CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A003800040001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 40
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 25, 2008
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 12, 1962
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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coPY N~o. ~
Oc ~ N O. 0438/62
12 October 1962
(CURRENT
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY
SUMMARY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
III OFFICE OF CURRENT INTEIUGENCE
State Dept. review completed
GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification
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SECRET'
CUR~{ENT INTELL3GENCE pIEEKLY SUMMARY
12 October 1962
THE WEEK IlV' BR I EF
(Information as of 1;':00 EDT 11 Oct)
SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY DEVELOPMENTS Page 1
Communist pronouncements last weE~k provided further
evidence that Moscow plans no further major moves on
Berlin or a peace treaty prior to ano~~her round of
negotiations with the US. Soviet and East German leaders
again made it clear that they would rE~sort to unilateral
action only if it proved impossible to reach agreement
with the West. This relatively restrained approach prob-
ably is intended to pave the way for ~:hrushchev to attend 25X1
the UN General Assembly and talk with president Kennedy.
SINO-SOVIET-RELATIONS CONTINUE TO DET~~.RIORATE .
The USSR, in a "new document" pux?porting to be a
recently discovered draft of an artic]~_e by Lenin, has
renewed its attack on the Chinese Communist leadership.
Concerned about the appeal of Moscow'~~ arguments to
susceptible elements in China, Peiping; has warned of the
.vulnerability of such elements to purge. Peiping's
anxiety about Soviet capkbilities for subversive activity
is also reflected in the closing of Soviet consulates in
China and in measures to expedite the emigration of White
Russians from border areas.
Page 3
TIGHTER FOOD SUPPLY IN EUROPEAN SATELLITES INDICATED Page 5
This winter's food supply in Eastern Europe is ex-
pected to be even worse that last year's The grain
harvest just completed, the smallest in five years, is
estimated at 7 percent below the average of 1956-60.
Unsatisfactory grain harvests in the rest of the bloc and
inadequate satellite holdings of foreign exchange will
make it difficu#t to fulfill grain requirements through
imports.
THE YUGOSLAV-SOVIET RAPPROCHEMENT page ?
Soviet president Brezhnev's visit to Yugoslavia
completed the normalization of state relations between
Belgrade and Moscow and laid the foundation f'or efforts
to restore party ties. Moscow expects the European
satellites to follow suit, even though this will pose
problems for the more conservative regimes and tend to
sharpen existing differences among the satellites.
Yugoslavia has apparently been given a free hand for
subverting the Hoxha regime in Albania, but has avoided
committing itself on a number of issuers of importance
to Moscow and seems determined to maintain its independent
position.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
EUROPEAN INTEGRATION DEVELOPMENTS . . Page
As the UK-EEC talks resume in Brussels, most of the
Six are sympathetic to Macmillan's domestic political need
to wind up the talks quickly. Hard bargaining is likely
nonetheless over the key problems posed by Britain's
efforts to ease Commonwealth pressureva, by its commitments
to its EFTA (Outer Seven) partners, and by its reservations
concerning certain aspects of the EEC's farm policy. While
French proposals far closer Bonn-Paris ties have strengthened
the determination of the smaller EEC ~~ountries to obtain
Britain's membership, none of them seems willing to make 25X1
major concessions to Britain. There :is growing concern in
the EEC lest the economic and politic~~l
so large as to be unworkable.
community become
THE MRBM ISSUE IN NATO Page 11
The NATO countries remain divided in their approach
to the question of creating a multilateral medium-range
ballistic missile (MRBM) force. Some members favor such
a farce as the most feasible way to g:Lve the Europeans a
greater share in the nuclear defense of NATO, while dis-
couraging the proliferation of independent nuclear capa-
bilities, especially in the case of GE~rmany. Others
object to the idea on both military aid political grounds.
FRENCH POLITICAL SCENE . Page 12
Leaders of the political parties which toppled the
Pompidou government on 5 October admit; they have little
chance of defeating De Gazelle's propo:ced constitutional
amendment in the referendum
on
28
October.
