(UNTITLED)
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP79-00927A003800030001-9
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
S
Document Page Count:
40
Document Creation Date:
December 21, 2016
Document Release Date:
July 28, 2008
Sequence Number:
1
Case Number:
Publication Date:
October 5, 1962
Content Type:
SUMMARY
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SECRET
(CURRENT
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY
SUMMARY
.CENTRAL iNTELLiGErJCE AGENCY
III OFFICE C1F CURRENT IhITELLIGENCE
COPY N0. i4~~~
OCI N0. o~~~~~~
SECRET
2~
State Dept. review completed
GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
_downgrading and ___
declassification
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'~`' SECRET'
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
5 October 1982
T H E W E E K I N B R I E F
(Information as of 12UU EDT 4 Oct)
SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY DEVELOPMENTS Page 1
Moscow continued its relatively moderate treatment
of the German problem during the past week. Authoritative
Communist bloc media asserted the USSR's desire to settle
the problem through negotiations with the Allied powers.
Soviet propaganda also reflected Mosc~aw's sensitivity to
possible West German acquisition of a nuclear weapons
capability. Un 1 October Khrushchev :reiterated the USSR's
willingness to accept the neutralist memorandum as the
basis for a solution of the nuclear test-ban issue.
DEVELOPMENTS IN THE CUBAN SITUATION Page 3
The number of identified Cuban surface-to-air and
coastal defense missile sites built b;y Soviet personnel is
increasing.
Soviet propaganda has centered
on a eged US efforts to "pressure" L~~.tin American states
into taking joint action against the Castro regime.
COMMUNIST CHINA CELEBRATES NATIONAL DAY Page 5
Peiping introduced a note of restrained optimism at
its 13th anniversary celebrations on :L October by implying
that the economic decline of the past three years had
reached bottom. The lack of supporting evidence in the
form of recent output figures or future targets, however,
suggests that the regime is still extremely cautious over
its economic prospects. Commentary surrounding National
Day ceremonies reflected continuing concern over problems
of party discipline and mass support. Peiping also used
the occasion to affirm its opposition to Soviet policies.
NATIONALISM IN THE MONGOLIAN PARTY Page ?
The recent purge of D. Tomor-Och~:r, top-level member
of the Mongolian Peoples Revolutionary Party, reflects the
regime's continuing efforts to suppre~~s Mongol nationalism.
Tomor-Ochir was charged with striving to revise party de-
cisions denouncing nationalism and with attempting to arouse
"national passions." Premier Tsedenbail's complete subser-
vience to the Soviet Union has long irritated many Mongolians
who want a more independent national identity within the
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Page 8
In contrast to the success of the Common Market, the
Coal-Steel Community (CSC)--the first of ttae three bodies
set up by the Common Market cou~atries in their move toward
ecorYOmic integration--has become increasingly ineffective.
The most recent symptom of the malaise affecting the CSC
was the resignation on 25 September of Dirk Spierenbur;;,
vice president and most energetic and capable member of
the CSC's nine-man executive, the High Authority. The High
Authority's difficulties derive-from the wavering support
of supranationalism by the member countries as well as the
uncertainty over the future of the Cam as a separate organ-
ization.
BONN'S ECONOMIC STABILIZATION PROGRAM Page 9
A special "stabilization program" to halt growing in-
flationary trends is to be presented to the Bundestag when
it reconvenes on 9 October. The prog?r~am, which is also
designed to strengthen Economics Minister Erhard's claim
to succeed Adenauer, has as its major feature an "absolute"
ceiling on the 19G3 budget. The new budget calls for a re-
duction in some fields such as housing and indicates a slow-
down in the defense buildup. Pressures to exceed the limi-
tations in some categories may prove too strong and force
the government to make cuts in foreign aid.
