CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 30 NOV 1962

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A003800110001-0
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• Document Page Count: 43
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 28, 2008
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: November 30, 1962
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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CURRENT
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY
SUMMARY'
COPY NO. 78
OCI NO. 0445/62
30 November 1962
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
111 OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
State Dept. review completed
DIA review(s) completed.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY c",MMARY
30 November 1962
T H E W E E K I N B R I E F
(Information as of 1200 EST 29 Nov)
CUBA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 1
Soviet IL-28 bomber aircraft are being disassembled
and removed from Cuban airfields. The Castro regime's
military forces have returned to an almost completely
normal defensive posture, and regime leaders are beginning
to exhort the people to concentrate once again on increasing
economic production. Cuba's 25 November official communiqud
on the Caribbean crisis rejected any international verification
of v iapons removal unless the UN inspected US territory. 25X1
SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY DEVELOPMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . Page
The Soviet leaders apparently intend to pursue a
temporizing and cautious course in the immediate post-Cuban
crisis period while they concentrate on rebuilding the USSR's
prestige and position. They are stressing their desire to
liquidate the Cuban problem as quickly as possible and to
move on to the settlement of other issues, although they
are playing down the urgency of the Berlin question.
Mikoyan has tried to put the best possible face on his
difficult and, at times, acrimonious negotiations with the
Cuban leaders. The usual joint communiqud was not forthcoming,
and Mikoyan did not even hint at new economic or military
assistance agreements. Moscow continued to stress that a
"final solution" of the Cuban problem depends on a formal
US noninvasion commitment.
While the USSR contends that the relaxation of tensions
in Cuba has created a favorable atmosphere for the resumed
Geneva disarmament talks, there have been no indications
that there will be any early major changes in the Soviet
SINO-INDIAN BORDER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page
Intensive political jockeying has accompanied the
eight days of quiet on the military fronts since Peiping's
self-imposed cease-fire went into effect on 22 November.
Indian tactics have been to play for time, to observe the
cease-fire, to regroup forces, and to await signs of Peiping's
scheduled withdrawal on 1 December. The Chinese, seeking to
exploit neutralist desires for a peaceful settlement, are
making a major effort to influence the planned meeting of
six nonaligned powers in Colombo early in December. Peiping
hopes neutralist leaders will prod India to the conference
table on Chinese terms.
SOVIET PARTY AND GOVERNMENT REORGANIZATION . . . . . . . . Page
The Soviet party central committee last week approved
a series of high-level organizational changes and personnel
appointments as the first steps in implementing Khrushchev's
recent plans for strengthening centralized party control of
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day-to-day administration of the economy. To staff the new
party administrative bureaus and government posts, several
newcomers have been brought into the top leadership, particu-
larly into the enlarged central party secretariat, and
some of Khrushchev's younger lieutenants have made substantial
gains in their power positions. Full implementation of the
scheme to organize industrial and agricultural branches at
all echelons of the party, however, will probably not be
completed before mid-January at the earliest.
KADAR'S "NEW TREND" REAFFIRMED AT HUNGARIAN CONGRESS . . . Page 1~.
The Hungarian party congress last week reaffirmed First
Secretary Kadar's moderate domestic policies and his regime's
support for Khrushchev's foreign policies and leadership of
the bloc. While there were no major personnel changes--in
contrast to the recent Bulgarian congress--Kadar warned the
hard-line element that the future of all functionaries
depends on their ability and on their support for his policies,
The Hungarian congress provided the second occasion in less
than a month for a confrontation between the Soviet and
Chinese parties, and a heightening of the temper of their
mutual recriminations resulted.
AIRCRAFT RE-EQUIPMENT PROGRAM IN EASTERN EUROPE
Page 13
Bloc air capabilities in Eastern Europe have steadily
improved with the acquisition of 500 or, more new-generation
aircraft, mostly fighters, in the past two years. Although
the number of high-speed (Mach 2) fighters in the forward
area may have doubled since early 1962, they still com-
prise only about 11 percent of the total fighter strength.
Soviet air forces in the satellites have a higher ratio of
new-generation fighters than do any of the four satellite
national forces which have such aircraft.
YUGOSLAV RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET BLOC . . . . . . . . . Page 15
President Tito apparently intends to go ahead next
week with his long-awaited "private" visit to the USSR.
Neither country is apparently, willing to let their recent
low-key ideological exchanges interfere with the pace of
their reconciliation. Fruitful results from the trip are
likely in the area of state political and economic relations.
The Yugoslavs will push their bid for some form of observer
status in CEMA and will probably discuss utilization in
1963 of the credit granted by Moscow last July.
PROSPECTS FOR MORE RADICAL ORIENTATION OF CONGO GOVERN-
MENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 17
The Adoula government survived a motion of censure on
28 November, but less than half of the deputies voted for
Adoula. In his weakened position, Adoula now is likely
to be even less flexible with Tshombd, more demanding on
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
the West and the UN for immediate strong measures against
the Katanga leader, and more willing to compromise with
proponents of closer cooperation with radical African
states and the Soviet bloc.
THE SITUATION IN LAOS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 18
Following leftist Prince Souphannouvong's return to
Vientiane on 20 November, the three Laotian factions have
agreed to form an integrated army and police force. Premier
Souvanna, while welcoming this development, remains suspicious
of Pathet Lao goodwill. The downing on 27 November of a
US-chartered plane
attests to his lack of co ntro1 over
DEVELOPMENTS IN SOUTH VIETNAM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 10
Two major Viet Cong attacks in the period 25-27 November
suggest that the Communists are increasingly willing to
mount operations involving larger units. The prevailing
Viet Cong pattern continues to be guerrilla activity and
harassment of the strategic hamlet program.
SOUTH KOREAN SECURITY CHIEF PREPARING FOR POLITICAL POST . Page 20
Security chief Colonel Kim Chong-pil is evidently moving
into a more openly political role. He probably will head
the government-supported political party in next year's
elections inaugurating a new, ostensibly civilian regime.
As part of his campaign, Kim is attempting to exploit his
recent Washington visit by claiming that he obtained full
US support for the ruling military junta. In view of his
unsavory reputation, however, his new role is more likely
to crystallize the opposition than to broaden the junta's
public support.
LAND REFORM ACCELERATES IN IRAN . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 21
The Iranian Government is stepping up the distribution
of land to peasant proprietors. Taking advantage of the
public indignation over the murder of a land reform official,
the government has declared martial law in one province in
order to push the land reform program and intimidate the
landlords who have formed the core of opposition. The
armed forces appear capable of dealing with any opposition
which might result from the increased pace of the program.
FRENCH NATIONAL ASSEMBLY ELECTIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 22
The National Assembly elections have refurbished De Gaulle's
image as the unchallenged spokesman for France and will: enable
him to pursue vigorous domestic and foreign policies. The non-
Communist left and center parties will be under pressure
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
30 November 1962
to surmount traditional differences and form a democratic
alternative to the Gaullist majority. The Socialist Party,
however, may be embarrassed by its heavy debt to the
Communist Party (PCF) for election support. The PCF
quadrupled its assembly representation, but in terms of
both popular vote and number of deputies it is still far
below its pre-De Gaulle strength.
BRITAIN, EURATOM, AND THE COAL-STEEL COMMUNITY .
Page 26
Although overshadowed by Britain's negotiations with
the Common Market, issues of considerable importance are
involved in London's bid for membership in the other two
European communities--EURATOM and the Coal-Steel Community
(CSC). Among these issues are Britain's contribution to
EURATOM's research program, Britain's nonmilitary nuclear
agreements with the US, and the further delineation of
EURATOM's jurisdiction with respect to the nuclear weapons
programs in both the UK and France. The CSC-UK talks now
are concerned primarily with the compatibility of Britain's
national coal and steel boards with the CSC treaty, but
the more important CSC problem may ultimately be the
control of cartel arrangements between the coal and steel
industries in Britain and on the continent.
GUATEMALA'S AIR FORCE REVOLT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 28
Dissatisfaction with President Ydigoras and plotting
against him will probably continue, although his success
in suppressing the recent air force revolt and the army's
support for him will discourage his opposition. Indiscriminate
arrests of air force personnel as well as civilians have
caused widespread resentment. Thus far, there is no confirma-
tion of Ydigoras' charges of Castro-Communist backing of
the attempt.
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30 November 1962
THE URUGUAYAN ELECTIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page
The incumbent Nationalist (Blanco) Party has narrowly
won the 25 November national elections, according to official
preliminary returns. The major opposition faction refuses
to concede, however, and the final results may not be
known until early next year.
SINO-SOVIET BLOC AGRICULTURAL SITUATION . . . . . . . . . Page 1
Food supplies will remain tight throughout most of the
Sino-Soviet bloc during the winter of 1962 and spring of
1963. In the USSR, agricultural output in 1962 made almost
no gain for the fourth straight year, and grain output is no
larger than the mediocre 1961 crop; food shortages will
probably develop in some parts of the country. Grain production
in Communist China will be only slightly better than the poor
1961 harvest, and the Chinese consumer is in for another hard
winter. The grain harvest in the European satellites is the
smallest in four years, and food supplies this winter are
expected to be below the level of last year. North Vietnam
continues to complain of agricultural problems and consequent
food shortages; North Korea, on the other hand, appears to be
maintaining relatively good levels of agricultural output.
PRESIDENT ALESSANDRI OF CHILE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 5
Since his election in 1958, President Jorge Alessandri
has had to cope with a succession of economic crises which
have fostered growing Communist political strength. During
the remaining two years of his term, his object will be to
drive through more of the measures called for under Chile's
ten-year plan for economic development, including land reform.
In pursuit of the outside assistance needed to achieve his
economic goals, Alessandri will arrive in the US on 10
December for a four-day visit.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
WEEKLY REVIEW
The dismantling of Soviet
IL-28 (Beagle) jet light bombers
in Cuba is proceeding. Aerial
photography re-
vealed that only four of the
seven to eleven bombers once
completely assembled at San Ju-
lian airfield remained intact,
and that all nine of the un-
opened IL-28 fuselage crates at
Holguin airfield had been re-
moved. Seven of the 20 unopened
fuselage crates at San Julian
have also been removed.
