CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A003600090001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 41
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 24, 2008
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 1, 1962
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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CURRENT
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY
SUMMARY
ARMY review(s)
completed.
COPY NO. 59
OCI NO. 0419/62
1 June 1962
State Dept. review completed
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
SECRET
GROUPI
Excluded from automatic downgrading
and declassification
I>~ Y ~~~ use
IA
JOB m ox----~''"
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
1 June 1962
T H E W E E K I N B R I E F
(Information as of 1200 EDT 31 May)
LAOS . . . 0 o a . 0 . 0 . . e . . . .. Page 1
Coalition talks are scheduled to begin at the Plaine
des Jarres on 8 June; it is unlikely, however, that a settle-
ment will be achieved before Souvanna's "deadline" of 15
June. Antigovernment forces continue active near Ban
Houei Sai in the north and the towns of Attopeu and Saravane
ALGERIA . . . . . . . . 3
. o o . . . . . . . . Page
The OAS is resorting to scorched-earth tactics in Al-
giers and Oran and to attacks on Moslem members of the
Force Locale, in addition to killings of individual Mos-
lems. This situation, as well as the failure of the mixed
civilian-military tribunal to impose a, death sentence on
Salan, is probably making it more difficult for premier Ben
Khedda and other moderates of the provisional Algerian
government to maintain their leadership and to cooperate
SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY DEVELOPMENTS .
the previous week with Ambassador Dean probably was in-
tended as a further sign of Moscow's displeasure with
Khrushchev has again voiced the critical assessment of
Western policy on major East-West issues which has char-
acterized Soviet comment during the past month. In his 25
May report to the Soviet people on his recent mission to
Bulgaria, he charged that the West is showing "intrac-
tability" and is unwilling to agree to a peaceful settle-
ment of such problems as a German peace treaty, Berlin,
disarmament, and nuclear testing. However, he avoided
threats and polemics in his speech, and Soviet propaganda
in general over the past week has confined itself to ac-
cusing West Germany of attempting to upset the "modest
progress" made during the US-Soviet talks on Berlin and
Germany. At the Geneva disarmament conference, Soviet
delegate Zorin's sudden renunciation on 28 May of a
declaration condemning war propaganda which he had drafted
Western positions on broader East-West issues.
Page 5
SOVIET MILITARY DOCTRINE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 8
Recent authoritative articles in the Soviet press
have given additional insight into current Soviet stra-
tegic and tactical military doctrine. One new doctrine
states that the opening phase of a nuclear war may be
decisive and carries the implication that at least the
attainment of a pre-emptive nuclear strike capability now
has become Soviet policy. The other involves the effect
of new tactical weapons of mass destruction on the size
of the armed forces; Soviet doctrine states that mass
armies and operations by all arms will be needed.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
1 June 1962
SOVIET-YUGOSLAV RELATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 10
The Yugoslav announcement on 28 May that Tito has been
invited to visit the USSR climaxed a rapid series of de-
velopments in Soviet-Yugoslav relations occurring since
Gromyko's April visit to Belgrade. Despite the continued
existence of doctrinal differences, i;he Soviet invitation
to Tito reflects an apparent decision by Khrushchev to at-
tempt a rapprochement like that achieved in Soviet-Yugoslav
relations during the period 1955-57. Belgrade's handling
of the publicity on the new Soviet-Yugoslav contacts ap-
pears designed to mitigate an expected negative Western
reaction.
. Page 12
The Adoula-Tshombd talks are continuing, but in an
atmosphere of mutual distrust. Although some progress has
been made on procedural matters and Tshombd has agreed in
principle to the integration of provincial military forces
into the Congolese Army, there is little optimism in
Leopoldville concerning the outcome of the talks. Adoula
is concerned over possible action by the Katangan delega-
tion to bring about his overthrow as premier. A large
number of anonymous pamphlets criticizing Adoula and urging
that Tshombd become premier have appeared in Leopoldville.
Page 13
In the Peruvian elections scheduled for 10 June, Vic-
tor Raul Haya de la Torre is the presidential candidate'of
Peru's largest party, the reformist, anti-Communist APRA.
Military leaders, long antagonistic -to Haya, have threatened
since March to intervene if he wins and during the past
week have taken control of the country's electoral machinery.
They evidently plan to install Fernando Belaunde Terry,
who is anti-US and has some Communist support.
CHINESE REFUGEE FLOW TO HONG KONG EB13S . . . . . . . . Page 15
The flow of illegal entrants into Hong Kong from
South China has returned to normal, and British authorities
are confident that the crisis along the border is over.
Some 60,000 or 70,000 tried to enter Hong Kong in the last
month despite efforts to turn back as many refugees as
possible, and an estimated 10,000 managed to run the po-
lice blockade.
SINO-SOVIET TRADE IN 1961 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 17
Official figures on Sino-Soviet trade for 1961 show
that total trade was down 45 percent from 1960 and 55 per-
cent from the peak level in 1959. Imports were at a rec-
ord low, and the amount of machinery and equipment, spare
parts, replacements, and military items received must have
been so small that it is affecting not only construction
work at former Soviet aid projects but current industrial
and military production as well. Chinese exports to the
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
on a long-term loan incurred in the mid-1950s.
USSR were also down sharply, confirming that domestic re-
sources have been stretched to the extreme. Peiping,
however, apparently made its scheduled annual repayment
India to produce the MIG-21 domestically--presumably on
an assembly basis--marking a new development in Moscow's
ment. During the most recent talks in Moscow, the USSR
apparently also offered to assist IndiLa with the develop-
ment of its air defense system, implying a readiness to
provide at least radar and possibly even surface-to-air
missiles. The USSR reportedly is also willing to allow
SOVIET-INDIAN MILITARY AID NEGOTIATIONS . . . . . . . . . Page 19
The current negotiations between the USSR and India
regarding the supply of Soviet MIG-21 jet fighters under-
score Moscow's desire to strengthen its ties with New
Delhi through the conclusion of a major military aid agree-
arms aid program in the underdeveloped countries.
GROWING PARLIAMENTARY RESTIVENESS IN FRANCE . . . . . . Page 21
National Assembly opposition to De Gaulle is becoming
more evident as the Algerian situation permits the deputies
to criticize more freely his encroachments on parliamentary
prerogatives. If the government indicates before the cur-
rent parliamentary session ends in late July that it is pre-
paring to undercut the assembly with another referendum,the
deputies will probably call a censure vote on an issue
where the government is vulnerable. Defeat on such a vote
would almost certainly lead De Gaulle to dissolve the as-
25X1 ITALY . . . ,
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 22
Premier Fanfani's left-center government faces two
important tests during the next few weeks. It is seeking
action on the nationalization of electric power--a measure
which the Socialists made a condition of their parliamen-
tary support but which is opposed by the right-wing minor-
ity in Fanfani's own Christian Democratic party. Moreover,
local elections will be held on 10 June in areas. where,
Fanfani fears, right-wing Christian Democrats may "knife"
the party ticket to make the left-center government look
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
1 June 1962
UN GE'ERMI, ASSEMBLY RECONVENING . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 24
The 16th UN General Assembly resumes its session on 7
June to discuss Ruanda-Urundi. It may call for the with-
drawal of all Belgian troops before the 1 July independence
date, despite warnings from U Thant that the UN is in no
position to maintain law and order there in Belgium's
place. Afro-Asian elements will also attempt to have the
General Assembly call for the abrogation of the 1961
Southern Rhodesian constitution on the grounds that it
does not provide adequate representation for Africans in
the parliament.
CAMBODIA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 25
Prince Sihanouk has overwhelming popular support, and
his mass political party, the Sangkum, will be virtually
unopposed in legislative elections on 10 June. In order to
forestall the development of any effective opposition, the
Cambodian Government recently cracked down on the local
Communist party. Sihanouk continues to express concern
over developments in Laos and South Vietnam.
SPECIAL ARTICLES
PROBLEMS OF AN INDEPENDENT ALGERIA .
Paris now plans to turn over power to an independent
Algerian government in a matter of days following the self-
determination referendum scheduled for 1 July. This govern-
ment, probably composed of men long absent from Algeria,
will be confronted with a virtually paralyzed administra-
tive structure, a faltering economy, and the likelihood of
an early power stuggle among its members. It is likely
to be under pressure for radical economic reforms, and it
may seek to demonstrate a foreign policy of nonalignment
by accepting bloc economic aid and diplomatic relations
Page 1
PEASANT LEAGUES IN NORTHEASTERN BRAZIL . . . . . . . . . . Page 5
Peasant leagues, founded in the mid-1950x... by Com-
munist.and Socialist leaders to agitate for rural reforms,
exist in many parts of Brazil's impoverished northeast.
Tensions in this area have been heightened by rapid rises
in food prices over the past several months. Francisco
Juliao, the most widely known league leader, has recently
begun cooperating with Brazil's dissident Communist party,
which is pro-Peiping and advocates revolutionary violence.
Peasant unrest is likely to play a significant role in
Brazil's congressional and state elections next October.
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CURRENT' INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Chances for a coalition
settlement in Laos are not
bright as the princes once
more prepare for personal nego-
tiations. The talks--tentative-
ly slated to begin on 8 June
at the Plaine des Jarres--will
center on the assignment of
cabinet posts to the contending
factions.
Boun Oum--who only re-
luctantly agreed to let Souvanna
hold the ministries of defense
and interior--has indicated that
his faction will insist that
strong anti-Communists be in-
cluded in any "neutralist"
center group. Souphannouvong,
for his part, probably feels
that his bargaining position
has been substantially improved
as a result of his recent mili-
tary gains in northwest Laos and
will very likely press for pre-
dominantly pro - Pathet Lao
representation. He might ad-
ditionally demand the with-
drawal of SEATO forces from
Thailand prior to any political
settlement.
Souvanna has lent an added
air of urgency to the forth-
coming talks by his threat
to withdraw from the political
scene should the princes fail
to achieve a satisfactory settle-
ment by 15 June.
Government forces still
control the strategic border
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town of Bal.. Houei Sal after
having been sharply rebuffed in
an attempt to expand the defense
perimeter around the town during
the past week. Enemy patrols,
probably North Vietnamese and
numbering between 100 and
150, are reported to be active
near the town; as yet, however,
they have made no move to cap-
ture it.
Although the Soviet Union
continues to profess an interest
in the formation of a coalition
government, indications are that
Moscow has no interest in using
its influence to bring about
this result. In a report to
the Soviet people on his recent
visit to Bulgaria, Khrushchev
on 25 May reaffirmed the USSR's
commitment to the formation of
a coalition government and to
the Vienna agreement with
President Kennedy on the crea-
tion of a neutral and independent
Laos. Despite constant re-
iteration of this standard
formulation, however, Soviet
spokesmen are strongly implying
that in their view the formula
for a settlement worked out at
Geneva and among the three
princes is no longer acceptable.
