CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A003600020001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 38
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 27, 2008
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 13, 1962
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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SECRET
CURRENT
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY
SUMMARY
COPY NO. 98
OCI NO.0412/62
13 April 1962
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
I I I OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
ARMY review(s)
completed.
SECRET
State Dept. review
completed
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
13 April 19132
T H E W E E K I N B R I E F
(Information as of 1200 EST 12 Apr)
SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY DEVELOPMENTS . . . , . . . . . . . . Page 1
The USSR took further steps last week to promote a
more conciliatory atmosphere for the next round of nego-
tiations on Berlin. Moscow has agreed to resume normal
operations of the US and Soviet Military Liaison Missions
in Germany and made overtures to restore normal relations
between the US and Soviet commandants in Berlin.
The Soviet press and radio promptly denounced the 10
April joint US-British statement on a. nuclear test ban.
The chief Soviet delgate at Geneva has pledged that the
USSR would not stage tests during the conference if the
West would make a similar pledge. There have been indica-
tions that the Soviets might follow this bid for a test
moratorium with a proposal ostensibly designed to break
the impasse over international controls to monitor a test
FRANCE - ALGERIA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page
The overwhelming approval of De Gaulle's Algerian
policy in the 8 April referendum in France further weakened
the Secret Army Organization, already faced with signs of
waning sympathy among Algeria's Europeans. De Gaulle, evi-
dently realizing he cannot interpret the vote as a blank
check for all his policies, has decided not to risk early
elections and to replace unpopular Premier Michel Debre
with Georges Pompidou. Pompidou, long one of De Gaulle's
closest advisers, will push a program calculated to appeal
to the left and center. In Algeria, difficulties have re-
portedly arisen in organizing the Local Force which the
provisional executive, installed on 10 April, will use to
keep order during the transitional period.
WEST NEW GUINEA .
Page 5
There is little prospect for early resumption of the
secret Dutch-Indonesian talks. Sukarno has qualified his
approval "in principle" of the most recent proposals for
solving the dispute by stating that West New Guinea must
still "return" to Indonesia in 1962. The Netherlands
Government has deferred a decision on the proposals until
later this week, probably to allow more time to formulate
counterproposals. The Indonesian Government claims it has
issued orders to stop military action and infiltrations in
West New Guinea.
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SOUTH VIETNAM
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
13 April 1962
:;Page 6
Viet Cong activities reached their highest level in
March. Increased rail sabotage, greater use of battalion-
size forces, and augmented unit firepower were noted.
The reported capture by government forces of Chinese-
manufactured ammunitton would,.if confirmed, provide the
first evidence of Viet Cong use of bloc military equipment.
Hanoi has announced that the National Front for the Libera-
tion of South Vietnam--the Viet Cong political arm--has
held its first con ress and elected a permanent or tional apparatus,
. a Page 8
Adoula's unwillingness to receive advice has further
clouded the outlook for the stalemated negotiations with
Tshombd in Leopoldville. However, aCongplese reunifica-
tion formula in which Katanga would retain 50 percent of
its mineral revenues may provide the basis for serious
bargaining. Signs of unrest continue in various areas of
the Congo. Anti-UN feeling is running high among Katangan
troops in Elisabethville, and new clashes could take place
at any time.
BLOC ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH CUBA Page 9
. . . . . . . . . . . .
The Sino-Soviet bloc is making considerably more than
a token effort to ease Havana's most pressing economic
problems, but probably will be unable to fulfill all of
Cuba's requirements for foodstuffs and consumer goods.
Deliveries of bloc foodstuffs, however, should be suffi-
cient to maintain an adequate diet in Cuba. The bloc's
agreements with Cuba already contain a number of innova-
tions designed to foster the island's integration into bloc
economic plans, and additional concessions may be made.
Meanwhile, the slow process of implementing agreements for
bloc aid in the construction of industrial ro ects is con-
tinuing.
ARGENTINA . . . . . . . . . . . . . , . . Page 10
President Guido has called a special session of Con-
gress for 12-18 April and will ask it to amend the law on
presidential succession to extend the list of those in
line to hold the office temporarily and to postpone the
date when elections for a new president become mandatory.
He may also ask for special powers to remain in office
until the scheduled end of Frondizi's term in 1964. Most
of the political leaders recently consulted would like
time to regroup 'for new elections. The problem of dealing
with the victorious Peronista candidates in the recent
elections is still unresolved; legally they are due to take
office on 1 May. New austerity measures are adding to
popular discont
t
en
and pressure on the government.
EUROPEAN CONFEDERATION DEVELOPMENTS ? ? a . e e m e o m .
Page 11
The foreign ministers of the six Common Market coun-
tries are expected to meet in Paris on 17' April in a new
attempt to reach an accord on a treaty to establish a
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
13 April 1962
European political union. The outlook for an agreement
has improved since the abortive ministerial meeting a
month ago: De Gaulle made concessions at his 4 April
meeting with Fanfani, and London stated on 10 April that
it intends to participate fully in the development of
political unity. Nevertheless Belgium and the Nether-
lands may still hesitate to conclude the treaty so long
as Britain's accession to the Common Market remains in
doubt.
SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page
There have been some indications recently that the
Soviet and Chinese parties are attempting to reduce spec-
ulation that their relations are so strained that a break
between them is imminent. Their show of "unity" may be
intended to discourage the West from attempting to exploit
any division between the two countries and to quiet fears
among rank-and-file Communists, many of whom have only re-
cently learned of the depth of the crisis. On the basic
issues, however, Moscow and Peiping remain as far apart
as ever.
NORTH KOREA AND THE SINO-SOVIET DISPUTE . . . . . . . .
North Korea, which signed military pacts with both
the USSR and Communist China last July, has been making
its sympathy for Peiping and Tirana increasingly clear.
The North Koreans have profited from Sino-Soviet competi-
tion in the past, however, and they are unlikely to ex-
Page 15
press their sympathies to the oint of impairing their
relations with the USSR. 25X1
ALBANIA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS . . . . . . . . . .
. Page 16
The USSR and its European satellites have severed al-
most all ties with Albania. Government contacts are kept
at a minimum, party dealings have ceased, and long-term
credits and economic aid have been canceled. Disruption
of the Albanian economy has been prevented by large-scale
Chinese Communist assistance and by the continuation of
trade with the European satellites. The Albanian regime
is seeking to enhance its stability by a veloping economic
and political contacts with the West and among the non-
committed states, but it depends basically on its effi-
cient security organs.
Albania's neig -
bors probably are making preparations to preserve their
interests in Albania should the resent re ime weaken.
SYRIA . . . . .
. . ., . Page 17
Syrian military leaders have run into difficulties in
reconstituting a civilian government. Political leaders,
including imprisoned President Qudsi, are refusing to par-
ticipate in a regime dominated by the army and are de-
manding restoration of constitutional government. The
military command appears to be reneging on its promise to
hold a plebiscite on the question of union with Egypt, but
pro-Nasir sentiment remains strong. Since the junta lacks
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
13 April 1962
support from both the conservative business and property-
owning elements and the leftist-socialist pan-Arabists
its life is likely to be short.
FRENCH RELATIONS WITH THE ARAB STATES
. . . . . Page 17
One consequence of the emerging settlement in Algeria
is likely to be early resumption of French diplomatic re-
lations with the six Middle Eastern Arab states which
broke with France at the time of the Suez affair in 1956.
Paris has already held preliminary talks with Syria; Saudi
Arabia and Jordan are probably next on the list. Points
of friction remain, particularly with Egypt, but all the
Arab states see immediate benefits in closer ties with
Paris and are unlikely to be deterred by France's continu-
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 19
Popular support for the governing Council of State
has been on the decline for several weeks, partly as a re-
sult of continuing economic difficulties and partly because
of political attacks by the generally moderate National
Civic Union (UCN), the country's largest party. The UCN
leaders, identified in the public mind with the government
but in fact unable to control its policy, apparently feel
it necessary to assail the council's record for campaigning
purposes in the December elections. The council is also
troubled by some internal dissension but retains,, at least
for the present, the loyalty of the military.
. . . . . . . . Page 19
The former British territory of Nigeria, independent
since 1960, is preparing to become a republic, but it will
remain in the Commonwealth. The change, which will give
Nigeria a status like that of Ghana, India, and Pakistan,
will probably bring to the presidency Nnamdi Azikiwe, a
nationalist leader of the "radical" pattern who is the
present Governor General. The change is being made with
the acquiescence of conservative Moslem leaders, who will
ensure that the president's powers area strictly limited.
These conservatives continue to dominate Nigerian politics,
not only because their co-religionists form a majority of
the population, but because they have effectively adapted
themselves to changing political conditions.
DISCIPLINARY MEASURES AMONG SOVIET WRITERS . . . . . . . . Page 20
The Soviet regime has recently moved with new vigor
to contain the ferment among Soviet writers. The ex-
tremists have been rebuked, in relatively mild terms, and
one chief editor has been removed as too liberal. These
actions have been accompanied, however, by limited praise
for the more moderate liberal writers. The disciplinary
measures are unlikely to provide more than a temporary
check to efforts by the nonconformists to expand their
area of creative freedom.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
13 April 1962
SPECIAL ARTICLES
EVOLUTION OF THE FRENCH COMMUNITY OF STATES . . . . . . Page
De Gaulle sees a Paris-oriented Eurafrican community
as a means of bolstering France's claim to be a world
power, and has recently referred to France's present re-
lations with its former colonial territories in Black
Africa as a model of what may be achieved in French-Algeri.-
an cooperation. Although the constitutional structure
devised for the French Community in 1958 is now a dead
letter, Paris retains a high degree of influence in most
of these sub-Saharan,states, largely by virtue of its ex-
tensive aid program, Besides substantial indirect aid
such as tariff preferences, direct French economic and
defense support will approximate $600,000,000 in 1962.
Several of the republics depend on French subsidies for
about half their budgets.