Withdrawal of all IL-28
aircraft from Cuba--42 of which
had been identified from photog-
raphy--would reduce Cuba's in-
ventory of bomber aircraft to
17 B-26s remaining from the Ba-
tista period. At least six of
the B-26s are considered dere-
licts.
Other Soviet weapons systems
and. military installations in
Cuba remain operational. Pho-
tography showed
little change in two of the
four identified Soviet armored
group encampments on the island.
Construction of permanent build-
ing facilities appears to be
progressing at the encampments
near Remedios in northern Las
Villas Province.
There is some evidence
that Cuban ground forces may
have been guarding a Soviet
camp in the Mayari Arriba area
in the mountainous interior of
Oriente Province, some 40 miles
northwest of the Gutantanarno
naval base. Photographic reconnais-
sance revealed .a, con-
centration of trucks and con- 25X1
struction equipment in the Ma-
yari Arriba area. Approximately
45 large shipping crates sim-
ilar in appearance to others
observed at the Banes coastal
defense cruise-missile site
were also observed in 'the area.
Final identification of
the function of the Mayari
Arriba installation cannot be
made on the basis of the evidence
now available, but it may be a
storage or supply point. Its
interior location argues against
its, identification as another
crui: e-missile site.
The Castro regime's mili-
tary forces have returned to
an almost completely normal. de-
fensive posture., 25X1
civil air
traffic has re urne to normal.
No incident involving Cubans
or Soviets firing on foreign
objects has been reported de-
spite Castro's continued threats
that such action would be taken.
Regime propaganda media
are giving increasing emphasis
to winning "the battle of produc-
tion." Despite Cuban claims
to the contrar
J the month-long disruption
in the economy caused by mili-
tary mobilization efforts has
further weakened Cuba's economic
position.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Indications are that the
coming sugar crop--still the
mainstay of the economy--will
be no better than last year's
poor one and possibly even
poorer. The harvest is sched-
uled to begin in mid-December.
The death of Cuban National
Bank President Raul Cepero
Bonilla in the Brazilian air-
liner crash on 27 November may
also have unfavorable domestic
economic repercussions. Cepero
was one of the few remaining
members of the Castro cabinet
appointed in January 1959 and
was one of the regime's best
trained economists.
Also killed in the crash
were Juan Vezquez Noyala, a
leftist Mexican economist on
Cuba's Central Planning Board
(JUCEPLAN), and Armando Valdes
Quesada, a high Cuban Foreign
Ministry official.
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Cuba's official "answer"
on 25. November to President
Kennedy's 20 November statements
regarding Cuba sought once again
to place all blame on the.US
for'the "so-called Caribbean
crisis." Issued immediately
following Mikoyan's televised
farewell speech to the Cuban
people, the statement attacked
in the customary hostile terms
what Cuba alleges are US "ag-
gressive designs" regarding Cuba.
The statement said that
Cuba reserves the right."to ac-
quire arms of,any kind for its
defense." The assertion was
made that,Cuba would accept in-
ternational inspection only if
the UN were to inspect the ter-
ritory of the US,'Puerto Rico,
and "other aggressive sites."
The communique also described
Castro's five points as "indis-
pensable for the real solution
of the crisis."
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
The Soviet leaders appar-
ently intend to pursue a tem-
porizing and cautious course in
the immediate post-Cuban crisis
period while they concentrate
on rebuilding the USSR's pres-
tige and position. They are
stressing their desire to liq-
uidate the Cuban problem as
quickly as possible and to move
on to the settlement of other
international issues.
Soviet propaganda has
claimed that the world is near
an important 'turning point.
For the first time since the
period between Khrushchev's
visit to the US in the fall of
1959 and the abortive summit
meeting in May 1960, Moscow has
emphasized the theme of mutual
concessions to achieve compro-
mise agreements.
An Izvestia article on 24
November by the authoritative
commentator Polyanov.asserted
that'the example of "reasonable
compromise" on Cuba must. play
a decisive role in the settle-
ment of other disputes of a
"chronic" but not "critical"
nature. Polyanov listed a
nuclear test ban, general dis-
armament, a NATO - Warsaw Pact
nonaggression treaty, and nu-
clear-free zones in Europe, Af-
rica, and Latin America, but
omitted Berlin and Germany
This 'treatment is consist-
ent with the general post-Cuba
Soviet line of playing down
Berlin and a German peace treaty,
although these issues continue
to be mentioned in other organs
of the Soviet press such as
Literary Gazette.- The East
erG man party program published
on 23 November, which will be
adopted at the party congress
in. January, contained only a
perfunctory restatement of bloc
demands for a peace treaty and
a free city.
Mikoyan's statements at
the end of his mission to Cuba
and the demonstrative-farewell
accorded him by Cuban leaders
were clearly intended to put
the best possilbe face on dif-
ficult and, at times, acrimo-
nious negotiations. The usual
joint communique marking the
conclusion of such talks was
not forthcoming. In his fare-
well. speech, the best that
Mikoyan could claim for his
mission was that Castro had
expressed satisfaction with
"our exchange of impressions"
and that both he and Khrushchev
shared this "opinion." Although
Mikoyan referred to unspecified
Soviet "guarantees to Cuba" and
reaffirmed the USSR's intention
to continue to help Cuba, he
did not even hint at new eco-
nomic or military assistance
agreements.
Mikoyan, however, tried to
strengthen the impression of
successful talks and close re-
lations in a message to the
Cuban leaders from his plane
while en route to New York.
He referred to the talks as
having taken place in an atmos-
phere of "sincerity, trust, and
inviolability of the bonds of
friendship between our parties,
governments, and peoples."
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
. Moscow continues to give
routine attention to the US-
Soviet negotiations, stressing
that a "final. solution" of the
Cuban problem now depends on
the implementation of President
Kennedy's offer of assurances
against a US invasion. Mikoyan,
backed by the Soviet press, re-
affirmed- pro forma support for
Castro's "five demands" and for
Cuba's insistence on reciprocal
UN inspection in both the US
and Cuba.
Soviet presidium member
Kuusinen's speech at the Hun-
garian party congress on 21
November continued the process
of developing Moscow's justifi-
cation for its backdown in Cuba.
He claimed that "rapid and ef-
fective measures to save the
situation" were'essential be-
cause a US attack on Cuba "was
an hourly possibility." He con-
tended that the danger of a new
world war had. never been greater
in the period since'World War II.
He credited Khrushchev with
achieving a "reasonable compro-
mise" which committed the US to
"respect the independence of
revolutionary Cuba."
Kuusinen introduced a new
theme by charging that the USSR's
restraint had undercut of forts
by "reckless supporters of a
military adventure" in the US
.to provoke the Soviet Union to
"act rashly" in order to gain a
pretext for "unleashing a nucle-
ar war."
Kuusinen's speech also
reflected .Soviet sensitivity to
attacks by bloc critics on
Khrushchev's behavior. He de-
nounced "certain figures far
removed from Cuba" who are rais-
ing a "hue and cry that one
should have acted quite differ-
ernatly." Although he mentioned
only the Albanian leaders spe-
cifically,. the real target was
Peiping. He deplored "irresponsible
accusations of capitulation" and
said "these ultra-left-wing
fault-finders" were incapable
of giving Cuba "the slightest
degree of practical support."
D:Lsarmament and Nuclear Test
an Talks
Moscow is emphasizing that
the successes-to date-in relax-
ing tensions over Cuba have
created a favorable atmosphere
for the resumed,negotiationsat
Geneva. The Soviet delegation
tried to sound a positive note
and contended that the "con-
cessions" on a general disarma-
merit program announced by Gromyko
at the UN General Assembly last
September marked an important
step forward.
At the opening session,
however, Soviet delegate
Tsarapkin recited the familiar
charges that the West is block-
ing agreement with its control
proposals aimed at "legalizing"
espionage. The first weeks of
the new round of talks will prob-
ably be confined to probing the
Western position in the after-
math of the Cuban crisis. A
Czech delegate told a.US official
that "nothing much could be done"
until-after the first of the
year.
The Soviet delegate to the
Geneva nuclear test-ban subcom-
mittee and Soviet propagandists
have continued to express oppo
sition to any compulsory on-site
inspections on Soviet territory.
In his 26 November speech at
Geneva, Tsarapkin did not men-
tion "black boxes" or a moratorium.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
He stated that the USSR still
regards the proposals on a
test ban made last April by
the eight nonaligned states as
a basis for successful discus-
sion--without indicating any
change in the Soviet position
that these proposals provide for
voluntary rather than obligatory
on-site inspections. He reaf-
firmed that the USSR "insists"
on an end to all tests without
any exception, in all environ-
ments--including underground
--and for all time.
Over the longer term, how-
ever, Moscow may put forward a
"compromise" plan for a test
ban. Bloc spokesmen have recent-
ly professed to find the posi-
tions of the US, Britain, a-no
the USSR "much closer" togeth-
er and have stated that only
a small impetus is needed to
remove the last obstacles to
an agreement.
Prior to the resumption
of the Geneva talks, Soviet UN
delegates hinted that Moscow
might make a moratorium propo-
sal. Izvestia commentator Mat-
veyev suggested in a 20 Novem-
ber article that the new mora-
torium proposal might be for a
fixed period of limited duration
while negotiations continue on a
treaty banning underground tests.
He specified a five-year period.
Polish UN delegate Lachs
told a British delegate on 20
November that he "surmised" the
Soviets might present a pro-
posaxl combining the "black
boxes" scheme--suggested in
early November by Soviet First
Deputy Foreign Minister Kuznetsov
to Ambassador Dean--with ac-
ceptance of a relatively small
number of on-site inspections
Lachs implied that the proposal
might modify the Soviet position
that the eight-nation memorandum
provided for voluntary rather
than obligatory on-site inspec-
tions.
