CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A003700090001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 37
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Sequence Number: 1
• Content Type: SUMMARY

Approved For Release 2008/08/11: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03700090001-4
V4110 'lot,
SECRET
CURRENT
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY
SUMMARY
COPY NO.
OCI NO. 0431/62
24 August 1962
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
SECRET
State Dept. review completed
GROUP I
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification
Approved For Release 2008/08/11: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03700090001-4
 25X1 Approved For Release 2008/08/11: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03700090001-4
Approved For Release 2008/08/11: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03700090001-4
 Approved For Release 2008/08/11: CIA-RDP79-00927A003700090001-4
SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMAPY
24 August 1962
T H TS' W E E K T N B R I E F
(Information as of 1200 ',DT 23 Aug)
SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY DEVELOPMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 1
Moscow's abolition of the Soviet commandant's office
in Berlin on 22 August was intended to remove the most im-
portant remaining symbol of four-power responsibility for
all of the city. Although this decision probably does not
foreshadow an early breakoff of the Soviet-US talks, it
does suggest that Khrushchev believes there is little chance
of obtaining further Western concessions at this time and
that he is now mainly concerned with strengthening the USSR's
position for signing a separate peace treaty with East Ger-
many. This latest move has not been accompanied thus far
by any efforts to create an atmosphere of imminent crisis,
and Khrushchev has reaffirmed that a negotiated settlement
is possible.
At Geneva, the USSR has made it clear that it will
reject any nuclear test ban which does not cover all tests,
including underground explosions. With the advent of a new
government in Iran, the USSR has rev
improve relations with that country.
CONGO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 5
The Leopoldville government has accepted the UN-sponsored
plan for reintegrating Katanga, but Adoula probably doubts
that it will bring Tshombe into line. There is no indica-
tion that Tshombe is ready to make meaningful concessions;
Small-scale fighting which broke out last week
in nort ern Katanga has ceased. The situation remains tense
there and in Kongolo and Elisabethville.
LAOS . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . Page 7
The coalition government has reached agreement on the
establishment of three International Control Commission
checkpoints to monitor the withdrawal o.f foreign troops
from Laos. Agreement had been delayed ,by refusal of the
Pathet Lao to permit inspection sites in their territory
on the grounds that no foreign troops a?re there
SOUTH VIETNAM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 8
Viet Cong units reportedly are concentrating in the area
north of Saigon and in the highlands adjacent to Laos. These
concentrations may be preliminary to large-scale attacks.
The Communist Liberation Front has called-once more for a
neutral government in South Vietnam.
SECRET
Approved For Release 2008/08/11: CIA-RDP79-00927A003700090001-4
 Approved For Release 2008/08/11: CIA-RDP79-00927A003700090001-4
*Wof
SECRET
24 August 196;2
ALGERIA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 9
The list of candidates for the 2 September Constituent
Assembly elections is a compromise between Ben Bella and
Algerian military leaders, who have again demonstrated their
power by blocking.his efforts to hand-;pick candidates. Since
the list is certain to be elected, the resulting assembly
is likely to reflect the divisive viewpoints that have ham-
pered the creation of an effective central government.
HUNGARIAN PARTY DISCIPLINES FORMER STALINIST OFFICIALS Page 12
The recent ouster of Stalinists from the Hungarian
party is the climax of a three-year effort by First Secre-
tary Janos Kadar to overcome opposition to his policies.
The timing appears to have been influenced by the approach
of the November party congress. As evidence that Kadar is
"liberalizing" the Hungarian party, the acts could also be
intended to serve as a gesture toward improving relations
with Yugoslavia and as concessions designed to encourage.
Acting UN Secretary General Thant to visit Hungary during
his pending tour of Eastern Europe.
CHURCH AND STATE IN POLAND . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 14
The Gomulka regime has taken a significant step in
its drive to force the church to confine its activities
strictly to religious ceremonies. On 1.3 August it an-
nounced that all remaining Roman Catholic schools and
orphanages--a small percentage of those once in existence--
will by the end of the 1963 school year be sequestered by
the state. Despite this and other harassments the church
retains basically strong popular support and the regime's.
attacks. against it probably will continue at a gradual pace 25X1
and in low key.
VOSTOKS III AND IV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 15
The recent dual Soviet man-in-space operation demonstrated
two significant achievements: the ability to launch a second
satellite into close proximity to a first; and the prolonged
use of the life support system to about half the time needed
for a manned landing on the moon and return. It is still
not clear whether the USSR intends to place priority on
manned flight in near-earth operations or to compete with
the US in landing a man on the moon. This operation is con-
sidered an important milestone leading to either objective.
SECRET
Approved For Release 2008/08/11: CIA-RDP79-00927A003700090001-4
 Approved For Release 2008/08/11: CIA-RDP79-00927A003700090001-4
Nae SECRET %NW
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
24 August 1962
COMMUNIST CHINA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 16
Several recent interviews given Western newsmen by
Chinese Communist Foreign Minister Chen Yi indicate the
regime is scaling down its agricultural and industrial
programs to realistic levels. Chen's remarks also suggest
that domestic difficulties have induced an attitude of
restraint on certain foreign policy issues, notably the
Indian border and the Taiwan Strait. He said that sporadic
shelling will continue against the offshore islands, but
intimated that Peiping does not intend to provoke a crisis
SOUTHERN RHODESIA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 18
African nationalists in Southern Rhodesia are likely
to adopt more violent tactics to protest white economic
and political domination. They have been encouraged to
take more militant action by the attention recently given
Southern Rhodesia in UN discussions . The Africans are
still poorly organized, however, whereas the government
is arming itself with tough new security, measures
THE POLITICAL SITUATION IN BELGIUM . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 19
There may be reshuffling of the Social Christian (PSC) -
Socialist party (PSB) coalition government after Parliament
reconvenes on 2 October. No progress was made in the last
session on any of the major problems confronting the govern-
ment, and serious splits developed within the PSC and between
the coalition partners over most of the measures considered
by Parliament. New elections in the immediate future are not
likely, since the present government took office only in
April 1961, but a shift in the premiership appears inevitable
and two or three other unpopular ministers may be re placed. 25X1
PORTUGUESE DEFENSE EXPENDITURES . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 20
Portuguese defense spending is increasing, due mainly
to the military campaign in Angola. The increase may
absorb more than half of all government outlays by the
end of the year. The soaring defense costs will probably
slow implementation of government plans for economic
development and increase public dissatisfaction with the
Salazar regime.
SECRET
iii
BRIEFS
Approved For Release 2008/08/11: CIA-RDP79-00927A003700090001-4
 Approved For Release 2008/08/11: CIA-RDP79-00927A003700090001-4
SECRET iWow
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
24 August 1962
ARGENTINA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 21
The prospect of an immediate overthrow of the Guido
government has receded, but dissension in the army, the
erosion of the government's rests e
still threaten the regime.
BRAZIL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 22
A commitment by the conservative congress to act favor-
ably in September on measures sought by the leftist admin-
istration of President Goulart has eased the country's politi-
cal crisis, at least temporarily. Leftist political .ele-
ments are apparently organizing a country-wide political
bloc to coordinate campas nin for the October congressional
elections.
COLOMBIA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 23
President Valencia and Colombian military leaders are
intensifying operations against bandit and insurgent groups
to halt the rural violence in many areas of Colombia. Gov-
ernment officials are concerned over recent assassinations
of several Colombian political leaders and the increased
evidence of Communist efforts to organize an armed revolu-
tionary movement.
EDUCATION AND INDOCTRINATION IN CUBA . .. . . . . . . . . . Page 25
Extensive educational and mass indoctrination programs
have been developed by the Castro regime in an effort to
ensure continuation of its public support, now derived
mainly from Cuban youth groups.. Cuba's educational system,
drawing on technical and material support from the bloc,
is still expanding and its instructional. material is
evolving along increasingly Marxist lines. "Old Communists"
in the field of education have apparently suffered little
of the downgrading recently applied to veteran party mem-
bers in Cuban political organizations.
SPECIAL ARTICLES
SECRET
iv
BRTFFS
Approved For Release 2008/08/11: CIA-RDP79-00927A003700090001-4
 Approved For Release 2008/08/11: CIA-RDP79-00927A003700090001-4
*Ape
SECRET
24 August 1962
THE ROYAL REGIME IN MOROCCO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 4
King Hassan II has proved to be an able political tac-
tician during the year and a half of his reign. Although
he relies heavily on the army and the security forces, he
has won considerable personal popularity with the public,
and the palace remains the dominant political element in
the country. Other political leaders, even those in his
own government, dislike and distrust him, but the opposi-
tion has been too faction-ridden to do more than snipe at
administrative confusion Partly to steal
the thunder of leftist critics, the King officially follows 25X6
a foreign policy of nonalignment, but he appears to want
to stay fairly close to Western protection. He is particularly
concerned over the future attitudes of independent Algeria.
