CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

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CURRENT
COPY NO. 76
OCR NO.0400/62
19 January 1962
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY
SUMMARY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
State Department and OSD review(S) completed
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THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECT-
ING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES
WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS,
TITLE 18, USC, SECTIONS 793 AND 794, THE TRANSMIS-
SION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO
AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.
The Current Intelligence Weekly Summary has been prepared
primarily for the internal use of the Central Intelligence
Agency. It does not represent a complete coverage of all
current situations. Comments and conclusions represent the
immediate appraisal of the Office of Current Intelligence.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
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In the meantime Sukarno is ex-
pected to order increased prepa-
rations for military action aimed
at seizing West New Guinea. Fur-
ther incidents, such as an In-
donesian bombing attack against
a Dutch military target, could
spark general hostilities. On
the other hand, although Sukarno
is unlikely to take any initia-
tive toward negotiations, there
are indications that he may
accept acting UN Secretary
General U Thant's offer to
mediate.
The attitude of Sukarno,
who recently had seemed more
amenable to exploratory talks
on a political settlement with
the Dutch, probably has hard-
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Prime Minister de Quay
informed U Thant on 16 January
that his government remained
willing to enter into talks
without conditions but that
Dutch forces would continue to
't make use of their right of
legitimate self-defense." The
Dutch cabinet had met earlier
to consider requesting action
by the UN Security Council but
decided against such a step, in
view of Thant's efforts to per-
suade Indonesia to agree to
The civilian-military junta
which was imposed by General
Rodriguez Echevarria on 16 Janu-
ary in place of the civilian
Council of State headed by Presi-
dent Balaguer can be maintained
only by strongly repressive
measures. At its inception it
faces widespread public repudia-
tion, the active opposition of
all organized political groups,
and disunity among the armed
forces themselves.
The ouster of the 16-day-
old civilian Council of State
grew out of tensions between
opposition leaders and high mili-
tary officers who feared their
talks and the belief that such
an appeal would be premature.
Although the Dutch Government
has made no move yet to add sig-
nificantly to its modest forces in
the area, it has extended the tours
of duty of military personnel serv-
ing in 'lest New Guinea. The Dutch
Navy has only three major fighting
vessels in New Guinea waters--a
destroyer and two frigates--and
there is no evidence that The
Hague plans to increase this
number.
positions would suffer under the
new government, in which Presi-
dent Balaguer was shortly to
be replaced by Rafael Bonelly
as head of the council. The
coup was immediately preceded
by an afternoon incident in
which tank crews shot and killed
several members of a crowd
listening to demands by spokes-
men of the National Civic Union
(UCN) for the immediate resig-
nation of Balaguer.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Some leaders of the UCN, the
main democratic opposition
group, already are planning
to take diplomatic asylum or
to go into hiding in order
to avoid arrest.
Other junta members have
little if any public following,
and the new regime will have
to depend to a large extent
on individuals discredited
during the Trujillo era. One
of the military members, army
Lt. Colonel Nival Seijas, has
a reputation for brutality
and murder under Trujillo.
Another member, Rear Admiral
Enrique Valdez Vidaurre, the
chief of naval operations pri-
or to the coup, is a popular
and respected officer, but
the abortive navy revolt of
13 January showed that there
is strong feeling against Rod-
riguez in navy circles.
The air force representa-
tive on the junta is an obscure
figure; a number of air force
officers resigned last week
in protest against Rodriguez'
"dictatorial" tendencies. The
other two members are civilians
who served as government func-
tionaries under the dictator-
ship. One of these, Huberto
Bogaert, is the nominal presi-
dent of the junta.
Bogaert's address of
17 January, in which he
echoed General Rodriguez'
claims that the "Communist
threat" necessitated the change
in government, will remind
many Dominicans of the simi-
lar rationalizations for
repressive action employed
by the late dictator. Lead-
ers of the UCN are convinced
that Rodriguez actually insti-
gated much of the recent mob
violence to magnify the Com-
munist danger and justify his
action.
Meanwhile, the genuine
Communist threat may grow
as more Dominicans feel im-
pelled toward violent action
which the Communist-infil-
trated 14th of June party
is preparing to lead as an un-
derground organization.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Leaders of the three Laotian
factions are in Geneva at the
invitation of the conference
co-chairmen--the UK and USSR--
but progress toward formation
of a coalition government is
doubtful because of the intransi-
gence of Boun Oum and Phoumi.
The Vientiane leaders, despite
heavy diplomatic pressure, show
every indication of sticking
to their announced purpose in
coming to Geneva: only to dis-
cuss the international aspects
of the Laotian problem. They
have balked at entering formal
talks with Souvanna and Souphan-
nouvong, although an initial
meeting of the three princes
was held on an informal basis
on 18 January.
Boun Oum and Phoumi,
reverting to a position held
before the start of the Geneva
conference last May, have taken
the stand that formation of a
government -is an internal matter
that can take place only on
Laotian soil. Their recent
statements impugning Souvanna's
suitability for the premiership
--including Boun Oum's charge
before the National Assembly
that Souvanna is pro-Communist
--make flexibility at Geneva
difficult. Souvanna Phouma and
Souphannouvong have expressed
dismay at Vientiane's attitude.
Boun Oum and Phoumi appar-
ently hope that even without an
agreement on a coalition an
arrangement can be reached for
a united Laotian representation
at Geneva which would enable
the conference to complete its
work ,on guarantees of Laos'
neutrality and withdrawal of
foreign troops. This approach
probably envisages an appoint-
ment by King Savang, who Phoumi
still hopes can be persuaded
to take personal charge of the
government if and when Souvanna
will admit inability to form
a cabinet.
In conversations with US
officials, Soviet representatives
attempting to lay the blame
Phoumi's continued intran- I There has been little actual
increase in fighting throughout
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19 Jan 62 WEEKLY REVIEW
sigence on what they call the
failure of US policy-makers to
"make him come to terms." On
13 January the Soviet charge in
Washington, under instructions,
delivered a long oral statement
on Laos to Secretary Rusk in
which he claimed that Phoumi's
demand for the posts of defense
and interior was "contrary to
a previous agreement among the
princes." He maintained that
the US "has it in its power" to
make Phoumi stop his delaying
tactics. A similar line was
taken by Gromyko in his 12 Jan-
uary discussions with Ambassador
Thompson. Gromyko said that the
USSR had been astounded at the
negative position taken by Boun
Oum and could not understand this
in view of US influence over him.
Reflecting continued Soviet
apprehension over Vientiane's re-
luctance to reach a settlement
with Souvanna on a coalition
government, Pushkin has told
Ambassador Harriman in Geneva
that he hoped the rival factions
could hammer out an agreement
in five to six days, form a
government, and sign the agree-
ments reached by the conference.
If they failed, he remarked,
it could lead to a "grave situa-
tion." Despite these state-
ments, Communist forces in Laos
probably will continue to exer-
cise restraint for the time
being--unless provoked by major
attacks by Phoumi's troops--in
expectation of an ultimate polit-
ical settlement.
In Laos, the Vientiane
government's Defense Ministry
continues its sporadic output
of communiques alleging stepped-
up enemy attacks and invasion
by Chinese Communist and North
Vietnamese forces. This effort
to keep the military threat in
the forefront seems primarily
designed to generate domestic
support for Phoumi's stand
against a political settlement.
and perhaps ultimately to justify
resumption of hostilities by
Vientiane.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
the country, although the contin-
uing maneuvering and buildup by
both sides have contributed to
increased tension in. several
areas. Enemy forces, reacting
to recent pressure by Laotian
Army units in northern Luang
Prabang Province, have advanced
in limited strength from the
Muong Sai area, pushing the
government troops'back to the
line of the Mekong. In central
Laos, government troops with
NORTHERN LAOS
Forces
r KONG LE - PATHET LAO 1
KONG LE - PATHET LAO AREAS
GOVERNMENT (MEO) BASE AREAS
ROAD
0
TRAIL L_
ROUTE NUMBER
620116 3
air support are continuing
efforts to drive behind enemy-
held Mahaxay and Nhommarath with
the aim of isolating these
points from resupply. Else-
where, scattered skirmishes
continue.
Peiping on 13 January
signed an agreement with the
Souvanna "government" provid-
ing for the establishment of
joint civil air routes between
the two countries. The two
governments at the same dere-
mony also formalized Souvanna
Phouma's acceptance last April
of Peiping's offer to construct
a road from China to Phong Saly
in northwest Laos, where the
Chinese established a consulate
general last fall.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
The pattern of Viet Cong
activity remains unchanged from
that of the past few months.
Relatively small-scale attacks
are concentrated in the south-
ern area, and terrorism and
propaganda are the major activ-
ity reported in the north. There
were 438 incidents reported
during the week ending 8 January,
as compared to 444 and 445 in
the preceding two weeks.
