CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

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• Content Type: SUMMARY

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SECRET
CURRENT
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY
SUMMARY
COPY NO. 76
OCI NO. 0429/62
10 August 1962
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
11 1 OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
State Dept. review completed
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
10 August 1962
T H E W E E K I N B R I E F
(Information as of 1200 EDT 9 Aug)
SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY DEVELOPMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 1
Moves on Berlin and Germany: Although Moscow has raised
the specter of imminent action n Berlin and a number of
reports have hinted at increased pressure on the Western
positions, it seems likely that Khrushchev has not yet de-
cided on his next move. The USSR is proceeding cautiously
to avoid the high risks involved in any clear-cut challenge
to the West. Work is continuing on military and security
defenses in East Germany in what may be preparations for a
period of heightened pressures on Berlin.
Nuclear Testing and Disarmament: The USSR is continuing
its nuclear testing. Soviet actions at Geneva suggest that,
with but a few weeks left before the disarmament conference
recesses, Moscow is marking time for the duration of its
test series.
Page 3
Since his return to Laos on 3 August Premier Souvanna
has been attempting to foster a climate of conciliation
among the three factions. One of the key questions facing
Souvanna will concern the future of the 14,000 Meo guerrillas.
On the diplomatic front, the Chinese Communists have inten-
sified their pressure on Viettiane to withdraw recognition
from the Nationalist regime. There is as yet no firm evi-
dence of major North Vietnamese withdrawals from Laos.
Page 3
The Indonesian and Dutch Governments have accepted the
preliminary arrangement on West New Guinea that their nego-
tiators announced on 31 July. Formal negotiations are
scheduled to begin on 11 August, and a final accord may
be signed soon thereafter. Dutch Foreign Minister Luns
finds the agreement distasteful, but he is expected to help
carry out the cabinet's decision. Indonesian leaders say
they still distrust the Dutch and are, maintaining readiness
for further military operations in case the Dutch fail to
cooperate in implementing the agreement rapidly. Large-
scale action by Indonesia seems unlikel but minor infil-
trations may continue.
ALGERIA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 4
The transfer of power within Algeria on 7 August from
the PAG to the political bureau formed by Ben Bella should
give the country asemblance of central authority until
the elections now scheduled for 2 September. Ben Bella can
probably control the selection of candidates for the elec-
tions. However, he faces a more serious problem in assert-
ing civilian authority over the Algerian National Army, and
an abrupt effort to do so could provoke another crisis.
Meanwhile, unless quick action is taken to.relieve unemploy-
ment, public disenchantment ma soon reach serious propor-
tions.
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. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 5
Adoula is making another series of gestures reasserting
Leopoldville"s sovereignty over Katanga. Restrictions on
air traffic and communications, and threats against com-
panies operating there have been announced in Leopoldville,
but the UN forces are the only instruments available to
enforce the restrictions in Elisabethville. Katanga has
retaliated by imposing a partial blockade of UN forces;
Announcement of the moves against Katanga has embarrassed
Western governments; similar moves were envisaged by them
only as late stages of a broader, coordinated plan to put
pressure on Tshombe. Domestic pressures on Adoula for action
against Katanga appear to have been reduced somewhat by the
adjournment of the Congo parliament until September.
Soviet military deliveries to Cuba apparently have
been stepped up sharply since mid-July, and large numbers
of Soviet technicians may have arrived in connection with
these shipments.
SOVIET DRIVE AGAINST CRIME . . . . .
. Page 9
. . . . . . . . Page 10
Moscow appears to be making little headway in its year-
old campaign to eliminate illegal economic activity. Despite
rigorous enforcement of laws prescribing the death penalty
for embezzlement, speculation, counterfeiting, bribery,
and theft of state property, such crimes continue. During
the last week of July, 11 persons, including two high-rank-
ing government officials, were sentenced to death and 52
others to long prison terms for "swindling the state." There
are some indications that the drive against economic crimes
will become even more intense in the near future.
USSR CROP PROSPECTS . . . .
. . Page 12
Soviet crop prospects in the fourth harvest season of
the Seven-Year Plan (1959-65) appear to be only about
average. The growing season in much of the European USSR
has been abnormally damp and cold; in major crop areas of
the Caucasus, parts of the Ukraine, and the New Lands,
there has been insufficient moisture.
BRITAIN'S NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE COMMON MARKET. . .
. . Page 13
Despite the atmosphere of crisis surrounding the 5
August adjournment of negotiations on Britain's accession
to the Common Market (EEC), neither side believes the
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
10 August 196+2
talks have reached a stalemate. A greater measure of
agreement had. been hoped for, but substantial progress
has been made, and Macmillan now has a broad outline of
an agreement to present to the Commonwealth prime ministers
on 10 September. The future course of the talks, sched-
uled to resume in late September, will now hinge to a
considerable degree on the Commonwealth reaction. British
officials say they are fairly clear on what is still
"negotiable" with the EEC, but EEC officials are con-
cerned lest London attempt to reopen questions which have
already been settled.
KENYA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 14
A deteriorating economic situation in Kenya will com-
plicate Britain's task of preparing the East African colony
for early independence. London proposes to spend some
$40,000,000 over the next five years to resettle Africans
on farm land formerly held by Europeans, but land-hunger
and unemployment among Kenya's Africans is already so
acute that a new outbreak of terrorism may occur in the
countryside. Kenya's political advance is still being
retarded by the continuing dispute over regional versus
central powers. The two main African parties forming the
coaltion government, however, have agreed with Britain on
the steps leading toward independence, which may come by
mid-1963.
AFGHAN-.PAKISTANI DISPUTE .
The Shah of Iran has made no headway in his effort to
mediate the Afghan-Pakistani dispute. The negotiating
positions of the Afghan and Pakistani Governments seem to
be farther apart and more unyielding than before the
Shah offered his good offices.
IRAQ: THE KURDISH REBELLION . .
Page 15
Page 16
During the past 18 months the Kurdish rebellion in
Iraq has changed from an insurrection protesting Arab dis-
crimination into a nationalist movement fighting for an
independent Kurdistan. Although in the past the USSR has
fostered the idea of an "independent" Kurdistan under
Soviet influence, it has maintained a discreet silence on
the issue in recent years out of fear of offending the
friendly Qasim regime. Criticisms of Qasim's punitive
measures, however, have been made in clandestine Soviet bloc
radiobroadcasts and in the Soviet journal Problems of
Peace and Socialism. Iranian officials are be-
coming increasingly concerned over the unsettling effect in
of Kurdish successes.