In a meeting with Ambas-
sador Dean on 25 November,
Ts'arapkin agreed that it was
desirable to keep the discussion
of the question of nontransfer
of nuclear weapons a matter for
private bilateral talks. In
view of this, he'suggested that
another Soviet item--such as a
NATO - Warsaw Treaty nonaggres-
siorL pact or nuclear free zones
--be discussed in the committee
of the whole to give balance.
On the question of a recess,
Tsarapkin agreed that 21 Decem-
ber would be an appropriate date
to adjourn. When the US dele-
gate suggested that 8 January
might be a suitable reconvening-
date, he said it seemed satis-
factory but that he would have
to refer the question to Moscow
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Intensive political jock-
eying has accompanied the eight
days of quiet on the military
fronts since Peiping's self-
imposed cease-fire took effect
on 22 November.
India has played for time
in hopes that the badly needed
cease-fire would not be broken
before Peiping began its scheduled
withdrawal on 1 December. Indian
spokesmen have sought to make
clear the unacceptability of
China's basic thesis that nego-
tiations would be facilitated
by the establishment of a 25-
mile-wide no-man's,,land along
the whole of the border as the
Chinese say it existed on 7
November 1959.
New Delhi, however, has
stopped short of formal rejec-
tion of the Chinese plan. It
is using the time available to
present its case to the world
and to undertake regroupment
of its battered forces.
Communist China continues
to stress the importance of
moving the Sino-Indian dispute
to the conference table. Foreign
Minister Chen Yi has urged Asian
and African leaders to use their.,
influence to prod New Delhi into
negotiations.
The Chinese have welcomed
Ceylon's proposal for a six-
nation gathering in Colombo
early in December to formulate
a joint mediation in the Sino-
Indian dispute. Ne Win of Burma,
Sukarno of Indonesia, Sihanouk
of Cambodia, Nkrumah of Ghana,
and Nasir of the VAR have been
invited.' Ne Win and Sihanouk
have accepted and will attend
in person; the VAR, Ghana, and
Indonesia will probably send
foreign ministers.
India is cool to Ceylon's
proposal. Concerned over the
imminent prospect of what it
considers to be uninformed third-
party meddling, New Delhi has
sent high-level diplomatic teams
to most of the capitals involved
to ensure that the participants
understand fully India's version
of the whole boundary dispute.
The Chinese in turn have
dispatched Vice Foreign Minister
Huang Chen to Southeast Asia
to present Peiping's case, The
Chinese probably hope that India
can be detached from the nonaligned
bloc. They are assiduously
publicizing India's dependence
on the West for military assist-
ance and suggesting that New
Delhi's equivocation on the 21
November cease-fire statement
is due to US influence. At an
Albanian Embassy banquet on 28
November Chen Yi castigated the
US for attempting to tie India
"to its war chariot" and warned
that it would be "most dangerous"
for the Indian Government to
continue "to act in accordance
with US desires."
Chen Yi emphasized once
again that, Chinese forces would
"start to withdraw" on 1 December
as scheduled. Neither his nor
other Chinese statements, how-
ever, commit Peiping on the date
when its withdrawal will be
completed.
The Chinese are attaching
considerable importance to the
idea, of a demilitarized zone.
Peiping's People's Daily,.for
SECRET
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
t Beg old-1 CHIP CHAP
2?692 VALLEY
'92 i i a
GALWA4ALLEY
-A-
KASH.N AI R
21571
"Chin[
Shpki Ia
^L 1;57400
Haji
Langar
PANGONG_
AREA ?=_
Rudog
ana La
18400
"CHANG C
ENMO VALLEY
SECRET
Jtoundaries and namef6 are not necessarily
those rc cognized by the U, S. G-1 -1810i,
Boundary shown on most US and Western maps
-..- Demarcated
x - Delimited only
Indefinite
where differing from US and Western maps)
Chinese
Indian
30 Nov 62 WEEKLY REVIEW
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i' . ? gam'
Boundaries and names are not necessarily
those recognized by the U, government,
Ts-tang 5UBAN5IR
UHIT
FA LUX
1_UHIT -
AninG`t
iPGE
SIANG
Lungiu F~ Miong
~*1irneking r td
URANSI R ,~,
Page 7 of 29
STAT
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
example, indicated on 22 Novem-
ber that a stable settlement was
not possible if the Indians re-
occupied Towang in the North East
Frontier Agency. Indian moves
to regain territory close to the
McMahon Line or Indian refusal
to pull back 20 kilometers in
the middle and western sectors
of the frontier might cause the
Chinese to protract the promised
withdrawal of their forces.
Moscow continues to main=
tain its neutrality on the bor-
der issue and to withhold com-
ment on the Chinese proposals.
Obviously concerned over the
implications of Indian accept-
ance of Western arms aid, Mos-
cow is persisting in its efforts
to preserve its position in In-
dia--without, however, seriously
jeopardizing its relations with
China,
30 Nov 62
The Pakistani Government,
after earlier tacitly encour-
aging the popular outcry against
Western arms aid to India and
demands for a.foreign policy
realignment by Pakistan,. has
begun to warn,that foreign policy
shifts could hurt the country's
long-term interests. The warn-
ings followed an embarrassingly
enthusiastic response from op-
position members of the National
Assembly. The opposition demand-
ed that Mohammad All resign as 25X1
foreign minister and that Pak-
istan withdraw from CENTO and
SEATO.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE MEEKLY SUMMARY
SOVIET PARTY AND GOVERNMENT REORGANIZATION
At the final meeting of
its week-long plenum, the Soviet
party central committee on 23
November approved a series of
high-level organizational changes
and personnel appointments as
the first steps in implementing
Khrushchev's recent plans for
strengthening 'centralized party
control of day-to-day admin-
istration of the economy. In
staffing the new party admin-
istrative bureaus and govern-
ment posts, several newcomers
have been brought up to work
directly under Khrushchev, and
some of the younger leaders
have made substantial gains
in their power positions.
The chairmen of the party
bureaus organized thus far will
also serve as members of the
powerful central committee
secretariat; which has been
expanded from eight to twelve
members. A similar expansion
has been effected in the coun-
cil of ministers, where the
number of deputy premiers has
been increased from six to nine.
The specific job assign-
ments under the,new system
indicate that'Khrushchev,
Brezhnev, Kozlov, Mikoyan,
Kosygin, and probably Suslov
will continue to function as
a kind of inner presidium or
executive committee. Neverthe-
less, by parceling out speci-
fied areas of responsibility
:to younger men, Khrushchev may
have cut into the strength of
some of the senior leaders
without formally altering their
status.
He will in addition . headthe
new Committee of Party and
State Control, the joint party-
government enforcement arm
which will apparently function
as an economic police force.
He-will probably continue to
have some supervisory respon-
sibilities over the Committee
for State Security (KGB) as
well.
Leonid Ilichev, also
brought into the secretariat
last year, will head the newly
formed central, committee Com-
mission for Ideological Affairs.
This appointment could infringe
on the responsibilities of Suslov,
who has long been a principal
spokesman on ideology. Party
secretary Petr Demichev.has been
named chairman of'the new bureau
for chemical'and light industries.
The four newly elected
party secretaries are men of
leaser stature; until now,
all had been chiefs of staff
departments in the party's
central apparatus. Three of
them--Aleksandr Rudakov, Vasily
Polyakov, and Vitaly Titov--
were chosen to head new bureaus
in the key areas of industry,
agriculture,' and personnel re-
spectively'. Yuri Andropov,
who has been head of the 'depart-
merit for liaison with bloc Com-
munist parties, was made a
secretary apparently without
receiving a bureau assignement.
It is likely that these new-
comers= will act essentially as
deputies to some of the senior
leaders.
.Of the younger leaders,
former secret police chief
Aleksandr Shelepin seems to
have profited most from the
changes. He remains on the
secretariat--to which he was
promoted last year--and has
been named a deputy premier.
Only one change was made
in the composition of the party
presidium. Leonid Yefremov,
party boss in the Gorky heavy.
industrial complex, was promoted
to candidate membership.
On the government side,
Dmitri Polyansky has been moved
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
KHRUSHCHEV,
First Secretary
BREZHNEV ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?
KOSYGIN...... ??????.??.
MIKOYAN..............
??????
KOZLOV ? ? ? . ? ? ? KOZLOV
KUUSINEN . . . . ? ? KUUSINEN
SUSLOV .. . . . ? ? ?SUSLOV
SHELEPIN .. . .
PONOMAREV
DEMICHEV?
ILICHEV?
RUDAKOV?
POLYAKOV?
TITOV?
ANDROPOV
WREAO FOR RSESR
0 WETRAL COMMITTEE
Cholvinan
KHRUSHCHEV? ? ~
Chairman
? KHRUSHCHEV
:r -
?KOSYGIN Ist Dep?I
?MIKOYAN ist Dep
Deputy Chairman
LESECHKO
NOVIKOV, I.
LOMAKO
USTINOV
RUDNEV
DYMSHITS
IGNATOV
Chairman, Presidium,
Supreme Soviet
(titular chief of stole)
???BREZHNEV
O.dirmon, Committee
Parry and State Control
(joint party -
government post)
Chairman USSR
Council of National
Economy. (Sovnarkhoz)
Chairman, RSFSR
Council of Ministers
First Deputy
C drnnn
VORONOV .............. .... VQRONOV.
KIRILENKO .. .......... ...... KIRILENKO
SHVERNIK MFmbers
POLYANSKY.. ??POLYANSKY??
POOGORNY (OTHERS)
YEFREMOV
SHCHERSITSKY
GRISHIN
MAZUROV
MZHAVANADZE
RASHIDOV
? OTHER RESPONSIBILITIES OF CENTRAL COMMITTEE SECRETARIES
DEMICHEV_ Chairman, Central Committee Bureau for Light and Chemical Industries
ILICHEV_ Chairman, Commission on Ideology, Central Committee
RUDAKOV - Chairman, Central Committee Bureau for Industry and Construction
POLYAKOV - Chairman, Central Committee Bureau for Agriculture
TITOV - Chairman, Commission on Organizational - Party Questions, Central Committee
up to become another deputy
premier--apparently without
portfolio--and replaced as
governmental chief in the
Russian Republic (RSFSR) by
Gennady Voronov, one of Khru-
shchev's chief agricultural aides.