Khrushchev devoted the
major part of his remarks on
international affairs to the
Laos problem in an effort to
develop a case that the US is
not really interested in the
formation of a government of
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national union headed by Souvanna
Phouma. He denied bloc responsi-
bility for the recent sharpen-
ing of the Laotian crisis and
accused the Vientiane government,
with American support, of
"sabotaging a peaceful settle-
ment. Khrushchev charged that
the "provocation by Laotian
reactionaries" at Nam Tha was
part of a far-reaching plan to
expand the Laos conflict, and
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE 'WEEKLY SUMMARY
thereby to provide the US with
a pretext to "interfere more
actively" in Laos. He re-
peated earlier statements that
the deployment of US forces in
Thailand will seriously impede
a settlement.
TASS followed up Khrushchev's
remarks by repeating on 26 May
--as have Hanoi and Peiping--
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Pathet Lao leader Kbamthay
Siphadone's statement that US
and "allied" troops must be
withdrawn from Laos and Thailand
in order to create favorable
conditions for a peaceful settle-
ment, Soviet Deputy Foreign
Minister Pushkin told the
British ambassador in Moscow
on 22 May that the Laotian
situation had changed.
The OAS is resorting to
scorched-earth tactics in
Algiers and Oran and attacks
on Moslem members of the Force
Locale, in addition to killings
of individual Moslems. This
situation, as well as the
failure of the French military
court to impose a death sentence
on Salan, is probably making
it more difficult for premier
Ben Khedda and other moderates
of the provisional Algerian
government (PAG) to maintain
their leadership and to co-
operate with France.
The OAS reportedly realizes
that it cannot long survive in
an independent Algeria--which
it can apparently no longer
prevent. French High Commissioner
Fouchet confirmed to the US
consul general on 29 May reports
that some OAS leaders are nego-
tiating with Algerian national-
ists, presumably for guarantees
that Europeans remaining in Al-
geria can form a legal opposi-
tion party. The PAG might be
receptive to such an arrange-
ment if it would halt terrorism,
sabotage, and the flight of
Europeans.
It is doubtful, however,
that these OAS leaders can control
the desperate young toughs who
appear to be responsible for the
present terrorism, and there are
increasing indications that the
bulk of the Europeans feel that
OAS excesses have destroyed
their future in Algeria.
Fouchet told Consul General
Porter that it now is "very
late" for any PAG-OAS understand-
ing. He also talked frankly
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
about the attitude of the army,
"which does not have its heart
in a task for which it is
unfitted." He said, however,
that the army would at least
prevent "wholesale destruction"
by the OAS. He apparently
takes seriously the threat by
the OAS to destroy what it can
in Algiers and Oran in the next
few weeks.
The OAS has also directly
challenged, the French Govern-
ment by announcing in a pirate
broadcast of 25 May that all
European youths 19 or older
will be drafted into the OAS.
Commander-in-Chief General
Fourquet meanwhile has an-
nounced that the government's
16 May decision to draft six
thousand 19-year-olds in Al-
giers and Oran will take effect
1 June.
The meeting of the Algerian
National Revolutionary Council
(CNRA) began on 26 May in
Tripoli. The failure of the
mixed civilian-military tribunal
in France to pronounce the death
penalty on Salan will strengthen
the hand of the CNRA members
already critical of the PAG for
its acceptance of the Evian
accords. They reportedly con-
sider this action "traitorous"
because of the close coopera-
tion with France to which the
accords commit an independent
Algeria.
Reports indicate that al-
though vice premier Ben Bella
and his followers did not insist
on including a revision of the
PAG on the formal agenda for the
meeting, they will nevertheless
press for either the removal of
some members or an enlargement
of the PAG.
The French Government is
increasingly embarrassed over
the political complications
arising from the trails of OAS
leaders. It has openly expressed
dismay over the Salan verdict,
and is apparently divided over
whether to proceed immediately
with the execution of ex-general
Jouhaud, condemned to death by
the same tribunal that tried
Salan. The question has been
referred to the Supreme Court
of Appeals, which reportedly
will not begin considering whether
it is competent to review Jouhaud's
sentence until 4 June. While
Jouuhaud's fate may depend on
whether there is a noticeable
diminution of OAS terrorism by
that date, De Gaulle is reportedly
determined that Jouhaud should
be executed as an example. A
French cabinet member told Am-
bassador Gavin privately on 27
May that fear was the decisive
factor in the court's verdict
on Salan, since the OAS had
publicly threatened members of
the tribunal and their families
with reprisals if the death
penalty was pronounced.
Salan's aide, Captain Ferrandi,
has further complicated the situa-
tion for Paris by pre-trial state-
merits that Premier Pompidou and
another De Gaulle associate had once
taken "bribes" from Salan for the
French Algeria cause. De Gaulle's
concern over these developments is
shown by his reported decision to
make another radio-TV address on
8 rune.
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Khrushchev, in his 25 May ~ talks as a "tremendous step
report to the Soviet people on
his recent mission to Bulgaria,
again voiced the critical assess
ment of Western policy on major
East-West issues which has
characterized Soviet comment
during the past month. How-
ever, he avoided threats and
polemics in his speech. He
maintained that he would not
repeat Moscow's position on
all the major questions, as they
had already been set forth ex-
tensively by the Soviet press
and official spokesmen. He
went on to include the USSR's
standard indictment of Western
policy, commenting that it re-
flected a failure to "under-
stand the changes in the balance
of power" which had taken place
in the world. He charged any
attempt by the US to base its
policy on a "position of
strength" was doomed to failure
An Izvestia article of 24
May hit the same theme and
maintained that the "grand
strategy" now being formulated
by the US was simply another
means of stepping up the arms
race. The Izvestia commentator
accused West Germany of attempt-
ing to upset the "very modest
progress" made during the US-
Soviet talks on Berlin and
Germany. A short TASS review
of President Kennedy's 24 May
news conference left the same
impression by emphasizing the
President's comment that the
US was analyzing the West German
proposals but had yet not agreed
to Bonn's suggestions. East
German commentary noted that
the President apparently intended
to continue the bilateral talks,
"regardless of Bonn's wishes."
On 27 May a public lecturer
in Moscow characterized the
ahead." However, he toned down
this optimism by alluding to
opposition in Paris and Boni}.
The speaker pleaded ignorance
as to the timing of the next
discussions. He pointed out,
nevertheless, that progress on
certain issues had been made.
Among these, he listed joint
East and West German committees
to discuss technical problems,
"general declarations" of
nonaggression between NATO
and the Warsaw Pact powers, and
the nontransfer of nuclear
weapons. He attacked an al-
leged US suggestion that East
Germany would act only as an
agent in any international ac-
cess authority for West Ber-
lin and "ridiculed" the US
position that acceptance of
East Germany as a member of
the access authority would
not constitute either de jure
or de facto recognition.
A 30 May Izvestia Observer
article used t eF occasion of
Secretary Rusk's recent Canberra
speech to call into question the
"real intention" of the US in
continuing the bilateral talks
on Berlin and Germany. The
article attacked the Secretary's
statement, which it alleged
was directed against the "liqui-
dation of the occupation regime"
in West Berlin, and implicitly
warned the US against the dan-
gers of prolonging the talks
indefinitely. Observer went on
to restate the familiar Soviet
position on the necessity to
"normalize" the situation in
Berlin and urged the US to
make use of the bilateral dis-
cussions to find a "mutually
acceptable solution."
The article attempted to
heighten the sense of urgency
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
in reaching a settlement by
emphasizing the consequences
of a separate peace treaty for
the Western powers. Observer
concluded that if the West "still
clings to an unreasonable and
unrealistic" position there
will be no alternative but to
conclude a separate peace treaty
with East Germany, and that "suf-
ficiently clear warnings" have
been served in this regard.
The Soviets have contin-
ued their harassment of Allied
military convoys using the
autobahn following the lengthy
delay on 23 May of a six-ve-
hicle US convoy. General
Solovyev's reply to the US
protest over the incident at-
tempted to argue that check-
point procedures are essential-
ly a Soviet affair and that
"advance notification" from
Allied convoys is an established
and accepted procedure. In a
discussion of the incident with
the US Military Liaison Mission,
General Ariko, chief of staff
of Soviet Forces in East Ger-
many, tried to dismiss the
affair by laying the blame on
the "undisciplined and erratic
behavior" of various US con-
voy commanders. Ariko main-
tained that the Soviets had
full responsibility for en-
suring the expeditious movement
of Western traffic along the
autobahn and that such pro-
cedures as a "requirement" for
advance notification, provided the
"most effective" means for clear-
ing US convoys.
On 28 May a five-vehicle
French convoy was delayed by
the Soviets for nearly six
hours on the grounds that ad-
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vance notification had not
been given. At the same time
Soviet officials ordered French
military personnel to dismount
for a headcount by the check-
point controllers. Following
the convoy's release, General
Ariko informed the French that
such procedures were "normal"
and must be observed. He issued
a strong statement to the
chief of the French Military
Liaison Mission on the neces-
sity for dismounting, in line
with the Soviets' effort to
press this issue along with
their insistent demands for
prior notification of the
movement of Allied convoys.
At the Geneva disarmament
conference, the sudden action
of Soviet chief delegate Zorin
on 29 May in renouncing a dec-
laration condemning war propa-
ganda which he had drafted last
week with Ambassador Dean probably
was intended as a further sign
of Moscow's displeasure with
Western positions on broader
East-West issues. Zorin--who
received his new instructions
only the day before--claimed
that "events of the past few
days" had obliged the USSR
to change its position and
cited the "occupation of Thailand"
by US and other SEATO forces,
the "atmosphere of military
hysteria" in West Germany, and
a recent demand by West German
Defense Minister Strauss that
the Bundeswehr be given nu-
clear weapons. Zorin demanded
a series of amendments, in-
cluding an obligation by signa-
tory governments to enact
legislation in their countries
banning war propaganda--a measure
known to be unacceptable to the US.
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On 24 May Zorin had in-
dicated agreement to the draft
declaration in a meeting with
Dean, and the next day he told
a session of the conference's
"Committee of the Whole" that
he was "satisfied" and termed
the declaration a "step in the
right direction." Soviet prop-
aganda promptly welcomed the
agreement. In his 25 May re-
port on his visit to Bulgaria,
however, Khrushchev denounced
Western "intractability" and
unwillingness to agree to a
peaceful settlement of such
problems as a German peace
treaty, Berlin, disarmament,
and nuclear testing. He also
attacked the deployment of US
forces in Thailand.