They believe,
however, that they will be
able
to
cut; the
representation
of the Gaullist Union for the New Republic (UNR) in the
National Assembly election to be held on 18 and 25 November.
The outcome of both votes will depend on the degree to which
De Gaulle participates in the campaigning. In the past he 25X1
has made strong appeals for support in, referendums but has
been unwilling to identify himself with a single political
faction.
DEVELOPMENTS IN YEMEN EMBROIL NEAR EA~~T. . Page 13
The battle for Yemen has become a key phase of the larger
contest in the Arab world between Nasir's radical, Arab
nationalist doctrine and the conservatism of other govern-
ments--especially the Saudi and Jordanian monarchies. Far
Nasir, whose prestige has been at a Iow ebb, the Yemeni
revolution represents a major victory. He/appears deter-
mined to provide as much direct militar su ort as ma be 25X1
required to preserve it.
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CURRENT INTELLIGEN'C~ WE)aKLY SUMMARY
12 October 19112
INDIAN-NEPALI RELATIONS WORSEN . Page 16
Relations between India and Nepal have taken a new
turn for the worse, following the failure of King Mahendra's
"last effort" to get New Delhi to takf~ measures against
the India-based Nepali exile movement? India's reaction
to Mahendra's adoption of a harder line has been restrained.
Its patience is apt to wear thin, however, if the King's
policies result in a significant expaYiison of Chinese
influence in Nepal . 25X1
DEVELOPMENTS IN LAOS . ,~ Page 1?
Substantial numbers of North Viei;namese troops remain
in Laos in support of the Pathet Lao following the 7
October withdrawal deadline, SOUVannz~ has called for the
withdrawal "as soon as possible" of rf~maining foreign
troops. The National Assembly on 8 October granted full
powers to the coalition government for' the period of one
year;the Pathet Lao, which denies the legitimacy of
the assembly, has strongly criticized this action. 25X1
SITUATION IN THE CONGO . . Page 17
Tshomb~ now says he will take several specific steps
to implement parts of the UN reconcili.atian plan without
prior agreement on a constitution. ;fie also indicated,
however, that he will continue to insist on a loose
federal constitution and will resist a~, 50-50 split of
Katanga's .revenues and foreign exchange. Adoula remains
extremely skeptical that Tshomb~ will in fact comply,
and is again threatening to act independently outside 25X1
the UN framework. The newly arrived Soviet ambassador
has renewed previous offers to Leopoldville of Soviet
economic assistance
CUBAN DEVELOPMENTS . Page 19
The identification of five more SA-2 surface-to-air
missile (SAM)E sites under construction in Cuba raises the
total of such sites to twenty. This almost completes the
air defense coverage of the island. Construction has begun
at Banes in Driente Province on what may become an imnortant
new Cuban naval facility.
VENEZUELAN GOVERNMENT MOVES TO QUELL COMMUNIST VIOLENCE. Page 21
The Venezuelan Government has followed up suspension
of constitutional guarantees on 7 October with further
strong action to curtail the current upsurge of Communist
violence. The terrorism. is apparently part of a campaign
to embarrass the administration, weaken public confidence,
and possibly provoke a military coup. President Betanourt
remains under heavy pressure from the military to arrest
Communist national deputies implicated in the antigovern-
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEI~KLY SUMMARY
CHILEAN CURRENCY DEVALUATION IMMINENT.. ,. Page 22
Devaluation of the escudo probabAy will be announced
on or soon after 15 October. The move was recommended by
the International Monetary Fund last .Tanuary, but President
Alessandri has delayed action because adverse political
repercussions might destroy the administration's shaky
congressional majority.
INSURGENCY IN LATIN AMERICA Page Z
Insurgency is increasing in several Latin American
countries. Communist or pro-Communist; groups in Colombia,
Paraguay, and Venezuela are actively engaged in campaigns
to undermine the governments and eventually to bring about
Castro-type revolutions. Ultranationailist organizations--
some with Communist support--are tryir,~g to merge extremist
elements in Guatemala and Nicaragua into unified movements
capable of prolonged antigovernment oX~erations. Extremist
groups in other countries are seeking to capitalize on
unstable political conditions to initiate insurgency
movements. While insurgency does not Bose an immediate
threat t~ any Latin American government, sabotage, terrorism,
and arms procurement raids will probat~ly increase as the
Communists and other subversive graups~ step up preparations
for guerrilla operations. 25X1
FRANCE'S OVERSEAS DEPARTMENTS Page 8
Popular expectation of early autonomy is mounting in
the most important of France's remaining overseas holdings--
the Caribbean island departments of Guadeloupe and Martinique.
