CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

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CURRENT
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY
SUMMARY
COPY NO. 76
OCR NO. 0401/62
26 January 1962
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
SECRET
State Department review completed
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THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECT-
ING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES
WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS,
TITLE 18, USC, SECTIONS 793 AND 794, THE TRANSMIS-
SION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO
AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.
The Current Intelligence Weekly Summary has been prepared
primarily for the internal use of the Central Intelligence
Agency. It does not represent a complete coverage of all
current situations. Comments and conclusions represent the
immediate appraisal of the Office of Current Intelligence.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
WEEKLY REVIEW
EAST-WEST RELATIONS
Moscow evidently is still
interested in negotiating with
the West on Berlin and Germany,
despite the harder line taken
by Gromyko in his second con-
versation with Ambassador Thomp-
son. A public lecturer in Mos-
cow on 21 January, in discussing
some details of the Thompson-
Gromyko talks, stated that solu-
tion of the West Berlin prob-
lem by negotiations is clearly
preferable to unilateral con-
clusion of an East German peace
treaty. Current Soviet press
commentaries are also stressing
the importance of negotiations.
While the Soviet press
has maintained complete silence
on the Thompson-Gromyko talks,
the public lecturer noted that
the ambassador was seeking to
determine whether there is a
basis for negotiations. The
lecturer did not predict the
outcome of the Thompson-Gromyko
meetings; he noted, however,
that Thompson could hardly suc-
ceed in the talks until "Wash-
ington forces Paris and Bonn
into agreement on negotiations."
The lecturer said that one of
the "major points" discussed
by the ambassador was an inter-
national corridor authority
which would include both East
and Nest Germany as partici-
pants, and that the ambassador
had also emphasized the neces-
sity of agreement on Western
access to Nest Berlin, to "be
guaranteed by both the USSR
and the GDR."
The lecturer did not com-
ment on Thompson's call for an
international access authority,
even though President Kennedy's
similar proposal--in his inter-
view with Izvestia editor
Adzhubey last November--was re-
jected in a speech by Khrushchev
on 9 December. The Soviet
premier termed such an approach
unrealistic and stressed that
assurances of free access would
have to be on the basis of an
agreement with East Germany.
Commentaries in Izvestia
on 18 January and Pravda the
following day urged a negoti--
ated settlement of the Berlin
and German problems. Pravda
reiterated the need for con-
clusion of a German peace treaty
and creation of a demilitarized
free city of West Berlin in the
"shortest possible time," but
did not mention a deadline.
Izvestia took issue with "some
meAmerican sources" who suggest
that the US give formal acquies-
cence to a separate treaty be-
tween the GDR and USSR, only on
condition that there be no
change in the status of West
Berlin. The article declared
that negotiations are not needed
to consolidate the "old, out-
moded situation," but to "legal-
ize" the new elements which have
resulted from World War II.
Without specifying that the
status of West Berlin must be
altered, Izvestia said it would
be naive to suppose the con-
clusion of a peace treaty be-
tween the GDR, USSR, and other
states would be a "mere formal-
ity."
There is no hint that Mos-
cow expects an immediate col-
lapse of the Thompson-Gromyko
discussions; there are, how-
ever, indications that in the
event of an impasse in these
talks, the Soviet leaders will
attempt to divert negotiations
into a new channel and at a
higher level rather than take
any unilateral action. A Pravda
article of 17 January, which
vigorously attacked opponents
of peaceful coexistence, made
a special point of defending
the value of Khrushchev's ef-
forts to maintain contacts with
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SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
WEEKLY REVIEW
EAST-WEST RELATIONS
Moscow evidently is still
interested in negotiating with
the West on Berlin and Germany,
despite the harder line taken
by Gromyko in his second con-
versation with Ambassador Thomp-
son. A public lecturer in Mos-
cow on 21 January, in discussing
some details of the Thompson-
Gromyko talks, stated that solu-
tion of the West Berlin prob-
lem by negotiations is clearly
preferable to unilateral con-
clusion of an East German peace
treaty. Current Soviet press
commentaries are also stressing
the importance of negotiations.
While the Soviet press
has maintained complete silence
on the Thompson-Gromyko talks,
the public lecturer noted that
the ambassador was seeking to
determine whether there is a
basis for negotiations. The
lecturer did not predict the
outcome of the Thompson-Gromyko
meetings; he noted, however,
that Thompson could hardly suc-
ceed in the talks until "Wash-
ington forces Paris and Bonn
into agreement on negotiations."