Although there is no in-
dication that the USSR intends
to withdraw from the disarmament
conference at this time, the
Soviet leaders probably hope
that under present circumstances
this demonstration of unwilling-
ness to register agreement with
the West on even the minor war?
propaganda issue will support
recent efforts to inject a
sense of greater urgency in
settling other outstanding
questions, particularly Berlin.
A Polish delegate told a
Western delegate that the four
satellite delegations were not
informed of Zorin's changed in-
structions on the declaration
against war propaganda until
just before the 29 May meeting.
The Polish official stated that
Zorin had cleared the text with
Gromyko and the Soviet Foreign
Ministry but that the party
central committee, "which was
the governing organization,"
for reasons of its own had
decided that it was "inadvisable"
to have a public rapprochement
with the US at this time, "pre-
sumably because of the stiffen-
ing character of the US replies
on Berlin.''
SECRET
The eight nonaligned pow-
ers have been pressing for a
conference recess and have sug-
gested the period 15 June - 15
Ju].y. Zorin told Dean on 26
May that while his instructions
were to continue the negotia-
tions without a recess, he would
seek new instructions if the
nonaligned powers and the US
favored a recess. He conveyed
the impression of insisting
that the US should express
willingness to accept a recess
before the Soviets finally
reply. He emphasized that the
USSR would take no initiative
on the matter, but added, on
a personal basis to Dean, that
the suggested dates seemed ac-
ceptable.
Nuclear Testing
Khrushchev in his 25 May
speech did not repeat his warn-
ing during his Bulgarian visit
that current US testing will
"force" the USSR to resume
atmospheric tests. Moscow's
reports of Soviet workers' meet-
ings protesting the US tests
in the Pacific stopped on 23
May. A member of the UAR
de:Legation at Geneva told US
delegates on 25 May that
he "had the impression" from
Soviet delegate Usachev that the
USSR "might eventually be able
to accept the concept of invita-
tional inspections on a quota
basis under which, if the
control commission indicated
a need to make an on-site
inspection, an invitation would
be forthcoming." At the 25
May test ban subcommittee meeting
the USSR's Tsarapkin avoided
direct answer to the UK del-
egate on a question intended
to draw out the Soviet position
on this point. Tsarapkin stated
that it would be handled "later"
during treaty-drafting work.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE 'M'EEKLY SUMMARY
SOVIET MILITARY DOCTRINE
Recent authoritative
articles in the Soviet press
have given additional insight
into current Soviet strategic
and tactical military doctrine.
The May issue of the party
journal Kommunist carries a
discussion by Defense Minister
Malinovsky which lays down two
of the basic doctrines under
which Soviet forces would ex-
pect to conduct World War III.
Two fundamental questions
facing Soviet military planners
have demanded revision of World
War II military doctrine. One
is the strategic problem of
how to deal with a potential
enemy whose main centers are
beyond the reach of the ground
forces and who has the capabil-
ity to destroy, with little if
any warning, any target in the
USSR. The other is the problem
of how the new tactical weapons
of mass destruction possessed
by both sides should affect
the size of the Soviet Army.
Strategic Doctrine
There is ample evidence
that the top leadership in
Moscow, including Khrushchev,
is fully aware of the enormous
strategic strike power possessed
by the United States. Khru-
shchev's policy of peaceful
coexistence is in part a direct
reflection of this recognition.
Precluded by this policy from
openly discussing the possibil-
ity of a deliberate attack on
the West, Soviet military writers
have concentrated on planning
in the context of counter-
attacking after the West's
first strike. Evidently this
context has not been satisfac-
tory, however. Military
theorists for several years
have stressed the crucial im-
portance of the early phase
of an all-out nuclear war,
arguing obliquely that under
certain circumstances the
U13SR should have the option
of attacking first to mitigate
the effects of a,strike by the
West.
The first suggestion that
the pre-emptive strike, or at
least the attainment of a
capability for such a strike,
was becoming Soviet military
doctrine was contained in a
speech by Malinovsky at the
22nd party congress in October
1961, in which he said: "Soviet
military doctrine considers
the following to be the most
primary, the most important,
and the main task of the
armed forces: to be in con-
stant preparedness to (effec-
tively) repel a sudden attack
by the enemy and to wreck his
aggressive plans."
Recent articles have for-
mulated the pre-emptive concept
more clearly. A Red Star arti-
cle of 11 May quoted the Mali-
novsky statement and explained
that it meant: "We must con-
tinue with great determination
to study and work out methods
of (effectively) repelling a
sudden nuclear attack by the
aggressor as well as methods
of wrecking his aggressive
plans by means of dealing him
a timely crushing blow."
In summarizing Malinovsky's
current article in Kommunist,
TASS said it was "the principal
proposition" of Soviet military
doctrine that the initial period
of a war might be decisive.
This is a veiled way of saying
that Soviet doctrine now holds
that surprise in a nuclear war
is so important that if the
USSR expects to be attacked,
it must have the capability to
launch a pre-emptive nuclear
strike. This formulation, in
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conjunction with the calls for
readiness to deal the enemy a
"timely blow" and to "wreck his
aggressive plans," is about as
far as Soviet public statements
can go and still maintain the
stance that the USSR will never
initiate nuclear war.
Malinovsky's article was
also intended to convey to Soviet
readers the impression that the
USSR has sufficient retaliatory
strength to deter a US nuclear
attack. The item makes the
point that in a nuclear war no
"preventive" or defensive
measures the US can take will
avert an "all-devastating"
retaliatory blow against US
economic, transport, military,
and administrative centers.
This Soviet capability was
said to be an answer to the "bel-
ligerent statements of Pentagon
generals and some unrestrained
congressmen," but it is primarily
aimed at the President's state-
ment in the Saturday Evening
Post interview with Stewart
p on the conditions under
which the US would use nuclear
weapons first against the USSR.
Soviet spokesmen have been ex-
tremely sensitive to speeches
and articles in the US since
last fall which have asserted
American ability to devastate
the USSR with a nuclear attack.
Tactical Doctrine
Concurrently with the de-
bate over whether the USSR
should adopt a pre-emptive
attack policy, there has been
a debate on the necessity for
the USSR to retain mass armies
in the age of nuclear/missile
and other weapons of mass de-
struction. Soviet forces were
cut back substantially after
World War II, again in the middle
and late 1950s, and following
Khrushchev's widely publicized
troop reduction speech of 14
January 1960--in which he said,
in contrast to the doctrine
of pre-emption, that surprise
attack with modern weapons did
not give an "advantage for
achieving victory." The latest
of Khrushchev's troop-reduction
programs was stopped before it
was halfway to its goal--os-
tensibly because of the develop-
ing Berlin crisis, but almost
certainly also because of the
insistent arguments of military
tacticians that mass armies
were still needed.
Malinovsky's article in
Kommunist reflects a settle-
ment of the debate over the
necessary size of the Soviet
armed forces without disclosing
specific data. It stated that
Soviet military doctrine holds
that "great as the role of nu-
clear and rocket weapons may
be, it does not dispense with
the need for the other means
of armed struggle, for the
existence of mass armies."
The Red Star article reiterated
this point: "Ultimate and de-
cisive victory over the imperial-
ist aggressor can be reached
only as a result of the joint
coordinated and decisive ac-
tions of all the armed forces
and services. A rocket nuclear
war will be waged by mass,
multimillion-man armies."
This position fits in with
what is known about the compo-
sition and training of Soviet
ground forces in the European
theater and the recent emphasis
on the development of other War-
saw Pact armies. Following a
massive strike by missile, rocket,
and tactical air forces, large
Soviet and satellite ground forces
apparently would have the mission
of destroying opposing troop rem-
nants and driving westward for
the ultimate occupation of all
Eurrope.
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. The announcement on 28 May
that Tito has been invited to
visit the USSR climaxed a rapid
series of developments in So-
viet-Yugoslav relations since
the visit of Soviet Foreign
Minister Gromyko to Belgrade
from 16 to 21 April. On 23
May, Belgrade announced the
composition of a parliamentary
delegation scheduled to go to
Moscow on 18 June. On the same
day, a Yugoslav Foreign Secretar-
iat official privately told the
US Embassy that Belgrade would
soon send an economic delegation
to Moscow to negotiate the res-
toration of about $244 million
in Soviet credits frozen in 1958.
Current rumors in Belgrade, pos-
sibly based on leaks from the
Foreign Secretariat, state that
the titular head of state of the
USSR, Leonid Brezhnev,will visit
Belgrade in September or October.
Yugoslav officials had informed
the US Embassy prior to the
Gromyko visit that negotiations
for a visit by Brezhnev would
soon take place.
The nature and timing of
these announcements and leaks
--all from Yugoslav rather
than Soviet sources--suggest
that Belgrade hopes to mitigate
an expected negative Western
reaction to the prospect of
significantly closer Soviet-
Yugoslav relations. A Yugoslav
official, announcing the in-
vitation to Tito, gave no date
and said, "Nothing precisely
has yet been agreed upon." His
statement stressed that Tito
would go for a vacation, not
a state visit, and that he would
go as President of Yugoslavia,
not as head of the Yugoslav
League of Communists.
The Yugoslavs described
the Brezhnev visit as a long-
deferred return trip for the
one which Tito made in June
1956. Although Tito vacationed
in the USSR three months later,
the June trip was the last of-
ficial visit before the Soviet-
Yugoslav rapprochement drew to
a close in 1957.
Yugoslav officials last
week sought to represent the
improvement in Belgrade-Moscow
relations as stemming from
Soviet rather than Yugoslav
concessions. The Foreign?
Secretariat official in charge
of relations with the USSR told
the US Embassy that Moscow
evidently now is prepared to
accept good relations with Bel-
grade on terms compatible with
complete Yugoslav independence;
he noted that "this is what we
have wanted all along." The of-
ficial added that Belgrade
welcomes an improvement of rela-
tions with the Soviet bloc in
order to balance Belgrade's
relations with Western and non-
a7Ligned states and thus rein-
force Yugoslav neutrality.
The embassy does not be-
lieve that Belgrade would
willingly give up its freedom
of action in return for improved
relations with Moscow. Tito
spelled this out clearly in a
speech at Split on 6 May when
he said that, despite grave in-
ternal economic problems, the
regime was not going to scrap
its decentralization scheme.
Statements last week that Bel- 25X1
grade is going ahead with plans
to promulgate its new constitu-
tion, although ostensibly directed
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SECRET
at Western speculation of an
economic retreat, are probably
likewise intended to remind
the bloc that Tito does not
intend to modify his internal
policies.