The economic dependence on France of these territories and
of the other two overseas departments--Guiana and Reunion--
has forestalled demands for complete independence. However,
local leaders criticize Paris' failure to solve their economic
problems and complain about its tight control over French
Government assistance funds and local taxes. 25X1
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE YPEEKLY SUMMARY
WEEKLY REVIEW
Communist pronouncements
last week provided further evi-
dence that Moscow plans no
further major moves on Berlin
or a peace treaty prior to an-
other round of negotiations
with the US. Soviet and East
German leaders again made it
clear that they would resort
to unilateral action only if
it proved impossible to reach
agreement with the West. This
relatively restrained ap-
proach and Gromyko's cautious
line in his talks with Lord
Home and Secretary Rusk also
suggest that any new Soviet
proposals on Berlin and Germany
will be withheld until Khru-
shchev can put them forward
personally at the UN or in
talks with President Kennedy.
Greetings from Khrushchev
and Brezhnev to the East German
leaders on the occasion of the
17th-anniversary of the East
German regime reiterated the
standard formula that "threats
of the imperialists" will not
prevent the signing of a German
peace treaty and "normalization"
of the Berlin situation. In
a speech at a GDR Embassy re-
ception in Moscow, however,
Kozlov emphasized the USSR's
desire for an "agreed solution"
which would not harm "anybody's
interests or claims." He as-
serted that if the West does
not show a "realistic approach"
and continues to reject a
settlement, the USSR and other
states will sign a separate
treaty with the GDR.
A 7 October Pravda editorial
on the GDR anniversary pointed
out that the USSR is displaying
great patience in its efforts
to persuade the West to sign
a treaty with both German states,
but. warned that "patience has
its limits" and repeated the
standard separate treaty threat.
The most striking evidence
of Moscow's intention to main-
tain a low-risk policy on Ber-
lin while pursuing further nego-
tiations was the line Ulbricht
took in his report to the East
German party central committee,
which met from 3 to 5 October.
U1b~richt appeared to be con-
ditioning party and public
opinion to the idea that further
East-West negotiations may be
protracted and that no early
signature of a separate peace
treaty should be expected.
Although Ulbricht repeated
the formula that the treaty would
be signed if the West is unwill-
ing to agree to a German settle-
ment, he avoided any sense of
imminent crisis and placed the
whole question in the context
of the growing superiority of
the Communist camp and increas-
ing support in the West for
Soviet and GDR proposals. Ul-
bricht stated flatly that "ne-
gotiations between the Soviet
Union and the US will be con-
tinued after the US elections"
and professed to see a hopeful:
sign in "new ideas" and '"tenden-
cies for a change in tactics"
emerging in West Germany.
While the bloc leaders
apparently intend to pursue a
cautious course of action on
Berlin, they may still hope to
register additional gains under-
lining GDR "sovereignty" by
the time the long-overdue East
German party congress meets from
15 to 19 January 1963.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE YVE]:KLY SUMMARY
Local Berlin Developments
The East German refusal
to permit a British military
ambulance to enter East Berlin
on 6 October to assist a West
Berliner wounded by GDR police
at the opening of an escape
tunnel appears to have been
dictated primarily by prestige
.considerations. It probably
was not intended as a challenge
to Allied access rights, although
the episode could provide the
East Germans with a useful prec-
edent far future attempts to
curtail or prohibit Allied
military entry into East Berlin.
East German preoccupation
with the prestige aspect of the
incident was reflected in the
remark of a GDR officer to
British authorities that the
East Germans hold themselves
responsible for rendering med-
ical aid in such circumstances.
