CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

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CURRENT
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY
SUMMARY
COPY NO.
OCI NO. 0406/62
2 March 1962
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
SECRET
State Department review completed
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THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECT-
ING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES
WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS,
TITLE 18, USC, SECTIONS 793 AND 794, THE TRANSMIS-
SION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO
AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.
The Current Intelligence Weekly Summary has been prepared
primarily for the internal use of the Central Intelligence
Agency. It does not represent a complete coverage of all
current situations. Comments and conclusions represent the
immediate appraisal of the Office of Current Intelligence.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Khrushchev's return to
Moscow may mark the end of a
period in which the Soviet
Union has appeared to be search-
ing for the means to move ahead
with difficult issues on both
the domestic and foreign fronts.
During his six-week vacation
at Sochi, on the Black Sea,
Khrushchev apparently readied
the report he is scheduled to
deliver to the central committee
plenum opening on 5 March, at
which a new program for tack-
ling the critical agricultural
problem is expected to be un-
veiled. There is some evidence
that he also consulted at Sochi
with many of his colleagues on
foreign and intrabloc questions.
They may also have reached a
decision on the fate,of Molotov
and the other members of the
antiparty group.
Ambassador Thompson reports
that an unusual number of So-
viet ambassadors have remained
in Moscow, although some of
them were scheduled to return
to their posts some time ago.
While they may be waiting for
a routine briefing after Khru-
shchev's return, it-is more
likely that their presence is
connected with a review of
foreign policy questions.
Among them are the ambassadors
to London, Washington, Paris,
and Rome; some of the ambas-
sadors to the satellite coun-
tries are also believed to
have returned to Moscow during
the past several weeks. The
Soviet ambassador to Laos re-
turned unexpectedly to Moscow
on 20 February, and Deputy
Foreign Minister Pushkin failed
to return to the Geneva con-
ference on Laos as expected
on 19 February. These develop-
ments suggest that a whole
range of topics has been up
for reconsideration.
Ambassador Thompson com-
ments that Soviet foreign policy
appears to be approaching a
crossroads. Moscow's position
on Vietnam, for example, will
be very much influenced by the
outcome of talks in Laos as
well as by developments in other
major East-West problems such as
disarmament and Berlin. Develop-
ments in any one of these questions
could affect policy toward the
West as well as toward Communist
China.
East-West Questions
In its relations with the
Western powers, Moscow has con-
tinued to speak with an inde-
cisive voice. On the one hand,
there are signs that Soviet
policies could shift to a more
militant line. Khrushchev
dropped his cordial tone and
employed pointed criticism of
US policy toward disarmament in
his letter of 21 February to
President Kennedy. He claimed
the US was "not yet determined
to reach agreement on questions
of disarmament," and that it
had already concluded that the
18-nation disarmament committee
would fail in its task. Khrushchev
directly charged the US with an
ulterior motive in proposing a
meeting of foreign ministers at
Geneva in order to "neutralize"
world opinion's "adverse reaction
to the resumption of nuclear
tests by the US and UK." The
harsher Soviet tone also was con-
tained in key speeches by Soviet
military leaders on the occasion
of Red Army Day.
While Khrushchev apparently
is determined:to gain a definite
commitment from the West for a
future heads of government meet-
ing, this approach does not rule
out the achievement of propaganda
advantages from alleged Western
disinterest in an immediate top-
level meeting on disarmament.
The extensive Soviet propaganda
campaign, government statements,
and Khrushchev's pronouncements
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
are designed to provide the
Soviet Union with a justifica-
tion for resuming its own test
series at any time. As Khru-
shchev said in his letter: "It
is clear that the Soviet Union
...will not want to be left
behind and will do everything
to maintain its nuclear arsenal
at the necessary level."
This strident campaign for
a summit has nevertheless been
offset by the wide publicity
given Khrushchev's prompt
congratulations on Colonel
Glenn's successful flight and
the Soviet leader's offer to
cooperate with the US in outer
space. In addition, Khrushchev
has left the door open for a
foreign ministers' conference
as proposed by the US and has
stopped short of announcing his
intention of going to Geneva
regardless of Western partici-
pation--a move which would fore-
shadow an unabashed propaganda
assault on the US. Press re-
ports from Moscow suggest that
Khrushcbev will soon make his
position clear in a number of
speeches and pronouncements
containing new versions of pro-
posals on disarmament and Euro-
pean security. The scheduled
World Conference on Peace and
Disarmament, to be held in Mos-
cow in July, suggests that the
"peaceful coexistence" and
disarmament themes will dominate
the Soviet line this spring,
with its predictable effect on
Sino-Soviet relations.
The summit campaign has
tended to overshadow the Berlin
question, but the USSR may have
reached new decisions in this
area. Almost immediately after
his return to Moscow, Khru-
shchev met for two days with
an East German delegation
headed by party First Secretary
Walter Ulbricht. The short
communique issued on 2? February
dealt mainly with economic
questions and indicated further
Soviet support for the East
German regime.
On the political side, the
communique stated only that "an
exchange of opinions" occurred
on the conclusion of "the German
peace treaty and the normaliza-
tion of the situation in West
Berlin on its basis." While
this formula contains no sense
of urgency and avoids any ques-
tion of timing, it is likely
that the Soviets and East Ger-
mans have used the meeting to
coordinate a tactical line on
these questions for the coming
months. This meeting, in the
wake of more aggressive actions
affecting access to Berlin,
also suggests that the bloc
will begin to press forward
on Berlin.
While Moscow has backed
away from any showdown over
Allied access, it has not
abandoned its maneuvering to
undermine the four-power basis
for air access to Berlin. After
a four-day respite, coinciding
with a Soviet holiday, the USSR
resumed flights in the air
corridors and continued filing
specific flight plans. Employ-
ment of this tactic, rather
than a return to the blanket
reservations used earlier,
suggests that for the present
Moscow is mainly interested in
keeping its position intact by
periodically asserting a right
to use the corridors at times
and places of its own choosing.
Coincident with Bonn's
reply to the Soviet memorandum
of 27 December, the Soviets
dispatched new notes to the
three Western powers on 26
February protesting that the
West German customs law of 1
January provided for inclusion
of West Berlin in the Federal
Republic customs system. This
.was labeled a "provocation"
designed to create new diffi-
culties in "normalizing the
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
situation in West Berlin on the
basis of conclusion of a German
peace treaty." The note in-
cluded the standard claim that
the extension of West. German
legislation to West Berlin was
"absolutely illegal and beyond
the competence of the Federal
Republic." The timing of these
protests, after almost two
months' delay, suggests that
it is a further step toward
driving a wedge between Bonn
and its allies by raising the
issue of the incompatibility
of the occupation status with
West German ties to Berlin.
Simultaneously, Soviet
diplomats in Vienna have in-
spired reports in the Western
press that Khrushchev is pre-
pared to make far-reaching con-
cessions to Adenauer if bilateral
talks are arranged. The Soviet
concessions would include in-
corporating West Berlin into
the Federal Republic, establish-
ing a corridor for access, re-
moving Ulbricht, and eliminat-
ing the wall; in return, Bonn
would sign a peace treaty,
recognize East Germany, and
accept the division of Berlin.
Su-:.- rumors are doubtless in-
te"..ded to provide an incentive
for Bonn to explore Soviet
intentions in private talks.
In the meantime, the Soviets
apparently will allow the talks
with Ambassador Thompson to
stagnate.
The Soviet leaders may
also have decided to launch
a new attack against the Al-
banian leaders and by implica-
tion their Chinese Communist
defenders. Pravda on 21 Feb-
ruary devoted two full pages o
articles and statements made
several months earlier by
leaders of other Communist
parties "supporting" the new
Soviet party program and ?,L
course established at the 22 Ad
party congress. One of Pre v .a.'s
two editorials tried, by citing
Engels, to rebut Chou En-lai's
complaint that it was "un-Marx-
ist" to attack: another Commu-
nist party--the Albanians.
Pravda warned that "only with
open and uncompromising criticism"
of Albanian leaders Hoxha and
Shehu can unity of the Communist
movement be preserved. This
appeal, which apparently is
directed at the Asian parties,
directly contradicts the Chi-
nese view that attacks on the
Albanians disrupt unity. It
probably is intended to pre-
pare the way for stepped-up
criticism of Tirana.
Khrushchev apparently is
moving to offset Chinese in-
fluence among other parties
where it is strong, and the
first new step in this effort
is toward Hanoi. A Soviet
Communist party delegation
headed by party secretary Boris
Ponomarev--and including Andrey
Andropov, head of the central
committee's department for
liaison with foreign Communist
parties--arrived in Hanoi on
21 February "at the invitation"
of the Vietnamese. Ponomarev
was active during Khrushchev's
behind-the-scenes assault on
the Rumanian party congress
in June 1960 and will probably
try to persuade the Vietnamese
leaders to reject Mao's chal-
lenge to Soviet leadership of
the international Communist
movement and join the Soviet
bloc in criticizing Albania.
The Russians are re-
opening the issue of factions
in the international Communist
movement--an issue presumably
decided in favor of the Chinese
at the Moscow conference of
Communist parties in late 1960.
A Soviet commentator on 24
February cited the British
Communist party's criticism of
the idea of "freedom to form
factions," and Pravda on 21
February reprinted part of
Lenin's letter to the Austrian
party stressing the need to ac-
cept the "international discipline
of the revolutionary movement."