These policies, slowly
evolved during the past decade,
have been strongly attacked as
"revisionist" by all members
of the bloc and remain a major
source of ideological differences
between Belgrade and the Sino-
Soviet bloc. Basic to bloc-
Yugoslav differences on these
and other questions, however,
is Belgrade's refusal to be
bound by any form of bloc dis-
cipline which would require
subordination of Yugoslav in-
terests, domestic or foreign,
to those of the USSR and
recognition of the USSR as the
arbiter of Marxist-Leninist
theory.
Despite the continued ex-
istence of doctrinal differences,
the Soviet invitation to Tito
reflects an apparent decision
by Khrushchev to attempt to re-
store a degree of the rapproche-
ment achieved in Soviet-Yugo-
slav relations during the prior
1955-1957--i.e., closer rela-
tionships at the top levels
of leadership. For example,
the Yugoslav parliamentary
delegation is to be led by Petar
Stambolic, head of the Federal
People's Assembly and also a
member of the party politburo.
Five of the other 11 members of
the delegation are also members
either of the party's central
committee or of the auditing
commission.
The Soviet decision to
improve relations with Yugo-
slavia signals an indifference
on Khrushchev's part to a highly
probably negative reaction from
the Chinese Communist and the
Albanian parties. In a sense,
the continued intransigence of
these two parties has freed
Khrushchev to return to the
policies which he began in
1955. He has probably concluded
that he cannot effect an im-
provement in Sino-Soviet rela-
tions short of jettisoning most
of his basic positions, and
therefore a renewal of policies
from which he was forced to re-
treat in 1957 will not basically
change the existing situation.
That the new flirtation
with Tito will require another
difficult readjustment by the
European satellites is reflected
in the limited and noncommittal
propaganda reaction which Khru-
shchev's moves have brought
forth. Czechoslovakia and Hungary
have released guarded commentaries
on his Bulgarian visit, calling
it a move which will bring peace
and unity to the Balkans. They
have not yet mentioned Yugo-
slavia by name, however. The
only positive response has been
that given by Bulgarian First
Secretary Zhivkov, both during
and after Khrushchev's trip.
Hungary, Rumaniaand Poland
have maintained good relations
with Yugoslavia. Czechoslovakia,
however, will face a serious prob-
lem, since any bloc rapprochement
with Tito will mean a reversal of
its present attitude toward Bel-
grade. East Germany will have less
of a problem, since until sev-
er-al months ago its contacts with
the Yugoslavs had been more or less
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
The Adoula-Tshombd talks
in Leopoldville are continuing,
but in an atmosphere of mutual
distrust. In a joint communi-
que issued on 25 May, the two
delegations announced an agreed
agenda. The communique also
indicated that procedures sug-
gested by the UN, mainly con-
cerning the creation of various
subcommittees, were acceptable
to both sides.
A communique issued on 30
May announced "agreement" be-
tween Adoula and Tshombd con-
cerning the integration, under
UN supervision, of Katangans
11,000-man army into the Congo-
lese Army. Means of implementing
such integration will be studied
by a joint UN-Congolese-Katangan
subcommittee, which will then
report to the principals.
The announced agreement is
consistent with Tshombd's efforts
to maintain a conciliatory pos-
ture in the talks, and was fa-
vorably received by Adoula. It
is uncertain, however, whether
the subcommittee mechanism will
permit effective pressure to be
brought to bear on Tshombd. Al-
though Tshombd agreed at Kitona
last December to place his mili-
tary forces under the authority
of President Kasavubu, he subse-
quently has balked at any move
which might diminish his control
over Katangan forces.
and suspicious of the mediation
efforts of UN representative
Robert Gardiner. In conversation
with Ambassador Gullion, Adoula
confirmed his concern over possi-
ble activity by the Katangan
delegation to bring about his
overthrow as premier. The 17-
man Katangan delegation report-
edly is well supplied with funds;
Adoula advised Ambassador Gullion
that he could not permit it
"total liberty" in view of the
"intrigues" it wished to conduct.
The Katangans have protested the
extent to which they have been
confined to their hotel and kept
under surveillance by the central
government.
Adoula's concern over the
activity of the Katangan dele-
gation may have some justifica-
tion. The US Consulate in
Eli,sabethville reports that since
Tshombd's return to Leopoldville,
there has been considerable local
speculation that he might succeed
Adoula. Sources close to Tshombd
have indicated that he might be
"available" as premier of a
united Congo, despite his oft-
voiced expressions of distaste
for Leopoldville politics. In
late May, anonymous pamphlets
which criticized Adoula and
urged that Tshombd become pre-
mier appeared in Leopoldville
in :large numbers.
Katanga's Foreign Minister
Kimba, acting for Tshombd in the
latter's absence from Elisabeth-
ville, has accused Adoula of
wanting to sabotage the negotia-
tions and warned that if he once
again "rejects the fraternal
hand" of Katanga, "it may be the
last time." On 30 May, Kimba
announced that "the Katangan
people" will not accept any
agreement reached at Leopoldville
unless the Katangan delegation
is permitted freedom of movement
there.
Adoula continues doubtful
concerning the value of the talks,
Adoula's prospects for ob-
taining outside military assist-
ance in resolving the key problem
of Katanga's secession appear to
have diminished. The Liberian
charge told Ambassador Gullion
in :Late May that Afro-Asian mis-
sions in Leopoldville supported a
negotiated settlement and, in his
opinion, did not contemplate aid
to Adoula outside the UN frame-
work. On 24 May, UN Under Sec-
retary Bunche said U Thant main-
tains that without a new mandate
from the Security Council, he 25X1
cou]Ld not initiate economic sanc-
tions against Tshombd which might
bring on new fighting.
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SECRET W
PERU'S PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION
On 10 June, some 2,000,000
voters in Peru are expected to
choose among the 1,441 candi-
dates for every national elec-
tive office--president, two
vice presidents, and the entire
bicameral legislature. Party
organizations, loose at best,
center around the presidential
candidates. The economic cli-
mate is good: prices have
been stable and trade has
been favorable for the past
year, although a slowdown in
investment has been noticed
in the immediate pre-election
period.
Three of the seven pres-
idential candidates are major
contenders. Victor Raul Haya
de la Torre is the nominee
of Peru's largest party the
elements and permitted the
party to operate more or less
openly. In this campaign he
has sought the support of the
leftists and has eight known
Communists on his congressional
list. He is in poor health
and, if he withdraws from the
race, he will attempt to pass
his support to Belaunde.
The Communist party is
illegal in Peru. It has about
7,000 members but up to 50,000
sympathizers. It tried but
failed to weld a number of
small extremist groups into
aL united front early in the
campaign, and has now divided
its support between Belaunde
and Odria.
ohe ]PRA party (Al Lanza Popular Revolucio-
reformist, anti-Communist Warta Americana) was XoLMded in 1924 by Victor
APRA, which he founded 38 Raul Haya de la Torre. Intended to be interna-
"=ttbi42 tit-SL`bB _ -IIZ th a- thcrouch radical sod io-
y e a r s ago. Originally thought economic re arm ronram for all ~lnao-~zri~a'!
to be an easy winner, Haya has Haya s term for Latin America )it survived as
-a pultttcal entt y onlytn Peru. Revolutionary
in the past month seen his posi- ~ Z,9t our never _9Dr vn s, APRA in-
tion seriously challenged by his
two main competitors.
Fernando Belaunde Terry,
head of the leftist Accion
Popular, was a strong contender
in the 1956 elections. He has
attacked APRA as a tool of the
US Government, hinting that
the United States is interven-
ing in the election by financing
Haya's campaign. He has extolled
the "benefits" of Castro's revo-
lution and has generally taken
an anti-US stand when discussing
international affairs. Belaunde
has courted the leftists through-
out his political career and
has 19 known Communists on his
congressional lists.
Manuel Odria, who was
dictator from 1948 to 1956,
has campaigned largely on the
memories of Peru's prosperity
in those years when world de-
mand for its exports was high.
Odria and his main backers are
basically conservative, but
when dictator he used the
Communists as foils in his
dealings with non-Communist
solved fn m a n y blood y., clashes with the Peruutan
m y t o u r g t h e I920s a n d J 30s,_and sent- or o f -
d i c e r s re~tatn -a-dew ee,Part _APRt
uns legalized early tn.1945 and was influential
in electi_ ~r~3~ent ,?ustaman_to to that year.
^It tvs outlawed again,,tn 19161 when t;anuel Odrta
-took over as dictator. Haya spent five years in
asylum. in the colombia?
vengeance of bdrIq . th_Qdr r's_departure in
1956, APRA was again accorded legal status. It
wined respectability by supporting the con-
ser'vative Manuel Frado,s successful _presiden-
--tial campaign in 1956, and has been his tacit
---cotgressional ally for the past six years.
All candidates have con-
sidered Haya their chief rival.
Anti-APRA propaganda has fol-
].owed two major themes. The
oligarchy and its followers
are told that APRA and Com-
munism are synonymous, that an
APRA government would expro-
priate land and wealth, and
that election of Haya would be
an invitation to economic chaos.
The liberals and leftists are
told that APRA is so pro-US
that "Kennedy will govern Peru
through Haya," that APRA prom-
ises of reform are fraudulent
and expropriations would only
line Aprista pockets, and that
an APRA victory would lead to
widespread unemployment and in-
flation.
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HAYA
Haya and APRA have lost
much ground as a result of the
claim by high military leaders
that they and their men "will
not serve" under an APRA gov-
ernment. The claim carries
the implied threat of military
intervention to deny Haya ac-
cess to office if he should win
the election.
During the past week the
armed forces have gained full
control of the electoral ma-
chinery. In their traditional
role of overseeing the elec-
tions and the tabulation of
the results, they now are in
a position to falsify a victory
by Belaunde without overt inter-
vention.
The military's opposition
stems from senior officers' mem-
ories of APRA's terrorist tac-
tics in its early years--when
many soldiers were killed or
wounded in battles with APRA
street gangs--and from the mis-
taken conviction that APRA is
pro-Communist. Although hatred
of Haya and APRA is not so
strong among junior officers,
anti-APRA indoctrination has
been sufficiently effective to
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BELAUNDE
ODRIA
make the threat of military in-
tervention plausible and effec-
tive. APRA has tried to assure
the military that it will not
"tamper" with the armed forces'
position in the state.
come at this time.
seems the more likely out-
Nevertheless, both Odria
and Belaunde have used the
military threat as campaign
propaganda, warning the elec-
torate not to waste votes on a
candidate who will not be per-
mitted to serve. Both President
Prado and War Minister Cuadra
have made public statements to
the effect that the military
will not upset constitutional
processes. The US ambassador
has warned them that Washington
will be unable to recognize a
government forcibly replacing
a duly elected anti-Communist
regime. In private conversa-
tions with the US ambassador
both Prado and Cuadra have
stated, however, they can
give no assurances that the
armed forces will respect
the elections if Haya wins.