PRESIDENT AYUB AND PAKISTAN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page
During his three and a half years of rule, President
Ayub has attempted to establish political and economic
stability and to prepare for a return to responsible civil-
ian self-government. Despite considerable success in in-
dustrial and business development, he has been unable to
make significant advances in fields affecting the large
majority of the rural population. Discontent has become
more obvious, especially in East Pakistan, and Ayub has
taken security and political measures to protect his own
position. Continued tension will not deter him from ef-
forts to achieve his goals, but it will almost certainly
lead him to seek additional support from Western nations
and to criticize any failure to provide as much support
as he feels he needs.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
WEEKLY REVIEW
SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY DEVELOPMENTS
Berlin and Germany
The USSR took further steps
last week to promote a more con-
ciliatory atmosphere for the
next round of negotiations on
Berlin. Marshal Konev, chief
of the Soviet forces in East
Germany met with General Clarke
on.5 April to discuss the fu-
ture of the Allied Military Li-
aison Missions in East Germany
and used the occasion to impress
the West with Moscow's desire to
improve relations with the US
and to demonstrate its willing-
ness to remove major irritants
in the Berlin situation. This
tactic apparently reflected Mos-
cow's decision that further har-
assment of the missions might
upset the process of negotiation
with the US. The joint commu-
nique issued at the conclusion
of the talks reaffirmed the
Huebner-Malinin agreement of
1947, which stipulated that all
mission personnel will receive
permanent passes entitling them
to enjoy "complete freedom of
travel without escort or super-
vision" in the US and Soviet
zones.
Konev expressed his per-
sonal regret for the incident
on 20 March in which a US Mili-
tary Liaison Mission car was
disabled by gunfire and US per-
sonnel were detained by the East
Germans for 26 hours. Calling
it a "pure accident," he avowed
that it should not affect the
basic agreement between Moscow
and the US on the operations of
the missions. Although Konev
repeated the standard line that
the US must respect the laws and
regulations of East Germany when
on its territory, he gave his as-
surance that the Soviets would
promptly investigate any future
incidents involving US military
liaison personnel and East Ger-
man police, and that they would
take steps to settle such mat-
ters quickly.
Konev also indicated inter-
est in resolving the impasse on
the issue of freedom of movement
across the Berlin sector border
for the US and Soviet comman-
dants. He asked specifically
that his view be conveyed to Gen-
eral Watson, the US commandant
in Berlin. On the same day, the
Soviet commandant's political
adviser, visiting Spandau prison
in the British sector of Berlin,
"unofficially" proposed that Gen-
eral Watson and Colonel Solovyev,
the Soviet commandant, meet on
"neutral" ground, possibly at UK
headquarters. The Soviet aide
said the was sure some agreement
could be reached at such a meet-
ing which would provide that the
US commandant's car and occupants,
civilian or military, would not
be subject to checks at the Ber-
lin border.
Personal contacts between
Watson and Solovyev were suspended
in late December when East German
authorities, with Soviet backing,
refused to permit the US comman-
dant to cross the East - West
Berlin sector border when accom-
panied by civilian aides unless
the latter showed their
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documentation to the East Ger-
mans--a move which would have
implicitly recognized East Ger-
man "sovereignty" in the Soviet
sector. On 30 January the UK
commandant informally proposed
that full freedom of movement
for the commandants be restored.
The Soviet aide's remarks
of 5 April are along the lines
of this British proposal and
mark a significant departure
from the position he took during
a 15 March conversation with a
US official. At that time he
indicated that the USSR would
make no concession on the general
issue of East German authority on
the sector border and suggested
that the US commandant contact
the East German Interior Ministry
to make arrangements to bring ci-
vilian aides across the sector
border.
Allied convoys are moving
regularly along the autobahns and
are clearing the Communist con-
trol procedures without undue
delay. The USSR has made no
further effort to establish new
requirements on processing Allied
military convoys on the autobahn,
although on 10 April a US supply
convoy from West Berlin to West
Germany was held up temporarily
until a Soviet escort vehicle
arrived. The Soviets maintained
that the US had failed to give
advance notification of the con-
voy's plans. While it has been
the practice for the Soviets to
follow troop convoys, this is
the first incident involving
supply convoys. The USSR, mean-
while, maintains its suspension
of flights in the Berlin air
corridors.
It appears that the East
Germans have postponed their at-
tempt to tighten up restrictions
on the movement of West Germans
and West Berliners on the East -
West; Berlin sector border. An
East. German news commentary of
10 April on the new East German
customs law suggests that East
Germany does not plan any im-
mediate attempt to change the ex-
isting arrangements concerning
East - West German interzonal trade
or to alter West Berlin's com-
mercial relations with West Ger-
many and other countries. This
would come about, the commenta-
tor stated, in a future Berlin
settlement which "respects the
sovereignty of the German Demo-
cratic Republic."
Disarmament and Test Ban
The Soviet press and radio
promptly denounced the 10 April
joint US-British statement on a
nuclear test ban as a "face-
saving maneuver" issued at a time
when the US is completing prepara-
tions for atmospheric tests. A
12 April Pravda article termed
it an "ultimatum" and "typical
nuclear blackmail." At the 12
April session of the Geneva dis-
armament conference, Soviet chief
delegate Zorin similarly de-
nounced the joint statement and
pledged that the USSR would not
stage tests during the disarmament
negotiations if the West would
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
make a similar pledge. There
have been indications that the
Soviets might follow this bid
for a test moratorium with a
proposal ostensibly designed to
break the impasse over inter-
national controls to monitor a
test ban.
Soviet representatives at
Geneva recently have hinted at
the possibility of some agree-
ment in principle to internation-
al controls over a test ban.
The Soviet leaders probably
would believe that such a propos-
al would generate strong pres-
sures on the US to postpone its
test series in the Pacific and
would maximize the political
costs to the US of a decision
to proceed with the tests.
The USSR probably expects
that the US will resume testing,
and the Soviets may do likewise
after the first few US explo-
sions and the anticipated neutral-
ist condemnation. Soviet dele-
gate Tsara kin at the disarmament
conferenc
reiterated
e s andard argument that US
control proposals for a test
ban would amount to an "espionage
network" on Soviet territory.
The Soviet delegation at
Geneva has continued to seek
to present the USSR as the
champion of general and complete
disarmament and to maintain
publicly that a test ban agree-
merit is possible only under the
terms of the Soviet November
1961 draft treaty, which excludes
international controls.
The Soviets are also at-
tempting to impress neutralist
delegations with their stand on
partial disarmament measures.
In urging the adoption of the So-
viet draft on banning war propa-
ganda, Zorin charged that the US
has systematically suppressed
peace propaganda and outlawed a
number of organizations in favor
of peace. The Soviets have capi-
talized on the fact that the US 25X1
has not yet presented a draft
treaty on general and complete
disarmament
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The overwhelming approval
of De Gaulle's Algerian policy
in the 8 April referendum in
France further weakened the
Secret Army Organization (OAS),
already faced with signs of
waning sympathy among Algeria's
Europeans. De Gaulle, evidently
realizing that he cannot inter-
pret the vote as a blank check
for all his policies, has de-
cided not to risk early elec-
tions and to replace unpopular
Premier Michel Debr6 by Georges
Pompidou. Pompidou, long one
of De Gaulle's closest advisers,
will push a program calculated
to appeal to the left and center.
The referendum clinched
the political case against die-
hard French Algeria proponents,
but abstentions were higher
than the government had hoped,
and the unusually high percen-
tage of invalid votes is inter-
preted as a protest against
the regime. All the major
parties except the Gaullist
Union for the New Republic
specified that their vote for
an Algerian settlement was in
no sense the massive vote of
personal confidence De Gaulle
sought.
Debr6 had reportedly long
planned to leave office once
the Algerian problem seemed
definitely settled. His odds-
on successor, Pompidou,is direc-
tor of the powerful Rothschild
bank in Paris and has long been
one of De Gaulle's most intimate
advisers. He was attached to
the Council of State from 1946
to 1954 when he entered the
Rothschild firm. He served as
chief of De Gaulle's personal
staff from mid-1958 until the
proclamation of the Fifth Re-
public in early 1959, when he
offic.tally returned to Roth-
schild.
He
has long been a arge o crit-
icism because of his big busi-
ness connections, and his re-
lations with parliament will
be strained by his lack of leg-
islative experience.
After a month's visit in
Algeria, Jacques Chevallier,
the liberal ex-mayor of Algiers,
said last week that the OAS
was beginning to lose its grip,
especially since its "cherished
myths" that the army would never
fire on Europeans and that
Moslems in the countryside
were sympathetic have now
been destroyed. Chevallier
feels that the lack of a posi-
tive OAS program has become
evident in the inconsistencies,
rumors, and improvisations to
which the organization is re-
sorting. Nevertheless, it
still has a strong capability
for terrorism.
The provisional Algerian
government (PAG) is disturbed
over, the continued killing of
Moslems in Algiers and Oran,
and perhaps hopes the French
Army will provide logistic
assistance for an Algerian
drive on the OAS. The PAG
probably expects such coopera-
tion in return for the control
it has exerted over the Moslem
population
The PAG may act to protect
Moslems in Algeria for reasons
of prestige
The French appear to be
having difficulty in organizing
the projected 60,000-man Local
Force, with which the provisional
executive--installed on 10 April--
is to keep order during the
transitional period.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
WEST NEW GUINEA
There is little prospect
for early resumption of the
secret preliminary Dutch-,Indo-
nesian talks on West New Guinea.
Sukarno publicly reiterated on
10 April that he approved "in
principle" the most recent pro-
posals for solving the dispute--
those put forward by US mediator
Ellsworth Bunker. The Indo-
nesian President qualified this
approval, however, by stating
that West New Guinea must "re-
turn" to Indonesia in 1962.
In the Netherlands, the
government has deferred its own
decision on the proposals until
later this week, probably to
allow more time to formulate
counterproposals or amendments.
Dutch officials continue their
sharp criticism of the new pro-
posals on grounds that they do
not provide adequate assurances
of self-determination for the
Papuan population of the disputed
territory and that the role
envisaged for the United Nations
is unclear. The Dutch press,
which apparently has been given
a background briefing on the
proposals, has also commented
critically.
While the government
continues to have the support
of a majority in parliament for
its West New Guinea policy, the
opposition Labor party appears
to be attacking this policy
more aggressively and is urging
the government to negotiate
with Djakarta on the basis of a
transfer of the territory to
Indonesia. The four governing
parties thus far have main-
tained a united front in the
face of these attacks, and the
differences within the cabinet
on the West New Guinea issue
do not appear to present an
immediate threat to its stability.