Several instances of sabotage
have been reported, and kid-
napings have included of a
number of schoolchildren. A
Viet Cong prisoner has claimed
that sabotage of land communica-
tions is to be stepped up with
the aim of so disrupting traf-
fic that by June 1962 the
guerrillas can begin "liberating"
Saud v am
COMMUNIST GUERILLA ACTIVITY
Quang Tri
M
MALAYA
SARA A JJ
K1
A',kNOM PENIS
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
isolated villages and towns
region by region. This sug-
gests continuation of the Viet
Cong strategy of expanding con-
trol by carefully planned stages.
Offsetting any such Viet
Cong plan to paralyze the mobil-
ity of government forces, the
South Vietnamese appear to be
making more effective sweeps
and surprise attacks, with the
support of recently arrived
US helicopter squadrons. A new
army division--bringing the
total to eight--was recently
activated in the central Vietnam
coastal area at Qui Nhon, and
plans are reportedly being
devised to provide night air
support to government posts
under attack.
esti-
mates in Saigon place Viet Cong
strength in the country at
20,000 to 25,000 "regular and
regional" forces, with an even
greater number of part-time
guerrilla forces. Viet Cong
casualties in 196-1 are esti-
mated at close to 19,000--a
50-percent increase over the
1960 rate. Despite the recent
weekly declines noted in Com-
munist-initiated incidents,
there is no evidence of an over-
all reduction of Viet Cong
capability. US military sources
have reported recent indications
that Viet Cong attacks in the
northern part of the country may
shortly be stepped up.
The Chinese Communists re-
iterated their support for Com-
munist efforts in South Vietnam
during the visit to Peiping last
week of a representative of the
National Front for the Libera-
tion of South Vietnam, the
Hanoi-directed political arm of
the Viet Cong. At a rally for
the visitor on 12 January,
Chinese Communist party central
committee member Liu Chang-sheng
cited the situation in South
Vietnam as a prime example of
the inevitability of armed re-
sistance and vowed every effort
to give firm support to the
South Vietnamese people. People's
Dail on 14 January echoed this
view, arguing that there is no
alternative to armed activity
in forcing US withdrawal and
the collapse of the Diem gov-
ernment.
The Diem government on 10
January passed an aide-memoire
to a Cambodian official pro-
posing a meeting of military
representatives in an effort to
reach an arrangement on border
control. With the toning down
of Saigon's charges that Cam-
bodia is permitting the Viet
Cong to maintain bases across
the border on its territory,
there are indications that
Prince Sihanouk may be amenable
to such an approach.
The USSR has finally re-
sponded to North Vietnam's notes
of 25 November and 28 December,
which requested the Geneva co-
chairmen to consult "without
delay" on the situation in South
Vietnam. On 10 January, the
Soviet charge in London delivered
an aide-memoire to the UK
strongly condemning the "fla-
grant interference of the US in
the internal affairs of South
Vietnam." Reflecting the USSR's
cautious approach to this
question, the note did not call
for any joint action by the co-
chairmen. However, according
to the UK, it was somewhat
sharper than previous communica-
tions and suggests that Moscow
is anxious to appear responsive
chairmen.
to repeated North Vietnamese
requests for action by the co-
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Adoula's moves against
Gizenga appear to have strength-
ened the premier's domestic and
international position and
should enable him to intensify
his efforts to end Katanga's
secession. Gizenga has been
dismissed as vice premier and
remains under house arrest in
Stanleyville.
Long anxious to rid him-
self of Gizenga, Adoula had
been forced to temporize, not
only because he believed the
reduction of Tshombe took
precedence but because he
feared a move against Gizenga
would cost him the support of
the Gizengists and Lumumbists
and because he had no depend-
able force to support any action
he might take against the Stan-
leyville leader. The abrupt
move against Gizenga on 15 Jan-
uary succeeded because a number
of factors had changed.
Gizenga's downfall began
when he accepted a post in the
Adoula government, ending his
claim to be the legal successor
to Lumumba. Gizenga's former
African and Soviet bloc support-
ers recognized the Adoula gov-
ernment, and Gizenga, in Stan-
leyville, was never able to re-
establish his previous lines of
financial and material support.
By trying to promote himself as
the leader of a new "umbrella"
nationalist party, he challenged
rival political leaders and so
alienated them they were no
longer opposed to a, move against
him. Gizenga's final mistake
was to attempt an armed rebel-
lion on 13 January when the
bulk of his potential army sup-
porters were a long way from
Stanleyville.
Gizenga, however, may still
be able to generate enough ex-
tremist and diplomatic support
from the radical African states
and the Soviet bloc to thwart
or at least temper Adoula's
moves. There are, moreover,
reports that some of Gizenga's
Stanleyville army supporters--
now in northern Katanga--may
try to rescue him.
Adoula told Ambassador
Gullion on 15 January that he
intended to keep Gizenga in
Stanleyville several days while
dossiers in his case were being
prepared. The premier gave no
indication of what fate he in-
tended for Gizenga, but it
seems unlikely he will let him
go free.
Adoula also expressed the
hope that the downfall of Gi-
zenga would have a beneficial
effect on Tshombe. Adoula is
acutely aware that his position
as premier is insecure and sub-
ject to "nationalist" challenge
and harassment as long as the
Katanga problem remains unre-
solved.
Adoula continues to insist
that additional Congolese Army
forces be brought into Katanga.
He plans to come to the US (no
date is yet set) and apparently
intends to press the issue then.
Reports on Adoula's impend-
ing cabinet reshuffle indicate
he intends to try to maintain
the somewhat uneasy alliance be-
tween the "moderates" and the
"nationalists." Their only real
bond is a common desire to gain
control of Katanga. Adoula him-
self lacks a solid political or
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tribal base and has always
moved cautiously against the
"nationalists," alternating
pressure and compromise. Am-
bassador Gullion believes Adoula
is too astute to force a show-
down with them, particularly be-
fore Tshomb6 is brought to heel.
Adoula was able to move against
Gizenga because he was isolated;
a frontal attack on the "nation-
alists" now--although they are
in disarray and fighting among
themselves--might result in
their coalescence against him.
A new cabinet list drawn up as
of 23 December preserved the
balance between the two groups,
gave more even geographical rep-
resentation, and dispensed with
some lesser "nationalists" and
others regarded as incompetent
or as political liabilities.
Adoula stated pubicly on
16 January that Gizenga's vice-
premiership was "open to a mem-
ber of Tshombe's party, depend-
ing on the outcome of the delib-
erations of the Katanga Assem-
bly." Besides the premiership,
Adoula now holds the Ministry
of Defense, which has often been
reported as "open" to a Tshomb6
follower.
The Katanga Assembly con-
tinues to stall in its delibera-
tions on the Kitona agreement;
its "foreign affairs" committee
has recorded sharp reservations
on three basic points, and the
"political committee" is still
considering the accord. In
Leopoldville, the constitutional
discussions are going somewhat
better. In initial meetings
the three-man Katanga delegation
has not strenuously objected to
Leopoldville's draft, and spokes-
men for both sides have expressed
optimism that a compromise can
be worked out.
However, Mabmoud Khiari, UN
chief of civil operations, told
US officials in New York recently
that he believes the extent
of Tshombe's agreement to the
Kitona accord depends on what
Tshomb6 considers to be unavoid-
able, and that the pressure must
be maintained on the Katangan
leader. He suggested further
penetration by Leopoldville
troops into northern Katanga
and UN control of strategic
points in southern Katanga, al-
though he said fighting was
"not necessary or desirable."
UN officials in Elisabeth-
ville report the city is calm
and incidents are diminishing.
A prisoner exchange between the
UN and Katanga was made on 16
January. UN officials neverthe-
less are disturbed by continu-
ing reports of Katangan recruit-
ment of mercenaries and pro-
curement of military equipment.
The top UN civilian in Katanga
told US officials recently he
intends to "have a serious talk"
with Tshomb6 soon regarding the
mercenary problem.
The mounting death toll
and the tendency toward mob
violence have created a dan-
gerous degree of tension in
the major Algerian cities. Mo-
rale of French civil and mil-
itary officials in the area has
declined, reportedly because of
inadequate political guidance,
terrorism against their person-
nel, and discouragement over
results of their efforts to re-
gain control of the situation.
Measures contemplated by Paris
to deal with the situation may
not be adequate to keep up with
events.
Minister for Defense Mess-
mer and Minister for Algerian
Affairs Joxe recently made sep-
arate visits to Algeria to con-
fer with civilian and military
officials on the spot. General
Ailleret, commander in chief in
Algeria, met with De Gaulle on
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17 January. Paris has drafted
a series of measures--such as
reinforcing urban security
forces and using standby powers
to control movement of civilian
residents--to be applied in
stages.
