CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 9 NOV 1962

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A003800080001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 34
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 30, 2008
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: November 9, 1962
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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CURRENT
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY
SUMMARY
COPY NO.-- - 75
OCI NO. 0442/62
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
State Dept. review completed
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WE"1KLY SUMMARY
9 November 19,32
T H E W E E K I N B R I E F
(Information as of 1200 EST 8 Nov)
CUBAN DEVELOPMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 1
Soviet offensive missile equipment is being loaded
aboard Soviet vessels in several Cuban ports, but there' is
no evidence of any movement to withdraw Soviet IL-28 bombers.
Some relaxation in the Cuban military alert has occurred,
Most Latin American governments continue to demonstrate
solidarit with US olicies on the Cuban problem
SINO-SOVIET BLOC DEVELOPMENTS IN THE CUBAN CRISIS . . . . Page 4
The USSR moved rapidly last week to remove its strategic
missiles from Cuba as quickly as possible. Moscow's aim is
to undercut US pressure for UN verification and to enable
Khrushchev to claim that he has fulfilled his commitments
to President Kennedy. When the removal. process is completed,
Khrushchev probably will call on the President to respond
by issuing a formal guarantee against an invasion of Cuba.
Events of the past week suggest that the Soviet bloc
leaders were deeply shaken by the vigorous US actions in
the crisis and that Khrushchev is acutely aware that his
backdown has made him vulnerable to renewed attacks by the
Chinese Communists and other opponents in the Communist
movement. In a series of moves designed to counter this
threat to his position and to guard against open disarray
in the Soviet camp, Khrushchev conferred individually with
East European leaders and staged a demonstration of solid
support for his actions, including public endorsements by
Marshal Malinovsky, Voroshilov, and satellite leaders.
On the foreign policy front, Khrushchev abandoned his
earlier plan to come to the UN and to meet with President
Kennedy this month. He apparently envisages a period of
consolidation while he assesses the effects of the Cuban
crisis on the USSR's world position and studies the future
course of US policy.
THE SINO-INDIAN BORDER CONFLICT . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page
Indian and Chinese military activity in the past ten
days has been restricted to small-scale patrol action and
artillery exchanges. Both sides, however, seem to be
preparing for a resumption of heavier fighting before winter.
The Chinese appear confident that their military advances
and continued diplomatic pressure will eventually bring
India to negotiations on Peiping's terms. However, Nehru--
backed by a surge of patriotic indignat:Lon--shows no sign
of acceding to them.
PAKISTAN'S FOREIGN POLICY .
Page 10
The Pakistani Government is reassessing its foreign
policy, and its relations with its Western allies seem
almost certain to grow more difficult as Western arms aid
is delivered to India. Long frustrated over what it regards
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
as its allies' indifference to its basic interests vis-a-vis
India, Pakistan considers that India's acceptance of Western
military aid will tend to undermine the major advantage that
accrued to Pakistan from its alliances with Western powers.
DEVELOPMENTS IN LAOS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 11
Right-wing leaders in Vientiane are taking steps to
instigate a formal investigation by the International Control
Commission of charges that North Vietnamese armed forces
remain in Laos. Souvanna, anxious to prevent the erosion
of his neutralist military support, recently visited Phong
Saly in an effort to mediate a factional dispute between
two of his key lieutenants. The North Vietnamese ambassador
presented his credentials to King Savang on 8 November, a
move which may result in the severance of relations between
South Vietnam and Laos. The Soviet airlift into Laos has
been suspended at least for the moment.
THE SITUATION IN YEMEN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 12
The Yemeni conflict is threatening to embroil Saudi
Arabia and Jordan in open warfare against the UAR, which has
made air and naval attacks on Saudi villages serving as
supply points for the Yemeni royalists. The Saudi Government
has broken diplomatic relations with the UAR and may call
on Jordan for military aid in accordance with the alliance
the two countries recently concluded. Both governments,
in continuing to aid the Yemeni royalists, are risking
disaffection within their own military establishments--
where opinion is reported sharply divided over the in-
volvement in Yemen. Yemeni royalist forces have made a
few minor gains in northwest Yemen, but it is unlikely
that they will be able to penetrate far into republican-held
territory.
CONGO DEVELOPMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 14
Convinced that Tshombd has no intention of complying
with the UN plan, UN officials are preparing to adopt a
more forceful policy.
The central governmen is stepping
up military pressure on Tshomb6 in northern Katanga, where
Congolese forces are reported to have attacked Kongolo.
POLITICAL SITUATION IN THE FEDERATION OF RHODESIA AND
NYASALAND . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 16
A series of elections and constitutional talks is under
way in the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland. In Northern
Rhodesia, elections on 30 October failed to provide any party
with a clear mandate, and African nationalists may resort to
violence rather than attempt to promote their program in the
new legislature. Talks on the Nyasaland constitution which
are scheduled to open in London on 12 November probably will
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
9 November 1962
set a date for self-government. In Southern Rhodesia, Prime
Minister Whitehead seems likely to win elections on 14 December,
but the odds are against his efforts to win mass African support
for his policies. Pressure continues to grow for the eventual
dissolution of the Federation.
FRENCH NATIONAL ELECTIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page
De Gaulle's opponents have not succeeded in putting up
a coalition slate for the 18 November election to the French
National Assembly, but they are confident of eliminating
many Gaullist candidates in the runoff vote a week later.
De Gaulle again assailed "the parties of the past" in his
7 November call for "political renovatiLon," but he continues
to avoid any clear identification with the Union for a
New Republic.
REPERCUSSIONS TO THE DEATH OF ITALY'S OIL CHIEF .
. Page
By an apparent interim appointment,, Premier Fanfani has
gained time to work out intraparty differences over who should
replace the late Enrico Mattei as head of ENI, the powerful
state petroleum holding company. A permanent replacement will
presumably be appointed when Mattei's term expires next spring.
Meanwhile, the company's domestic political influence may be
somewhat reduced and its activities abroad temporarily less
aggressive than in Mattei's day. The government will, however,
almost certainly consider it in the national interest to try
to carry on and even expand Mattei's basic policies at home
and abroad.
AUSTRIAN GENERAL ELECTIONS
. Page 21
In the parliamentary elections of 18 November the People's
Party may increase its slight dominance over the Socialists,
with whom it has shared power in a two-party coalition since
1945. Both parties basically agree on foreign policy--particu-
larly on the need for Austrian association with the European
Common Market--and are campaign' lar el on ersonalities.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
ANTI-US OUTBREAKS IN VENEZUELA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 22
President Betancourt has placed most of Venezuela under
virtual martial law to counter Communist terrorist outbreaks
following the US quarantine against Cuba. The armed forces
have been mobilized for the first time since World War II,
and constitutional guarantees remain suspended. Military
leaders are urging stronger measures against Castro.
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 23
The appointment of State Council members Imbert and
Amiama to high military rank puts them in a stronger position
to interfere with the planned transition to elective government.
Both have been maneuvering for some time to build their personal
positions
LEFTIST GAINS IN GUATEMALAN MUNICIPAL ELECTION . . . . . Page 24
Results of the 4 November mayoralty election in Guatemala
City indicate growing strength of the extreme left and will
give impetus to anti-US former president Arevalols campaign
for re-election in 1963.
SPECIAL ARTICLENE WIN'S REVOLUTIONARY BURMA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 1
In the eight months since General Ne Win's military regime
seized power it has made almost no progress toward its avowed
goal of a unified socialist state for Burma. Fear of the army's
overriding power has stifled criticism, but rival political
parties are still functioning and there has been little evidence
of popular rallying to Ne Win in his political role. Ethnic
insurgent forces have continued their activities and strengthened
their popular support.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Military Situation
Continuing aerial surveil-
lance of Cuba discloses that
Soviet offensive missile equip-
ment is moving into port areas--
principally Mariel, Casilda,
and La Isabela--and is being
loaded aboard Soviet ships.