FRANCE'S RELATIONS WITH THE UN . Page 11
The 1962 French UN delegation can be expected to dis -
play greater tactical -flexiba.lity than its recent pred-
ecessors, but it will still be circumscribed by De Gaulle 's
basic view that the United Nations should be no more than
an international debating society. France probably will
not comply with the advisory opinion o:f the International
Court of Justice regarding extraordinary UN expenses, nor
will Paris press its influence with th~~ French-speaking
African countries on issues where French interests are not
clearly at stake.
THE REVOLT IN YEMEN Page 12
Major hostilities between the revolutionary regime's
forces and tribal elements loyal to thy: monarchy are in-
creasingly likely. The regime is encountering resistance
in the northern province and in the area of the Aden border.
The claimant to the Imamate, Prince Ha:san, now is on the
Saudi-Yemeni border attempting to rally his Yemeni tribal
supporters for a counterrevolt. He ha;~ the backing of Saudi
Arabia and Jordan. The regime's leaders, many of whom have
long been associated with the Egyptian--backed Free Yemeni
Movement, are looking to Gairo for support and guidance
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THE SITUATION IN LAOS Page 15
there are continuing indiicatians that the North
Vietnamese intend to leave at least some elements in Laos
to bolster the Pathet Lao forces after the ? October dead-
line f or withdrawal. The Pathet Lao, in an effort to farce
the disbandment of Meo guerrilla forces in northern and cen-
tral Laos, are pressing for the cessation of US-chartered
air resupply flights. Souvanna has persuaded North Vietnam
briefly to delay sending its ambassador to Vientiane. Mean-
while Laos apparently is preparing tc> exchange representa-
tives with East Germany. 25X1
THE SITUATION IN THE CONGO Page 16
Virtually no progress has been made on implementation
of the UN reconciliation plan. The joint commission dis-
cussions in Elisabethville have succeeded only in pointing
up wide divergencies between the two sides, and Adoula has
categorically rejected Tshomb~'s request to discuss the con-
stitution UN experts have drafted. Meanwhile, Adoula ap-
pears to have successfully carried off his moves to reassert
Leopoldville's control over South Kasai and secessionist
leader Albert Kalonji. 25X1
NE~V ALGERIAN GOVERNMENT Page 17
A substantial opposition to Ben Bella is developing
within the Algerian Constituent Assembly. This group, led
by Hussein Ait Ahmed, comprises various tribal elements.
It may cause increasing trouble when the government's legis-
lative program is presented for approval and the constitu-
tion drafted.
SOMALI-ETHIOPIAN RELATIONS WORSEN Page 1$
The tempo of charges and countercharges between the
Somali Republic and Ethiopia has increased. The Somali
Government is attempting to divert popular attention from
internal problems by accusing Ethiopia of plots against the
country.
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LEGALIST FACTION ASSERTS CONTROL IN ARtlENTINA Page 19
The establishment of firm control over the government
by the Legalist military faction has lessened the possibil-
ity of an early renewal of the recent military power
struggle. The Legalists, however, are not themselves
agreed on policies to meet the country's problems. An
early challenge to their unity will arise in connection
with the issue of Peroriist participation i.n :Forthcoming
elections.
THE BRAZILIAN ELECTIONS . . Wage 20
At stake in the national election: on 7 October are
11 governorships, two thirds of the Sedate seats, and al.l
409 seats in the Chamber of Deputies, ;~s well as a consid-
erable number of lesser state offices. The gubernatorial
contests are probably the most important. Governors in
Brazil have much independent authority, including that of
negotiating with bloc governments for economic arid. Pre-
liminary indications are that as many :~s seven governorships
could be won by anti-US candidates.
TRENDS IN TRINIDAD AND JAMAICA Page 22
Political ferment has increased i~~1 both Jamaica and
Trinidad since they became independent of Britain in August.
Trinidad is renewing its long-standing controversies with
the US over the Chaguaramas base and economic aid. The
Jamaican Government--although strongly anti-Communist--is
cautious in its relations with Cuba because of the large
Jamaican community resident there, and because it .fears
Cuban subversive activities.
