CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A003700010001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 40
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 30, 2008
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 29, 1962
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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SECRET
CURRENT
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY
SUMMARY
COPY NO. 70
OCI NO. 0423/62
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
I I I OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
SECRET
State Dept. review completed
GROUP I
Excluded from automatic downgrading
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
29 June 1962
T H E W E E K I N B R I E F
(Information as of 1200 EDT 28 June)
CHINESE COMMUNIST MILITARY ACTIVITIES
. . . . . . . . . . Page
Indications are that a tense situation exists
among the population in this region and that some evacuation
is under way. Communist propaganda carries allegations of
Chinese Nationalist and US plans for an invasion of the main-
land and pictures the build-up as a defense measure. There
is no evidence of a concentration of amphibious lift capacity
suitable for an attack on the offshore islands.
SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY DEVELOPMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . ? Page 3
While Moscow is treating the situation in the Taiwan
Strait with caution, its propaganda support of Peiping ap-
pears to be part of a concerted bloc offensive against the
presence of US forces in East Asia. Khrushchev wound up
his visit to Rumania with a speech reaffirming Soviet in-
terest in further negotiations on Berlin and Germany. How-
ever, be branded as distortions Western press stories which
imply that Moscow is about to agree to the status quo in
Germany; he said that a Berlin solution which terminates
the Allied occupation cannot be "postponed indefinitely."
Khrushchev has announced that he will make a major address
on Soviet disarmament policy at the Moscow Peace Congress,
scheduled to open 9 July.
The provisional coalition government, installed on
23 June, has designated a unified delegation to attend the
Geneva conference on Laos. Barring complications, the
conference should quickly approve draft agreements designed
to ensure Laotian neutrality; both bloc and Western powers
have indicated they would support the accords. Phoumi, in
Vientiane, appears to be on the alert to maintain his own
position and to forestall Pathet Lao dominance of the new
government.
ALGERIA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 8
Terrorism and sabotage have abated throughout Algeria.
Relatively normal activity is resuming in Algiers, and there
are signs of reconciliation between the European and Moslem
communities. However, the exodus of Europeans, estimated at
250,000 since 1 January, is continuing.
The transition is unlikely
to be smooth, however, because of dissensions within the pro-
visional Algerian government and the restiveness of the Algeri-
an National Army.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE 'WEEKLY SUMMARY
CONGO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 9
Negotiations between Adoula and Tshomb6 concerning the
unification of the Congo were recessed on 26 June, and the
future of the talks is once more in doubt. Although Adoula
agreed to Tshombe's request for a recess, he refused to
sign a UN-drafted communique which emphasized "progress" in
the talks; subsequently he implied that he regards further
negotiations as useless.. Adoula apparently now hopes that
the UN will take the initiative in unifying the Con o b
militar means if necessary.
THE BERLIN WALL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..... . . Page 10
Warmer weather and the summer vacation season will
probably bring an increase in incidents along West Ber-
lin's sector and zonal borders as more and more East Ger-
mans, reacting to food shortages and a generally unsatis-
factory economic situation, try to escape. West Berlin
leaders are already showing concern over the number of
escape incidents, the frequency and seriousness of shoot-
ings, and efforts to destroy the wall with explosive charges.
They believe the wall gains in political significance from
acts of desperation on the part of the East German populace,
the aggressiveness of the Communist security personnel, and
the activities of West Berliners in abetting escape plots.
They fear that Moscow may cite this "dangerous problem" as
a means of increasing pressure on the West to accept Com-
munist terms for a solution of the Berlin problem,
YUGOSLAVIA'S DETERIORATING ECONOMIC SITUATION . . . . . . . Page 13
Yugoslavia appears headed for its second straight year
of disappointing economic performance and is facing increas-
ingly serious economic problems. Crop prospects are poor,
and the rate of industrial growth has been falling. The
country already has an unfavorable balance of trade and a
heavy external debt. The US Embassy in Belgrade believes
that "some infusion of convertible funds or postponement of
external debt maturities may be necessary-to break the
vicious spiral that seems to be setting in."
BELGIAN GOVERNMENT ENTERING CRITICAL PERIOD .
. . . . . . . Page 15
The Social Christian - Socialist government in Belgium
is entering a critical period. A bitter dispute between
the anticlerical Socialists; and the church-oriented Social
Christians over educational policy is threatening to come
to a bead. In addition, the left-wing Socialists are planning
to make trouble over the recent Belgian-US atomic coopera-
tion agreement. The government is also likely to be bitterly
attacked if violent anti-Belgian outbreaks occur in Rwanda
and Burundi when these former Belgian colonies become inde-
pendent on 1 July.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
29 June 1962
RWANDA AND BURUNDI . . . . . o o . a . o a . . . o . . . o
Termination of the Belgian trusteeship of Rwanda and
Burundi on 1 July will give free reign to intense tribal
animosity within each of the new states and bitter quarrels
between them. Belgian troops leave about 1 August, along
with European administrators and technicians. Even before
the Belgian troops go, violent struggles involving both
tribal and interstate relations are likely.
Page 16
COMMON MARKET RELATIONS WITH AFRICA . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 18
The six Common Market (EEC) countries will resume nego-
tiations next week with 16 African states on a new EEC-African
association convention. The Six have resolved most of their
own differences over the complex questionsinvolved in this
particular issue, and prospects for an accord by the end of
the year--when the 1957 convention expires--are generally
favorable, since the EEC is offering the Africans substantial
trade, aid, and even political advantages. Nevertheless,
the negotiations are bound to be difficult, and complications
may arise over the extension of association to the African
members of the Commonwealth and to a free Algeria. Moscow
is trying to convince underdeveloped countries that the EEC
is neocolonialist.