The lecturer said that one of
the "major points" discussed
by the ambassador was an inter-
national corridor authority
which would include both East
and Nest Germany as partici-
pants, and that the ambassador
had also emphasized the neces-
sity of agreement on Western
access to Nest Berlin, to "be
guaranteed by both the USSR
and the GDR."
The lecturer did not com-
ment on Thompson's call for an
international access authority,
even though President Kennedy's
similar proposal--in his inter-
view with Izvestia editor
Adzhubey last November--was re-
jected in a speech by Khrushchev
on 9 December. The Soviet
premier termed such an approach
unrealistic and stressed that
assurances of free access would
have to be on the basis of an
agreement with East Germany.
Commentaries in Izvestia
on 18 January and Pravda the-
following day urged n`egoti~-
ated settlement of the Berlin
and German problems. Pravda
reiterated the need for con-
clusion of a German peace treaty
and creation of a demilitarized
free city of Nest Berlin in the
"shortest possible time," but
did not mention a deadline.
Izvestia took issue with "some
American sources" who suggest
that the US give formal acquies-
cence to a separate treaty be-
tween the GDR and USSR, only on
condition that there be no
change in the status of West
Berlin. The article declared
that negotiations are not needed
to consolidate the "old, out-
moded situation," but to "legal-
ize" the new elements which have
resulted from World War II.
Without specifying that the
status of West Berlin must be
altered, Izvestia said it would
be naive to suppose the con-
clusion of a peace treaty be-
tween the GDR, USSR, and other
states would be a "mere formal-
ity."
There is no hint that Mos-
cow expects an immediate col-
lapse of the Thompson-Gromyko
discussions; there are, how-
ever, indications that in the
event of an impasse in these
talks, the Soviet leaders will
attempt to divert negotiations
into a new channel and at a
higher level rather than take
any unilateral action. A Pravda
article of 17 January, which
vigorously attacked opponents
of peaceful coexistence, made
a special point of defending
the value of Khrushchev's ef-
forts to maintain contacts with
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Western statesmen by trips
abroad, including his visit
to the US.
The Polish party organ
Tibuna Ludu on 19 January
carried a dispatch from its
London correspondent which
treated in a favorable man-
ner reports that Macmillan
is considering a visit to
Moscow. The reports were
attributed to "London po-
litical circles."
Soviet interest in high-
level contacts is also demon-
strated by current Soviet ac-
tions in Bonn. Soviet Embassy
officials there are spreading
the idea that Khrushchev might
respond favorably to an invita-
tion to visit Adenauer. In in-
formal meetings with West Ger-
man political figures, Soviet
correspondents are reportedly
noting that old invitations are
still outstanding for such a
visit and for a visit of a
West German parliamentary
delegation to Moscow.
The Soviet hints are re-
lated to publication in Bonn
of the informal memorandum of
27 December handed to West
German Ambassador Kroll in
Moscow. The Soviet press has
not yet printed the memorandum,
but a Pravda article of 19
January emphasized the ad-
vantages which would accrue
to West Germany if it chose to
embark on a policy of friend-
ship and peace with all neigh-
bors, and echoed some of the
themes of the 27 December
memorandum.
Geneva Test Ban Talks
At the 19 January session
of the test ban talks, Soviet
delegate Tsarapkin said the
Western proposal to move the
test ban negotiations to the
18-nation disarmament talks is
being studied by the Soviet
Government and will be answered
"in due time." Tsarapkin asked
questions which suggested that
the USSR does not want detailed
discussion of a test ban at the
disarmament talks. He indicated
that the Soviet Government would
not permit the US to lead the
18-nation committee away from
general and complete disarma-
ment by getting the committee
to approve a wide system of con-
trol on tests.
Tsarapkin said the Western
proposal indicates that the
US wishes to push through its
"old thesis--control without
disarmament"--which he reit-
erated is unacceptable. He
remarked that the US seems to
be planning to go to the new
organ "with its old luggage."
He did not comment on the West-
ern suggestion that the test
ban question might be taken
up at the disarmament talks
by a subcommittee of three--
the US, Britain, and the USSR.