Although the East Germans later
permitted the British provost
marshal to enter East Berlin,
they
kept
him
100
yards away
from
the
scene
of
the shooting.
British military police and US
patrols also entered East Berlin
but were barred from the area
by restriction signs and police
blocks.
The tunnel, through which
some 40 East Berliners had
hoped to escape, was later
cemented shut by East German
police.
UN - Nuclear Testing
The USSR last week with-
drew the demand that its item
on preventive war propaganda
be taken up as the first item
on the UN political committee's
agenda and agreed that the test
ban item should be given prior-
ity. A member of the Soviet
UN delegation told a US official
on 4 October-that the Soviets.
would "fight" for discussion
of agenda items in this order:
(1:) nuclear testing; (2) dis-
armament; (3) war propaganda;
(4') ban-the-bomb replies; (5)
Korea; (6) outer space.
He emphasized that the
Soviets attach great importance
to the war propaganda. item and
will insist that it be discussed
se~oarately rather than in con-
ju~7ction with disarmament. He
in~~icated that the Soviets
intend to return to the Geneva
disarmament conference at the
co~{lclusion of the current re-
ce:as .
He hedged when asked
whether the Soviet delegation
would return to Geneva if the
wa~~^ propaganda- debate is
not concluded by 12 November,
thE~ date the conference is
scheduled to reconvene. He
diarmament items so that the
reivurn to Geneva would not be
delayed .
In Geneva, the Soviet
de]Legate to the Big Three test
bazi subcommittee has held fast
to his intransigent position.
He told the US and British
de]Legates "not to expect an -
thitng new from us."
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
The closing of the last
two Soviet consulates in China
is the latest illustration of
the steady deterioration in
governmental relations result-
ing from the Sino-Soviet contro-
versy over party doctrine.
'the consulates were closed at
Peiping's request. The Soviet
Embassy in Ivioscow has tried to
put a better face on the matter
by depicting the closing as an
economy measure. It is pos-
sible that the Chinese, taking
a leaf from their treatment of
US consuls in China during 1949
and 1950, conducted such a
campaign of harassment that the
USSR decided it had no recourse
but to shut down the consulates.
version that could not be ig-
nored. in the context of the
growing estrangement between
the two countries, xn this
connection, the Chinese could
have recalled. the subversive
activity fostered. by Soviet con-
sulates in Sinkiang during the
1940s .
In its anxiety to diminish
the Russian presence in China,
Peiping appears to be expedit-
ing the emigration of White
Russians, whom the Chinese re-
gard as a suspect segment of
the population. Well over 400
White Russians arrived in Hong
Kong in September. This total
compared with figures of about
170 in August and of only 50 ~r
so per month earlier in the year.
Peiping's concerns about
security have apparently led to
increases in the contingent of
border guards along the Soviet
frontier at least near Man-
chouli.
25X1
These measures to tighten
state security have been accom-
panied by allusions in recent
Chinese propaganda to "revision-
The Chinese pressures ~ of the Chinese Communist Party.
against the consulates may have I A sign that these efforts may
reflected Peiping's view that , be continuing was provided by
they provided bases for sub- j the publication in Pravda on
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUbIMARY
28 September of a "new docu-
ment'" purporting to be a deciph-
erment of a hitherto missing
Lenin draft. The Soviets claim
that the document is an earlier
version of certain chapters of
Lenin's report on "The Immedi-
ate Tasks of Soviet Rule,'"
which he had presented at the
April 1918 session of the high-
est governmental body in Rus-
sia at that time.
The "new document" was of-
fered by Pravda as a rebuttal
to Chinese-,7e s at Soviet "econ-
amism"--i.e., an excessive con-
cern for economic development,
with a consequent refusal to
wage the struggle against the
West with sufficient militancy.
Lenin was represented as affirm-
ing that political tasks are
subordinate to economic tasks
after a Communist party has
come to power. "Agitators,"
according to Lenin's newly
discovered. precepts, were use-
ful mainly for the tasks of
seizing power; later and more
complex economic tasks were
said to require "practical
leaders and organizers." The
implication that Communist China
should borrow from the exper-
ence of the USSR was contained
in Lenin's alleged observation
about learning from the "neigh-
~ boning and. very much more de-
veloped countries."