Khrushchev may be preparing to
use the issues of factions and
dogmatism, possibly in his re-
port to the central committee
plenum, as pretexts for criti-
cizing Peiping more openly.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
General Phoumi, leader of
the Vientiane faction in Laos,
is reported to be suffering from
"cerebral tension"--not further
identified--accompanied by a
high fever. He is scheduled to
go to Bangkok for treatment and
rest. This will probably have
the effect--perhaps designed--
of further delaying substantive
negotiations toward a coalition
government. Souvanna Phouma had
indicated that he might return
to Vientiane for a resumption of
talks this weekend.
Souvanna had earlier made a
five-day visit to Vientiane and
conferred with leading political
figures. Before he left on 26
February for Khang Khay, his
headquarters in Xieng Khouang
Province, he said he would re-
port there to Souphannouvong on
the results of his efforts in
Vientiane and would present two
proposals for consideration:
his own cabinet list drawn up
in consultation with the Western
ambassadors, and a proposal for
a council government made by
General Phoumi.
Phoumi's plan calls for a
government presided over by the
King and composed of six councils
responsible for defense, admin-
istration, economic affairs and
finance, foreign affairs, culture,
and social affairs. The leading
Laotian families and the major
regions would be equally repre-
sented in each council. Those
for defense, administration,
and economic affairs and finance
would be assigned to Souvanna,
Boun Oum, and Souphannouvong,
respectively. This proposal
has not been received favorably
by Souphannouvong, however, and
it is unlikely that it would
receive the support of the King
or the West unless all three
tendencies expressed agreement
to the arrangement.
In his own slate--approved
by the Western ambassadors on
23 February--Souvanna assigned
to himself the two controversial
posts of defense and interior
and provided for a center group
composed of seven Xieng Khouang
and four Vientiane "neutralists."
This was subsequently termed
unacceptable by Phoumi, who
maintained that Souvanna, in
view of his admitted lack of con-
trol over the Pathet Lao, would
not be qualified to lead the
government. It is possible,
however, that this proposal--
with some modification--will
prove acceptable to Souphannouvong,
in which case the Vientiane
faction might be pressed to ac-
cept it.
In recent conversations with
Western diplomats, Soviet offi-
cials have reiterated their con-
cern that the US may have shifted
its policy in Laos. Twice during
the past week the Soviet charge
in Vientiane' has remarked to
US Ambassador Brown that "time
has become an important factor"
in the Laotian situation, although
he agreed that every effort
should be made to maintain "quiet
at Nam Tha." It is possible
that a new Soviet initiative on
Laos may be forthcoming in light
of the increasing evidence that
questions relating to Southeast
Asia have been given considerable
review recently by Soviet leaders.
The increased role of the US in
South Vietnam is apparently
causing Moscow considerable con-
cern. and Soviet officials are
probably weighing the efficacy
of a new move by the bloc in Laos.
The USSR has made it clear
that, for the present, it intends
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
to postpone any joint venture
with the West toward influencing
events in Laos. The chief Soviet
delegate to the Geneva conference
on Laos, Deputy Foreign Minister
Pushkin, has turned down a pro-
posal by the British delegate
that the two cochairmen go to
Laos in a personal attempt to
resolve the political impasse,
despite the fact that Soviet Am-
bassador Abramov in Laos had
raised this suggestion earlier.
Pushkin, still back in Moscow,
curtly remarked that the US
could solve any problems in Laos
quickly and simply by withdrawing
support from Phoumi? The UK
delegate now feels that Pushkin
will not return to Geneva until
the current round of talks be-
tween the rival factions in,
Laos have run their course.
The attack on the presiden-
tial palace in Saigon by two
air force planes early on 27
February points up the disaffec-
tion with President Diem preval-
ent in various military and
civilian circles. It is-not yet
clear whether the air incident
was an isolated assassination
attempt by malcontents or a pre-
mature effort in connection with
broader coup plotting. Informa-
tion on preliminary questioning
of the pilot captured near Saigon
by South Vietnamese officials
and the pilot held by Cambodian
authorities yields no conclusive
story; both, however, claim to
have expected further uprisings
to follow their raid. The
father of one pilot is reported
to have been under arrest at
one time for antigovernment
political activities.
No related activity indic-
ative of organized coup plotting
occurred. Other aircraft and
military services in the Saigon
area responded promptly and
loyally in accordance with plans
to ward off any coup attempt,
and Diem was unhurt in the at-
tack despite extensive damage
to the palace. No Viet Cong
move to exploit the situation
was noted.
Viet Cong activity increased
sharply last week after a month-
long decline. Reported incidents
of all kinds totaled 481, roughly
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double the previous week's
number, with acts of terrorism
showing the greatest increase.
A raid on a fortified tribal
village in the southern plateau
area may be the forerunner of a
campaign of reprisals against
tribesmen cooperating with the
government and communities or-
ganizing under Diem's new "stra-
tegic hamlet" program. Harass-
ment of land communications con-
tinues in the northern part of
the country, especially near
major roads connecting with
southern Laos.
Hanoi and Paiping cited
Western press sources for their
initial comments on the air
attack. Both stressed that it
was carried out by South Viet-
namese planes of US manufacture;
Hanoi, still quoting Western
press reports, added that the
attack revealed that Diem is
disliked not only by South Viet-
nam's guerrillas but also by
his own army. In its first in-
dependent comment, Moscow pic-
tured the attack as a manifesta-
tion of popular dissatisfaction
in South Vietnam, saying that
even those the US has trained
and armed have turned against
the "Saigon despot."
Supporting recent pro-
nouncements from Hanoi, the
Chinese Communist Foreign
Ministry issued a statement on
24 February charging that US
assistance to Diem not only
threatens the security of
North Vietnam but "seriously
affects the security" of China.
A North Vietnamese Foreign
Ministry memorandum issued on
28 February detailed Hanoi's
current charges against the US
aid program, but also stressed
that North Vietnam advocated
reunification elections as
outlined by the 1954 Geneva
conference. The North Vit+ :namese,
who have a population majority
over the South, realize that they
have little chance of getting
elections but hope this gambit
will appeal to Asian neutral
opinion and in turn win some
support in this quarter for Hanoi's
primary objective, the reduction
of US support for Diem.
Moscow has stepped up its
efforts in support of North
Vietnam and is taking an in-
creasingly critical stand on the
US military aid program in the
South. The level and tone of
Soviet propaganda suggest that
Moscow may be preparing to take
a more forthright stand in
response to repeated appeals
from North Vietnam for the Geneva
cochairmen to ensure the "cor-
rect implementation of the Geneva
agreements." The Soviet campaign
may be an effort to be responsive
to Hanoi's numerous appeals and
to counter any charges by Peiping
that it is not wholeheartedly
supporting the "national libera-
tion movement" in Vietnam. The
visit by a senior Soviet party
delegation to North Vietnam re-
flects an apparent effort by Mos-
cow to secure Hanoi's support
for the Soviet position in the
dispute with Communist China.
Ambassador Thompson in
Moscow has noted that the
Soviet press has given the
Vietnamese issue a high pri-
ority; in many papers it takes
second place only to commentary
on Khrushchev's disarmament
proposals. A long 27 February
Pravda article drew attention
o anoi's appeal and claimed
that the US was creating a
situation in South Vietnam
which was "dangerous for peace,
not only in Asia, but in the 25X1
entire world."
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
The 28 February communique
of the provisional Algerian
government (PAG) did not state
that the rebels' National Rev-
olutionary Council (CNRA) had
ratified the accords with the
French, but some PAG ministers
have said they now are author-
ized to sign a cease-fire agree-
ment. One PAG source in Tunis,
however, indicated on 27 Feb-
ruary that the rebels would not
agree to a cease-fire until De
Gaulle has taken effective
measures to halt activity of
the Secret Army Organization
(OAS).
round of negotiations from
the strongest possible posi-
tion, especially since one
of the points reportedly to
be settled is what persons
will serve on the provisional
executive. Premier Debre's
personal assistant told a US
Embassy officer on 27 February
that the French considered the
next round of talks would be
confined to clarifying certain
papers to eliminate excessive
vagueness or mistakes due to
hasty drafting.
Apparently the only docu-
ment to be signed is a cease-
If further talks ran beyond fire agreement. Other items
the few days reportedly en- of the settlement are report-
visaged by Paris, chances for
a negotiated settlement could
be gravely jeopardized. De
Gaulle might feel compelled to
take unilateral action to force
a settlement. The PAG, in view
of the recent indiscriminate
killing of Moslems by the OAS,
might be unable to prevent the
aroused Moslem population from
massive retaliation against
Europeans, especially if the
recent large-scale deployment
of French Army units in Algiers
and Oran fails to halt OAS
terrorism.
Another PAG source told US
officials in Tunis last week
that even if the CNRA meeting
should approve the agreements
in full, about five additional
days of formal negotiations
edly to be announced in separate
declarations from Paris and
the PAG. French Delegate
General Morin, however, is said
to have divulged the terms to
local officials in Algiers on
27 February, and, as reported
by the press, these terms appear
to safeguard the interests of
the settlers. French officials
i have for some time reportedly
felt that when these terms
become known, the fears of many
Europeans will be allayed and
support for the OAS will weaken.
The OAS, however, has
boasted of its responsibility
for the killings of Moslems
in Algiers, and is likely to
continue efforts to nullify
any settlement reached by Paris
and the PAG. On 26 February
would be needed "to settle the OAS circulated leaflets
questions of procedure," ending calling for a general strike
with the signing of a cease- on the day following official
fire and the immediate installa- announcement of a cease-fire.
tion of a provisional executive However, OAS terrorism and
body in Algeria. For tactical lawlessness may already
purposes, the PAG communique have created a climate in
may not have specified CNRA ap- which a settlement could
proval, as the rebels would not be implemented without
want to approach the "final" extensive bloodshed.