SECRET
v
Approved For Release 2008/08/11: CIA-RDP79-00927A003700090001-4
 Approved For Release 2008/08/11: CIA-RDP79-00927A003700090001-4
SECRET %W
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
WEEKLY REVIEW
SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY DEVELOPMENTS
Moscow's abolition of the
office of the Soviet commandant
in Berlin on 22 August was in-
tended to remove the most impor-
tant remaining symbol of four-
power responsibility for all of
the city. The timing of this
move probably was dictated by
renewed Western insistence that
the USSR acknowledge its responsi-
bility for East Berlin by partici-
pating in a meeting of the four
commandants to discuss means of
easing tensions produced by the
recent incidents at the Berlin
Wall. Although the decision to
dissolve the commandant's office
probably does not foreshadow an
early breakoff of bilateral
talks with the US, it does sug-
gest that Khrushchev sees little
chance of obtaining further West-
ern concessions at this time and
that he is now mainly concerned
with strengthening the USSR's
position for signing a separate
peace treaty with East Germany.
The Soviet communique an-
nouncing the abolition of the
commandant's office suggests
that this will not have any im-
mediate practical effect on Al-
lied military access to West
Berlin. Responsibility for "con-
trol over the movement of per-
sonnel and supplies" of the West-
ern garrisons has been transferred
"temporarily" to the commander in
chief of the Soviet forces in
Germany. The Soviets apparently
do not intend to withdraw from
the Berlin Air Safety Center
(BASC) in the near future, and
thus abandon their control over
military air access. The fail-
ure of the communique to refer
specifically to BASC's future
suggests, however, that some
move to subject civilian air
access to East German control
may be in the offing. Moscow
may also be prepared to permit
the Ulbricht regime to incorporate
East Berlin into East Germany
and to impose new requirements
on Allied military personnel
entering East Berlin in an ef-
fort to force the West either
to recognize GDR sovereignty
over East Berlin or to forego
further patrol activity there.
The dissolution of the
commandant's office marked the
culmination of a series of
maneuvers over the past months
to bypass the Western commandants
in Berlin and to transfer all
remaining four-power relations
and functions from the commandants
to the level of the commanders
of the Soviet and Western forces
in Germany. The USSR had re-
jected a Western proposal of 25
June for a meeting of the four
commandants to discuss means
of easing tensions in Berlin.
The acting Soviet commandant
repeated this rejection when
the three Western commandants
renewed the proposal on 19 August.
The Soviet communique of 22 Au-
gust charged that the Western
commandants were trying to take
advantage of the existence of
the Soviet commandant's office
to interfere in the internal
affairs of the "sovereign and
independent" GDR and its capital.
In addition to the immediate
purpose of blocking Western ef-
forts to oblige the USSR to ac-
knowledge its responsibility for
East Berlin, the Soviets probably
believe that the abolition of
their commandant's office will
further erode Western rights
based on the four-power status
of the city and make it more
difficult for the West to justify
its position that the continued
presence of Western forces under
existing agreements is not a ne-
gotiable question.
The decision to terminate
the commandant's office has not
SECRET
24 Aug 62 WEEKLY REVIEW Page 1 of 25
Approved For Release 2008/08/11: CIA-RDP79-00927A003700090001-4
 Approved For Release 2008/08/11: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03700090001-4
SECRET
been accompanied thus far by
any efforts to create an atmos-
phere of imminent crisis. The
East German reaction to recent
disorders in West Berlin was
harsh, featuring charges that
''fascist hooligans" and "young
political rowdies," enjoying
the protection of Mayor Brandt,
had attacked Soviet personnel
and terrorized the West Berlin
populace. Moscow radio warned
on 20 August that tension in
Berlin "has now turned into a
direct threat of a serious con-
flict" but concluded that these
disorders simply show that a
peace treaty must be signed
with delay. Moscow added
that the USSR "is not closing
the door to negotiations on the
German and Berlin problems."
Khrushchev Speech
In his speech at the 18
August Moscow ceremony honoring
the two Soviet cosmonauts, Khru-
shchev repeated the standard
formula that a separate treaty
will be signed only if "we fail
to meet with understanding on
the part of the Western powers."
He cited both the Laos and West
New Guinea settlements as evi-
dence that it should be possible
to settle the questions of a
German peace treaty, admission
of both German states to the UN,
and creation of a free-city status
for West Berlin. On the question
of Western troops' remaining in
West Berlin, Khrushchev apparently
tried to leave an impression that
his position was hardening. He
said that the USSR would agree
to a temporary presence of troops
under UN auspices but would not
accept forces of NATO members
under the UN flag. He made no
reference to his earlier public
proposal to replace Western forces
with contingents from four smaller
NATO and Warsaw Pact states under
UN authority.
Despite Khrushchev's public
rejection of any NATO troops in
West Berlin, the Soviets continued
to hint privately at flexibility
on this issue. A member of the
Soviet UN delegation sounded
out a US official on 17 August
regarding a "UN solution" which
would permit US, British, and
French forces to remain in West
Berlin, supplemented by contin-
gents of Warsaw Pact and other
NATO troops, all under the UN
flag.
The Soviet ambassador to
Bonn took a cautious line after
returning from Moscow, stating
on 18 August that there is "no
definite date" for signing a
separate treaty and that Moscow
expects further talks between
Rusk and Dobrynin.
]Possible Initiative
On Berlin in UN
There have been further in-
dications that Khrushchev may
come to New York next month to
place the Berlin and German ques-
tions before the UN General As-
sembly and possibly to create
an occasion for a meeting with
President Kennedy.
Khrushchev's principal
purpose in appearing before
the UN probably would be to
generate additional pressure
SECRET
24 Aug 62 Approved For Release 2008/08/11: CIA-RDP79-00927A003700090001-4 7 23
 Approved For Release 2008/08/11: CIA-RDP79-00927A003700090001-4
SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
on the West to be more forth-
coming in negotiations for a
Berlin settlement. He might
envisage this as his final ef-
fort to probe for Western con-
cessions before deciding to
proceed with a separate peace
treaty. Recent Soviet pronounce-
ments suggest that Khrushchev
will propose a "compromise" under
which the Western "occupation
regime" would be replaced by
some form of UN role in guaran-
teeing the independence and se-
curity of West Berlin. He may
also call for the admission of
both German states to the UN
and seek UN endorsement of the
need for a German peace treaty,
portraying this as the prerequi-
site for progress on disarmament
and a general improvement in
East-West relations.
The possibility cannot be
excluded, however, that Khru-
shchev has decided to proceed
toward a separate peace treaty
or invoke other measures to
heighten Berlin tensions and be-
lieves that taking the issue to
the UN would inhibit Western
reactions.
Geneva Talks
The USSR rejected on 20
August proposals for a nuclear
test ban treaty which would in-
clude tests in the atmosphere,
outer space, and under water,
but not underground explosions.
A Soviet spokesman at Geneva
said a partial test ban "will
not settle the problem" of end-
ing the nuclear armaments race
"because the Americans would
continue testing weapons under-
ground." He added that the
USSR remains "dedicated" to the
eight neutralist-members' "com-
promise" memorandum as the
"sole" basis for a treaty
banning all tests.
In a talk with Ambassa-
dor Dean on 15 August, Soviet
delegate Kuznetsov made it
clear that the USSR will not
relax its insistence on a test
ban based exclusively on na-
tional detection systems, with
no international supervision
or obligatory on-site inspec-
tions. He contended that on-
site inspection is an entirely
political question and that
the divergent views of Soviet
and US scientists are irrele-
vant. Kuznetsov hinted, how-
ever, that prospects for agree-
ment may improve in the next
few years with changed circum-
stances, including perfection
of detection systems which
might make the US more willing
to forego on-site inspection.
Soviet-Iranian Relations
The fall of the Amini
government in Iran in mid-
July moved the USSR to revive
its campaign to improve rela-
tions with Iran and to draw
that country away from its
ties with the West. In con-
trast with the abusive cam-
paign against Amini and the
Shah, Communist propaganda
has moderated its attacks on
Iran and Radio Moscow has
pointed out the benefits for
Iran of an "independent" for-
eign policy, particularly the
possibility of technical aid
from the USSR. Iranian news-
papers have reported rumors
of new Soviet loan offers.
SECRET
24 Aug 62 WRRKi.v RRVTRW Page 3 of 25
Approved For Release 2008/08/11: CIA-RDP79-00927A003700090001-4
 Approved For Release 2008/08/11: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03700090001-4
SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Soviet Ambassador Pegov
has been quite active in Tehran
in the past month, both in re-
viving a Soviet proposal for
a nonaggression treaty and in
exploiting the signing of the
annual barter agreement be-
tween the two countries.
Pegov characterized this agree-
ment, which reportedly raises
the level of trade 20 percent,
as a precursor of improved
relations and an expansion
of cultural, technical, and
economic ties. The Iranian
Government has given no indi-
cation of interest in Soviet
suggestions for expanding re-
lations and hopes to exploit
the Soviet good-will campaign
to extract a payments agree-
ment from Moscow.
SECRET
24 Aug 62 WEEKLY REVTVW n..--, 4 of 25
Approved For Release 2008/08/11: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03700090001-4
 Approved For Release 2008/08/11: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03700090001-4
SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
The Leopoldville govern-
ment has accepted the UN-sponsored
plan for reintegrating Katanga
with the rest of the Congo.