SPECIAL ARTICLT~3
NORTH KOREAN FACTIONALISM AND THE RISE OF I{IM IL-SUNG Page 1
Kim I1-sung, an obscure officer o:F the Sovier Army in
1945, today holds a position of absolute power as chief o.f
state and party in Narth Korea. Y~is rase is due mainly to
his ruthless determination and an unca~zny instinct for
political intrigue which served him well in one of the
world's most faction-ridden Communist movements. Although
victory over factionalism was official~Ly proclaimed at the
fourth congress of the Korean Workers ;Party in September
1961, the history of the party suggest:; that Kim cannot
afford to relax his vigilance.
SOVIET ANTARCTIC ACTIVITIES Page 5
The USSR's plans for its Eighth Antarctic 1'xpedition,
1962-63, include extensive preparation: .for the International
Year of the Quiet Sun, a year of world-wide scientific
cooperation planned for 1964-G5. In addition to annual
restaffing and resupply of Soviet Anta~retic stations, a
former year-round scientif is station w:Lll be reopened, a
new one established, and another perma~lent geophysical
observatory constructed. Studies in atmospheric physics
will be further emphasized. Polish sc:Lentists will return
to Antarctica after an absence of three years.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE 1NEEKLY SUMMARY
UGANDA Page
The British protectorate of Uganda becomes independent
on 9 October in an atmosphere of racLal harmony and econom-
ic well-being relatively high by Easic African standards.
The coalition government of Prime '~iriister Obote neverthe-
less faces substantial problems in overcoming deep tribal
differences which constitute the lar?;est single barrier to
the country's political stability. t)bote will probably
follow a moderate neutralist line in international relations
and avoid for the time being closer 1'r,ies with the more ex-
tremist states of Africa.
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SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE YPEERLY SUMMARY
WEEKLY' REVIEW'
SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY DEVELOPMENTS
Berlin and Germany
The Soviet Union continued
to play the Berlin and German
questions in low key during the
past week, reflecting Moscow's
apparent decision to defer any
new moves to bring the issues
to a head at .least until mid-
November . ]During his of f ici a 1
visit to Yugoslavia, Soviet
President Brezhnev has re-
iterated Moscow's standard
themes on Berlin and Germany
and has attercipted to leave the
impression that Yugoslavia's
attitude toward these issues
is the same as the soviet
Union's.
In his. 27 September speech
at Spla.t, Brezhnev did not
allude to the German question
until the end of his address
and the only in moderate-terms--
as he did throughout his trip
to Yugoslavia. He emphasized
the need far settling interna-
tional problems tllrough~~~en-
sible realistic talks."
Brezhnev then drew the con-
clusion that the USSY1's "strug-
gle to conclude a German peace
treaty" was convincing proof that
negotiations were the correct
approach to the solution of
urgent problems.
and German affairs, stressed
the standard line that Western
"saber-rattling" will make no
impression on the USSR and that
Soviet forces have "powerful
mear.~s to administer a crushing
rebuff to the aggressors."
Poly~anov also renewed previous
warr.~ings that any "showdown"
aveY~ West Berlin initiated .by
the West could escalate into a
genE~ral nucelar canf lict .
Izvestia concluded by empha-
sizing t- i~ at Moscow will not allow
its "initiative" to sign a Ger-
man peace treaty to be "stopped
halfway." It reaffirmed the
U SSFt' s preference for a nego-
tiated settlement, but warned
that; there is a "time limit"
to ~~oviet patience. It said
that; if the US refuses to en-
gagc~ in "reasonable" talks and
continues its "saber-r.ati;ling,"
the USSR will proceed with the
separate treaty.
The Soviet press claimed
that: McNamara's recent in-
spection trip to West Germany
provided further evidence that
the "nuclear rocket arming" of
West: Germany is continuing at
"fu7~_1 speed" and that the "West
German brass virtually already
havE~ atomic bombs . "
aoviet reaction to ;3ecre-
tary McNamara's 2B September .
press conference ref lected bias-
cow's sensitivity to statements
regarding the Western powers'
readiness to use force to main-
tain their position in Berlin
-and to the possibility of West
Germany's acquiring a nuclear
capability.