. . Page 18
The tripartite coalition government, the second headed
by Ismet Inonu, faces the same serious political and economic
problems as its short-lived predecess-or, but will be under
greater pressure to solve them quickly. It faces a stronger
political opposition and is less certain of military sup-
port. Pressures on the government may come to a head soon
after the National Assembly reconvenes on 3 September and
bring on a new political crisis.
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10 August 1962
BRAZIL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 21
The leftist regime of President Goulart is making con-
siderable headway in its drive, to re--establish a strong
presidency. Most influential military officials apparently
have decided to support Goulart as long as he refrains from
extraconstitutional activity. Economic problems including
food shortages and serious inflation are generating public
demand for stronger national leadership and thus support
Goulart's drive for a strong presidency.
ARGENTINA . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Page 22
The forced resignation of Secretary of War Loza on 8
August threatens the stability of the Guido administration. 25X1
While the crisis appears to be the result of a struggle
within the army hierarchy, it could present an opportunity
for an attempt to overthrow the government.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
10 August 1962
THE CHINESE COMMUNIST AIR FORCE . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 1
The Chinese Communist Air Force has been on the de-
cline for the past several years. Its most serious short-
ingssstem from the loss of Soviet aid and technical
assistance and from Peiping's own inability to manufacture
sufficient numbers of modern military aircraft to maintain
the force over the coming years. Other problems include
shortages of POL and spare parts, poor maintenance of
equipment, and inadequate pilot training. The numerical
strength of Communist China's air force is impressive--
over 2,000 jet fighters and 325 jet light bombers. However,
unless new aircraft are forthcoming from the USSR or a
turn in the economy permits an increase in Chinese aircraft
production, a continued deterioration of Peiping's air
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
WEEKLY REVIEW
SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY DEVELOPMENTS
Moves on Berlin and. Germany
Although Moscow has raised
the specter of imminent action
in Berlin and a number of fore-
boding reports hint at increased
pressure on the Western posi-
tion, it seems likely that Khru-
shchev has not yet decided on
his next move. The Soviet Union
is proceeding cautiously to
avoid the high risks involved
in any clear-cut challenge to
the West on the Berlin issue.
Soviet leaders may hope that
renewed threats bearing on the
consequences of,a peace treaty
will(be enough )to bring forth
Western concessions which could
result in a negotiated settle-
ment.
In West Germany, Soviet
representatives have inspired
rumors pinpointing the months
from August to October as a
period for some kind of Soviet
action on Berlin. Soviet dip-
lomats in Bonn have hinted
broadly to newspapermen that
they should not take a vacation
in August since they would miss
"a historical event." They hint
that all nations which fought
Germany in World War II might
be invited to attend a "peace
conference," some time before
the UN General Assembly convenes
on 17 September, to conclude
a peace treaty with the East
Germans. Another rumor has it
that the USSR and the bloc will
sign a treaty with East Germany
prior to the UNGA but suspend
its application so that the
entire question of Berlin and
a German peace settlement can
be laid before the UNGA. Yet
another rumor speculates that
harassment will be stepped up
on access routes by stationing
East Germans at control points.
Some of these rumors are
also current in the diplomatic
community in Moscow. However,
Yugoslav, Indonesian, Indian,
and UAR diplomats have informed
the US Embassy that they have
heard of no approach to their
governments over the question
of a peace treaty. The Yugo-
slav charge confided that the
issue was not raised during
the recent visit of a Yugoslav
parliamentary delegation to
the USSR.
Ambassador Dobrynin reflect-
ed the deliberate prudence which
has characterized Soviet actions
to date on Berlin in his 1 August
conversation with Ambassador
Harriman. ' Dobrynin "admitted"
that there were indications
Khrushchev intended to sign
a separate peace treaty before
long, but noted that he had set
no date. The Soviet ambassador
quickly added that independent
action would not be necessary
if an agreement could be reached.
Dobrynin concluded that without
an early agreement, grave diffi-
cu:Lties might arise.
While Soviet leaders appear
to be engaged in a review of
the Rusk-Gromyko talks in Geneva
and a reassessment of their own
position, Soviet and East Ger-
man personnel in East Germany
are continuing work on military
and security defenses in what
may be preparations for a period
of heightened pressures on Ber-
lirn. The East Germans are
rushing the completion of con-
struction along the sector and
zonal borders of West Berlin,
and their security personnel
are apparently familiarizing
themselves with Soviet proce-
dures in controlling official
Allied surface travel. In
addition, the armed workers'
militia, the Kampfgruppen,
participated in a two-day
exercise on 4-5 August, appear-
ing in East Berlin and along
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CURRENT INTELLIGEN('E WEEKLY SUMMARY
he Wall for the first time
since they were brought from
Outlying districts last summer
to augment local security forces
during the initial phase in
the(construction)of the Wall.
Soviet and East German
propaganda is concentrating its
attack on the ties between West
Berlin and West Germany, in an
effort to demonstrate that the
occupation forces in the city
Are protecting those responsible
for recent provocations against
East Germany. East Germany's
Neues Deutschland bitterly
criticized West German President
Luebke's plans to visit West
Berlin on 10 August to partici-
pate in anniversary ceremonies
;decrying the erection of the
:Berlin Wall. The East German
'Government officially protested
Bonn's enforcement of its de-
mands that East German railroad
screws procure Allied Travel Of-
fice documentation to transit
West Germany. And in a 31 July
note delivered in Warsaw to the
Western powers, the GDR threat-
ened to meet any further attacks
'on the elevated railroad sta-
tions in West Berlin, which are
owned and operated ry East Ger-
many, by r'inforcing East Ger-
man railroad police on both
the suburban and long-distance
railway systems in West Berlin,
thus raising the possibility of
future interference with the
city's rail connections with
West Germany.
Disarmament
Soviet actions at the 17-
nation Geneva disarmament con-
ference suggest that, with but
a few weeks remaining before
the conference recesses for
the opening sessions of the UN
General Assembly, Moscow feels
its'best bet is to mark time for
the duration of its own test
series. Soviet delegate Zorin
promptly attacked the new US
proposals on a nuclear test
ban;treaty\,with the claim
th.a-Lno change in principle
had been advanced. After lis-
tening to Ambassador Dean's
preliminary and informal pres-
entation of the US position,
Zorin said that it appeared
that prospects for agreement
were as bad as they had been
before.
The Soviet delegate reiter-
ated the USSR's standard asser-
tion that all suspicious events
could be detected and identi-
fied by national posts and
that no obligatory on-site in-.
spection was needed or justi-
fied. Zorin maintained that
the question of on-site inspec-
tion should be handled along
the lines of the eight neu-
tralist nations' proposal which
provided for "invitational" in-
spection of a suspected seismic
occurrence.