Rebel leaders reportedly
plan to launch a major terror-
ist campaign against members of
the Secret Army Organization
(OAS)
is materialize, it could pre-
cipitate large-scale counterat-
tacks by the Europeans and might
bring the army to accede to OAS
pressure for cooperation. The
French Government on 17 January
specifically noted that the sit-
uation in Algeria would be
handled within the framework
of existing civil powers.
The US Embassy in Paris
reports that the French Foreign
Ministry's reactions to last
week's communique from the pro-
visional Algerian government
(PAG) was partly one of relief
that the door was still open to
negotiations, but a security of-
ficial noted that the'communique's
reference to stepped-up rebel
activity-against the OAS nulli-
fied,the portion on negotiations.
The embassy'in Tunis noted a
general feeling there that the
communique had greatly improved
the prospect for a_settlement,
while according to the embassy
in Rabat, "satisfaction" and
"optimism" were the words most
often used to express reaction
to the communique in press and
diplomatic circles.
There are indications that
part of the purpose of PAG pre-
mier Ben Khedda's prolonged
stay in Morocco is to re-estab-
lish PAG authority over rebel
.
military units in that':country.
There have been reports of
open dissidence among these
units, and the PAG doubtless
feels that it must have firm
control before any accord with
the French is announced. It
appears that Ben Khedda's ef-
forts in this respect have
been successful, at least for
the time being.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
COMMON MARKET DEVELOPMENTS
Common Market (EEC) offi-
cials are generally jubilant
over the 14 January accord on
farm policy which has belatedly
permitted the opening--retro-
active to 1 January--of the
second of the EEC's three
transitional stages. Although
still incomplete in certain
details, the agreement is a
major step toward the integrated
EEC market for farm products
called for by the 1957 Common
Market Treaty and essential to
the delicate balance of national
interests in the EEC. The
resulting market will be a
protected one, but probably less
so than the national markets it
replaces.
The comprehensive policy
embodied in the agreement regu-
lates trade in grains, pork,
eggs, poultry, wine, fruits, and
vegetables, and makes general
provision for fair competition,
minimum prices, and financing
of the program. While the
marketing systems will vary on
specific products, one of their
principal features will be the
use of variable import levies or
tariffs as the sole protective
device for most of these items.
Through these levies import
prices will be raised to the
level of EEC target prices, and
the resulting receipts will be
used to subsidize farm exports,
support prices, and encourage
farming improvements.
This program--to become
effective over a transitional
period of seven and a half
years beginning in July--is of
such scope that a ranking Bonn
official has said any national
parliament would have required
a year to decide it. The major
difficulties were caused, how-
ever, by only a few key issues.
On one of these, the level at
which prices will ultimately be
harmonized, no real decision was
made, but support prices were
frozen at present levels, and
the first step toward harmoni-
zation has been set for mid-
1963.
On two other critical
issues--administration of safe-
guard clauses and financing of
the agricultural fund--ingenious
compromises were found. If its
market is disrupted by imports,
any member country may suspend
the otherwise automatic issuance
of import licenses. The EEC's
independent commission, however,
may decide within four days to
annul that suspension, and the
member country will have no
recourse except to the supra-
national community court. During
the first three years, the costs
of the program will be met in
large part by national contribu-
tions to the EEC's farm fund. It
is expected, however, that after
this initial period the fund
will be financed entirely by the
community's import levies.
The prominent role which
the EEC's institutions will thus
continue to play in carrying
out the farm program increases
the political significance of
the 14 January agreement--
which in any case would have
been considerable. The "farm
problem" has always been con-
sidered one of the most diffi-
cult the EEC has had to face,
but when the chips were down,
none of the member countries
was prepared to assume responsi-
bility for failure. In all
major respects the agricultural
policy which finally emerged
is the handiwork of Commissioner
Mansholt, and his contribution
has again demonstrated the vital
part the Commission plays in
the working of the EEC.
By paving the way for the
opening of the second stage,
the farm accord has contributed
to the permanence of the EEC.
Certain decisions which hereto-
fore required unanimity can be
made in this second stage by
a majority of the member states,
and neither the second nor
third stage can be prolonged
beyond the prescribed four
years except by unanimous con-
sent. These stages may be
shortened, however, and the
EEC council is expected to meet
next month to decide whether
the tariff changes scheduled
for the second stage shall be
accelerated.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
CONFERENCE OF INDEPENDENT AFRICAN STATES
The conference of independ-
ent African states to be held in
Lagos, Nigeria, from 22 to 30
January promises to be the
largest to date. Arrangements
call for three days of talks at
the foreign ministers' level,
followed immediately by a meet-
ing of heads of state or govern-
ment. It is sponsored by the
20 moderate African governments
which sent delegates to Monrovia
last May to plan functional co-
operation, but apparently will
also be attended by representa-
tives of the five more radical
African states in the Casablanca
grouping.
All independent states
except South Africa, which was
not invited, have apparently
indicated their intention to
attend--although some now seem
to be wavering because the
Algerian rebels have not yet been
invited. The Nigerians, out of
deference to objections by some
pro-French African states, have
maintained that the question
of Algerian representation can
be settled only by the conference
itself. The Casablanca powers'
decision to be represented at
the foreign ministers' level
was reached only after they had
failed to force a postponement
of the conference. They would
have preferred, for reasons of
face, that reunion with the
Monrovia powers take place at
the conference to be held in
Tunis next April--which was
scheduled before the Casablanca-
Monrovia split developed. The
Lagos gathering has posed partic-
ular problems for Morocco be-
cause Mauritania, which Rabat
claims is: rightfully part of its
territory, will be there.
However, when it became
clear that Nigeria's Prime
Minister Balewa was determined
to proceed with a meeting in
Lagos now, the Casablanca allies
were unwilling--at least until
very recently when the question
of Algerian representation ap-
parently became acute--to absent
themselves, as they had from Mon-
rovia. Their agreement to attend
influenced Sudan and, apparently,
the Somali Republic--states which
have been reluctant to take sides
in intra-African conflicts not
affecting their immediate inter-
ests.
Agenda items, now being
discussed through diplomatic
channels, are to be fixed by
the foreign ministers. Nigeria
and other moderates hope to focus
discussion on 16 recommendations
concerning economic, cultural,
and technical cooperation and
the coordination of transport
and communications worked out
in Dakar last July by a commis-
sion of experts from the Monrovia
states. Other Nigerian sug-
gestions reportedly will include:
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"topical" subjects such as
Angola, Congo, Algeria, and
South Africa; establishment of
a loose overall African organi-
zation; and the question of
African association with the
EEC.
The more cohesive Casablanca
group, on the other hand, appar-
ently intends to try to divorce
the Lagos meeting from the Mon-
rovia background and, by exploit-
ing the general African desire
for "unity," to push its own
more militant, essentially anti-
Africa
LAGOS CONFERENCE
O Monrovia oup
O Casablanca group
the Algerian rebels' provisional
government s also affiliated.`
Egyptian
officials have also been stress-
ing, in contacts with US repre-
sentatives, the desirability of
an all-African ministerial-level
meeting at which "differences"
could be discussed,
The Casablanca group may
hold separate pre-conference
the preliminary meeting.
talks in Accra to coordinate
strategy and positions. There
are some indications that
at least some of the Casablanca
chiefs of state, including
Ghanaian President Nkrumah,
may attend the summit phase
if they are reasonably
satisfied with the results of
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
EAST GERMANY MOVES TO ASSERT "SOVEREIGNTY"
The East German regime ap-
pears to be recovering from the
uncertainty and confusion of
recent weeks and to be moving
ahead with the campaign to as-
sert its sovereignty, particular-
ly at the Berlin sector border
and at the zonal border with
West Germany.
Along the sector border in
Berlin the regime during the
past week has begun building
sheds, apparently for customs
control purposes, at three
crossing points, in addition to
a shed completed earlier at the
Friedrichstrasse crossing, and
may plan to build others at the
three remaining crossing points.
Over the weekend of 13-14 Janu-
ary, West German traffic through
the crossing at Heinrich Heine
Strasse (also called Prinzen-
strasse) was slowed almost to
a standstill as East German
police carried out meticulous
searches of West Germans, in-
cluding the stripping and search-
ing of all males. The Bornholmer-
strasse crossing point, also for
West Germans, was closed for the
night of 15-16 January and re-
portedly will be closed nightly
in the future.
While this harassment of
West Germans probably was in-
tended primarily to strengthen
security during a major Commu-
nist celebration on 14 January
(commemorating the murder of
Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Lieb-
knecht in 1919),it may have had
the additional purpose of put-
ting Bonn on notice that current
moves to discourage participa-
tion by West German firms in
the Leipzig fair this March
will lead to reprisals at the
city sector border and probably
the East - West German zonal
frontier.
