CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A003400070001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 44
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 29, 2008
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 1, 1961
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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SECRET COPY NO. 73
CURRENT
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY
SUMMARY
OCI NO.0308/61
1 December 1961
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
State Dept. review completed
DIA review(s) completed.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
1 December 1961.
T H E W E E K I N B R I E F
(Information as of 1200 EST 30 Nov)
NUCLEAR TEST BAN TALKS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 1
The new Soviet proposal for a simple four-point test
ban agreement, containing provisions which the USSR has
long known are unacceptable to the West, demonstrates the
USSR's intention to use the Geneva talks as a propaganda
forum for denouncing the continuation of Western testing,
particularly any US decision to undertake atmospheric tests.
Moscow hopes to use the talks to repair the damage to its
image abroad caused by the long Soviet test series. The
USSR's "new approach" is also intended to divert the dis-
cussions from previous Soviet obstructive demands such as
the "troika" scheme in the control system and to exploit
the US-UK rejection of a new uncontrolled moratorium on
testing during the negotiations.
SOVIET-FINNISH RELATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 3
The outcome of the Khrushchev-Kekkonen talks on 24
November in Novosibirsk is strong evidence that Moscow's
main objectives were to ensure Kekkonen's re-election and
to obtain some form of Finnish endorsement for the Soviet
line that West German "militarism" threatens the USSR. The
withdrawal of Kekkonen's only serious rival for the presi-
dency practically assures Kekkonen's re-election. While
the USSR dropped its demand for bilateral military talks,
Kekkonen's statement referring to Soviet "arguments" on the
danger of war in Europe as "well-grounded" provides Moscow
with nonbloc support for its insistence on the necessity
of a German peace treaty to remove this danger. Kekkonen
stated that Moscow accepts Finland's neutrality as part
of Soviet security policy, which places Helsinki "under
obligation to preserve a foreign policy that has the So-
viet Union's confidence."
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 6
The political situation continues unsettled. Efforts
by the moderate opposition to force President Balaguer to
resign and accept proposals for a coalition regime led to
the crippling general strike launched on 28 November, de-
spite the fact that the President and opposition leaders
were close to an agreement. Rank-and-file oppositionists
threatened to get out of the control of their leaders on
29 November as rioting broke out and popular hostility a-
gainst the military became manifest. The military, under
the strong leadership of General Rafael Rodriguez Eche-
varria, feels increasingly obliged to assume functions
normally those of civil government.
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CONGO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 7
Tshombe's defiant response to the UN resolution of 24
November--which rejected Katanga's claim to independence
and authorized the UN to use force against Tshombe's mer-
cenaries--poses the threat of new clashes between Katangan
forces and the UN Command. Although tension is high in
Elisabethville, a major move against Tshombe appears un-
likely until the UN reinforces its 15,000-man Congo force.
The campaign by Gizenga-oriented Congolese Army soldiers
to occupy northern Katanga is not opposed by the UN Command
and offers some prospect of success.
. . . Page 9
Secret talks between France and the provisional Al-
gerian government are still under way, but there is evidence
that both sides are coming to realize that any agreement
reached would be difficult if not impossible to implement
as long as the Secret Army Organization (OAS) commands sup-
port from the bulk of the European settlers in Algeria.
The OAS already seems to exercise effective control in
several areas, a situation which could develop into de
facto partition no matter what Paris decides.
SOUTH VIETNAM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 10
The uneasiness in Saigon has been marked by editorial
attacks on the US in the government-controlled press. The
press attacks apparently were instigated chiefly by Presi-
dent Diem's brother Nhu, whose influence has been a major
target of reform-minded critics in official and opposition
circles. Several top army officers appear convinced that
Diem must be removed from authority before the reforms they
believe necessary to defeat the Viet Cong can be accom-
plished. Despite some drop in Viet Cong activity, the se-
curity situation continues to deteriorate.
. . . . Page 11
Following the breakdown of talks on security arrange-
ments for the meeting of the three princes at Vientiane,
Souvanna has proposed that the meeting be held on 1 De-
cember at Hin Heup--site of the previous conference, in
early October. Boun Oum's initial response has been neg-
ative. Souvanna has recently appeared more flexible on
the question of cabinet composition, but negotiations will
probably be characterized by tough bargaining by each fac-
tion. Military activity during the past week was marked
by limited probing actions by both sides. Soviet Ambassa-
dor Abramov in Vientiane is still actively seeking the es-
tablishment of a "neutral and independent" government.
At Geneva the USSR has stepped up its efforts to reach an
early compromise agreement.