The USSR had accepted the
neutralist "compromise" pro-
posal on 19 April as the basis
for further negotiations but
made clear that it did not
feel the "invitational" provision
carried any specific obligation
to allow inspection. In forth-
coming discussions the USSR
wi]L1 probably maintain an
equally intransigent position
and study the impact of the
new US proposals on the neu-
tralists before making its
next move. In the UN sessions,
it will probably exploit-'any
unilateral proposals by the
neutralists which would divert
attention from the US proposals.
The, Mexican delegate, for exam-
ple, apparently plans to ad-
vance at the UNGA a draft at-
mospheric test ban proposal
which will probably propose a
cut-off date (of 1 January 1963
for all tests.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Premier Souvanna returned
to Laos on 3 August. During his
absence, the coalition was ham-
strung by the mutual suspicions
of Souphannouvong and General
Phoumi, and action on all im-
portant matters was deferred.
One of the key questions
facing Souvanna will concern the
future of the 14,000 Meo guer-
i'illas. .. .who control'. large
areas of Xieng Khouang and Sam
Neua provinces. The Pathet Lao
want to neutralize these forces,
which pose a threat to their
control of northern Laos, and
have called for a cessation of,
aerial resupply flights, alleg-
ing that such flights are for
the purpose of dropping arms
to Phoumi's "special agents and
bandits." The capability of
the Meo forces would be seri-
ously impaired if their air-
dropped supplies, now consist-
ing of food and other nonmili-
tary items, were curtailed.
Souvanna also faces the
.problem of Chinese recognition.
.Peiping has stepped up its pres-
sure on Vientiane to withdraw
recognition from the Nationalist
regime. Repeated Communist at-
tacks on the Nationalist posi-
tion were climaxed when, follow-
ing, Souvanna's arrival at the
Vientiane airport, the Communist
charge stepped in front of the
Nationalist ambassador and
greeted Souvanna in the name of
"650,000,000 Chinese people."
Taipei protested and requested
the "immediate expulsion" of the
Peiping representative. It is
unlikely that Souvanna will com-
ply. In the past he has indi-
cated that, while he would not
object to Nationalist presence
in Vientiane, he had no alterna-
tive but to establish diplomatic
relations with Communist China.
There are indications that
the North Vietnamese are with-
drawing limited numbers of their
troops from Laos, but there is
no evidence to suggest that a
full-scale withdrawal is yet
under way. It is possible that
Hanoi will attempt to retain
control over the northern and
eastern border areas, and it may
incorporate 4ncreased numbers of
Lao- speaking)cadres from North
Vietnam into Pathet Lao units.
Such a move would be difficult
to detect in view of the ethnic 25X1
similarities among the tribal
groups in eastern Laos and west-
ern North Vietnam.
The Indonesian and Dutch
governments have accepted the
preliminary arrangement on West
New Guinea that their negotia-
tors announced on 31 July.
Formal negotiations are scheduled
to begin on 11 August, and a
final agreement may be signed
by about 15 August. The arrange-
ment provides for the replace-
ment of the Dutch by an interim
UN administration as soon as
;possible, with Indonesia assuming
,the administration by 1 May 1963.
The native Papuans must be per-
mitted self-determination no
later than 1969.
Among the technical ques-
tions apparently still to be
solved is the disposition of
some 300-500 Indonesian troops
who have infiltrated New Guinea
since last March and are still
at large. It seems likely that
U Thant will grant Indonesia's
demand that they be permitted to
remain for use by the interim
UN administration.
Some members of the Dutch
Government--notably Foreign
Minister Luns--find the agree-
ment distasteful, but van Roijen,
head of the Dutch delegation,
believes Luns will fully carry:
out cabinet decisions regardless
of personal views. In a con-
versation with Ambassador Rice
on 6 August, Luns remarked that
the agreement meant "complete
capitulation" by the Netherlands
and that it would not improve
relations between Washington
and The Hague.
Indonesian leaders say that
,they still distrust the Dutch.
The military is maintaining
operational readiness in case
the Dutch fail to cooperate
with the UN in implementing the
agreement rapidly. Large-scale 25X1
action seems unlikely, but
infiltration activity is a
continuing passibility.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
The formal transfer of
power within Algeria on 7
August from the PAG to the
political bureau formed by
Ben Bella should give the
country a semblance of central
authority pending the elections
now scheduled for 2 September.
Ben Bella can now probably
control the selection of
candidates for the elections.
A parallel effort to bring
the~Algerian National Army
(ALN }under control poses more
serious problems. ALN leaders
would probably resist, thus
provoking another crisis. Mean-
while, unless quick action is
taken to relieve unemployment,
public disenchantment may soon
reach serious proportions.
Ben Bella appears to have
made some concessions to the
Ben Khedda group. Colonel
Boumedienne, the ALN chief of
staff "dismissed" by Ben Khedda,
was excluded from Ben Bella's
entourage which arrived in
Algiers on 3 August. The agree-
ment to have the composition of
the political bureau reviewed
by the National Revolutionary
Council (CNRA) after the Con-
stituent Assembly elections is;
probably meaningless, however,
since the assembly will then be
the effective arena of power.
The
consul general in Algiers re-
ported on 6 August that al-
though the question of civilian
control over the military re-
mains to be settled, it may not
become acute until after the
elections and the installation
of a government.
to ensure diplomatic precedence
to countries which recognized
it before France granted in-
dependence. The PAG foreign
minister, however, has resigned
and left Algeria, and little of
significance in foreign affairs
is likely to occur until after
the elections. The USSR has
sent some relief supplies to
Algeria, and Bulgaria has
provided hospital equipment
and personnel.
The US consul general feels
that steps so far taken by the
French-appointed Provisional
Executive are insufficient to
stop the downhill slide of the
economy. He thinks that only
firm steps by the French Govern-
ment to provide money for immedi-.
ate, large-scale make-work proj-
ects can give the Algerian
leaders the necessary breathing
spell . France is continuing
to meet operating expenses under
the ordinary Algerian budget
Paris apparently intends to
wait until an elected govern-
ment is installed before under-
takiLng any large-scale aid
projects.
Paris has welcomed the
stabilization of the Algerian
situation as a necessary step
toward implementing the Evian
accords and halting--perhaps
reversing--the outflow of
Europeans.
The PAG, which has been
recognized by nearly 40 coun-
tries, will continue to have
some responsibility for foreign
affairs, and apparently intends
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forces remained in Algeria.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Adoula is trying--inde-
pendeiat ly of Western and UN
planning--to seize the initia-
tive by a series of anti
Katangan gestures reasserting
Leopoldville's sovereignty.