Prime Minister Adoula and his
ministers probably still doubt,
however, that the plan will
bring Tshombd into line. They
requested no important changes
in the UN proposals but said
that the suggested 50-50 split
of Katanga's mineral revenues
between Elisabethville and
Leopoldville would not satisfy
their needs.
Tshombd has publicly re-
iterated his willingness to join
a Congo federation. He has
offered to turn over to Leopold-
ville or to an international body
that part of Katanga's revenue
which is not "indispensable" to
its administration and economy,
but there is no indication that
these are more than gestures.
In fact his recent statement
that Katanga would accept rein-
tegration as "an autonomous re-
gion" under a new federal con-
stitution may reflect a harden-
ing of his bargaining position
since his return from Europe.
He fears that the UN will pre-
sent him with a Congo reconcilia-
tion proposal on which the world
will already have agreed and
about which he will have had
little to say. Reportedly,
Tshombd is not seriously
worried by threats of an economic
blockade against Katanga. He
believes that such sanctions
would affect the European rather
than the African population, and
he is probably confident that
the Portuguese and Northern
Rhodesians would maintain supply
lines into Katanga.
On 21 August Tshombd left
Elisabethville for a ten-day
tour of south Katangan tribal
areas. To maintain the UN's
timetable, UN representative
Gardiner plans to go to Elisabeth-
ville and present the UN pro-
posal to Tshombd's deputy but
this may postpone any Katangan
reply beyond the ten-day limit
envisaged by the UN.
On 16 August President
Kasavubu promulgated legislation
creating 16 new Congolese prov-
inces instead of the present
five. North Katanga was not
mentioned. The US ambassador
believes that the longer "range
position of the central govern-
ment will not be significantly
changed by this legislation,
REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC
BaNGlll Bongaasou .~'"'^-?-~^",~ SOU D A N
Mate d
Kilon a/ q
SECRET
Bon do
Gemena k eti. angbere
uluabourg*
l
epanga ~a mina
Slanleyville V-" UGANDA
K I V U
_Kasongo
24 Aug 99 WPPTrT v D'L'TTTL'TU Dnrrro ti of 25
Approved For Release 2008/08/11: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03700090001-4
 Approved For Release 2008/08/11: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03700090001-4
SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
nor will it affect Adoula's
relations with Tshomb6. Leopold-
ville's authority might even
increase as the relative politi-
cal weight of each province
dwindles.
Small-scale fighting broke
out last week south and west of
Albertville as Congolese and
Katangan units collided ap-
parently while moving to oc-
cupy as much disputed North
Katangan territory as possible.
Fearing a Katangan offensive,
the UN moved a Malayan battalion
into Albertville and issued an
ultimatum to Katanga to cease
action at once or risk UN in-
tervention. Fighting has
stopped for the moment. The
UN also fears the situation at
Elisabethville could become crit-
ical and has advised. US officials
that it may need airlift assist-
ance to reinforce its troops in
SECRET
Katanga. One of the best Congo-
lese battalions is to be in-
corporated into the UN contingent
at Kamina. The Katangans are
still keeping 60 railroad car-
loads of UN gasoline and 50
carloads of UN supplies at the
Rhodesian border. The UN
may have to airlift rations to
replenish dwindling stocks in
Elisabethville.
24 Aug 62 WEEKLY REVIEW Page 6 of 25
Approved For Release 2008/08/11: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03700090001-4
 Approved For Release 2008/08/11: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03700090001-4
SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMAR2
Without conceding the pres-
ence of foreign troops within
the territory they control, the
Pathet Lao on 23 August agreed
to the establishment of Inter-
national Control Commission
(ICC) inspection teams at Vien-
tiane, the Plaine des Jarres,
and Nhommarath, a town in south-
central Laos. Souvanna, who
earlier had expressed preference
"Fd w Ou Neua
Tay
....~Rhong Saly
o_ ,u,,, oun Neua
$HONG /
Miang 1SALY }
. Mal Muonjr Yo
Sing Na*--
`ien Thala M
PouKha~ ~
am
Muo g
`
Ban
HouE Sa NAMTHA - S a l ' LUAS(G
PRA BA
Pak
$en~Muong, Hougr
"uang
Prabangg
Sayabour' Phou
Khau
Imuorot
j ~ K~a~y?.
Ban Hin
i ,
r~
ri
forward post of limited stra-
tegic importance--is a gesture
toward the observance of the
Geneva provisions which at the
same) time prevent ICC access to
areas of greater sensitivity.
There has been no firm evidence
of withdrawal of North VietnameEe
troops from such Pathet Lao
strongpoints as Tchepone, Ban
Bar4 and Sam Neua.
?; Sam Neua 4
SAM NEUA
Khang '= Ban
Sy - ?Nang Het
.>kQUI Janes 7Xit Khouan
s XIENGG KHOU ANG
11 fPa Dong-- Tha
SJang._. J
Vieng
KHAMM~
rlno
V f H A f L A N D
L A O S
0 Royal Army base area
Meo base area
Kong Le/Pathet Lao/North
Vietnamese areas .........
ak Sane 'Kam
' \KT tt Nape,
Road
Trail
Route number
Road under
construction
for nine checkpoints throughout
Laos--several to be located
within Pathet Lao territory--
feels that the compromise solu-
tion has preserved the "prin-
ciple" of ICC inspection.
The Pathet Lao decision
to allow the stationing of an
ICC team all; Nhommarath--a
/'Mahaxay
Pha .
Ia e Tcfie
;a nnakhet
SAVAN NAKHI
Muong
Phine }
r-d
1-?'
KSU
Bassac rAttop
1PASSAK ',
ATTOPEU
SOUTH
VIETNAA
Elsewhere, Communist
mopping-up operations against
Meo guerrillas continue. On
20 August, Pathet Lao and
North Vietnamese in battalion
strength, using artillery
and mortars, captured a Meo
outpost of company strength
near Sam Neua to`.vn
SECRET
24 Aug 6 -
Approved For Release 2008/08/11: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03700090001-4 f 25
 Approved For Release 2008/08/11: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03700090001-4
JKC:KZ l
Reports from the South
Vietnamese Third Corps Area
Command indicate that several
Communist units with a total
strength of about 1,000 men
have moved into positions north
of Saigon. The Viet Cong may
be planning a large-scale at-
tack in provinces near the
capital to counter both the
military and propaganda impact
of recent government successes.
Other Vietnamese reports
point to a similar concentra-
tion of Viet Cong forces in the
highland area adjacent to Laos.
Battalion-size units, probably
including some recently :infil-
trated cadres, are said to be
grouping in the Kontum, Pleiku
and Ban Me Thuot areas. Viet
Cong strategy apparently is to
protect key infiltration routes
and to combat the government's
tribal resettlement program.
Officials in Saigon are
showing concern over the pos-
sibility that a settlement on
the Laotian pattern, which they
believe would lead to an
eventual Communist takeover, may
be applied to South Vietnam.
Continued Western press criticism
of Diem apparently has also
contributed to suspicions of
American intentions.
25X1 In a late July speech, Presi en
Diem's influential sister-in-
law, Madame Nhu, attacked the
failure of the "frivolous free
world" to cope with Communist
subversive warfare, and described
"so-called allies...who mouth
the enemy's propaganda" as "the
real traitors."
Saigon is also probably
worried by more rumors of
coup plotting. As usual, some
government sources think that
senior South Vietnamese army
officers have US or French
backing for a move against
Diem. There has been no good
evidence of such plotting,
although many military officers
remain dissatisfied with Diem's
prosecution of the counterin-
surgency effort, Some of the
rumors may be part of the Viet
Cong's effort to sow confusion.
The Viet Cong - sponsored
National Front for the Libera-
tion of South Vietnam, in a
14-point statement broadcast
by Hanoi on 18 August, renewed
its appeal for a "neutral and
independent" government in
South Vietnam--a government
in which it would hope to be
the dominant faction. It
aimed especially at arous-
ing support in Cambodia and
Laos by offering to form
wit:. those countries a neu-
tra1L zone in Southeast Asia.
The Front regards a period
of "neutrality" in South
Vietnam, after the US pres-
ence is removed, as a prel-
ude to reunification under
Hanoi. The statement
placed somewhat greater
stress on this aspect than
did earlier appeals.
SECRET
Sur h 2i e
24 Aug 6" - --- -- -- - un c-a R o f 2 5
Approved For Release 2008/08/11: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03700090001-4
 Approved For Release 2008/08/11: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03700090001-4
SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
The electoral lists for the
2 September Constituent Assembly
elections area compromise
between Ben Bella and Algerian
military leaders, who have
again demonstrated their power
by blocking the former's efforts
to hand-pick candidates. Since
the listed candidates are certain
to be elected, the resulting as-
sembly is likely to reflect the
divisive viewpoints that have
hampered the creation of an
effective central government.
The list of 196 candidates
contains 72 military personnel,
but only two wilaya commanders.