There has been no direct
interference with the access
of Western Allied military ve-
hicles conducting routine patrols
in East Berlin. On 10 January,
however, East German surveillance
personnel tailing a US Military
Liaison Mission auto in Potsdam
broke the virtual truce which
had existed for almost a month
by stopping the car, breaking
its window, and hitting the US
officer driving it in the face.
When the chief of the US mission
protested to the chief of the
Soviet External Relations
Branch of the Group of Soviet
Forces in Germany (GSFG), the
Soviet officer apologized for
the attack, characterized the
behavior of the East Germans
as inexcusable, and said he
is under strict instructions
from GSFG headquarters to avoid
undesirable incidents with the
missions. Seven American officers
assigned to photograph the Com-
munist ceremonies on 14 January
were harassed--but not physi-
cally assaulted--by a crowd of
East Germans wearing party badges.
The East German regime is
reiterating its claim to the
right to control the Berlin air
corridors. An article in the
January issue of the Foreign
Ministry's semiofficial Aussen-
politik asserts that the civil
airlines are not entitled to
fly the corridors unless they
acknowledge East German sovereignty,
and that the Western Allies have
forfeited their air access rights
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
by violations of postwar quadri-
partite agreements. The tenor
of this article suggests that,
in the event of a separate
Soviet - East German treaty,
Autobahn
Highway
Railroad
i Railroad(elevated)
(S-Bohn)
Subway (U-Bohn)
X S-Bahn tracks torn
up at these points
0 MILES 5
MEMBERS OF DIPLOMATIC CORPS
AND OCCUPATION FORCES ONLY
8. Friedrichstrasse
WEST GERMANS ONLY
3. Bornholmerstrasse
9. Heinrich Heine Strasse
WEST BERLINERS ONLY
5. Chausseestrasse
6. Invalidenstrasse
10. Oberbaumbruecke
13. Sonnen Allee
ORIGINAL CROSSING POINTS
OF 13 AUGUST NOW CLOSED
1. Kopenhagenerstrasse
2. Wollankstrasse
4. Brunnenstrasse
7. Brandenburger Tor (Gate)
Ulbricht will quickly attempt
to intimidate the Western
carriers into dealing with East
German authorities or stop
flying into Berlin.
11. Puschkin Allee Authorized East Germans and East Berliners
12. Eisenstrasse presumably can cross at any border points
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Heinrich Heine
Sta.. ,c
CENTRAL BERLIN
Construction in progress: 3,5 and 9
Construction completed: 8
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Some important act by the
rubber-stamp East German People's
Chamber to underline the regime's
"sovereignty" may be forthcoming.
One possible move might be en-
actment of a new customs law,
known to be pending, which would
put a "legal" end to the still
existing economic union between
East and West Germany and report-
edly would designate East Ger-
many's boundaries--including the
Berlin sector border--as state
frontiers. Another might be a
law calling for general con--
scription in East Germany.
On 12 January, Minister
of Defense Heinz Hoffman de-
livered a radio address in which
he stated that, while East Ger-
many. had hitherto "restricted
the National Peoples Army to
90,000 men and for years has
abstained from a generally com-
pulsory draft" despite appeals
from workers for such a move,
in the future "national defense
will be brought to further
completion" and the provisions
of the National Defense Law
will be carried out "in every
respect."
The release on 15 Janurary
of two American students con-
victed of helping an East Ber-
lin girl in,:..an attempt to
escape to West Berlin last
August would seem to have been
undertaken for its propaganda
value as an act of clemency
by a sovereign state. The
regime, however, has shown
no disposition to release
Frederick Pryor, a Yale
University graduate student
who was working on a doctoral
dissertation at the Free Univer-
sity of West Berlin. In recent
weeks, Pryor's parents have been
under East German pressure to
work out an exchange of Pryor for
Col. Rudolf Abel, the convicted
Soviet spy now in prison in the
US. If this fails, the regime will
probably charge Pryor with seeking
contacts with prominent East Ger-
mans identified with the anti-
Ulbricht faction headed by Karl
Schirdewan and may even stage a
show trial designed to discredit
Ulbricht's former rival.
Moscow shows some signs of
concern that the latest revela-
tions of Stalin's crimes and the
measures taken. since October in
the de-Stalinization campaign
have confused and disoriented
the man in the street. The ini-
tialshock was occasioned by the
fact that the full extent of the
late dictator's-misdeeds against
hiw own people had never been
publicly revealed. Dismay at
their enormity and excitement
over what de-Stalinization ap-
peared to mean were accompanied,
however, by a sense of relief
and relaxation; in assessing
the overall effects of the 22nd
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Soviet party congress on the
Soviet people, the American Em-
bassy in Moscow noted the freer
public discussion and expression
of opinion, which contrasted
sharply with the careful con-
formity of Stalinist times.
In this atmosphere, funda-
mental second thoughts of seri-
ous concern to the regime are
being expressed among the people.
Some citizens have evidently be-
gun to wonder out loud what guar-
antees exist against the emer-
gence of a new personality cult,
and whether there is any real
difference between Stalin's pow-
er and the authority now wielded
by the Kremlin. The present
leaders' activities during Sta-
lin's time have occasionally
been questioned at public meet-
ings. The question of the role
played by the party as a whole
in the building of socialism
has been raised.
The regime was clearly
aware that the nature of its
attacks against Stalin made such
questioning virtually inevitable.
Immediately after the congress
the propaganda mill began to
supply answers in an attempt to
prevent the-development of un-
healthy trends. Heavy emphasis
was given in November and early
December to explaining the
difference between Stalin's au-
tocratic powers and the author-
ity of today's "collective lead-
ership" as well as assurances
that the personality cult could
never recur.
On 14 November, for example,
a writer in the trade-union organ
Trud asserted that the authority
ourrent leaders, "as N.S.
Khrushchev reminded us at the
congress," derives from the ac-
tivities of the masses they
head. Pravda put forward a simi-
lar thesis a week later, holding
that leaders are outstanding
only when they correctly express
the interests of the party and
faithfully serve the people.
As the same time, repeated
reminders appeared that the party
program and statutes adopted at
the 22nd congress contain "seri-
ous guarantees" against any re-
vivals of the personality cult
--presumably the provisions for
systematic turnover in the com-
position of all party bodies.
No mention was made of the fact
that recognized leaders of "out-
standing ability" are specifi-
cally exempted.
One of the most troublesome
problems for the regime's propa-
gandists stems from the allega-
tions that Stalin was a complete
autocrat. Socialism now is
claimed to have triumphed "com-
pletely" in the USSR, and it is
clear that it must have" had its
greatest development during Sta-
lin's era. The question thus
arises as to exactly what the
Soviet party as a whole contrib-
uted to that development. Some
have suggested that the party
was forced into stagnation or
perhaps even into degeneration
under Stalin. Others have admit-
tedly claimed that, owing to the
country's peculiar international
situation, one-man rule was the
only workable formula for prog-
ress at that time.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Both these views have been
branded a deviation from the
"Marxist-Leninist interpreta-
tion of history," because, it
is argued, no one man could
alone have decided all theoret-
ical and practical questions.
Nothing could stop the progres-
sive movement of society toward
socialism, it is maintained, and
the party remained Leninist and
socialist despite the obstacles
posed by the cult of personality.
Propaganda has carefully
avoided any direct comment on
the related question of the ac-
tivities of present leaders dur-
ing Stalinist times. The alle-
gation that democratic princi-
ples were kept alive in republic
and provincial party organiza-
tions may be intended as an im-
plicit answer, since Khrushchev
and most other members of his
hierarchy were working at lower
levels during the darkest days
of Stalin's terror.
There was no discernible
pattern in the way in which
these answers were presented.
Throughout the weeks following
the congress, it appeared that
the propaganda machinery went
into action whenever the Kremlin
felt that a particular question
was beginning to trouble the
populace. By December, however,
Moscow had evidently become con-
vinced that this approach had
not been entirely successful.
On 25 December, Khrushchev
accordingly convened the largest
nationwide conference of propa-
gandists in Soviet history to
discuss "the 22nd congress and
tasks of ideological work."
The four-day proceedings were
dominated by central party sec-
retary Leonid Ilichev, veteran
head of the central committee's
agitation and propaganda depart-
ment, who delivered an unpre-
cedented indictment of Stalin
as a theoretician. He accused
the late dictator of the gamut
of doctrinal heresies, ranging
from abolition of the Marxist
"law of the negation of the
negation" to grave errors on
the question of raising collec-
tive farm property to the level
of public property.
Ilichev exhorted the ideolo-
gists to take up the offensive
in indoctrinating the people.