The photography also shows that
surface-to-air missile (SAM)
sites remain operational, with
no evidence that any such fa-
cilities are being dismantled.
Photography re-
vealed, however, that missile-
associated equipment at two
SAM assembly areas was no longer
visible.
confirmed use of that airfield
since completion of an extensive
construction program there in
late July. The IL-28s known to
be in Cuba now total 42.
photography
also discloses that Cuba's re-
cently acquired MIG-21s (Fish-
beds), at first concentrated at
Santa Clara airfield, now have
been dispersed among three mil-
itary airfields where the bulk
of Cuba's MIG-15 (Fagot), -17
(Fresco), and -19 (Farmer) air-
craft are located. Several
MIG-15s were also observed at
Holguin airfield for the first
time in early November.
An additional cruise-mis-
sile site in Cuba was identified
by photography
This site, which appeared
opera ional, includes two un-
revetted, canvas-covered launch-
ers and is similar in configura-
tion to the cruise-missile site
near Banes. The new site is
near La Sierra on the southern
coast of Las Villas Province,
about 15 miles southeast of
Cienfuegos. It is the fourth
missile installation of its
type to be positively identi-
fied in Cuba.
There is no evidence of
any movement to withdraw Soviet
IL-28 (Beagle)jet light bomb-
ers from Cuba.
nine of these aircraft--five
completed and four still being
assembled--were observed at San
Julian airfield, where 24 addi-
tional IL-28 fuselage crates
were also observed
Nine more of
the fuselage crates were noted
on photography at
Holguin airfield in Oriente
Province. This is the first
The Cuban military alert,
in force since 22 October, is
being relaxed. A radiobroad-
cast on 6 November in Santiago
de Cuba referred to a "partial
demobilization" of the armed
forces and urged all local cit-
izens to greet the returning
"demobilized combatants... who
have gained a new victory over
the threats of imperialism."
Th(broadcast added that only
those forces necessary to halt
any "surprise enemy attack"
would continue on full alert.
Other indications of a general
relaxation include a more normal
selection of radio programs, which
until 5 November were almost ex-
clusively devoted to material
connected with crisis.
Nonmilitary Developments
Cuban propaganda media con-
tinue to stress Castro's oppo~i-
tion to any inspection of Cuban
territory and his five demands
for further guarantees against
US "aggression." Castro re-
iterated these themes in his
last public speech on 1 November.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
This performance was also
notable for his attempt to
smooth over his regime's sharp
disagreement with the USSR over
the withdrawal of missile bases.
Castro used the word "missiles"
for the first time in this
speech, but he did not mention
the presence of IL-28 bombers
in Cuba. He indicated, however,
that Cuba would still retain
"powerful means of defense."
Soviet First Deputy Premier
Mikoyan's talks with Cuban lead-
ers have received noncommittal
and unrevealing treatment by
the Cuban press and radio, al-
though semiofficial Cuban spokes-
men are making every effort to
preserve the facade of Cuban
gratefulness to and respect for
the
Soviet Union. The Cuban
side
in the
protracted talks
with
Mikoyan
has included the
five
members
now in Cuba of the
key
six-man
Secretariat of the
Cuban political machine; Fidel
and Raul Castro, Che Guevara,
President Dorticos, and Emilio
Aragones. The sixth Cuban par-
ticipant in the talks is Carlos
Rafael Rodriguez, veteran Com-
munist leader and agrarian re-
form chief. He is not a member
of the Secretariat and may be
substituting for ranking Cuban
Communist Blas Roca, who has
been traveling in the European
satellites since early October
and now is attending the Bul-
garian party congress.
Major
spee es at an official cele-
bration honoring the anniversary
were made on 6 November by Carlos
Rafael Rodriguez and Soviet Am-
bassador Alekseyev. Rodriguez'
speech was largely a routine
review of Soviet history and
anti-US phrases unmarked by
any effusive praise of Soviet
support for Cuba. Mikoyan at-
tended the ceremonies, as did
Dorticos, but the Castro broth-
ers and Guevara did not. The
Cuban premier subsequently at-
tended a Soviet Embassy func-
tion the same evening, however,
and appeared affable as he min-
gled with the 800 guests, in-
cluding Mikoyan.
Most Latin American govern-
ments continue to demonstrate
solidarity with US policies on
Cuba although there is growing
concern among pro-US Latin Amer-
ican officials over the implica-
tions of a US commitment not to
invade Cuba. These officials
feel that the continuation of
the Castro regime would. pose a
constant threat to other coun-
tries of the hemisphere and
that, unless Castro is elimi-
nated, "other Castros" will
arise in other countries.
Justification for such
fears may be found in continu-
ing; evidence of attempts by
the Castro regime to incite
anti-US violence in other areas
of the hemisphere.
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possibly missile-related
H
OE
? Confirmed surface-to-air missile (SAM) site
X Possible SAM site, exact location unknown
A Support facility for processing equipment
Airfield with MIG aircraft
0 Coastal defense cruise-missile site
Effective air defense perimeter
(estimated radius: 20-25 nautical miles)
The OAS action on 5 Novem-
ber unanimously approving an
Argentine resolution to improve
coordination of anti-Castro mil-
itary measures by member states
provides another indication of
growing hemisphere unity in the
face of the Cuban crisis. Bra-
zilian Premier Hermes Lima, how-
ever, told the US ambassador in
NAUTICAL MILES
32778
Rio de Janeiro that Brazil's
favorable vote on the 5 November
resolution would be accompanied
by a statement that Brazil
doubted the need for such action
and that the resolution should
not be construed as recognizing
a special military bloc of na-
tions within the OAS framework.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
The USSR moved rapidly last
week to withdraw its strategic
missiles from Cuba as quickly
as possible. Moscow's aim is
to undercut US pressure for UN
verification of the dismantling
and removal of the missiles and
to enable Khrushchev to claim
that he has fulfilled his com-
mitments to President Kennedy.
Moscow has taken advantage
of Castro's rejection of any
form of UN inspection in Cuba
and the easing of the crisis
atmosphere that followed Khru-
shchev's 28 October backdown
to maneuver to extricate the
USSR from the embarrassing agree-
ment to UN verification. Al-
though Khrushchev apparently
felt that he had no choice at
the height of the crisis but
to agree to a UN role, Moscow
was concerned that this would
create a dangerous precedent
in the future, particularly
with respect to any disarmament
or nuclear test ban controls.
In order to escape pressure for
international supervision, the
USSR agreed bilaterally to ar-
rangements which allow US naval
vessels to contact Soviet ships
with missiles aboard for the
purpose of counting the missiles.
When this process of re-
moval has been completed, Khru-
shchev probably will announce
that he has made good on his
end; of the bargain and call on
President Kennedy to respond
by issting a formal declaration
guaranteeing Cuba against an
invasion by the US and other
Western Hemisphere countries.
The Soviet leaders probably
believe such a move would put
them in a strong position to
charge the US with "bad faith"
if the President should decline
to give a formal guarantee on
the ground that Khrushchev had
reneged on his pledge to accept
UN verification.
It is possible that Khru-
shchev actually hopes to create
such an impasse, believing he
could use it both to repay US
charges of Soviet deception
and to recover the initiative
in the Cuban affair. At the
Kremlin reception on 7 Novem-
ber, he remarked that, although
the Cubans were skeptical, the
Soviet leaders believed that
the! President would "keep his
word." He warned, however,
that if a formal US guarantee
against an invasion is not
forthcoming, this would "put
us back to a position of
castastrophe."
