(UNTITLED)

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP79-00927A003800030001-9
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
S
Document Page Count: 
40
Document Creation Date: 
December 21, 2016
Document Release Date: 
July 28, 2008
Sequence Number: 
1
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
October 5, 1962
Content Type: 
SUMMARY
File: 
AttachmentSize
PDF icon CIA-RDP79-00927A003800030001-9.pdf3.29 MB
Body: 
Approved For Release 2008/07/28 :CIA-RDP79-00927A003800030001-9 SECRET (CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY .CENTRAL iNTELLiGErJCE AGENCY III OFFICE C1F CURRENT IhITELLIGENCE COPY N0. i4~~~ OCI N0. o~~~~~~ SECRET 2~ State Dept. review completed GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic _downgrading and ___ declassification Approved For Release 2008/07/28 :CIA-RDP79-00927A003800030001-9 25X1 Approved For Release 2008/07/28 :CIA-RDP79-00927A003800030001-9 Approved For Release 2008/07/28 :CIA-RDP79-00927A003800030001-9 Approved For Release 2008/07/28: CIA-RDP79-00927A003800030001-9 '~`' SECRET' CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 5 October 1982 T H E W E E K I N B R I E F (Information as of 12UU EDT 4 Oct) SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY DEVELOPMENTS Page 1 Moscow continued its relatively moderate treatment of the German problem during the past week. Authoritative Communist bloc media asserted the USSR's desire to settle the problem through negotiations with the Allied powers. Soviet propaganda also reflected Mosc~aw's sensitivity to possible West German acquisition of a nuclear weapons capability. Un 1 October Khrushchev :reiterated the USSR's willingness to accept the neutralist memorandum as the basis for a solution of the nuclear test-ban issue. DEVELOPMENTS IN THE CUBAN SITUATION Page 3 The number of identified Cuban surface-to-air and coastal defense missile sites built b;y Soviet personnel is increasing. Soviet propaganda has centered on a eged US efforts to "pressure" L~~.tin American states into taking joint action against the Castro regime. COMMUNIST CHINA CELEBRATES NATIONAL DAY Page 5 Peiping introduced a note of restrained optimism at its 13th anniversary celebrations on :L October by implying that the economic decline of the past three years had reached bottom. The lack of supporting evidence in the form of recent output figures or future targets, however, suggests that the regime is still extremely cautious over its economic prospects. Commentary surrounding National Day ceremonies reflected continuing concern over problems of party discipline and mass support. Peiping also used the occasion to affirm its opposition to Soviet policies. NATIONALISM IN THE MONGOLIAN PARTY Page ? The recent purge of D. Tomor-Och~:r, top-level member of the Mongolian Peoples Revolutionary Party, reflects the regime's continuing efforts to suppre~~s Mongol nationalism. Tomor-Ochir was charged with striving to revise party de- cisions denouncing nationalism and with attempting to arouse "national passions." Premier Tsedenbail's complete subser- vience to the Soviet Union has long irritated many Mongolians who want a more independent national identity within the ~'ECRET BRIEFS Approved For Release 2008/07/28: CIA-RDP79-00927A003800030001-9 Approved For Release 2008/07/28: CIA-RDP79-00927A003800030001-9 ~ .~E~iRE~' Page 8 In contrast to the success of the Common Market, the Coal-Steel Community (CSC)--the first of ttae three bodies set up by the Common Market cou~atries in their move toward ecorYOmic integration--has become increasingly ineffective. The most recent symptom of the malaise affecting the CSC was the resignation on 25 September of Dirk Spierenbur;;, vice president and most energetic and capable member of the CSC's nine-man executive, the High Authority. The High Authority's difficulties derive-from the wavering support of supranationalism by the member countries as well as the uncertainty over the future of the Cam as a separate organ- ization. BONN'S ECONOMIC STABILIZATION PROGRAM Page 9 A special "stabilization program" to halt growing in- flationary trends is to be presented to the Bundestag when it reconvenes on 9 October. The prog?r~am, which is also designed to strengthen Economics Minister Erhard's claim to succeed Adenauer, has as its major feature an "absolute" ceiling on the 19G3 budget. The new budget calls for a re- duction in some fields such as housing and indicates a slow- down in the defense buildup. Pressures to