The "new document" thus
invokes Lenin in support of
Khrushchev's long-standing
condemnation of the extremist
economic programs promoted by
Mao and his associates against
the objections of mare realistic
sections of the party. The
Chinese leaders are obviously
sensitive about such appeals
by 14loscow to susceptible ele-
ments in .China. Recent Chi-
nes~s statements ominously sug-
gest the vulnerability of such
elements in any new party purge.
For those who might have
qup;;tions about the presence
of 'these unreliables in the
armed forces, Communist China's
chief of staff included some
pointed remarks in a speech on
6 October. He "expressed. the
hopE~," according to the Chinese
Communist news agency, that the
arm3r would be the agent of fur-
ther victories "in the defense
of i;he party central committee
and Chairman Mao.':' He exhorted
the armed forces to heightened 25X1
vigilance against the country's
enemies "no matter wha they
are . "'
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE VPEEKLY SUMMARY
TIGHTER FOOD SUPPLY IN EUROPEAN SATELLITES INDICATED
This winter's food supply
in Eastern Europe is expected to
be even worse than last year's.
The grain harvest just completed,
the smallest in five years, is
estimated at 7 percent below the
average of 1956-60. Unsatisfac-
tory grain harvests in the rest
of the bloc and inadequate sat-
ellite holdings of foreign ex-
change will make it difficult to
fulfill grain requirements
through imports.
Throughout the 1962 crop
season Eastern Europe was
plagued with unfavorable weather.
A late, cold spring throughout
the area was followed by a sum-
mer drought in the southern sat-
ellites and by excessive rain
and cool weather in the north.
Yields per acre dropped, and the
area of grain harvested was
smaller than in 1961.
In East Germany, Czechoslo-
vakia, and Hungary, the decline
in grain acreage resulted from
problems created by collectivi-
zation. Inefficient management
of large state and collective
farms accentuated the effects of
a farm labor shortage at peak
farm operations. A slight de-
cline (2 percent) in grain
acreage in Poland resulted from
a government price policy that
favored industrial crops.
It is estimated that, of
the northern satellites, only
East Germany increased grain
production aver 1961--a below-
average year. Even so, produc-
tion in East Germany remained
below the 1956-60 average for the
second successive year, and the
quality was poorer because of
too much rain and too few harvest
hands.
Polish production dropped by
nearly 10 percent from 1961 to
approximately the 1956-60 average
levell; Czechoslovakia registered
a delcline of about 5 percent.
In t)oth countries, however,-the
quality of the grain for milling
is Metter than in 1961.
The southern satellites ex-
perienced a larger drop in grain
production than the northern
satelllites. Small grain produc-
tior.~( declined from 1961, but the
decrease was less than for corn.
Corn production in 1962 is
GrRA1N PRODUCTION IN EUROPEAN
SATELLITES
(ESTIMATES IN MILLION METRIC TONS)
TOTAL PRODUCTION
WHEAT, RYE, BARLEY, OATS, AND CORN
1956-60 1961 1962* 1956-60 1961 1962'
AVERAGE AVERAGE
ALBANIA HUNGARY
-, ,,,, 9.26
3.63 3.50 2,91
11? ~
BULGARIA
5.60
5.34 4.80 5.20
EAST GERMANY
TOTAL 42.24 43.87 39 d9
CORN PRODUCTION
1'756 - 60 1961 1962 * 1956 - 60 1961 1962 "
AVERAGE AVERAGE
.48 ,g .5
RUMANIA
13.30 14.30 13.00
~ ? ~
TOTAL 8.52 8.8 6.7
esioov 'PRELIMINARY ESTIMATE
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE ~G'EEKLY SUMA~dARY
estimated to be nearly 30 per-
cent below the 1956-60 average
and was the smallest crop har-
vested in the Balkans since
1956. Limited information in-
dicates that Albania had an
average grain harvest.
The European satellite
area will remain a large im-
porter of grain in 1962-63.