The chief of staff of the
Algerian National Army (ALN),
Colonel Boumedienne, and the
commanders of Wilayas I, V,
and VI--generally regarded
as supporting Ben Bella--are
not included, suggesting that
they prefer to remain identified
primarily as military leaders.
There are, however, large num-
bers of other officers from
these three wilayas on the lists.
When confronted with specific
legislation and the problems of
drafting a constitution, the
military group is more likely
to fragment along regional and
personal lines than to maintain
itself as a bloc.
All members of the PAG
are on the lists except
Saad Dahlab and Hocine Ait
Ahmed, who resigned, Lakhdar
Ben Tobbal, who has left the
country, and Mohamed Khider
and Rabah Bitat, who apparently
desired to concentrate on re-
organizing the FLN into a
political party. Labor and
student organizations have 13
representatives on the lists,
while most of the 16 Europeans
are persons who actively
cooperated with the national-
ists during the rebellion,
rather than "liberals" who
were not actually in the
rebel camp. So far as can be
ascertained at present, none
of the candidates is primarily
a peasant representative,
although an ambitious agrarian
reform is the cornerstone of
Ben Bella's program.
The assembly is also to
appoint the first Algerian
government. PAG Information
Minister Yazid told the US
consul general in Algiers on
18 August that an attempt will
be made, presumably by the
political bureau and the
military leaders, to agree
prior to the elections on a
government which the assembly
could nominate. He indicated,
however, that this would be
difficult, perhaps impossible.
Meanwhile, Ben Bella
and the political bureau are
apparently having difficulty
in establishing an effective
administrative organization.
SECRET
24 Aug 62 WEEKLY REVIEW Page 9 of 25
Approved For Release 2008/08/11: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03700090001-4
 Approved For Release 2008/08/11: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03700090001-4
Approved For Release 2008/08/11: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03700090001-4
 Approved For Release 2008/08/11: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03700090001-4
SECRET
HUNGARIAN PARTY DISCIPLINES FORMER STALINIST OFFICIALS
Disciplinary action last
week against 26 members of the
Hungarian Communist party
probably marks the climax of
First Secretary Kadar's three-
year effort to disperse opposition
in the party to his policies and
leadership. One politburo mem-
ber was demoted and 25 other party
members were ousted by the central
committee during its expanded
meeting of 14-16 August in which
all district party leaders par-
ticipated. The disciplinary
steps and an announcement that
190 former party members who
had been jailed between 1949 and
1953 had been "completely" re-
habilitated were described as
closing the book on injustices
committed within the party in
the Rakosi era of "cult of
personality." All the victims
had been accused by a special
party commission of varying
degrees of responsibility for
the political trials and in-
carcerations of party members
during that period.
politburo but allowed to retain
his membership on the central
committee and his positions in
the government. He had been
removed from his position on
the party secretariat last fall,
and probably will not be re-
elected to the central committee
at the November party congress.
Of the 23 others deprived of
party membership, 17 were
former judiciary, prosecution,
or police officials. Six were
accused of forming a factional
group with Rakosi. No names
were divulged, suggesting that
none of the victims is currently
prominent in the party.
The party that was re-
constituted in 1957 contained
many members who did not agree
with Kadar's policies, and it
was not until the last party
congress--in 1959--that he was
able, by expanding the central
committee, to obtain a clear
majority supporting his views.
At the session, former
Stalinist leaders Matyas Rakosi
and Erno Gero were deprived of
their party membership. Both
have long been used by the
regime as examples of what can
happen under "rule of the cult
of personality." Rakosi ap-
parently is still in the USSR,
to which he fled in 1956; Gero
is believed to have returned
to Hungary in 1961.
Karoly Kiss, the last
remaining high-level holdover
from the Rakosi era aside from
Radar, was removed from the
Since 1959, and particularly
within the last nine months,
the Kadar regime has been
striving to eliminate the still
considerable opposition at the
lower levels of party and gov-
ernment administration. A key
issue in the recent past has
been agricultural policies,
with the hard-liners arguing
in favor of harsher methods
and against the use of such
measures as incentives. In
response, Kadar has eased op-
ponents out of positions of
influence in the government
and economy in favor of qual-
ified non-party people. A party
SECRET
24 Aug 61 Approved For Release 2008/08/11: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03700090001-4 3' of 25
 Approved For Release 2008/08/11: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03700090001-4
Vit WiWaJi
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
journal this summer noted that
because of their attitudes
certain people--the hard-lin-
ers--would have to leave their
party jobs. At the same time,
some capable former supporters
of Rakosi-type policies--such
as former politburo member
Hidas and economic theorist
Friss--have made their peace
with Kadar and are working in
responsible positions outside
the party.
Although the regime admits
that opponents of Kadar still
exist in the party and admin-
istration, it appears that
Kadar has succeeded in rendering
impotent the "sectarian and
dogmatic" opposition in the
party. His patient efforts to
install people who would be loyal
to him are beginning to pay off,
and the forthcoming congress
should leave him at his strongest
since 1956.
The ouster of Rakos3, and
Gero from the party is probably
also a gesture toward improving
relations with Yugoslavia. Mos-
cow and East Berlin, reporting
the ouster,quoted the Hungarian
indictment that these two in-
dividuals, among other iniquities,
had "voiced groundless suspicions
against... leaders of other
fraternal parties... and thus
caused immeasurable damage on
an international scale."
Kadar may also have hoped
that the party's actions last
week would be favorably re-
garded by Acting UN Secretary
General Thant. Thant, who is
to begin a tour of some East
European capitals on 24 Au-
gust, has maintained that he
could not. visit Hungary un-
less Kadar made some gesture
toward complying with the UN
1,e'>olution. There is no evi-
dence yet, however, that
Hungarian officials have re-
issued an invitation to Thant
to visit the country.
SECRET
24 Auz 62 WEEKLY REVIEW
Page 13 of 25
Approved For Release 2008/08/11: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03700090001-4
 Approved For Release 2008/08/11: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03700090001-4
`ww&ECRET
CHURCH AND STATE IN POLAND
Poland's Communist party is
continuing its drive to force the
church to confine its activities
strictly to worship. The Gomulka
regime announced on 13 August that
all remaining Roman Catholic schools
and orphanages will be sequestered
by the state by the end of the 1963
school year. Since 1960 all but 17
of 50 religious schools and 30 of
460 orphanages have been closed
without violence or even markedly
adverse public reaction, testifying
to the effectiveness of the party's
tactics of gradual encroachment on
church prerogatives..
The closing of church schools
and orphanages, which began in
1960, was formalized by a school re-
form law promulgated in July 1961,
which specifically forbade members
of religious orders to teach.
However, most of these institu-
tions operated as usual through-
out the 1961-1962 school year and
it was during the past two sum-
mer vacation months that most of
the closures were effected.
The party's attack on the
church has not been limited to
primary and secondary education.
The regime has gradually forced
the Catholic University at Lublin
--the only institution of its
kind in the bloc--to give up all
its nontheological faculties ex-
cept humanities. Now the 100
students of the university's
English department reportedly will
not be permitted to participate in
a required seminar sponsored by
the Ministry of Higher Education,
and thus will be ineligible to
receive their degrees. The uni-
versity also is under the threat
of seizure for nonpayment of
ruinously exorbitant back taxes
and suffers from competition by
the state university at Lublin
for its professors and students.
Its graduates are often rejected
by prospective employers at the
instigation of the party. The ulti-
mate aim of the regime is to reduce
the university to the status of an
advanced theological seminary.
In the past year the state ap-
parently has stepped up personal
attacks against priests, including
beatings, false arrests and convic-
tions on trumped-up criminal and
moral charges, and confiscation
24 Aug 62
Approved For Release 2008/08/11 CIA-RDP79-00927AO03700090001-4 age 14 of 25
of church and personal property
--including even clothes and fur-
niture--of those priests who re-
fuse to pay ruinously high taxes.
Increasing numbers of nuns are
being forced out of work in hos-
pitals, and many convents have been
closed on the pretext that the nuns
occupy more living space than is
allowed by law.
Atheistic propaganda has in-
creased. Birth control agitation
has lessened because the regime dem-
ographic forecasts show a natural
downturn in the expected birth rate;
nevertheless both birth control
and legalized abortion remain as of-
ficial state policies which are vig-
orously opposed by the church. Since
1960 official contacts between the
episcopate and the government have
been virtually nonexistent.
The regime's position has been
strengthened by a recent law on
public gatherings, which in effect
gives the police discretionary power
over all church gatherings. The law
has been used in Poznan, for instance,
to break up a meeting of students
within a church, because the topic
urxIEr discussion was judged to be non-
religious. In other cases outdoor
processions have been banned. The
parity has met the church's resist-
ance by drafting seminarians into
the army and by countless daily ha-
rassments of any recalcitrant clergy.
Stefan Cardinal Wyszynski,
primate of the church in Poland, has
called repeatedly and publicly for
redress of these wrongs, but with-
out effect. The Sejm (parliament)
leadership has rejected two re-
quests by the cardinal for an in-
vestigation of church-state affairs.