exceed the limi- tations in some categories may prove too strong and force the government to make cuts in foreign aid. FRANCE'S RELATIONS WITH THE UN . Page 11 The 1962 French UN delegation can be expected to dis - play greater tactical -flexiba.lity than its recent pred- ecessors, but it will still be circumscribed by De Gaulle 's basic view that the United Nations should be no more than an international debating society. France probably will not comply with the advisory opinion o:f the International Court of Justice regarding extraordinary UN expenses, nor will Paris press its influence with th~~ French-speaking African countries on issues where French interests are not clearly at stake. THE REVOLT IN YEMEN Page 12 Major hostilities between the revolutionary regime's forces and tribal elements loyal to thy: monarchy are in- creasingly likely. The regime is encountering resistance in the northern province and in the area of the Aden border. The claimant to the Imamate, Prince Ha:san, now is on the Saudi-Yemeni border attempting to rally his Yemeni tribal supporters for a counterrevolt. He ha;~ the backing of Saudi Arabia and Jordan. The regime's leaders, many of whom have long been associated with the Egyptian--backed Free Yemeni Movement, are looking to Gairo for support and guidance ~'ECRET Approved For Release 2008/07/28: CIA-RDP79-00927A003800030001-9 Approved For Release 2008/07/28: CIA-RDP79-00927A003800030001-9 THE SITUATION IN LAOS Page 15 there are continuing indiicatians that the North Vietnamese intend to leave at least some elements in Laos to bolster the Pathet Lao forces after the ? October dead- line f or withdrawal. The Pathet Lao, in an effort to farce the disbandment of Meo guerrilla forces in northern and cen- tral Laos, are pressing for the cessation of US-chartered air resupply flights. Souvanna has persuaded North Vietnam briefly to delay sending its ambassador to Vientiane. Mean- while Laos apparently is preparing tc> exchange representa- tives with East Germany. 25X1 THE SITUATION IN THE CONGO Page 16 Virtually no progress has been made on implementation of the UN reconciliation plan. The joint commission dis- cussions in Elisabethville have succeeded only in pointing up wide divergencies between the two sides, and Adoula has categorically rejected Tshomb~'s request to discuss the con- stitution UN experts have drafted. Meanwhile, Adoula ap- pears to have successfully carried off his moves to reassert Leopoldville's control over South Kasai and secessionist leader Albert Kalonji. 25X1 NE~V ALGERIAN GOVERNMENT Page 17 A substantial opposition to Ben Bella is developing within the Algerian Constituent Assembly. This group, led by Hussein Ait Ahmed, comprises various tribal elements. It may cause increasing trouble when the government's legis- lative program is presented for approval and the constitu- tion drafted. SOMALI-ETHIOPIAN RELATIONS WORSEN Page 1$ The tempo of charges and countercharges between the Somali Republic and Ethiopia has increased. The Somali Government is attempting to divert popular attention from internal problems by accusing Ethiopia of plots against the country. ~'ECRET iii Approved For Release 2008/07/28: CIA-RDP79-00927A003800030001-9 Approved For Release 2008/07/28: CIA-RDP79-00927A003800030001-9 ~r e.~~v~,,r.ew.~.:r .c LEGALIST FACTION ASSERTS CONTROL IN ARtlENTINA Page 19 The establishment of firm control over the government by the Legalist military faction has lessened the possibil- ity of an early renewal of the recent military power struggle. The Legalists, however, are not themselves agreed on policies to meet the country's problems. An early challenge to their unity will arise in connection with the issue of Peroriist participation i.n :Forthcoming elections. THE BRAZILIAN ELECTIONS . . Wage 20 At stake in the national election: on 7 October are 11 governorships, two thirds of the Sedate seats, and al.l 409 seats in the Chamber of Deputies, ;~s well as a consid- erable number of lesser state offices. The gubernatorial contests are probably the most important. Governors in Brazil have much independent authority, including that of negotiating with bloc governments for economic arid. Pre- liminary indications are that as many :~s seven governorships could be won by anti-US candidates. TRENDS IN TRINIDAD AND JAMAICA Page 22 Political ferment has increased i~~1 both Jamaica and Trinidad since they became independent of Britain in August. Trinidad is renewing its long-standing controversies with