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According to the press,
the French Government on 27
February ordered the army to
move in force into Algiers and
Oran in an effort to stop the
violence. Previous reports
have indicated that Paris did
not plan such extensive deploy-
ment of army units until 24-48
hours before official announce-
ment of a cease-fire. The PAG,
which issued a strongly worded
communiqud on 26 February
accusing the French security
force and army of not protect-
ing Moslems, would certainly
react unfavorably if the kill-
ings of Moslems continued. If
the formal round of French-PAG
negotiations is protracted and
the preseiut high level of ter-
rorism continues--particularly
to the point of provoking mass
settler-Moslem clashes--the
troops in the large cities,
subjected to OAS propaganda,
may be only passively loyal
or even side with the settlers.
A French officer in Algiers
recently said that the-proportion
of officers actively loyal to
the government was high enough
to ensure the loyalty of the
army but not high enough to
ensure decisive action at the
outset of any serious OAS move.
In France, De Gaulle has report-
edly taken extensive measures
to ensure the loyalty of army
and air force regional, a commanders.
25X1
Efforts to bring Tshombd
and Adoula together have once
again been hampered by the
threat of military outbreaks.
On 21 February, the UN Command
announced that Katangan forces
had reoccupied the town of
Kongolo in northern Katanga
and were moving eastward to-
ward Albertville. UN sources
indicated that approximately
200 Katangan troops, reportedly
including some Europeans, moved
into Kongolo following the
withdrawal of Stanleyville-
based Congolese troops. The
Congolese soldiers reportedly
became demoralized following
rumors that families left be-
hind in Kindu and Stanleyville
were in danger of starvation.
The reoccupation of Kongolo
appears to have been interpreted
in Leopoldville as strengthening
Tshombd's hand prior to talks
with Adoula. Tshombd emphasized
that he was still prepared to
meet with Adoula if the UN
would provide suitable guar-
antees for his personal safety.
On 25 February, Tshombd told UN
officials that he had no ob-
jections to a trip to Kongolo
by a joint UN-Katangan in-
spection team. The central
government, however, which
has been trying to fill the
political vacuum in northern
Katanga, decided on military
countermeasures. On 23 Feb-
ruary, General Mobutu began the
piecemeal airlifting of four
battalions from Luluabourg to
Albertville, utilizing the four
transport aircraft available
to the Congolese Army.
The UN Command initially
viewed the Congolese Army move
with equanimity. The senior
UN representative in the Congo,
Robert Gardiner, advised Mobutu
that while the UN could not
provide transport aircraft, it
would provide fighter cover for
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
a Congolese airlift. The UN
subsequently withdrew the offer,
as well as a proposition by which
the UN Command would "sell"
some UN vehicles in Albertville
to the central government.
Gardiner characterized recent
moves by both sides in north-
ern Katanga as "an elaborate
bluff and counterbluff opera-
tion," but the he added that
the UN would discourage further
military adventures.
In Elisabethville, there
continues to be apprehension
concerning a possible UN move
in key mining towns in southern
Katanga. The US Consulate be-
lieves that, despite disclaim-
ers, the UN Command intends to
occupy towns such as Jadotville,
Kipushi, and Kolwezi. The UN
military commander, Brigadier
Raja, returned to Elisabeth-
ville on 26 February from
leave abroad. Although work-
ing relations between Katangan
and UN authorities continue
generally satisfactory, UN
spokesmen have been critical
of Tshombe's failure to proceed
to Leopoldville, and UN com-
manders speak openly of plans
"to move on Kipushi"and other i
mining towns. j
Senior officials of Union
Miniere have periodically
alluded to a plan by which the
mining comib ine would place in
escrow as much as 75 percent
of the xevenues hitherto
paid to Tshomb6 in the form
of dividends and taxes. Such
a move would cut Tshom 6 off
from his main source of reve-
nue until he came to an ac-
commodation with the central
govern-mient. Union Miniere
officials in Brussels state
that Tshomb6 has refused to
consider the escrow plan prior
o 20
32243
.s.en~eyv!IIe
FEDERATION OF RHODESIA
AND NYASALAND
25X1
to meeting with Adoula. Union
Miniere, which fears economic
retaliation by Tshombd, shows no
disposition to force the issue
at this time.
In Leopoldville, Adoula has
indicated to Ambassador Gullion
that he hopes Gizenga can be
given a suspended sentence for
his secessionist activities and
then be sent into exile. To
date, however, the central
government has not preferred
charges or taken steps to remove
Gizenga's parliamentary immunity.
At the same time, Adoula has not
persuaded Gbenye to accept "promo-
tion" from the key Interior Minis-
ter to a vice premiership. Local
observers regard Gbenye's partici-
pation in the Adoula government 25X1
as important to the maintenance
of a balanced coalition.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
The Congress party, in
general elections held from 16
to 25 February, again asserted
its dominance of Indian politi-
cal life. It retained its
majority of nearly three fourths
in the 494-seat lower house of
parliament and in so doing beat
several outstanding oprosition
leaders there and lost none of
its own key ministers. In ad-
dition, the party maintained
its control of 10 of the 12
state assemblies up for re--
election; the party's agent,
the National Conference, won a
resounding victory in Kashmir.
Congress majorities in
several states, however, have
been reduced substantially.
In nearly every case, the key
factor was intraparty faction-
alism, which has served to
strengthen Congress opponents
feeding on resurgent communal
and separatist sentiment. In
two states, Madhya Pradesh and
Rajasthan, the'Congress lost
its former majority position
by a narrow margin, although
Congress governments will prob-
ably be formed with the aid of
independents. Factionalism
caused the reverse in Madhya
Pradesh, while the results in
Rajasthan reflect a resurgence
of feudal elements revitalized
by popular candidates and the
antisocialist platform of the
Swatantra (Freedom) party.
The Communist party, in-
ternal divisions notwithstanding,
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WEEKLY REVIEW
Page 10 of 22
apparently will hold its 6-percent
share of seats in parliament,
helped by its strong showing--
more than 50 percent of the vote
--in the southwestern state of
Kerala. Although no state as-
sembly elections were held there,
the Communists' share of the vote
in balloting for the state's
13 parliamentary seats bodes
ill for Kerala's shaky anti-
Communist coalition govern-
ment of the Congress and Social-
ist parties. In such strong-
holds as Andhra Pradesh, the
Communists improved their
position, while in Maharashtra
they lost and in West Bengal
merely held their own in the
absence of dramatic issues.
difficult.
India's most vexing problems
fall into the area of national
unity, and the challenge of
these parties, which focus on
the wide differences among
Indians, will make his job more
Nehru will probably read
the elections, particularly at
the national level, as a renewal
of his party's mandate to move
ahead in its aim of creating "a
socialistic pattern of society,"
especially in such fields as co-
operative farming. However,
he will be concerned at the
persistence and strength of
right-wing, traditionalist,
and separatist sentiment, partic-
ularly at the state level but
also in parliament, where the
Hindu Jan Sangh will take over
as the third party in strength,
displacing the Praja Socialists.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Premier Jagan is trying to
resume orderly government by
modifying the budget proposals
which touched off the mid-Feb-
ruary disturbances. Jagan is
apparently ignoring the poten-
tial for future disunity and
viol'ence' in the East Indian -
vs',- Negro and town-vs.-country
antagonisms intensified by the
pattern of disorders, and is
still publicly demanding inde-
pendence t'i s year while rec-
ognizing. his continued need for
British '.:::oops. Tension is
still so great that early with-
drawal of the troops--which
currently number about 2,000--
would result in further out-
breaks of violence, and London
therefore envisages keeping
them there and its five frigates
in the area for some time to
come.
A serious threat to Jagan's
control is the fact that middle-
class East Indians turned a-
gainst him during the disturb-
ances; only the rural rice and
sugar workers who have always
been his main support remained
firm. Crop problems in the rice
industry and marketing difficul-
ties for sugar could undercut
this backing or open the way
for another East Indian to take
over the leadership of the
People's Progressive party.
Minister of Home Affairs Rai--
who is responsible for police
and security--appears to be
coming into greater prominence.
Jagan has apparently met
most of the demands which labor
and the opposition exploited
to initiate the general strike,
but the setback to the economy
because of the disturbances will
increase discontent, particularly
if Jagan haggles on details of
modifying his budget. Prospects
of gaining early commitments from
private investors also seem dim.
Nevertheless, Jagan faces no
immediate threat in the legisla-
ture. His party's 19-15 majority
ha. :eld, and the two dissimilar
opposition parties have failed to
resume their pre-strike cooperation.
Lyndon Forbes Burnham, leader of
the mainly Negro People's National
Congress, seems disinclined to
work closely with the small and
conservative multiracial United
Force. Even if defections from
Jagan's majority opened the pros-
pect for forming a new coalition
government headed by the egocentric
Burnham, it would be highly un-
stable and probably require early
elections.
The British Government is
considering whether to reinsti-
tute direct rule as an alter-
native to continued dealing
with a Jagan-led government on
a course toward early independ-
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COMMUNIST CHINA TO CONVENE NATIONAL CONGRESS
Peiping's principal legis-
lative body--the National Peo-
ple's Congress (NPC)--is sched-
uled to meet on 5 March. Al-
though not a policy-making or-
gan, the congress provides one
of the regime's most important
public forums; major decisions
are announced,and plans and
goals for the future are set
forth in outline.
Despite the constitutional
requirement that it meet annually,
the NPC did not convene in 1961,
when economic setbacks and
the ensuing confusion provided
a poor setting for the customary
reports of progress and goals.
The decision to hold the cur-
rent session coincides with
other evidence that the economic
situation is under somewhat
better control and that Peiping
has formulated a number of pro-
grams to which it feels it can
give national publicity.