His relations with Catholic dep-
uties in the Sejm appear to have
deteriorated as a result of dif-
ferences over the role of Catholic
laymen, in Poland vis-a-vis the Com-
munist regime.
Despite the primate's efforts
to fight back, the regime appears
to have been remarkably successful
in isolating the hierarchy from
the community, especially in urban
areas. The church retains basically
strong popular support, however, and
the regime's attacks against it prob-
ably will continue to be marked by
cautious gradualism.
SECRET 25X1
 Approved For Release 2008/08/11: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03700090001-4
SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
The recent dual Soviet man-
in-space operation demonstrated
two significant achievements:
the ability to launch a second
satellite into close proximity
to a first; and the prolonged
use of the life support system
to about half the time needed
for a manned landing on the moon
and return. It is still not
clear whether the USSR intends
to place priority on manned
flight in near-earth operations
or to compete with the US in
landing a man on the moon. This
operation is considered an im-
portant milestone leading to
either objective.
The announced purposes of
the tests were to establish com-
munications between the two
cosmonauts, to study the differ-
ences in their behavior in the
same space environment, and to
investigate the coordination
of their action.
The flight also enabled
the Soviets to investigate the
communications problems involved
in such an operation. Soviet
statements indicate that com-
munications were adequate for
the mission intended.
The most perfectly syn-
chronized launching of Vostok
IV into close proximity to
Vostok III and into an orbit
almost identical to the one
in which Vostok III had been
launched a day earlier consti-
tutes the successful completion
of the first stage of a rendez-
vous, mission. For such a mis-
sion, it is necessary to place
the two vehicles near enough
together to permit a powered
flight maneuver to close the
remaining distance. 25X1
Soviet statements indicate
that a major part of the experi-
ment was oriented toward. the
collection of physiological data
related to the maintenance of
life in a space environment.
In contrast to the earlier one-
day flight in Vostok II, manned
flights of several days' duration
pose many new problems such as
the removal of waste products
and the generation of oxygen
for extended periods. Further,
more prolonged. flights will be
necessary to develop a capabil-
ity for meeting the life support
requirements of a manned lunar
flight. A landing on the moon
and return will require six to
ten days, and a circumlunar
flight a minimum of about five
days.
According to Soviet
statements the two capsules
landed about 200 kilometers
apart in an area north of Lake
Balkhash.
SECRET
24 Aug 62 WEEKLY REVIEW of 25
Approved For Release 2008/08/11: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03700090001-4
 Approved For Release 2008/08/11: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03700090001-4
J- C4l[L'? l
IWO
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Several recent interviews
given Western newsmen by Chinese
Communist Foreign Minister Chen
Yi afford some insight into Pei-
ping's anxiety about its eco-
nomic problems. Chen pictured
Peiping's current attitude as
one of sober realism. "We have
learned that building a country
is not an easy thing," he said,
and added that the regime is
presently scaling down its in-
dustrial and agricultural pro-
grams to levels which "can be
achieved."
He admitted that the grain
crop for the first half of 1962
would be worse than the poor
harvest during the same period
of 1961, and that the short-
falls in agriculture over the
past three years had affected
the whole economy and greatly
reduced the rate of China's in-
dustrial construction. He con-
ceded that at least 20 percent
of China's communes are in "bad
condition," and that many of
Peiping's "several million"
opponents on the mainland have
exploited economic difficulties
in attacking the regime. The
foreign minister displayed con-
siderable sensitivity over for-
eign criticism that mainland in-
dustrial and agricultural short-
falls prove Peiping has failed;
he argued that 13 years of Com-
munist control was not enough
time to permit any conclusions.
Chen's remarks suggested
that domestic difficulties have
induced an attitude of restraint
on certain foreign policy issues,
notably the Taiwan Strait and
the Indian border. In an in-
terview with Japanese newsmen
on 29 May, at the time when
Chinese Communist troops began
their buildup in the Taiwan
Strait area, Chen displayed
what appeared to be genuine
concern over the possibility
that Taipei, aided by the US,
would attempt an invasion to
exploit mainland economic dif-
ficulties. In interviews with
Western newsmen at Geneva in
mid-July, Chen seemed less ap-
prehensive. He claimed that
the Communist buildup had forced
Taipei to change its plans, and
that the US had given assurances
SECRET
24 Aug 62 WEEKT.Y RF.VTF,W Page 16
Approved For Release 2008/08/11: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03700090001-4
to the Chinese Communists at
Warsaw that it would not back
Taipei in an attack, thus creat-
ing a "detente" in the Taiwan
Strait.
Chen stated that if the
United States "restrains" Chiang
Kai-shek, a "dangerous situa-
tion" in the area will not de-
velop, although "sporadic shelling
will take place in the accustomed
manner." His remarks on this
score constitute the nearest
to a pledge not to attack the
Nationalists which Peiping has
yet given, and probably reflect
a Chinese Communist decision
to avoid any substantial mili-
tary pressure on Taipei until
the mainland economic situation
substantially improves.
The foreign minister made
it clear that Peiping still de-
mands a withdrawal of US forces
from Taiwan before any "rapproche-
ment" can be reached in Sino-US
relations. In his interview with
the Japanese, Chen indicated that
Peiping did not foresee an early
rapprochement. "We cannot re-
treat," he said, and he indicated
that the Chinese believe Washing-
ton has no intention of modifying
its position either. Chen's pur-
pose was apparently to suggest
that Peiping was willing to live
with, the present stalemate indefi-
nitely and would not be forced to
make concessions to the US because
of China's economic difficulties.
On the subject of relations
with India, Chen expressed. fear
that leaders in New Delhi would
attempt to exploit China's eco-
nomic difficulties to "push
their advantage" in Ladakh.
Chen indicated that China would
strive to prevent clashes along
the border. He stated, however,
that it would be "impossible"
for Chinese forces to withdraw
from their positions in the face
of Indian military pressure. A
border settlement, he indicated,
ought to be worked out according
to the principle of the "line of
effective control," that is,
acceptance of China's and
India's claims to the territory
currently held by their re-
s ecitive forces.
 Approved For Release 2008/08/11: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03700090001-4
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Several recent interviews
given Western newsmen by Chinese
Communist Foreign Minister Chen
Yi afford some insight into Pei-
ping's anxiety about its eco-
nomic problems. Chen pictured
Peiping's current attitude as
one of sober realism. "We have
learned that building a country
is not an easy thing," he said,
and added that the regime is
presently scaling down its in-
dustrial and agricultural pro-
grams to levels which "can be
achieved."
He admitted that the grain
crop for the first half of 1962
would be worse than the poor
harvest during the same period
of 1961, and that the short-
falls in agriculture over the
past three years had affected
the whole economy and greatly
reduced the rate of China's in-
dustrial construction. He con-
ceded that at least 20 percent
of China's communes are in "bad
condition," and that many of
Peiping's "several million"
opponents on the mainland have
exploited economic difficulties
in attacking the regime. The
foreign minister displayed con-
siderable sensitivity over for-
eign criticism that mainland in-
dustrial and agricultural short-
falls prove Peiping has failed;
he argued that 13 years of Com-
munist control was not enough
time to permit any conclusions.
Chen's remarks suggested
that domestic difficulties have
induced an attitude of restraint
on certain foreign policy issues,
notably the Taiwan Strait and
the Indian border. In an in-
terview with Japanese newsmen
on 29 May, at the time when
Chinese Communist troops began
their buildup in the Taiwan
Strait area, Chen displayed
what appeared to be genuine
concern over the possibility
that Taipei, aided by the US,
would attempt an invasion to
exploit mainland economic dif-
ficulties. In interviews with
Western newsmen at Geneva in
mid-July, Chen seemed less ap-
prehensive. He claimed that
the Communist buildup had forced
Taipei to change its plans, and
that the US had given assurances
to the Chinese Communists at
Warsaw that it would not back
Taipei in an attack, thus creat-
ing a "detente" in the Taiwan
Strait.
Chen stated that if the
United States "restrains" Chiang
Kai-shek, a "dangerous situa-
tion" in the area will not de-
velop, although "sporadic shelling
will take place in the accustomed
manner." His remarks on this
score constitute the nearest
to a pledge not to attack the
Nationalists which Peiping has
yet given, and probably reflect
a Chinese Communist decision
to avoid any substantial mili-
tary pressure on Taipei until
the mainland economic situation
substantially improves.
The foreign minister made
it clear that Peiping still de-
mands a withdrawal of US forces
from Taiwan before any "rapproche-
ment" can be reached in Sino-US
relations. In his interview with
the Japanese, Chen indicated that
Peiping did not foresee an early
rapprochement. "We cannot re-
treat," he said, and he indicated
that the Chinese believe Washing-
ton has no intention of modifying
its position either. Chen's pur-
pose was apparently to suggest
that Peiping was willing to live
with the preselAt stalemate indefi-
nitely and would not be forced to
make concessions to the US because
of China's economic difficulties.
On the subject of relations
with India, Chen expressed. fear
that leaders in New Delhi would
attempt to exploit China's eco-
nomic difficulties to "push
their advantage" in Ladakh.