the US over the Chaguaramas base and economic aid. The Jamaican Government--although strongly anti-Communist--is cautious in its relations with Cuba because of the large Jamaican community resident there, and because it .fears Cuban subversive activities. SPECIAL ARTICLT~3 NORTH KOREAN FACTIONALISM AND THE RISE OF I{IM IL-SUNG Page 1 Kim I1-sung, an obscure officer o:F the Sovier Army in 1945, today holds a position of absolute power as chief o.f state and party in Narth Korea. Y~is rase is due mainly to his ruthless determination and an unca~zny instinct for political intrigue which served him well in one of the world's most faction-ridden Communist movements. Although victory over factionalism was official~Ly proclaimed at the fourth congress of the Korean Workers ;Party in September 1961, the history of the party suggest:; that Kim cannot afford to relax his vigilance. SOVIET ANTARCTIC ACTIVITIES Page 5 The USSR's plans for its Eighth Antarctic 1'xpedition, 1962-63, include extensive preparation: .for the International Year of the Quiet Sun, a year of world-wide scientific cooperation planned for 1964-G5. In addition to annual restaffing and resupply of Soviet Anta~retic stations, a former year-round scientif is station w:Lll be reopened, a new one established, and another perma~lent geophysical observatory constructed. Studies in atmospheric physics will be further emphasized. Polish sc:Lentists will return to Antarctica after an absence of three years. SECRET BRIEFS Approved For Release 2008/07/28: CIA-RDP79-00927A003800030001-9 Approved For Release 2008/07/28: CIA-RDP79-00927A003800030001-9 ~" ~lfi(..iL'CL' d CURRENT INTELLIGENCE 1NEEKLY SUMMARY UGANDA Page The British protectorate of Uganda becomes independent on 9 October in an atmosphere of racLal harmony and econom- ic well-being relatively high by Easic African standards. The coalition government of Prime '~iriister Obote neverthe- less faces substantial problems in overcoming deep tribal differences which constitute the lar?;est single barrier to the country's political stability. t)bote will probably follow a moderate neutralist line in international relations and avoid for the time being closer 1'r,ies with the more ex- tremist states of Africa. SECRET v BRIEFS Approved For Release 2008/07/28: CIA-RDP79-00927A003800030001-9 Approved For Release 2008/07/28: CIA-RDP79-00927A003800030001-9 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE YPEERLY SUMMARY WEEKLY' REVIEW' SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY DEVELOPMENTS Berlin and Germany The Soviet Union continued to play the Berlin and German questions in low key during the past week, reflecting Moscow's apparent decision to defer any new moves to bring the issues to a head at .least until mid- November . ]During his of f ici a 1 visit to Yugoslavia, Soviet President Brezhnev has re- iterated Moscow's standard themes on Berlin and Germany and has attercipted to leave the impression that Yugoslavia's attitude toward these issues is the same as the soviet Union's. In his. 27 September speech at Spla.t, Brezhnev did not allude to the German question until the end of his address and the only in moderate-terms-- as he did throughout his trip to Yugoslavia. He emphasized the need far settling interna- tional problems tllrough~~~en- sible realistic talks." Brezhnev then drew the con- clusion that the USSY1's "strug- gle to conclude a German peace treaty" was convincing proof that negotiations were the correct approach to the solution of urgent problems. and German affairs, stressed the standard line that Western "saber-rattling" will make no impression on the USSR and that Soviet forces have "powerful mear.~s to administer a crushing rebuff to the aggressors." Poly~anov also renewed previous warr.~ings that any "showdown" aveY~ West Berlin initiated .by the West could escalate into a genE~ral nucelar canf lict . Izvestia concluded by empha- sizing t- i~ at Moscow will not allow its "initiative" to sign a Ger- man peace treaty to be "stopped halfway." It reaffirmed the U SSFt' s preference for a nego- tiated settlement, but warned that; there is a "time limit" to ~~oviet patience. It said that; if the US refuses to en- gagc~ in "reasonable" talks and continues its "saber-r.ati;ling," the USSR will proceed with the separate treaty. The Soviet press claimed that: McNamara's recent in- spection trip to West Germany provided further evidence that the "nuclear rocket arming" of West: Germany is continuing at "fu7~_1 speed" and that the "West German brass virtually already havE~ atomic bombs . " aoviet reaction to ;3ecre- tary McNamara's 2B September . press conference ref lected bias- cow's sensitivity to statements regarding the Western powers' readiness to use force to main- tain their position in Berlin -and to the possibility of West Germany's acquiring a nuclear capability. A 3 October article by polyanov, Izvestia's authori~ tative commentator on Berlin Soviet spokesmen at the UN haves told US officials that.