Soviet propaganda has be-
gun to accuse the US of attempt-
ing to evade its "commitments,"
in contrast with the USSR which
is scrupulously carrying out
its pledges. Moscow charges
that the US is not only refus-
ing to "guarantee and firmly
respect Cuba's sovereignty"
but advancing new demands that
"look like ultimatums."
Mikoyan's Mission to Cuba
Although neither Moscow
nor Havana has commented on
the course of Mikoyan's talks
with Cuban leaders, there are
indications that the Soviet
envoy has encountered serious
difficulties and has been
obliged to prolong his stay.
Both Fidel and Raul Castro
and Che Guevara were absent
from Havana's ceremonies on the
anniversary of the Bolshevik
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Revolution, although Mikoyan
and President Dorticos at-
tended. Soviet Ambassador
Alekseyev's speech was full
of effusive praise of Castro
as "Cuba's legendary national
hero." He stressed that Cuban-
Soviet friendship is based on
"mutual respect" and "complete
equality" and again endorsed
Castro's five-point demands
for US concessions.
One area of disagreement
may be the question of the re-
moval of IL-28 jet bombers.
Unlike the missiles which were
under exclusive Soviet control,
the IL-28s may have been
actually transferred to Cuban
control under the terms of mili-
tary assistance agreements.
Intrabloc Relations
The events of the past week
suggest that Soviet bloc leaders
were deeply shaken by the US
stand on Cuba and that Khru-
shchev is acutely aware that
his backdown has made him vul-
nerable to renewed attacks by
the Chinese Communists and by
other opponents in the Communist
movement. In a series of moves
designed to counter these threats
to his position and to guard
against open disarray in the
Soviet camp, Khrushchev con-
ferred separately with East
European leaders and staged a
demonstration of support for
his actions in the crisis which
included public endorsements
by Marshal Malinovsky, Voroshi-
lov, Gomulka, and other satel-
lite leaders.
The unprecedented parade of
Eastern European chiefs to
Moscow in a short period of
time began with the arrival of
Czechoslovak leader Novotny
on 29 October, the play after
Khrushchev's backdown. Novotny
was followed by Ulbricht of
East Germany, Zhivkov of Bul-
garia, Poland's Gomulka, and
Hungary's Kadar. Khrushchev
probably used these consulta-
tior.sto explain his position
in the Cuban crisis, establish
a unified line in the post-
crisis period, discuss the
future course of bloc foreign
policy on Germany and other
major issues, and deal with
separate domestic problems of
the East European countries
in the aftermath of the crisis.
Khrushchev apparently in-
structed these leaders to reaf-
firm the central theme of peace-
ful coexistence and negotiated
settlement of disputes. Both
Zhivkov, in his opening address
to the Bulgarian party congress
on 5 November, and Gomu lka , in
a Pravda article on the same
day, praised Khrushchev for hav-
ing prevented the US from un-
leashing a nuclear war. Both
emphasized that "there is no
other road" but peaceful co-
existence. All other Eastern
European governments, except
the Albanian, immediately
adopted this line in their
propaganda and official statements.
The purge of eight prominent
Stalinist officials of the Bul-
garian party, including Premier
Yugov and former Interior. Min-
ister Tsankov, obviously with
Khrushchev's blessing, carried a
clear message to the other satel-
lite parties that they must give
Khrushchev and his policies their
unqualified support. Novotny is
probably under pressure from Khru-
shchev to undertake some limited de-
Stalinization action in Czechoslo-
vakia. Novotny, however, cannot
carry any such action far without
wr(3ckin his party.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
The pronouncements by Kosy-
gin, Suslov, Malinovsky, and
Voroshilov last week were clear-
ly intended to show that the
Cuban affair has not affected
Khrushchev's leadership of the
Soviet party. Voroshilov's 3
November Pravda article, ob-
viously written at Khrushchev's
behest, praised Khrushchev's
"exceptional self-control" in
handling the crisis and credited
him with preventing a "world
catastrophe." He specifically
endorsed Khrushchev's letters
to President Kennedy as showing
that the crisis "can be solved
speedily by peaceful means."
Voroshilov was careful to em-
pha8ize, however, that "our
peacefulness is not a sign of
weakness." In his speech at
the 7 November Moscow parade,
Malinovsky also praised Khrush-
chev for his actions to "pre-
serve peace" which, he said,
were supported by "all progres-
sive mankind."
The Soviet premier does not
seem to anticipate any immediate
challenge to his position.
Mikoyan's lengthy stay in Havana
and the attendance of party
secretaries Suslov and Shelepin
at the Bulgarian party congress
point in this direction. Both
Suslov and Mikoyan supported
Khrushchev against the antiparty
group in June 1957 and apparently
have remained allied with him
since. Khrushchev would un-
doubtedly want both of them at
hand if he had any inkling of
an impending showdown.
Peiping's Reaction
Peiping's censure of
Khrushchev's handling of the
crisis became increasingly
pointed last week. The Chinese
displayed their dissatisfaction
by failing to send a delegation
to Moscow's October Revolution
anniversary celebration.
Although Chinese propaganda
has not specifically mentioned
Moscow as the target, it has
been replete with references to
"appeasement" of the US and to
"Munich schemes" against Cuba.
The Chinese have organized daily
mass demonstrations protesting
"US aggression" and supporting
Castro's "five just demands."
Among the Asian members of
the bloc, only Mongolia has ex-
pressed unqualified approval of
Khrushchev's decisions in the
crisis. North Korea has followed
the Chinese pattern of mass meet-
ings and has echoed Peiping's
propaganda line. The North Viet-
namese are taking their customary
middle position, combining full
support of Castro's demands with
approval of Moscow's success in
obliging the US "to make the
initial concessions."
Moscow's initial impulse
after President Kennedy's 22
October speech was to make a con-
ciliatory gesture toward Peiping
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
in the hope of forestalling
open Chinese attacks on Khru-
shchev's actions at the height
of the Cuban crisis and of pre-
senting a picture of greater
bloc unity in a time of great
danger. The Soviet press on
25 October endorsed Peiping's
proposals of 23 October for a
mutual withdrawal of Chinese
and Indian forces from exist-
ing lines and for top-level
Sino-Indian talks--terms which
were clearly unacceptable to
the Nehru government.
Moscow
publicly indicated that
e sale of MIG-21 (Fishbed)
jet fighters to India would
be suspended, at least for the
time being.
When Peiping rebuffed
these Soviet overtures and
derided Khrushchev's stand
on Cuba, and India turned to
the West for military as-
sistance, Moscow cautiously
retreated toward its earlier
position of neutrality. A
5 November Pravda article
and Kosygin s pseech on 6 No-
vember omitted any specific
reference to Peiping's pro-
posals and merely urged
negotiations without precon-
ditions.
Future Soviet Policy
Kosygin's speech, together
with Khrushchev's Kremlin re-
ception remarks on 7 November,
suggest that the Soviet leaders
contemplate a period of relative
inaction on the main diplomatic
fronts while they assess the
effects of the Cuban crisis on
the USSR's world position and
study the future course of US
policy. They probably feel the
outcome of the Cuban affair has
reduced Soviet bargaining power
and that there would be no pros-
pect of gaining Western conces-
sions in new negotiations on
such issues as Berlin and Ger-
many in the near future.
Khrushchev implied that he
has abandoned his earlier plan
to come to the US this month to at-
tend the UN General Assembly and to
meet with President Kennedy. He
said such a meeting is not neces-
sary at this time and that he would
favor heads-of-government talks only
"if it is a question of peace and
war." Both Kosygin and Khrushchev
treated the Berlin question cau-
tiously, repeating the standard
formula that they cannot wait in-
definitely for a solution. Khru-
shchev ridiculed Western press
speculation regarding a Soviet
timetable for a separate peace
treaty with East Germany.