Imports from all sources, how-
ever, are unlikely to be Buf-
f icient to satisfy demands for
both food and livestock feed
in most satellites. The many
demands on limited holdings of
foreign exchange probably will
restrict purchases of grain
from the West.. As a result
government efforts will be
aimed at procuring maximum
amounts of grain from the coun-
tryside to guarantee the urban
bread supply. This effort, if
successful, will intensify
shortages of feed grain and in
some o.f the southern satellites
wi]!.1 create shortages of grain
for food in rural areas.
Far the second successive
yea+r, no basic improvement is
estimated in the per capita
availability of food. Shortages
of meat and dairy products are
expected to become more wide-
spread by spring. Even Poland,
one of the best-fed countries
in the bloc last year, may not
be exempt if Polish exports of
livestock products continue at
the high level of the past year.
Rationing of certain foods
by price, consumer lists, and/
or coupons was introduced during
the first half of 1962 in East
Germany, Rumania, and Bulgaria.
Other satellites may find it
necessary to introduce similar
measures before the next harvest 25X1
in an effort to distribute food
supplies more equitably.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
THE YUGOSLAV-SOVIET R.~IPPROCHEMENT
Soviet president Brezhnev's
visit to Yugoslavia from 24
September to 4 October completed
the normalization of state rela-
tions between Belgrade and Mos-
cow and laid the foundation for
further explorations to find an
acceptable formula for party
ties.
The USSR appears ready
again to restore Yugoslavia to
a favored position in the Com-
munist world. This was made
evident by specific reference
in the 3 Qctober communique
to the Tito--Khrushchev declara-
tion of June 1955. This dec-
laration, signed after Khrushchev
apologized in Belgrade for
Stalin's past actions,.outlined
areas for future cooperation,
outlawed hostile actions, and
in effect recognized Yugoslavia
separate road to "socialism."
The Tito-Brezhnev com-
muniquE~'s emphasis on expanded
economic cooperation would seem
to foreshadow Soviet credits
and Yugoslav participation in
same committees of the bloc's
economic organization (CEMA).
Trade is scheduled to
increase substantially. Bel-
grade has charged in the past
that Moscow refused to buy what
Yugoslavia wanted to sell or to
sell Yugoslavia the goods it
wanted. As a result trade de-
clined in 1961, and the agreed
levels of exchange were not
attained; this apparently will
be true again this year. The
1963 protocol signed on 4 Oc _
tober, however, sets trade at
more than double that estimated
fox? this year.
During the Brezhnev visit
agreement also seems to have
been reached on a program for
a broader exchange of infor-
mation between the countries.
This concession by the USSR will
meet a long-standing complaint
of Yugoslavia, which has wanted
to establish a reading room in
Moscow. On 6 October the direc-
tor of the official Yugoslav
news agency left for Moscow to
meet with his TASS counterpart
and on 10 October signed an
agreement extending cooperation
between the two news services.
Foreign Policies
On fgreign policy the com-
mun~~qu~, cited an "identity or
prorcimi.ty" of view and detailed
areas of agreement. It endorsed
Soviet stands on disarmament
and .nuclear testing and went on
to agree to the specific ways by
which Moscow advocates their
realization.
At the same time, it drew up
short of agreeing completely on
seve~cal issues of importance to
Mosc~~w. it stated in regard to
Germ~~ny, far example, only that
the i;wo states recognized the
need to sign a German treaty
taking into account the existence
of taro Germanys , In speeches
during his visit, Brezhnev had
implied that Yugoslavia favors
signing a separate peace treaty
with the East Germans if an all-
~Gcrman accord cannot be negotiated.
In regard to Yugoslavia's
close association with the non-
aligned states, the communique
endorsed the proposal for an
international trade conference
advanced by last July's Cairo
Economic Conference of Developing
State~~--a Yugoslav brain child.
By doing so Moscow tacitly rec-
ognizE~d Yugoslavia's leading
position among these states and
identified itself with their
aspirations.