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ALBANIA'S RELATIONS WITH EAST AND WEST . . . . . . . . . . Page 13
Albania'has maintained its propaganda offensive against
the Moscow leadership in the face of unrelenting Soviet
bloc criticism of the Hoxha regime. The Chinese leaders,
through their actions and statements of the past week, have
left no doubt that they continue to support Albania. Al-
bania's neighbors--Greece and Yugoslavia--are concerned
about the outcome of the controversy, although neither evi-
dently plans unilateral action against Albania. Tirana
continues efforts to broaden its international contacts;
there has been what appears to be another feeler for US dip-
lomatic recognition.
RENEWED DE-STALINIZATION PLAGUES ULBRICHT REGIME . .
. Page 15
Khrushchev's renewed attacks on Stalin and the attend-
ant rush among the satellites to fall in line creates a
dilemma for the East German regime. `a`Ulbricht';s;personal-
ity cult must be soft-pedaled at the same time that his
leadership has to be defended against widespread public and
party criticism and complaints that his one-man rule is not
in keeping with Khrushchev's revival of de-Stalinization.
Ulbricht has echoed the Khrushchev line vigorously, but
party leaders are confused and uncertain over how this should
be reflected within East Germany. There are some tentative
indications of steps to develop a successor for Ulbricht,
but a move to replace or downgrade him does not appear im-
minent.
. Page 16
At the 21-23 November plenum of the Polish party cen-
tral committee, First Secretary Gomulka attempted to assuage
fears in the party that the current de-Stalinization campaign
would have serious repercussions in Poland. Since the Soviet
22nd party congress, well-known party and nonparty figures
have called for liberalization and more freedom within Po-
land and within the bloc; some party members, however, fear
that liberalization would release uncontrollable public
pressures in Poland. In his report to the plenum, Gomulka
discussed the disruptive tendencies roused by the Soviet
congress and urged the preservation of bloc unity; he ap-
parently feels that in the long term his regime can sur-
vive only in a politically stable bloc. 25X1
COMMUNIST CHINA'S FOOD PRODUCTION IN 1961. . . . . . . . . Page 18
For the third successive year food production in Com-
munist China is estimated to have fallen below the level
of the previous year. The grain harvest this year will
be roughly equal to that of 1955, when there were about
90,000,000 fewer people to feed. This continued poor per-
formance in agriculture will increase the threat of mal-
nutrition and related health problems during the coming
winter and spring and further impede the regime's policy
of rapid industrialization. Peiping imported 5,500,000
tons of grain this year, and it probably will need more
next year to maintain even the low food rations of last
winter.
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CURRENT INTELLTGFNCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Nehru's release of the government's fifth White Paper
on Sino-Indian relations and the resultant Indian indig-
nation over Peiping's alleged actions on the northern
frontier compound New Delhi's dilemma in dealing with
Peiping. The documents, which attempt to emphasize New
Delhi's "firm" diplomacy, also point up the ineffective-
ness of its China policy.
BLOC TO STEP UP MERCHANT SHIPPING ACTIVITIES IN ASIA .
Plans are well advanced for a coordinated effort by
the bloc to increase its merchant shipping activities in
Asia. Soviet, European satellite, and Chinese Communist
ships will apparently operate in a common pool coordinated
from a headquarters in Bangkok or Rangoon. With an eye to-
ward increasing economic relations with the Asian countries
and breaking up the near monopoly of Western shipping in-
terests in the area, the bloc will cut rates and will make
regularly scheduled calls at ports regardless of the avail-
ability of profitable amounts of cargo.
BLOC ECONOMIC AND MILITARY RELATIONS WITH MALI . .
Page 19
Page 20
. . . Page 22
An economic credit of $7,500,000 extended to Mali by
Poland brings total bloc credits to that country to well
over $68,000,000. The recent visit to Moscow by Malian
Secretary of State for Defense Diakite and Armed Forces
Chief of Staff Soumar6 suggests that an additional arms
agreement may also be forthcoming. Such an agreement would
probably include Soviet assistance in the field of military
air transport. The USSR and Czechoslovakia have already
achieved a dominant position in Mali's civil aviation
through the provision of commercial aircraft, operational
and maintenance crews, and an aviation training program
for Malian personnel. 25X1
EGYPT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 23
In the wake of the most serious setback of his career--
Syria's secession two months ago--Nasir has undertaken a
series of domestic and foreign policy moves aimed at restor-
ing his prestige and recapturing the dynamism of his so-
cialist, neutralist, pan-Arab programs. The Egyptian leader
in the past has demonstrated a remarkable ability to turn
short-run defeats into longer range victories, and may
succeed in doing so again, although he faces more diffi-
cult problems than ever before.