The Soviet leaders appear to
be using the nuclear test ban issue
to signal their desire to liqui-
date the Cuban crisis quickly and
to restore "normal" relations with
the West. In reply to a question
at the Kremlin reception, Khru-
shchev said "it is a good time"
for a nuclear test ban agreement
and claimed that the Soviet and US
positions are "very close together."
On the same day,' Deputy Foreign
Minister Kuznetsov presented to
Ambassador Dean a new proposal for
controls over underground tests.
This proposal was based on sug-
gestions of the recent Pugwash Con-
ference of scientists for employing
automatic, unmanned seismic stations
to police a.test ban agreement. Ac-
cording to Kuznetsov, the USSR
would agree to installation of auto-
matic seismic stations along Soviet
borders on the territory of adjacent
countries, if the latter consent.
The Soviet Union would also agree
to two or three such stations on
its own territory, provided the
other nuclear powers would like-
wise agree. While he asserted
that the sealed instruments in"
stalled on Soviet territory should
be transported from and to the
"international center" by Soviet
personnel and aircraft, Kuznetsov
indicated that if the US should in-
sist on foreign personnel partici-
pating, the USSR might accept such
an airrangment.
This proposal, however, does
not change Soviet unwillingness
to accept on-site inspections on
Soviet territory.
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SECRET'
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Small-scale patrol action
and artillery exchanges have
characterized Indian and
Chinese military activity since
Peiping's initial thrusts paused
some ten days ago. Both
sides seem to be preparing for
at least one more military bout
this fall, but relative posi-
tions are not likely to change
significantly.
In Ladakh, India's abandon-
ment of Daulat Beg Oldi has
left control of the Karakoram
Pass to the Chinese; New Delhi
is concentrating Indian defen-
sive efforts farther south near
its threatened base at Chushul.
In the northeast, Indian forces
have given no new ground. In
Sikkim, opposite the Chumbi
Valley, and in northwestern
Uttar Pradesh, they have been
strengthened because of reported
Chinese buildups across the
border.
New Delhi is carefully
watching Chinese actions in the
Chumbi Valley--an area where
there are neither border dif-
ferences nor fighting--as a
gauge of Peiping's intentions
with regard to expanding the
conflict.
Within India, Nehru's
government is making every ef-
fort to recoup its prestige and
to capitalize on the surge of
patriotism evoked by the Chinese
threat. A broadly based nation-
al defense council has been
formed; private Indian wealth
is being marshaled; militia-
type organizations are being
formed; army enlistments are
rising; and the Communist Party's
nationalistic stance has been
welcomed. Krishna Menon's
enemies have seized the occasion
to force Nehru to oust the con-
troversial Menon from the
government.
Internal security measures
have been tightened against
resident Chinese nationals, and
the government has arrested
several prominent Communist
Party members who oppose the
Indian party's support of New
Delhi. Parliament began its
winter session ten days early
on 8 November and India's economic
planners have begun to assess the
impact of recent events and
greater defense expenditures on
the remaining three and one-half
years of the Third Five-Year
Pla.n.
On the diplomatic front,
Nehru has again rejected Moscow's
suggestion that the two sides call
off' the fighting and begin nego-
tiations on the basis of Peiping's
mutual withdrawal proposals. He
is certain to reject Chinese rep-
etition of the same bid.
The Chinese still appear
confident, however, that their
military advances and continued
diplomatic pressure will eventual-
ly bring India to negotiations on
Peiping's terms. On 6 November
the Chinese released the text of
a note to New Delhi which reaf-
firmed support for their proposals
of 23 October. India's insistence
that the Chinese withdraw to the
positions they held prior to 8
September was once again labeled
"absolutely unacceptable." The
note also called "especially
serious" US arms aid to India
and New Delhi's continuing recon-
naissance flights over Tibet.
In a letter to Nehru made
public on 7 November, Chou En-lai
claimed that China was not trying
to force any unilateral demand on
India through its recent military
successes. He pointed out that
the "line of actual control" men-
tioned in Peiping's proposals--
from which a mutual withdrawal
would then take place--is the line
shown on Chinese maps when the
same proposal was made three years
ago, and argued that this "in the 25X1
main" coincides with the McMahon
Line in the area of the North
East Frontier Agency.
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V IJ Vl%LJ i
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY;
'Chandigarh
"P 29692
J AM M,U
"Kargil Ci
-/N - Thoise
to
./' Haji '
Langar
CHIP CHAP
VALLEY
21000' f:j
GALWAN VALLEY
P Ei ,
JoShimath'
'.. '8a'rkl a.
-+------~- Railroad
Road
- Major caravan route
or trail
Boundary shown on most US and Western maps
-..- Demarcated
X- Delimited only
Indefinite
Boundary shown on. recent Chinese and Indian maps
(where differing from US and Western maps)
Chinese
Indian
Airfield
Pass
Spot height
(in feet)
SECRET
D STATUTE
Bounda7ies af4 ncpnes are n'ril
those recogwi zed 5y the Ua
EASTERN CHINA - INDIA
FRONTIER AREA
BHUTAN
' *THIMBU
rr
_eking.0 ew, SUBANSIRJL , KAM#NG ~1A
LBo dila Lnn
wanga p~
L r
ngju"SIANCc
9 Nov 6 Approved For Release 2008/04/30: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03800080001-4 ,e 9 of 24
STAT
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SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
The Pakistani Government
is reassessing its foreign
policy. Karachi has long been
frustrated over what it feels
is its allies' disregard for
its basic interest in forcing
a stronger India to negotiate
over Kashmir. Pakistan fears
now, however, that India's new
willingness to accept arms from
the West and the West's will-
ingness to deliver them will
deprive Pakistan of the major
advantage it has derived from
the Western alliance.
Although Nehru in 1959 re-
fused an offer from Pakistan
to conclude a joint defense
agreement, the Pakistani leaders
have continued to hope that
India's growing problems with
Communist China would force New
Delhi to the conclusion that a
settlement with Pakistan was
desirable to protect the Indian
rear. The Pakistanis now see
this prospect vanishing. When
Pakistani spokesmen object to
Western arms aid to India on
the ground that this endangers
the "local balance of power,"
they are really saying that
this aid enables India to main-
tain military superiority--
better than two to one--along
the Pakistani-Indian border
and to fight the Chinese at
the same time.
Pakistan is concerned over
the growing Chinese Communist
threat to the subcontinent, but
it feels that the present Sino-
Indian conflict is confined to
a border dispute and does not
threaten Pakistan's security
in any immediate way. Accord-
ingly, President Ayub sees no
need for Pakistan to rally to
India's defense. He sees rather
a chance to exploit India's
predicament by pressing for a
Kashmir settlement. He is re-
luctant to assure India that he
will not cause trouble on the
Kashmir border or elsewhere
because he feels that such an
assurance would deprive him
of the only real leverage he has.
The Pakistani press has been
taking an increasingly anti-
American line, hitting at the
CENTO and SEATO pacts and calling
for improved relations with
Peiping. Ayub has held emergency
meetings with Foreign Ministry of-
ficials and army leaders; he has
called an emergency meeting of
the National Assembly for 21 No-
vember to explain his views.\
Ayub's problems are com-
pounded by his need to strengthen
his internal political position
against a determined effort by
old-line politicians to reduce
his power under the new constitu-
tion. At present his power
stems from the backing of the
Pakistani Army, which depends
heavily on US aid.
While Ayub for the immedi-
ate future will probably pro-
ceed cautiously on foreign policy
matters, unless he feels greater
pressure is being put on India
to curie to terms on Kashmir,
he is likely to adopt an increas-
ingly uncooperative attitude
toward the West, particularly
the NS.