There were several other.shifts,
the most important being the
appointment of former planning
chief Venyamin Dymshits to head
the new National Economic Coun-.
cil--the group responsible for
management of the economy.
Other top-level personnel
appointments will probably be
made in the near future. The
bureaus for agriculture and
industry in the RSFSR and the
Central Asian-Bureau--called
for by Khrushchev in his 19
November speech to the plenum--
NEWCOMERS TO THE TOP HIERARCHY
e?t'+F APPOINTMENTS
NEWLY FORMED POSTS
evidently have not yet been
staffed. At the secondary
echelons, changes are likely to
be made slowly.
The proposed amalgamation
of the existing 100 regional
economic councils (sovnarkhozes)
into 40 larger units will prob-
ab:Ly be formalized at the Su-
preme Soviet session scheduled
to open on 10 December. During
the next several weeks, regional
and local party conferences
throughout the country will be
he:Ld to establish party indus-
trial and agricultural branches.
As a. result, Khrushchev's re-
organizational plans are un-
likely to be fully realized
before mid-January at the
earliest.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
The eighth Hungarian party disgraced at the eighth congress.
congress last week was the forum All ten full members of the
for the reaffirmation of the politburo were re-elected, and
relatively moderate domestic
policies which have character
ized First Secretary Janos
Kadar's attempt to build a viable
Hungarian brand of Communism.
Emphasizing a pragmatic rather
than doctrinaire approach to
solving Hungary's particular
problems, the Kadar line, some.-
times termed the "New Trend,"
basically is aimed at enlisting
popular support for regime pro-
Typical of Kadar policies
which were endorsed at the con-
gress are the general use of
incentives to encourage higher
industrial and agricultural pro-
duction, the opening of all but
party jobs to qualified nonparty
people, and the elimination of
class background requirements
for entrance to higher educa-
tional institutions. While these
programs have led, and will con-
tinue to lead, to a better life
for many Hungarians, particularly
those living in urban areas,
they do not promise any real
progress toward political free-
dom.
The reaffirmation of the
"New Trend" and the enactment
of a new, more liberal party
statute reflect the continuing
process of de-Stalinization in
the Hungarian party. The con-
gress did not, however, under-
take new purges of high party
functionaries. This aspect of
the party's reorientation began
last fall and concluded this
August with disc.iplinary actions
against 26 party members--in-
cluding politburo member Kiss
and former party bosses Rakosi
and Gero--for their roles in
Stalinist purge trials.
While there were some
changes in jobs and responsi-
bilities, none of the politburo
or secretariat members were
three strong Kadar supporters
were elevated from alternate
to full membership. Two former
party secretaries were dropped,
but were appointed at the same
time to important posts, one
as an alternate politburo 'member
and the other as a deputy
premier.. In addition, seven
central committee experts were
named to the party.secretariat
or to the politburo.
The central committee, whose
new membership has yet to be an-
nounced, was expanded from 70
to 81 full members and from 22
to 39 candidates. Only six
former members were dropped;
they were described by a Western
press informant as "well-known
functionaries who had long
opposed Kadar."
Kadar evidently has eschewed
using the congress to purge
opponents to his policies in
favor of trying to pursuade them
to work for him. He has stressed
that the individual's present
attitude, rather than his past
attitudes, is the criterion for
continued acceptance. Karoly
Kiss, for example, whom one US
Legation informant claims is
"reconciled" to Kadar's poli-
cies, apparently was re-elected
to the central committee.
At the same time, the regime
has clearly warned against future
opposition to the "New Trend."
Politburo member Gaspar told
the congress that "from now on,
members can expect prompt and
severe retaliatory measures for
any deviations."
The congress established two
new committees--a State Finance
Committee and an Agitation-Propa-
ganda Committee. While their
functions and subordination have
not been spelled out, they will
presumably be under both the
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
party central committee and the
government. Their members are
all high-level party figures
who are. experts in various
areas of administration and
economy. While not like the
bodies established under the
recent Soviet reorganization,
the new committees probably have
the same aim--to improve party
control over the state admini-
stration and the economy.
The Hungarian congress
provided the second occasion
in less than a month for a con-
frontation between the Soviet
and Chinese parties, and a
heightening of the temper of
their mutual recriminations re-
sulted. The Soviet delegation
and its supporters continued the
stance which they adopted at the
Bulgarian congress two weeks
earlier--an adamant defense of
Khrushchev's whole range of
international policies, in-
cluding a specific glorification
of his handling of Cuba, and in-
sistent attacks on ""Albanian"
dogmatism.
The leader of the Chinese
delegation, Wu Hsiu-chuan, who
had represented China at the
Bulgarian congress as well,
maintained both his party's
attack on the "revisionists" in
the movement and its defense
of Albania.' At the Bulgarian
congress the Chinese delegation
sat through speech after speech
.b; Soviet supporters decrying
the line which the Chinese
leader had taken.; After Wu spoke
to the Hungarian congress on
its second day, however, the
Chinese delegation, to under-
score its contempt for the pro-
ceedings and its refusal to
agree to criticism of its posi-
tion, boycotted the remaining
sessions.
Speaking for the Soviet
side, Hungarian leader Kadar,
in his closing speech on 24
November, assailed the Alba-
nians, and. therefore the
LEADING HUNGARIAN PARTY ORGANS
POLITBURO MEMBERS
PRIOR TO OPENING OF AFTER CONGRESS
NOVEMBER CONGRESS
Antal APRO ................... APRO
Bela BISZKU . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . BISZKU
Lajos FEHER ................... FEHER
Jeno FOCK ........... . FOCK
Janos KADAR .... ...... ......... KADAR
Gyula KALLAI .................. KALLAI
Ferenc MUNNICH ....... ........MUNNICH
Dezso NEMES ..................NEMES
Sandor RONAI ... .............. RONAI
Miklos SOMOGYI ................SOMOGYI
Sandor GASPAR
Zoltan KOMOCSIN
Istvan SZIRMAI
ALTERNATE POLITBURO MEMBERS
Lajos CZINEGE ................ CZINEGE
Sandor GASPAR
Zoltan KOMOCSIN
Istvan SZIRMAI
*Miklos AJTAI
-Janos BRUTYO
*Lajos CSETERKI
-Poi ILKIJ
-Rezso NYERS
SECRETARIAT MEMBERS
Janos KADAR .... First Secretary . . . . KADAR
Lajos FEHER
Sandor GASPAR
Dezso NEMES .................. NEMES
Istvan SZIRMAI ................. SZIRMAI
* Newly elected
621126
-Bela BISZKU
- Rezso NYERS
* Karoly NEMETH
Chinese,.in terms stronger than
those used' heretofore in the
recent exchanges. He expressly
referred,to the-Chinese when he
noted that they alone had criticized
the passages in his earlier
report which attacked the Alba=
nian leadership. He stressed
the-point.that the Chinese should
take into account the . attitude of
the "entire" 'international move-
ment in the. interest of pre-
serving Communist unity.
The implication in Kadar's
speech that the Chinese.are
isolating themselves from the
movement and that they should
cease activities which tend to
split the Communist world
followed the guidelines laid
down in the authoritative 18
November Pravda article by
Soviet party secretary Ponomarev.
STAT
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%moo, %00
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
AIRCRAFT RE-EQUIPMENT PROGRAM IN EASTERN EUROPE
Bloc air capabilities in
Eastern Europe have steadily
improved with the acquisition
of 500 or more new-generation
aircraft, mostly fighters, in
the past. two years. Although
the number of high-speed (Mach
.2) fighters in the forward area
may have doubled since early
1962, they still comprise only
about 11 percent of the total
fighter strength. Soviet air
forces in the satellites have
a higher ratio of new-genera-
tion fighters than do any of
those satellite national forces
which have such aircraft. These
forces are East Germany, Poland,
Hungary, and Czechosolovakia.
MIG-21 (Fishbed C)
The Fishbed C can be used
both for ground support and air
defense, but its use in the
latter role is limited to per-
iods of clear air-mass condi-
tions since it is equipped with
a nonprecision airborne radar.
It carries the AA-2 infrared-
homing air-to-air missile (AAM)
in addition to other armament.
This is the only Mach 2 fighter
known to have been delivered to
the satellite air forces.
Although to date only one.
regiment of the Polish Air Force
may have received Fishbed Cs--
about 12 such aircraft--a few
Polish pilots may have progressed
beyond the checkout stage-in
their training and reached the
SOVIET. BLOC AIRCRAFT STRE
EAST GERMANY
EAST
SOVIET GERMAN
24
24
232
350
proficiency required to employ
the Fishbed C as an operational
weapon.
The Czechoslovak Air Force
may have as many as 20 Fishbed
Cs, but their operational.status
is unknown.
The Hungarian Air Force,
with 36 Fishbed Cs, possesses
more new-generation aircraft
than any other satellite. It
probably also has achieved a
greater combat capability with
aircraft of this type since it
was the. first satellite force
to receive them.
The East German Air Forca.
has 28 Fishbed Cs, and its
pilots probably have achieved
a fair degree of operational
proficiency in these aircraft.
Fishbed D
Fishbed D is an all-weather
Mach 2 fighter equipped with the
Spin Scan airborne intercept (AI)
radar, which probably permits
the, use of the more advanced
AA-3 semiactive radar-homing
AAMs. As many as-47 of. these
fighters have been delivered
to the Soviet 24th Tactical Air
Army (TAA) in Germany since mid-
1962.