He called for patient and insist-
ent explanations of the party's
viewpoint on the cult of per-
sonality and a clear differenta-
tion between Stalin's power and
the "vitally necessary" author-
ity of the present leaders. He
cautioned, however, both against
dogmatic, uncritical attitudes
and against allowing anti-Lenin-
ist views to be advanced un^er
the guise of combating Stalin-
ism, and added that such views
should not be permitted to leak
into the press. Claiming that
certain recent press articles
suggested that "not everybody
had understood the demands of
the 22nd congress," Ilichev
cited one writer who had gone
too far in attacking the person-
ality cult, with the result that
he had "cast doubt on the whole
political economy of socialism."
On the other hand, Ilichev la-
mented, some people were still
"sticking to the viewpoint that
Stalin was a theoretical god."
Such warnings reflect a de-
sire to establish limits at both
extremes of the doctrinal spec-
trum and thus to set up the
framework within which the ideo-
logical re-education of the So-
viet people is to take place.
Thus far, however, the Kremlin
appears undecided on just which
aspects of Stalinism to discard
and which to retain, and on the
extent to which any further lib-
eralization of thought will be
tolerated. Furthermore, the
regime has been unable to evolve
completely convincing arguments
that the nature of Kremlin rule
has undergone a fundamental per-
manent change. The ideological
conference appears to have been
notable chiefly for its failure
to provide new answers to those
questions which Moscow feels
must be most troublesomie to
the general populace.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
SINO-SOVIET-ALBANIAN RELATIONS
The Sino-Albanian docu-
ments signed on 13 January in
cluded agreements on 1962 trade,
technical; and scientific coop-
eration, and the provision by
the Chinese Communists of com-
plete plants for Albania. They
also cover Chinese credits for
Albania, and some. reports im-
ply that new credits are in-
volved; so far,press commen-
taries from Peiping and Tirana
have blurred this matter. Pei-
ping already is committed to
an extensive long-term economic
aid program under earlier credit
agreements--$13,500,000 in 1959
and $125,000,000 last year,
most of which remains unused.
The agreements are aimed
at countering the sanctions
imposed on Albania by the USSR
and the European satellites
and were signed at a time when
Peiping is holding trade talks
with the USSR. As happened in
1961, the Chinese may withhold
the more precise terms of the
agreements with Tirana pending
the outcome of the Soviet nego-
tiations.
As it did in mid-1960,
Moscow is again hinting that
China may find itself cut off
from Soviet bloc economic sup-
port. On 6 January a Soviet
radio commentary to Indonesia,
allegedly responding to a lis-
tener's question on Soviet aid
to Peiping, warned that "the
idea of building socialism sep-
arately from other socialist
countries is theoretically un-
sound... it is reactionary in
nature and dangerous polit-
ically."
Foreign Minister Chen Yi
the day before had told Chi-
nese Communist scientists and
engineers that "by relying mainly
on our own efforts, in addition
to international aid, scientific
and technical problems in China's
economic construction and nation-
al defense can be solved." Chen's
statement is the first by any
Chinese Communist official to in-
clude problems of }'national de-
fense"--i.e., equipping and mod-
ernizing Peiping's armed forces--
in the category of self-reliance,
and suggests that the Chinese
leaders are willing to accept the
continued prospect of reduced
Soviet military aid rather than
yield on the question of Albania
and bloc strategy.
Directly contradicting So-
viet statements, Chinese Premier
Chou En-lai on 13 January de-
clared Albanian party boss Hoxha's
leadership "correct" and praised
Tirana's defense of the "purity"
of Communist doctrine. A press
communique on the economic talks,
issued in Peiping on 15 January,
by implication took Moscow to
task for disrupting bloc unity
through its political and eco-
nomic sanctions against Albania
and China.
There are indications that
the Sino-Soviet dispute may lead
to a scaling down of diplomatic
contacts between Moscow and Pei-
ping. The Chinese have already
reduced the size of their diplo-
matic staff in Moscow.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Despite the deterioration
of Albania's relations with the
Soviet bloc, which included
severance of diplomatic rela-
tions with the USSR in early
December, Albania has not been
formally ousted from the War-
saw Pact or the bloc's Council
for Mutual Economic Assistance
(CEMA).
Recent Albanian comment
has differed from Peiping's
only by using names and harsh-
er language. A Zeri i Popullit
article on 9 January stated
that Khrushchev had twisted
Lenin's concept of peaceful co-
existence to mean that the pol-
icy of the Soviet state must
be "confined" to the matter of
living at peace with states of
different social systems. The
complaint is that Khrushchev
deliberately ignores the prob-
lem of relations among Commu-
nist-led states based on the
principles of "fraternal aid
and assistance" and the need
to support "by all means" the
liberation struggle of depend-
ent peoples--the latter charge
made again by the Chinese on
New Year's Day. The article con-
cedes that at the Soviet 20th
party congress Khrushchev ad-
vised Communists in capitalist
countries to prepare either for
the peaceful or nonpeaceful road
to a seizure of state power,
but it goes on, as had Peiping,
to attack Khrushchev's reluc-
tance to stress the nonpeaceful
road--"armed revolt."
Zeri i Popullit also states
that one o rus c ev's most
"dangerous views" is his in-
sistence that disarmament is
the "only" road to peace and
represents the "primary and
most urgent tasks" for the
world Communist and "anti-
colonial" movement, by which 25X1
colonial peoples "automatically 25X1
will be saved from im erialism "
without fi htin
The Chinese Communists may
have been responsible for the
publication in a Hong Kong Com-
munist newspaper, Ching Po, of
a direct attack on Khrushchev.
Chinese Communist officials ar-
rived in Hong Kong in November
to join the local Communist
press organization--a move which
may have resulted in the publi-
cation on 28 December of an
editorial stating that "Khru-
shchev's cult of personality
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
is responsible for the Albanian
problem." Although the attack
could be merely an expression
of the editor's own opinion, it
does not contradict the. views
believed to be held privately
by Chinese officials.
Khrushchev's prestige is
deeply committed in the current
dispute, and Moscow seems intent
upon demonstrating the extent
of Tirana's and Peiping's iso-
lation in the Communist move-
ment on the issue of Albania.
Pravda on 12 January carried
a Tunisian Communist appeal for
"every" Communist party to crit-
icize Tirana. The Albanians are
complaining that Khrushchev in
effect is trying to compel non-
Soviet parties to attack their
leadership openly. Pravda on 17
January claimed that t e Albanian
leaders were condemned by "the
overwhelming majority of sister
parties" and the "entire" Com-
munist movement.
Khrushchev has thus far
been supported among the world's
Communist parties by roughly
the same majority which backed
him in late 1960, but he is find-
ing it more difficult now to
conceal the existence of a
strong minority and to suppress
its views.
CHINESE COMMUNIST RELATIONS WITH JAPAN
Communist China's economic
difficulties, together with its
strained relations with other
members of the bloc, have ap-
parently induced it to modify
its attitude toward trade with
Japan. Until late last year,
Peiping insisted that Tokyo had
to drop its "hostile" attitude
toward the mainland and stop
supporting the "two-Chinas
scheme" before trade could be
significantly increased. Now,
however, Peiping gives every
indication of a readiness to
tone down its political demands
as part of what is probably a gen-
eral effort to diversify its
foreign trade sources.
Chinese Communist trade
agencies have concluded a num-
ber of important deals with
private Japanese firms, and
others are under discussion.
Negotiations for Chinese
exports
of
soybeans, coal, salt,
tin,
and
other raw materials
have
met
with modest success.
The
Chinese recently bought
nearly
$8,000,000 worth of Japanese ff;r-
tilizer, and similar transactions
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
are pending. Last fall, Japan
made its first substantial sale
to China of steel products, and
the sale of around 100,000 tons
is reportedly anticipated in
1962--an amount equal to that
under discussion when Sino-
Japanese trade was disrupted in
1958. The Chinese have also
bought synthetic rubber, wool,
and rayon fibers from Japan
recently, and press reports con-
tinue to mention inquiries and
negotiations for Japanese 1e-
troleum products.
The volume of Sino-Japanese
trade, which reached a peak of
$140,000,000 in 1957 and dropped
to a low-of about $22,000,000
in 1959, may have reached near-
ly $50,000,000 in 1961. A heavy
Japanese import surplus during
the first half of the year was
probably reduced by the large
imports by China in the second
half of the year. An increase
to some $80,000,000 is expected
for 1962, according to a recent
statement by the Japanese For-
eign Ministry. This figurecould
i?ise or fall rapidly depending
on Chinese tactics, but at the
moment it appears to be a real-
istic appraisal of the trend.
The Chinese Communists
have not advertised their change
in attitude, suggesting that
they are reluctant to undercut
their tough political stance
toward the Ikeda government.