A victory by Belaunde--prob- 25X1
ably by fraudulent means--
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CHINESE REFUGEE FLOW TO HONG KONG EBBS
Hong Kong authorities are
confident that the refugee crisis
is over. The Chinese Communists
began actively patrolling their
side of the border on 24 May,
and the number of illegal en-
trants into the colony fell
rapidly. No figures on the number
of crossers apprehended have
been issued since 23 May, but
the British have closed their
mass detention center at Fanling
and relieved army units of bor-
der patrol duty.
The refugee influx into
Hong Kong was accompanied by
a rise in the number of Chinese
entering neighboring Portuguese
Macao. Figures on entrants there
rose from 514 for the entire
month of January to 700 a day
by 21 May. Macao is now crowded
with refugees hoping to make
their way to Hong Kong; there
is almost no hope of finding work
in the Portuguese territory, and
it does not have an adequate
social welfare apparatus. Some
of those wanting to leave China
probably decided they would
stand a better chance of reach-
ing Hong Kong through the smug-
gling rings operating by junk
owners out of Macao than by cross-
ing directly over the land fron-
tier from China. The reported
Communist restrictions on travel
within Kwangtung Province and
the ban on the issuance of new
exit permits to both Hong Kong
and Macao should sharply cut
emigration to Macao within the
next few days, although the Com-
munists may not try to stop those
already on their way.
The Chinese Communist de-
cision to halt the refugee flow
was probably made primarily for
domestic reasons, although it
came after British representations
in both Peiping and Canton. The
size of the exodus--an estimated
60,000 or 70,000 tried to enter
Hong Kong in the last month--
must have seriously embarrassed
Peiping. Farming operations in
those areas which peasants left
were certainly disrupted, and an
influx of thousands of persons
in the vicinity of the border
must have severely strained nor-
mal administrative authority.
Local party cadres, already de-
pressed by criticism from the
peasants and their superiors,
were probably further demoralized
by the mass desertions. It is
possible that central authori-
ties will dismiss at least some
Kwangtung provincial party figures
for allowing the situation to
get out of hand.
The Chinese re-established
emigration restrictions by sta-
tioning additional troops along
the border and rounding up refu-
gees, who were then sent north
in trains and trucks. Politi-
cal cadres also came into the
area to attempt to persuade refu-
gees to turn around; the Commu-
nists apparently tried to use
a minimum of force. Heavy rain-
fall which began on 24 May un-
doubtedly helped the Chinese to
close the border; the waters of
the Shumchun River, which forms
much of the frontier, rose rapid-
ly. The Chinese have also moved
to cut off the refugees at the
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
source; it now is said to be
impossible in Canton to buy
rail tickets for the border
area.
Although the British turned
back as many of the border cross-
ers as they apprehended, some
15 to 25 percent got through.
According to one informed esti-
mate, Hong Kong's refugee popu-
lation will rise by 100,000
this year, over twice the num-
ber estimated to. have entered
last year.
The British reaction to
recent free-world offers to
take some of Hong Kong's sur-
plus population has been marked
by concern over antagonizing
Peiping and fear of stimulating
increased immigration into the
colony. While the British have
welcomed the US offer to take
more Hong Kong Chinese, offi-
cials are suspicious of Taipei's
announced intention to take
all refugees who desire to come.
Hong Kong authorities suspect
that the Chinese Nationalist
offer is an empty gesture de-
signed to lead to negotiations
from which Taipei would seek
to extract maximum propaganda
value. At the same time, be-
cause of the colony's pressing
population problem, the British
may be cautiously exploring
the Nationalists' offer.
Chinese Nationalist Vice
Foreign Minister Chu Fu-sung
has confirmed that prepara-
tions are under way to receive
an :initial group of 10,000 refu-
gees. There is some indication
that the government intends to
take considerably more, pro-
vided the United States pays
most of the cost. It is un-
clear, however, what the Nation-
alists really intend.
present government thinking
is to bring the refugees to
Taiwan and then, with the as-
sistance of international re-
liel' organizations, to resettle
the bulk of the newcomers in
Brazil and other Latin American
countries. However, it is un-
likely that these countries
would accept more than a token
number of Chinese settlers.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
SINO-SOVIET TRADE IN 1961
Recent figures on Sino-So-
viet trade for 1961 indicate
that the decline has been much
sharper than previously believed.
According to data published by
the Soviet Ministry of Foreign
Trade and believed to be official
figures--at least preliminary
estimates--total Sino-Soviet
trade in 1961 amounted to only
$918,000,000--45 percent below
1960 trade and 55 percent below
the peak level in 1959.
This decline means that
for the first time since 1950,
Communist China's trade with
bloc countries was less than
half of its total trade. Trade
with bloc countries other than
the USSR was also off sharply
in 1961, and the first purchases
of sizable quantities of grain
from the West resulted in an
increase in Chinese trade out-
side the bloc. On the basis of
the new figures, total bloc
trade in 1961 amounted to about
45 percent of China's total
trade, as against an average of
about 65 percent for 1958-60.
According to the Soviet
figures, Chinese imports from
the USSR amounted to only $368,-
000,000, less than in any year
since the Peiping regime came
to power. This level of imports
is only about one third that in
1959, when the "leap forward"
was at its height and imports
rose to a record level, and is
less than the value of just the
machinery and equipment imported
for Soviet-aid plants in 1959
and 1960.
---less than $200,000,000--of
these metals and manufactures
was so small that practically
no Soviet industrial facilities
could have been imported, and
imports of miscellaneous machin-
ery and equipment must have
been insignificant.
The amount of Soviet metal
products, spare parts, and re-
placements received must have
been so small that it affected
current industrial and military
production and maintenance.
Some factories requiring Soviet-
made components and spare parts
are known to have been operating
far below capacity in 1961. An
official Chinese military docu-
ment dated August 1961 acknowl-
edged a shortage of repair
parts "from abroad." There
have also been several state-
ments by regime spokesmen to
the effect that spare parts
for machines made in bloc coun-
tries were unavailable and hence-
forth had to be produced domesti-
ca:Lly.
The implied low level of
industrial imports from the
USSR in 1961 means that the with-
drawal of Soviet technicians in
1960, the industrial overhaul
required after the Leap For-
ward, the critical agricultural
shortages, and conceivably So-
viet refusal to make deliveries
have resulted not only in a
suspension of industrial ex-
pansion but in many cases a
cessation of some heavy indus-
trial operations.
Sugar, grain, and petroleum
products probably account for
roughly half of total imports
from the USSR in 1961. Petroleum
products apparently were deliv-
ered in about the same amounts
as in 1960. The remaining im-
ports, as in the past, probably
comprised metal products such
as special steel and copper, ma-
chinery and equipment, replace-
ment items, spare parts, and
military goods. The total value
Chinese exports to the So-
viet Union were also down sharply
--$550,000,000, compared with
$849,000,000 in 1960 and $1.1
billion in 1959. This decline
reflects the sharp reduction in
China's capability to export
agricultural products which
previously comprised a large
part of exports to the USSR.
Exports in 1961 were evidently
limited mainly to textiles,
clothing, miscellaneous manufac-
tures, minerals,and metals.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Even these were shipped in much
smaller quantities than in 1959
and 1960. The level of Chinese
exports revealed in these latest
figures tends strongly to con-
firm that domestic resources
have been stretched to the ex-
treme.
The new figures reveal
that despite the reduced ex-
port-import totals, Peiping
managed to achieve an export
surplus of $182,000,000, as
good as or better than the
significantly better trading
years 1957 and 1959. The bulk
of this sum represents the an-
nual payment on China's long-
term debt to the USSR which
was due in 1961. The fact that
Peiping, in light of its press-
ing need for exports with which
to pay for Western grain imports,
should have had to maintain
such a sizable export surplus
with its major trading partner
is strong evidence that Moscow
has not seen fit to ease China's
payment position during its
current economic difficulties
and thus has contributed meas-
urably to these difficulties.
Details on China's trade
with other bloc and nonbloc
countries, together with the
Soviet trade figures, show a
marked shift in the commodity
composition of Chinese imports.
Imports of food, mainly grain
and sugar, accounted for over
one third of total imports in
1961, as against one or two
percent in previous years. Im-
ports of industrial and mili-
tary goods dropped from 55-60
percent of total imports in
1952-60 to about 20-25 percent
in 1961. Imports of industrial
raw materials--mainly petroleum
products, cotton, wool, rubber,
fertilizer, and metals--ac-
counted for roughly the same
proportion of total imports
as previously, although they
declined sharply in absolute
terms.
This import picture points
up the seriousness of China's
economic difficulties. Scarce
resources have gone to pay for
food imports with which to sus-
tain the rapidly growing popu-
lation, while industrial devel-
opment, which can create the
margin for sustained growth,
for the time being.
(Prepared by ORR)
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
The current negotiations
between the USSR and India re-
garding the supply of Soviet
MIG-21 jet fighters, and appar-
ently other air defense equip-
ment, underscore Moscow's desire
to strengthen its ties with New
Delhi through the conclusion of
a major military aid agreement.
In keeping with its recent prac-
tices in other underdeveloped
countries--the UAR and Indo-
nesia--Moscow has indicated
a willingness to provide India
with two squadrons of one of its
later model operational fighters
--probably equipped with stand-
ard air-to-air guided missile
armaments.
The financial terms pre-
sumably would be similar to
those usually given to other
underdeveloped countries. In
addition to accepting payment
in Indian rupees--which would
in turn be used to finance Soviet
purchases of Indian products--
Moscow may grant a discount of
about one third the list price
of the MIGs and probably would
accept repayment over a period
of about ten years at a low rate
of interest--probably 2 percent.
During the latest talks in
Moscow on the proposed purchase,
the USSR apparently also offered
to assist India with the develop-
ment of its air defense system,
implying a readiness to provide
at least early-warning and ground-
control intercept radar. In
addition, Moscow presumably would
be willing to supply radar-con-
trolled antiaircraft weapons--
possibly even surface-to-air
guided missiles similar to those
now being delivered to some other
nonbloc countries. This materiel
probably also would be provided
under the same favorable finan-
cial terms.
The USSR, which has in the
past offered India military aid
in addition to its large-scale
economic assistance program, re-
portedly has also offered to
assist India in producing the
MIG-21 fighters. Moscow is un-
likely to agree to provide the
production facilities necessary
to construct the entire air-
craft, but may have decided to
allow India to establish a plant
which could construct MIG-21
air frames from a combination
of parts supplied from the So-
viet Union and other parts of a
less complicated variety fabri-
cated at the plant itself. The
engines, weapons systems, and
other complex components prob-
ably would be shipped from the
USSR to India for assembly with
the air frame at the Soviet-
built plant.