Triennial elections to the upper house of the Japanese
Diet on .1 July are not expected to produce significant
changes in the relative strengths of the two major parties,
the ruling Liberal Democrats and the opposition Socialists.
Afterward, however, Prime Minster Ikeda will face major
policy decisions and possible challenges to his leader-
ship from rivals within his party. The elections also
may all but eliminate the moderate Democratic Socialists,
the third largest party, formed in 1960 by defectors from
the more extreme Socialist party.
TURKEY'S NEW GOVERNMENT . .
Members of Premier Ismet Inonu's Republican People's
party were named to most of the key posts in the coalition
cabinet formed on 25 June. The government's dependence,
however, on two unstable minor parties which do not fully
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
29 June 1962
support Inonu's economic austerity and reform measures may
enable the opposition Justice party to erode his support
in the legislature. Inonu was forced to raise the specter
of renewed military intervention to bring his cabinet to-
gether and end the four-week crisis.
BRITISH WEST INDIES . . . . . . . . . . .
. . Page 23
Following Trinidad's independence, scheduled for 31
August, Premier Williams will probably press for renegotia-
tion: of the 1961 Defense Areas Agreement with the US.
Jamaica's Premier Bustamante, now in Washington, will ar-
rive in London on 2 July, probably seeking aid and train-
ing for Jamaican defense forces after independence--due on
6 August. Meanwhile, developments in Grenada may result
in that island's union with Trinidad,,
NEW SALVADORAN PRESIDENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 25
Lt. Col, Julio Rivera takes office as president of El
Salvador on I July. Working through provisional governments,
be and his army reformists have already made an effective start
on a program of social and economic reforms, but face con-
tinuing opposition from extremes of both right and left.
Wealthy groups see the program as a threat to their inter-
ests and have cut back needed private investment, while the
Communists fear tbe,program's appeal to the poorer classes.
As long as Rivera retains the support of the armed forces
and can prevent significant economic deterioration, the
extremes can only seek to keep unrest alive against the
day when a coup appears more feasible.
PERU . . . . . . . . . . . .
Page 26
Haya de la Torre has gained a substantial lead in the
official returns of the 10 June election, but may fall short
of the one third of the total vote needed to win without
congressional action.
e aun a threatens to lead an armed insur-
rection if he is not elected, but military leaders will sup-
press any such move.
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INDO-NEPALESE RELATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 5
Indo-Nepalese relations, long strained, may deteri-
orate further as a result of recent Chinese Communist over-
tures to Nepal. Since the expiration on 2 June of the
Sino-Indian trade agreement, China has been trying to ob-
tain through Nepal a number of commodities on which India
imposes export restrictions. Peiping may also seek to em-
barrass India by offering Nepal milita:ry assistance. Kat-
mandu would resent efforts by India to restrict Sino-Nepalese
trade or to prevent Nepal from establishing closer diplomatic
or military relations with China. 25X1
PROBLEMS OF DE-STALINIZATION IN THE USSR . . . . . . . . . . Page 8
The problem of deciding who should share the guilt for
Stalin's crimes poses a dilemma for the Soviet regime in
determining the pace and extent of, de.-Stalinization. This
question has been widely and-publicly discussed in Soviet
literary circles. Liberal writers--mostly of the younger
generation--have condemned writers successful under Stalin,
while those of the older generation hold that much of what
was written in that period is still valid. Basically the
same dilemma exists in all fields, and the hesitant course
of de-Stalinization to date is probably due more to this
essentially insoluble problem than to any high-level op-
position to the principle of de-Stalinization per se.
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NW IMUR J
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
WEEKLY REVIEW
CHINESE COMMUNIST MILITARY ACTIVITIES
Propaganda
A Peiping statement on 23
June charged that the Chinese
Nationalists, with the support
and connivance of the US, are
preparing to invade the main-
land. This statement was given
wide dissemination to both
foreign and mainland audiences.
On 25 June, a People's Daily
editorial reiterated the theme
of impending assault from
Taipei and stressed the Commu-
nist ability to defeat such an
attack. In a further effort to
implicate the US in Taipei's
plans, Chinese Communist Foreign
Minister Chen Yi stated at a
;Peiping rally on the 25th that
the US must bear full responsi-
bility for the "grave conse-
quences" arising from an as-
sault on the mainland. The
Chinese propaganda is probably
intended in part to encourage
'Western pressure on the US to.
:restrain the Chinese National-
ists from any military action.
Moscow and the European
satellites have rebroadcast
a summary of the 23 June
Chinese Communist statement
without comment, while the
Asian Communist regimes and
Albania have added press comment
echoing Peiping's warnings. TASS,
citing Western reports that war-
ships of the Seventh Fleet are
being moved into the Taiwan
Strait, charges that the United
States has begun "another
provocative show of military
strength off the shores of
the Chinese People's Republic."
Concurrent with Peiping's
denouncement of the invasion
threat, mass anti-Nationalist
rallies have been held, at which
pledges to "annihilate" the
"Chiang Kai-shek gang if and
when it invades the mainland"
have been voiced. The mass
meetings appear to have stressed
primarily defensive themes, with
no effort being made to stimulate
sentiment for offensive military
action against Taipei.
Extensive use of the in-
vasion theme among the mainland
populace suggests that Peiping
may be exploiting it to generate
support for some of its current
domestic programs. During the
1958 Taiwan Strait crisis, the
organization of the communes and
the backyard steel drive were
promoted in a similar fashion.