Concern for the West
7~ndicative of Belgrade's
sensitivity to possible misun-
dersta~nding in the West, the
jYugoslav chief of protocol called
Ambas~~ador Kerman on 5 Qctober
to exg,ress regrets over Brezhnev 's
attacks on the US and NATO
. At
the Ur', a Yugoslav diplomat told
.US representatives that Yugoslavia
;had resisted strong pressure to
;sponsor with the Soviets a res-
olution advocating establishment
~of a world trade organization.
Yugoslavia and the Satellites
The Brezhnev communique'
~sugges~ted that Moscow expects the
satellites also to repair their
?political relations with Yugo-
~slavia, even though this will
pose problems far the more con-
~servat2ve regimes and tend to
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sharpen ,existing differences
among the satellites. In addi-
tion to citing the 1955 declara-
tion, the specific statement
was made that the USSR "supports
the policy of Yugoslavia...aimed
at strengthening peace in the
Balkans and promoting inter-
national cooperation."
There are indications that,
even prior to the Brezhnev visit,
Moscow had been urging the sat-
ellites to expand their eco=
nomic relations with Belgrade.
A Bulgarian trade delegation,
headed by a deputy premier,ar-
rived in Belgrade on 5 October
to negotiate a three-year trade
agreement similar to one signed
by the Yugoslavs and Soviets in
July. Initial trade negotia-
tions have begun with Czecho-
slovakia.
Poland, which some months
ago moved to improve trade
within the context of existing
agreements, opened ,talks with
Belgrade on a 1963 protocol on
8 October. Belgrade revealed
on 9 October that Warsaw earlier
this year granted Belgrade a
credit of several million dol-
lars, the first credit from
a bloc state since 1956.
Party Relations
With the restoration of
amicable state relations, the
stage appears set--as in the
months following the 1955 dec-
laration--to explore the
possibilities of re-establish-
ing party relations. Such
discussions were probably in-
itiated during the Brezhnev
visit; Yuri Andropov, the So -
viet party's expert on rela-
tions with ruling Communist
parties, was a member of the
delegation.
The communique made no
reference to party questions
or even to Yugoslavia's "so-
cialism." In Brezhnev's pres-
ence, Tito lauded Yugoslavia's
new constitution, which em-
bodies many ideological pre-
cepts considered heretical by
.Moscow. Tito also stated that
Yugoslavia will draw on its
own experience to overcome
domestic problems, thus reject-
ing Soviet doctrine as a guide.
The communiqu~'s citation
of the 1955 declaration, however,
implied that Moscow again recog-
nizes the legitimacy of Yugo-
slavia's "socialism." Moreover,
by calling for "cooperation be-
tween public and other organiza-
tions," the communique seemed to
hint that party matters will be
discussed.
Moscow. may have given some
of the more liberal Communist
parties the green light for talks
with the Yugoslavs in an effort
to promote discussions without
directly involving its own pres-
tige.
A Yugoslav
newsman has stated that Belgrade
has 'been invited to the Hungarian
congress next month. Yugoslav
politburo member Vladimir Bakaric
is currently in Poland, osten-
sibl;y as leader of a delegation
of t;he Tito regime's mass polit-
ical organization (SAWPY), and
talking with high Polish party
leaders .
Any significant developments
in p:~.rty relations will probably
wait until Tito visits the Soviet
Uniowz "privately" in December.
Tendr~red last summer, the invi-
tati~~n was accepted during--and
prob~ibly because of--Tito's talks
with Brezhnev.
One important outcome of
the Yugoslav-Soviet rapproche-
ment may be new Yugoslav efforts
to subvert the Albanian regime.
BrezYinev's endorsement of Yugo-
slavj.a's Balkan policy implied
that Belgrade has been given a
free hand.
While Brezhnev was in Yugo-
slavia, moreover, Dusan Mugosa,
Yugos.lavia's leading Albanian ex-
pert, gave a speech in which he
warnod that communism in Albania
was endangered by the Hoxha-Shehu
leadership. He also alleged that
these two Albanian leaders do not
enjoy the support of their own
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE YPE~.KLY SUMMARY
politburo. This speech was
published on the front page of
P~rba, authoritative Belgrade
awry, on the following day.