Indonesian Foreign Minister
Subandrio assured the American
ambassador on 8 April that, as
an assist toward a peaceful
settlement, orders had been
issued to stop military action
and infiltrations in West New
Guinea and that the government
would do all in its power to
control belligerent statements.
He qualified his promise by
pointing out that there were
"trigger-happy young men" in
the area and that further action
could develop from infiltrations
which had already taken place.
Statements attributed to
Indonesian military officers
or broadcast without attribution
by the Indonesian radio, pre-
suma.bly issued before Djakarta's
noninfiltration order was
announced, describe Indonesian
military successes in New
Guinea and a favorable re-
ception by the local population.
These reports, which appear to
be largely fabricated, are
chiefly intended to counter
Dutch reports of Indonesian
casualties and surrenders.
Sukarno has finally taken
official cognizance of serious
rice shortages in Java and has
had himself appointed commander
in chief of the "Supreme Eco-.
nomicc Operational Command." The
shortages, which are attributed
to last year's floods in some
areas and droughts in others and
to a chronic problem of distribu-
tion, apparently have been further
aggravated by military stock-
piling for West New Guinea prep-
arat:tons. Army rations have
been ordered reduced to make more
rice available to the public.
The rice crisis is expected to
continue for at least two months,
by which time the present crop
will have been harvested and dis-
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Viet Cong activity reached
its highest monthly level in
March, with 1,861 reported inci-
dents, seven more than the pre-
vious high of last October. The
number of attacks slightly ex-
ceeded those in October, and
many kidnapings were reported.
The Viet Cong has been making
greater use of battalion-size
forces with improved fire-
support capability. Increased
use of machine guns, mortars,
rocket launchers, and 57-mm.
recoilless rifles has been not-
ed. Six instances of sabotage
within a five-day period along
the coastal railroad in the
vicinity of Phan Thiet have
forced the suspension of night
trains between Saigon and Nha
Trang. Last year, insecurity
forced the closing of the rail-
road north from Saigon toward
the Cambodian border.
What appeared to be Chinese-
manufactured copies of US ammuni-
tion were found after govern-
ment forces beat off attacks on
two military posts northwest of
Quang Ngai in the First Corps
area on 6 April. This would,
if the ammunition were indeed
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SU
MMARY
Chinese, be the first identifiable
bloc military equipment in South
Vietnam. The Viet Cong have
been careful to mask bloc support
by using captured US and French
equipment.
Hanoi has announced that
the National Front for the Liber-
ation of South Vietnam--the po-
litical arm of the Viet Cong--has
held its first congress and elect-
ed a 52-member central committee,
a politburo-type standing com-
mittee, and a president.
The congress
ca ed for peaceful reunifica-
tion" of North and South Vietnam
and indicated the need for prior
ouster of the Diem government.
This step by the Front could
provide the apparatus for an
eventual "liberation government"
or for the Viet Cong to claim a
voice in any international con-
ference on Vietnam.
Since the air attack on
President Diem's palace in Feb-
ruary, high-level civilian and
military officials in Saigon
have shown increased concern
that a period of chaos could
result from Diem's sudden death
in office.
Saut~i v a*
Communist Guerrilla Activity
25X1
,t,atIon_
(;U/,N 0/
1!:1/11 Quart La 1(
(Ca lams
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Adoula's unwillingness to
receive advice and his "sulking"
over the stalemated negotia-
tions with Katangan President
Tshombe have further clouded
the outlook for the talks in
Leopoldville. Adoula has made
himself inaccessible to foreign
diplomats, and has threatened
to leave the talks for an ex-
tended trip to Stanleyville. He
has reiterated that he wants to
get the UN out of the Congo by
30 April. According to a UN of-
ficial, Adoula is very nervous
and has already suffered a
"temporary collapse." While
a rupture in the negotiations
does not appear imminent, ef-
forts to promote meaningful dis-
cussion have thus far proven
fruitless.
The negotiations continue
to be accompanied by evidence
of unrest elsewhere. The ar-
rest by the Adoula government
of three of its most vocal
critics in late March appears
to have been designed in part
as a warning to antiadminis-
trcLtion elements. In northern
and central Kasai, local chiefs
reportedly are increasingly
critical of the central govern-
ment's failure to supply eco-
nomic assistance, and are be-
coming more sympathetic to
Tshombe. From Elisabethville,
Katangan Foreign Minister Kimba
has led a heavy propaganda as-
sault on Adoula, charging that
Interior Minister Kamitatu was
planning to prevent Tshombe
from returning to Elisabethville.
Although UN representative
Gardiner confirmed that he had
seen letters to this effect,
the publicity which accompanied
Kamitatu's subsequent denial
makes unlikely any attempt to
detain Tshombe by force.
Anti-UN feeling is again
running high among Katangan
troops in Elisabethville. Al-
though an exchange of shots be-
tween Indian and Katangan sol-
diers on 8 April apparently
involved no casualties, observ-
ers in Elisabethville fear that
the proximity of UN and Katangan
units, together with a reported
overconfidence among the Katan-
gan military, will lead to a new
outbreak of fighting.
In northern Katanga, Con-
golese Army units appear anxious
concerning possible attacks by
Katangan soldiers and generally
apprehensive regarding their
isolation from Leopoldville. There
are no indications that ill-sup-
plied Katangan units in the area
are contemplating any major mili-
tary move; the presence in the area
of poorly disciplined forces of 25X1
both sides, however, poses a con-
tinuing threat of disorders.
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BLOC ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH CUBA
The Sino-Soviet bloc is
making considerably more than
a token effort to ease Havana's
most pressing economic problems,
but probably will be unable to
fulfill all of Cuba's require-
ments for foodstuffs and con-
sumer goods. Deliveries of bloc
foodstuffs should be sufficient
to maintain an adequate Cuban
diet, although there have been
frequent complaints about the
poor quality and the unfamiliar-
ity of many products. The bloc's
agreements with Cuba already
contain a number of innovations
designed to foster the island's
integration into bloc economic
plans, and it is possible that
additional concessions will be
granted to cope with current
problems.
A Cuban mission left in
early March to begin a new round
of trade talks in Eastern Europe
and the USSR. It has signed a
supplementary agreement for 1962
with Czechoslovakia, and nego-
tiations for a similar purpose
are in progress in the USSR.
A Chinese delegation arrived in
Cuba in early April to discuss
trade and sign a 1962 protocol.
All these talks may be aimed at
revising overall trade plans to
remedy some of the shortcomings
in Cuba's economy which have
developed since the first of
the year. Some scaling down of
its export commitments may emerge,
particularly for sugar. To
cope with payment difficulties,
some bloc countries may grant
Cuba short-term credits for
consumer goods or allow greater
imbalances in trade than now
permitted under commercial agree-
ments.
The recent visit to Cuba
by the head of the Soviet State
Bank probably was for the pur-
pose of clarifying bloc-Cuban
banking and payments arrange-
ments in the wake of the US
embargo and Havana's deteriora-
ting economic situation. It
is likely that implementation
of multilateral payments arrange-
merits, wherein Cuba may buy from
one bloc country and sell to
another, was discussed, and pos-
sibly even increases in Soviet
hard-currency payments to Cuba.
Most trade announcements
emphasize bloc commitments for
supplying machinery and indus-
trial raw materials, but deliv-
eries of foodstuffs and consum-
er goods continue to be impor-
tant. Soviet shipments of
edible oils, soap, grain, flour,
corn, and meats are being made
in significant quantities. The
European satellites are ship-
pingo, fruits, vegetables, meat,
lard, beans, and dairy products
to Cuba, even though such goods
are often in short supply at
home. Communist China continues
to supply rice, soybeans, meats,
and other foodstuffs.
Trade between Cuba and the
bloc in petroleum, industrial
raw materials, and capital
equipment continues, with no
sign of basic disagreements
over the magnitude of bloc
support or of a diminution in
Moscow's willingness to care
for Cuban requirements.
The slow process of imple-
menting agreements for bloc aid
in constructing industrial proj-
ects in Cuba continues. Some
small plants for the production
of tools, containers, light
bulbs, pencils, and other light
industrial products have already
been set up. Contracts signed
on 10 April for Soviet aid in
building a file factory and a
spare parts plant are typical
of the drive to reduce Cuba's
dependence on imported manu-
factured goods. More grandiose
plans for large-scale industrial
projects are still in the initial
stages, and most will not get
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under way until next year at
the earliest.
A Soviet delegation is in
Cuba now to help lay plans for
Soviet aid in further develop-
ing the nickel industry, but
construction is not slated to
begin until mid-1963. Contracts
have been signed with the Euro-
pean satellites in recent months
for a variety of projects, in-
cluding shipyards, power stations,
cement plants, and textile mills25X1
No progress has yet been made in
aid talks with Communist China.
President Guido has con-
voked a special session of the
Argentine Congress for 12-28
April to help resolve the crisis
resulting from the military's
ouster of Frondizi on 29 March.
Guido will ask Congress to amend
the law on presidential succes-
sion to extend the list of those
in line for the office and to
increase from 30 to 180 days the
period after which a call for
a new presidential election
becomes mandatory.
Guido issued the call
after consulting leaders of
various parties. He had pre-
viously hoped that a special
session would pass new legis-
lation to provide for propor-
tional representation, to out-
law "totalitarian" parties, and
to revise the basic labor law,
which is considered undemocratic
by the International Labor Or-
ganization. The Intransigent
Radical Civic Union (UCRI),
which controls both houses of
Congress until the newly elected
members take their seats on 1
May, agreed to such laws before
Guido took office.
The key issue of dealing
with the Peronista electoral
victories in 11 provinces on
18 March poses the greatest
threat to the Guido regime,
but still is unresolved. Im-
pelled by practical politics
as well as democratic sentiment,
leaders of the UCRI and the
other large non-Peronista party
have taken a public stand in
favor of letting the election
results stand. The UCRI, in
addition, has called for Fron-
dizi's reinstatement--although
both Frondizi and the UCRI na-
tional committee originally urged
Guido to accept his responsibili25X1
as legal successor to the presi-
dency.