In the event the Soviet
leadership rejects the West-
ern proposal, the USSR may
bring the test question before
the UN General Assembly. The
assembly session is not expected
to conclude until 10 February.
The USSR may seek formal UN
approval of its proposal for a
ban on atmospheric, outer space,
and underwater tests--using
national detection means--and
a moratorium on underground
tests. The USSR may calculate
that UN approval of the Soviet
proposal would provide difficul-
ties for the US if Washington
should decide to resume atmos-
pheric tests.
(Concurred in by OSI)
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Despite the effective
opposition of the larger Latin
American countries to any con-
ference decision imposing sanc-
tions against the Castro re-
gime, general agreement that
a Marxist-Leninist government
is incompatible with the prin-
ciples of the Organization of
American States appears to be
emerging from the meeting at
Punta del Este.
The countries which had
indicated before the confer-
ence began that they were
against sanctions--Argentina,
Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Ecua-
dor, and Mexico--have main-
tained that stand and have
been joined by Haiti, which
apparently is seeking to indi-
cate dissatisfaction with
Haitian-US relations. This
group as a whole, however,
apparently has not been re-
ceptive to the proposal for
"neutralization" of Cuba advo-
cated by Brazil, which has
been the most active opponent
of strong anti-Castro action.
Cuba's approach to the con-
ference has emphasized its common
tradition and cultural ties with ?r?^
The general consensus of
the conference that Cuba's
Marxist-Leninist orientation
is incompatible with the princi-
ples of the OAS implies eventual
exclusion of Cuba from the
organization. The importance
of juridical considerations to
most Latin American governments
suggests that the development
of legal provision for ex-
clusion may require protracted
negotiation and possibly the
scheduling of another confer-
ence in a few months. The OAS
charter now has no provision
for expulsion of a member.
The OAS may, however, act
to limit Cuban access to certain
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
of its institutions.. Last April,
for example, Cuba was voted
out of secret sessions of the
21-nation Inter-American De-
fense Board--the OAS military
group which meets in Washing-
ton to plan defense strategy
for the western hemisphere.
The Board voted 12-1 to bar
Castro's representatives as
long as Cuba continues its
evident alliance with the Com-
munist bloc. Cuba was alone
in opposition; Mexico, Vene-
zuela, Ecuador, and Chile ab-
stained; Brazil reserved its
vote; and three countries were
absent.
Communist calls for demon-
strations against the confer-
ence are meeting with varying
success and in several areas
have been overshadowed by
rallies protesting against the
Castro regime. In areas where
demonstrations have had to be
postponed because of a poor
turnout, plans are being made
to hold later rallies, in
some cases after the results
of the conference are known,
to correspond with Havana's
"national assembly of the
people" rescheduled for 4 Feb-
ruary.
A reported 25,000 Boliv-
ians participated in a torch-
light parade in La Paz shout-
ing "Cuba yes, Russia no" and
"Bolivia yes, Communism no,"
and demanded that Bolivia break
relations with Cuba. In Quito,
from 6,000 to 10,000 anti-Com-
munists met last weekend to
demand that President Arose-
mena fight Communist infiltration
and immediately break relations
with Cuba. Simultaneously an
estimated 35,000-70,000 Ecua-
doreans demonstrating in Guaya-
quil made similar demands. In
Lima, however, an anti-Castro
"march of silence" drew only
100 persons, and the Peruvian
regime--as is the case in Mexi-
co--continues to prevent pro-
Castro elements from holding
public demonstrations.
The 18 January pro-Cuba
rally in Santiago, Chile, at-
tracted only a moderate crowd
of about 3,000, and Chilean
Communists now are reportedly
awaiting the results of the
conference and planning strikes
throughout the country if po-
litical or economic action is
taken against Cuba. Efforts
to promote student demonstra-
tions in Honduras met with
such little response that pro-
Cuban demonstrations, even
among workers, have been post-
poned.
Communist agitators have
realized their greatest suc-
cess in Venezuela, where pro-
Castro elements have capital-
ized on general labor unrest
in the capital to stage wide-
spread demonstrations which con-
tinued during three days despite
strict security measures. In
Costa Rica and areas of Brazil,
local pro-Castro rallies have
protested OAS action against
Cuba. The Uruguayan Communists
have taken little action, and
calls for violence reportedly met
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
High French officials have
asserted that virtual agreement
has been reached with the pro-
visional Algerian government
(PAG) on all major issues, and
they appear to be setting mid-
February as a "deadline" for
PAG concurrence.
come of current French efforts
to control terrorism in Algeria
and smash the Secret Army Organ-
ization (OAS) will probably be
a key factor in any final PAG
decision.