Chen indicated that China would
strive to prevent clashes along
the border. He stated, however,
that it would be "impossible"
for Chinese forces to withdraw
from their positions in the face
of Indian military pressure. A
border settlement, he indicated,
ought to be worked out according
to the principle of the "line of
effective control," that is,
acceptance of China's and
India's claims to the territory
currently held by their re-
SECRET 25X1
24 Aug 62 WEEKT.V RRVTRW Page 16 of 25
Approved For Release 2008/08/11: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03700090001-4
 25X6 Approved For Release 2008/08/11: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03700090001-4
Approved For Release 2008/08/11: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03700090001-4
 Approved For Release 2008/08/11: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03700090001-4
*4001, SOO
SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Africans in this self-
governing British colony are
turning increasingly toward
violence to protest white eco-
nomic and political domination.
African nationalists are poorly
organized, but they have been
encouraged by the outside sym-
pathy they feel they have gained
in recent discussions of South-
ern Rhodesia in the UN General
Assembly.
Southern Rhodesia's leading
African party, the Zimbabwe
African People's Union (ZAPU),
has announced that it will re-
fuse to participate in next
spring's legislative elections.
The elections are to be held
under the terms of the 1961 con-
stitution, which "safeguards'"
15 of 65 legislative seats for
Africans although Africans out-
number whites 13 to 1. The
party will probably attempt a
campaign of terrorism: intim-
idation, especially in towns,
of other Africans who refuse to
follow the party line; strikes
and demonstrations against Euro-
peans generally; sabotage of
communications facilities; and
eventually, attacks on individ-
ual Europeans and government
officers.
ZAPU's main strength is
among urban Africans, but rural
branches of ZAPU are being rap-
idly organized..
ZAPU president Joshua
Nkomo, on returning to Salisbury
in late July after the success-
ful presentation of the Africans'
case to the UN, demanded inde-
pendence for the colony within
a short time. He threatened a
"complete economic breakdown or
bloody revolution" should Britain
refuse to negotiate.
Prime Minister Whitehead's
government is meeting ZAPU's
challenge with new legislation
which empowers it to ban not
only specific groups of persons
engaging in unlawful activity
but the parent organization
to which the groups belong.
Stiffer penalties al?e to we
levied against leaders. Mean-
while, government leaders have
declared. that they will ignore
a recommendation by the UN last
June to change the constitution.
past.
Southern Rhodesia's 5,000-
member police force, called the
British South African Police,
is the best prepared of the
local forces in Central Africa
to repress internal disturbances.
The government would also use
Rhodesia and Nyasaland federal
and territorial troops--largely
white--to assist in maintaining
law and order, as it has in the
SECRET
24 Aug 62 WEEKLY REVTEW 1$ of 25
Approved For Release 2008/08/11: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03700090001-4
 Approved For Release 2008/08/11: CIA-RDP79-00927A003700090001-4
'SSECRET NMO
The position of the Social Chris-
tian (PSC) - Socialist party (PSB)
coalition government is extremely
weak and its continuation in office
after Parliament reconvenes on 2
October is problematical. No prog-
ress was made in the last session
on any of the major problems con-
fronting the government, and
Prime Minister Lefevre of the PSC
lost heavily in public esteem by
his inept handling of the legis-
lative program. Serious splits
developed within the PSC and be-
tween the coalition partners
over most of the measures con-
sidered by Parliament. The only
bright spot in an otherwise dismal
legislative record was the perform-
ance of Foreign Minister Spaak,
whose vigor and skill were pri=
marily responsible for keeping
the feeble coalition together.
New elections in the immediate
future are not likely, since the
present government took office
only in April 1961, but a shift in
the premiership appears inevitable
and two or three other unpopular
ministers may be replaced.
Trouble for the coalition be-
gan last spring when the Catholic
party only halfheartedly endorsed
the fiscal reform bill, designed
to overhaul the archaic tax struc-
ture and increase tax revenues. On
another issue, the Flemish Cath-
olics demanded, over bitter. So-
cialist opposition, that the Ed-
ucation Ministry be divided into
separate Flemish- and French-
speaking halves. A government col-
lapse was narrowly averted largely
through the intervention of Spaak,
but the education dispute ruined
the efforts of the government to
fix a linguistic frontier between
the two sections of the country,
another high-voltage political
issue. Resentful Catholic con-
servatives then joined the oppo-
sition Liberals in amending and
delaying the fiscal reform bill
until its passage became impos-
sible before Parliament adjourned
early in August. Consequently,
the PSC finance minister has
threatened to resign unless the
crippling amendments are removed,
while the Socialists, who are com-
mitted to fiscal reform, have
warned Lefevre that their continued
participation in the coalition
will depend upon the success of
the measure.
Socialist prospects in any
future election are brightened by
the weakened state of the Catholic
party, which is torn by internal dis-
sension on almost every issue. The
Socialist party is in better shape
since the principal threat to its
unity has disappeared. The Walloon
popular movement in the Liege dis-
trict had threatened for some time
to draw left-wing elements in Belgium
into a separatist organization under
a firebrand left-wing Socialist
leader, Andre Renard. Renard:'s
death last month, however, deprived
the movement of much of its momentum
and took considerable pressure off
the Socialists.
:[n the field of foreign af-
fairs the government and the country
have been well served by Spaak. His
skillful handling of the Congo prob-
lem and his strenuous efforts on
behalf of European integration have
made him the outstanding public
figure in Belgium. His influence
has kept the shaky Lefevre coalition
in office for the last six months.
His Congo policy, however, is en-
countering bitter resistance from
powerful financial interests rep-
resented in the opposition Liberal
partyas well as in the Catholic party,
such as Paul Struye, president of
the Senate, who was instrumental
in mangling the fiscal reform pro-
gram. The campaign being waged by
these people on behalf of Tshomb6
will test Spaak's ability to hold
Belgium in line in the coming
months behind the US-UN plan for
reintegration of the Congo.
Although Spaak has agreed to an
economic blockade of Katanga, on con-
dition that the UN protect Belgian
property there, a resumption of
fighting is likely to fan anti-
American and anti-UN feeling in Bel-
gium to a point beyond Spaak's abil-
ity to control it. Such a develop-
ment may rally public opinion behind
the Lefevre government, which has
so far held a neutral course in the
matter, and give it another lease
of life at least until the Congo
question is settled and public
opinion can be focused on domestic
affairs.
SECRET
24 Aug 62 WEEKLY REVIEW
Approved For Release 2008/08/11: CIA-RDP79-00927A003700090001-4 ~-~ of 25
 Approved For Release 2008/08/11: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03700090001-4
V*aw -*No
SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
PORTUGUESE DEFENSE EXPENDITURES
Portuguese defense spending
is increasing, due mainly to. the
military campaign in Angola. The
increase may absorb more than
half of all government outlays by
the end of the year. The soaring
defense costs will probably force
a slowdown in the implementation
of government plans for economic
development, and increase pop-
ular dissatisfaction with Prime
Minister Salazar's regime.
The 1961 Portuguese defense
budget exceeded eight percent of
the estimated gross national prod-
uct, the highest proportion of
GNP devoted to defense in a West
European country. The original
1962 defense budget, $157.6 mil-
lion, was six percent higher
than the figure for 1961. On
12 July a supplemental $45 mil-
lion appropriation brought an-
other rise of 29 percent
outstanding obligations
and rising expenses will require
a further increase of $87 million
by the end of the year. These
increases would bring the overall
national budget to $568.6 million,
a rise of 38 percent over 1961,
with the defense share $290 mil-
lion or 51 percent.
The finance minister, in
his budget message last January,
said that the six-percent in-
crease would not require any cut-
back in economic development proj-
ects, but a reduction now seems
inevitable in the light of the
great rise in defense expend-
itures. This rise will not only
retard the much needed develop-
ment of the economies of-Portu-
gal and its African holdings,
thereby reducing the country's
prospects for eventual associ-
ation with the European Economic
Community, but also is likely
to divert funds which could be
used to raise low Portuguese
living standards.
In addition to an increase
in popular discontent, the regime
may encounter growing political
pressure from Lisbon banking and
financial interests which resent
further increases in internal
taxes imposed this year in both
Portugal and Angola as one means
of meeting rising military costs.
One tax in this category, announced
by the government in June, is a
new levy on business profits,
ranging from 5 to 30 percent and
affecting most companies which
had been operating in Angola for
more than five years. The need
to meet rising defense costs may
spur the regime to demand substan-
tial financial assistance from the
US as one condition for a renewal
of the Azores bases agreement,
due to expire at the end of this
year.
SECRET
24 Aug 62 W1 RWT.V P1 VTTZ'W n-~, 9,0 of 25
Approved For Release 2008/08/11: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03700090001-4
 Approved For Release 2008/08/11: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03700090001-4
*ale
SECRET
The prospect of an immedi-
ate overthrow of the Guido gov-
ernment has receded, but dissen-
sion in the army, the weakened
power and prestige of the gov-
ernment
still threaten the regime.