Several reports indicate
that some evacuation of resi-
dents from coastal areas is
under way. Although the
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1W 0ZLINZ I Noe
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
evacuation is ostensibly in con-
nection with preparations against
invasion, it fits Peiping's pro-
gram for the removal of some 30
million unemployed urban workers
and their dependents to rural
areas. There have been strong
indications during the past few
months that this program was meet-
ing with widespread resistance.
Chinese Communist Intentions
There have been some indi-
cations during the past week
that the Chinese Communists still
consider the balance of Communist,
US, and Nationalist armed forces
in the Taiwan Strait area unfa-
vorablefor an all-out attack on
the offshore islands. Peiping's
23 June statement on the invasion
threat appeared to concede that
the Chinese Nationalists are
able to "hold onto Taiwan and
other coastal islands" because
they are "shielded" by US armed
forces.
It is probable that the
Communist armed build-up along
the Taiwan Strait reflects real
apprehension by Peiping over the
possibility of Chinese National-
ist military action against the
mainland aided by the US. It
is likely that the build-up was
designed mainly to discourage
such action. There is a strong
possibility that a Chinese Na-
tionalist attack--even an airdrop
of special forces--would bring
Chinese Communist retaliation
in the form of military pressure
against the offshore islands.
Chinese Nationalist Reaction
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Spokesmen have been
restrained in their comments on
Communist military moves and
propaganda broadcasts, and Na- 25X1
tionalist newspapers are urging
a "political offensive" before
military action is taken.
Taipei is concerned over
the fact that recent publicity
on the Taiwan Strait situation
places it in an unfavorable light
by characterizing the Communist
build-up as defensive.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE `WEEKLY SUMMARY
SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY DEVELOPMENTS
While Moscow is treating
the specific situation in the
Taiwan Strait with caution,
the support it has given Peiping
by rebroadcasting Chinese propa-
ganda statements appears to be
part of a concerted bloc propa-
ganda offensive against the
presence of US forces in East
Asia. The USSR expanded this
offensive on 26 June through a
request to the UN acting secre-
tary general that the withdrawal
of foreign troops from South
Korea be placed on the agenda
of next fall's UN General As-
sembly. Moscow radio has also
charged that the US is preparing
a series of "particularly
serious provocations" this
autumn against North Korea.
North Korea last week
launched a major propaganda
campaign demanding withdrawal
of US forces from South Korea,
and Pyongyang has sent a memo-
randum along these lines to
"parliaments of all the countries
of the world." Pravda followed
this up by repor-t nig a mass
meeting in Pyongyang demanding
Korean reunification, and the
Soviet Trade Union organization
has sent a "solidarity" message
to its North Korean counterpart
supporting reunification and
the withdrawal of foreign
forces from South Korea.
On 27 June TASS broadcast
an attack on the continued
presence of US troops in Thai-
land after the establishment of
a coalition government in Laos,
and asserted that "imperialist
circles have turned Thailand
into a dangerous springboard of
aggression threatening the peace
and security of all Southeast
Asia." This developing bloc
campaign, focused on charges
that US forces in Korea, Japan,
Taiwan, and Southeast Asia con-
stitute a threat to the peace
and security of the entire area,
may be intended to lay the ground-
work for future strident claims
that crises in the area will
recur so long as US forces re-
main there.
Berlin
During the past week, the
USSR maintained its uncompromis-
ing stand on the Berlin and
German issues while reaffirming
its readiness to resolve these
questions through negotiations
with the West. Reflecting the
somewhat sharper tone apparent
lately in the Soviet attitude
toward the Berlin problem,
Khrushchev in his 24 June speech
in Bucharest warned that the
"good will and patience" of the
USSR in the US-Soviet talks must
not be used by the Western powers
to avoid a solution of the
problem. He acknowledged that
the "most clear-sighted" West-
ern leaders understand the neces-
sity of resolving disputes by
peaceful means. He again cited
the Laos agreement as an example
for reaching a solution to the
German problem and mentioned
the Warsaw Pact declaration of
7 June as evidence of Moscow's
desire to work toward reaching
a "rautually acceptable solution."
Khrushchev accused Western
correspondents of "distorting"
an earlier speech by making it
appear that the USSR intends
to abandon its previous stand
and accept the present situa-
tion in Germany. He reiterated
the standard Soviet demands and
concluded that the evacuation
of the occupation troops from
West Berlin, together with the
creation of a free, demilita-
rized city. is the "only road
which would make the situation
healthy."
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
The Soviet leader's warn-
ing that a solution of the Ber-
lin question could not be post-
poned indefinitely was repeated
in a Soviet-Rumanian communique
published on 25 June following
his visit to Rumania. The com-
muniqu6 called attention to
"recent provocations" in West
Berlin and implied that the
West was carrying these out
under cover of the bilateral
talks. The communique re-
stated Moscow's position on
all outstanding East-West
issues and declared that "if
in the future" the Western pow-
ers show reluctance to reach
an agreed settlement, a separate
peace treaty with East Germany
will be signed.
Marking the 21st anniver-
sary of the Nazi attack on the
Soviet Union, Marshal Malinov-
sky in the 22 June Pravda ac-
cused the Western powers of
attempting to pursue the same
policies which led to World War
II and asserted that they would
"like to turn the German prob-
lem into a trial of strength.'
He declared that the peace
treaty "must and will be signed,"
but went on to mention the War-
saw Pact declaration as reflect-
ing Moscow's interest in seek-
ing a negotiated settlement.
Pravda of 21 June published
Walter Uibilcht's views on the
German problem as set forth in
a speech before the East German
National Congress, held on 16-
17 June. The East German party
boss alluded to "certain re-
sults" which had been achieved
thus far in the US-Soviet talks
and claimed that President Ken-
nedy, unlike Chancellor Adenauer,
took into consideration a "cer-
tain recognition of the status
quo." However, Ulbricht re-
iterated the Communist demand
for the withdrawal of NATO
forces from West Berlin and
contended that no one takes
"seriously" the West's proposal
for an international access
authority composed of 13 states.