Guido may ask Congress
for special powers to remain
in office until 1 May 1964,
the scheduled end of Frondizi's
term. Most political leaders
prefer time to regroup for gen-
eral elections, which would
fall due in February 1964. Guido
may also ask for special powers
to rule by decree, if the UCRI
proves unwilling to pass new
legislation governing elections.
Guido's new cabinet--com-
pleted on 6 April--is generally
conservative and pro-US. Minister
of Economy Pinedo and his secre-
taries are competent orthodox
economists. Pinedo, who considers
new austerity measures necessary
to meet the financial crisis,
issued four decrees on 11 April--
increasing gasoline prices and
sales and import taxes--which
will raise living costs. These 25X1
measures will add to popular dis-
content and pressure on the
government.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WE13KLY SUMMARY
EUROPEAN CONFEDERATION DEVELOPMENTS
The foreign ministers of
the six Common Market (EEC)
countries are expected to meet
in Paris on 17 April in a new
effort to reach an accord on a
treaty to establish a European
political union. Prospects for
such an agreement remain uncer-
tain, but several developments
of the last two weeks have ma-
terially improved the outlook
since the abortive ministerial
meeting only a month ago.
The most important of
these was the meeting between
De Gaulle and Italian Premier
Fanfani on 4 April, during
which the French President made
concessions on at least two
of the three substantive issues
which have blocked agreement.
De Gaulle agreed to modify,
treaty articles to assure that
the political union would not
interfere with the functioning
of the EEC and to provide that
common defense policies adopted
by the union should "reinforce"
NATO. On the third issue, De
Gaulle agreed "in principle;'
that, with a view to strengthen-
ing the union's institutions,
the treaty should contain a
clause calling for its revision
after a transitional period but
mentioning specific objectives--
such as direct election of a
European assembly--only as "ex-
amples."
Apparently largely the
work of Fanfani, this compromise
formula was subsequently en-
dorsed by West German Chancellor
Adenauer at a meeting with the
Italian premier on 7 April.
The proposed reference to NATO
has also been described as
"quite good" by Secretary Gen-
eral Stikker, who believes it
is one that "NATO can live with."
Britain's statement con-
cerning the political treaty
at a 10 April meeting of the
Western European Union council
has injected still another im-
portant new element into the
treaty talks. While agreeing
with the five against France
on the need for respecting EEC
and NATO integrity, the British
spokesman--Lord Privy Seal Heath--
sided with De Gaulle against
too centralized a union at the
present time. He implied,, however,
that once Britain was a mem-
ber of the EEC, it would take a
different view on questions
of this sort, and he strongly
reaffirmed London's intent to
participate actively in the
development of political unity.
With the three larger EEC
countries and Britain in apparent
agreement on the broad out-
lines of an approach to politi-
cal union, the outcome of the
17 April meeting would seem
again to hinge on the tactical
position of the Belgians and
the Dutch. Provided De Gaulle
does not retreat again, these
countries have obtained substan-
tial concessions on two points
of major concern. On the third,
neither Brussels nor The Hague
wishes the supranational issue
to become a major obstacle to
Britain's participation in
European union, and both have
indicated they are prepared to
sacrifice the immediate prospect
of federal union provided they are
certain of British membership.
Nevertheless, both may hesitate
to sign a political treaty until
they are certain of the UK's ac-
cession to the EEC, and both may
still hope that a stronger treaty
could be negotiated once this
has been accomplished. 25X1
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS
There have been some indi-
cations recently that the Soviet
and Chinese Communist parties
are attempting to reduce specu-
lation among Communists and in
the world press that their re-
lations are so strained that a
break between them is imminent.
Their show of "unity" may be in-
tended to discourage the West
from attempting to exploit open
signs of a split and to quiet
fears among rank-and-file Com-
munists, many of whom have only
recently learned of the depth
of the crisis, that the momen-
tum of world Communism has been
slowed. On the basic issues
such as Chinese support for
Albania, Soviet support of Chi-
nese economic and military de-
velopment, and disagreement
over world Communist tactics,
Moscow and Peiping remain as
far apart as ever.
Soviet Treatment Of
Chinese Statements
The Soviet press in the
last week republished two Chi-
nese editorials, a somewhat un-
usual procedure in recent months.
The editorials were carefully
chosen, however, and either sup-
ported Soviet positions on is-
sues that have been disputed or,
by skillful deletions, were made
to appear so. The first, orig-
inally in People's Daily on 29
March and carried by Pravda on
3 April, suggested in aegor-
ical terms that the "great leap
forward" approach to economic
growth had been in error and
that it now was necessary to
move forward slowly and calmly.
Soviet reprinting of this edi-
torial indicated approval of
its general content and served
to demonstrate to Soviet readers
that on this issue the USSR had
been right all along. At the
same time, it conveyed an im-
pression that there is a body of
Chinese opinion on the "right"
side of the issue.
The second editorial--re-
printed by Izvestia on 4 April--
was one on disarmament that ap-
peared in People's Daily on
3 April. Its main thrust was
a defense of the customary Chi-
nese view that it is necessary
to strengthen national libera-
tion movements in order to
achieve practical results in
the struggle for disarmament.
In its Chinese version, the
editorial appeared to be a
response and counterargument
to a Soviet editorial of 30
March on disarmament which laid
its stress on the concept that
achieving disarmament would
serve to aid the national lib-
eration movements. Without
altering the basic Chinese po-
sition on the priority which
must be given to the national
liberation struggle, the Peo-
ple's Daily editorial did note
in passing the formulation, un-
usual for Peiping, that national
liberation struggle and general
disarmament "support and sustain"
each other; but even here, lib-
eration struggle was placed
first.
Also unusual was a refer-
ence to the possibility of reach-
ing agreement with the West on
"certain disarmament measures,"
with the broadcast version of
the editorial suggesting a ban
on nuclear weapons as an ex-
ample. This reference was not
unprecedented, however : at the
height of the Sino-Soviet
polemics in 1960, Chinese crit-
icism of the USSR on the dis-
armament issue was qualified by
a statement conceding that it
might be possible to reach an
agreement banning nuclear weap-
ons..
That the Chinese have not
altered their basic position is
suggested by the wide publicity
given on 7 and 8 April to Indo-
nesian Communist party leader
Aidit's letter to World Peace
Council (WPC) chairman Bernal;
Aidit expressed the opinion
that the WPC meeting this July,
theoretically devoted to the
problem of disarmament, should
pay full attention to the ques-
tion of the fight against im-
perialism and for independence--
a stand vigorously opposed by
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Moscow at the last meeting of
this organization. The Soviets
also clearly recognize that the
Chinese position remains in op-
position to their own. In re-
printing the 3 April People's
Daily editorial, Izvestia care-
fully deleted key passages which
underline the dissident views of
the Chinese in order to make it
look as though Moscow and Peiping
were closer than is actually the
case.
In like manner, TASS dis-
torted remarks made by Chinese
Foreign Minister Chen Yi at a
reception on 4 April at the Hun-
garian Embassy. Chen Yi had as-
serted that it was impossible
for the West to divide the so-
cialist camp--a position that
Chinese spokesmen have taken
even during periods of violent
exchanges. True to the Chinese
view of this unity, however,
Chen included Albania in the
camp; "'...from Tirana to Hanoi
our 12 socialist nations are
closely united as one and will
remain forever undivided and in-
separable." TASS, true to the
Soviet position that Albania is
not a member of the camp in good
standing, conveniently deleted
this part of Chents remarks.
Continuing Disagreement
Both countries have re-
duced the volume and intensity
of polemics in their mass media
recently but have continued to
snipe at one another in party
journals and specialized broad-
casts. A recent issue of the
Soviet journal International
Life--in terms chosen to make it
unmistakable that the target
was China--reportedly attacked
"mock-revolutionary non-Marxist,
and adventurous views in the
world Communist movement that
oppose Lenin's tenet of peace-
ful coexistence ' In early
March, an article in the Soviet
party journal Political Self-
Education reaffirmed the dan-
gers that lie in wait for those
who isolate themselves from the
world Communist movement. A
series of broadcasts in Mandarin
from 29 March to 3 April car-
ried the Soviet arguments for
peaceful coexistence to the
Chinese mainland.
The Chinese party's theo-
retical journal, Red Flag, in
two recent issues has carried
strong attacks on "revisionism"
in such terms as to indicate
that Khrushchev and his views
are the target, although there
is no mention of Khrushchev in
the articles. In the February
issue, a bitter article en-
titled "On Bernsteinian Revi-
sionism" charges that the re-
visionists "disseminated the
illusion of pursuing only a
peaceful road and only a legal
road while accusing all those
who talked about armed revolu-
tion and civil war of being
anarchists...." In the early
March issue, discussing a book
by Yugoslav theoretician Kardelj,
Red Flag brands revisionists as
"cou nterrevolut ionists .'"
There is some evidence
that these indirect attacks on
Khrushchev in Red Flag have
provided the text for direct
attacks on the Soviet premier
in discussion meetings through-
out China.
It seems
clear that Khrushchev is being
made the scapegoat for the eco-
nomic ills that beset the Chi-
nese people--a role which may
also have been accorded him at
the current National People's
Congress.
Soviet and Chinese dis-
cussions of current interna-
tional events also point up the
continuing differences of view
held by the two parties. Neither
the Soviet Union nor China ac-
curately reported Castro's de-
nunciation of veteran Commu-
nist Anibal Escalante, and each
country chose for its account
only those portions of Castro's
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speech and actions that could
be interpreted as justification
for its own position. In addi-
tion, the treatment accorded
the Algerian cease-fire agree-
ment by the two sides reflects
their continuing difference of
view on the role of "armed
struggle."