Peiping continues to denounce
Tokyo's pro-US policy and to
accuse Prime Minister Ikeda of
plotting the revival of Japanese
militarism and the formation of
an anti-Chinese military alli-
ance in Northeast Asia.
The number of Chinese
friendship and cultural mis-
(Prepared jointly
sions to Japan has increased,
probably signaling that Pei-
ping intends once again to
broaden its contacts-.-severely
restricted for the past sev-
eral years--with Japanese
leftists. Peiping's action
in receiving a Japanese Social-
ist party (JSP) mission to
China recently suggests that
it is anxious to restore its
influence within the JSP, which
was disrupted by the assassi-
nation of pro-Peiping JSP leader
Asanuma in 1960. The Chinese
urged the mission to obtain
the party's acceptance of the
"struggle against US imperial-
ism" as its main task, and
managed to extract from it an
endorsement of the Asanuma
line that the anti-US struggle
is a "common task" of the Chi-
nese and Japanese people.
The acquiescence of the
mission in what is viewed by
many in Japan as heavy-handed
Chinese interference in Social-
ist party affairs has drawn
sharp criticism on all sides
in Tokyo. It could not only
cost the Socialists election
losses but might also stimulate
serious dissension within the
party itself. Peiping may have
risked this reaction in the be-
lief that the left-wing factions
of the JSP, which predominated
in the delegation to China,
have a chance of obtaining the
post of JSP secretary general
in the near future. Such a
development, following the
factions' accommodation with
Peiping, would probably again
place the Chinese in a posi-
tion of influence in Social-
ist affairs comparable to that
enjoyed during the Asanuma era.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
GROWING RESISTANCE ACTIVITY IN NEPAL
s epped-up resistance ac-
tivity in Nepal against King
Mahendra's one-year-old authori-
tarian regime.
there have been several armed
raids on government police posts
in outlying areas.
The immediate objective of
these forays, which have occurred
in eastern and central districts
bordering on India where the
Nepali Congress is strongest,
apparently is to harass the royal
administration with a view to
gradual evasion of the King's
support within the government and
among the people. Congress leader Subar-
na is resisting pressure from the ex-
tremist wing of his organization
for all-out action, judging that
the movement is not yet strong
enough to risk launching a gen-
eral revolt.
unlikely to take any initiative
in opposing the King.
Mahendra betrayed his nerv-
ousness over opposition efforts
in an unusual public attack on 25X1
6 January on "traitors trying
to seize power from the sanc-
tuary of a foreign power."
:::]he has expressed concern 25X1
over what he construes as grow-
ing Indian hostility toward his
regime, charging Indian complic-
ity in Nepali Congress activi-
ties and noting Nehru's apparent
lack of interest in a personal
meeting. He has also sought
assurances of support from
"friendly" governments.
Nehru I has long 25X1
been critical of Mahendra's
takeover as a serious setback
to his efforts to speed Nepal's
development within the Indian
sphere of influence. Recently
he has expressed concern over
Mahendra's growing ties with
Peiping.
The success of any major
uprising would depend largely
on the position of Nepal's army
and police forces, which appear
capable of maintaining order
through most of the country.
Despite Nepali Congress claims
of growing disaffection, there
is little evidence that signif-
icant elements in the army are
or are likely to become disloyal
to the King. The Indian ambas-
sador in Katmandu reportedly be-
lieves that while certain senior
officers may be favorably in-
clined toward the Nepali Con-
gress and restoration of parlia-
i erl.ar': -overnment, they are
Nevertheless Nehru reported-
ly continues to feel that rebel
attempts against the royal re-
gime--unless assured of success
--would play into Peiping's
hands by providing a pretext for
intervention. He apparently in-
tends therefore to stick to his
policy of avoiding strong open
support for the Nepali Congress
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
ITALY'S CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATS PREPARE FOR NATIONAL CONGRESS
Early returns indicate that
a majority of the provincial
delegates elected to the con-
gress of Italy's governing Chris-
tian Democratic party, which
opens in Naples on 27 January,
will be disposed to favor for-
mation of a center-left govern-
ment dependent on parliamentary
support from Pietro Nenni's
Italian Socialist party, but
firm positions will probably not
b: evident before the congress
convenes. Leaders of both par-
ties are stressing the points
of similarity in the programs
each group has prepared for such
a government--which would prob-
ably be headed by the present
premier, Amintore Fanfani--but
minority elements in each will
probably play up the differences
in an effort to block a rap-
prochement.
if the church should oppose the
scheme but that so far the church
seemed to be going along. He
considered the present situation
the most delicate his party had
faced since 1953, when it lost
its majority in the national
elections. On 11 January an ar-
ticle in the semiofficial
Vatican paper Osservatore Romano
attacked the Socialist-s, but
because the article was not an
editorial, it is not considered
in press circles to commit either
the paper or the church hierarchy.
After formulating an
economic program which appears
to be generally acceptable to
the Christian Democrats' center-
left majority, the Socialist
central committee on 11 January
defeated a motion by Nenni's
left-wing opponents calling
for radical changes in Italian
Results from 57 of the 96
provinces electing delegates to
the congress reportedly show a
substantial majority--estimates
range fron, 60to80 percent--favor-
inga center-left government. In
addition, the leaders of the
party's two largest factions--
Fanfani and party secretary
Mom--appear to have reached an
understanding which would line
up Moro's heretofore uncommitted
faction in support of the plan.
The attitude of the Cath-
olic Church is still not clear.
Moro indicated to the American
ambassador in early December
that his party would lose votes
foreign policy, and backed a
resolution merely urging that
NATO be given a "defensive
interpretation and geographic
limitation." The American
Embassy reports that Nenni
implied that the opposition
of Riccardo Lombardi, the
Socialists' number-two man,
to any plan for a NATO
atomic striking force should
not be construed as Social-
ist party policy. Lombardi's
remarks can, however, be
exploited by Christian Demo-
crats,who hold that any
alliance with the Socialists
would adversely affect Italy's
foreign relations.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Bolivia's governing
Nationalist Revolutionary Move-
ment (MNR) is preparing for a
national convention in late
February to nominate candidates
for congressional elections
next May or June. It now holds
all 18 seats in the Senate and
51 of the 68 in the Chamber of
Deputies. One third of the
Senate seats and half of those
in the lower house are at stake.
The pre-convention ma-
neuveringis sharpening the rival-
ries among the party's three
principal factions and may lead
to outbreaks of violence, since
each leader has armed followers.
Armed civilians, loyal to local
political or trade-union leaders,
have repeatedly been involved
in political clashes in recent
years, particularly in La Paz,
Cochabamba, Santa Cruz, and the
mining areas.
President Paz controls the
core of the party, but dissatis-
faction with slow economic prog-
ress under his leadership has
strengthened dissident factions.
A new cabinet appointed on 9 Jan-
uary appears to have given more
representation to Paz' group, but
further changes are probable
after the convention. Newly
appointed Foreign Minister Fell-
man is likely to act primarily as
a Paz supporter despite his past
association with the far left--
a record which includes having
employed Che Guevara, now Cuba's
minister of industries, in a gov-
ernment job for some months in
the early 1950s.
As President, Paz controls
the army, but use of the regular
armed forces is particularly un-
popular in Bolivia, since they
backed the more conservative
regimes which preceded the MNR
and were defeated by groups of
armed civilians in the 1952
revolution. As a politician,
however, Paz also has the loyal-
ty of a rural militia force
which he called to the capital
on four occasions last year to
back his policies by intimidat-
ing his opponents.
Vice President Juan Lechin,
the country's most important
labor leader, is apparently hoping
to build up his strength within
the party organization to control
the presidential nomination in
1964. Although Communists have
made inroads in the miners' un-
ions, which are armed and which
form his labor base, Lechin can
still exert considerable control
over the mine workers.
Many of Lechin's labor
supporters now in congress, how-
ever, appear to have joined a
third MNR faction formed during
the past year by former Labor
Minister Anibal Aguilar and the
Sandoval brothers. The Sandovals
have had considerable armed
strength in and around the eastern
city of Santa Cruz in recent
years, and in the past six months
they have been involved in several
armed clashes which caused numer-
ous deaths.
All three factions profess
the leftist orientation which
has been essential to political
success in Bolivia since the
revolution of 1952. When Lechin 25X1
recently asserted, for example,
that members of the Aguilar-
Sandoval group had helped to
put through the US-backed eco-
nomic stabilization plan, Aguilar
countered that Lechin during 1961
had chosen to visit Taiwan rather
than Communist China.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
PANAMA
President Chiari's coali-
tion government continues to
be .3ivided by conflicting per-
sonal ambitions. Chiari's weak-
ness is reflected in such de-
velopments as the National As-
sembly's recent passage of an
inflationary budget over execu-
tive objections. This weakness
is impeding Panama's adoption
of reform measures called for
by the Alliance for Progress.