He suggested that a small num-
ber of "police forces" provided
by neutral states or by the three
Western powers and the Soviet
Union could take the place of
NATO forces in West Berlin.
Moscow has played Secre-
tary Rusk's Western European
trip in comparatively low key,
while claiming that West Ger-
man :leaders, in conversations
with the Secretary, have reflect-
ed Bonn's intention to prevent
"by all means" an early solu-
tion of the German problem.
Commenting on Rusk's trip to
West Berlin, the official East
German news service stated that
the Secretary was "reserved"
in his remarks and particularly
singled out his statement re-
garding the need to continue
the bilateral discussions with
the USSR. A 21 June Pravda
commentary attacked the speeches
made by Mayor Brandt and Adenauer
in connection with Secretary
Rusk's visit to West Berlin as
amounting to the adoption of a
"policy of provocations."
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE 'NrEEKLY SUMMARY
Disarmament
The Soviet-Rumanian commu-
niqu6 of 25 June contained the
first authoritative bloc com-
ment on the Geneva disarmament
conference since the 14 June
recess. The document claimed
thatthesetalks have shown that
the Western powers still oppose
realistic disarmament measures,
and instead seek to organize a
widespread system of military
espionage under the guise of
disarmament controls. It
charged the Western powers with
making "hypocritical state-
ments" on disarmament at Geneva
while in fact stepping up the
arms race, particularly with
the current US nuclear test
series.
While citing the development
of a draft treaty on general
and complete disarmament as the
"main task," the communique en-
dorsed the principle of con-
currently "agreeing on partial
measures which would ease in-
ternational tension and create
a climate of mutual confidence."
It cited as "major measures"
in this field establishment
of clenuclearized zones in vari-
ous parts of the world, preven-
tion:. of the further spread of
nuclear weapons, the renuncia-
tion of their use, conclusion
of a nonaggression pact between
NATO and the Warsaw Treaty or-
ganization, and withdrawal of
troops from foreign territories.
The communique claimed that the
Western powers "unfortunately"
show no desire to reach agree-
ment on these "overdue" questions.
On several occasions dur-
ing his visit to Rumania, Khru-
shchev briefly alluded to the
need for general and complete
disarmament and Western oppo-
sition to it. In contrast to
his speeches in Bulgaria, he
did not make sarcastic refer-
ences to the Geneva disarmament
conference. However, his host
Gheorghiu-Dej, addressing a
Bucharest mass meeting on 24
June, did complain that the
results achieved so far by the
conference are "far from satis-
factory," and that at the present
pace, the final articles of the
treaty will be discussed "by
the grandchildren of those now
taking part in the negotiations."
Khrushchev sent greetings
to the Accra "World Without
the Bomb Assembly," admonishing
the participants that achieve-
ment of general and complete
disarmament depends on breaking
the resistance of those selfish in-
terests who "gamble irresponsibly"
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with the destinies of whole
nations. He expressed the view
that the "broader the front of
peace champions" and the closer
their ranks, "the sooner a de-
cisive victory will be scored
over the forces of war and ag-
gression."
In a recent informal con-
versation with a member of the
US delegation at Geneva, Indian
delegate Lall saw two "crucial"
issues facing the disarmament
conference: Soviet insistence
on elimination of nuclear weapons
and their delivery vehicles in
the early stages of a peace
treaty; and US insistence on
verification of agreed levels
of retained armaments. He
thought that the US would have
to "give" on the Soviet position
and the USSR on the US position
if the conference was to be
successful.
In this connection Lall
asserted that he had told So-
viet delegate Zarin just prior
to the recess that the Soviet
position on verification was
"weak." According to Lall,
Zorin in his response had given
"some indication" that his
government was aware of this
and "was going to do something
about it." Soviet delegates
had earlier indicated, however,
that there would be no change
in the Soviet position after
the recess.
Communist Front Meetings
In a recent letter to
Canon Collins, one of the
leaders of the British anti-
nuclear weapons movement and
a sponsor of the forthcoming
Moscow Peace Conference, Khru-
shchev announced that he would
make a major address on Soviet
disarmament policy at the con-
ference, scheduled to open 9
July. Collins had sent mes-
sages to the government leaders
of the powers represented at
the Geneva disarmament con-
ference soliciting their views 25X1
on the disarmament issue.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Laos' provisional coali-
tion government was invested
on 23 June after a drawn-out
dispute over the wording of the
installation ordinance. Its
first major act was to appoint a
seven-member delegation headed
by Foreign Minister Quinim
Pholsena to attend the 14-nation
Geneva conference on Laos--
scheduled to be resumed on
2 July.
The conference, convened
in May 1961, has almost com-
pleted work on accords designed
to ensure Laotian neutrality.
Barring new demands by Commu-
nist representatives, the few
remaining issues should be
quickly resolved. Formal sign-
ing of the agreements has also
awaited promulgation of a dec-
laration of neutrality by the
Laotian Government and the
presence of a unified delega-
tion in Geneva.
The Soviet Union continues
to devote little attention to
the Laotian situation, treating
it as a chapter that is drawing
to a close. The relatively
low-keyed propaganda statements
concerning the presence of US
troops suggest
that the USSR does not intend
to make withdrawal of these a
condition to a final settle-
ment. It is probable, however,
that the Communists will use
the conference at Geneva to
develop considerable propaganda
noise, asserting that peace and
security in the area, without
which Laos cannot develop as a
free and neutral nation, is
impossible so long as US troops
remain. That Moscow expects
the conference to move fairly
smoothly is suggested by
Khrushchev's repetition on
24 June of his earlier remark
that the Laos settlement should
be considered a model for the
way other disputed issues, such
as Berlin and Germany, can be
resolved. He did enter a hedge
against the possibility that
difficulties might arise, how-
ever, by noting that maneuvers
by "reactionary forces" might
complicate a settlement.