State Relations
Since early March the two
parties have tried to make it
appear as though their dis-
agreements on tactics and
doctrine have not affected
state relations between them--
at least there has been more
activity than at any time since
the Soviet 22nd party congress,
The Chinese ambassador has
been reported back in Moscow
after a absence of over three
months; Peiping, for the first
time since mid-November, has
again sent observers to meet-
ings of the Soviet bloc's Coun-
cil for Mutual Economic Assist-
ance; and the Sino-Soviet com-
mission studying the Amur River
basin has met to draw up a final
report based on surveys carried
out between 1956 and 1960. A
broadcast from Peiping on 5
April cited the "correct lead-
ership" of the Chinese and So-
viet governments for this proj-
ect and "the close cooperation"
of the scientists of both coun-
tries. In its account of the
meeting, the USSR failed to
mention the line about "correct
leadership" but, as in other
recent accounts of joint work
published in the Soviet press,
invoked vague impressions of
scientific and technical collab-
oration.
A better key to state re-
lations, however, is contained
in the difficulties attending
Sino-Soviet trade talks for
1962. More than a month has
passed since the preliminary
talks ended, and although this
phase usually is followed in
not less than a week by final
negotiations, they have not yet
begun.. While the duration of
the preliminary talks--mid-
December to 9 March--is not in
itself unusual, the break since
early March is unprecedented
and may indicate a deadlock
over terms for this year's
trade protocol. It is possi-
ble that no agreement will be
signed this year and that trade
will be continued without a
formal agreement. Last year
the Chinese did not sign a
trade pact with Czechoslovakia,
presumably because trade had de-
clined to a level where an
overall agreement was consid-
ered unnecessary.
In contrast to the USSR,
which briefly mentioned the
opening and conclusion of the
preliminary trade talks, Pei-
ping has maintained total si-
lence on the subject. This
may be only a reflection of
indecision while domestic and
foreign policies are being
reviewed, but it suggests
that the difficulties in Sino-
Soviet economic relations will
not be short-lived. A recent
statement in the Soviet press
that Poland will occupy third
place in Soviet trade this
year indicates that the USSR's
trade with China will decline
for the third year in a row
and will not amount to more
than $1.1 billion, as com-
pared with an estimated $1.2
billion last year and more than
$2 billion in 1959. This will
reduce China to fourth place,
as contrasted with first in
1959 and second in 1960 and
196:L.
Chinese trade probes out-
side the bloc continue. Few ma-
jor transactions have material-
ized yet, but requests for
credits, capital equipment, and
technical assistance from Western
Europe and Japan point up con-
tinued Chinese interest in culti-
vating alternatives to their past
economic dependence on the USSR
and Eastern Europe. Several times
in recent months the Chinese have
cited the withdrawal of Soviet
assistance as the motive for
undertaking such negotiations
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
NORTH KOREA AND THE SING-SOVIET DISPUTE
North Korea, although
avoiding actions openly antago-
nistictoward Moscow, has recent-
ly made clearer its sympathy for
Peiping and Tirana in the Sino-
Soviet-Albanian dispute.
At the Soviet party congress
last fall, Kim I1-sung failed
to endorse Soviet measures
against Albania, although he
balanced this omission with a
call to Communists of all coun-
tries to strengthen "unity with
the Communist party of the So-
viet Union." Later, in his
report on the congress to the
Korean party central committee,
Kim merely expressed the hope
that Albania and the USSR would
mend the breach between them,
and placed no blame on either
side.
Pyongyang's party greetings
to Albania on its national day
in November were, like Peiping's,
markedly more cordial than Mos-
cow's. Last month the North
Koreans moved to the point of
showing their support for Al-
bania more openly when they fol-
lowed the example of Communist
China in sending agricultural
experts to Albania under the
termsof a technical cooperation
agreement signed in January.
The USSR and most of its European
satellites have withdrawn their
technicians from Albania during
the past year.
North Korea also failed
to follow the Soviet lead, as
has Mongolia, in attacking
the personality cult. In his
party report on the Soviet con-
gress, Kim made clear that deni-
gration of Stalin was strictly
an internal affair of the Soviet
party, and that attacks on the
personality cult had no place
in Korea. In his regime's prop-
aganda Kim continues to receive
personal adulation and credit
for North Korean progress.
Pyongyang has taken to quot-
ing Lenin to display agreement
with Chinese foreign policy
positions. In an outspoken
assertion of sympathy for Pei-
ping's stance toward the West,
a North Korean party newspaper
recently published a compilation
of Lenin quotations to support
the proposition that peace prop-
aganda not accompanied by the
caJLl for revolutionary action
of the masses can only sow
illusion and corrupt the pro-
letariat. The paper included
quotations often used by Pei-
ping in its rebuttal of the So-
viet line. Pyongyang has also
mirrored Peiping's suspicion
of the Geneva disarmament nego-
tiations by citing Lenin to the
effect that "bourgeois sophists"
are attempting to subvert the
masses with the ideal of the
termination of war and divorcing
this ideal from the need for
revolutionary action.
In its comments on the re-
cent Algerian cease-fire, Pyong-
yang again demonstrated its
ideological affinity for Peiping
by reflecting Peiping's suspicion
of negotiations as a means of
achieving independence. Like
Peiping, Pyongyang sees the
European Secret Army Organization
as the tool.. of the De Gaulle gov-
ernment and warned that "utmost
vigilance" is required to pre-
vent the French from reneging
on the Evian accords. North
Korea also made the point that,
like Communist China, it recog-
nized the Algerian rebels in
1958, whereas the USSR took this
step only after the cease-fire.
North Korea was the only
bloc nation to join Albania in
expressing approval of the Chi-
nese stand in the border dis-
pute with India.
It is unlikely that Pyong-
yang will publicize its sympathies
for Peiping and Tirana to the
point of gravely impairing its
relations with the USSR. The
Koreans, although imitating some
of Peiping's "leap forward" eco-
nomic policies, continue to ex-
press gratitude for Soviet eco-
nomic assistance. North Korea
sees profit in Sino-Soviet com-
pe7tition--last summer Communist
China hurriedly followed up the
USSR's commitment to a mutual
defense pact by inviting Kim I1-
sung to Peiping to sign a virtu-
ally identical agreement. Pyong-
gyang's overriding interest is 25X1
to preserve the commitments of both
its powerful neighbors to North Korea's
military security.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
FOREIGN RELATIONS
The USSR and its European
satellites have severed almost
all ties with Albania. Govern-
ment contacts are kept at a
minimum, party dealings have
ceased, and long-term credits
and economic aid have been
canceled.
Moscow on 11 December 1961
announced suspension of dip-
lomatic relations. Three of
the European satellite ambas-
sadors were soon recalled from
Albania, and the other three
apparently did not return to
Tirana after leaves of absence
last fall.
China has stepped in to provide
long-term credits for industrial
development as well as financial
aid for day-to-day imports, and
probably will underwrite much of
the increase in Sino-Albanian
trade this year. Tirana appar-
ently believes Chinese support
will be sufficient; there has
been no evidence so far that it
has asked for Western economic
assistance.
The Albanian regime appar-
ently hopes its increased eco-
nomic and political contacts
with the West and among the un-
committed states will enhance
its stability, but it still de-
pends basically on its effi
security organs.
The regime's
Albania's isolation is also
reflected in the absence of its
representatives from meetings
of important bloc groups such
as the Council for Mutual
Economic Assistance (CEMA) and
the Warsaw Pact. The Warsaw
Pact representative in Albania
reportedly left there in late
January and evidently has not
been replaced. So far, however,
Albania has not been publicly
ousted from these organizations.
The Sino-Soviet bloc con-
tinues to be the mainstay of
the regime's foreign trade,
but Communist China has replaced
the USSR in accounting for more
than half of total Albanian
trade. Albania's trade with
USSR has been suspended com-
pletely, but that with the
control of the situation is
demonstrated by its willingness
to admit to the Albanian people
that the Soviet leadership has
called on them to overthrow
First Secretary Hoxha and Pre-
mier Shehu.
Hoxha's position is
secure for the time being because
the Soviets were never popular
among the Albanian people and
because Hoxha has continued
to portray Albania as the
subject of the irredentist
aspirations of its neighbors.
Moscow thus does not ap-
pear to have the capability
to bring about a successful pro-
Soviet internal coup, and its
tactics against Albania ap-
parently do not at this time
ca"Ll for armed intervention.
European satellites continues,
apparently on a strict pay-as-
you-go basis. Albanian feelers
in the West have led to some
increase in trade, particularly
in Western Europe.
Because of Albania's
limited ability to export,
foreign credits are needed to
subsidize imports. Communist
weaken.
The fears of Greece, Italy,
and Yugoslavia last winter
about the fate of Albania ap-
pear to have abated, as have
rumors of preparations for
possible intervention by these
three countries. Nevertheless,
each probably is prepared to
act to preserve what it believes 25X1
to be its interests in Albania
should Hoxha's and Shehu's hold
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Syrian army leaders who
assumed power on 3 April have
reached an impasse as to how
to rule the country. While they
want to throw a cloak of con-
stitutionality over their re-
gime by returning the country
to civilian hands, they also
want to retain ultimate contrcl.
Since no strong man has emerged
from among the military leaders,
the present prospect for a
military dictatorship without
further upheavals does not
seem bright.
Civilian political leaders,
on the other hand--especially
imprisoned President Qudsi--are
loath to take responsibility.
Qudsi is reluctant to reassume
office without guarantees from
the military that they will back
a constitutional regime and re-
frain from constant interference
in governmental operations. The
fate of the former cabinet, also
now in prison, adds to this reluc-
tance. The military leaders
seized power without considering
the constitutional and practical
consequences, while the political
leaders appear to have learned
little from recent Syrian history.
Neither group seems prepared to
compromise.
The military command also
seems overconfident regarding
the extent of its suppression
of the recent pro-Nasir up-
surge in the country and, while
still paying some lip service
to the idea of a loose union
with Egypt, hedges on its pre-
vious promise for a plebiscite
on the union question. The com-
mand's present middle-of-the-
road ideas run counter to the
interests of the country's two
most important political group-
ings--the extremely conservative
business and property-owning
elements who backed the Qudsi-
Dawalibi regime and brought on
its downfall, and the leftist-
socialist pan-Arabists. As
the present junta lacks sup-
port of either right or left,
its life is likely to be short.
Any change in the composition
of the ruling group will prob-
ably involve a shift to the
left.
One consequence of the
emerging settlement in Algeria
is likely to be an early resump-
tion of French diplomatic rela-
tions with the six Middle Eastern
Arab states which broke with
France at the time of the Suez
affair in 1956. Arab solidar-
ity with the Algerian rebels
has prevented these states from
re-establishing diplomatic ties
with Paris, as all except Saudi
Arabia have done with London.