He has ordered private airlines
overflying or landing anywhere
in the Congo to obtain prior
permission from Leopoldville;
has "suspended" all radio and
telecommunications to and from
Katanga; and has threatened re-
taliation against commercial
firms, mining companies, plan-
tations and other enterprises
which "continue to support"
Katanga. Leopoldville's
ability to enforce compliance
is very limited, but Adoula
may be laying the groundwork
for possible legal action, at
least against some companies.
The UN command in Katanga, which
is in control of the airports
at Elisabethville and Kamina,
is apparently enforcing the
airline decree there. The
Katangan government has re-
taliated by clamping a partial
blockade on UN forces. More
than 200 carloads of food and
fuel intended for UN forces
were halted at Sakania on the
Northern Rhodesian border.
New Leopoldville-sponsored
military attacks in force in
northern Katanga, of which
.there were some earlier indica-
tions, have yet to materialize.
Western European govern-
ments are embarrassed and irri-
tated 3y the heavy premature
publicity given the UN-Western
plan to work out a settlement
and by the restrictions an-
nounced by Adoula. The UN-
Western plan for reconciliation
has yet to receive final ap-
proval by London and Brussels,
and the economic pressures--
similar to the ones Adoula has
tried to set in motion--are
still being debated. The sanc-
tions, moreover, would come into
play only after Tshomb6 had re-
jected the UN-Western proposals.
There are other signs that
Adoula is exerting more vigorous
leadership. He took some of
the steam out of the opposition
by adjourning parliament on 3
August. He formed an eight-
man committee within the cabi-
net to speed the making of
decisions. This committee was
apparently responsible for the
anti-Katanga decrees. In what
appears to be an effort to in-
crease its control in Orientale
Province, Leopoldville has
reportedly transferred General
,Buts
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Lundula from the Stanleyville
command and replaced him with
a lieutenant colonel.
The opposition intends,
nevertheless, to continue to
press President Kasavubu to dis-
miss the Adoula government.
Before it adjourned,
Parliament passed legislation
dividing the present six Congo
provinces into at least nine-
teen new provinces. The pro-
liferation of provincial tribal
fiefdoms, while satisfying to
local politicians, is bound to
weaken even further central
government control and add to
the already heavy burden of
government expense on the Congo-
lese economy. Katanga has been
divided into northern and
southern Katanga. TshombC's
power is really little affected
because his influence in the
north has always been minimal
and the base of his power, the
mining and industrial complex,
is in southern Katanga.
Apparently satisfied that
UN-Katangan tensions had been
sufficiently reduced, Tshombe
flew to Geneva on 2 August,
reportedly for his health, but
more probably to talk to his
bankers and to seek advice.
The wide publicity given pro-
posals for UN-Western economic
pressures on Katanga if Tshombe
continues to refuse to integrate
apparently led him to press
Union Miniere to pay mineral
SECRET
royalty revenues in advance of
export.
Regarding Adoula's proposal
of a new federal constitution,
the laws on constitutional changes
will afford Tshombe immeasurable
opportunities for delay.,,Tshombe
may again demandthat future
talks with Adoula be held outside',
the Congo.
There is- disquiet among some
of the nations providing troops
to the UN Congo operations over
the slow progress on a settlement
and some have indicated a desire
to withdraw their troops. Al-
though Nehru is not likely to
withdraw the Indian troops, the
largest of the UN contingents,
there is some Indian public and
official opinion which believes
they might be better employed at
home in view of the tense Sino-
Indian border situation. Nigeria
has wanted to bring home one of
its two battalions, and has only
reluctantly agreed to permit it
to stay on. Ireland has given
some indications it might like to
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ELK I,
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Soviet military deliveries
to Cuba apparently have been
stepped up sharply since mid-
July, and large numbers of So-
viet technicians may have ar-
rived in connection with these
shipments.
een reports that several ship-
ments of military equipment have
arrived in Cuba recently.
:Lt appears that
a large part of the new deliv-
eries, at least in the first
arrivals, is made up of com-
munications equipment of various
types.
Concurrently, five Soviet
passenger ships have arrived in
Cuba with large numbers of per-
sonnel. One of these, which
arrived in Havana in early
August, carried 1,500 Soviet
agricultural specialists and
students, according to Soviet
and Cuban press reports J
The link, if any, between
these arms deliveries and the re-
cent visit of Raul Castro, head
of the Cuban armed forces, to
the Soviet Union remains obscure.
Castro's visit appeared to be
aimed primarily at procurement
of additional Soviet military
aid. However, the circumstances
of his departure from Moscow in
mid-July--noted by the USSR only
in a terse TASS announcement--
suggested that difficulties had
cropped up during the talks.
The
current military
ship-
ments evidently began to leave
Soviet ports just prior to Raul
Castro's departure from Moscow,
suggesting that agreements for
new materiel had been worked out
prior to the visit but that
shipment( was delayed until the
Cuban delegation arrived to
complete preliminary arrange-
ments.
The delegation was 25
composed of several high-rank-
ins Cuban military officers 1
A sharp i
in Soviet
Sov
military assistance--accompanied
by what appears to be an (excep=
tionally` large influx of military
technicians--suggests a major.
effort to strengthen'Havana's'
overall military position rather
than another routine development
in the USSR's arms aid program
in Cuba. The normal assimila-
tion of weapons and military-
related equipment supplied by
Moscow should not necessitate
the large number of technicians
reported to have arrived re-
cently. However, a rapid expan-
sion of Cuba's air and coastal
defense systems or the future
development of its internal
security capabilities probably
would require large numbers of
Soviet advisers and technicians..
251
X1
SECRE7'
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Moscow appears to be making
little headway in its year-old
drive to eliminate illegal eco-
nomic activity. Despite rigorous
enforcement of laws prescribing
the death penalty for embezzle-
ment, speculation, counterfeit-
ing, bribery, and large-scale
theft of state property, there
has been little diminution in
the crime rate. During the last
week of July, 11 persons were
sentenced to death and 52 others
to long prison terms for "swin-
dling the state."
Two of those receiving the
death sentence were high-ranking
government officials. On 25,
July the Soviet press announced
that K. T. Degtyarev, head of
a department in the USSR Minis-
try of Finance, would be shot
for taking bribes from pension
applicants, and that B. D.
Dyushaliyev, who was head of
the State Planning Committee
(Gosplan) in the Kirgiz Republic
during 1957-60, would be put to
death for currency speculation
and theft of state property.
"You won't believe me, but word of honor, I won it alI in the State lottery." (Krokodil.)
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Along with Dyushaliyev, eight
other persons--most of them
minor government and economic
officials in Kirgizia--were
also sent to the firing squad;
40 of their accomplices
received stiff prison terms.