In Vientiane, the question
of transferring authority from
ministers in the former Vientiane
government to incumbents in the
Souvanna coalition is causing
confusion and friction. Neutral-
ist Foreign Minister Quinim com-
plained to Ambassador Brown on
26 "rune that two former ministers
had refused to yield their posts,
allegedly acting under instruc-
tions from General Phoumi. On
27June, Phoumi issued a direc-
tive stating hat all administra-
tive levels in the country would
be responsive to orders from the
outgoing ministers, who temporarily
were to continue their former
functions. Phoumi claimed that
this procedure had been approved
at a cabinet meeting on 24 June,
but this appears to be a liberal
interpretation on his part, and
his action will probably bring
protests from the Pathet Lao.
In the few days since the
coalition has been in office,
Phoumi has demonstrated that he
intends to be on the alert to
maintain his own position and
to counter Pathet Lao influence.
He recently protested success-
fully to Souphannouvong over un-
authorized press releases by
Phoumi Vongvichit, the Pathet
Lao minister of information in
the coalition cabinet.
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Terrorism and sabotage have
almost ceased in Algiers and
are abating in Oran and other
cities. Relatively normal ac-
tivity is resuming in Algiers,
and there are signs of reconcil-
iation between the European and
Moslem communities. However,
the exodus of Europeans, esti-
mated at 250,000 since 1 January,
is continuing.
French Foreign Minister
Couve de Murville recently told
Secretary Rusk that he expected
Algerian independence to be
proclaimed on 5 July, with the.
present Provisional Executive
designated as a provisional
government.
The transition to independ-
ence is unlikely to be smooth
because of dissensions within
the provisional Algerian govern-
ment (PAG) and the restiveness
of the Algerian National Army
(ALN). PAG vice premier Ben
Bella's quarrel with premier
Ben Khedda and the "moderate"
wing of the PAG came to a head
during the early June meeting
of the National Revolutionary
Council and appears to be so
deep-seated as to preclude any
permanent reconciliation. The
PAG's failure to make an agreed
public comment on the 17 June
truce arranged by the Provi-
sional Executive and representa-
tives of the Secret Army Organi-
zavtion (OAS) indicates the in-
creasing dissension among the
Moslem leaders. There are
some indications that Ben Bella
is heeding advice not to aggra-
vate the dispute.
The PAG will probably
dissolve itself as soon as
independence is announced.
Its present members would then
campaign for seats in the Al-
gerian assembly, possibly run-
ning as a list from the city
of Algiers, where their popu-
larity is highest relative to
the ALN's influence.
The US Consul General in
Algiers believes that the PAG
and the French Government,
in order to prevent Ben Bella
and the hard-line faction of
the ALN from disrupting the
Evian accords, are cooperat-
ing to delay the return to
Algeria of the ALN units in
Tunisia and Morocco. The
French Army has apparently
not yet withdrawn from its
positions along Algeria's
frontiers, and there may be
clashes with ALN units attempt-
ing to enter immediately after
independence.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Negotiations between Adoula
and Tshomb6 concerning the uni-
fication of the Congo were re-
cessed on 26 June for the second
time since they began on 18
March. As at the time of the
April recess--when Congolese
troops attempted to prevent
Tshombe's aircraft from leaving
--the Katangan leader's departure
from Leopoldville was again ac-
companied by angry recriminations.
Premier Adoula refused to sign
a UN-drafted communique which
emphasized areas of agreement
between the two sides, and the
future of the talks is once more
in doubt.
In three months of palaver,
Tshombb has agreed to little
more than the establishment of
joint commissions to recommend
solutions for outstanding is-
sues. On arriving in Elisabeth-
ville, he emphasized that he
had made no binding commitments,
but stated that he was prepared
to meet further with Adoula and
that "much remains to be done."
In Leopoldville, Adoula scarcely
disguised his frustration at his
inability to bring Tshombb to
heel. Adoula warned that peace-
ful means of ending Katanga's
secession "appear to be ex-
hausted," and he called upon
the UN to carry out its mandate
to bring about a unified Congo.
The latest breakdown in the
talks appears linked in part to
internal problems facing both
leaders. Adoula may have felt
that a communique which revealed
how little progress had been
achieved would have serious re-
percussions on his position.
His foreign minister, Justin
Bomboko, is under heavy political
attack in the Congolese Senate,
ostensibly for bypassing that
group in certain dealings with
the UN; Adoula had indicated
that he will seek to forestall
a censure motion against Bomboko.
Adoula's pique at Tshombe proba-
bly stems in part from a belief
that Tshombb timed his departure
to provide new ammunition for
critics of the government.
Tshombb, on his side, had
been importuned by various ad-
visers to return to Elisabeth-
vi]Lle, where rumors of a UN
military move to occupy the
miming towns of Jadotville and
Kolwezi have again increased
tension. On 22 June, Katangan
Foreign Minister Kimba charged
the UN and the United States
with plotting to occupy mining
centers in order to collect ex-
port revenues on behalf of the
central government.