A 3 October article by
polyanov, Izvestia's authori~
tative commentator on Berlin
Soviet spokesmen at the UN
haves told US officials that.- the
Ber]~in question will be settled,
"one rvay or the other," by the
end of 1962. However, they stop
short of a flat prediction that
a peace treaty will be signed by
that; time. They have asserted
that; an "agreed solution" an Ber-
lin can be reached only if "one
doe. not miss possibilities and
opportunities that present them-
selves."' They have cited the
pre.,ence of "sYestern forces and
the occupation status of West Ber-
lin as tk~c main unresolved issues.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEIEKLY SUMMARY
The forthcoming visit to East
Germany of Polish party chief
Gomulka may be timed to coincide
with the 7 October celebrations
of the 13th anniversary of the
founding of the GDR. The occasion
could be used far a gathering of
high-level bloc leaders designed to
emphasize their solidarity with
the Ulbricht regime and to restate
the bloc's position on Berlin and
a peace treaty.
In a front-page editorial on
3d September, the authoritative
East German Neues Deutschland
elaborated on the "pause" in nego-
tiations for a German peace settle-
ment. This editorial, the first
extensive East German comment on
the 11 September TASS statement
noting the existence of such a
"pause," echoed similar remarks by
Ulbricht in urging that the West
use the time to create "favorable
conditions" for a resumption of ne-
got is tions . The ed itor is 1 argued
that a policy of peaceful coexist-
ence is the only sensible approach
far West Germany to take and urged
.the Western powers to be "smart"
enough to accelerate the pace of
the discussions with the USSR.
A 28 September Pravda article
underscored a sharp attack on
Adenauer with the accusation that
Bonn was .attempting to drive a
wedge between the Soviet.Union and
the three Allied powers. In con-
trast to Moscow's recent bitter at-
tack on De Gaulle, which by impli-
cation played down Moscow's hopes
for obtaining any four-power settle-
ment on Berlin in the foreseeable
Nuclear Test Ban
Khrushchev on 1 October re-
ceived a delegation from the
Gandhi Peace Foundation of India.
He used the occasion to reiterate
Moscow's standard positions on
a nuclear test ban, including
Soviet willingness to accept
the memorandum of the eight
nonaligned powers as the basis
for a solution: During the meet-
ing he in effect rejected the idea
of a unilateral moratorium on test?25X1
ing if no agreement is reached.
future, the article asserted that At Geneva, Soviet. delegate Tsarap-
the Soviet Union wished to solve kin ~?ontinued to berate the US and
the German problem "through nego- British delegates to the test-ban sub-
tiations with all states concerned." committee and to denounce the two West-
Pravda reiterated the line recently ern draft treaties. On 27 September he
t-aTcen by a_public lecturer in Mos- said that in the Soviet view there was
cow and declared that a German no desire on the part of the West to
peace settlement is a complicated reach agreement and that continued
problem and that "no one believes talking was not producing .results.
that it is easy to solve." TsarR-pkin's negative stand suggests
that Moscow may be considering a move
to rc~cess the .subcommittee when the
UN Gc~neral Assembly takes up the test-
ba n c~uest ion .
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
DEVELOPMENTS IN TIDE CUBAN SITUATION
Soviet military personnel
are continuing the construction
of surface-to-air missile (SAM)
sites and coastal defense cruise
missile installations in Cuba.
Fourteen SAM sites now have
Std t5f? pIN~S
r ,~
?'> .,, Iklewly identified
Conf~rmedsurfaca-t~ air rrjiss"tXe ~S~A) site
P~sss~ble SAM site, exact locataan unknown'
Support facGl~ty far processing equipment
~~rf~eld with ~1~