SECRET
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
DEVELOPMENTS IN LAOS
Right-wing leaders in
Vientiane are taking steps to
instigate formal investigation
of remnant North Vietnamese
forces in Laos, but the pro-
cedure is time-consuming. Ngon
Sananikone, conservative repre-
sentative on a coalition com-
mission charged with overseeing
implementation of the Geneva
accords, has called upon the
body to investigate selected
charges of the presence of
North Vietnamese military units
at Tchepone and Sam Neua.P
Detection by the ICC of
remaining North Vietnamese
troops would prove extremely
difficult, however. The
North Vietnamese
LJcould retire temporarily
across the border, or move to
more inaccessible jungle areas
to escape detection. Poor
communications and the ICC's
limited means of transporta-
tion facilitate such deception.
Premier Souvanna Phouma, in
addition to facing difficulties
stemming from the rivalry be-
tween the right and left factions
in his coalition government, is
also beset by a potentially
serious rift within his own
neutralist group. An open
break has existed for over a
month between two factions of
the neutralist garrison in
Phong Saly Province. This dis-
pute threatens to fragment the
support he can count on from
his already modest neutralist
forces. Accompanied by Kong
Le, Souvanna flew to Phong Saly
on 6 November in an effort to
mediate the quarrel.
North Vietnam's ambassador-
designate, Le Van Hien, pre-
sented his credentials to King
Savang on 8 November. Souvanna
had put off the presentation in
hopes that the South Vietnamese
might be persuaded to retain
some form of diplomatic ties
even after Hanoi's envoy was
accepted in Vientiane. Presi-
dent Diem apparently is still
pondering the problem but has
given no hint that he has
changed plans to recall his
representative from Vientiane
immediately upon the estab-
lisshment of relations between
Laos and North Vietnam.
Pathet Lao leader Gen-
eral Singkapo announced on
5 November that the Soviet
airlift to Laos has stopped.
Singkapo claimed that the
Pathet Lao now would be free
to fire on aircraft flying for
Air America, a US charter line
engaged in resupply. The Pathet
Lao are critical of Souvanna's
unilateral arrangements with
Air America and hope to bring
this operation under direct
coalition supervision in order 25X1
to curtail resupply operations
to the anti-Communist Meo guer-
rilla forces.
SECRET
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 Saudi Arabia severed diplo-
matic relations with the UAR this
week following a series of air
strikes on Saudi territory and
naval bombardment of the Saudi
port of al-Muwassam.
R
(EG PT)
JORDAN
~Al Muwlssam
/ FREf~CH ?Nr_~
SOMALIL ND
ADEN
GULF OF ADEN
A R A B I A
IRAQ
Ma rib
STATUTE MILES 400
NEUTRAL
ZONE
KU 1T
UWAIT
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SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Saudi Arabia may also use
the charge of UAR aggression to
call upon King Husayn for mili-
talry aid in accordance with the
Saudi-Jordanian military alliance
concluded only last week. Open
SECRET
WEEKLY REVIEW Page
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vfto~
SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
warfare involving Saudi Arabia
and Jordan against the UAR and
revolutionist forces in Yemen
probably would expose the Saudi
and Jordanian governments to
increased domestic unrest and
possibly to subversion. Segments
of the populace in each country,
including elements in both
armies, already oppose the
assistance which their rulers
have given the Yemeni royalists.
The Egyptians' decision to
extend their air strikes into
Saudi territory probably reflects
Cairo's concern over the inability
of the revolutionary government
to establish firm control of
the country. Royalist forces,
have been attempting to get a
major campaign under way in north-
western Yemen, and have had
limited success near the towns
of Harad and Sadah. The royal-
ists control a band of territory
stretching from the Saudi border
south of Najran through the
Wadi al Jawf area and Marib
to Harib near the Aden Protec-
torate border.
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SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
CONGO DEVELOPMENTS
The UN appears to be pre-
paring to use a more forceful
policy to effect Katan a's in-
tegration.
part of its 1,800-man contingent,
and the UN is seeking additional
jet aircraft. The Indian Gov-
ernment has informed the UN that
for the time being it will leave
its troops in the Congo.
Under Secretary General
Bunlche believes that a show of
force may enable the UN to
attain its objectives without
a fight. He has indicated that
the UN's next move will consist
of "administrative actions."
The UN has already placed cen-
tral government customs and
immigration officials at Elisa-
bethville airport without evok-
ing a response from Tshomb6.
Bunche estimates that the UN
could move into the mining towns
s. SUDAN
r,...
Indonesia has offered two
C-130 transports--each with a
capacity of 64 paratroops--as
V.51-5311
REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO
cogaiInatoOe 4tS0
~ .o
... J5/NSA
327k?
SECRET
P
Port R-9,4
"~lr`--.
P17
300
W
T9,glliNB ga
I. fps L P ..:.T
O United Nations forces'
Congo National Army
Tshombe's forces
Airfield
- Railroad
Kapanga
L,.e?oid n/' ?
6.900
1~~` Scallered
~1_
Ka.-
5;650 1
Kondor
KBba
de?~~erteoP= AND NYASA AND 255X-
9 Nov F2 WIT KT.v f1 VT1?W D-- 14 of 24
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SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
of Jadotville, Kolwezi, and
Kipushi without being challenged
by the Katangan gendarmerie.
Such a move would curtail Tshom-
be's mining revenue, but, de-
spite Bunche's estimate, it is
very doubtful that these three
mercenary strongholds could be
seized without a serious fight
and without US airlift support.
Katanga is still detaining
more than $2 million worth of
UN supplies at Sakania on the
Northern Rhodesian border and
at Dilolo on the Angola border
in spite of Tsiiornbe's assurance
that the nonmilitary goods
would be released. The local
UN representative has said that
the UN preferred to let the mat-
ter lie for two or three weeks
more and implied that continued
Katangan failure to release the
UN goods would provide a basis
"for other UN action, not in-
volving the use of force." A
swift occupation of the two
towns would enable the UN to
control all Tshombe's copper
ore exports while bypassing the
main Katangan defenses.
Foreign Minister Bomboko
is in the US seeking transport
planes.
The Congolese Parliament
opened in Leopoldville on
5 November in what proved
to be an anticlimatic ses-
sion, as the senate failed
to obtain a quorum. The op-
position hopes when Parliament
finally gets down to business
to be able to topple Adoula
on the question of the con-
stitution or his failure to
integrate Katanga, but it
now appears unlikely that
they will have sufficient votes
to do so.
SECRET
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SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
POLITICAL SITUATION IN THE FEDERATION OF RHODESIA AND NYASALAND
A series of elections and
constitutional talks is under way
in the Federation of Rhodesia and
Nyasaland. The purpose is to
provide a basis for further con-
stitutionalnegotiations between
Britain and representatives of
the Federation and of its three
constituent territories. Talks
aimed at revising the federal
structure may begin early next
year. Nyasaland's Hastings Banda
expects the Federation to be dis-
solved by the end of 1963.
Northern Rhodesian elections
on 30 October, held under ex-
tremely complicated procedures,
failed to give any party a clear
mandate but emphasized the sharpen-
ing division of the electorate
along racial lines. Of the 45
legislative seats, eleven are
still unfilled; the remainder
are divided among two African
parties--which favor the breakup
of the Federation--and Federation
Prime Minister Sir Roy Welensky's
United Federal Party. Elections
on 10 December for the unfilled
seats are unlikely to shift the
balance significantly. Britain,
which still has ultimate respon-
sibility for forming a govern-
ment, may find it impossible to
put together a stable combination.
African nationalist Kenneth
Kaunda's party, the clear choice
of the African majority, may turn
to violence rather than attempt
to promote its program in the
new legislature.