The Fitter--like the Fish-
bed' C--is a clear air-mass fighter
GTH
CZECHO-
SLOVAKIA
LIGHT BOMBERS
FIREBAR A
29
29
BEAGLE
180
11
12
96
64
48
15
20
446
TOTAL
209
11
12
96
64
48
15
20
475
* STRENGTH FIGURES ON NEW GENERATION FIGHTERS ARE MINIMAL
AND MAY BE REVISED UPWARD IN THE LIGHT OF NEW INFORMATION
.-l-
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&.7L1a.AA%J"? s
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
SOVIET AIRCRAFT
FISHBED C
(MIG-21)
FITTER
FI.SHBED-E
capable of Mach 2 speed, but it
has a considerably greater.opera-
tional range. It probably has a
primary role of ground support,
although it is used for air de-
fense also.
Fitter is the only operational
fighter considered to be designed
for carrying comparatively large
weapons. Thus it may have a better
capability for tactical nuclear
bombing than other fighters. On
21 August, a Fitter of the 24th
TAA was observed practicing a form
of low altitude or toss bombing
similar to that used by US fighter
aircraft in the delivery of nuclear
weapons.
Firebar A
The Firebar A is a new super-
sonic jet tactical. strike recon-
naissance aircraft currently in
service in the 24th TAA which may
lie intended to replace at least
.-Some of the obsolescent IL-28s
(Beagles). It has a combat radius
of about 460 nautical miles with
external fuel tanks and an estimated
top speed of Mach 1.52 when not
equipped with the external tanks.
Without these tanks, however, the
combat radius is severely limited.
The aircraft can carry a 6,600-
pound bomb load, but a payload of
this size would severely impair its
performance. The normal payload is
expected to be somewhat less. The
Firebar A can carry out bombing mis-
sions under all weather conditions.
Flashlight D
The Flashlight D is a jet air-
craft whose primary role possibly
is reconnaissance. It is currently
estimated to have a maximum theoreti-
cal speed of Mach 1.05 at about
36,000 feet. Flashlight Ds are 2;25X1
signed to the Soviet 37th TAA in
Poland and the Polish Naval Air
Force.
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in the Bulgarian congress' res-
olution, and in Kadar's speech
but has not responded to the
Ponomarev article. The Yugo-
slavs claim in their rebuttals
to be primarily concerned over
the possibility that these bloc
statements were made as conces-
sions to hard-line parties in
the international movement and
may encourage a reversal of re-
cent liberal trends.
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
YCJGOSLAV RELATIONS WITH. THE SOVIET BLOC
Yugoslav President Tito
reportedly will arrive in Mos-
cow on 4 December for his first
visit to the USSR since 1956.
Although the visit is still
being billed as a "private va-
cation," both countries clearly
recognize the major symbolic
importance this visit will carry
in advancing their quickening
political rapprochement.
Neither the USSR nor Yugo-
slavia is willing, at this mo-
ment, to allow their recent low-
key ideological exchanges to
deter the forward movement of
their reconciliation. Moscow,
to protect its claims to ideolog-
ical purity as part of a
continuing polemic with the
left wing of the Communist
movement, has found it necessary
to again condemn Yugoslav party
policy as "revisionist." Its
attacks on Yugoslavia, however,
were both brief and subsidiary
to its major criticism of the
opposite tendency, the "dogma-
tism" of Albania and China.
The Soviet position was
stated in a recently published
history of the Soviet party and
in an 18 November article by
Soviet party ideologist Ponomarev
on the anniversary of the 1957
declaration of Communist parties
(see inset). The Bulgarian par-
ty on 14 November likewise con-
demned Yugoslav ideology in the
final resolution of its recent
congress, as did party First
Secretary Kadar in his opening
speech to the Hungarian party's
congress on 20 November.
Belgrade. has publicly re-
plied to the anti-Yugoslav pas-
sp,ges in the Soviet party history,
Tito probably also hopes
to obtain assurances from Khru-
shchev that these denunciations
May-June 1955 - Khrushchev visits Tito, apologizes for past Soviet treatment,
aid sanctions Yugoslavia's "separate road to socialism."
June 1956 - Tito makes triumphal tour of the USSR.
September-October 1956 - Tito and Khrushchev hold talks, first in Yugoslavia
and then in the USSR, to ease problems which arose when Belgrade began
advocating its system for the satellites.
Auguit 1957 - Tito and Khrushchev meet in Rumania to attempt to save their
rapprochement after the Hungarian revolution.
November 1957 - Tito boycotts bloc meeting in Moscow. Yugoslav repre-
sentatives refuse to sign declaration and to accept degree of bloc
discipline.
April 1958 - Yugoslav party holds congress. Bloc delegates walk out. Party
relations broken and economic discrimination shortly follows.
September 1960 - Tito and Khrushchev meet and talk at the UN in New York.
July 1961 - Yugoslav Foreign Minister Popovic visits the USSR.
April 1962 - Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko visits Yugoslavia.
May 1962 - Soviet military equipment displayed in Yugoslav May Day parade.
June-July 1962 - High-level Yugoslav parliamentary delegation visits the
USSR.
July 1962 - High-level Yugoslav economic delegation visits to the USSR."
Limited Yugoslav participation in bloc's Council for Mutual Economic
Assistance and renewed credits agreed upon in principle.
September 1962 - Soviet president Brezhnev visits Yugoslavia; expanded
trade agreement signed; 1955 declaration reaffirmed.
November 1962 - Polish Foreign Minister Rapacki visits Belgrade.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
of Yugoslav ideology do not
constitute a retreat from the
communique Tito signed with So-
viet president Brezhnev in
September. The communique res?,
urrected the 1955 Tito-Khru-
shchev declaration, in which
the thesis of separate roads
to socialism was approved
as the basis for future re-
lations.
On the other hand, the Yugo-
slavs are probably pleased by
such bloc trends as pushing
ahead with de-Stalinization, dem-
onstrated at the Bulgarian and
Hungarianparty congresses. The
Hungarians and Bulgarians have
also called for improved state
relations with Belgrade, even
though rejecting Yugoslav
ideology. In a message of
greetings to Tito on Yugoslavia's
28 November National Day, Khru-
shchev expressed hopes for a
further strengthening and ex-
pansion of relations.
Yugoslavia's political in-
tercourse with the bloc is also
increasing. Even Rumania, tradi-
tionally the slowest to bring
its policies into line with
those of the USSR, sent a parlia-
mentary delegation to Yugoslavia
from 12 to 22 November. Polish
Foreign Minister Rapacki.visited
Yugoslavia from 19 to 24 Novem-
ber, the first satellite official
to pay such a visit since Yugo-
slavia's last period of coopera-
tion with the bloc ended in 1958.
The Poles and Yugoslavs
had some difficulty drafting a
final communique because of
certain differences of view
on bloc foreign policy. The
document nevertheless lauded.
Polish-Yugoslav cooperation in
the "economic, cultural, and.
scientific fields," pledged
"further all-round development
of relations," and announced
that Yugoslav Foreign Minister
Popovic will visit Warsaw at
an unspecified time.
In the economic sphere,
the Yugoslavs. are currently
negotiating trade protocols
with the bloc for 1963. Those
with Poland, the USSR, Bulgaria,
and East Germany have already
been signed and call for sub-
stantial increases in the total
volume of goods exchanged.
Yugoslavia and the bloc are
not natural trading partners
because essentially they have
similar import requirements.
The fact that high targets have
been agreed upon for next year
suggests that some mutual con-
cessions are being made.
,soviet officials, in
their discussions with Tito
next week, will probably
make clear that current lib-
eral trends within the bloc
will not be allowed to pro-
ceed to a point where the
Yugoslavs can speak in
bloc councils without ac-
cepting a degree of bloc
discipline.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Congolese Premier Adoula
survived a motion of censure
on 28 November. The opposition
was able to muster 50 votes--
over half of the 99 chamber
members present but 16 short
of the two-thirds required to
oust the government.
Adoula had acceded to the
chamber's demands--voted by
acclamation on 23 November--
by releasing certain political
pri`soners recently arrested by
the government and lifting the
state of quasi-martial law in
Leopoldville Province. This
probably helped cut the opposi-
tion's strength temporarily.
Although the vote in the
chamber suggests that Adoula's
opponents are not at the mo-
ment able to muster the votes
needed for the alternative
method of unseating him--a
simple majority of the listed
members of both houses--it
seems almost certain that they
will try again soon.
The opposition is an unvi-
able alliance of Gizengist and
Lumumbist radicals, former cab-
inet ministers, and other dis-
sidents of widely varying polit-
ical views. It is almost cer-
tainly receiving financial as-
sistance from radical African
and Soviet bloc embassies and
from Tshombe.
The opposition now will
probably demand that Adoula
reshuffle his cabinet. Under
present laws,.Adoula must ob-
tairt a two-thirds vote for ap-
proval of the UN-drafted con-
stitution, as well as for other
legislative matters. This will
enable his opponents to weaken
him further and to bargain with
him over new demands. A more
radical orientation of the gov-
ernment seems inevitable, either
through the admission of new
elements into the cabinet, or as
a result of still more intense
political pressures to achieve a
rapid solution of the Katanga
problem.
Adoula'.s precarious posi-
tion, is basically due to his
failure to.find that solution
since taking office in August
1961--either through his own
efforts or through his associa-
tion with the West and the UN.
To save himself, he is almost
certain to argue again for im-
mediate tough economic and pos-
sibly military pressures on
Tshombe. He will probably press
the US hard again for military
equipment, particularly aircraft.
He will be even less flexible with
Tshombe and with the UN.
If this effort fails,
Adoula may either resign or
give in to those Congolese who
argue that the West and the
UN cannot solve the Katanga
problem for him, and that the
only solution is through closer
cooperation with the radical
African states and the Soviet
bloc.
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CURRENT INTNLLTCENCZ WEEKLY SUMMARY
THE SITUATION IN LAOS
Following leftist Prince
Souphannouvong's return to
Vientiane on 20 November, the
three Laotian factions have
agreed to form unified mili-
tary and police forces. The
agreement, signed on 27 Novem-
ber, calls for an army of
30,000 men drawn equally from
the rival military forces.