Domestic Programs
The economic setting for
the coming congress is still a
somber one. Successive crop
failures have caused a nation-
wide food crisis, Grain output
in 1961 is estimated to have
been about the same as in 1957.
Although stringent rationing,
encouragement of private side-
line farming and marketing, and
large grain imports have averted
mass starvation, the size of
future crops has come to have a
make-or-break significance not
only for any industrialization
program but for the stability
of the regime as well.
Problems in industry, al-
though less crucial, are by no
means minor. Industrial pro-
duction dropped last year, per-
haps by more than 20 percent
compared with 1960. Soviet
technical assistance remains
sharply reduced, the bad harvests
and the slump in industrial
production have reduced state
revenues, and problems with
morale and efficiency in the
labor force dim prospects for
any significant upturn in in-
dustry for the present.
Faced with these problems,
Peiping will be hard put to
boast to the NPC of any domestic
achievements. It will probably
take the tack, as it has before,
that, given China's recent
"natural calamities,conditions
would have been much worse
without the "correct leadership
of the party and Chairman Mao."
What will emerge at the
congress, however, is a sharper
picture of how China intends
to cope with problems of morale,
incentives, and control. Here
the regime faces the classic
Communist dilemma of deciding
between measures to encourage
individual productivity and
regulations to ensure the gov-
ernment's dominance over the
economy. In 1961 private plots
were returned to the peasants,
and free markets allowing pri-
vate trade in some farm commodi-
ties were opened in most areas.
There has recently been a spate
of articles in the press on how
to run these markets, reflect-
ing the regime's concern over
what it terms "spontaneous capi-
talism."
The national leaders, their
prestige impaired by the retreat
from the "leap forward," have
evidently lost some control over
provincial and local organi-
zations. Warnings against
"independent kingdoms" have
not been frequent, so the prob-
lem may not be unusually grave;
but the speeches at the NPC
will probably come down hard
on the need for centralization
of authority and the necessity
for subordinating local to na-
tional interests.
Foreign Policy
NPC sessions traditionally
include a major foreign-policy
statement, usually part of the
work report delivered by Chou
En-lai as premier.
Faced with the possibility
of dramatic new developments at
the Soviet party plenum, opening
in Moscow on the same day the
NPC is scheduled to convene in
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Peiping, the Chinese may delay
their treatment of bloc rela-
tions until some assessment of
the Moscow meeting can be made.
There are even rumors that their
congress may be postponed for
several days. Since November
the Chinese have been grooming
the party and people for the
possibility of a break with
Moscow. The regime has been
taking the line in party
circles and among influential
segments of the population
that Moscow is to blame for
China's economic problems and
that Khrushchev is a revision-
ist. There is no indication
that the NPC will reflect this
anti-Soviet tone, but the
machinery has been set up for
use if necessary.
In any case, the specter
of wors'ning wino-Soviet rela-
tions seems likely to haunt
the con ?e,_,s ,-) ocoad a ngs . It
seem the l.Lo-I~o ~~ p_e L
split wiLl be deepened by the
adoption of domestic programs
based on self-reliance rather
than mutual bloc help.
In another reflection of
bloc differences, the NPC is
expected to reaffirm China's
pledge of support and assist-
ance to national liberation
movements in Asia, Africa, and
Latin America. In this connec
tion,statements at the congress
addressed to the situation in South
Vietnamese and Laos are likely
to intimate that US policy in
those countries may broaden the
area of conflict between East
and West. The Chinese are also
likely to reaffirm an intention
to liberate Taiwan, without, how-
ever, setting special urgency on
this objective. They will prob-
ably underscore a desire for a
settlement of the Sino-Indian
border dispute and may make a
bid for high-level talks or the
establishment of a joint com-
m-.sion to break the deadlock.
The European satellites
were unable in 1961 to raise
their overall rate of economic
growth above the 5 percent
achieved in 1960, a rate lower
than in 1958 and 1959. Most of
the satellites failed to achieve
the average rate needed to reach
1965 goa for national income,
22
20
and few of them met their in-
dustrial and investment-plans,
indicating weaknesses that
could hamper future growth.
Increases in industrial
production in 1961 were not
outstanding except in Rumania
and Hungary. East Germany
EUROPEAN SATELLITES ; ECONOMIC GROWTH IN 1961
PFRCENT OF INCREASE ABOVE 1560)
7
6
EAST I
GERMANY HUNGARY
10
iI p
BULGARIA CZECHOSLO\'AVIA
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
failed to reach even its reduced
goal of a 7-percent increase,
Bulgaria suffered a further
decline from the high rates of
1958 and 1959, and Albania ap-
parently achieved only a slight
rise in production. Growth
rates for industrial output
compared favorably in the other
countries with the averages
scheduled under the plans ending
in 1965 and in most cases re-
flected planned rises in labor
productivity. In Czechoslovakia,
however, the labor productivity
plan was not fulfilled, and
the increase in industrial em-
ployment was much greater than
planned.
A continuation of the 1961
overall growth rates is imperiled
in some countries by lags in in-
vestment expenditures and fail-
ure to reduce construction costs
and shorten construction periods
as planned. All the satellites
fell short of 1961 investment
goals by a sizable margin. For
the countries as a group, the
growth rate for investment
was the lowest of the past four
years. The best accomplishment
was Rumania's increase over 1960
by about one fifth. Hungary,
on the other hand, went down a
fifth--a poor start for its new
Five-Year Plan. East Germany,
too, failed by far to achieve
its planned increase, despite
earlier abandonment of a higher
goal.
In Czechoslovakia, Rumania,
and possibly some of the other
countries, housing construction
seems to have risen much more
rapidly than construction of
productive facilities. This may
lead to a reconsideration of
housing programs and an attempt
to put high-priority industrial
projects back on schedule.
Despite the considerably
greater material support being
channeled to agriculture, farm
production again this year
failed by a wide margin to
reach planned levels. Increases
were substantial in Poland and
Albania, although perhaps
smaller than announc,;d. In the
other countries, production
declined slightly or at best
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remained at the 1960 level, in
contrast to the average annual
gains of 4 to 10 percent called
for through 1965. While bad
weather accounted in part for
the poor performance, organiza-
tional problems and low morale
in the collective farms were
also factors.
The lag in agricultural
production prevented any sub-
stantial improvement of con-
sumer welfare. Retail sales
in Hungary and consumption per
capita in Czechoslovakia rose
only 2 percent, and living con-
ditions probably did not im-
prove much more in the other
countries. The exception was
Poland, where unusually good
progress in agriculture and
additional credits from the
US made somewhat larger gains
possible.
Scattered data suggest
that foreign trade was one of
the more successful aspects
of satellite economic develop-
ment in 1961. Total turnover
continued to expand, although
not so rapidly as in 1959 and
1960. Hungary succeeded in
boosting its exports con-
siderably while restraining
the growth of imports, balancing
its trade,and taking an im-
portant step toward establish-
ing the export surpluses that
will soon be needed for pay-
ments on earlier credits.
Little is known of the trend
in Albanian trade, but the
cancellation of Soviet bloc
credits and the possible re-
striction of trade with the
Soviet Union may have reduced
turnover despite increased
deliveries from Communist China.
Poland's balance-of-payments
position may have worsened some-
what in 1961, although the new US
credit and drawings against old
credits permittea a further post-
ponement of measures to correct
the imbalances in itscommodity trade.
In Rumania, the regime assert-
ed that its trade remained bal-
anced; there is evidence, however,
that economic aid from other bloc 25X1
countries caused imports to rise
more rapidly than exports.
(Prepared by ORR)
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
INTERNAL DISAGREEMENT OVER ADOPTION OF NEW YUGOSLAV CONSTITUTION
Serious disagreement has
arisen within the Tito regime
over a new Yugoslav constitu-
tion proposed by the central
leadership. The regime orig-
inally planned to present the
document for adoption at this
spring's parliamentary session,
but now does not expect to sub-
mit it before October. Some
republic officials are stubborn-
ly refusing to accept the pres-
ent draft, and Vice President
Kardelj, the regime's top ideol-
ogist, twice has had to postpone
an official visit to Indonesia
in order to try to resolve the
differences. The chairman of
the drafting committee, Jovan
Djordjevic, apparently has suf-
fered a nervous breakdown, and
the committee, now under Kar-
delj's personal supervision, is
working in the isolation of a
Slovenian resort town.
The Yugoslav parliament in
December 1960 established a com-
mission to supervise prepara-
tion of a new constitution
which would reflect the changes
made under the regime's program
of political and economic de-
centralization. Although a
draft was to be submitted to
the Constitutional Commission
last fall, none was slated for
discussion until 10 January 1962,
and this draft, according to
Djordjevic, had been rewritten
ten times. Slovenian and Mace-
donian members forced the com-
mission to discard it, however,
even though it reflected the
ideas of no less powerful a
figure than Kardelj.
The impasse stems from the
basic disagreement in Yugo-
slavia between federalists and
republican nationalists. The
federalists wish to divide
powers between the federal
authorities and the approx-
imately 750 opstinas, Yugo-
slavia's smallest units of
government, in a manner leav-
ing the central government the
only effective authority. The
nationalists, on the other
hand, would enhance the powers
of the six republics, particu-
larly at the expense of the
federal government.
Since World War II, during
which the Axis powers and Yugo-
slav separatists partitioned
the country, the federalists
have been virtually unchallenged.
In the permissive atmosphere of
the regime's economic decen-
tralization program, however,
republican nationalism has been
growing, particularly during
the past year, in the form of
economic regionalism. It was
the underlying cause of open
debate at the December session
of parliament.
It now appears that the
republics will be granted more
authority than was originally
intended. No matter how the
constitutional question is re-
solved, however, the central
leadership faces a dilemma.