On 12 November, talks on the
constitution of Nyasaland are to
open in London. Banda and his fol-
lowers--African nationalists who
have been the most vociferous op-
ponents of the white-dominated
Federation--have been in effective
control of their territory for
more than a year. Both Britain
and the Nyasalanders expect the
talks to set a date for Nyasaland's
internal self-government. Banda
says, however, that he will not
leave London until Britain an-
nounces that the Federation will
be dissolved.
In white-controlled Southern
Rhodesia., legislative elections are
to be held on 14 December. The ar-
rangements for these have already
been condemned by the UN General
Assembly. Africans--between 15
and 18 of them--will have seats
in the 65-member legislature for
and
SOUTHERN
RHODESIA
the first time. African national-
ists, however, call this advance
inadequate, and most of the eli-
gible Africans will boycott the
elections. Prime Minister White-
head and the Southern Rhodesian
section of the United Federal
Party seems certain to win a
majority of the seats. Whitehead
then plans to push ahead with a
long-promised program of economic
and social reform which favors the
Africans. Whitehead is also try-
ing to detach Joshua Nkoma and
other relative moderates from the
extremists who dominated the lead-
ing African nationalist party
before it was banned on 20 Septem-
ber. By liberalizing his policy
and simultaneously encouragirgthe
moderates, Whitehead hopes to bring
into being a mass African party
which will work within a constitu-
tional framework. However, the
odds are against him, and further
racial unrest seems likel .
of
Rhodesia
Nyasaland
SECRET
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SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
De Gaulle's opponents have
not succeeded in putting up a
coalition slate for the 18 No-
vember election to the French
National Assembly, but they are
confident of eliminating many
Gaullist candidates in the run-
off vote of a week later. De
Gaulle again assailed "the
parties of the past" in his 7
November call for "political
renovation," but he continues
to avoid any clear identification
with the Union for a New
Republic (UNR). Under French
electoral law, in constituencies
where no candidate gets a
majority on the first ballot
there is a second runoff ballot
decided by a plurality. Candi-
dates receiving 5 percent or
more of the vote on the first
round remain eligible for the
runoff. In metropolitan France,
where 465 seats are at stake,
2,367 candidates have filed, an
average of five per seat. The
four overseas departments and
the territories will elect 17
deputies.
Nearly all incumbents are
running again, as well as many
former deputies who were defeated
in the Gaullist landslide of
1958. Only the Communist Party
has candidates in nearly every
constituency. The UNR has at-
tempted to present a candidate
against each of the 280 deputies
who voted to censure the Pompi-
dou government.
The broad anti-Gaullist
coalition envisaged by the
parties which censured Pompidou
will not materialize on the
first round. Deals to refrain
from entering competing candi-
dates have been made by two or
three of the anti-Gaullist
parties in only a few depart-
merits. The full effect of the
opposition to De Gaulle is
therefore expected to be felt
on the second ballot, when
relatively weak candidates
will be under pressure to with-
draw in favor of those most
likely to defeat the UNR as-
pirant. This tactic is ex-
pected to cut UNR representation
drastically, inasmuch as about
70 of the UNR incumbents won in
1958 only on second ballot plu-
ralities. In a few constituen-
ciES, however, it will also
favor Communist candidates
likely to receive more than a
third of the votes cast in the
first round. There is general
agreement the Communists will
PARTY STRENGTHS IN
FRENCH NATIONAL ASSEMBLY
NOTE; The outgoing assembly had two vacancies. The elections
on 18 and 25 November will fill all 482 seats.
SECRET
9 Nov 62 WEEKLY REVIEW Page 17 of 24
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NW iw~
SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
at least double their rep-
resentation.
Some of the anti-Gaullist
leaders except the UNR to lose
100 seats. Since it has no
political philosophy apart from
barking De Gaulle and since it
lacks bole cohesion and a strong
party machine, its fortunes
are directly dependent on De
Gaulle. There is little
chance, however, that De Gaulle
will campaign directly for the
UNR as a party.
At best, Gaullist candi-
dates can hope for some public
gesture of support from the
Association for the Fifth
Republic, which Andre Malraux
has organized to back any
candidate it considers favor-
able to the Gaullist cause.
Malraux has covered nearly
every constituency in his list
SECRET
of approved candidates, a third
of whom are running under other
than UNR labels--largely Inde-
pendents and Popular Republicans.
Repatriates from Algeria
are nowhere sufficiently numerous
to elect their own representa-
tives independently but will
probably cast decisive votes
against the UNR in many southern
and southwestern constituencies,
particularly where agricultural
unrest is expected to prompt
many erstwhile UNR supporters
to :return to their traditional
Radical and Socialist loyalties.
Of all the center parties,
the Popular Republicans seem
to be in the best tactical
position to profit from UNR
losses, particularly in Brittany
and Normandy where they are
running youthful newcomers who
have won prominence as labor
union and farm organization
9 Nov 62 Rvtry %' - 18 Of 24
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NW SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
REPERCUSSIONS TO THE DEATH OF ITALY'S OIL CHIEF
The death of Enrico Mattei
presented the Fanfani govern-
ment with the difficult prob-
lem of choosing a new chief for
ENI, Italy's powerful state pe-
troleum holding company. Fan-
fani's appointment of 72-year-
old ENI Vice President Marcello
Boldrini
is apparently an interim
arrangement which gives the
prime minister time to iron out
differences within his Christian
Democratic Party over the ques-
tion of a permanent replacement
when Mattei's term expires next
spring. Meanwhile the company's
domestic political influence may
be somewhat reduced and its ac-
tivities abroad temporarily less
aggressive than in Mattei's day.
The government will, however,
almost certainly consider it in
the national interest to try to
carry on and even expand Mattei's
basic policies at home and abroad.
Mattei's controversial
operations in the petroleum
field at home and abroad pri-
marily aimed at securing cheap
fuel for Italian consumption.
His spectacular successes and
his personal contribution to
Italy's international prestige
made him a public hero. Nomi-
nally a Christian Democrat,
he was interested above all in
ENI, for which he brought sup-
port by multifarious political
contributions
The promotion of Boldrini
and the appointment of Eugenio
Cefis to replace him as vice
president put ENI in the hands
of two of Mattei's chief col-
laborators and economic tech-
nicians. Cefis has been spoken
of as Mattei's alter ego and
acted for Mattei in setting
up deals with Argentina, Com-
munist China, and the USSR.
The USSR in 1961 furnished some
14 percent of Italy's total
crude oil imports.
Disagreements over who is
to be the power behind--or,
over--ENI can be expected to
make further trouble within
the government coalition. The
press continues to speculate
as to whether, as had been the
case with Mattei every time
his term ran out, ENI's new
director is to be reappointed 25X1
for another three years.
The conservative Liberal Party
--a member of the parliamentary
opposition--is calling for the
breakup of the ENI complex by
separation of its subsidiaries
engaged in oil exploration,
natural gas distribution, dis-
tribution of petroleum deriva-
tives, and oil and gas refining.
Government spokesmen have
stated, however, that there is
no intention of breaking up
ENT or changing its basic pur-
pose. It may, however, be di-
vested of certain interests,
such as textiles and nuclear
power. There are some indica-
tions that the government may
intend to reduce the power of
Mattei's successor and assume
more direct control of the com-
pany's activities. This would
be done by placing ENI under
the new planning commission for
coordination of government eco-
nomic enterprises headed by
Budget Minister Ugo LaMalfa--
who, like Mattei, was one of
the architects of Italy's post-
war "economic miracle."