Unrest in Elisabethville
probably will be eased by 25X1
Tshombe's return and by his as-
surances that he made no com-
mitments to Adoula.
pendence."
tidoula nonetheless regards the
next move as up to the UN, and
if assistance is not forthcoming
he may be forced once again to
fall back upon the maladroit
Congolese army in an attempt to
end Katanga's secession. If
Tshombb returns to Leopold-
ville at all, it is expected
to be after 11 July, the date
on which his followers will
celebrate the second anni-
versary of Katanga's "inde-
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WEEKLY SUMMARY
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE'
THE BERLIN WALL
SECRET
Warmer weather and the
summer vacation season will
probably bring an increase in
incidents along West Berlin's
sector and zonal borders as more
and more East Germans, reacting
to food shortages and a generally
unsatisfactory economic situation,
will try to escape.
West Berlin leaders are
already alarmed by the number
of escape incidents, the fre-
quency and seriousness of
shootings, and efforts to de-
stroythe wall with explosive
charges. They believe the
wall gains in political signif-
icance from acts of desperation
on the part of the East German
populace, the aggressiveness of
the Communist security personnel,
and the activities of West
Berliners in abetting escape
plots. They fear that Moscow
may cite this "dangerous problem"
as a means of increasing pres-
sure on the West to accept Com-
munist terms for solving the
Berlin problem.
Since 23 May, when West
Berlin police killed an East
German guard named Goering, who
was sitting on a graveyard
wall shooting at a wounded 14-
year-old escapee, there have
been almost daily shootings on
the Communist side of the
borders and several exchanges
between East and West Berlin
police. Goering's death sparked
a loudspeaker war across the
wall, with the Ulbricht regime
charging that West Berlin
"murderers" and assassins"
were endeavoring to sabotage
the US-Soviet talks on Berlin.
Goering was given a state fu-
neral.
29 June 62
In a radiobroadcast on
27 May, Mayor Brandt pledged
that West Berlin police would
use small-arms fire if necessary
to assist anyone seeking to
flee. The Ulbricht regime
increased the size of its
security patrols, particularly
in the central and more heavily
populated part of the city,
and began building concrete
bunkers and reinforcing barriers
at strategic points along the
sector border. Trenches were
dug behind the zonal border,
and new observation posts were
built opposite the British and
French sectors. By 30 May the
size of the East German security
patrols had returned to normal,
but shootings continued. Several
East Germans--one attempting to
swim the Spree River--were
killed on 5 June.
The West Berlin police
countered on 18 June by build-
ing shelters and watchtowers
reinforced with sheet steel
and digging trenches on their
side of the wall. They were
issued steel helmets and their
radio cars were equipped with
M-2 carbines.
In recent months, fifty
to sixty refugees have been
registering weekly at Marienfelde
reception center in West Berlin.
Perhaps half as many flee across
the interzonal border directly
to West Germany. In Berlin,
there are some group escapes
(through tunnels or such means
as the recently commandeered river
excursion boat), but most refugees
seek to flee alor or with a
single companion--usually by
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Twow M-1 UIA-f-I -1 1%00
a
lr.,,,h EAST:
Sector
BERLIN T
__ - Area of
Zone boundary
Sector boundary
Well
if x Barbed wire fence (s) Masonry wall O Bunker
~--~.- Chain link fence
topped with two strands
of barbed wire
Cleared strip and (or) ditches x x Tank barrier
Walled up building A Observation tower
7*D Crossing point for West Berliners
' Crossing point for West Germans
Crossing point for occupation forces
and diplomatic corps
crossing where the border runs
through sparsely populated or
wooded areas or by swimming
one of the canals which form
part of the border. To prevent
underwater escapes, East Ger-
man police last weekend began
sinking barbed wire concer-
tinas into the canal beds and
installed heavy wooden gates,
strung with wire, at midchannel.
There is no way of esti-
mating how many would-be ref-
ugees have been apprehended
or killed. West Berlin author-
ities have reported that at
least 30 have died in sight
of the border--six in the past
month--and gunshots are heard
almost daily from somewhere be-
hind the border surrounding
West Berlin.
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125
7
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
REFUGEE ARRIVALS IN WEST BERLIN
84
73
JANUARY FEBRUARY MARCH APRIL
=- II fL'~IN ELS 015 CO VF.RFD
Many East Germans and
East Berliners flee with the
direct assistance of the West
,'Berliners, chiefly university
students. When alerted in
advance, West Berlin police
hide near the border to help
if needed. On 18 June, during
such an escape, an East German
guard was shot and killed,
apparently by one of his com-
rades. The Ulbricht regime
hailed the dead guard as a
"martyr" and buried him with
.great ceremony, as in the case
of Goering.
Tunnels have become a
common means of escape. West
Berlin students, many from
the technical and mining facul-
ties of the Free University,
apparently have made use of
city planning maps and first-
MAY
hand knowledge of the city's
streets, elevated train lines,
and, sewer systems to plot ex-
cavations from buildings im- 25X1
mediately adjacent to the border
into nearby East Berlin build-
ings.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
YUGOSLAVIA'S DETERIORATING ECONOMIC SITUATION
Yugoslavia appears headed
for its second straight year
of disappointing economic per-
formance and is facing increas-
ingly serious economic problems.
Crop prospects are poor, and
the rate of industrial growth
has been falling. The country
already has an unfavorable bal-
ance of trace and heavy external
debt.
declining growth rate is in
part the result of deflationary
policies adopted to curb the
excessive spending stimulated
by an economic reform program
begun last year. In addition,
a foreign-exchange shortage
has affected the production
rates of those industries using
foreign parts or raw materials.
The 1962 economic plan
called for an increase of 23
percent in overall agricultural
production above the depressed
level of 1961. As a result of
adverse weather, however, wheat
and rye production will almost
certainly fall for the third
consecutive year. This year's
crop is estimated at 2,800,000
metric tons, approximately
1,200,000 tons below annual
domestic requirements. If the
corn crop is no better than last
year's, as seems likely, the re-
gime will be deprived again
this year of a major dollar-
earning export.