If it tries to reassert control
over those no longer willing
to accept unquestioningly its
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authoritarianism, it will in
effect sabotage the decentral-
ization program at the risk of
internal unrest and perhaps
violence. If it makes no ef-
fort to meet the challenge of
republic leaders, a further
erosion of the powers of the
Tito leadership seems inevita-
ble.
The collapse of the coup
attempted by a group of army
officers drawn chiefly from the
staff and faculty of the Mil-
itary Academy in Ankara appears
to provide Turkish Premier Ino-?
nu's coalition government with
a respite from open political
action by the military. The
effort to topple the govern-
ment was apparently triggered
by the dismissal of the com-
mandant of the Military Acad-
emy because of his antigovern-
ment political activity. His
adherents, who included many
of the cadets from the academy
and some troops from a local
armored unit, were able to
seize Radio Ankara's transmit-
ter for a short time, but troops
loyal to the regime, acting un-
der the personal leadership of
the chief of the General Staff,
rounded up or dispersed the dis-
sidents during the early hours
of 23 February.
No significant support of
a military coup attempt devel-
oped elsewhere.
Although a number of offi-
cers who were implicated in the
attempt were transferred or
forced into retirement, no dras-
tic action against the dissi-
dents appears in the offing. The
regime evidently feels that the
most prudent course is to re-
move them from the main polit-
ical arena, as was done in No-
vember 1960 with a group of 14
officers suspected of being
overly active in politics.
The faction of the Justice
party most openly critical of
military politicking has also
suffered a setback with the re-
cent expulsion, apparently at
Inonu's behest, of several ex-
tremist deputies from the party.
The reduction in the polit-
ical influence of these violently
bility.
opposed political elements may
bring about a period of relative
political peace. The basic en-
mity between the officer corps
and the heirs of Menderes re-
mains, however, posing a con-.
tinuing threat to political sta-
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''URRENT* INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Traditionalists have re-
asserted themselves in Britain's
protectorate of Uganda in East
Africa. The elections in Buganda
Province on 23 February, in which
supporters of the traditional
Buganda ruler (the Kabaka) won
a landslide victory, mark the
re-entry of Buganda into organ-
ized Ugandan politics. The
province, which has a special
treaty relationship with Britain,
is the largest unit in the pro-
tectorate and is essential to
its geographical unity and eco-
nomic well-being. For most of
1961, Buganda had refused to
have anything to do with poli-
tics beyond the provincial
borders, out of fear that its
semiautonomous position would
be jeopardized in the course
of Uganda's progress to inde-
pendence.
Last October the British
persuaded the Kabaka to accept
a new constitution for Uganda.
While most of the privileges of
Buganda and other traditional
governments will be preserved,
the protectorate received self-
government on 1 March and is
to get independence on 9 October.
The provincial elections in
Buganda will be followed on
25 April by protectorate-wide
polls to elect a national as-
gPmhly which will then choose
UY anda
l"J-*' S U D A N
the government which is to lead
the protectorate to independence.
In the Buganda voting, a
movement called the Kabaka Yekka
(King Alone) won 65 of the 68
elective seats in the provincial
legislature. These representa-
tives will be allowed to choose
the province's 21-man delegation
to the national assembly (whereas
in the rest of Uganda, such dele-
gates will be directly elected).
The Kabaka Yekka, therefore, is
assured of a strong bloc in that
91-member body.
All but one of the 21
Buganda seats now are held by
the Democratic party (DP) of
Uganda Chief Minister Benedicto
Kiwanuka, which swept the prov-
ince when the Kabaka ordered
his followers to boycott the
elections a year ago. Since
there are only 28 Democratic
representatives outside Buganda
and the DP is not likely to in-
crease its seats, it will prob-
ably lose control of the govern-
ment after the next elections.
It probably will be replaced
by a coalition of the national-
istic Uganda Peoples' Congress
(UPC), which had the largest
number of votes in last year's
elections, and the Kabaka Yekka.
These two parties have already
made an agreement to this end.
Such an alliance seems likely
to prove unstable. The Kabaka
Yekka is an amal
am of arch-
g
traditionalists, relative liberals,
and opportunists which is held
together by the King's authority
and by the desire to get into
power; its agreement with the
UPC is based largely on a common
opposition to the DP and a dis-
trust of Kiwanuka's authoritarian
proclivities. No party or coali-
KENYA tion seems capable of commanding a
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consistent majority, and a period
of weak central governments, per-
haps with scattered violence, is
therefore in prospect. However,
weak governments, particularly
weak ones in which Buganda holds
the balance of power, may be the
only authority Buganda will
tolerate without making new mo-
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Premier Fanfani's new,
center-left government is
broadly representative of his
own Christian Democratic party.
By retaining the previous for-
eign affairs and defense minis-
ters he has sought to provide
assurances that Italy's Western
and pro-NATO policies will be
maintained. Allocation of key
economic ministries to Social
Democrats and Republicans in-
dicates an intention to move
ahead in the field of socio-
economic reform. Nenni's Ital-
ian Socialist party has already
given general approval of the
new government's program and
is expected to provide Fanfani's
minority cabinet with a substan-
tial parliamentary majority by
either abstaining or voting
support.
The American Embassy ex-
pects the new government to
undertake constructive reforms
while holding domestic and for-
eign policy risks to a minimum.
This outlook is strengthened by
the allocation of the Budget
Ministry to a leading Republican,
Ugo la Malfa--long a major pro-
ponent of a reformist govern-
ment--and by including the new
economic planning post in the
Budget Ministry. Other impor-
tant economic posts have gone
to Social Democrats, but party
leader Giuseppe Saragat has not
accepted a ministry, apparently
preferring to be free to cam-
paign for the presidency of the
republic, for which parliament
will hold elections in mid-May.
Parliament must meet with-
in ten days after the govern-
ment's oath of office on 22
February to initiate discussion
leading to the confidence vote.
The Socialists grumble at reten-
Previous Cabinet
( I-CD1____..
Premier Amintore Panfani
Deputy Premier Attilto Picctont
Foreign Affairs Antonio Segnt
Defense Gialto Andreotti
3:dget Gi,~sepPe Pella Ugo L. Nalfa (PRI)
Interior Cato Scolba Paolo Alitlto Thutani (CD)
Labor ant Soctal Fiorentino Sullo Virginto Bertinelli (PSDI)
welfare
Foreign Trade
Southern Italy
Development
Giuseppe Trabucchi
Ctactnto Bosco (CD)
Of the 24 cabinet seats, the Christian Democrats (CD) have 29,
the Social Democrats (PSDI) three, and the Republicans (PRI) two.
tion of the Christian Democrats'
extreme right-winger,Guilio
Andreotti, in the Defense Min-
istry and might have preferred
someone from the lay parties in
the Education post, but their
principal interest is the new
government's domestic program,
which incorporates proposals
such as tax reform measures and
appropriations for new schools.
On those they may expect earlier
action than on nationalization
of nuclear energy and establish-
ment of geographic regions--
others of the platform planks
which they strongly support.
The conservative Liberals
are already attacking this gov-
ernment, as are Monarchists and
neo-Fascists. Communist strategy,
which has included both attacks
and plaudits, is not clear. Com-
munist chief Togliatti has boast-
ed to the press, however, that he
can give any government a "kiss
of death" by supporting it and
thereby justifying, rightist ef-
forts to block it.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
WEST GERMAN - SOVIET RELATIONS
The West German reply of
21 February to the Soviet memo-
randumof 27 December urging a
normalization of relations
avoids the question of bilateral
Bonn-Moscow negotiations but
welcomes a further "exchange
of views." It clearly rejects
any dealings with the Ulbricht
regime regarding German re-
unification, however.
The response was care-
fully prepared with a view to
its impact on domestic politics.
During the discussions preceding
its issuance, Bonn's ambassador
to Moscow, Hans Krol:.--who takes
the Soviet offer of concessions
very seriously strongly urged
the government to make "accommno-
dations" to the, USSR. He sug-
gested economic support foY? the
Soviet 20-year plan as one pos-
sibility. Although Krell public-
ly claimed a "substantial" part
in drafting the reply, "prac-
tically none" of his proposals
were approved, according to a
Foreign Ministry official. Ac-
cusations by leading newspapers
that Kroll is spreading a "capit-
ulation" concept calling for
recognition of the Oder-Neisse
frontier, neutralization of
West Germany, and the removal
of US atomic warheads from West
Germany have raised a storm of
controversy including demands
that Kroll be ousted.
Bonn's note has been-much
praised publicly, but for vary-
ing reasons. A spokesman for
Adenauer's Christian Democratic
Union (CDU) stressed that the
reply points up the USSR's mis-
calculation that it could divide
West Germany from its allies.
Chairman Erich Mende of the Free
Democratic party, the CDU's
coalition partner, said the
reply "completely incorporated
his party's views." He has
strongly urged direct German-
Soviet talks--with Allied concur-
rence--if the Thompson-Gromyko
probes should break down, and
was evidently very pleased by
the note's failure to close the
door on this possibility.
West Berlin Mayor Brandt,
while warning against expecting
"miracles," believes that hints
of possible concessions in the
Soviet memorandum should be
fully explored. He said Bonn's
task would be to lay the ground-
work for subsequent negotiations
between the "occupation powers
--whose jurisdictional authority
on Berlin and German questions
must not be altered." Brandt
stressed that Bonn-Moscow talks
were necessary to eliminate any
possibility of subsequent West
German speculation over the
nature of present Soviet inten-
tions and allusions to "missed
opportunities" to obtain Soviet
concessions.
Chancellor Adenauer does
not seem interested in Soviet -
West German negotiations, and
he doubts that Moscow would make
any concessions to the Germans
which it was unwilling to make
to the three Western powers.