The Kirgiz group was accused of
stealing state property worth
,over 3 million new rubles,
illegally selling expensive
clothing, and speculating in
foreign currency with the pro-
ceeds. The state claimed that
at the time of their arrest
they had in their possession
50 pounds of gold, 66 pounds
of silverware, over 4 million
rubles in cash, and real estate
and automobiles valued at al-
most 7 million rubles. In
other cases publicized during
the week, a slaughterhouse
attendant in Uzbekistan was
shot and two accomplices
jailed for fraud, and 10
Estonians were sent to prison
for black-market dealings in
foreign currency.
According to Soviet press
accounts, at least 80 persons
have received the death
sentence and well over 250
have been imprisoned for eco-
nomic crimes during the past
year. All areas of the Soviet
Union have been affected, and
all levels of the social scale,
from'unemployed "parasites" to
government bureaucrats. Approx-
imately 25 to 30 percent of
those sentenced have Jewish
names, but their arrests evi-
dently resulted from actual
lawbreaking rather than from
any offically inspired anti-
Jewish campaign. Strong over-
tones of anti-Semitism have
appeared in some local accounts
of crime, but these are prob-
abbly reflections of the govern-
ment's current railing against
all,,religions in the USSR.
High-level dissatisfaction
with the failure to eliminate
economic crimes is becoming ap-
parent in Moscow. At a recent
meeting attended by partypresid-
ium ;member Dmitry Polyansky,
leading state prosecution offi-
cials were reminded of the con-
tinuing need to inflict strict
punishment on economic offenders
and to enlist wider public par-
ticipation in the fight against
crime. In early August, the
USSR Supreme Court complained
that lower courts were still
underestimating the "particular
social danger" of economic
crimes, and called especially
for a crackdown on bribery.
Apparently,?he Kremlin is bent
on intensifying still further
`its campaign against activities
which are damaging to the
economy and which belie its
,propaganda assertions that the 25X1
causes of crime have been
eliminated under socialism.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
USSR CROP PROSPECTS
As the USSR enters the
fourth harvest season of the
Seven-Year Plan (1959-65), agri-
cultural prospects appear to be
only about average and crops
will fall short of 1962 plan
targets. The growing season
in much of the European USSR
has been abnormally damp and
cold and there has been in-
sufficient moisture in major
crop areas of the Caucasus,
parts of the Ukraine, and the
New Lands. Although Khrushchcv
recently told Ambassador Thompson
that this year's crop would be
"about the best" the USSR ever
had, he did not give the state-
ment much emphasis. Soviet nQws-
paper statements on the subject
have been relatively cautious.
Grain acreage this year
has been expanded about 10 per-
cent over 1961, and it is quite
possible that the Soviets may
claim a harvest exceeding the
claimed record 141,200,000 tons
for 1958. However, much will
depend on the New Lands grain
harvest; prospects for both
winter grain production in the
Ukraine and the corn crop appear
to be unfavorable.
An early spring in the New
Lands has hastened harvest time,
but development has been spotty
because the shortage of moisture
persists in some areas. Soviet
concern with the New Lands
harvest--apparent in the un-
usually large number of decrees
on the subject this year--re-
flects a desire to avoid the
mismanagement which helped
"wreck" the 1960 and 1961
harvests and to make up for
unsatisfactory grain production
in other areas.
Prospects for this year's
cotton crop are only mediocre---
with the likelihood that the
cotton textile industry, already
lagging, will not make much im-
provement next year. An un-
usually cold, wet spring in
Central Asia, accompanied by
wind and hail, retarded develop-
ment and required extensive re-
planting. According to numerous
Soviet reports, there has been a
consistent shortage of water for
irrigation during the summer
months.
The outlook for meat and
other livestock products is rel-
atively favorable. There is a
record number of livestock and
the early spring over much of
the USSR favored the development
of pastures. There has been a
considerable expansion this year
of areas planted to higher yield-
ing; feed crops under Khrushchev's
program of reduced grasslands and
fallow areas. This expansion
should provide greater feed sup-
plies for the coming year--though
the increase in production will
be limited by manpower and ma-
chinery problems.
The production of potatoes
and vegetables will probably be
somewhat below average due to
the effects of the cool, damp
weather in much of the USSR as
well as a slightly reduced
acreage. A significant part
of the sunflower and sugar beet
crops is grown in areas which
have suffered from insufficient 25X1
noisture and production is ex-
pected to be adversely affected.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Despite the atmosphere of
crisis surrounding the 5 August
adjournment of further negoti-
atiQns on the terms of Britain's
membership in the Common Market
(EEC), neither London nor the
EEC believes the talks have
reached a stalemate. A fuller
measure of agreement had been
hoped for, but substantial prog-
ress has been made, and London
now feels it has a "pretty good
idea" of what it can expect to
,achieve when the negotiations
,resume in late September. After
some initial hesitation, Mac-
millan has decided to proceed
as scheduled with the 10 Septem-
ber meeting with the other Com-
monwealth prime ministers to
test their reaction to the
UK-EEC arrangements which have
so far been decided.
The belief that no further
progress could now be made and
the physical, exhaustion of the
principal negotiators were
major factors in the decision
to recess the talks. The pre=
:vious four days of almost con-
tinuous bargaining were diffi-
cult--at times marked by a tense
atmosphere. As expected by both
sides, the French attempted to
drive the hardest bargain pos-
sible. They were careful, how-
ever, to avoid a break with
their Common Market partners,
and on most issues 'they had
the support of the EEC Commis-
sion, whose function it is to
act as guardian of the EE
The issue on which the
talks adjourned--the regulations
concerning the EEC's common
agricultural fund--is exemplary
of the aggressive but generally
adroit tactics of the French.
In question is the use of the
monies which will eventually
accrue to the EEC from the
various duties levied on im-
ports of farm produce and
which may ultimately total hun-
dredsof millions of dollars.