French negotiators and
other officials are report-
edly convinced that rebel pre-
mier Ben Khedda, supported by
vice premier Belkacem Krim and
foreign minister Saad Dahlab,
is determined to achieve a
negotiated solution with the
French. Foreign Minister
Couve de Murville told Ambas-
sador Gavin on 20 January that
"things are going along well
and a settlement is antici-
pated,"
A Foreign Ministry offi-
cial told a US Embassy officer
last week that government cir-
cles feel that agreement will
have to be reached within the
next few weeks or "other meas-
ures" will have to be considered.
While there is still occasional
speculation concerning the old
alternative of forming an "Al-
gerian Algeria" without the
cooperation of the PAG if ne-
gotiations fail, it now seems
more likely that De Gaulle
would be obliged to implement
his threat of "regrouping"
the European settlers as a
last-resort pressure on the
PAG to reach an acceptable
accord.
The collegial decision-
making process of the PAG is
probably slowing down a final
decision. Couve de Murville
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commented to Gavin that, as
each point arises, PAG negotia-
tors must travel to discuss it
with their colleagues--a pro-
cedure that takes about a week.
Moreover, there are reports that
the PAG, still apparently re-
luctant to take responsibility
for a final decision, intends
to call another meeting of the
National Council of the Algerian
Revolution (CNRA), the 54-man
"parliament" of the rebel move-
ment, to ratify any agreement.
Yazid has explained to a US
Embassy officer in Tunis that
any agreement involving a cease-
fire would have to be approved
by a four-fifths majority. CNRA
meetings have generally been
long and chaotic, and in view
of reports of serious rifts
between the PAG and rebel fight-
ing units which are represented
in the CNRA, a meeting at this
time could be particularly dif-
ficult.
Meanwhile, the OAS terror-
ism aimed at disrupting pros-
pects for an agreement has now
gained such momentum that
French officials--adding up
casualties caused by both
Europeans and Moslems since
1 January--say ' this_.period
is comparable to the worst
weeks of,1956-57. De facto
"partition" within the trou-
bled cities of Algiers and
Oran is already being achieved
to some extent as both OAS and
FLN gangs forcibly evict minor-
ity families from mixed res-
idential areas.
While the Delegation Gen-
erale is avoiding proclamation
of martial law, it has clamped
severe security restrictions
on Algiers, Oran, and Bone. The
authorities hope that such meas-
ures as cordoning off troubled
sectors and strict control of
vehicular and pedestrian traffic
will severely hamper OAS move-
ments and lead to tie apprehen-
sion of more activists. The
special investigative police
units recently sent to Algeria
from metropolitan France are
now reported to be making some
headway in countering OAS ac-
tivities.
Whether an accord can be
implemented may depend on the
effectiveness of these new secu-
rity measures. An important
factor will be the attitude of
the FLN.
The loyalty of the
French armed services in
the event of a showdown
with the extremists may
again come into question
following President de Gaulle's
decision last week to over-
rule his advisers and pro-
ceed with immediate evacua-
tion of two more army di-
visions and some air force
units.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
A political settlement in
Laos still appears remote,
despite the "formula" for a
coalition government worked out
at Geneva on 19 January be-
tween Boun Oum and Phoumi,
Souvanna Phouma, and Souphannou-
vong. The two Vientiane lead-
ers subsequently have made it
clear in private statements
that they are as unreconciled
as ever to a coalition govern-
ment under Souvanna, though
their public utterances since
returning to Laos have been more
equivocal. Follow-up talks to
those in Geneva are scheduled
to be held in Luang Prabang to-
ward the end of the month, but
it is not certain this meeting
will materialize.
Boun Oum and Phoumi re-
gard the outcome of the Geneva
talks with great satisfaction,
feeling that they managed to
project an image of reason-
ableness by indicating will-
ingness to relinquish the cab-
inet portfolios of defense and
interior to Souvanna's neu-
tralist supporters while in-
jecting various conditions
calculated to protect their
XIENO U.
KHUANG\
Muon~q S-i