Bonn government officials ap-
pear to oppose direct talks
on grounds that Bonn could
not deal with Moscow on an
equal footing.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Encouraged by Brazil's
"world power" aspirations, its
tendency toward a more inde-
pendent foreign policy, and
its need for new markets, the
USSR continues to push for
closer relations. A formal
agreement was signed last No-
vember restoring diplomatic
relations between the two
countries. More recent Soviet
moves include Khrushchev's
well-publicized invitation in
early February to the Brazilian
charge to visit him at Sochi
and the trip to Brazil by Khru-
shchev's son-in-law Aleksey
Adzhubey.
Soviet statements con-
cerning future relations be-
tween the two countries have
been such as to encourage
Brazilians to expect favorable
treatment. Their diplomatic
mission in Moscow will probably
be an active one. The new Soviet
ambassador to Brazil, Ilya
Chernyshev, arrived in Rio de
Janeiro on 23 February. Bra-
zil's most important conserva-
tive paper emphasized that his
major task will be to con-
vince Brazilians that the USSR
wants to foster Brazil's eco-
nomic development. The Soviets
have recently reiterated in-
terest in increasing coffee
purchases.
The USSR made particular
efforts to influence the results
of the Punta del Este conference
through discussions with the
Goulart government. Since
the meeting it has continued
to praise Brazil for its inde-
pendent viewpoint. The So-
viets may follow a similar line
with reference to the Geneva
disarmament conference, which
Brazil will attend as a member
of the 18-nation commission.
Brazil's Foreign Minister
Dantas recently declared to a
pro-Cuban rally that Brazil's
"indigenous independence" will
be reaffirmed at Geneva. Al-
though Brazil turned down
Khrushchev's call for a "summit"
meeting to open the Geneva con-
ference, the Czech President
has subsequently sent President
Goulart a letter urging. him
to attend.
Plans are progressing for
a large Soviet trade fair in
Rio de Janeiro in early May--
the first in Latin America
since that in Cuba in early
1960. In January the USSR
reportedly asked for visas for
250 "technicians" to set up
the fair. It has since been
announced that the Beryozka
dance troupe will be a special
attraction.
Panama wants a new treaty
acknowledging its sovereignty
over the Canal Zone. Presi-
dent Chiari contends that the
United States, in its answer
of last November to his re-
quest for treaty talks, com-
mitted itself to renegotiation,
not mere revision. His gov-
ernment is increasingly im-
patient for talks to begin and
may start pressing its case
publicly without waiting for
the US to complete studies of
the feasibility of a sea-
level canal.
Foreign Minister Solis
told the press on his return
from Punta del Este that Secre-
tary Rusk had said he was "deeply"
interested in conversations for
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
a new canal treaty which would
be on a basis quite different
from the antiquated basis of
the present treaty." Panamani-
an news media have played this
up heavily, together with
Solis' statement that talks
would begin in March. When
Ambassador Farland told Solis
the latter had misinterpreted
Secretary Rusk's statement, the
foreign minister promised to
"clarify" the situation, but he
has done nothing further.
Panamanians have long
pressed for an increase in
their share of canal benefits.
They claim too that the United
States has always been slow in
making treaty adjustments and
then in implementing such re-
visions. Recognizing that
even with current extensive ex-
pansion, the canal is obsoles-
cent, they are anxious to
reach a new agreement before
canal value and income are
sharply reduced. They want
acknowledgment of Panamanian
sovereignty over the Zone, a
terminal date in place of the
1903 treaty's perpetuity clause,
and other guarantees. Farland
believes these desires have be-
come increasingly important
political pressures on Chiari
and probably are behind his
statement to Farland that
renegotiation should begin
no later than May.
Panamanian differences
on the approach to negotiations
have recently become apparent.
Solis has said he feels it would
be to Panama's advantage not to
present its demands first, as
it has previously done, buL. to
let the US present its position.
However, extreme nationalists
--who will no doubt be repre-
sented on any delegation--
maintain that Panama should
present "absolute demands"
and refuse to compromise. Labor
groups insist that the treaty
be renegotiated separatly from
any possible arrangements for
construction of a sea-level
canal, such as has been pro-
posed for Darien Province
close to the Colombian border.
Other groups want the govern-
ment to demand economic con-
cessions, such as US tariff
advantages similar to those
for Puerto Rico, and US help
in converting present Canal
Zone facilities into an in-
dustrial complex.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
SPECIAL ARTICLES
SOVIET AGRICULTURAL PROBLEMS
The Soviet party central
committee will meet on 5 March
to examine the perennial prob-
lem child of the economy--
agriculture. This will be the
fourth such meeting since 1958
and follows a recent series of
regional conferences attended
by Khrushchev.
Faced with a pressing need
for rapid improvement in agri-
culturP1 output,the-party leaders
may reveal major administrative
changes at the central committee
plenum. This is the midpoint of
the Soviet Seven-Year Plan
(1959-65),which calls for gross
agricultural production to in-
crease 70 percent over 1958. In
contrast to industry, wtij.ch
is well ahead of schedule, agri-
cultural production has made
virtually no progress during
the first three years of the
plan. To meet the 1965 goal
for agriculture, an annual in-
crease of over 13 percent would
be required for the remaining
years of the plan.
ment and for machinery supply
and repair. The reorganization
apparently has not been pro-
ceeding smoothly,, and Khrushchev
recently said that further
changes might be necessary. The
troublesome decision as to how
best to administer the collective
farm system--which comprises
roughly 55 percent of all farm-
land--has yet to be made after
nearly four years of intermittent
debate. Discussions at the
March plenum. may also reveal
the regime's intentions toward
modifications in the fields
of price and wage policy, in-
vestment and equipment alloca-
tion, and regional specialization.
Khrushchev's recent campaign
against traditional farming
practices is likely to be a
prominent feature of the speeches.
Agriculture in 1961
The USSR claims a grain
harvest in 1961 of 138,000,000
metric tons, which would be
Moreover, the party pro-
gram adopted at the 22nd party
congress assigned to agriculture
highly ambitious goals for the
period 1961-80, with the greatest
increases to be made during the
first decade. To meet the 1970
goal, agricultural production
must advance at nearly 11 per-
cent a year for the next decade.
The party program's claim that
the economy will ensure the
highest standard of living in
the world is based on successful
fulfillment of agriculture's
goals, both for food output and
for the production of raw mate-
rials for consumer goods in-
dustries--also scheduled for
rapid growth.
The agricultural plenum
in 1961 approved a fairly ex-
tensive reorganization of the
Ministry of Agriculture and of
the agencies for state procure-
40
20
00
Qom.
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second only to the record
1958 crop. Soviet statistics
on grain, however, have ap-
peared to be highly inflated
since 1958, possibly as a
result of some change in the
system of estimating yields,
if not statistical falsifi-
cation. On the basis of weath-
er data and information on
crop conditions and acreage,
it is estimated that grain
production was actually 115,-
000,000 metric tons--an in-
crease of 15 percent over the
estimated 1960 harvest but far
below the Soviet claim.
The output of cotton,
sugar beets, and sunflower seed
was about average in 1961.
State procurement of sugar beets
was somewhat below the 1960
level, probably reflecting a
sharp rise in sugar production
resulting from an increase in
imported raw sugar. Overall,
the acreage devoted to growing
livestock feed was somewhat
less than in 1960, and the
feed supply does not appear to
have increased much.
While Moscow claims that
meat production increased some-
what, this statement also appears
inaccurate. Four percent less
meat was processed through the
state slaughterhouses than in
1960,and--in view of the in-
creasing share of meat produc-
tion accounted for by the state,
as opposed to livestock slaugh-
tering by collective farms and
individuals--a decline of at
least 5 percent in total meat
production would seem more prob-
able. Milk production was
reported up less than 2 percent
over 1960. No information has
been released on potato and
vegetable production.
The relatively tight food
situation reflected by the 1961
production figures explains in
large measure numerous reports
of food shortages and hoarding,
one of which claimed that
farmers and villagers in low-
producing areas were referring
to 1961 as the "hungry year."
While there undoubtedly have
been shortages, they were
evidently local, temporary,
and limited to certain food
items. On the whole the food
supply, although adversely
affected by three years of
mediocre harvests, is well
USSR: SELECTED AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION
MILLION METRIC TONS
5 150
4.63- 4.64 COTTON 4.5
% 4.30 ........
4.34?'~~
4 ~%------..4*
t 00#0 3.97
SUNFLOWER
3.02 SEED
0 .36
1958 1959 1960 1961
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130 *
120 ???~?.? ?? 115
GRAIN .?'
?????~ 100 * 100 * ?~.??~~???
..............
90 86.5 86.6
------ 85*
POTATOES 84.4
0
1958 1959
SUGAR BEETS
(for Processing)
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMURY
above that of the pre-Khrushchev
eraisince total agricultural
production under the impetus
of the New Lands and corn pro-
grams has increased more than
50 percent. The supply of
some items--wheat, sugar, fish
--was substantially better in
1961 than in 1960, and the
amount of potatoes, vegetables,
and milk available was prob-
ably on par with 1960.
Changes in Farm Organization
n Practices
Implementation of the
agricultural reorganization
approved in January 1961 oc-
cupied the attention of Soviet
farm administrators through
much of the year. Under the
new setup,the Ministry of
Agriculture--already weakened
by abolition of the Machine
Tractor Stations (MTS) and the
loss of its planning and supply
functions--was confined to
agricultural research,adminis
tration of agricultural educa-
tion, and giving practical
demonstrations on "model" farms
established in each local ad-
ministrative area. A new agency
was set up to supply the farms
through local outlets with
equipment, spare parts, ferti-
lizer, and other needs, and a
State Committee for Agricultural
Procurement was established to
exercise control, through a
system of "contracts" admin-
istered by a widespread network
of local agents, over the
collection of agricultural prod-
ucts for the state.
leaders for further attention
and reform.