The projected 6,000-man unified
police force also is to be
staffed equally from among the
three factions.
nouvong's performance on spe-
cific issues becomes clear
The downing of a US-char-
tered plane over the Plaine
des Jarres on 27 November at-
tests to the Souvanna govern-
ment's lack of effective con-
Premier Souvanna, while
describing the agreement as a
"big step forward," remains
suspicious of Pathet Lao in-
tentions. He indicated that
the real test would come in
the next three or four weeks,
when Pathet Lao leader Souphan-
trcl over left-wing elements.
Souvanna-has blamed the
incident on the Pathet Lao, who
have repeatedly protested these
resupply flights, terming them
"unauthorized." On several 25X1
occasions Pathet Lao spokesmen
had threatened that the planes
woL;ld be fired on.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE: WEEKLY SUMMARY
DEVELOPMENTS IN SOUTH VIETNAM
Two major attacks by the
Viet Cong during the period
25-27 November suggest that
the Communists are increasingly
willing to intersperse operations
involving larger units among
the general run of small-scale
guerrilla actions.
The first attack, mounted
by two battalions against a
South Vietnamese army outpost
in the northern part of the
country, was repulsed by govern-
ment artillery. The Communists
suffered heavy casualties and
lost many weapons. The second
attack, about 40 miles north of
Saigon, was carried out by a
force estimated at one battalion.
This force simultaneously struck
an army post and two hamlets of
the government resettlement proj-
ect, "Operation Sunrise," in-
flicting a number of casualties
on defending troops.
The attack on "Operation
Sunrise"--recently reorganized
to expand the perimeter of new
strategic hamlets in a Communist
stronghold area--is the most
dramatic action so far in the
Viet Cong's gradually growing
campaign of harassment and
terrorism against the strategic
hamlet program.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Colonel Kim Chong-pil, South program. General Pak will be-
Korea's controversial security come president and. nominally re-
chief, is using his recent visit main above partisan politics.
to Washington to move into a
more openly political role. I
Since his return in mid-
November, the government-con-
trolled press has portrayed Kim
as the chief strategist of the
revolution and copartner of
General Pak Chong-hui,.leader
of the ruling military junta.
Wide publicity has been given
Kim's assertions that he obtained
full American support for
the,regime. Implying that top
US officials endorsed the junta's
intention to control the ostensi-
bly civilian government promised
for next year, Kim has sought
to use the claimed assurances
to dispel doubts over the ac-
ceptability to the United States
of the regime and himself.
Kim is probably seeking to
enhance his public image in prep-
aration for overt political
activity. In the national elec-
tions next year he reportedly
will head the government party,
one of three that will be allowed
to participate: Such a role
would make him eligible to be-
come a senior member of the new
government--possibly as prime
minister--and permit him to
continue to direct the regime's
Despite the regime's
propaganda, Kim's new political
role is more likely to crystal-
lize the opposition than to
broaden the regime's public
support. He is widely hated
and feared. As security chief
he has made many enemies both
inside and outside the junta
His key part in last summer's
mu.Ltimiiiion-dollar stock .
market swindle and other sim-
ilar affairs is public knowl-
edge. Kim's evident place in
the government's new plans is
likely to confirm the wide-
spread belief that free polit-
ical processes will not be re-
stored..
Incidental to his polit-
ical activities, Kim may soon
resign as director of South
Korea's Central Intelligence
Agency
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
The Iranian Government is
stepping up the distribution of
land to peasant proprietors.
Taking advantage of the public
indignation over the murder of
a land reform official, the
government has declared martial
law in one province in order
to push the land reform program
and intimidate the landlords
who have formed the core of op-
position.
So far, acreage has been
distributed primarily in north-
west, northeast, and south central
sections of Iran. The program
is scheduled to be virtually
finished by, June, when Prime
Minister Alam hopes to hold
parliamentary elections.
.Alain says that he will see
to it that the new peasant land-
holders are represented in
parliament. The Shah: apparently
hopes to develop this element
into ?a popular political force
supporting the monarchy. Here-
tofore national politics have
been largely dominated by the
large landlords and their allies
in other sectors of society.
in municipal elections--to
launch a campaign which will
strike at land reforms as
well. Landlords are providing
funds to the mullahs--Moslem
religious leaders--to oppose
both women's suffrage and land
reform. The mullahs are recep-
tive to such inducements not
only on religious grounds but
because they depend on the rich
landlords for their regular
funds as well..
Some of Iran's once-power-
ful nomadic tribes--notably the
Qashqai--also fear the land re-
form program on the ground that
the government may, allot their
grazing lands to village peasants.
The tribes are probably not capa-
ble,-however, of effective re-
sistance.
and to be able to deal with
any violent opposition to it.
The increasing pace with
which the government is pursuing
the land program makes incidents
of local violence more likely..
Horwwever, the army, together
with other security forces, ap-
pears to be backing the reform 25X1
The landlords, meanwhile,
are trying to use conservative
religious sentiment--which has
been offended by a recent cabinet
decision to allow women to vote
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
The National Assembly elec-
tions have refurbished De
Gaulle's image as the'unchal-
lenged spokesman for France and
will enable him to pursue vigor-
ous foreign and domestic poli-
cies. The non-Communist left
and center parties will be under
pressure to surmount traditional
differences and form a democratic
alternative to the Gaullist ma-
jority. The Socialist Party,
however, may be embarrassed by
its heavy debt to the Communist
Party (PCF) for election support.
The PCF quadrupled its assembly
representation, but in terms
of both popular vote and number
of deputies it' it still far below
its pre - De Gaulle strength.
Without the encumbrance of
an assembly which had increas-
ingly opposed major aspects of
his policy, De Gaulle will prob-
ably push more rapidly for im-
plementation of his program. His
1963 budget, which appeared
headed for rough sledding in the
former assembly primarily be-
cause of its heavy spending on
a nuclear striking force, will
probably pass easily as one of
the first items of business when
the new assembly: meets on 6 De
cember. Georges Pompidou has
been retained as premier.
The.Gaullist party (UNR/
UDT) came out of the elections
with the largest representation
in the assembly of any party in
French history. As long as De
Gaulle is in office, the.UNR/UDT'
will give him a working majority.
It has not yet built an effec-
tive local party organization,
however, and this would weaken
its chances of survival if De
Gaulle were to depart from the
scene in the near future.
The heaviest losers, in
addition to the extreme rightists,
were the Independent Party and
the Popular Republican Movement.
The Independents not only lost
more than half their assembly,
seats, but also split into two
factions. In terms of Assembly
repre$e'ntation, the larger of
these is pro-Gaullist and is
grouped around Finance Minister.
Valery Giscard d'Estaing. The
losses by the extreme right em-
phasize public rejection of the
Secret Army Organization (OAS),
Party Strengths In
FRENCH NATIONAL ASSEMBLY
/A \
Cr
"N"
UNION FOR THE
NEW REPUBLIC (UNR)
173
SOCIALISTS 43
cammuxisr-
INDEP (CNIP7
CENTER REPUBLICANS I'
* Election of two remaining overseas seats to be held on 2 December 1962.
** The UDT (Democratic Union of Labor) is the UNR's left-wing affiliate.
Committed to DeGoulle
STAT
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Although the parties of ballot was more than a million
the non-Communist left--Radi- below its 1956 figure. The
cal Socialists, Socialists, and strategy of the PCF in the
Unified Socialist Party--all
gained seats in the new assembly,
the net gain was due in each
case to PCF withdrawals in the
second round of balloting. PCF
withdrawals in favor of the
Socialist candidate--in many
cases even though the PCF can-
didate had led the Socialist
on the first ballot--were re-
sponsible for 39 of the 67
Socialist victories. Communists
showed remarkable discipline in
delivering second-ballot votes
for other candidates.
The PCF won more than the
30 seats required for recogni-
tion as a separate political
group in the assembly, but its
total popular vote on the first
second ballot was to give up the
possibility of winning a few
additional seats in return for
an opportunity to break from
political isolation through elec-
toral arrangements with other
leftist parties.
PCF leaders are already ask-
ing that such arrangements be
extended to a broad spectrum of
joint action. Although the top
leadership of the center parties
remains unquestionably anti-
Communist, the local levels of
the non-Communist parties and
free trade unions may find it 25X1
increasingly difficult to resist
such urging in the face of PCF
support at the polls.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
BRITAIN, EURATOM, AND THE COAL-STEEL COMMUNITY
Although still overshadowed
by the UK-EEC accession talks,
Britain's negotiations with
EURATOM and the Coal-Steel Com-
munity have taken on increased
importance in recent weeks.
Difficult problems have?already
arisen, particularly in the
EURATOM talks, and there is
growing realization that British
membership will materially alter
the course of the two communities
and US relations with them.
Recent discussions of
Britain's role in EURATOM's re-
search program typify the impor-
tant issues involved. EURATOM
is about to enter its second
five-year research program, which
calls for the expenditure of
some $425 million and is closely
connected with the US-EURATOM
cooperation agreement to promote
the uses of nuclear energy for
power development. Coordination
of national research efforts is
also part of the EURATOM pro-
gram, along with the concentra-
tion of certain research activ-
ities in centers taken over for
use by the European community
as a whole--such as the.one at
Ispra in northern Italy.
Fitting the UK into these
activities would in any case-be
difficult, but EURATOM has added
to the difficulty by attempting
to extract a fat entrance fee
from Britain.. London is evi-
dently willing to match French
and German contributions to the
1962-1967 program, conditional
on its appropriation being spent
in Britain, but EURATOM is
likely to boggle at such ear-
marking out of fear of setting
a precedent. Moreover, EURATOM
has made it clear that it wants
compensation from Britain for
the advances EURATOM has made
during its first five-year pro-
gram--if not money, then at
least the designation of a
British research facility for
EURATOM's use.
Britain's nuclear weapons
program has also revived a long-
standing dispute among the pres-
ent members over EURATOM's
jurisdictional limits. EURATOM
is, concerned only with the peace-
ful uses of nuclear energy.