Chiari, who won a surprise
victory in the May 1960 elections,
despite the opposition of the
incumbent administration, is a
moderate but commands little sup
port in the National Assembly.
Both of his Liberal party's impor-
tant coalition partners, the Re-
publican and Third Nationalist
parties, are headed by determined
presidential aspirants, Second
Vice President Jose Bazan and
Finance Minister Gilberto Arias
respectively.
Arias, for political as
well as fiscal reasons, so
strongly opposed the Assembly's
revision of the budget as irre-
sponsible that he threatened to
lave the government if Chiari
signed the bill. He was persuad-
ed to stay, however, probably by
Chiari's intention to request
extraordinary powers to use after
the Assembly adjourns late this
month. If these are granted,
the executive can--if it wishes--
enact by decree reforms called
for under the Alliance for Prog-
ress. The 12-party Assembly
has failed to implement most
of Chiari's programs, however,
and it may refuse him the
requested powers.
Several deputies are among
Panama's most demagogic na-
tionalistic agitators. They
opposed Panama's break with
Castro in December, and one of
them, Thelma King, authored a
recently passed Assembly motion
demanding removal of the wire
fence separating parts of Panama
City from the Canal Zone. The
resolution compares the fence,
built after the anti-US violence
in November 1959, to the wall
dividing Berlin.
A previously reported in-
vitation for Mrs. King and other
deputies to visit the USSR in
May at Soviet expense now has
become public. Although Panax:a
does not have relations with
the USSR, the deputies may
accept, arguing that such a
trip would improve Panama's
international reputation and
contacts, and focus world
attention on its desire for a
new treaty on the Canal Zone.
President Chiari last September
requested treaty negotiations
with the United States, and
most of the invited deputies are
so concerned with pushing their
country's demands against the
US that they could easily be
exploited by Soviet nrobazandists.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE, WEEKLY SUMMARY
SPECIAL ARTICLES
BLOC MILITARY AID TO CUBA
The Sino-Soviet bloc has
been supplying the Castro regime
with large-scale military as-
sistance for more than a year.
Bloc military deliveries--pri-
marily from the USSR and Czecho-
slovakia--have included MIG
jet fighters and a wide assort-
ment of land armaments ranging
from small arms to heavy tanks.
Extensive military training has
been provided both in the bloc
and in Cuba.
Communist military aid
has turned the Cuban military
establishment into one of the
strongest in Latin America.
This support has been instru-
mental in enabling Castro to
combat the counterrevolutionary
movement and to consolidate con-
trol over the population.
Background
The Castro government in
1959--the year it came to power
--began its attempts to procure
bloc arms. The USSR's initial
cool response was largely the
result of uncertainty over the
future course of the Cuban
revolution. As Havana's efforts
to purchase military equipment
in the West encountered increas-
ing difficulties through 1959
and early 1960, Cuban purchas-
ing missions traveled to the
bloc to investigate new sources
of supply. Discussions report-
edly covered a whole range of
equipment from small arms to
modern jet aircraft.
With Mikoyan's trip to
Cuba in February 1960, the USSR
abandoned its former aloofness
toward Cuba in favor of all-out
propaganda and economic support
but still appeared unwilling to
move toward a major arms deal
as fast as the Cubans desired.
Recognizing the initial popu-
larity of the Cuban revolution
in the rest of Latin America,
the Soviet Union preferred to
grant endorsement to Castro and
commend his regime's "neutralism,"
rather than arouse apprehension
in other Latin American countries
and the United States by rushing
in with arms. Mikoyan's visit
signaled the beginning of a
massive bloc trade and aid pro-
gram which gained momentum
throughout 1960 as US-Cuban re-
lations deteriorated.
In the wake of the abortive
East-West summit meeting in
May 1960, many of the Soviet
inhibitions about providing
military aid to Cuba disappeared
and the bloc undertook to as-
sociate itself more closely with
the Castro regime. This period
was characterized by Soviet at-
tacks on the Monroe Doctrine
and assurances of support in
the event of US military action
against Cuba. However, these as-
surances--including Khrushchev's
ambiguous references to retalia-
tion with missiles--were offered
in general terms intended to
cover arms aid and technical
assistance without committing
the USSR to specific moves in
support of Cuba.
Cuban military negotiations
with the USSR and Czechoslovakia
in the early summer of 1960 were
followed by a well-publicized
trip to Prague and Moscow by
Raul Castro, which probably was
the occasion for the conclusion
of secret arms deals. In mid-
summer of 1960 a shipment of
Czech small arms and ammunition
arrived in Cuba. Shortly
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SU fARY
thereafter, the first sizable
group of Cuban military personnel
was sent to the bloc for training.
Further talks in Cuba dur-
ing July and August probably
concerned arrangements for the
delivery of bloc arms, accompa-
nied by military technicians to
provide the necessary training.
By August, Czech small arms were
being issued to some Cuban militia
units. In September the first
major shipment of Communist arms
arrived.
Scope of Bloc Military Aid
From September 1960 until
the late summer of 1961, bloc
arms deliveries were made reg-
financial information on the
bloc's arms deals with Cuba has
been disclosed, but it is esti-
mated that something on the order
of $100,000,000 worth of equip-
ment and technical services has
been provided. Large numbers
of vehicles and other military-
related items have also been
delivered.
25X1
25X1
25X1
During a recent military
parade celebrating the third
anniversary of Castro's take-
over, a representative sampling
of bloc military hardware was
unveiled. Units equipped with
medium and heavy tanks, assault
guns, truck-mounted rocket launch-
ers, artillery, antiaircraft
weapons, and mortars, as well
as rifles and machine guns, were
featured prominently. A flyby
of MIG jet fighters, including
some high-performance MIG-19s,
was one of the highlights of
the air display, which also
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The capabilities of the
Cuban ground forces have in-
creased steadily since the in-
troduction of bloc equipment and
training. Under the new organi-
zational structure, the ground
forces available to the regime
are estimated to include 75,000
full-time army and militia per-
sonnel, 100,000 in the militia's
ready reserve, and another 100,-
000 in the part-time militia.
with bloc small arms.,- and many
SOVIET AT-S ARTILLERY TRACTORS
TOWING 122-mm GUNS
(Havana, 2 January 1962)
included helicopters and piston-
engine trainers.
During the second half
of 1961 the focus of the
bloc's military aid to Cuba
was on assimilation of new
equipment, intensive training,
and completion of the reorgan-
ization of Cuba's military
establishment along bloc lines.
Negotiations with bloc mili-
tary aid personalities, how-
ever, are believed to have
taken place in Cuba last
summer, and they probably re-
sulted in new agreements. The
recent resumption of large-
scale military deliveries to
Cuba probably is in fulfill-
ment of these new agreements.
have heavier equipment as well.
Soviet bloc arms aid has given
the Cuban ground forces an
armored, artillery, antiair-
craft, and antitank capability
largely lacking in the past and
unknown to other countries of
the Caribbean area. Hundreds
of bloc transport vehicles have
greatly increased the mobility
of these forces. Thousands of
modern bloc small arms have
been delivered, enhancing the
regime's guerrilla warfare capa-
bilities and enabling it to
release Western-made weapons
SOVIET T-34 TANKS
(Havana, 2 January 1962)
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well-trained military cadre
which ultimately could be used
to lead or support Communist
guerrilla actions in the rest
of Latin America.
Some Chinese Communist
weapons have been supplied to
the Cuban ground forces, but the
extent of Peiping's activity in
the military aid field is unclear.
130 mm., 32-tube TRUCK-MOUNTED
ROCKET LAUNCHER
(Havana, 2 January 1962)
for subversive operations in
other countries.
An estimated 350 Soviet
bloc instructors have been used
extensively for training pur-
poses and serve as full-time
advisers to some individual
units. The combat effectiveness
of the Cuban ground forces has
risen under continuous bloc
tutelage to a level probably
surpassing that of any other
Latin American country. In
addition, bloc aid is helping
the Castro regime develop a
The capabilities of the
Cuban Air Force declined sharply
as a result of purges and defec-
tions of key personnel following
Castro's takeover. One of the
major goals of the new regime
was to acquire combat jet air-
craft, and many of the Cuban
military trainees who went to
the bloc in the summer of 1960
were air cadets. At least 75
Cuban pilots are believed to
have been trained in the bloc.
Most of them now have returned
to Cuba, where they are continu-
ing to receive training in MIG
jet fighters which arrived last
summer.
Aircraft deliveries have
included at least 50 MIG-type
fighters, some of them MIG-19
supersonic interceptors which
are still of primary importance
in the bloc's own air defense.