Soviet press reports in-
dicate that there have been de-
lays in supplying equipment and
spare parts, and farms are said
to compete with one another
for use of repair equipment.
In spite of the authority of
the new supply agencies to
supervise the use of farm
machinery, abuses were suffi-
ciently alarming at the end of
the year to cause the regime
to promulgate a law calling
for prison sentences of up to
three years for persons convicted
of mistreating farm equipment.
Changes in farming practices
advocated by Khrushchev during
the closing months of 1961 are
potentially more significant
for the future of Soviet agri-
culture than these reorganiza-
tions. The Soviet leader,
striving for rapid short-run
increasesin farm output, recom-
mends for the New Lands area
a severe limitation on the
amount of cultivated land in
clean fallow; i.e., not planted
for a season and cultivated
only as needed to prevent weed
growth. He would also reduce
the amount of land planted to
grass and clover under the so-
called "ley" system. To replace
these practices he advocated
cultivation of corn, sugar beets,
peas, and field beans in a
rotational pattern. These pro-
posals have apparently met with
resistance from some local farm
administrators and scientists.
Despite these measures no
fundamental change has been
noted in Moscow's overcentralized
approach to farm management,
and many problems continue to
exist. The traditional tug-of-
war between farmer and state
has evidently not been moderated.
by the new procurement system,
and the regime is still not
satisfied with the type of
control exercised by its pro-
curement agents. There have
been many complaints of sta-
tistical falsifications both
by agents and farm administra-
tors and of inadequate trans-
tort and storage for produce
procured. This field has been
specifically named by the Soviet
By Western standards, the
USSR already maintains far too
little clean fallow in the New
Lands; a reduction could mean
further loss of soil moisture
and fertility and lead to serious
erosion in the event of a pro-
longed drought. Reduction of
"ley" fallowing could cause
long-run soil deterioration
and sharply raise labor and
machinery requirements.
The Collective Farm Problem
Probably the greatest
organizational problem--and one
likely to be weighed carefully
at the forthcoming plenum--is
the administration of the kolkhoz
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
State farms differ from collective farms in
four ways: (1) the collective--rather than the
state--nominally owns all of the farm's productive
assets other than land--such as machinery and tools;
(2) the state farm receives its capital directly
from the state budget, the collective largely from
the profits of its own operation; (3) the collec-
tive farmer's wages are more dependent on the suc-
cess of the crop than are those of the state farmer;
(4) collective farm produce is sold both at collec-
tive farm markets and state stores, whereas state
farm produce is sold only at state stores.
or collective farm system. Any
fundamental change in this
field, however, may have to
await the congress of collective
farmers which Khrushchev has
promised will be convened
"sometime in the future" to
approve a new collective farm
charter. While the 1961 re-
organization adequately pro-
vided for the administration
of state farms, no parallel
structure was established for
the direction of collectives.
In No'ember, Khrushchev hinted
at the, need to increase local
party control over the collec-
tive farm.
Collective farm adminis-
tration has been a politically
explosive issue since the
abolition early in 1958 of the
MTS system, which had controlled
collective farm affairs as well
as farm machinery. At that
time some leading officials
proposed a national system
of kolkhoz unions to administer
collective farms, to broaden
collective farm "self-govern-
ment," and to pool farm re-
sources for the aid of backward
farms. Other leaders objected
that such a structure would
tend to strengthen the parochial
interests of the Soviet farmer
at the expense of state con-
trol. At a central committee
plenum in December 1959 Khru-
shchev vetoed the union scheme
at the national or republic
level but said that local "in-
tercollective farm" agencies
should be seriously considered
to provide organizational
support for the growing number
of joint activities engaged in
by collective farms. The prob-
lem was then sent back to the
presidium for further consider-
ation.
In recent months variations
on the "union" theme have ap-
peared in the press. Some
articles favor closer ties
at the local level among col-
lective farms, state farms,
and industry, possibly under
the direction of "councils of
agriculture" (agro-sovnarkhozes),
which would be counterpart to
the industrially oriented
regional sovnarkhozes. According
to the new party program the
productive links between agri-
culture, both collective and
state farms, and industry are
to be strengthened, leading to
agrarian-industrial associations.
Three successive mediocre
harvests have evidently damaged
the financial condition of many
collective farms, which took
on more obligations after 1958
when they began to purchase
their own equipment. Although
Moscow granted the collective
farm system some monetary relief
last year in the form of ex-
tensions on existing loans and
lower prices for gasoline and
certain other farm supplies
and machinery, many collective
farms were converted to state
farms, a practice Khrushchev
has recently condemned. The
number of state farms grew
from 6,000 in January 1959 to
8,000 in October 1961, and
state farms added almost 70,000,-
000 acres to their sown area--
an increase of 50 percent--while
that of the collectives de-
clined by about 50,000,000
acres. While this decline in
the relative importance of
collective farms seems to fore-
shadow their eventual abolition,
the official party view is that
both systems will continue side
by side until they are amalgamated
into a single so-called "all-
national farm system."
Incentives
Another question likely
to be discussed at the plenum
is the wage structure and
material incentives. As part
of the general reform, a new
wage system was adopted for
state farm workers which was
expected to gear wage payments
to the quality and quantity of
work completed. There has been
nothing in the Soviet press to
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indicate the degree of success
achieved by this program, but simi-
lar attempts in industry have
faltered because of the difficulty
in measuring improvements in qual-
ity..
Collective farm wages, on the
other hand, are still largely tied
to the system of distributing earn-
ings in the form of cash and prod-
uce at the end of the growing sea-
son. This has been widely criti-
cized because it leads to abuses,
fails to encourage improvement in
work, and is difficult to adapt to
modern accounting practices. A
monthly cash wage system adopted
by some farms is being officially
encouraged. There are, however,
many obstacles to overcome, espe-
cially in poorer farms which can-
not build up a sufficient cash
reserve to carry them through pe-
riods of low harvest. Some critics
of the present system have even
suggested a guaranteed minimum
monthly wage system. The adoption
of this, financed by the govern-
ment, would eliminate a principal
difference between the collective
and state farm systems.
Coupled with the wage question
is that of private plots and live-
stock and of the collective farmers'
marketing activities, which pro-
vide them with substantial cash
income at various times during the
year. While Khrushchev has pressed
for abolition of these vestiges of
free enterprise, he favors a grad-
ual approach. The state has good
reason to desire elimination of
the private sector, since it is
outside of the direct controls of
the state, takes up a great pro-
portion of the peasant's time and
often his best efforts, and runs
counter to the schemes for mecha-
nization. On the other hand, '"
there are also good reasons for
Khrushchev's caution. The private
sector now produces over half of
all the potatoes and vegetables
and a large part of all meat and
milk, although it contains less
than 3 percent of total sown acre-
age. One "socializing" scheme
recently adopted by a few collec-
tive and state farms has been to
combine "private" plots into one
community plot.
Investment Priority
At the January 1961 plenum
Khrushchev said: "We now are in
the position to appreciably in-
crease capital investment-for
expanding agriculture." There
is little evidence that this is
being carried out. During the
Stalin period, agriculture in
large measure financed the rapid
development of industry but at
the expense of its own growth.
Although Khrushchev considerably
raised the level of agricultural
investment during the mid-1950s,
there still remains a great dis-
proportion between investment al-
location to industry and to agri-
culture.
Agriculture's share of total
investment has dropped steadily
since 1.956. The increases in
state investment in 1961 and in
the 1962 plan Suggest that sUdh
investments-are merely keeping
pace with the growth of the state
farm system. While Khrushchev
made great promises of increases
in agricultural chemicals at the
22nd party congress, the produc-
tion of fertilizer is badly lag-
ging and the increase planned for
1962 is relatively small. Plans
for state-developed rural electri-
fication and irrigation have re-
cently been revised upward, but
this may stem from the inability
of collective farms to provide
what,was originally planned as
their own contribution to such
improvements. There seems to
be a serious effort under way to
provide agriculture with the
machinery it needs, but much of
the new production will be needed
to replace outmoded and worn-out
equipment.
The Future
Regardless of the outcome
of the forthcoming plenum, Soviet
agriculture will continue to be
hampered by a combination of de-
terrents--relatively unfavorable
soil and climate, the effects of
neglecting investment for many
years, the. lack of incentives
which is inherent in socializa-
tion, and the failure of the
Soviet system to accommodate it-
self to the high degree of de-
centralized and flexible decision-
making required for agriculture.
In the long run, however, greater
increases in investment and the
rational application of scientific
methods offer the USSR the pos-
sibility of a more efficient and
productive agriculture, although
with growth rates substantially
below those implied by Moscow's
politically determined goals.
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LEFTIST INFLUENCE IN THE BRAZZAVILLE STATES
Visits to Bloc or
Bloc-Oriented Countries
Africa's 12 French-speaking
"Brazzaville states," ruled by
moderate, Western-oriented leaders,
are experiencing a growth of
leftist influence. There are no
Communist parties in these coun-
tries except for a small group on
Madagascar not subject to Moscow's
control. At present only Senegal
has diplomatic relations with any
Communist country, a small Yugo-
slav mission having been estab
lished in Dakar last October.
Only a few of the Brazzaville
group have exchanged diplomatic
missions with Ghana, Guinea, or
Mali, the Black African states
where Soviet bloc influence is
strongest. Consequently, the
leftist influence on the Brazza-
ville governments is generally
exerted indirectly.