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
AUSTRIAN GENERAL ELECTIONS
In Austria's parliamen-
tary elections on 18 November,
the People's Party is likely to
maintain and possibly increase
its slight dominance over the
Socialists, with whom it has
shared power in a two-party
coalition since 1945. The trend
in recent municipal elections
in Austria has favored the
People's Party--and, to a lesser
extent, the Communists--at the
expense of the Socialists.
There have been few genuine
campaign issues, since foreign of
fairs is largely taboo because
of Austria's carefully preserved
neutrality, and the economy is
extraordinarily prosperous.
Both the major parties agree on
the nation's single most impor-
tant foreign policy objective:
that Austria must press its case
for association with the European
Common Market.
Austria's basic pro-Western
orientation.
The unusually large number
of new voters is a variable
factor of some importance, but
the two major parties are ex-
pected to share almost 90 per-
cent of the vote, as in 1959.
The US Embassy at Vienna an-
ticipates the People's Party
will retain or slightly enlarge
its one-vote margin over the
Socialists in the Nationalrat
(lower house). The small right-
of-center Liberal Party may
slightly increase its current
AUSTRIAN NATIONALRAT
LOWER HOUSE
VOTES - 1959 ELECTIONS
STAT
Consequently, personalities
have played a major role in the
campaign--which has been sur-
prisingly bitter, considering
that neither party wishes to
break up the coalition. The
Socialists have called for an
end to Finance Minister Klaus'
one-man rule in fiscal matters, 6211052
accusing him of blocking labor's
legitimate wage demands. Klaus
is generally regarded as the
People's Party's eventual heir
apparent to the well-liked, but
maladroit, Chancellor Gorbach.
The People's Party has attacked
Vice Chancellor Pittermann,
charging that he used his recent
trip to Moscow to promote trade
with the bloc and that he advo-
cates a form of "economic neu-
trality" inconsistent with
eight.-man representation. The
even smaller Communist Party,
which failed to get a single
seat in 19.59, is given a better-
than-even chance to win a seat
in a Vienna district--which
would qualify it for two or
three additional seats in the
proportional redistribution of
the vote.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
ANTI-US OUTBREAKS IN VENEZUELA
President Betancourt has
placed most of Venezuela under
virtual martial law following
Communist terrorist outbreaks
in reaction to the US quarantine
against Cuba. The armed forces
have been mobilized for the
first time since World War II,
and constitutional guarantees
remain sus ended
Pro-Castro extremists
succeeded in sabotaging major
US-operated oil installations
despite the placement of rein-
forced security guards around
US Government buildings and US
business properties immediately
following the announcement of
the quarantine. Saboteurs
dynamited four US-operated oil
and gas pipelines in Puerto La
Cruz on 2 November. On 28
October terrorists sabotaged
power stations in the Lake
Maracaibo oil fields of the
Creole Petroleum Corporation,
the largest oil company in Ven-
ezuela. Approximately one sixth
of the country's oil production
was temporarily halted. Sporadic
attacks against other US business
interests have occurred.
courts were given jurisdiction
over most crimes committed in
the Caracas area. Although
maximum security measures con-
tinue in effect, the government
is hampered by an inadequate
police force. Security forces
also lack sufficient riot
control and transportation
equipment and effective com-
mun:Lcations systems.
Security forces continue
to arrest numerous Communists?
including oil union labor leaders--
and other persons implicated
in the terrorist activity. How-
ever, the government is unable
to arrest PCV and MIR congress-
men known to be the behind-the-
scenes instigators of the ter-
rorism, because the opposition-
controlled Chamber of Deputies
refuses to remove the immunity
of any of its member--.
The Supreme Court s decision on
the government's request to out-
law the PCV and MIR.is not ex-
pected before the end of No-
vember.
Several persons involved
in the sabotage of the oil
installations were identified
as members of the Communist
Party (PCV) and the pro-Castro
Movement of the Revolutionary
Left (MIR). Government of-
ficials stated that the sabotage
was initiated on instructions
reportedly transmitted by radio
from Cuba on 27 October urging
Venezuelans to protest with
violence the Cuban blockade and
Betancourt's support of the US.
The Havana press and radio gave
credit for the sabotage to
"guerrilla forces of the Nation-
al Liberation Army" and ridi-
culed the allegation of Cuban
involvement.
The government has placed
all oil fields under mil:_tary
control, and 5,000 reservists
have been called up to strength-
en the armed forces. Military
The US Embassy reports that
there is a widespread conviction
in Venezuela that Communist
terrorism and subversion will
increase unless Castro is elimi-
nated soon. Most military lead-
ers strongly urge that steps
must be taken to "annihilate"
Castro to prevent further
violence in Venezuela and
elsewhere in Latin America.
Foreign Minister Falcon an-
nounced that he would present
evidence to the OAS this week
of Cuban involvement in subver-
sion in Venezuela.
While Communist attempts
to organize protest demonstra-
tions-have failed,
sporadic
acts of
violence in
support
of Cuba
are likely
to continue.
Further
substantial
sabotage
to the
oil industry
could
produce
serious effects on
Venezuela's economy. Ninety
percent of the country's
foreign exchange is derived
from :petroleum exports.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
The outlook in the Domin-
ican Republic for orderly tran-
sitionto a freely elected gov-
ernment probably has not been
enhanced by the recent agree-
ment between the interim gov-
ernment and the armed forces
to appoint Antonio Imbert and
Luis Amiama brigadier generals
and "supervisors" of the armed
forces. Sole surviving partici-
pants in the Trujillo assas-
sination plot and afraid of
revenge, both men have had an
unsettling effect on the polit-
ical scene for several months
while trying to gain strong
positions in the next govern-
ment. The ruling sevenman
Council of State, of which they
are members, turns over its
power to an elected government
on 27 February 1963.
Although the leaders of
the armed forces appear to re-
gard the affair as settled, the
US ambassador cautioned on 5
November that the appointments
may in fact have further strength-
ened the hands of Imbert and
Amiama in the Council of State
and made it more difficult for
the next govornment to break
their inf luent?_al relationship
with the police and the prose-
cut-ion branch of the ju-
diciary. The ambassador be-
lieves that it, may be diffi-
cult to prevent Imbert and
Aiaiama from gaining control
cf the armed forces, and thvst
"so much poser invites abuse."
As yet they are no indi-
cations that they plan to in-
terfere with the holding of
free presidential and congres-
sional elections--now scheduled
for 20 December. However, they
distrust both democratic pro-
cedures and the presidential
nominees of the two major con-
tending parties. Over the
past several months, Imbert
has tended to regard himself
as the only person who can
govern the country.
The 30-year Trujillo dic-
tatorship left the country with-
out political leaders tested
in democratic rule. The two
major presidential candidates
have serious political short-
comings. The 67-year-old
Viriato Fiallo, a respected
physician, nominated by the
National Civic Union, on oc-
casions has displayed a lack
of political acumen. Juan
Bosch, a temperamental and op-
portunistic writer who became
a professional revolutionary
exile after opposing Trujillo
in the early 1930s, is the
nominee of the Dominican Rev-
olutionary Party, which rep-
resents the moderate left.
Numerous small parties, intent
on. testing their strength, are
running candidates who may draw
enough votes away from the two
principal candidates to prevent
either from winning a majority.
Ex-president Joaquin Balaguer
--who continued as president after
Trujillo's assassination until the
present regime gained control and
now is living in the US--has been
nominated by a small party. This,
as well as provocations that prob-
ably will be attempted by the small
extreme leftist parties, could of-25X1
ford Imbert and Amiama pretexts
for interfering with the elections.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
LEFTIST GAINS IN GUATEMALAN MUNICIPAL ELECTION
Results of the 4 November was considered the probable
mayoralty election in Guatemala winner, he ran a poor third.