The rapid change in the politi-
cal climate made by the 19 March
cease-fire announcement,
however, was underlined by
a resolution passed by the
Arab League on 3 April pre-
dicting "a new era of equi-
table and fruitful relations"
with France.
French and Syrian of-
ficials expect informal con-
versations held in Paris in
late March to lead "soon" to
the re-establishment of full
diplomatic ties, following which
Paris plans to renew relations
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A Egypt: Although there are no formal French-Egyptian
diplomatic relations, France had a property
commission-for which it claimed diplomatic immunity-
a in Cairo from 1958 until recently.
Tunisia: French embassy personnel withdrawn because
of Bizerte crisis in July 1961, although consular
personnel remain.
Libya: French charge d'affaires in Tripoli since
ambassador withdrawn in late 1959.
with Saudi Arabia and "probably
Jordan." Iraq foresees "a grad-
ual resumption of contact" over
a period of months.
Nasir's opposition to French
retention of military bases in
Algeria and nuclear testing in
the Sahara may delay an early
reconciliation on his part with
France. However, a major step
in that direction was the re-
lease on 7 April of the four
French property commission mem-
bers on trial in Cairo as "spies"
since November. Paris had in-
sisted on the release of the men
before "any talk of renewed re-
lations." According to a 10
April press report, Egypt's
deputy foreign minister will
probably visit Paris in May.
All the other North African
states--Morocco, Tunisia, and
Libya--as well as the Sudan ap-
pear eager to renew close rela-
tions and secure French economic
assistance. However, the Bizerte
base issue with Tunisia and the
objection of all North Africa
to French nuclear testing in
the Sahara continue to be major
obstacles. Tunisia is hopeful
that France will be ready at
least by July to set a date for
evacuating Bizerte and, since
the Algerian cease-fire, has
twice made overtures for French
economic assistance. The Moroc-
can minister of national economy
and finance early this month
also expressed hope that France
will "resume its aid and re-
turn to first place in Morocaan
life?"
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Popular support for the
Dominican Republic's governing
seven-man Council of State
has been on the decline for
several weeks, partly because
of continuing economic difficul-
ties and partly because of po-
litical attacks by the National
Civic Union (UCN)--the country's
largest political party. Ever
since the council came to power
in January, the generally mod-
erate UCN has supplied most of
its popular support, but it is
worried by the competition of
more leftist parties. The UCN
leaders, who are identified in
the public's mind with the gov-
ernment but in fact are unable
to control its policy, appar-
ently feel they must assail the
council's record for campaign-
ing purposes in the national
elections scheduled for Decem-
ber.
The members of the coun-
cil face the difficult polit-
ical transition from dictator-
ship to democracy simultaneously
with such pressing economic
problems as unemployment, and
they have little practical po-
litical experience to draw on.
There has been discord among
them, partly over the demands
for immediate social and eco-
nomic reforms, which some of
them regard as too drastic.
Most of them believe that the
national election should be
postponed for a year while mod-
erate parties develop leader-
ship and organization. The UCN
continues to insist on elections
as scheduled, and on 31 March
it sharpened the council's fears
of a coup by publicly demanding
"revolutionary" measures to
purge the armed forces of offi-
cers guilty of crimes under the
dictatorship.
In retaliation, some mem-
bers of the council have made
moves toward inviting other par-
ties of the center and left to
join the government, and the UCN
now is scaling down its demands.
Meanwhile, however, the pro-
Castro 14th of June party and
other extreme leftists continue
their attacks on the government
and were responsible for sporadic
outbursts of violence at the end
of March.
The council for the pres-
ent retains the loyalty of the
top military leadership. This
group, however, consists of
young and inexperienced offi-
cers ;preoccupied with reorgan-
izing the armed forces into a
professional nonpolitical body
modeled on US lines. The dan-
ger of antigovernment action
comes from the reactionary of-
ficers who are gradually being
eased out. These may eventually
gain significant support among
other officers if the dissen-
sion within the Council of State
worsens and disputes among the
moderate parties begin to seem
like anarchy or an impending
Communist takeover to military
men unaccustomed to a free po-
litical system.
The former British terri-
tory of Nigeria, independent
since 1960, is preparing to be-
come a republic, but it will
remain in the Commonwealth.
This constitutional change will
give it a status like that of
Ghana, India, and Pakistan.
The principal formal ad-
justment involved is the sub-
stitution of an elected presi-
dent for a Governor General
appointed by the Crown on ad-
vice of the Nigerian Govern-
ment. The present Governor
General is Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe,
leader of the earliest and most
radical of Nigeria's three main
parties, the National Council of
Nigerian Citizens (NCNC), which
controls the Eastern Region of
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
southern Nigeria. The idea of
"completing Nigeria's independ-
ence" and dropping the vestiges
of formal ties to Britain has
wide popular appeal in the south.
Leaders of the conservative
Northern Region, however, have
regarded the connection with
Britain as a kind of guarantee
of their feudal positions and
view the republic proposal with
distrust.
Regional differences over
the pace of change can become
critical problems at the na-
tional level, because the gov-
ernment is a coalition of the
NCNC and the Northern People's
Congress (NPC), which reflects
the views of the long-established
northern Moslem leaders and is
bossed by the formidable Sardauna
of Sokoto- ,Northern Region premier--
and his "lieutenant," Federal Prime
Minister Sir Abubakar Balewa.
The NPC-NCNC coalition, in which
the NPC is the senior partner,
has been in existence since
December 1959. Although strange
bedfellows by outlook and ideol-
ogy, the two parties have ex-
hibited a noteworthy willingness
to compromise, and because of
NPC objections Azik~we had until
recently soft-pedaled the re-
public proposal.
The issue was first agitated
actively over a year ago by Chief
Obafemi Awolowo, leader of the
Action Group (AG), Nigeria's
third major party, which con-
trols the Western Region and
is in opposition on the na-
tional level. Awolowo, who
hoped the move would set the
NCNC at odds with the NPC and
strain the coalition, had some
success at first. Last October,
Azd.kiwe, chafing under the re-
strictions on his largely
ceremonial office, came out for
a republic, obviously visualizing
himself as president, with a
division of executive power
between a president and prime
minister. Northern leaders
promptly threatened to force
a popular vote on the issue--
whiLch the North, with 19 million
people compared with 16 million
Southerners, could win. Azikiwe
and the NCNC then backed off,
whiLle making their point as to
the wide popularity of a new
"anticolonial" gesture.
The upshot has been that
the NCNC leaders are on record
as favoring a "harmless" type
of republic having a president
with only limited power, as
in India; in return, the North-
ern leaders have agreed not
to contest Azikiwe's candidacy
as first president. 25X1
Recent developments on the i eral writers on the sensitive
Soviet literary scene show the
regime moving with new vigor to
contain but not to extinguish
the ferment among writers. The
extremists have been rebuked,
but the rebukes have been couched
in relatively mild terms and
have been balanced by crumbs of
praise for the more moderate
liberal authors.
An authoritative party
voice, that of the central com-
mittee organ Kommunist, in late
March defendeTthe political
line of novelist Vsevolod
Kochetov's The Obkom Secretary,
which had been attac e by lib-
issue of the hero's reluctance
to accept the denigration of
Stalin. The leaders in this at-
tack--the newspaper Literary Ga-
zette and the monthly journal
New lVorld--were themselves crit-
ic zed y Kommunist for raising
the issue. The article also
reiterated previous criticism
of easily Aksenov's novel Ticket
to the Stars for its picture of
disorien a Soviet youth.
At the same time, the arti-
cle admitted the artistic weak-
ness of Kochetov's novel and
criticized the unqualified praise
of the novel by such conservative
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publications as Literary Gazette's The disciplinary measures
rival, the newspaper Literature directed against established
and Life. Moreover, it prase professional writers are un-
the work of the moderate liberals likely to provide more than a
Vladimir Soloukhin and Vladimir temporary check to efforts by
Tendryakov, who have managed to the nonconformists to expand
avoid belaboring questions of their area of creative freedom.
allegiance to regime goals. It is a measure of the freedom
Other official moves ap-
peared equally carefully calcu-
lated to maintain the equilibrium
between the conservatives and
liberals. The award of an Order
of Lenin to Kochetov, the lead-
er of the militantly conformist
writers, on the occasion of his
50th birthday in early February
was soon counterbalanced by an
Order of Lenin for moderate
Konstantin Fedin on his 70th
birthday.
Last January, much public
interest was aroused by a lecture
in which Ilya Ehrenburg criti-
cized Soviet handling of the
Pasternak affair and explained
that "we were all accomplices
in a vast conspiracy of silence"
under Stalin. Probably for this
reason, a lecture on his auto-
biography scheduled to be de-
livered by Ehrenburg in mid-
March was abruptly canceled. He
appeared in Vienna the follow-
ing week, however, for a meeting
of the steering committee of
the World Peace Council.
Despite sharp criticism of
the editorial policies of Lit-
erary Gazette, New World, and
the fnazag ne Youth at both the
22nd party congress in October
and the All-Union Conference
on Ideological Work in December,
the editorial boards of the
first two are still intact.
Valentin Katayev was replaced
as chief editor of Youth by the
highly conformist Boris-Polevoy
in January, but the rest of the
editorial board has not been
changed. Most notably, the
much-criticized Victor Rozov,
whose movie script '"A.B.C.D.E...'"
has shared angry conservative
attacks equally with Aksenov's
Ticket to the Stars, remains
on the board.
already gained that Soloukhin
and Tendryakov appear to occupy
a middle-of-the road position
in Kommunist's eyes. Despite the
party's often reiterated demand
that writers assist in the
formation of the new Communist
man and contribute to the build-
ing of communism, neither author
has produced politically ori-
ented propaganda. Soloukhin is
known primarily as A lyric poet,
but has also written some prose
on pastoral scenes of village
life. Tendryakov has recently
been concerned with timeless
problems of conscience in terms
of good and evil, without refer-
ence to political systems.