France, however, has long and
successfully resisted full
application of EURATOM's security
and inspection procedures to
dual-purpose installations, such
as those at Marcoule, which pro-
duce nuclear materials with both
military and peaceful uses.
While France is apparently
more than willing to have Britain
adopt a similar attitude, un-
expectedly strong opposition
has developed among the other
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
EURATOM members to a continued
unilateral exclusion of certain
facilities from EURATOM's
controls. Bonn, in particular,
has insisted that the UK-EURATOM
talks should lead to a precise
understanding on the application
of EURATOM's control provisions
in a way which does not dis-
criminate between those members
which have nuclear weapons
programs and those which do not.
In the CSC-UK talks,
questions of comparable impor-
tance have not yet arisen. At
a meeting in Luxembourg on 19
November, Britain agreed that
certain functions of its na-
tional steel and coal boards
are incompatible with the CSC
treaty, and'joint examination
of the necessary changes is
under way. The continental
coal industries have shown con-
siderable concern over the
prospective invasion of their
markets by British coal, and
it is possible the CSC may seek
changes in the administration
of Britain's nationalized in-
dustry which would be unaccept-
able to London.
The more important CSC
problem may ultimately be
the control of cartel arrange-
ments between the coal and
steel industries in Britain
and on the continent. The CSC's
record in promoting competition
in coal is exceedingly poor,
and there have been reports
already of "friendly meetings"
between representatives of
Britain's and West Germany's
steel industries.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
GUATEMALA'S AIR FORCE REVOLT
Dissatisfaction with Pres-
ident Ydigoras and plotting
against him will probably con-
tinue in Guatemala, although his
success in suppressing the re-
cent air force revolt wil dis-
courage his opposition. Indis-
criminate arrests of air force
personnel as well as civilians
have caused widespread, resent-
ment. Thus far, there is no
confirmation of Ydigoras' charges
of Castro-Communist backing of
the attempt.
The Guatemalan Air Force,
an elite favored by Ydigoras
and loyal to him in past up-
risings, had previously been
considered a stabilizing in-
fluence. The President appears
infuriated by the defection of
some high air force officers
and by the inability of the
air force commandants--who did
not participate--to avert the
revolt. He has permitted in-
discriminate arrests and mis-
tre!atment of air force person-
nel. This could breed future
trouble.
Arevalo's prospects for
re-election as president in
1963 appear to have been en-
hanced recently by the strong
left-wing showing in recent
Guatemala City elections and
by his formal acceptance on 25X1
23 November of nomination as
the candidate of two leftist
Guatemalan parties.
Realization of Yd.igoras'
foreknowledge probably influenced
senior army officers to stand
by him. This was the key element
in his victory. The US Embassy
ascribes the army's refusal to
join the revolt to its lack of
confidence in the plotters, who
had failed to maintain the se-
curity of their activities. It
is also possible that the army
may have obtained Ydigoras' per-
sonal assurance that he would
not assist Arevalo.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
The incumbent Nationalist
(Blanco) Party has narrowly won
the 25 November national elec-
tions i~w Uruguay, according to
official preliminary returns.
The major opposition faction,
Colorado List 15, refuses to
concede, however, and the final
results may not be known until.
January or February. The new gov-
ernment ancIlegislature are sched-
uled to take office on 1 March.
the Colorados 45. FIDEL and
the Christian Democrats will
each have 3 seats and the So-
cialist-led Union Popular 2
seats.
The lack of a Blanco ma-
jority in the assembly will con-
tinue to make it difficult to
enact legislation intended to
solve the country's economic
problems.
On the basis of the pre-
liminary returns, the "Orthodox
Herrerista" coalition within
the Blanco Party defeated the
rival "Nardone-Echegoyan Axis"
and thus will occupy the six
majority seats on the nine-man
National Council of Government
(NCG). The Colorado List 15
faction defeated its.intraparty
rival, List 14, and will receive
two minority seats; List 14 will
have the remaining one.
The preliminary figures
indicate that neither party will
have a parliamentary majority.
In the 31-man Senate, the Blanco:
will have 15 seats, and.the op-
position Colorados 14. The Com-
munist-led "Leftist Liberation
Front" (FIDEL) captured approx-
imately 13,000 more votes than
in 1958 and now will have one
senator. The other Senate seat
will go to the Christian Demo-
cratic Party. In the 99-mem-
ber Chamber of Deputies, the
Blancos captured 46 seats and
In addition, a referendum
to streamline Uruguay's cumber-
some plural executive form of
government was defeated in the
election. In the'past the NCG
has experienced great difficulty
in reaching important decisions--
as evidenced by Uruguay's tardy
vote in the OAS. imposing the
quarantine on Cuba and by the
protracted debate over severing
diplomatic relations with Cuba.
.Daniel Fernandez Crespo,
a former member of the NCG and
leader of the Union Blanca Dem-
ocratica (UBD) faction within
the "Orthodox Herrerista" coali-
tion, will preside.over the NCG
from March 1963 to March 1964.
According to the US Embassy in
Montevideo, Fernandez Crespo
appears to be a "tired man" no
longer displaying his former
ebullience.. His administration
as mayor of Montevideo revealed 25X1
him to be an inept executive
and ineffectual political leader.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
SINO-SOVIET BLOC AGRICULTURAL SITUATION
Food supplies will remain
tight throughout most of the
Sino-Soviet bloc during the
winter of 1962 and spring of
1963. In the USSR, agricultural
output in 1962 made almost no
gain for the fourth straight
year, and grain output is no
larger than the mediocre 1961
crop; food shortages will prob-
ably develop in some parts of
the country. Grain production
in Communist China will be only
slightly better than the poor
1961 harvest, and the Chinese
consumer is in for another hard
winter.
The grain harvest in the
European satellites is the small-
est in four years, and food sup-
plies this winter are expected
to be below the level of last
year. North Vietnam continues
to complain of agricultural prob-
lems and consequent food short-
ages; North Korea, on the other
hand, appears to be maintaining
relatively good levels of agri-
cultural output.
Soviet Union
In a 12 November memorandum
to the party presidium, Nikita
Khrushchev claimed a record
grain harvest for the Soviet
Union this year--147 million
metric tons. Although this
figure is far below the Khru-
shchev prediction given at the
central committee plenum last
March, it appears still to be a
gross exaggeration. The US es-
timate--based on extensive data
on weather, acreage, and crop
characteristics--is that Soviet
production this year will about
equal last year's mediocre grain
crop, judged to be about 115
million tons.
Since 1958 the gap between
Soviet claims and US estimates
has widened appreciably, perhaps
because of some form of statistical
manipulation or falsification by
the Soviets. A directive on de-
termining the grain harvest was
issued by the Soviet Central
Statistical Administration early
in 1958, but its contents have
never been made public.
Poor weather reduced yields
in many important agricultural
areas, offsetting the benefits
expected from Khrushchev's cam-
paign--launched early this year--
to replace grass and fallow land
with corn, sugar beets, peas,
beans, and small grains. The
increase in the area sown to small
grains at the expense of fallow
was nullified by drought in the
eastern New Lands, a poor winter
crop in the Ukraine, and harvest-
ing delays in the northern areas.
Abnormally cool wet weather de-
layed the harvest in the northern
European USSR, and the crops
gathered from plowed-up grassland
in this area may actually have
provided less livestock feed than
the hay and pasture normally
grown.
The potato crop--a staple
in the Soviet diet and an im-
portant livestock feed--was
sharply reduced by the adverse
weather conditions. Potato pro-
duction is reported to have been
63 million metric tons or only
about three-fourths of the 86-
million-metric-ton average pro-
duced during the period 1957-61.
Shortages of potatoes both for
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
human consumption and for live-
stock feed can be expected dur-
ing the coming winter and spring,
particularly in the northern
half of European USSR.
Khrushchev also claimed
a 6-percent increase in meat
production for 1962. While this
apparently reasonable claim would
represent some improvement over
last year's poor record, the
situation is still quite un-
satisfactory. In relation to
1959, for example, the claimed
1962 increase for meat amounts
to only 3 percent. A shortage
of livestock feed and the higher
meat procurement prices intro-
duced last June should lead co
heavier slaughtering after the
beginning of the year and some
increase in meat supplies--al-
though at the expense of future
development of the industry.
Even so, chances are slim
for significantly improving the
Soviet diet and alleviating local
food shortages--particularly in
northern European USSR.
Communist China
Peiping continues to with-
hold information on crop acreage,
yields, and total output, but
available evidence points to a
1962 harvest only slightly better
than the poor one in 1961.F---]
oreign Minister Chen
Yi was quoted by Japanese news-
men as saying that annual agri-
cultural output in the years
1959-62 was below the level of
1957, when grain output had been
announced as 185 million tons.
The early rice crop suffered
from dryness in some areas and
from flooding in others, and prob-
ably did not come up to the rela-
tively good early crop in 1961.
Although winter wheat, the other
major early crop in China, had
better soil moisture conditions
than in the previous year, a
decline in acreage and frost
damage during the spring prob-
ably combined to offset the im-
provement in moisture conditions.
Thus the winter wheat crop prob-
ably was only a little better
than the unusually poor crop in
196:1.
The fall harvests may be
only slightly, if at all, better
than in 1961. Acreage sown to
grains harvested in the fall--
intermediate and late rice,
spring wheat, and miscellaneous
grains--apparently was larger
than last year, but the increase
is not expected to boost total
output over 1961 because low-
yielding kaoliang and millet
were planted in areas used in
past years for higher yielding
winter wheat. Growing con-
ditions, although better in some
areas than in 1961, were charac-
terized by extremes in precipi-
tation and on the average were
below normal, with the result
that over-all prospects for the
fall harvest are only fair.
Although the official grain
ration remained unchanged through-
out 1962, a slight improvement
in the diet of the average Chinese
did occur. This apparently was
due to the increased availability
of vegetables and other sub-
sidiary food from private plots,
returned to the peasants in 1961.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEII;KLY SUMMARY
However, the increased emphasis
on these plots has resulted in
some neglect of the collective
grain fields.
