numbers of
these irregular forces, which
have been in the Laos-Thailand-
Burma border area since 1949,
have remained in northwestern
Laos, engaged in the opium traf-
fic. They have resisted repeated
efforts by the Lao Government to
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
SINO-MONGOLIAN BORDER TREATY
The Sino-Mongolian border
treaty concluded on 26 December
reflects Peiping's endeavor to
restore its waning prestige in
Mongolia, to improve its posi-
tion in the Sino-Soviet con-
troversy, and to strengthen its
negotiating hand on the Sino-
Indian frontier.
before the 23 December announce- 25X1
ment that Tsedenbal was coming
to Peiping to sign the treaty.
There had been no public
mention of Sino-Mongolian talks
CHINESE COMMUNIST BORDER CLAIMS
32876
Boundary shown on recent
Chinese Communist maps
Boundary claimed by STAT
neighboring state
0 500
Mi Ies
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Animosity over boundary
differences was also recently
indicated
Typ-
ical o the Chinese actions
which infuriated the Mongo-
lians was the shifting of bound-
ary markers in the spring of
1962. The Mongolians moved the
markers back, and the markers
were shuffled back and forth
several times before a detach-
ment of Mongolian troops ar-
rived to put an end to the
incident.
The exact terms of the
accord have not been made pub-
lic, but the Chinese may have
made the greater part of the
concessions. The difficulties
of reaching agreement with
India have inclined Peiping to
a demonstrative flexibility in
its negotiations with other
neighbors. -,'lith minor excep-
tions, the boundary agreements
reached with Burma in 1960
and with Nepal in 1961 followed
the alignments claimed by Ran-
goon and Katmandu.
The Chinese are probably
particularly anxious to pro-
ject an image of reasonableness
just before the arrival in
Peiping of Ceylon's Prime Min-
ister Bandaranaike, who is
coming next week to press the
Colombo Conference's proposals
for an accommodation along the
Sino-Indian border. Mrs. Ban-
daranaike will probably also
be briefed by the Chinese on
their boundary agreement "in
principle" with the Pakistanis,
which was announced in Rawal-
pindi on 26 December.
The fanfare attending
Tsedenbal's reception in Pei-
ping was probably in part a
measure of Communist China's
interest in affecting Mongolia's
attitude toward the Sino-Soviet
controversy. Originally dis-
posed to a cautious neutrality
in the Sino-Soviet dispute,
the Mongolians are now unequivo-
cally in Moscow's camp. The
Mongolian party leaders have
gone so far in the past year
as to criticize the Chinese
explicitly.
Present indications are
that the boundary treaty will
not budge the Mongolians from
this alignment. Recent radio
commentary from Ulan Bator has
enlarged on Mongolia's support
for Khrushchev's handling of
the Cuban crisis and has con-
demned the "hopeless dogmatists"
who opposed him. In Peiping,
Tsedenbal reiterated Mongolia's
approval of the Soviet role
in Cuba at the same time that
he voiced the expected plati-
tudes about Sino-Mongolian
friendship.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
TIGHTENING OF PARTY CONTROL OVER SOVIET CULTURE
A "hard-line'' policy for
Soviet culture was laid down by
party secretary Leonid Ilichev
at a recent meeting between
Soviet intellectuals and top
party leaders. Signs of a crack-
down have been evident since
Khrushchev's 1 December visit
to an abstract art exhibit, but
Ilichev's speech, which stated
that experimentation in the arts
will not be tolerated and that
the party is the only source of
"truth" for the arts, is the
first high-level pronouncement
to be published. His remarks
apparently signal an end to the
regime's toleration of a trend
toward liberalization which has
gone virtually unchecked since
the 22nd party congress in Octo-
ber 1961. Hopes among Soviet
intellectuals for greater crea-
tive freedom aroused by the re-
cent renewal of de-::3talinization
have been dashed, and some form
of tightened party control seems
inevitable.
Until recently, the liberal
factions of Soviet artists, writ-
ers,, and musicians were rapidly
gaining control of the cultural
organizations, apparently with
Khrushchev's general, if not
always specific, support. En-
couraged by the renewal of de-
Stalinization in mid-October and
by reports that Khrushchev
specifically called for greater
creative freedom for Soviet
writers in his still unpublished
speech to the central committee
plenum on 23 November, the lib-
erals appeared well on their
way to winning a decisive vic-
tory over the conservative f ac-
tion of cultural administrators
and party-lining hacks who con-
trolled the cultural organiza-
tions.
These developments encour-
aged Moscow's numerous "under-
ground" artists to exhibit their
works publicly for the first
time. However, cultural bureau-
crats, whose authority had been
undermined by recent liberali-
zation moves, deliberately ar-
ranged for Khrushchev to be shown25X1
some of the avant-garde paintings
on 1 December, knowing what his
reaction would probably be.
Khrushchev's visit was fol-
lowed by "hard-line" editorials
in all major newspapers and of-
ficial controls over the arts
were noticeably tightened. At
the 17 December meeting between
top party leaders and intellec-
tuals, both Ilichev and Khrush-
chev apparently laid down a "hard-
line" policy. The latter's
speech has not yet been published,
but Ilichev, whose speech ap-
peared in Pravda on 22 Decdmber,
harshly attacT