With the appointment of
retired General Cornejo Saravia
as secretary of war, rivalries
within the army shifted from
open confrontation of troops
tointra-army contention over
positions of command and con-
trol. The rebel faction has
succeeded in placing its sup-
porters in the key positions
of commander-in-chief of the
armed forces, chief of the
general staff, and a number
of commands at interior posts.
General Federico Toranzo Montero,
instigator of the crisis, has
returned to his command, at the
4th Army Corps headquarters in
Salta.
On the other hand., the
position of the loyalist fac-
tion has been strengthened by
the appointment of General
Julio Alsogaray--brother of
Economy Minister Alvaro
Alsogaray--as commander of stra-
tegic Campo de Mayo garrison
and the appointment of General
Carlos Ongania as commander of
the Cavalry Corps. Both are
firm supporters of the Guido
government and. of constitution-
ality. The shuffle of army
commands has divided power fairly
evenly between the two groups.
The air force continues to be
a strong supporter of the gov-
ernment. The navy--at least
for the present--also appears
to back the government.
The refusal of more than
400 ;junior officers to accept
the authority of Chief of the
General Staff Carlos Turolo
led to his resignation on 22
August. The appointment of
General Bernardino Labayru as
Turo:Lo's successor may be a
significant victory for the
rebel faction.
Press
reports state that General
Labayru has privately expressed
the opinion that the Guido gov-
ernment is unconstitutional
and should be replaced by a
strong military regime.
SECRET
24 Aug 62 Approved For Release 2008/08/11: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03700090001-4 1 of 25
 Approved For Release 2008/08/11: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03700090001-4
SECRET
A commitment by the con-
servative congress to act favor-
ably in September on measures
sought by the leftist adminis-
tration of President Goulart has
eased the country's political
crisis, at least temporarily.
Congressional leaders have
agreed that congress will re-
assemble in Brasilia from 10
to 15 September, despite the
pressures of campaigning for
congressional elections on 7
October. At that time, a firm
date prior to mid-April 1963
will be set for a plebiscite on
the year-old parliamentary sys-
tem. In addition, a limited
concession will be made on the
administration's request for
facilitating amendment of the
constitution. The parliamentary
system appears widely unpopular
in Brazil, and a plebiscite is
likely to result in a return to
a strong presidency.
The Goulart administration
is apparently optimistic that
congressional leaders will keep
their commitment to take action
in September. An administration
official has stated that air
force planes would be used to
assemble the congressmen and
that "since everyone agrees, if
a few votes are missing nobody
will complain if those votes
show up in the 'yes' column
anyway."
Congressional action to
authorize the plebiscite would
be a partial victory for
President Goulart. It would
be likely to increase his
ability to help candidates from
his leftist Labor party in the
October congressional elections.
A congressional failure to follow
through on its commitment, on
the other hand, would be likely
to result in a new crisis.
Political uncertainty is
reflected in a deterioration of
the foreign exchange situation.
A sharp drop in the freely
fluctuating tourist exchange
rate in early August was followed
recently by a 20-percent drop
in the official exchange rate.
Negotiations with West Germany
for $50 million in economic
aid have been suspended because
of Brazilian insistence that
all aid shipments should be
transported in Brazilian ships,
although Brazil probably does
not have sufficient tonnage to
handle them.
Meanwhile, leftist polit-
ical. elements are apparently
organizing a country-wide political
bloc to coordinate campaigning
for the congressional elections.
President Goulart's ultra-
nationalist brother-in-law,
Leonel Brizola, who is the fore-
most critic of the Alliance
for Progress in Brazil, is report-
edly to be coordinator in southern
Brazil from Rio de Janeiro to
the Uruguayan border. Former
Foreign Minister San Thiago
Dantas, a former fascist who
has in recent year,.: been the
chief ideological adviser of
Goulart's leftist Labor party,
is to head the campaign in the
central states, while pro-
Communist Miguel Arraes is to
be in charge in the impoverished
SECRET
24 Aug 62 WEEKLY REVIEW Pn.s_re 22 of 25
Approved For Release 2008/08/11: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03700090001-4
 Approved For Release 2008/08/11: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03700090001-4
NOW
SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
COLOMBIA
President Valencia and
his military leaders are inten-
sifying operations to eliminate
bandit and insurgent groups
which continue to terrorize
many rural areas of central and
western Colombia. Valencia,
who took office on 7 August,
BOGOTA
Statute Miles 300
SECRET
# ece Ian
Area of recent rural violence
considers rural violence to be
Colombia's most serious problem.
The most violent outbreak since
late 1961 occurred on 15 August
when bandits using grenades and
automatic weapons killed 25
persons traveling on a bus 90
miles north of Bogota.
24 Aug 62 vrrrrv. ", 7.77- - --
Approved For Release 2008/08/11: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03700090001-4 f 25
 Approved For Release 2008/08/11: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03700090001-4
NOW Nor
SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Military operations appear
to be increasing in all areas
of heavy violence. Several
notorious bandit leaders have
been captured or killed and
their bands dispersed.
President Valencia's
appointment of General Ruiz
Novoaas minister of war is
expected to add further impetus
to the drive against violence.
Ruiz is considered the most
able officer in the army and a
strong proponent of civic action
as a means of removing the
causes of rural unrest. One
of the principal obstacles to
reducing the violence is the
lack of cooperation between
the rural population and the
army. Ruiz hopes to gain the
confidence of the peasants by
increased army participation
in social and economic projects.
While most of the armed
bands are essentially nonpolit-
ical, there is some evidence
that the violence in certain
areas may be resuming the polit-
ical character that prevailed
during the 1949-53 period of
Liberal-Conservative hostil-
ities. Four prominent political
leaders; including two congress-
men, have been assassinated in
recent weeks. Colombian officials
fear that some members of the
Liberal party--resentful that
the National Front system of
alternation has installed a
Conservative in the presidency
when a majority of the electorate
is Liberal--may be resorting
to violence to express their
dissatisfaction -
There is also increased
evidence of Communist efforts
to coordinate the outlaw bands
into an insurgent movement.
The pro-Castro United Front for
Revolutionary Action was formed
in March 1962 and has been in-
creasing in strength, reportedly
with substantial financial aid
from Cuba. This organization,
rather than the less violent
Colombian Communist party,
appears to be the instrument
of Cuban plans to incite armed
revolution in Colombia.
While the 42,000-man army
probably still lacks adequate
communications and training to
neutralize all active bandit
groups in the foreseeable
future, the renewed campaign
could substantially reduce
unrest in many rural areas.
SECRET
24 Aug (32 Approved For Release 2008/08/11: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03700090001-4 )f 25
 Approved For Release 2008/08/11: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03700090001-4
SECRET
EDUCATION AND INDOCTRINATION IN CUBA
Extensive educational and
mass indoctrination programs
have been developed by the Cas-
tro regime in an effort to en-
sure continuation of its public
support, now derived mainly from
Cuban youth groups. Cuba's ed-
ucational system, drawing on
technical and material support
from the bloc, is still expand-
ing and its instructional ma-
terial is evolving along increas-
ingly Marxist lines. "Old Com-
munists" in the field of educa-
tion have apparently suffered
little of the downgrading re-
cently applied to veteran party
members in Cuban political organ-
izations.
In contrast to the disorgan-
ization and poor planning which
threaten Cuba with economic dis-
aster, there is firm anc: com-
plete regime control of all ac-
tivities in the field of mass
education and indoctrination.
A host of new educational in-
stitutions have sprung up in
revolutionary Cuba, all aimed
at further preparing all sec-
tors of Cuban society to live
and work under "socialism."
Much of the impetus came in
1961, Cuba's "Year of Education,"
when an all-out effort was made
to reduce the illiteracy rate--
an estimated 25 percent. Regime
claims in December 1961 that
only 271,000 "unteachables,"
(3.9 percent of the population)
remained unable to read and
write after the campaign may
well be exaggerated; the cam-
paign's efforts in laying the
groundwork for the further ex-
tension of "socialism" in Cuba
must nevertheless be considered
of major significance.
Most of the drive and
direction behind Cuba's mass
indoctrination program is fur-
nished by long-time Communist
party stalwarts, whose status
has apparently changed little
despite the relative disgrace
into which other "old" Commu-
nists have fallen since the
ouster in late March of veteran
Communist Anibal Escalante.
The present rector of the Uni-
versity of Havana, Juan Marinello,
was president of Cuba's Popular
Socialist (Communist) party (PSP)
from 1939 until the party was
"dissolved" in August 1961.
At the head of Cuba's important
"School of Revolutionary In-
struction"--designed to train
political cadres in the finer
points of Communist theory and
practice--is Lionel Soto, who
has been active in Cuban Commu-
nist affairs since the late
1940's.
"old" Communists
con inue o overshadow young,
inexperienced, and weaker "new"
Communists at the national,
provincial, and local levels
of Cuba's educational system.