It must be noted, moreover,
that these liberal writers, even
in their most nonconformist
moods, are overtly loyal to the
Soviet system. Nor are Aksenov's
disoriented youths in active
opposition; they merely lack
emotional involvement in build-
ing; communism. Within the limits
of this loyalty to the system,
the liberal writers can be ex-
pected to continue to press for
greater freedom in realism and
the portrayal of nonpolitical
psychological factors, as well
as greater attention to artistic
merit in writing techniques.
The relative immunity
which these authors enjoy, how-
ever, has not been extended
to the active dissenters.
According to a recent report
in the French press, one
such novelist, a professor
in Leningrad who was imprisoned
for ten years under Stalin,
was recently rearrested after
his anti-Soviet novel was
smuggled out of the USSR and
published abroad.
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cS'CRE 1
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE W.1EKLY SUMMARY
EVOLUTION OF THE FRENCH COMMUNITY OF STATES
De Gaulle sees a Paris-
oriented Eurafrican community
as a means of bolstering
France's claim to be a world
power, and has recently referred
to France's present relations
with its former colonial terri-
tories in Black Africa as a
model of what may be achieved
in French-Algerian cooperation.
In his 1958 plan for the French
Community a "special place"
was reserved for Algeria, and
De Gaulle apparently still
hopes that the now-much-modified
concept of the Community can
accommodate an FLN-governed
Algeria. In his 26 March ad-
dress on the Algerian peace
accords, he looked to future
Franco-Algerian cooperation as
a logical development of French
policy, spoke of a continuing
high level of aid to the area,
and emphasized the transforma-
tion of France's colonial policy
which has permitted Black Africa
to "cooperate" with France.
France's present relations
with the 12 independent "Brazza-
ville states" and the former
UN trust territory of Togo are
very different from what De
Gaulle envisaged in 1958, and
the political structure devised
then is a dead letter now.
France does, however, continue
to exercise a high degree of
influence in most of these
states, largely as a result of
its extensive aid program.
Growth of the Community
the President of France. All
the African colonies accepted
this, status, except Guinea,
which voted against the consti-
tution in the referendum to
approve it and opted instead
for complete independence.
Soon. after the Community was
inaugurated in April 1959, how-
ever, De Gaulle began to acknowl-
edge publicly its "evolutionary
character," and he made little
effort to deter movements for
full independence in the other
12 former colonies.
By late 1960 all of the
ex-colonies and UN trust
territories in Black Africa
except French Somaliland had
juridical independence. While
all except Guinea quickly signed
cooperation agreements with
France, only Gabon, Congo
(Brazzaville), Chad, the Central
African Republic, Senegal, and
the Malagasy Republic retained
Community membership. A new
agreement with Mali signed in
March 1962 may presage improved
J
TOoo
The French constitution
approved in September 1958
provided the framework for
France's colonies to become
autonomous republics in which
French hegemony would be safe-
guarded by the retention of
broad decision-making powers
in the hands of the President
of the Community--who was also
r'oC0N'T
1 untl~
REPUBLIC
OF THE CONOO
UAR
iEOYPT)
Former member of the French Community
State presently acknowledging formal
membership In the French Community
The group derives It, name from a conference
held by rho 12 French-speaking stales at Brazzaville
In December 19 50, They expressed a certain Identity
no
of moderate views, Impliciry opposing radical Arab
"on""' ar ne militant pan-Africanism of Nkrumah.
These 12 state. all but Cameroon, a former UN tract
territory, were french calorie,-became Independent at
various rimes in 1960 and have maintained close polirical
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French-Malian relations, and a
rapprochement with Guinea could
follow the Algerian settlement.
Nevertheless, the de facto
demise of the Community as a
formal institution was apparent
in 1960, and the Community ar-
ticles of France's constitution
may be abrogated this year.
Despite the eclipse of
the Community, France continues
to hold a pre-eminent position
in the affairs of all the former
Community states except Mali,
as well as in the former UN
trust territory of Cameroon.
Bilateral agreements assign
Paris a paramount position in
many areas, including pref-
erential commercial relations,
a veto over requests for non-
French defense assistance,
priority claims on strategic
raw materials, monetary control,
and such cultural preferences
as establishment of French as
official language. Each of the
governments remains heavily
dependent on French assistance,
but Paris has on the whole been
remarkably circumspect in ex-
erting political pressure. When
pressure has been applied--as
on the Algerian issue in the
UN--it has not always been
successful.
Aid: Direct and Indirect
In recent years, France
has allocated 2.5 to 3 percent
of its GNP--about $66 billion
in 1961--to assistance pro-
grams in the less developed
countries. This is generally
recognized as the highest
percentage of any country in
the world. Over four fifths
of the total aid figure is
apportioned to the franc zone.
Direct economic aid--largely
grants--to the Brazzaville
states and Togo has increased
from an estimated $300 million
in 1959 to a projected figure
of almost $400 million in 1962.
While French expenditures for
military assistance to these
states are decreasing, they are
still probably close to $200
million annually. In addition,
private French investment, ac-
cording to a recent statement
The virtually complete dependence on France
of ;such poorer states as th% Central African
Republic, Rauritania, Niger, and Dahomey is
illustrated by the situation in Chad, an arid,
landlocked,,' resource-poor state of about three
mil?ibn people. Its OFF' for 1961 was estimat-
ed at)l 63 million, about two fifths of which
consisted of food products outside the money
economy. Although Prime Minister Tombalbaye
is considered "pro-French," any public indica-
tion of subservience to Paris would probably
be politically fatal. Nevertheless, more than
half' the government's budget for 1.962--esti-
mated at $22 million--is directly or indirect-
ly :subsidized by France.
Paris' contributions for this year include
$2.5 million in an outright budget subsidy,
$6.54 million for investment programs under the
Funk for Aid and Cooperation (FAC) and the
Common Organization of Saharan Regions (OCRs),
$700,000 to complete the 1960 PAC program,
$'3..' million to pay RAC technicians, $800,000
for the gendarmerie, and $1.6 million to sub-
sidize the cotton crop. This listing excludes
expenditures for the 4,000 French troops in
Chad, long-term loans, Parts' contributions to
the Common Market Economic Development Fund,
and private French investment.
by the minister of cooperation,
reaches "several dozen billion
old francs each year"--i.e.,
at least $75,000,000.
France also subsidizes the
budgets of all 12 Brazzaville
states.
There are also several types
of indirect French assistance
to the Brazzaville states and
Togo, the "cost" of which to
France is counterbalanced to
some degree by reciprocal advan-
tages. Preferential commercial
agreements provide price sup-
ports and guaranteed markets for
many of the primary products
which are the principal source
of income in all of these states.
Ivory Coast, for example, sells
coffee to France at prices about
50 percent above world market
levels. The French have put a
value of $72,000,000 per year
on such commodity price stabili-
zation efforts. France, in
turn, benefits in the form of
a tightly protected market for
its high-priced exports; in some
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
of these states, over 90 percent
of the foreign trade is still
with France. Paris has been
meeting balance-of-payments
deficits for all of them.
Furthermore, under the 1957
EEC convention regarding African
territories, these African states
enjoy tariff preferences in the
other five EEC countries and
share in a five-year $581,000,-
000 development fund with the
other former African colonial
territories. The level of
African tariff preferences will
be reduced when this convention
expires at the end of 1962, but
Paris, by way of compensation,
is seeking a substantial in-
crease in the EEC's development
aid to Africa.
Defense Responsibilities
France places extreme im-
portance on the mutual security
agreements it has signed with
all of the former French terri-
tories except Guinea and Mali.
These accords give France the
exclusive right to form, supply,
and train an indigenous force
in each republic, and they
provide for French base and
troop-stationing rights in all
except Upper Volta. At the end
of 1961, about 43,000 French
troops were stationed in the
former French territories of
sub-Saharan Africa. Military
assistance funds have been de-
creasing slightly since 1959,
and Paris plans further cuts
as French troops are replaced
by indigenous forces. However,
there is a possibility that
battalions of the Foreign Legion,
which cannot legally be with-
drawn from Algeria to metro-
politan France, may be stationed
in. the African states.
France has reluctantly
accepted the idea of American
supplementary military aid to
its former territories in
Africa, but as recently as
last month the French secretary
of state for sub-Saharan af-
fairs, in a conversation with
a US Embassy officer, objected
strenuously over tentative
American plans to provide
training for African forces.
Education and Technical Personnel
The Fifth Republic has
placed particular emphasis on
its education and training
program for African personnel.
Paris hopes to maintain its
tradition of educating in
France the elite of French-
speaking Africa and to this
end is currently providing
1,350 scholarships for pro-
spective teachers and 520 for
the military training of young
Africans in France.
Within the 14 sub-Saharan
former French territories there
were at the beginning of 1961
between 10,000 and 11,000
French teachers and nonmilitary
technicians--about half of them
in Senegal, Ivory Coast, and the
Malagasy Republic. While the
French officials and technical
personnel are slowly being
replaced by native cadres, the
number of French teachers has
actually been rising--from
2,416 in 1960 to 3,364 in March
1962, with 800 positions
scheduled to be filled with
Frenchmen during this year.
The French "adviser" continues
to play an essential role in
administration and education.
Every Malagasy minister, for
instance, has his French alter
ego---who either does all the
real work or carefully guides
the minister's moves.
View From the African Side
African impatience over
the progress attainable under
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
a policy of "Africanization"
has encouraged dependence on
French administrators and
technicians, and French assist-
ance is generally the main
factor making for stability in
each state. At the same time,
however, this assistance has
occasioned charges from strident
nationalist groups that the
African political leaders rely-
ing on it are French "puppets"
and dupes of French "neocolo-
nialism." The presence of French
troops has also become an in-
creasingly controversial polit-
ical question in some of these
states. The Sino-Soviet bloc
can be expected to do what it
can to sharpen these points of
irritation--especially by offers
of aid "without strings."
There seems little prospect
of an early change in this situ-
ation. It is true that the
Brazzaville states--indirectly
stimulated by the French--have
set up ambitious joint programs
which could eventually lead to
effective inter-African economic
and military cooperation and a
consequent reduction in their
dependence on France. There
is, however, almost no inter-
African trade at present, the
economies are still extremely
underdeveloped, and it is to be
expected that all will be eco-
nomically dependent on France
to a considerable degree for
many years. The African Mala-
gasy Union (UAM), the organi-
zation established last fall by
the Brazzaville states to coor-
dinate defense and economic poli-
cies, is similarly dependent on
French guarantees and troops.