The French have a primary
interest in the fund since, ifI
EEC farm prices are set so high
that EEC farm production in-
creases, the costs of dispos- 25X1
ing of surpluses will be met
by the fund and the major
potential recipient is France.
j.ng formulas to meet Britain's
peels, they' have also shown
remarkable solidarity in the
last, nine months of negotia-
tions in defending what they
While a number of such
delicate issues will have to
be resolved when the talks
'esume, problems of similar
complexity have been settled
already, and Macmillan will
herefore have a fairly complete
UK-EEC package to offer the
bomrnonwealth prime ministers at
hej'Lr September meeting. This
package is unlikely to satisfy
the Commonwealth entirely--In-
dia has already reacted neg-
atively- -and the future course
of the negotiations with the
EEC will therefore depend to a
considerable degree on Mac-
millan's success in convincing
the other prime ministers in
September that he has bargained
effectively in protecting COm-!
monwealth interests. While the
Six have proved adept in find-
consider the basic principles
of the EEC. The EEC Commissio
for example, strongly supporte
the French maneuver regarding
the agricultural fund because
it is anxious~to reduce the ex-
tent to which the community
budget must rely on national
contributions. Therefore, should
London decide to present requests
nlonths.
for major new concessions next
autumn, the accession talks
might well drag on for many more
r
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kENYA
The deteriorating econom-
iic:,situation in Kenya will com-
licate and may even upset
{ 3ritain's methodical prepara-
tion of the colony for inde-
pendence. African land-hunger
.nd unemployment are growing,
while European farmers and
businessmen who fear a future
African government are leaving
the country. Political activ-
.ty has been retarded and lit-
tle progress has been made to-
ward writing a new constitution.
However, intertribal tensions
and interparty disputes have
been kept to a minimum, and
the African moderates have not
yet been seriously challenged
by extremists.
Kenya's economy is in a
steady though no longer dra-
Yhatic decline, particularly in
agriculture. The departure of
several hundred European farm-
Ors has thrown thousands of
Africans out of work; these
tend to migrate to the cities
where unemployment is already
a serious problem. Some
70,000 Africans--over 10 per-
cent of the labor force--are
now unemployed, and in some
tribal areas they may join with
existing groups of unemployable
toughs to terrorize the country-
side.
London is willing to em-
bark on a $40,000,000, five-
year program to buy some
1,000,000 acres of farmland
from European owners for Afri-
can resettlement. The impact
of such a program would be
slow, however, on both unem-
ployment and on Kenya's over-
all financial problems. Afri-
can farmers, with limited cap-
ital, are not likely soon to
make up for the loss of for-
eign exchange and the general
decline in economic activity.
A Kenya government commission
is now touring Europe in an
effort to attract some $15,-
000,000 in immediate assist-
ance.
The visit of the then
British Colonial Secretary
Maudling in July resulted in
considerable agreement on the'
steps in Kenya's political
evolution. Present plans call
for the introduction of a new
constitution--basea on the
framework agreed on in London
last spring--and a series of
elections to various legisla-
tive bodies in 1963. There
is then to be a period during
which control of foreign af-
fairs, defense and internal
security will be reserved to
the governor before full inde-
pendence, which may occur as
early as mid-1963. Meanwhile
the two main African parties
are joined in a coalition gov-
ernment under the dual lead-
ership of Jomo Kenyatta and
Ronald Ngala, with Tom Mboya,
an intelligent moderate, play-
ing a major role as minister
of labor. However, the par-
ties' disagreement over the
question of tribal and region-
al power remains unresolved.
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AFGHAN-PAKISTANI DISPUTE
The Shah of Iran has made
no headway in his effort to me-
diate the Afghan-Pakistani dis-
pute. The negotiating positions
of the Afghan and Pakistani Gov-
ernments seem to be farther a-
part and more unyielding than
before the Shah offered his
good office =i.
Ayub seems to believe that
Afghanistan's interest in reach-
ing an agreement through the
Shah's good offices demonstrates
the effectiveness of Pakistan's
hard line. He has made it clear
that any major concessions must
come from the Afghans.
The Afghans are proving
equally intractable. They are
maintaining the basic essen-
SECRET
tials of their position while
concentrating on finding ways
to make it easier for Pakistan
to make 'concessions.
Kabul holds that the
restoration of its consulates
and trade offices is not ne-
gotiable but is a condition
for the normalization of re-
lations and for reopening the
boarder to shipments transiting
Pakistan. Afghan Foreign Min-
ister Naim says his government
would agree to stop anti-Paki-
stan.propaganda while negoti-
ating on giving Pakistan's
Pushtoon tribes the right of
self-determination. Ayub re-
gards such assurances as worth-
less, however, and would not
agree to negotiate on the fate
of Pakistan's tribes in any
event.
Both sides may continue
diplomatic gestures in the mis-
taken belief that the other
may be willing to make substan-
tival concessions. The Shah
and the Afghans still appear
to hope that negotiations on
the language of a joint decla-
ation of intentions will facil-
itate an agreement, and further
talks between the two countries
are being considered.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
IRAQ: THE KURDISH REBELLION
During the past 18 months
the Kurdish rebellion led by
Mulla Mustafa al-Barzani has
gradually changed from an in-
surrection sparked by discrimi-
nation against the Kurds by the
Iraqi Government to a national-
ist movement fighting for the
independence of Kurdistan. At
present the movement is free
from foreign domination, al-
though the Kurds admit they
would accept material aid from
any source and have approached
the American, British, and So-
viet embassies in Baghdad.
The change, to a large ex-
tent, has been brought about by
Barzani's successes in frustrat-
ing the Iraqi Army's year-long
punitive campaign and its ex-
tensive indiscriminate bombings
of Kurdish villages, which have
turned many neutral Kurds against
the government. Also, Barzani's
success in eluding the army,
trapping isolated units, and
even ambushing army columns as
large`--as a battalion has re-
sulted in a "band-wagon" move-
ment among the Kurds. There
have been many desertions from
Iraqi army and security force
units, and the rebels have cap-
tured substantial quantities of
weapons and ammunition.
The Iraqi regime, which
has committed about 30,000 men,
nearly half its army, in the
Kurdish campaign,.so far has
been able to hold the more im-
portant cities of northern Iraq
000 Number of Kurds
in each country
Proportion of population made up of Kurds
fi 0 20
percent
STATUTE MILES 400
SECRET
and maintain a tenuous control
over the major connecting roads.
The rebels, however, control an
increasingly broad strip of
mountain territory along the
Turkish and Iranian borders.
During the next few weeks they
may maintain their hold on the
northern part of the Mosul and
Irbil areas and expand their
range of control in the;area
north and east of Sulaymaniyah.
Qasim's defense council is re-
porl;ed to be making plans for
a new offensive.
Qasim's failure to crush
Bar-z-ani-has-3ed_-t0-unrest in
SAUDI
ARABIA
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
'the Iraqi Army, which is losing
jface. Even though there is
little likelihood that the Kurds
can control any area but the
mountains, a continuation of
the rebel successes might lead
disgruntled officers to attempt
a coup against Qasim.
The rebellion has faced
the Soviet Union with a dilemma.