- the Ber]~in question will be settled, "one rvay or the other," by the end of 1962. However, they stop short of a flat prediction that a peace treaty will be signed by that; time. They have asserted that; an "agreed solution" an Ber- lin can be reached only if "one doe. not miss possibilities and opportunities that present them- selves."' They have cited the pre.,ence of "sYestern forces and the occupation status of West Ber- lin as tk~c main unresolved issues. SECRET 5 Oct 6 Approved For Release 2008/07/28: CIA-RDP79-00927A003800030001-9 e 1 of 22 Approved For Release 2008/07/28: CIA-RDP79-00927A003800030001-9 SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEIEKLY SUMMARY The forthcoming visit to East Germany of Polish party chief Gomulka may be timed to coincide with the 7 October celebrations of the 13th anniversary of the founding of the GDR. The occasion could be used far a gathering of high-level bloc leaders designed to emphasize their solidarity with the Ulbricht regime and to restate the bloc's position on Berlin and a peace treaty. In a front-page editorial on 3d September, the authoritative East German Neues Deutschland elaborated on the "pause" in nego- tiations for a German peace settle- ment. This editorial, the first extensive East German comment on the 11 September TASS statement noting the existence of such a "pause," echoed similar remarks by Ulbricht in urging that the West use the time to create "favorable conditions" for a resumption of ne- got is tions . The ed itor is 1 argued that a policy of peaceful coexist- ence is the only sensible approach far West Germany to take and urged .the Western powers to be "smart" enough to accelerate the pace of the discussions with the USSR. A 28 September Pravda article underscored a sharp attack on Adenauer with the accusation that Bonn was .attempting to drive a wedge between the Soviet.Union and the three Allied powers. In con- trast to Moscow's recent bitter at- tack on De Gaulle, which by impli- cation played down Moscow's hopes for obtaining any four-power settle- ment on Berlin in the foreseeable Nuclear Test Ban Khrushchev on 1 October re- ceived a delegation from the Gandhi Peace Foundation of India. He used the occasion to reiterate Moscow's standard positions on a nuclear test ban, including Soviet willingness to accept the memorandum of the eight nonaligned powers as the basis for a solution: During the meet- ing he in effect rejected the idea of a unilateral moratorium on test?25X1 ing if no agreement is reached. future, the article asserted that At Geneva, Soviet. delegate Tsarap- the Soviet Union wished to solve kin ~?ontinued to berate the US and the German problem "through nego- British delegates to the test-ban sub- tiations with all states concerned." committee and to denounce the two West- Pravda reiterated the line recently ern draft treaties. On 27 September he t-aTcen by a_public lecturer in Mos- said that in the Soviet view there was cow and declared that a German no desire on the part of the West to peace settlement is a complicated reach agreement and that continued problem and that "no one believes talking was not producing .results. that it is easy to solve." TsarR-pkin's negative stand suggests that Moscow may be considering a move to rc~cess the .subcommittee when the UN Gc~neral Assembly takes up the test- ba n c~uest ion . SECRET 5 Oct 62 Approved For Release 2008/07/28: CIA-RDP79-00927A003800030001-9 Page 2 of 22 Approved For Release 2008/07/28: CIA-RDP79-00927A003800030001-9 "~"~ SECRET CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY DEVELOPMENTS IN TIDE CUBAN SITUATION Soviet military personnel are continuing the construction of surface-to-air missile (SAM) sites and coastal defense cruise missile installations in Cuba. Fourteen SAM sites now have Std t5f? pIN~S r ,~ ?'> .,, Iklewly identified Conf~rmedsurfaca-t~ air rrjiss"tXe ~S~A) site P~sss~ble SAM site, exact locataan unknown' Support facGl~ty far processing equipment ~~rf~eld with ~1~