Industrial production was
to rise 13 percent each year
under the current five-year plan
(1961-65). However, it rose
only 7 percent in 1961 and even
less in the spring of 1962. The
increase over the comparable
period in 1961 was 5 percent at
the end of March 1962, 4 percent
at the end of April, and only 3
percent at the end of May. This
As a result of the situa-
tions in industry and particu-
larly agriculture, exports in
the first five months of 1962
rose only 5 percent instead of
the 18 percent planned. At
the same time, imports rose 8
percent and the balance-of-
trade deficit 10 percent. Yugo-
slavia has been slow in repay-
ing some types of commercial
credits and recently asked
Italy, the largest holder of
short-term loans, to defer for
eight years all payments due
during 1963-65.
Current regime policies
should, in the opinion of the
US ;Embassy in Belgrade, ulti-
mately strengthen the economy,
but plans will probably need
additional revision. Yugo-
slav planners now apparently
intend to extend target dead-
lines of the five-year plan.
The public is naturally
reluctant to make sacrifices
in the improved but still low
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
SELECTED YUGOSLAV GRAIN PRODUCTION
2.7
r
J~
~r
1958
(f~r
1960 1961 1962
(EST)
standard of living. In recent
months, regime leaders had been
issuing hard-hitting statements
on economic problems, their
causes, and proposed solutions.
A speech of this type by Tito
on 6 May apparently so alarmed
the public, however, that he
subsequently pledged there
would be no "belt tightening"
for the people.
Tito also indicated, as
have other regime leaders, the
abandonment of certain economic
plans which were essentially
politically motivated and which
aroused opposition particularly
in the industrially developed
north. Federal investment in
the backward southern areas of
the country is apparently now
to be curtailed in favor of sim-
ilar investment in the north
which will pay off more rapidly.
YUGOSLAV
INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION INCREASES
+3%
(through
May)
Belgrade is also attempt-
ing to hearten the public by
playing up the few positive de-
velopments which have occurred
this year, such as the small
improvement of its balance of
trade with Western Europe and
the increase of industrial ex-
ports.
The embassy believes
that: "some infusion of con-
vertible funds or a postpone-
ment, of external debt maturities
may be necessary to get unused
plant capacities into operation
and to break the vicious spiral
that now seems to be setting
in." It also notes that the
Yugoslavs may have to import
as much as $140,000,000 worth
of agricultural products, the
foreign exchange for which
is not readil available.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
BELGIAN GOVERNMENT ENTERING CRITICAL PERIOD
The next few weeks will
be a critical period for
Belg.um.'s Social Christian -
Socialist coalition government.
A number of difficult problems
remain to be solved in the re-
maining days of this parlia-
mentary session, any one of
which could split the coalition
and bring down the government.
Chief of these problems
is the dispute over the Edu-
cation Ministry, which the
Flemish Roman Catholics of
Prime Minister Lefevre's So-
cial Christian party propose
to divide into separate French
and Flemish offices. This has
aroused violent objections on
the part of French-speaking,
anti-clerical Socialists, who
believe that the plan is a de-
vice to extend church influence
in education. Both coalition
parties feel strongly enough
on the issue to go to the polls
if necessary, and a compromise
solution will not be easily
reached.
The government's
fiscal
reform
bill continues
to
cause
friction in the
coali-
tion.
A watered-down
version
passed
the Chamber after pro-
longed
and acrimonious debate
and now goes to the Senate,
which has reluctantly agreed
to consider it before adjourn-
ment on 10 August. Its passage,
however, is not yet assured.
Rejection of the program even
in its present limited form
would be a serious setback to
the Belgian economy, which
has long been plagued by an
antiquated tax system producing
neither sufficient public rev-
enue nor investment incentive.
Conservative elements within
both the Social Christian party
and the opposition Liberal
party have cooperated in chopping
back the Lefevre program, which
has so far been kept alive by
the support of the Socialists
and the labor wing of the Social
Christians.
Spaak, who has just returned
to Brussels from New York where
he attended the UN debate on the
com:Lng independence of the Bel-
gian trust territories, Rwanda
and Burundi, will have his hands
full'. keeping the more militant
elements of his party in line.
In addition to dealing with the
Education Ministry dispute,
Spaak faces the task of quieting
the noisy antimilitary elements
within his party who are dis-
turbed over the signing of the
atomic cooperation agreement
with the US in May. By arranging
to have the agreement signed in
Washington with no publicity,
Spaak apparently had hoped to
avoid a public row. The Social-
ist leader in the Senate, how-
ever, has asked for a parliamen-
tary:interrogation of the foreign
and defense ministries, and the
Socialist press is charging that
the agreement violates the 1960
Socialist party congress resolu-
tion against the use of strategic
nuclear weapons by Belgian forces
and against nuclear weapons stock-
piling on Belgian territory.
Finally, in the present
bruised state of Belgian pub-
lic sentiment about African
questions and the UN, Spaak will
almost certainly have to cope
with a situation verging on the
explosive if independence for
Rwanda and Burundi--set for 1
July--is accompanied by major
anti-Belgian violence.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
The Belgian trusteeship of
Rwanda and Burundi ends on 1
July, and Belgian troops will
leave about a month later,
along with European administra-
tors and technicians. Even be-
fore the Belgian troops go,
violent struggles involving
both tribal and interstate re-
lations are likely. The un-
settled situation in these
territories grows out of an
as yet incomplete "revolution"
by the Hutu people--85 percent
of the population in each
country--who want to throw off
the centuries-old social, eco-
nomic, and political monopoly
held by the Tutsi tribal
aristocracy.