Paris is likely to resist
any movement--such as that ini-
tiated by President Senghor of
Senegal at the late March meet-
ing of UAM representatives--
to replace its present policy
of bilateral aid agreements
with a French-African "vertical
organization" in which aid
would be channeled on a "multi-
lateral" basis.
Outlook for Continuing French Aid
Despite the anticipated
requirements of an independent
Algeria for aid, recent official
statements indicate that De
Gaulle has no intention of re-
ducing the volume of French
economic assistance of sub-
Saharan Africa in the near
future. While France envisages
substantial increases in its
financial assistance to under-
developed countries outside
the franc zone, this will be
contingent on other countries'
sharing the burden France now
carries in Africa on a bilateral
basis.
The African area as a whole
will retain a high priority in
France's aid program, despite
changes in types of aid or in
particular countries. The
minister of cooperation said
in March that budget subsidy
aid is "due to disappear quick-
ly" in favor of increased in-
vestments, and Paris apparently
will not hesitate to risk a
possible rupture in relations
by withholding budget funds in
order to repress financial ir-
responsibility. For example,
although France finally decided
to provide a sizable subsidy
advance to Dahomey this month
in order to relieve temporarily
the chronic financial crisis,
it was made clearto President
Maga that the present scale of
sumptuary expenses would have
to be curtailed.
There is also a reportedly
growing segment of opinion
in :France that the continuation
of aid depends "to a very large
degree" on the political con-
duct of the recipient govern-
ments. France will, however,
probably be wary of repeating
its mistake of 1958,when the
abrupt termination of all
aid to Guinea made possible
rapid Communist penetration
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
PRESIDENT AYUB AND PAKISTAN
Throughout his three and
a half years of rule, Pakistani
President Ayub has had two basic
objectives: first, to create
political and economic stability
through administrative reforms
and improvement of Pakistan's
means of production; and second,
to create a sense of responsi-
bility among the people and
gradually lead them back to
full civil government. During
1961, increased rumblings of
popular discontent produced
the first doubt in Ayub's mind
that he was making satisfactory
progress. Therefore, along with
intensifying efforts to achieve
his political and economic goals,
he took several steps to protect
his own position from attack.
Conflicts produced by
these opposing progressive and
defensive efforts may lead this
year to increased popular dis-
satisfaction and to rising polit-
ical tension. Such tension
would not be likely to deter
Ayub from his basic aims, but
it could result both in requests
to the West for additional sup-
port and in criticism of the
US in particular for not sup-
porting Pakistan as strongly
as Ayub desires.
Over the past three years,
industry and business have made
significant gains. The indus-
trial production index (1953=100)
rose from 208 in 1958 to 261 in
1960, and continued to rise in
1961. Production of cotton cloth
and jute goods has increased
steadily. West Pakistan pro-
duced a surplus of cement for
the first time in 1961, but
East Pakistan continues to suf-
fer a short supply. Construc-
tion of Pakistan's first steel
mill was approved in December
1961, and development in oil
exploration, refining, and
marketing is proceeding apace.
Trade is booming, although the
problem of balancing imports
and exports remains acute.
Many of the financial,
industrial, and business advan-
ces made between 1958 and 1961
are of an intangible nature not
felt by Pakistan's overwhelmingly
rural population. Others affect
mainly the urban areas. Ayub,
therefore, has begun to feel
increased pressure, especially
from rural East Pakistan, to
show visible signs of progress.
As of early 1962, however, he
has little with which to pacify
the peasants despite his efforts
to intensify activity on various
fronts.
During Pakistan's First
Five-Year Plan (1955-60), de-
velopment expenditures fell
10 percent below planned tar-
gets, per capita income rose
only 1 percent instead of 7
pe:rcent as expected, and the
average annual per capita in-
come in East Pakistan in 1959-
60 was still only $45. The
Second Five-Year Plan (1960-65)
was designed to increase national
income 20 percent,, with an an-
nual increase of nearly 2 percent
in per capita income. By the
spring of 1961, however, prices
for projects had already risen
21 percent and Pakistan's popu-
lation--at 93.8 million.--was 5
percent higher than previously
estimated.
The index of total agri-
cultural production (1952-54-
1013) rose from 105 in 1958 to
117 in 1960 and then fell to
114 in 1961. From 1958 through
1961, however, the index of per
capita production was only 95,
102, 101, and 97, indicating
that after three years of mili-
tary rule Pakistan's people
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE "WEEKLY SUMMARY
were perhaps not even as well
fed as in 1952. A limited land
reform program carried out in
West Pakistan between 1959 and
1961 demonstrated that signifi-
cant increases in agricultural
production would not appear for
some time; between 1951 and
1961, Pakistan changed from a
nation self-sufficient in food
grains to a net importer.
Production of cloth has
gone up steadily during Ayub's
rule,but because export promo-
tion schemes have limited the
amounts available locally, the
domestic price remains fairly
high.. Prices of other consumer
goods are also generally above
the 1958 level, despite a drop
shortly after Ayub's takeover.
National taxes, at least
on business, were reported down
10 percent in 1960-61, but this
was said to be more than offset
by provincial and local taxes.
At the village level, some coun-
cils empowered under Ayub's rule
to collect new taxes are reported
to have done so too heavily;
others, failed to tax at all.
From the peasant's point
of view, the availability and
price of food and cloth and
the rate of taxation are fac-
tors of far greater importance
than the industrial production
index or the balance of trade.
With rural areas worse off in
matters of food and no better
off than in 1958 in respect to
cloth supply and consumer prices,
Ayub has real cause for concern.
Ayub's efforts to build
a new spirit of political respon-
sibility, initiative, and self-
reliance among the people have
met only limited success. The
President's major effort along
these lines is the system of
basic democracies (village,
township, district, divisional,
and provincial councils)which
provide limited self-government.
Two years after their establish-
merit, however, these basic democ-
racies are still suffering grow-
ing pains, and many government
officials remain skeptical of
their eventual success.
International Problems
In the international field
as well, Ayub has failed to
achieve his major goals. Pos-
sibly emboldened, following his
visit to Washington last July,
by a belief that the United
States would condone, if not
support, action against Afghan-
istan, Ayub in late August took
new steps to implement the hard-
line policy he has long advocated.
By closing Afghan consulates and
trade agencies in Pakistan, he
provoked Afghanistan's Prime
Minister Daud into closing the
border and breaking off diplo-
matic relations. Kabul has
probably been less affected by
the border closure than Ayub
hoped, however, since it has
been able to use its trade out-
let through the USSR and has
developed new outlets through
Iran.
Ayub in December 1961
turned once more to the dis-
pute with India over Kashmir,
threatening to call for a UN
Security Council meeting on
the subject. Despite opposi-
tion from various quarters, a
pro forma meeting was held on
2 February, but there has been
no substantive discussion to
date. Efforts to arrange for
bilateral negotiations outside
the UN have been fruitless so
far, and Ayub has no more reason
than before to believe that India
will agree to a solution satis-
factory to him.
Growing Internal Opposition
The Pakistani public in
1961 became more openly critical
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
of military rule. Criticism
grew to major proportions in
East Pakistan, where people feel
their province is discriminated
against politically as well as
economically. Students, a tra-
ditionally volatile group, were
in a state of unrest throughout
the year in both West and Fast
Pakistan. Lawyers and intellec-
tuals remained restive under the
restraints of martial law. Re-
ligious leaders were aroused
over Ayub's failure to give more
than lip service to Islamic prin-
ciples in the new constitution
he was preparing. Politicians
and their followers, despite
some preventive arrests, prepared
during the latter part of 1961
and early 1962 to oppose restric-
tive conditions in the new con-
stitution and to contest elec-
tions in the hope of altering
the constitution after being
elected. Tribesmen along the
Afghan frontier and traders near
the border became uneasy over
ramifications of Ayub's anti-
Afghan policy.
Partly because of exist-
ing situations and partly to pre-
vent future trouble, Ayub in 1961
and early 1962 instituted a se-
ries of security measures. In
both Nest and East Pakistan he
strengthened laws under which
persons could be detained with-
out trial. He took steps to
limit control by the regular
courts over martial law personnel
and curtailed the authority of
religious leaders. Most impor-
tant of all, however, Ayub en-
sured the incorporation into the
new national constitution, pro-
mulgated on 1 March 1962, of
restrictions permitting him to
retain control over virtually
all legislative actions of the
new parliament to be elected on
28 April. Finally, Ayub made
a serious effort to retain the
support of the armed forces.
He reconfirmed the tenure of
the army and air force command-
ers in chief, raised the rank
of the navy commander in chief,
promoted an East Pakistani to
general officer rank for the
first time, and increased re-
cruitment of East Pakistanis.
The growing opposition to
Ayub is not coordinated and it
stall lacks leadership. Fear of
swift reprisal under martial law
discourages overt antigovernment
activity. Ayub, however, appar-
ently has at last reached the
poiLnt where he must soon decide
whether to remain a dictator
or restore democratic rights.
To date, his contradictory ac-
tions on this score have created
uncertainties among all classes.
If his future course does not
soon become clearer, he is al-
most certain to be faced with
an increasingly restive popula-
tion.
Outlook
Except as a last resort,
Ayub is unlikely to return to
single-handed rule with military
support. He is much more likely
to continue holding out hopes of
more democratic government while
taking measures to prevent its
being achieved until he feels the
people are "ready." Thus, he is
likely to come increasingly into
conflict with political groups
attempting to broaden their base
of power under the new constitu-
tion. Should Ayub respond to
these groups with harsh measures,
he would find himself having to
rule with less and less popular
support.
In these circumstances, Ayub
would probably press even harder
for economic advances and call on
Western countries to increase
their financial assistance. He
might also request token aid from
the Soviet bloc. as a means of
maintaining pressure on the West.
Should he fail to make readily
demonstrable progress in the
near future, Ayub might be in-
clined to shift the blame for
his own failures to others. This
could lead to a deterioration in
relations with a number of Paki-
stan's friends and neighbors.
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