. Page 25
Increasing bitterness among the three major candidates
in Costa Rica's presidential elections on 4 February raises
the possibility of violence in what is normally the most
stable of the CentralAmerican republics. The Echandi
government, weakened by a deteriorating economic situation
and possessing little military strength, may be unable to
prevent outbreaks of fighting during the final weeks of the
campaign as well as in the immediate post-election period.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
1 December 1961
SPECIAL ARTICLES
SOVIET EDUCATION IN TRANSITION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 1
Soviet education, which was geared in the 1930s to
preparing a relatively few students for higher education,
is being reorganized under the 1958 education law to supply
the economy with skilled workers as well as highly trained
specialists. The law extended universal compulsory educa-
tion from seven to eight years but ordered that students
in all grades from elementary school through higher educa-
tion receive "labor training" as well as academic work.
Various difficulties have arisen, particularly in the ef-
fort to integrate students into factory work, but the re-
organization goals have not been modified.
GREATER MALAYSIA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 6
In talks in London from 20 to 23 November, Prime Min-
ister Macmillan and Malaya's Prime Minister Rahman reached
general agreement on the "Greater Malaysian Federation"
scheme sponsored by Rahman and Prime Minister Lee of Sing-
apore. If this scheme becomes a reality in August 1962,
as now appears possible, Malaya, Singapore, and the British
Borneo territories will become a new nation in the Common-
wealth with a population of almost 10,000,000. The major
obstacles to federation--the reluctance of Borneo peoples
to join and British desires for unrestricted access to the
Singapore military bases--appear to be on the way to solu-
tion. A major problem will be the unification of the polit- 25X1
ically and economically advanced peoples of Singapore with
the primitive societies of Borneo.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
WEEKLY REVIEW
NUCLEAR TEST BAN TALKS
The new Soviet proposal
for a simple four-point test
ban agreement, containing pro-
visions which the Soviets have
:Long known were unacceptable to
the West, underscores the USSR's
intention to use the Geneva
talks as a propaganda forum for
denouncing the continuation of
Western testing, particularly
any US decision to undertake
atmospheric tests. Moscow
hopes to use the talks to re-
pair the damage done to its
image abroad by the long Soviet
test series. The USSR's "new
approach" is also intended to
divert the discussions from
previous Soviet obstructive de-
mands such as the "troika"
scheme in the control system
and to exploit the US-UK re-
jection of a new uncontrolled
moratorium on testing during
the negotiations.
In a move designed to ap-
pear responsive to the Western
position, the Soviet statement
of 27 November recalled the 3
September proposal by President
Kennedy and Prime Minister Mac-
millan for a ban on atmospheric
testing, relying on existing
means of detection, and pro-
posed that this ban be extend-
ed to include outer space and
underwater tests. On the cru-
cial and unresolved issue of
underground tests, Moscow pro-
posed a moratorium pending
agreement on a control system
which would be a "composite
part" of an international sys-
tem to supervise a general dis-
armament agreement.
This new approach raised
the possibility that the Soviet
Union, despite Khrushchev's 10
September rejection of the US-
UK proposal when the Soviet test
series was just getting under
way, may eventually propose
that this Western proposal be
adopted as the basis for an
immediate agreement banning
atmospheric tests. The Soviets
may calculate that such a maneu-
ver could inhibit the US from
undertaking atmospheric tests
and place the US and UK on the
defensive in the talks.
A member of the Soviet
delegation, in a conversation
with a US delegate on 28 No-
vember, feigned surprise over
the negative Western reaction
to the new Soviet proposal and
argued that the Soviet plan in
essence went no further than
the Western offer to ban atmos-
pheric tests with monitoring
left to existing national de-
tection systems. The Soviet
representative said the USSR
would "emphasize" that the
West's negative reaction rep-
resents a retreat from the
3 September proposal and in-
sisted that world opinion
would not understand this
"switch" in position."
A TASS report on the 28
November session of the test
ban talks said that the Soviet
proposals were rejected by the
Western representatives "with-
out even bothering to study
them." The report claimed that
from the start the Western del-
egates displayed intractabil-
ity and insisted on their old
positions, while US delegate
Dean said that the Western
powers would not halt nuclear
tests. Soviet delegate Tsarap-
kin told newsmen after the ses-
sion that he was "not very
happy" about the Western re-
action to the Soviet proposals
but commented that "after care-
ful study of our proposals,
after consideration of our new
approach, the West could easily
come to an agreement on this
basis." Tsarapkin also said
that the Soviet Union would
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUM(RY
not negotiate on the basis of
"the ancient treaty proposed by
the West."