The bloc has also supplied heli-
copters, piston-engine trainers,
and small, single-engine trans-
ports. At least 12 IL-14 twin-
engine transports were delivered
last fall for the Cuban civil
airline. There are some indi-
cations that Cuba may receive So-
viet jet bombers, but none have
been delivered so far.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
The Cuban Air Force now is
able to provide effective sup-
port to ground units, and the
introduction of supersonic So-
viet fighters and air intercept
radar equipment is strengthening
its air defense capabilities.
Its few B-26 bombers could be
used against nearby targets, but
until Soviet bombers are pro-
vided, Cuba will continue to
have little offensive air capa-
bility outside its own territory.
Offensive operatigns in the rest
of Latin America are also hin-
dered by the lack of more than
minimal troop and cargo trans-
port capability.
Navy
During the first year and
a half of the bloc's military
aid program, the Cuban Navy
did not receive any signifi-
cant assistance. A few Cuban
vessels have been equipped
with bloc antiaircraft guns
and possibly other equipment,
but no bloc naval vessels were
delivered. One Kronstadt-
class submarine chaser recently
arrived in Cuba, however, along
with four motor torpedo boats.
Another patrol vessel is en
route.
Although there is no evi-
dence of bloc training for Cuban
naval personnel, a program for
strengthening Cuba's limited
naval capabilities appears to
be under way.
Outlook for Continued Arms Aid
In keeping with the pattern
of Soviet military aid to other
countries, it is unlikely that
Moscow will establish a Soviet
military base in Cuba; deliver
nuclear armaments, long-range
guided missiles, or other stra-
tegic weapons; or even dispatch
"volunteers" for military serv-
ice in the event of conflict.
Rather than planning on the use
of Cuba as a staging area for
overt Communist military opera-
tions in the western hemisphere,
the USSR probably views its
arms aid to Cuba as essential to
maintain the'prese: Cuban regime.
The current arms deliveries
may be the beeinning of a new
phase in the bloc military aid
program emphasizing a further
build-up of the Cuban air and
ground forces, but also in-
cluding an expansion of the
regime's naval capabilities and
the delivery of more modern
equipment. Moscow may even have
agreed to supply Cuba with
short-range tactical guided
missiles similar to those
being provided to Egypt Iraq,
and Indonesia. (Pre-
pared by ORR)
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Only recently in his 25
years of personal rule has Franco
come seriously to grips with a
problem which has long disturbed
many Spaniards--the question of
the succession. Presumably in
an attempt to allay the anxiety
of his supporters and at the
same time to dissuade monarch-
ists and other conservatives
from any-.cooperation with more
radical opposition elements, the
Spanish leader now has a blue-
print for a successor regime.
Both Franco and the pretender
Don Juan appear confident that
a constitutional monarchy can
eventually be superimposed on
most of the present institutions.
Present Arrangements
Franco is simultaneously
chief of state, president of
the government, commander in
chief of the armed forces, and
chief of the National Movement,
of which the Falange is the core.
The Law of Succession of 1947,
one of six laws passed by the
present regime to take the place
of a formal constitution, de-
clares Spain to be a kingdom
and provides that a king or re-
gent will succeed Franco as
chief of state. No provision
was made, however, for passing
on his real powers as head of
the government.
Present arrangements specify
that when Franco dies or is in-
capacitated, a three-man Council
of the Regency takes over the
government pending choice of a
successor by the cabinet and the
14-member Council of the Realm,
which includes high-ranking
church and military dignitaries
and important state officials.
The new chief of state would be
installed after his approval by
parliament. In the absence of
any individual capable of hold-
ing the loyalty of the various
influential groups, the army
would probably soon be obliged
to take over to maintain public
order.
Franco's Plan
A new draft law, which
has been prepared under Franco's
direction, would divide his pow-
ers between a future chief of
state, whether king or regent,
and a head of government. The
law implies no intention to
divide these powers as long as
Franco rules,.but it formalizes
his long-held opinion that no
one individual should inherit
all of them.
The head of government
would be appointed by but would
have wider powers than the chief
of state. He would not be sub-
ject to ouster if parliament
should change its political com-
plexion or reject his policies.
However, he would not be able
to alter any basic state institu-
tions. The Council of the Realm
would continue in existence, and
the chief of state's power to
choose and dismiss the head of
government would be subject to
its "advice and consent." Par-
liament would presumably be
little different from the pres-
ent Cortes, which serves merely
to ratify decisions of the gov-
ernment.
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Don Juan and his political
advisory committee reportedly
accepted the essential points
of this law on 4 November. They
did not, however, approve of
some of its specific provisions,
They felt that the future king
should have powers comparable
to those of De Gaulle but less
sweeping, while the powers of
the future head of government
should be "considerably more"
than those of the French premier.
Don Juan told New York Times
correspondent Benjamin We=es in
mid-November that he felt the
plan which Franco had seat him
"some months" earlier gave too
much power to the king and not
enough to the prime minister.
Implications
Franco has so far refrained
from publicly designating the
next chief of state. Don Juan,
now 48, is generally expected
to be chosen, despite specula-
tion that his 23-year-old son,
Prince Juan Carlos, would suc-
ceed Franco. Juan Carlos has
insisted that he will not oc-
cupy the throne before his fa-
ther; in any case, Spanish law
would prevent his assuming full
powers before his 30th birthday.
Perhaps the most significant
of these terms is Franco's in-
sistence that the future king
pledge in advance to perpetuate
the essence and legislation of
the present regime and the Nation-
al Movement. This presumably
refers to the concept of "organic
democracy," or state corporativ-
ism, whereby the individual par-
ticipates in the administration
of the state through the "natural"
units of the family, municipality,
and syndicate. No political ac-
tivity is permitted now except
through the Falange. There is
the implication under Franco's
plan, however, that the syndi-
cates (associations of employers
and workers) will play an in-
creasingly important political
role and will eventually assume
the role of political parties.
During the past two years,
Don Juan's followers of liberal
persuasion and the monarchist
sympathizers in Gil Robles'
right-wing Christian Democratic
group have felt that the pre-
tender was increasingly giving
in to Franco on basic issues,
and they have urged him to take
a strong position. He has re-
fused, however, to do anything
that might cause a rift with
Franco and thereby jeopardize
his chance of becoming king.
His policy has been to make cer-
tain concessions, in the belief
that the advantages thereby
gained for himself would out-
weigh any dissatisfaction on
the part of his followers or
potential allies among the demo-
cratic opposition.
Early in 1961, Don Juan in-
dicated publicly that he favored
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEFKLY S11MARY
a monarchical state which would
avoi:' "dangerously weak politi-
cal formulas''--clearly a refer-
ence to the old system of many
political parties--a system
whose return Franco is deter-
mined to prevent. Don Juan's
acceptance of the new draft law
implies agreement with Franco's
demand that the important in-
stitutions of the present regime
continue unchanged under any
successor. On the other hand,
all opposition groups left of
center would insist that the
right of broad political activ-
ity be guaranteed in any fu-
ture agreement between them
and Don Juan.
Nevertheless, Don Juan is
anxious to avoid alienating
the democratic opposition to
Franco, and in accepting the
new law he was careful to ex-
press his interest in having
the prime minister's powers
increased--presumably with an
eye to strengthening his posi-
tion among moderate political
elements. Components of the
coalition of non-Communist left-
of-center parties known as the
Union of Democratic Forces,
which was set up by exile groups
in France in mid-1961, have
said they are willing to ac-
cept a temporary restoration
of the monarchy until a perma-
nent form of government can be
determined by a referendum.
Franco may calculate that
success in securing the support
of the great majority of mon-
archists for the new law would
afford his regime an additional
prop. Should the advent of the
monarchists to the "family cir-
cle" so antagonize the republi-
can-minded Falange organiza-
tion--which no longer has any
real political power--as to
cause its withdrawal, a re-
placement with considerably
more public appeal would be
at hand.
Support for an orderly suc-
cession through the mechanism
outlined in the new draft law
would probably be forthcoming
from the army, the church, big
business, and landowners, par-
ticularly since the monarchy
would be unlikely to take any
radical steps in political and
socio-economic reform. The
syndicates would probably back
the plan in the hope that its
implementation would give
them increased political in-
fluence and a chance to strength-
en their appeal among the work-
ers through legislation grant-
ing greater welfare and so-
cial security benefits.
Opposition could be expect-
ed from the Falange, intent on
safeguarding its future exist-
ence.. Also opposed would be
the many.- -~jlitically minded
workers who have little use
for the syndicates and young
intellectuals to whom the mon-
archy connotes corruption and
favoritism. The plan would al-
most certainly be unacceptable
to various small opposition
groups of republican sympathies .25X1
The public at large is apathetic
toward the monarchy.
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