The amount of grain pro-
cured by the state probably will
be lower this year than last
because of the regime's re-
laxation of controls over pro-
duction and distribution in the
rural areas. The need to meet
the food requirements of the
urban population therefore
probably accounts for continua-
tion of grain imports at about
the level of last year.
On balance, no significant
improvement in per capita food
availabilities in Communist
China can be expected before the
first harvest in 1963. The
food situation will remain criti-
cal throughout the winter of'1962-
63, and some decrease in con-
sumption is expected as sup-
plies of vegetables decline
seasonally.
European Satellites
East Germany was the only
country in Eastern Europe which
increased grain production over
1961, but production there was
below the 1956-60 average and
heavy rains reduced the quality
of the crop. Although there
was a record harvest last year
in Poland and a fair harvest in
Czechoslovakia, grain production
in both countries in 1962 dropped
back to the 1956-60 average.
Also, the production of feed,
root crops, and vegetables was
lowered by adverse growing con-
ditions. Grain production,
particularly corn, declined
sharply in Rumania, Hungary, and
Bulgaria as a result of drought.
Reflecting the need to dis-
tribute inadequate food supplies
more equitably, East Germany,
Rumania, and Bulgaria early this
year introduced rationing by
coupon or consumer lists for
certain staple food items.
Bulgaria also raised retail
prices of livestock products. In
an effort to improve control over
state procurement and distribution
of agriculture products, Czechoslo-
vakia late in October abolished
private sale of agricultural pro-
ducts. Other satellite countries
may find it necessary to intro-
duce some form of food rationing
before the next harvest.
Shortages of meat and dairy
products should become more wide-
spread by spring and increase
consumer dissatisfaction through-
out :Eastern Europe, especially
in East Germany and Czechoslovakia.
Even Poland--which of all bloc
countries has had the least dif-
ficulty in meeting food re-
quirements--may 'suffer some
shortages this winter, particu-
larly if the past year's high
level of exports for livestock
products is maintained.
For the first time in
several years Bulgaria and Ru-
mania may be confronted with a
shortage of bread--the main diet
stap:Le--unless substantial
quantities of wheat are im-
ported. However, all the
European satellites will exper-
ience difficulty in expanding
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
grain imports. The Soviet Un-
ion--the major supplier--is not
expected to increase grain ex-
ports significantly in view of
its own mediocre harvest. With
limited holdings of foreign
exchange, moreover, it will be
difficult for the satellites
to increase imports of grain
from the West.
North Vietnam continues to
complain of agricultural prob-
lems which have contributed
to persistent agricultural
failures since 1960. This year's
early rice and vegetable crop
was below last year's, and
Hanoi warned that the food sit-
uation would worsen in the
latter half of 1962. In view
of poor food prospects, the
regime is trying to improve
food distribution and is en=couraging city dwellers to sup-
plement their diet by growing
food on unused land.
In remarkably frank assess-
ments of their difficulties,
the North Vietnamese have put
little blame on the weather
and have instead cited faulty
management and leadership in
the agricultural cooperatives
as the primary cause of agri-
cultural failures. There is
considerable evidence that the
peasants have adjusted poorly
to the agricultural coopera-
tives--now including 89 percent
of the nation's peasant house-
holds--and the regime appears
reluctant to push earlier plans
for more advanced forms of col-
lectivization.
The harvesting of North
Vietnam's major rice crop--
totaling two-thirds of the
year's output--is nearing
completion, but the lack of the
usual press reports on progress
of harvesting and the cautious
statements being made by the
leadership suggest that there
is little expectation of a good
harvest this fall; on the
contrary, Hanoi's continued
emphasis on food problems implies
that the regime anticipates a
prolongation of the persistent
food' shortages.
North Korea has continued in
1962 to exaggerate its claims
for agricultural output, but
actual performance is believed
to have maintained or slightly
exceeded previous levels. The
official claim for grain pro-
duction in 1962--five million
tons--is clearly inflated
and can be dismissed as a claimed
fulfillment of a previously
announced production goal.
Actual grain output probably
equaled or slightly exceeded
the relatively good harvest in
1961--an estimated 3.26 million
tons--which was in turn some
300,000 tons better than the
probable actual output in 1960.
Although actual grain pro-
duction continues to be well below
claimed levels, no significant
change in food availabilities is
expected, since the disparity be-
tween actual and claimed perform-
ance is not significantly dif-
ferent from that which has pre-
vailed for several years. Food
rationing continues, but at
evidently adequate levels
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Since his election in
1958, Chilean President Jorge
Alessandri has had to cope
with a succession of economic
crises which have fostered
growing Communist political
strength. During the remaining
two years of his term, his ob-
ject will be to drive through
more of the measures called
for under Chile's ten-year
plan for economic development,
including land reform. In
pursuit of the outside assist-
ance needed to achieve his
economic goals, Alessandri will
arrive in the US on 10 December
for a four-day visit.
Alessandri's Background
Alessandri was 62 when
he took office on 3 November
1958. He had been a civil
engineer and an industrialist
before following his father--
also a Chilean President-- in-
to politics. His political
offices included a term as a
senator and an appointment as
minister of finance. At the
time of his election to the
presidency he was considered
a champion of economic lib-
eralism and anti-Communism,
and his subsequent record has
justified this.
The Economic Program
Remedying Chile's chronic
economic instability--caused
primarily by grossly inequitable
distribution of income and mani-
fested in inflation, unemploy-
ment, and the flight of capital--
became Alessandri's first and
primary problem. His advisers
produced a Ten-Year Development
Plan, (1961-70) which directly
attacks the three main facets
of instability through increased
domestic production. One of
the main features of the plan
is a construction program to
provide 40,000 to 50,000 low-
cost houses annually.
Alessandri attempted to
disarm strong leftist congres-
sional opposition to his pol-
icies by permitting increased
political activity among Com-
munists and other leftists,,
particularly among labor groups.
This led to significant leftist
gains in the congressional
elections of March 1961. As
a result, the Conservatives and
Liberals,. Alessandri's main
congressional supporters, were
he has remained
popular with the general public.
In 1958 he received a large
number of votes in Marxist
working-class districts in
spite of his anti-Communist
campaign.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
PARTIES REPRESENTED IN CHILE'S CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES
BY % OF POPULAR VOTE IN MARCH 1961 ELECTION
Communist
Party Socialist
Party
11.7 11.1
National
Democratic
Party
Popular Action Front (FRAP)
Christian
Democratic
Party
15.9
Radical
Party
Liberal
Party
Conservative
Party
no longer able to muster the
one-third vote needed to sus-
tain a presidential veto.
In August 1961, after a
series of leftward modifica-
tions of his economic program,
Alessandri accepted the Radical
Party into the governing coali-
tion. He gave the Radicals--
who represented a greater per-
centage of the electorate than
any other party--four caoinet
posts and agreed to reforms
in agriculture, taxation, and
education. Alessandri stoutly
rejected demands for increased
wages, however, and the Radicals
sustained his veto.
By the end of 1961, Ales-
sandri's modified program had
bogged down. An acute foreign
exchange crisis closed the banks
for a week at the end of Decem-
ber. The flight of capital
swelled to a volume unprecedented
even in Chile, and the cost-
of-living index soared. The
International Monetary Fund
and ,a team of US economic ad-
visers urged immediate and
drastic devaluation of the
currency, but Alessandri and
the ;Radicals both refused to
accept this because it would
entail political risks. Congress
refused Alessandri's request
for special powers to speed
reform programs.
Finally, however, after
months of political bickering,
a fairly moderate agrarian
reform bill was passed and
signed into law early this
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
month. Other reform bills are
in the legislative mill and may
appear before spring. Also,
after months of recriminations
and delay, mostly due to Radical
intransigence, the currency
was devalued in mid-October to
the "free rate," and measures
were introduced to ease import
restrictions.
Social Reform
Social reform in Chile has
received fresh impetus. In
September 1962, the Catholic
Church published a pastoral
letter criticizing the lack of
reform-mindedness among wealthy
industrialists and landowners
and outlining a plan for re-
forms in agriculture, labor
relations, the social structure,
and consumer credit. The
church also divided its own
extensive landholdings among
tenants working on them, and
sponsored committees of re-
sponsible laymen to develop
practical programs for reform
in other fields.
The Political
Nationwide municipal elec-
tions to be held in March 1963
will produce a fair indication
of each party's relative strength.
The percentage of the popular
vote which each party can
muster will be more significant
than the offices it might win.
Such percentages will probably
be the major determinants of
the political coalitions which
will be formed for the presi-
dential campaign of 1964.
The Communists are backing
Socialist Senator Allende, and
are more confident of victory
than any other party. They
display more unity and single-
mindedness than any other party,
including even the Socialists.
The party is well financed,
partly from abroad, has con-
siderable strength in the labor
union movement, and has elicited
much support from non-Communist
leftists because of its popular
stand on reform issues.
A long series of interna-
tional meetings of leftists
and Communists in Santiago
has given the Chilean Communist
Party great prestige among
leftist movements throughout
Latin America and among some
non-Communists in Chile. One
upshot of the Cuban affair may
be some temporary setbacks for
Chilean Communists, but they
have been less vociferously
pro-Castro than the Socialists,
who therefore have the most to lose
from Castro's loss of prestige.
Alessandri's Needs
president Alessandri is
acutely conscious of the weak-
nesses of his coalition and has
a genuine fear of the Communist
potential. He desires-the
economic and social advancement
of his people, but his reform
program remains handicapped
because it endangers the vested
interests of his major support-
ers in congress and elsewhere.
His principal need, as he sees
it, is prompt aid from the US
to bolster Chile's sagging
economic structure. During his
forthcoming visit, his principal
requests probably will be for
budgetary support and for a
cost fund to reimburse land-
holders whose lands are to be
distributed among tenant farm-
ers.
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