I almost all the Brazza-
ville states, political power is
ii-, tl.e hands of an educated, West-
- --+irMALI ~
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oaae.aaeooe~
,M ?tN o,.,",*
*y....dF, I
RFPUBLIC //++T
Brazzaville J OF THE CONGO nN?n
The "Brazzaville Group" r, "`N?I \ a 218 R
CnxiN [~.? ~\ N (-i~~ TANCANIIAA
The group derives its name from a conference
held by the 12 French-speaking states at Broeroville
in December 1960. They aepresxd a certain identity
0f moderate views, implicity oppocingradical Arab
notia na lism or the militant pan-Africanism of Nkrumah.
These 12 tats,-all bat Cameroon, a former UN trust
territory, were French colonies-become independent
at various times in 1960 and have maintained close
political and economic ties with Paris.
Taesrotive
REftiaLic
OF Incur n
SOUTH AFRICA .............................-
SECRET
UAR
(EGYPT)
ernized minority, many of whom
are easily impressed during
visits to bloc countries or to
radical African states. They
describe the progress and vigor-
ous leadership they have been
there in terms that probably
have considerable impact on
the uncritical but restive
masses at home.
Little is known of some
of these visits. The Ameri-
can Embassy in Dahomey reports,
however, that nearly all offi-
cials in that country's left-
ist-oriented Trade Union Federa-
tion have made at least one
visit to the bloc. In Septem-
ber 1961 a governmental "good-
will" mission from Niger was in
Warsaw, Prague, and Budapest as
well as in Western European
capitals; at almost the same
time a similar mission from.
Congo (Brazzaville) visited
Moscow, probably because Presi-
dent Youlou wanted to demon-
strate that his country was
truly independent. There are
indications that the Africans
returned well disposed toward
their bloc hosts; Poland and
Czechoslovakia have returned
the Niger visit.
Other trips to the bloc
have been more widely publi-
cized. Albert Balima, the
vigorous and intelligent "young
Turk" secretary general of the
Upper Volta Foreign Ministry,
visited the Soviet Union during
his student days in Paris, and
is fond of telling about the
warm welcome he received. Last
fall the Niger Government se-
lected a group of young men to
attend--at bloc invitation and
expense--the Communist Youth
Conference in Moscow. One of
them wrote a gushing account of
the group's reception and the
remarkable achievements of the
Soviet Union which was published
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25X1
25X1
in Temps du Niger, the govern- that Dejean had signed the
mentnewspaper. I communique without cabinet ap-
Last May, Dahomey's Vice
President Apithy led a ministeri-
al-level "good-will" mission
to Guinea and Mali, and on his
return gave a widely published
interview filled with unre-
strained strained praise for the "disci-
pline, vitality, and progress"
in these countries. Apithy, a
wily politician who probably
aspires to unseat President Maga
and who advocates closer ties
with the East, concluded that
Dahomey should rapidly emulate
proval. Dacko has still not
established relations with the
USSR.
In Niger, President Diori
is being surrounded by leftists
who appear to be exerting in-
creasing influence on him. Sev-
eral alleged French Communists
have recently been named to im-
portant government posts, and
in answer to the protests of
French officials, Diori some-
what lamely replied that he was
committed to the appointments,
The director of the Niger Devel-
opment Plan is reputed to be a
Communist sympathizer
Further actions attributed
to Apithy, as well as those of
other leftist-inclined persons
within or close to the Brazza-
ville governments, indicate
the extent to which they have
promoted leftist influence.
In the spring of 1961,
personnel from the Soviet Em-
bassy in Lome, capital of Togo,
began making frequent visits to
Dahomey, for unspecified pur-
poses, but apparently leaving
Russian propaganda pieces in
government offices and hiring
young boys to sell French-
language Russian magazines in
Cotonou, Dahomey's capital.
Foreign Minister Dejean
of the Central African Republic
appears to have been responsible
for the arrival there in De-
cember 1960 of the Soviet am-
bassador to Togo, and for a sub-
sequent communique announcing
that his country and the USSR
would exchange diplomatic mis-
sions. President Dacko, in-
censed, told the US ambassador
Although the new Federal
Republic of Cameroon has re-
buffed Soviet bloc diplomatic
and economic overtures, the bloc,
and particularly Communist China,
has nevertheless been able to
gain some influence by support-
ing the dissident wing of the
Union of Cameroun People's party
-(UPC)--the faction which con-
tinues to conduct a sporadic
terrorist campaign aimed at top-
pling the pro-Western Ahidjo gov-
ernment. This element receives
bloc support through exiled
leaders living in Guinea and
Ghana, and a number of UPC terror-
ists captured last year had at-
tended an intensive ten-week
course of training in guerrilla
warfare and sabotage in Peiping.
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CURREWT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Leftist-Indoctrinated Students
The leftist threat in the
Brazzaville states is increased
by a sizable number of radical
students who have been exposed
to leftist indoctrination while
studying abroad. When these
students return home they gener-
ally find older and, in their
view, less competent men en-
trenched in the positions to
which they feel their education
entitles them. This situation
creates a dangerous restiveness
that will steadily increase.
There are many indications that
leftist and bloc countries are
stepping up their efforts to
exert influence through students.
Direct offers to Brazza-
ville governments of scholar-
ships for study in bloc uni-
versities have met with almost
no response, and the Communists
have consequently resorted'to
more devious methods.
One of these groups is al-
most certainly composed of the
now-outlawed opposition SAWABA
party, which has headquarters
in Mali. According to Niger
Government sources, SAWABA agents
contact promising students to
induce them to go abroad. Other
contacts are made by leftist
teachers in Niamey, Niger's
capital; at least one of these
teachers is said to have organ-
ized active Communist cells
among the lycee students and, in
1960, was responsible for send-
ing 15 of them through Uganda
to Moscow. President Diori, in
a recent conversation with Am-
bassador Cook, appeared to be
aware of this situation and
thought it could best be counter-
acted by raising the standard
of living in Niger--a somewhat
distant prospect.
Other Brazzaville states
have dealt with subversive ac-
tivity among students more vigor-
ously. The Ivory Coast Govern-
ment has withdrawn scholarships
from dissident students and re-
stricted their travel. Last July
it recalled radical student lead-
ers from Paris, and those who
did not manage to slip off the
plane during a stopover in Mali
were imprisoned when they got
home. In October, President Mba
of Gabon, in order to "clean up
the mess in Paris," recalled some
students from his country and
dropped the scholarships of others.
Several Brazzaville govern-
ments have had to suppress stu-
dent dissidence at home. Last
summer, meetings of student
groups in both Upper Volta and
Niger were broken up by police
when they degenerated into
violent tirades against "imperi-
alists aid colonialists" and
against the governments of those
countries for their ties with
France and friendship for the US.
In December, the Senegalese Gov-
ernment banned a congress of the
University of Dakar student organ-
ization, deported three radical
student leaders, and took stern
measures against an ensuing stu-
dent strike.
Bloc Missions
Most of the Brazzaville
states have cordially received
trade or cultural missions from
the bloc. Except to establish
initial contact, however, the
great majority of these have not
been successful, and most over-
tures for establishment of diplo-
matic relations have been reso-
lutely rejected. Ivory Coast's
President Houphouet-Boigny has
several times stated that Communists
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
are not welcome in his country,
and Upper Volta's President
Yameogo last summer expressed
similar sentiments. Last July,
President Mba put the members
of a Soviet trade mission to
Gabon under house arrest and
shipped them out on the first
available plane. A Chinese Com-
munist good-will mission angered
the Senegalese last spring by de-
manding the expulsion of the
"representative of the Kuomin-
tang clique" as a condition for
establishing diplomatic rela-
tions. In the fall of 1960 a
Czech Foreign Ministry official
visited Chad and talked vaguely
about economic aid, but nothing
has materialized. A Soviet trade
delegation to the Malagasy Re-
public left empty-handed last
25X1 A ril
ov et mission to
Niger in October was more warmly
received, but departed without
concluding a trade agreement,
Since October, however, so
many bloc missions and person-
nel have descended upon Niamey
as to suggest that Niger may
have been singled out for special
attention, The Polish delegation
in November concluded a trade
agreement based on the standard
bloc tactic of offering an under-
developed country a dazzling
array of finished products in re-
turn for basic raw materials,
The Poles indicated that other
assistance, including a loan,
would be forthcoming--after the
establishment of diplomatic re-
lations. Niger has since con-
cluded a similar agreement with
the Czechs.
A French journalist was
impressed by the cleverness of
the Soviet journalists who at-
tended the independence cele-
brations in Niamey last De-
cember. One of them had read
an obscure book by National As-
sembly President Boubou Hama,
whom he flattered with a de-
tailed discussion of the work.
The questions of other Soviet
journalists showed signs of a
deliberate effort to do their
homework. Also in December, the
leftist clique in Niamey, in-
cluding the commissioner of in-
formation, arranged an exhibit
of paintings by a Communist Afro-
Brazilian painter. The exhibit,
which was favorably commented
on in Temps du Niger, was loaded
with pictures of Ku Klux Klan
lynchings, gallows victims in
Kenya, forced laborers in South
Africa, and peace doves. When
American officials pointed out
these political themes to the
commissioner, his reply was,
"Art is free,"
As the popular intoxication
of independence recedes, the
Western-oriented leaders of the
Brazzaville governments are under
great pressure to produce the
benefits of independence, They
are all confronted with economic
problems, and should they, in
spite of their Western help, fail
to make significant progress, in-
ternal leftist pressures and bloc
overtures could have dangerous
consequences.
There is evidence of over-
confidence among some Brazza-
ville leaders, who assert that
Communism is not suited to the
African temperament. Others
seem overly satisfied with
their initial successes in
controlling dissident students
or repulsing bloc trade missions.
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