Although it has long fostered
the idea of an "independent"
Kurdistan under Soviet influence,
with the friendly Qasim regime
holding power in Baghdad, the
USSR has been restrained in its
attitude toward the Kurds. Re-
cently, however, Communist propa-
ganda has championed the national
rights of the Kurds as Iraqi
citizens, and increasingly vio-
lent attacks on Qasim's policy
of "national extermination" of
the Kurds have appeared in Com-
munist pamphlets circulated in
Iraq, in the Soviet journal
Problems of Peace and Socialism,
on the East German secret radio
Peyk e Iran--the radio of the
Iranian Tudeh party--and on the
East-German clandestine radio
station of the Turkish Commu-
nist Party.
Should Qasim be overthrown,
the USSR would be likely to
follow an even more cautious
policy toward both the new
regime and the Kurds. Moscow
would more openly favor Kurdish
nationalism only if the new
regime were avowedly anti-So-
viet.
While aware of the recent
propaganda attacks, Qasim re-
mains friendly toward Communist
bloc governments and blames
the "imperialists" for his
Kurdish troubles. Some of `the
Iraqi Arab public, reflecting
its pathological Anglophobia,
considers Anglo-Soviet coopera-
tion in Kurdistan very real.
Other Iraqis see the revolt
as a deep plot by Qasim and
Barzani.
Iranian officials are
showing added concern over
the possible unsettling ef-
fect in Iran of the Kurdish
successes. They fear that
Kurdish tribes in Iran, im-
pressed by Barzani's activi-
ties, may become restive, or
that Barzani forces may at=
tempt to foster political agi-
tation and supply arms to
friendly elements in Iran.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
TURKEY
Political and economic,
problems that have thus'far
defied solution by the post-'
revolutionary government in
Turkey may bring on a new cri-
sis in the country's leader-
ship within the next few months.
The National Assembly recon-
venes on 3 September amid re-
ports of increasing restive-
ness and criticism throughout
the country.
The 78-year-;old Inonu, the
leader of the governing tripar-
tite coalition, is still the
key figure in Turkey's polit-
ical life. He has the backing
of about 270 of the 450 depu-
ties, as 'a result of the cab-
inet reshuffle of last June.
Like Inonu's previous govern-
ment which lasted only six
months-, the regime has prom-
ised extensive economic reform
and an ambitious development
program. The Five-Year Plan
is currently under intensive
study, and draft legislation on
state enterprises, a revised
tax system, minerals exploita-
tion,and customs regulation's is
being prepared for early sub-
mission to the assembly. The
numerically strong Justice par-
ty (JP),, drawn principally from
the prerevolutionary Democratic
party of Adnan Menderes and no
longer a coalition member, will
give the opposition greater co-
herence and force. The JP can
be expected to attack the gov-
ernment for its inability to
solve Turkey's economic prob-
lems, and probably will seek
to force new national elections.
The opposition also will
seek to profit from popular
disillusionment with the gov-
ernmment and the demonstrated
lessening of popular respect
for authority. Lawlessness
and rowdyism are increasing;
labor groups, and at least one
prominent newspaper, have open-
ly criticized top government
leaders; government-employed
laborers have gone on strike
for the first time in Turkish
history; and rioters in several
localities have turned on the
gendarmerie and had to be dis-
persed with bayonets.
The military establish-
ment; which provides the regime's
ultimate support is divided in
its attitude toward Inonu. The
majority of the general staff
and top-ranking officers appear
still to favor him.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
BhAZ I L
The leftist regime of
President Goulart is making
considerable headway in its
drive to re-establish a strong?
presidency, and Goulart appearis
increasingly confident of his
apolitical strength and military
backing. The recently appointed
ministers of war, navy and air
have all publicly endorsed the
government's call for an early,
plebiscite on abolition of the,
parliamentary system established
last September and a return to
a strong presidency. Prime
Minister Brochado da Rocha,
who is expected within the next
few days to ask congress to
grant the early plebiscite, is
acting as an agent of Goulart
rather than as a defender of
the parliamentary system to
which he owes his post.
On 7 August the US Embassy
learned that leaders of the two
largest parties in congress have
agreed firmly to reject granting
the cabinet "any but absolutely
necessary powers" and not to
countenance an early plebiscite.
However, the embassy believes
the congressional leaders may
be overestimating their ability
to withstand Goulart's maneuvers.
Certain armed forces lead-
ers, several governors includ
ing anti-Communist Carlos
Lacerda of Guanabara, and prol-
ably a majority of the congress
SECRET
remain strongly opposed
to, Goulart.
Food shortages and
serious inflation are
causing considerable pub-
lic dissatisfaction, and
there is a growing tendency
to blame the country's eco-
nomic problems on the weak-
nesses of the parliamentary
system of government. Short;
ages of prime staples have
occurred in major cities
throughout
the country
but
25X1
have been
particularly
acute;
in Rio de
Janeiro, capital
uanabara State,
A
deterioration of the free
exchange rate for the
cruzeiro by some 20 percent
in recent weeks probably
reflects not only a con-
tinuing rise in the cost
o:f living--which went up
18 percent in the first
six months of the year--
but also a certain amount
of capital flight.
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A$tGENTINA
Secretary of War General
Juan Bautista Loza was forced
to resign on 8 August when many
of the army commanders and the
navy and air force refused to
back him in a showdown with
'General Federico Toranzo Montero.
;Minister of Defense Jose Luis
Cantilo has been appointed
acting secretary of war pending
the designation of a new secre-
tary by the rebellious generals.
Inspector General of Logistics
Juan Carlos Reyes, who also
called for Loza's resignation,
has been prominently mentioned
as a possible successor.
The present crisis was
touched off early on 8 August
when General Federico Toranzo
Montero, commander of the 4th
Army Corps in the northern
province of Salta, established
himself in neighboring Jujuy
and advised President Guido that
he refused to recognize the
'authority of General Loza as
secretary of war. Loza immedi-
ately declared Toranzo in
rebellion and relieved him of
his command.
the opportunity to attempt an
overthrow of the government.
The military may also be concerned
over a 2 August announcement
in Moscow by a leading Argentine
Communist that the Peronists
and Communists are in alliance
against the Guido government and
the Alliance for Progress.
Ambassador McClintock on 7
August reported some of the
"most responsible" Argentine
business people now argue that
the only solution is a military
coup and a military government
for an extended period of,_time
until the country can be '11prop-
erly prepared" to return to a
constitutional government.
There have been rumors of
army dissatisfaction with Loza
in recent days. The dissatis-
faction apparently stems from
Loza's retention of personal
.control over the army as secre-
tary of war and acting commander.
in-chief, the return to active
duty of officers of Peronist
inclination, and Loza's manage-
ment of army personnel and
,policy. While the present crisis
appears to be an internal
squabble within the army and not
directed at the Guido government,
there is a danger that would-be
"golpistas" might seize upon
Observers believe that 25X1
Loza's resignation will settle
the matter for the present.