The government's pervasive
propaganda and indoctrination
apparatus is, according to most
accounts, only now beginning
to reach a high degree of ef-
ficiency in Cuba's primary and
secondary school system. The
public school curriculum
changed little during Castro's
first two years in power, but
a special program for each grade
level emphasizing "social
studies" was begun during this
period. At present the curricu-
lum is completely Marxist in
nature, distorting both histori-
cal and geographic facts. Text-
books now in use in Cuba are
restricted to the works of
prominent Cuban Communists or
other Communist-oriented
authors, and "popular" themes
for children's compositions
are said to include "the new
socio-political system in
Cuba," "the wonders of the
revolutionary government,"
"Castro's visit to the UN,"
and so on.
According to a recent
government announcement, more
than 18,000 young Cubans now
are abroad on all-expenses-paid
trips to bloc. countries for
training of varying types and
duration. Judging from present
trends, such travel for study
will continue to increase. At
home a steady increase in the
number of school facilities
and scholarship programs has
been given priority by the re-
gime. According to Havana's
Communist newspaper Hoy in
early June, more than-71,000
students were then studying in
Cuban institutions under govern-
ment scholarships.
SECRET
24 Aug 6~ Approved For Release 2008/08/11: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03700090001-4 of 25
 25X6 Approved For Release 2008/08/11: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03700090001-4
Next 2 Page(s) In Document Denied
Approved For Release 2008/08/11: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03700090001-4
 Approved For Release 2008/08/11: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03700090001-4
%W *fte
SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
THE ROYAL REGIME IN MOROCCO
Partly by default of other
political elements, King Hassan
II dominates the politics of in-
dependent Morocco. Regarded by
other Moroccan leaders as a
francophile playboy when he suc-
ceeded his popular father a year
and a half ago, he has proved to
be an able political tactician
He
has obtained a large measure of
support from the Moroccan people,
partly by adopting as his own
slogans developed by the politi-
cal leaders and intellectuals
who had hoped to rule while the
King. reigned. Hassan relies
heavily on the army, both as a
political weight and as a source
of administrative talent, and
on the security forces. In
foreign affairs, the King publicly
espouses nonalignment and from
time to time makes appropriate
neutralist gestures, but his
policy in practice is to stay
within easy reach of the Western
umbrella. He is especially con-
cerned over the future attitudes
of Algeria.
Hassan's unpopularity with
most of Morocco's partisan po-
litical leaders was established
well before he came to the throne.
His father, King Mohamed V,
flouted Moroccan tradition by
proclaiming Hassan crown prince
and grooming him as his succes-
sor. When Mohamed formed a
"royal" government in May 1960,
Hassan was named deputy premier,
in which post he was the active
head of the cabinet. His role
was attacked by the opposition
and strongly resented by his
fellow ministers.
The government that Hassan
formed in June 1961 and still
heads is an essentially defensive
coalition of conservative and
traditionalist groups. Its pri-
mary aim is to keep the leftist
opposition, the National Union
of Popular.Forces (UNFP), from
power. It has succeeded in
large part because of,fac-
tionalism and ineptitude in the
opposition.
The King has not, however,
developed significant positive
policies'of his own or supplied
effective leadership to his cabi-
net. The administration flounders
in uncertainty
as to what line the King may
adopt. Only one member of the
government, Ahmed Reda Guedira,.
the minister, of interior and
agriculture who functions as
deputy premier, is a confidant
of the King. As such, he is
regarded with distrust by other
ministers. Even in_Kthe area of
provincialadministration, the
King keeps ,his distance from
civilian politicians, relying
increasingly on the army to
fill high-level posts.
As crown prince, Hassan
had urged his father to let
him.use the army to suppress
the UNFP; as King, he has
adopted the tactic of ignoring
the left while taking over its
proposals. For example, early
in his reign he announced a
SECRET
24 Aug 62 SPECIAL ARTICLES PA A A of 6
Approved For Release 2008/08/11: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03700090001-4
 Approved For Release 2008/08/11: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03700090001-4
149W 14W
SECRET'
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
"mobilization" of the masses for
work and social progress, an idea
out of the left's book. One of
the first projects undertaken
was the construction, largely
by the army, of some 1,200
schools; Hassan showed that
he had acted while the politicians
talked. But at this point the
:administrative weakness of
Hassan's regime appeared; there
was no comparable crash program
to train teachers for the 1,200
schools. Similarly, the King
won acclaim in rural areas by
announcing the abolition of an
unpopular tax on agricultural
production, but the tax continues
to be collected.
Hassan has declared he in-
tends to fulfill his father's
promise to submit a constitution
to popular referendum before
the end of 1962. He is reported
to have named a committee of
jurists to prepare a draft for
submission to the constitutional
council established by his father
and then to him before placing
it before the voters. Hassan
admires De Gaulle and his
methods, and the final draft is
likely to provide for a power-
ful chief of state on the mod-
el of the constitution of the
Fifth Republic.
The quarrel between the
King and the UNFP centers at
present on the method of draft-
ing the constitution. The UNFP
argues that the constitution
must "come from the people"--
that is, be prepared by a popu-
larly elected assembly rather
than imposed by the King. It
refused to participate in the
constitutional council and has
demanded the election of a con-
stituent assembly. Although
some UNFP leaders are republican
in sentiment, most concede that
a monarchy, preferably patterned
on the British system, is prob-
ably best suited to Morocco.
For the moment at least,
the UNFP acts mainly as a gadfly,
criticizing the royal regime
rather than proposing new moves.
It has a collegial leadership
and suffers from differences and
divisions. Potentially, how-
ever, it is a dynamic political
force,.. inasmuch as it encompasses
organized labor and most intel-
lectuals as well as youth and
urban elements. The tone of its
second congress, held last May
in Casablanca, was revolutionary,
and it claims to be concentrat-
ing: on solidifying. and expand-
ing; its organizational structure.
In foreign affairs, Hassan
has followed the policy of "non-
dependence'' enunciated by his
father.. Although as crown
prince he has resisted French
pressures, the King's relations
with France improved after Paris
agreed at the time of his ac-
cession to the early evacuation
of the remaining French military
personnel in Morocco. Relations
have been close since Hassan's
meeting with De Gaulle last May,
when he was promised financial
assistance.
SPA NI ' 1
s,3 aaA
villa
Cisoero
lrs
x()1'
me ~TXR'at cui
molrzocta
NfAVRI `A IA
Nouakchott
SECRET
24 Aug 62 SPECIAL ARTICLES Page 5 of 6
Approved For Release 2008/08/11: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03700090001-4
 Approved For Release 2008/08/11: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03700090001-4
INw NVW
SECRET'
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Hassan's territorial aspira-
tions--Western Algeria, Ifni,
Mauritania, and Spanish Sahara
are all Morocco irredenta--com-
plicate his relations with his
neighbors. Morocco provided
asylum, bases and procurement
facilities for Algerian mili-
tary forces, but Hassan fears
the establishment of a strong
Algerian republic and is prob-
ably looking around for friends
in the event of a future con-
flict. He is now moving cau-
tiously to avoid antagonizing
Algerian leaders regarding dis-
puted border areas where Moroc-
can agitators and local officials
early in July attempted to re-
establish Moroccan control.
Hassan endorses the prin-
ciple of a Maghreb federation.
However, he has pointedly snubbed
President Bourguiba and main-
tains no diplomatic relations
with Tunisia. A prime mover
behind the formation of the
"radical" Casablanca bloc--Mo-
rocco, Algeria, Ghana, Guinea,
Mali and the UAR--Hassan is no
longer vying so openly to direct
that grouping.
Moroccan relations with the
US are friendly. Hassan is com-
mitted to a state visit to the
United States next March. He
has made no effort to advance
the date--the end of 1963--for
withdrawal of American forces
from the four remaining American
bases in Morocco and has asked
American assistance in converting
the bases for Moroccan use. A
substantial US economic program
is aiding in the development
of Morocco's basic economic
facilities, while a small military
assistance program is supplying
essential communications and
transport equipment for the army
and the small Moroccan air arm.
The King would like to see these
programs expanded.
Hassan's relations with the
Soviet bloc also have been cor-
dial. As crown prince he so-
licited a gift of 14 MIGs from
the USSR, and his government re-
cently concluded an arms pur-
chase agreement which included
heavy artillery and tanks. A
number of Soviet military tech-
nicians remain in Morocco de-
spitte the King's professed
desire that they leave.
Soviet bloc offers of eco-
nomic aid are frequently reported.
Morocco has established an ex-
perimental tea-growing project
after technicians from Communist
China made an extensive survey
of potential areas for tea
cultivation in Morocco. It has
also signed contracts with Poland
to build and equip a sugar beet 25X1
refinery and with Czechoslovakia
to develop copper deposits.
The leftist opposition is
strongly neutralist, and Has-
san's flirtations with the bloc
are in part an aspect of his
attempts to steal the left's
thunder. However, even though
he is personally pro-Western,
he i,3 eager to continue to
extract all benefits that he
can from cold war tensions.
SECRET
24 Aug 62
Approved For Release 2008/08/11: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03700090001-4
 25X1 Approved For Release 2008/08/11: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03700090001-4
Approved For Release 2008/08/11: CIA-RDP79-00927AO03700090001-4