The USSR's apparent willing-
ness to provide India with means
of production for the MIG-21 may
foreshadow similar Soviet moves
aimed at increasing the impact
of military aid programs in
other more advanced underdeveloped
countries. This would entail
certain disadvantages on Moscow's
part--such as some additional
initial expenses, further loss
of weapons security, and in-
creased demands on Soviet tech-
nical personnel--but these as-
pects appear counterbalanced
by the potential advantages.
The provision of such assistance
could be viewed by the under-
developed nations as a clear
demonstration of Moscow's claim
to supply aid with no strings
attached.
It would also tend to tie
the recipient country even more
closely to the USSR than does
the need for spare parts or re-
placements for the weapons sup-
plied by the bloc. Such aid
would, furthermore, tend to slow
down indiscriminate requests
for additional and more advanced
equipment. Moreover, since the
USSR would be the source of the
most sophisticated components of
the aircraft, dependence for
spare parts would thus be just
as real as if the aircraft it-
self were purchased by India.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
GROWING PARLIAMENTARY RESTIVENESS IN FRANCE
National Assembly opposi-
tion to De Gaulle is becoming
more evident as the Algerian
situation permits the deputies
to criticize more freely his
encroachments on parliamentary
prerogatives. If the government
indicates before the current
parliamentary session ends in
late July that it is preparing
another referendum, the depu-
ties will probably call a cen-
sure vote on an issue where the
government is vulnerable. Defeat
on such a vote would almost cer-
tainly lead De Gaulle to dissolve
the assembly.
Parliament already feels
that it must stop the whittling
away of its authority by such
devices as the referendum, and
its restiveness will be encour-
aged by the government's embar-
rassment over a number of touchy
domestic problems. Labor is be-
coming more and more demanding.
De Gaulle's prestige is being
weakened by the spreading im-
pact of the Salan sentence, and
the impending "repatriation" of
OAS terrorists will probably
create a serious security prob-
lem which will concentrate pub-
lic criticism on the government.
European integration is in
creasingly becoming the issue
unifying broad parliamentary
opposition to De Gaulle. The
cabinet's five Popular Republi-
can (MRP) ministers resigned
on this issue 'on 15 May,, and the
MRP's current congress will see
considerable pressure for closer
alignment with the Socialists--
who are already in opposition,
largely on the European question.
Agitation for Independent minis-
ters to withdraw from the
cabinet is ostensibly on this
issue, although the "European"
dedication of some long-time
Independent opponents of De
Gaulle is questionable. Dis-
satisfaction is even preva-
lent; in the Union for the New
Republic, some of whose members
believe it should make stren-
uous efforts to become a durable
political party and cease being
simply a "Gaullist Club."
Although the die-hard
rightist move to censure De
Gaulle's Algerian policy next
week includes a catch-all
section on Europe and NATO
designed to attract Socialists
and the MRP, it is virtually
certain to be defeated.
The dilemma posed for
moderate opponents of De Gaulle
is evident in the decision
taken by the assembly'Foreign
Affairs Committee on 24 May,
demanding that the foreign policy
debate beginning on 12 June be
followed by a vote on which the
existence of the government
would not be at stake, The
Gaullist minority on the com-
mittee insist the vote be on
a censure motion--which the gov-
ernment also would be likely
to win.
This motion is a recog-
nition that De Gaulle retains
the initiative. The political
parties have no illusions about
their chance to wage a success-
ful electoral campaign :inn 'the
face of an appeal by De Gaulle
on a specific issue. While he
would prefer not to restrict
his own maneuverability by
bringing about a new assembly
which would be free of the
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EVOLUTION OF ASSEMBLY BACKING FOR FRENCH GOVERNMENT
(RADICALS AND LEFT
REPUBLICANS)(DF1
COMMUNISTS
(PC F)
UNITY OF THE REPUBLIC
(PRO- FRENCH ALGERIA)
(UNIR)
CONTINUED SUPPORT FOR BOTH DEERE AND POMPIDOU GOVERNMENTS
CONTINUED OPPOSITION TO BOTH
Q INDENTIFIED WITH DEERE GOVERNMENT
LARGELY WITHDREW SUPPORT FROM DEERE
threat of dissolution for its
first year, he would not hesi-
tate to force new elections if
the present assembly censured
the government. If he signi-
fied his intention to seek
early popular approval of his
European policy or constitution-
al :reform, however, the deputies
would feel that they had little
choice but to force new elec-
tions.
Italian Premier Fanfani's
left-center government faces
two important tests during the
next few weeks. It is seeking
action on the nationalization
of electric power--a measure
which the Socialists made a
condition of their parliamentary
support but which is opposed
by the right-wing minority in
Fanfani's own Christian Demo-
cratic party, Moreover,
local elections will be held
on 10 June in areas where,
Fanfani fears, right-wing Chris-
tian Democrats may "knife" the
party ticket to make the left-
center government look unpopular.
In his mid-March inaugural
address, Fanfani promised to
have a nationalization measure
under way within three months.
A government committee is cur-
rently working on a draft, but.
the Christian Democratic right
wing; and the parliamentary op-
position are working to block
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it. One strike against nation-
alization is the fact that the
Christian Democrats' majority
left wing, which agrees with
the left-of-center parties on
most domestic legislation, is
only lukewarm on this issue.
The Socialists, RPaubli-
cans, and Social Democrats--
although they have not assumed
a rigid position--prefer that
nationalization be enacted by
decree, which would automatical-
ly become law unless vetoed by
Parliament within a given
period. The Christian Demo-
crats are insisting on the usual
method of open parliamentary
discussion--which would prob-
ably be lengthy--before a vote.
MARCH 1962
DEMOCRATIC SOCIALISTS
D SUPPORT
ABSTAIN
OPPOSE
'---NEO-FASCISTS (MSI)
Includes 7 members appointed for life
COMMUNITY MOVEMENT
DEMOCRATIC SOCIALISTS (PSDI) \ 11 w REPUBLICANS (PRI)
Meanwhile, the Socialists are
letting it be known that if by
the time of the parliamentary
recess in late July or early
August there are no signs
that a nationalization measure
will be enacted, they will reap-
praise their support of the
government.
The June elections--which
involve some three million
voters--will be held in right-
wing Christian Democratic strong-
holds--including the cities
of Rome, Bari, Naples, and
Foggia. The right wing has
been encouraged by the recent
election to the presidency of
Antonio Segni, who does not
favor the present experiment in
center-left government. Right-
wing Christian Democrats will
be tempted to switch votes to
the rightist opposition parties and
then charge that Christian
Democratic losses constitute
a popular repudiation of the
present government. An inhib-
iting factor, however, may be
the recent articles published
in the semiofficial Vatican
daily Osservatore Romano and
other key cburc organs urging
Catholics to vote for the
ChriLstian Democrats rather than
end by "playing the Communist
game" and obstructing the party's
goals.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY RECONVENING
Belgium and Britain face
bitter anticolonial attacks on
their handling of two of their
African territories when the
16th UN General Assembly resumes
on 7 June. Originally scheduled
to discuss only Ruanda-Urundi,
the resumed session will prob-
ably also take up the question
of Southern Rhodesia.
Ruanda-Urundi
The five-member UN commis-
sion on Ruanda-Urundi sent to
the territory by the assembly
in February failed in its ob-
jective to gain agreement to po-
litical union of the two areas
after the 1 July independence
date, but it did achieve limited
success on economic union. The
commission, headed by crusading
anticolonialist Angie Brooks of
Liberia, also took the view that
Belgian troops must be withdrawn
before independence. The com-
mission maintained this view
despite indications that violence
would erupt after independence
unless an adequate military
force remained, and despite U
Thant's warning that the UN
would be unable to provide troops
or money for another Congo-type
operation.
During the forthcoming
debate, the acting secretary
general will attempt to convince
key Afro-Asians that the UN is
in no position to pick up "Bel-
gium's burden" and may suggest
that Belgian troops be retained
under some type of "UN umbrella."
Although Thant's intervention may
influence some Afro-Asians, the
strong anti-Belgian bias held
by many UN members could prevail
and result in assembly endorse-
ment of the commission's views.
Southern Rhodesia
Some members of the Afro-
Asian bloc insisted that the
resumed assembly session take
up the question of Southern
Rhodesia. They believe that
the 1961 .constitution does not
provide sufficient representa-
tion for Africans in the parlia-
ment and will probably attempt
to have the assembly call for
revocation of the constitution.
Britain, opposing assembly con-
sideration, maintains that Lon-
don has no power to revoke the
constitution and is unable to
"interfere" in the scheduled
elections in this internally
self-governing colony.
Although there is little
doubt that the Afro-Asians
will be able to muster the
two-thirds majority vote re-
quired to inscribe the item,
it is questionable whether
they can get assembly endorse-
ment of their more extreme de-
mands.
Election Campaigning
Campaigning for two of the
three forthcoming vacancies in
the UN Security Council will
probably be intense during the
resumed session. Elections to
the Security Council in the
past few years have been hotly
contested, primarily because
the new African members are
underrepresented in the coun-
cil. There are five announced
Afro-Asian candidates for the
Near Eastern seat being vacated
by the UAR, raising the possi-
bility that Western Europe may
lose its traditionally assigned
seat. Norway probably has the
best chance of gaining the seat
being vacated by Ireland, but
Oslo may have to split the two-
year term with a member of the
A:rro-Asian bloc. Trading of
votes on the two key issues
being discussed at the resumed 25X1
session may well influence the
outcome of next fall's council
elections .
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
In the National Assembly
elections on 10 June, Prince
Sihanouk's handpicked candidates
-from his mass political party,
the Sangkum, will probably se-
cure more than 99 percent of the
total vote. They are nominally
opposed by two "independent"
candidates in a total of 77
electoral districts. Included
on the Sangkum slate are a few
leftist-inclined younger persons
who were educated in France.
Despite his overwhelming
popular support, Sihanouk has
taken the opportunity of na-
tional elections to crack down
on any potential opposition.
Recentlyi15 members of the
Communist Pracheachon party
were sentenced to death for an
alleged subversion plot. While
the Pracheachon organization
has exercised little influence
to date, Sihanouk's concern
over any activity opposed to
his policies is clearly evident.