Several embassy
sources have indicated that the
ouster of Alsogaray may be
imminent.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
SPECIAL ARTICLES
THE CHINESE COMMUNIST AIR FORCE
Prior to the defeat of the
Nationalist forces and their
withdrawal to Taiwan in 1949,
the Chinese Communists had vir-
tually no air force, although
they are believed to have es-
tablished an air school in
Manchuria using captured Japa-
nese equipment. With the formal
establishment'of the Chinese
People's Republic on 1 October
1949, the Air Force of the Peo,-
ple's Liberation Army was created.
It is likely that some provision
for the expansion and moderniza-
tion of the embryonic air force
was made in the Sino-Soviet aid
treaty signed in Moscow on 14
3ebruary 1950.
The virtual. annihilation
of the North Korean forces prior
to the Chinese Communist entry
into the Korean conflict in
October 1950 probably accelerated
the development of Chinese Com-
munist air power. In any case.,
by March of the following year
the initial stages of expansion
were apparent. Training units
had been established and a
number of tactical air units
had appeared at various air-
fields throughout China. These
units were equipped with So-
viet aircraft including certain
World War II piston fighters
such as the LA-9 (Fritz), LA-11
(Fang), and some World War II
modern MIG-15 (Fagot) jet fighter
was also noted; The introduction
of these aircraft brought in
numerous Soviet personnel who
were assigned at practically all
levels of the air force.
Expansion and Development
By 1952, IL-28 (Beagle) jet
light bombers were being intro-
duced in the Chinese Communist
Air Force (CCAF). In 1953, a
few TU-4 (Bull) piston medium
bombers were received from the
USSR. By 1955 the CCAF was
estimated to have about 1100
jet fighters, and in that year
the number of IL-28's was doubled
from about 150 to over 300. A
large number of these bombers,
probably about 90, were given
to the Chinese Communists in
1955 when the Soviets with-
drew from Port Arthur.
The year 1955 was also
significant in that airfield
construction was begun on a
fairly large scale, particularly
in the Taiwan Strait coastal
area. Two airfields--Luchiao
and Chuhsien--were completed
and occupied by tactical units,
and jet bombers were deployed
to the Shanghai area for the
first time.
bombers- TU-2's. (Bats)..- The then _I ly
By April 1956, approximate-
100..
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(Fresco) j.et....fighters
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had been brought into the
air force, which had by this
time become the fourth largest
air force in the world. The
last piston engine fighter
unit--the 26th Division located
in south China--began receiving
MIG-type fighters.
Retrenchment and Deficiency
The decline in Chinese
Communist air power probably
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~ -OF %W W
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
had its earliest beginning
when deliveries of new Soviet
aircraft ceased sometime in
1959. However, it was not in
evidence until after mid-1960
when Soviet aid and technical
assistance were withdrawn. An
indication that all was not
well in the air force was con-
tained in an official document
published by the General Polit-4
ical Department of the People' -9
Liberation Army in January 1961.
This document reported the pro-;
ceedings of the 8th plenary
session of the Party Committee
for the Air Force held between
25 November and 9 December 1960
in Hsian. The report stated
that the "size of organization
of the units and schools at the
various levels of the air force
is still too large and it is
necessary to reduce their size
.n order to strengthen the
basic level." Although it was
pointed out that this retrench-,
;Went would primarily involve
"colleges and schools" and
particularly "airfields and
air stations with no flying
units," it was also clear that
following "the 50-percent re-
duction achieved in 1958,
units under the direct command
of the air force headquarters
were to be reduced by a
further 20 percent and reduc-
tions in corps and divisions
were to be 15 and 10 percent
respectively.
A collection of speeches
given by the inspector general
of the armed forces, Yeh Chien"
ying, appeared in the June 1961
issue of the General Political
Department publication. In one
of his speeches delivered to an
air force training conference,
Yeh stated that "the air force
needs more flights but cannot
afford them. The fact is, main-
tenance of material and equip-
ment cannot catch up with the
training needs. One of the
reasons for this is the low
standard of our national defense
industry." Another reason cited
by Yeh is "our low level of
technique, our backwardness in
the quantity and quality of re-
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pair, loose control, incompetent
systems, and serious losses."
Yeh urged more ground train-
ing and the establishment of
such conditions "as to make
ground training seem like aerial
exercises." He also pointed
out that actual air training, al-
through brief, should be made as
realistic as posAible.
This retrenchment and re-
organization indicated that the
a-~Lr force was tightening its
belt and was going to attempt
to get the maximum use from its
equipment with a minimum of wear
and tear. 25X1
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Operational Effectiveness
Despite its many problems
the CCAF is still` an; impressive
force numerically, with over
2000 jet fighters and 325 jet
light bombers. But numbers
alone do not determine the
capability of China's air arm.
The most serious challenge
to the CCAF occurred during the
Taiwan Strait crisis of 1958.
At that time the CCAF was prob-
ably at its peak. Many'of its
aircraft, supplied by the USSR,
were relatively new. Still the
score of kills in combat was over
30 to one in favor of the National-
ists. Chiang Kai-shek's pilots
who were involved in these aerial
encounters attributed the high
Communist losses to inadequate
training in air tactics, poor
aircraft handling, and pilot
confusion. Following this over-
whelming defeat, the Communists
apparently attempted to remedy
many of their shortcomings by 25X1
improved training.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
In sum, the modernization
and re-equipment program of both
the fighter and bomber elements
of the Chinese Communist Air
Force, which made great strides
during the 1950's, began to slow
down in 1958 and probably ceased
in mid-1960 when political dif-
drawal of Soviet technicians
Soviet aid. Although the So-
viets have provided substantial
numbers of new-generation fight-
era to the European satellites,
and even some fairly late7model
fighters and bombers to the UAR
and Indonesia, the Chinese Com-
munists have received only a few
MIG-19 jet fighters, their most
modern jet fighter. The Chinese
Communist bomber force still has
two divisions and an independent
regiment of obsolete TU-2 piston
bombers. Another-division has
a :Large number of IL-10 (Beast)
World War II ground attack bombers.
Despite deliveries of-the relatively
modern TU-16 jet medium bomber to
countries outside the bloc,
Communist China is known to have
on'Ly two. The remaining long-
range bombers in Peiping's
inventory consist of not more
than 15 obsolete and probably
worn out TU-4 piston bombers.
and China's economy permits
resumption of domestic military
aircraft production, the size
and effectiveness of the CCAF 25X1
which began at least by mid-
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