The subject could have been
discussed during Mugosa's
visit to Moscow last July.
Satellite Reaction
The European satellites
have all reported the Brezhnev
visit to Yugoslavia at some
length. Bulgaria and Czecho-
slovakia have been the only
countries to .comment editori-
ally, however; after maintain-
ing a hostile silence toward
.Yugoslavia for some months,
Prague now claims to be "close"
to the USSR and Yugoslavia.
Reactions within the
satellite parties to Yugoslav-
Soviet amity are probably
quite diverse. The more liberal
Polish and Hungarian regimes
probably believe it will in-
crease their flexibility when
dealing with domestic problems.
The conservative regimes of
Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia,
however, probably believe it
presages greater pressure to
move on with "de-Stalinization, "
a policy they fear will upset
their domestic stability.
Communist China's hostil-
ity to the Brezhnev visit,
mar.~ifested last month by an
up~~urge of polemics against
"Yugoslav revisionism," was
again indicated at the con-
clusion of the visit. People's
Daily on 8 October underscores:
'~~ similarity of Soviet and
Yu@;oslav views by extracts from
a TASS account of the Brezhnev
viecit . By a liberal use of
quotation marks, Moscow itself
was. given as authority far
statements that Soviet and Yugo-
slaw positions "coincide or are
close," that Brezhnev had ac-
ceX~ted "The Great Star of Yugo-
slavia" medal from Tito, and
that Brezhnev hailed the current
state of Soviet-Yugoslav rela-
tions and the prospects for
fuY~ther improvement. By this
inr.iuendo, the Chinese were
again indicating what the
Alk~anians have stated explicitly
--ghat Khrushchev himself ig
dangerously "revisionist . "
policies.
Peiping is still houeful
that its augmentation wall
rally an important segment of
they international Communist move-
merit against the Soviet leader.
To this end, the Chinese re-
printed a North Korean attack
against the "Tito group"" on
thE~ same page of People's Daily
which excerpted t e account
of Brezhnev's visit. Peiping's
implicit point was that the Chi-
ne~~e have already won important
su~iport and do not intend to moder-
atE~ their opposition to Khrushchev's
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
A sharp increase in the tries are another complex issue
tempo of European integration
developments is in prospect with
the resumption of negotiations
in Brussels on Britain's Common
Market entry. Most of the EEC
countries are sympathetic. to Mac-
millan's domestic political need
to wind up the accession talks
quickly, but hard bargaining and
intensive maneuvering are likely
over the key issues which remain.
The 8-9 October meeting of
UK and EEC ministers was largely
taken up--in addition to sched-
uling--with Britain's bid for a
better deal for the Commonwealth.
Although the British requests
were relatively modest, the Com-
mon Market reaction was generally
negative. Agreement may ulti-
mately be reached on somewhat
better terms for such underde-
veloped countries as India, Pak-
istan, and Ceylon, and a new
approach may be taken to the
:problems of the African Common-
wealth members rejecting formal
;association with the EEC. Of
the developed Commonwealth coun-
tries, however, only New Zealand
seems?likely to obtain conces-
sions other than easier access
to EEC or UK markets for exports
of certain industrial raw ma-
terials.
Among the other issues to
be considered in the resumed
accession talks, the dispute
over the EEC's common agricul-
tural policy--which occasioned
the ad3ournment of 5 August--
seems especially difficult.
The French contend that the Com-
mon.Market countries agreed last
January that all receipts from
the EEC's variable levies on im-
ports of farm products will
eventually accrue to the commu-
nity and that no further EEC
decision is required. Paris
has made it amply clear it will
insist on London's endorsement
of this interpretation, even
though this might mean that
Britain might contribute as much
as half of the community's total
financial resources.
London's obligations to the
other EFTA (Outer Seven) coun-
for which no solution is yet in
sight. Britain feels itself mor-
ally bound not to enter the EEC
unt~Ll satisfactory arrangements
havE~ been made to meet the "legit-
ima'te interests" of its EFTA
paritners. Of the EFTA countries,
howE:ver, only Denmark has so far
obt