In 1960-61, the Hutus in
Rwanda organized, with Belgian
assistance, a Hutu Emancipation
Movement (PARMEHUTU) and took
over the native government of
that territory. Led by Gregoire
Kayibanda, now president and
premier, they formed an all-
Hutu government, forced the
incumbent Mwami Kigeri V to
flee, and abolished the Tutsi
monarchy.
A similar Hutu "revolution,"
also encouraged by the Belgians,
began to germinate in Burundi
but has not fully developed.
The Tutsis' position is still
stronger in Burundi than in Rwanda
because the two principal Burundi
parties, the Party of Unity and
Progress (UPRONA) and the Front
Commun, while containing Hutu
elements, are controlled by
competing Tutsi leaders. In
S?utember 1961, the anti-Belgian
UPRONA led by the Tutsi ruler's
son, Prince Louis Rwagasore,
won territorial elections and
took over the government.
Each government has since
sought to consolidate its posi-
tion by eliminating its internal
opposition. In Rwanda, the
struggle is along strictly trib-
al :Lines, and Hutu harassment
of the Tutsi population has
resulted in the flight of some
142,000 people into neighboring
territories. The Tutsi refugees,
in turn, have acquired rifles
and machine guns and have or-
ganized so-called "inyenzi"
,Rwanda and Burundi
REPUBLIC
OF THE CONGO
0 Statute Miles 100
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TANGANYIKA
25X1
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
cockroach terrorist groups
which raid into Rwanda.
The Tutsis, organized in
the Rwanda Union party (UNAR)
with a program of restoring the
monarchy, have won the sympathy
of radical elements in the
Congolese government at Leopold-
ville and of the UAR and other
radical African states. They
are probably receiving arms
and money from some of these
sources. The Hutu leaders
early this year admitted UNAR
representatives in the govern-
ment, but both Hutu and Tutsi
leaders still appear to believe
that the only solution to their
problems is extermination of
their rivals.
The Tutsi-dominated UPRONA
government of Burundi, headed
by Prime Minister Andre Muhirwa,
a son-in-law of the Mwami,
gained no sense of security
from its electoral victory.
Since gaining power it has bent
all its efforts to destroy any
opposition and to oust the
Belgians as rapidly as possible.
Members of the Tutsi Batare
clan--who constituted the
leadership of the defeated
opposition--retaliated last
October when they assassinated
Prince Louis Rwagasore. The
atmosphere of aggravated in-
security created by this
assassination in turn has en-
abled extremists to take con-
trol of the governing party
and has fostered the forma-
tion of an UPRONA youth group
which habitually beats up
opposition leaders and killed
five of them last January.
While this clan fight
continues, involving Hutus
and TutsiS on both sides, there
are signs that the struggle
in Burundi is changing into a
Hut:u-vs.-Tutsi conflict like
that in Rwanda. Hutus within
UPRONA are loudly complaining
about Tutsi domination of the
party and favoritism shown
Tutsis in government posts.
These Hutu elements--including
assembly leaders and ministers
in the Muhirwa government--re-
portedly are aiming to wrest
control from Muhirwa in order
to establish a republic. The
Mwami, who could serve as a
force for moderation, is still
popular but oliticall in-
effectual.
Relations between Rwanda
and Burundi are similarly
bitter. Both states have
flatly rejected the idea of
political union, and each
government is seeking to help
its sympathizers in the other
state. The sheer weight of
Hutu numbers would seem to
favor an eventual Hutu take-
over in both states, but the
Tutsis will not give up with-
out a real fight.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
COMMON MARKET RELATIONS WITH AFRICA
The six Common Market (EEC)
countries will resume nego-
tiations next week with 16
African states on a new EEC-
African association convention.
The Six have resolved most of
their differences over the
complex questions involved in
this particular issue,, and pros-
pects for an accord by the end
of the year--when the present
convention expires--are generally
favorable. Hard bargaining is
likely, however.
The EEC countries reached
a concerted position on a
new convention only last week
after months of bickering
centered on the kind and volume
of developmental aid the EEC
will offer the Africans and
the trade ties which will link
the two areas. The new aid
fund will total $780,000,000
over the next five years--a
$200,000,000 increase provided
by substantially larger con-
tributions from Italy, West
Germany, and France. The bulk
of this increase, however, will
be allocated to assisting the
Africans in marketing and
diversifying their production,
leaving about the same amount
available as before for economic
and social development.
The aid increase is intend-
ed in part to compensate the
Africans for a reduction in the
level of preference their ex-
ports have heretofore enjoyed
in the Common Market. Exports
of the associated states will
continue to enter the EEC tariff
free, but EEC tariffs applicable
to such items when imported
from nonassociated areas will
be reduced in general by about
25 to 40 percent. These arrange-
ments are the result of a com-
promise between the French, who
insisted on continuing tariff
preferences, and the Germans
and Dutchwho share the US
belief that such preferences
distort the economic develop-
ment of Africa and hurt the
nonassociated competitor in,
say, Latin America.
pects which may in the long
run, prove of equal importance.
While the present associates
had little or no voice in set-
ting the terms of the old con-
vention, they will participate
as sovereign states in the
current negotiations, and
elaborate institutional arrange-
ments are being planned to assure
them a major voice in supervising
implementation of the new accord.
The consensus in Brus-
sels is that the Africans will
ultimately accept something close
to the proposals the EEC now is
in a position to present. Nego-
tiations with 16 states are
bound to be difficult, however,
and some of them are already
proving adept in mounting counter-
pressures for the kind of agree-
ment they want. Chad, Congo
(Brazzaville), Central African
Republic, Gabon, and Cameroon
are putting the finishing touches
on a common external tariff
EAS'
ER
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