Sihanouk is satisfied that
Cambodia's internal affairs
are in order, but he remains
worried over developments .in
Laos and South Vietnam. His
harsh criticism of the pro-
Western regimes in those coun-
tries stems from his belief
that their policies are not
calculated to win popular sup,
port and will end inevitably in
a Communist takeover. Sihanouk
has stated that partition may
be the only solution in Laos
and has echoed the suggestion
of Hanoi that talks on neutral-
izing South Vietnam are desir-
able.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
SPECIAL ARTICLES
PROBLEMS OF AN INDEPENDENT ALGERIA
France now plans to turn later, less than 6 percent of
over power to an independent the highest category of civil
Algerian government in a matter administrators were Moslems.
of days following the referendum
scheduled for 1 July. Conditions
prevailing within Algeria, the
nature of the government that is
likely to accede to power, and
the necessity for large amounts
of aid from France or elsewhere
pose problems that will severely
test that government's ability
to establish firm political con-
trol and to prevent administrative
and economic chaos.
Algeria is a large country,
with modern ports, railroads,
highways, schools, and most of
the other trappings of an ad-
vanced society. To govern the
country the French have employed
a force of professional adminis-
trators larger than that of the
government of Belgium. The top
echelons?Of this structure have
been manned almost exclusively
by Frenchmen; even in the lowest
grades, Moslems have comprised
less than half the total.
In recent years, Paris has
made belated attempts to increase
the number of Moslems in respon-
sible government posts through-
out Algeria. In August 1960 the
French eased the academic require-
ments for entry into the Algerian
government service and specified
that a certain percentage of
vacancies in the four categories
of government employment be re-
served for Moslems. Nevertheless,
many Moslems who qualified were
reluctant to risk FLN reprisals
by associating themselves with
the French administration.
Although French statistics
claim that on 1 January 1961
there were 18,000 Moslems among
the 67,000 permanent rated gov-
ernment employees in Algeria,
the overwhelming proportion of
these were serving in clerical
or lower capacities, including
the rural constabulary. A year
Any "Algerianization" of
the administration can be accom-
plished only at the expense of
greatly reduced efficiency. The
provisional Algerian government
(PAG) is aware of this and has
repeatedly indicated that Euro-
pean administrators and tech-
nicians will be welcome and
needed in the new Algeria. How-
ever, the continuance of terror-
ism by the Secret Army Organiza-
tion (OAS) and the failure of
the European community as a
whole to dissociate itself from
such activity are rapidly dim-
ming prospects of Moslem-Euro-
pean cooperation.
It now appears likely that
many more Europeans will leave
Algeria, voluntarily or other-
wise, than was envisaged even
when the Evian accords were
signed. A PAG official in Tunis
told the US ambassador on 13 May
that it was becoming clear that
the Europeans of Algeria in-
cluded a very large proportion
of "unredeemable racists" who
had forfeited their right to
remain.
In addition to staffing
difficulties, the leaders of
the new Algeria will be taking
over an administration which,
because of the paralyzing effects
of the struggle against the OAS,
has virtually ceased to exist.
In early May the US consul gen-
eral in Algiers reported almost
anarchic conditions among the
formerly efficient government
offices concerned with economics
and commerce. Some of the build-
ings have been bombed, and no
one seemed to know or care when
they would reopen. Almost all
Moslem employees and many Euro-
peans have simply failed to ap-
pear for work, and supervisors
do not know when or if they will
return. A few essential reports
are prepared by inexperienced
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
and hastily recruited personnel,
but there is no way of getting
them printed.
there is also a complete break-
down in the administrative ma-
chinery in the countryside
many French are
leaving, many Algerian National
Army (ALN) units are moving in,
and, since the people do not
understand who is in charge
during the interim period,
orderly administration has al-
most ceased.
The PAG--most of whose pres-
ent members will in all prob-
ability compose the first Al-
gerian government--has limited
means with which to meet these
problems. The PAG itself is a
relatively small organization,
staffed to direct a rebellion
rather than run a large country.
Some 10,000 Algerians who have
been employers of the civil
administrations of Tunisia,
Morocco, and the UAR will return
to Algeria, many of them before
independence. A fairly large
number of Algerians reportedly
organized self-improvement
classes while in French prisons,
with a view to becoming civil
servants in a future Algeria,
and ALN units in Tunisia are
said to be prepared to assume
certain administrative tasks.
Probably only a few Al-
gerians from these sources are
competent to fill positions in
the upper categories, however,
and they will face a difficult
period of orientation, possibly
without much help from the French
they are to replace. Moreover,
the Moslem-dominated Provisional
Executive at Rocher Noir has re-
portedly been unable to establish
effective control over the ad-
ministration, and is consequently
unable to direct the integration
of these new personnel.
The economic situation is
almost as stagnant as the admin-
istration. The US consul general
described Algiers earlier this
spring as a dying city, with com-
merce at a virtual standstill.
Prices of food and daily neces-
sities have risen 25 to 50 per-
cent, docks are piled high wit]25X1
deteriorating cargo,-and most
of the banks are operating at
a sharply reduced level. Much
the same situation prevails in
Oran, the second largest city.
Political uncertainty and ter-
rorism have severely curtailed
construction work throughout
Algeria.
All during 1961 the specter
of an independent, Moslem-domi-
nated Algeria produced a recession
among the private European
sector of the economy. An esti-
mated $600 million in private
capital fled the country during
the year, and the economy escaped
complete collapse only by con-
siderably increased government
spending. Public funds expended
directly or indirectly by the
French Army and the civil admin-
istration financed an estimated
50 percent of the total final
purchases of goods and services,
and although French aid for spe-
cific projects is to continue
after independence, this priming
of the economy will decline as
French troops and administrators
leave.
The net emigration of French
Europeans from Algeria in 1961--
about 75,000, double that of the
previous year--presages a
growing shortage of skilled and
professional workers. As in the
administrative structure, the
promotion of Moslems into technical
positions in the private sector
of the economy has for some years
lagged considerably.
The best estimates predict
that, following independence,
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
economic activity will drop 30
to 40 percent and that the
country's demand for goods and
services will sharply decline,
causing a drop in industrial ac-
tivity and a near cessation of
new investment in industry. The
picture is further darkened by
the fact that unemployment is
already at nearly 40 percent.
Moreover, remittances from Al-
gerian workers in France, which
are estimated to provide support
for 2,000,000 Moslems in Algeria,
will probably be curtailed as
these workers return to their
own country, especially should
relations with France become
strained.
Efforts of the PAG in Tunis
to formulate workable economic
programs have been severely handi-
capped by its isolation from the
Algerian scene, lack of competent
practical economists, and its
commitment to give the Algerian
revolution a speedy and meaning-
ful content for "those who bore
the burden of combat." Further-
more, the PAG's preoccupation
with the protracted negotiations
with the French, and its current
internal struggles, has left
little time for economic planning.
Possible Economic Changes
The leaders of an independ-
ent Algeria will be compelled to
effect an ambitious land-reform
program, despite the enormous
practical problems involved. The
ALN is largely a peasant army,
and its veterans will be a potent
political force in the new Al-
geria. Many PAG ministers,
especially vice premier Belkacem
Krim, have made it amply apparent
that these veterans must be
rewarded for their services.
Indications are that at
least 3,000,000 acres of land
will be redistributed, with a
fixed upper limit on acreage
owned, whether by Europeans or
Algerians. There will also be
an attempt to bring about maximum
employment of Algerians on all
farms, and an effort will be
made to induce mechanized farms
to convert part of their land
to activities requiring a higher
input of labor. During at least
the initial phases of this pro=
gram, productivity will almost
certainly decline, while the
planned shift from grapes to
other crops will have an ad-
verse effect, since wine--
mostly exported to France--now
accounts for one third of the
value of Algeria's agricultural
products.
The most articulate segment
of the Moslem population, how-
ever, resides in the urban areas,
and the new government will prob-
ably have to take some action
in, the industrial and commercial
sector. Efforts will probably
be made to reorient industry so
as to reduce Algerian dependence
on foreign sources by reducing
the number of plants which
produce exclusively for export.
A major obstacle to speedy
and effective government action
in this sector is the fact that
Europeans own or control 80 per-
cent of Algeria's industry and
probably 50 percent of its major
commercial firms. Pressures to
diminish European control may
prove irresistible, in spite
of the "guarantees" of the
Evian accords or the risk of
having French aid cut off or
reduced. The PAG apparently
interprets these guarantees as
opportunities for the Europeans
to contribute to a Moslem Al-
geria, rather than as a com-
mitment to preserve the status
quo.
Faced with these problems,
the Algerian government--par-
ticularly if it is committed
to cooperation with France--
will soon be under great pres-
sure from a populace disilllu-
sionedwith the fruits of in-
dependence and open to political
exploitation by more radical
leaders. One economic planner
in Tunis remarked last fall
that the PAG's chief task is
to be able to cope with the
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arguments, methods, and promises
which it expects Algerian Com-
munist leaders to use when they
return to Algeria after independ-
ence.
The Political Program
Since the most pressing
problem of the new leaders, who
have been in exile for years,
will be to consolidate their
control over their own country,
the immediate postindependence
period will probably be filled
with speeches and declarations
of nationalist sentiments. Soon,
however, elucidation and debate
over the orientation of the gov-
ernment are likely to take first
place.
The PAG leaders reportedly
now envisage establishing a na-
tiona.list Algerian form of
socialism, stressing a policy
of nonalignment in foreign af-
fa.rs. They emphasize such
words 4s "secular," "social-
istic," and "democratic," while
insisting that no foreign system
will be imitated. On the whole,
their statements have shown a
surprising lack of animosity
toward the French and an appar-
ently sincere desire to accept
French assistance. Several
factors, however, may limit the
new government's ability to con-
tinue along these lines.
The vagueness of the pro-
gram will in itself pose serious
problems. There are already in-
dications that most of the key
terms are not understood in the
same sense by all of the FAG,
let alone by all nationalists
within Algeria.
There are strongly divisive
basic influences within the Al-
gerian population itself. French
Government references to "'the
populations" of Algeria have
reportedly annoyed the PAG,
probably because of the un-
pleasant truth therein. During
the rebellion, ethnic, religious,
and regional differences were
suppressed--often summarily--but
these can be expected to re-
assert themselves soon after in-
dependence. The Kabylies of
north-central Algeria, the nomaas
of the Sahara, the urbanized
Moslems of Algiers and Oran, and
the wretchedly poor peasants of
eastern Algeria, plus the re-
maining Europeansand some 200,-
001D Jews, will all press for
particular benefits and programs.
There are already reports that
the Kabylies may agitate for some
sort of separate, semiautonomous
state.
These problems will have to
be met by a government within
which a struggle for power will
probably be taking place. Even
if, as seems likely, the present
PAG is transformed into an Al-
ge:rian government, it probably
will not remain as such for long.