City indicate growing strength The fourth-runner, with Commu-
of the extreme left, and will nist support, received almost
give impetus to anti-US ex-pres- twice as many votes as the mod-
ident Arevalo's campaign for erate leftist Revolutionary
re-election in December 1963. Party's candidate--which was a
Extreme leftist Francisco severe blow to that party's
Villagran, supported by Arevalo's future.
followers but not openly by
Arevalo himself, lost by only The controversial Arevalo
1,000 votes to Francisco Monte- has been in exilein Venezuela
negro, an independent without and Mexico for several years,
political affiliation who ap- and the extent of his evidently
parently received behind-the- substantial personal popularity
scenes support from President will, be hard to judge until he
Ydigoras. Montenegro is a radio- returns to Guatemala to campaign.
television newsman who served His recent criticism of Commu-
as director of tourism and head nism and Castro, combined with
of the consular section of the his antipathy toward the US,
Foreign Ministry under President may strengthen his image as a
Castillo Armas after the ouster strong Guatemalan nationalist 25X1
of the Communist-dominated Ar- well known in Latin America.
benz regime.
The strength of Villagran's
showing surprised and disturbed
Guatemalan observers, since he
is considered an opportunist
who follows the Castro-Communist
line
although he
ublicl
,
p
y
claimed he did not want Commu-
nist support in the election.
The pattern of voting among the
eight candidates indicates pub-
lic rejection of the existing
political parties and a strong
desire for something new. Al-
though the candidate jointly
supported by conservative groups
had the most financial backing ands
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
SPECIAL ARTICLE
NE WIN'S REVOLUTIONAaY BURMA
General No Win's military
regime in Burma--the "Revolu-
tionary Government"--has made
almost no progress toward its
avowed goal of a unified so-
cialist state. In the eight
months since he seized power
from U Nu and the civilian
politicians, Ne Win has failed
to develop a program of action.
If anything, his goal has be-
come more distant and less
clearly defined. Ethnic in-
s-urgent forces have continued
their civil war and have
strengthened their popular
support.
encouraged them to continue
their functions so long as they
did not oppose the revolution,
hoping they would eventually
rally to his leadership.
Support for the govern-
ment's socialist goals was
easily obtained from the
parties. Despite Ne Win's
addition of Marxist slogans
and his proposal for extensive
nationalization of the economy,
the revolutionary government's
objectives are hardly different
from those of all political
leaders since independence.
Political Activity
Although uncertainty and
fear of the overriding power
of the army have stifled public
criticism, Burma's various
political parties continue to
function. Ne Win, with solid
backing from his army which
made civilian opposition to
his regime clearly fruitless,
expected all Burmese patriots
to rally unquestioningly to
his revolutionary banner. How-
ever, there has been little
evidence of popular support
for the national military hero
in his political role.
Ne Win aspired to create
a single national party on the
lines of the pre-independence
nationalist movement. He ar-
rested his only rival for na-
tional popularity, U Nu. In
order to take the drive out of
the incipient ethnic minority
separatist movement, he de-
tained Shan leaders who wanted
autonomy within a federal struc-
ture.
Politicians, whom he
despises, should have had no
place else to turn--particularly
since by abolishing the parlia-
ment he had destroyed their
sources of public influence.
With a naive magnanimity, he
Only the leftist National
United Front, however, rushed
to announce its wholehearted
support for the new regime. The
Front hoped to gain the confi-
dence of the army leadership
and then to direct the policies
of the government.
The undetained leaders of
U Nu's Union Party stalled on
support, arguing they could not
act until they knew the views
and condition of the arrested
prime minister. The Anti-
Fascist People's Freedom League--
the country's best organized
political party, with branches
in all electoral districts--
also withheld its support, in-
sisting upon an ultimate re-
turn to an elected government.
Ne Win's failure to take
immediate action against the
parties has given them an
opportunity to regroup. They
have found supporters among
those repelled by the regime's
harsh actions--especially the
ruthless suppression of student
demonstrators at Rangoon Uni-
versity on 7 July. Despite
several well-publicized de-
fections and resignations, the
various party organizations re-
main a potential force for the
government to contend with.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
In July the government
tried again to attract support
by formally establishing its
political party--the Burmese
Socialism Program Party. How-
ever, the handful of army of-
ficers appointed to lead this
organization has thus far failed
to develop any mass following.
Insurgency Undiminished
Ne Win appears to have
intensified the chronic prob-
lem of insurgency and made
a solution more difficult. Just
before the coup, U Nu appeared
on the verge of a political
settlement with the ethnic
minorities, but Ne Win's in-
sistence on centralized control
in Rangoon and his use of mili-
tary force has further alienated
them.
Loosely linked through
a Nationalities Liberation Al-
liance, they have some 10,000
men under arms. Karens, with
6,000, are the most powerful;
Sharks, Kachins, and lesser
groups make up the balance.
Although the insurgents do not
threaten the Rangoon government,
they are a costly nuisance and
could become a menace in the
future.
The government has made
no major military efforts against
the insurgents but has sought
to convey an impression of great
success in extensive operations.
It recently announced the success-
ful conclusion of "Operation
Monsoon" against the Shan in-
surgents and in a public ceremony
accepted the surrender of 150
rebels.
The situation in the Kachin 25X1
state is similar. Travel on
roads outside Bhamo and Myitkyina
is hazardous.
In dealing with the lesser
problem of Communist insurgents,
the government has similarly
claimed great success. It re-
cently announced that the army
had smashed the headquarters
of Thakin Soe's extremist
Red Flag Communists and forced
them to join with Thakin Than
Tun's moderate White Flag
Communist insurgents. If true,
this would be only a minor
accomplishment, for Thakin Soe's
forces had already been reduced
to scattered bands estimated to
total only about 500 men.
Foreign Policy
Ne Win had made no formal
change in U Nu's policy of
neutrality and nonalignment
and has been careful to main-
tain good relations with Com-
munist China. He has drawn
on the $84 million credit
extended by Peiping and at
the same time has continued
the US Military Equipment
Purchase Agreement and sought
US agreement to construct
the long-delayed Rangoon-
Mandalay highway project. After
canceling development programs
already planned by the USSR,
he has opened negotiations
for Soviet-sponsored projects
of his own choosing.
Ne Win's suspicious nature
and parochial outlook have
nevertheless caused Burma's
withdrawal from foreign con-
tracts not on an intergovern-
mental basis. Private founda-
tions have been required to
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEIKLY SUMMARY
'terminate their operation in
Burma, foreign investors have
been discouraged from entering
the Burmese market, and the
travel of Burmese abroad has
been sharply limited.
In all areas of govern-
mental activity, the greatest
obstacle to energetic action
is Ne Win's insistence on per-
sonally approving all decisions
of the slightest import. He
distrusts civil servants, and
has not accepted civilian
politicians to fill administra-
tive gaps.
The military leaders sur-
rounding him in the ruling
Union Revolutionary Council
find themselves overtaxed
with administrative problems.
Ne Win's three-month absence
in Europe last summer brought
a hiatus in policy development,
for decisions could not be made
witho t hi
u m.
and when he led the government
during Ne Win's absence there
!was a relaxation in tension
in Rangoon. There are rumors
that in order to strengthen
the administration, the gov-
Eernment will recall the vigorous
l officers, such as Brigadiers
Maung Maung and Aung Shwe, who
were ousted in an army shake-
j up :Last year.
Outlook
Prospects are dim that
the situation in Burma will
!soon change. Ne Win gives
!no, indication of preparing to
!return the country to civilian
!rule, and the political parties
I lack the power base necessary
to upset his authoritarian
regime. It appears probable
that Burma will mark time
Ion major economic and social
programs, and discontent may
cause insurgency and banditry
to increase throw hout the
!country.
Ne Win's deputy, Brigadier
Aung Gyi, is moderate and tactful,!
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