The system of collegial leader-
ship it has employed has been
cumbersome and ineffective. The
appointment of Ben Khedda as
PAGY premier was probably designed
to postpone the question of indi-
vidual leadership until after
independence. Most observers do
not feel that he will be a dominant
figure then. Ben Bella is con-
sidered by many sources to be
the strongest of the Algerian
leaders and the one in the best
position to become the eventual
strong man. The possibility
remains, however, that the entire
re:Latively moderate PAG leader-
ship could be overthrown by urban
extremists embittered over the
OAS terrorism now taking place
in Algiers and Oran.
other sources.
In any case, the Algerian
government will probably feel
itself compelled to demonstrate
that it is not under French
domination, and to make good its
protestations bf nonalignment by
accepting bloc economic aid and
diplomatic relations with Com-
munist countries. This will pose
delicate problems in its relations
with France, and failure to re-
sist the almost inevitable tempta-
tion to cover its own shortcomings
by blaming France could result in
reduction or even cancellation of
French aid. Then the government of
an independent Algeria would have
to seek massive assistance from
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WJBEKLY SUMMARY
PEASANT LEAGUES IN NORTHEASTERN BRAZIL
Peasant leagues, founded
in the mid-1950s by Communist
and Socialist leaders to agi-
tate for rural reforms, exist
in many parts of Brazil's im-
poverished northeast. Tensions
in this area have been height-
ened by rapid rises in prices
of several basic foods over the
past few months--rises which
have been accentuated by hoard-
ing on the part of the more
prosperous. Drought in some
areas of the interior has caused
thousands of agricultural work-
ers and their families to abandon
their farms and seek work and
food in the towns. Hunger riots
have broken out, and there has
been some looting of food stores.
Northeastern Brazil, an
area of 970,000 square miles
with a population of 22,000,000,
is rivaled in Latin America as
a depressed area only by Bolivia
and Haiti. Per capita income
is estimated at less than $100
annually, one third of the aver-
age for Brazil as a whole. In
Piaui, the most depressed state,
annual income is only 30 dollars
per capita--less than that of
Communist China.
In a narrow humid belt
along the coast, land is devoted
to sugar cane production but
with considerably less efficiency
than in other commercial sugar
raising areas in Brazil or else-
where. Cane planting, with low
labor productivity, pays mini-
mal wages. Urban growth and
population increases, together
with little industrial expansion
and a scarcity of food cultiva-
tion, have led to extremely high
food prices in relation to wages.
Most of the interior is
an area of periodic drought.
This is the area which authori-
ties have long had difficulty
in controlling and which is
the setting of Brazil's best-
known literary work, Rebellion
in the Backlands--the factual-
account of a fanatic who led
a rebellion for many years in
the! latter part of the 19th
century.
Although normal annual
rainfall in the interior is
about 25 inches, it occurs in
cloudbursts which limit its
utility. For many years the
economy consisted mainly of
cattle-raising on a subsistence
level. This is still one of
the two most important sources
of livelihood in the area, and
a hardy variety of cattle has
been developed which can feed
on nothing but cactus. There
has been a gradual shift, how-
ever, toward raising cattle
for export to the coastal cities,
and with it has come a gradual
concentration in landownership.
Cotton has been introduced
as a leading cash crop and is
the region's most drought-re-
sistant money crop. Cotton,
however, requires considerably
more labor than the previous
all-cattle economy and conse-
quently a much higher degree
of food cultivation. This has
increased the area's vulner-
ability to severe drought. When
drought in 1958 caused a loss
of up to half the interior's
food supplies, thousands of
rural workers flooded the
coastal zones and depressed the
living standards of the resident
poor--who were already close
to the subsistence level.
The Peasant Leagues
The economic dislocations
of the 1958 drought provided a
new impetus for improving con-
ditions in the area, and the
peasant leagues have gained
strength. In the state of Paraiba
they constitute a militant popular
organization. Elsewhere, however,
the leagues are as yet badly co-
ordinated and some are inactive.
Most are in the sugar zone,,while a
smaller number have been founded
in the area of periodic drought.
Membership ranges widely from
75 to 5,000 per league, and mem-
bers are usually assessed 5-10
cents monthly for dues.
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The leagues have emphasized
legal aid for rural workers,
tenants, and small landholders,
and many of the part-time or-
ganizers are said to be lawyers
who are engaging in league
activity with an eye to a polit-
ical future. Legal advice for
small landholders has particular
importance in Brazil, since only
an estimated one percent of
land titles are clearly valid.
Squatters, who can acquire legal
title to a plot of land after
some years of living and raising
crops on it, also require legal
help.
A Brazilian magazine of
national circulation highlighted
the importance of legal services
for the rural poor in an account
several months ago of a tenant
farmer's problems with his land-
lord. The tenant objected to
a summary doubling of his rent.
? --
Sao Luis
Maranhao
0
The landlord's 20-year-old son
and his friends thereupon visited
the tenant, playing a hunting
"game" with the tenant's small
son which ended in shooting him
to death. Legal services avail-
able in the area resulted in
liberty for the landlord's son
and prison, beatings, and suicide
for the tenant.
Leagues in
The largest number of peas-
ant leagues is in the state of
Pernambuco, but those showing
most activity in the past ten
months are in the state of Pa-
raiba. These leagues have
achieved widespread support--in-
cluding that of the conservative
Social Democratic party--and
at ]Least the benevolent neu-
trality of the governor, but
they are opposed by large land-
holders and army elements.
APiaui
less than 5
Area of periodic drought
00 Number of peasant leagues
TATUTE MILES 300 '
2 X 1
32461
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ACeara
less than 5
15-20 ' Joao Pessoa
APernambuco ecife,
-\, about 60
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The subversive potential
of the Paraiba leagues was in-
dicated in August 1961 when
an army search of a farm near
Sape uncovered Communist party
propaganda as well as literature
on agrarian reform and a number
of .45-caliber pistols with
ammunition. The farm belonged
to a peasant league leader,
and the army's discovery appears
to have heightened tensions
in the area. In late 1961 the
president of the peasant league
of Sape was seriously wounded,
and on 2 April the acting pres-
ident was killed by unidentified
gunmen. Preliminary investiga-
tion indicates that the gunmen
were hired by members of the
"Syndicate of Death," an organi-
zation of landlords.
In early April army units
were reported posted on all
roads leading from the interior
of the states of Paraiba, Per-
nambuco, Rio Grande do Norte,
Sergipe, and Piaui. The army
announced officially that the
roadblocks were for the pur-
pose of controlling smuggling,
but the army maneuver was evi-
dently designed to find arms
caches in peasant hands and to
prevent a scheduled mass demon-
stration by rural workers
aroused over the 2 April killing.
Peasant league leaders in Parai-
ba's capital city were placed
under house arrest and one was
apparently secretly deported
to a neighboring state.
The two-sided nature of
possible violence was indicated
earlier this year when the manager
of a large ranch in Paraiba and
one of his assistants were
killed with knives and hoes.
The Paraiba governor appears
to be sympathetic to the rural
workers, however, and in early
May sent a protest to President
Goulart against prolonged
occupation of his state by the
army,"which continues to occupy
the streets and fields as if
the solution of the crisis
depended on the speed of their
triggers."
The popularity of the Sape
league may derive from the
numerous welfare services which
it has provided for its members.
At least prior to the assassina-
tion of its leader in April, it
operated a primary school for
children of members and offered
medical and dental care as well
as :legal assistance to members
and their families. In addition
to paying the fees of one law-
yer, one physician, and two
dentists on a full-time basis,
the Sape league used the services
of 18 physicians and several
lawyers on a part-time basis.
The program of the Sape
league specially urges the
lowering of land rental and
costs and the alleviation of
the requirement made on the
peasants to work two or three
days a week for the landowner
for about 12 cents a day. The
Sape league, which covers an
aretL of sisal, sugar, pineapple,
and cotton holdings, collected
the equivalent of $160 to $240
a month from its members during
the winter and from $320 to $400
a month during the months which
yielded good crops. Its member-
ship is reportedly 5,000.
Pro-Communist Francisco
Juliao--a state deputy in Per-
nambuco State, which has long
been the cultural and economic
center of the northeast--is
the most widely known league
leader. He reportedly achieved
his reputation by volunteering
as a lawyer to defend the legal-
ity of the leagues in 1957
when. other lawyers refused to
take the case. To protect his
personal safety in an area
where landowners traditionally
have personally loyal gunmen,
he is reported to have made a
list of 20 prominent landholders
and told his followers, "If
anything should happen to me,
I want to meet them all in hell."
Juliao has not admitted
membership in the Brazilian
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Communist party, but he has
repeatedly avowed his admiration
for Fidel Castro and Mao Tse-
tung. Juliao visited Peiping
in 1961 and has visited Cuba
three times in the past year.
His wife and two daughters
visited China earlier this year,
and his daughters now have en-
rolled in school in Moscow. He
has been criticized by Brazilian
Communists for advocating vio-
lence when the party's policy
is to seek control through
peaceful means. The Communists
have nevertheless tended to co-
operate with him. One of the
delegates to the international
Communist Agricultural Workers'
Conference in Bulgaria in April
was a peasant league leader;
the other was a member of the
Rural Commission of the ortho-
dox or pro-Moscow Brazilian
Communist party.
The dissident or pro-Pei-
ping Communist party of Brazil,
which advocates violence and a
revolutionary line, is evidently
also interested in the peasant
leagues and seeking to increase
its influence within them.
Juliao and dissident Communist
leaders have apparently agreed
to join forces to advocate revo-
lutionary activity, and the two
key dissident leaders reportedly I leagues.
went to Cuba early in May at
Juliao's instigation to receive
instruction in revolutionary
techniques.
Juliao's leadership is de-
nied by some important league
leaders. Assis Lemos, president
of the Peasant League Federa-
tion of Paraiba, recently stated
that Juliao has no influence
in the Paraiba leagues and no
following among the members
there. He said that his federa-
tion is independent and receives
no support or counsel from
Juliao or anybody else.
The October Elections
The increasing problem
presented by peasant unrest,
whether mobilized by peasant
leagues or other organizations,
is likely to play a significant
role next October in congres-
sional and municipal elections
throughout the area and in
simultaneous gubernatorial
elections scheduled in five
northeastern states. Illiter-
acy will limit the direct voting
strength of league members.
One leader estimates, for example,
that only 20 percent of league
members in his state are suf-
ficiently literate to qualify
for voting.
Nevertheless, rural reform
is :Likely to be a campaign is-
sue. Three gubernatorial
elec- tions in 1960 resulted in active
reform programs and relative
peace in two states--Rio Grande
do Norte and Alagoas--while
the indecisiveness of Governor
Gondim in Paraiba has probably
contributed to the repeated
threats of widespread violence
there. Moreover, Francisco
Jul:Lao probably has sufficient
strength in his home state of
Pernambuco to achieve election
as federal deputy and thus
gain a national forum for
agitation for the peasant
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