Moscow's current proposal
for the first time includes a
demand for French participation
in the talks and adherence to
the agreement, although Moscow
began warning last March that
French testing while the talks
were in progress could make the
talks pointless. One of rea-
sons Khrushchev advanced for
his 10 September rejection of
the US-UK proposal to ban at-
mospheric tests was its failure
to include France. Khrushchev
said the USSR would not tolerate
such an "impermissible situation:'
During the 28 November ses-
sion Tsarapkin repeated the call
for French participation but
without making continuation of
the talks dependent on fulfill-
ment of this demand. His fail-
ure to do so and his mild com-
ment that a pledge to refrain
from testing would "facilitate"
negotiations suggest that the
Soviets are preparing for a
long stay at Geneva and will
try to place the onus for any
breakoff of the talks on the
Western powers. A Soviet del-
egate has already expressed
"hope" that the Western del-
egations would follow the cus-
tom of proposing a Christmas
recess.
By coming out in favor of
an immediate ban on all tests,
the Soviet leaders probably
hope to convince neutral opin-
ion that the Western desire for
further tests is the main ob-
stacle to an early agreement.
In this connection Khrushchev
explicitly stated in a recent
letter to the president of the
World Peace Council that if the
Western powers conduct tests,
"we too shall be obliged to
return to them in order to keep
our armed forces at the modern
level." In an obvious attempt
to attract neutralist support
for the "new approach," the So-
viet Foreign Ministry immedi-
ately passed copies of its
latest proposals to the ambas-
sadors of neutral countries.
The 21 November Soviet note
agreeing to return to the Geneva
talks had similarly been dis-
tributed promptly to neutralist
representatives.
The draft treaty was re-
leased by the Soviets on 27 No-
vember, the day before the
Geneva test ban talks resumed
after a recess of almost three
months. It marks a further
shift from the position taken
by Moscow that a test ban agree-
ment could be considered only
as part of an agreement on com-
plete and general disarmament.
Whereas last spring and sum-
mer the Soviet delegation in
Geneva insisted that a ban on
tests apart from general dis-
armament would be unacceptable
unless the Western powers ac-
cepted the "troika" principle
for controlling a test agree-
ment, the new Soviet proposal
avoids the controversial con-
trol issues and pays only lip
service to a general disarm-
ament agreement.
The plan in effect calls
for a separate, uncontrolled
ban on all tests and is a re-
version to the position taken
in early 1960, when the USSR
made a similar proposal for a
permanent ban on all tests ex-
cept small underground explo-
sions, which would have been
covered by a voluntary mora-
torium. That proposal was
eventually modified to link
the duration of the moratorium
to a research program to improve
detection aild..identification
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
techniques; the current plan,
however, would extend the mora-
torium on underground tests un-
til agreement could be reached
on a system of controls for
such tests, which would form
part of an international con-
trol system for general disarm-
ament. In this way Moscow
would avoid submitting to a
system of foreign inspection,
which it had earlier claimed
was far too extensive for an
agreement limited in scope.
Moscow would also avoid having
to defend the "troika" plan,
which it contends would not be
necessary under general dis-
armament.
The Soviet statement ac-
companying the new draft treaty
asserts that it represents a
"new approach" and is intended
to "direct" the Geneva talks
into a "practical current" in
order to exclude the "difficul-
ties and obstacles which stood
in the way of an agreement in
the past." This line suggests
that in the face of widespread
criticism of Soviet testing,
the Soviet leaders probably
felt they could not afford to
stand on either of their previ-
ous positions of linking a test
treaty to agreement on general
and complete disarmament, or de-
manding a "troika" system for
controls. The proposal indicates,
however, that no international
controls over a test ban agree-25X1
ment would be implemented until
a disarmament agreement was
reached. (Con-
curred in y S
The outcome of the talks
between Khrushchev and Finnish
President Kekkonen in Novosi-
birsk on 24 November is strong
evidence that the main objec-
tives of recent Soviet moves
regarding Finland were to make
certain of Kekkonen's re-elec-
tion and to obtain some form of
endorsement of Moscow's charges
against West Germany. Khru-
shchev's agreement to "postpone
for the time being" the military
talks originally demanded prob-
ably reflects both his desire
to enable Kekkonen to claim an
important victory in dealing
with the USSR and his satis-
faction with the results pro-
duced thus far by pressure tac-
tics against Finland. Moscow's
tactics have led to the with-
drawal of Kekkonen's chief
rival in the January presiden-
tial election, Olavi Honka,
thus practically assuring Kek-
konen's re-election.
The communiqud issued on
25 November after the talks
makes no mention of internal
Finnish politics. Khrushchev,
in his speech at a luncheon
for Kekkonen, made it clear,
however, that the USSR would
not accept a change in Finnish
leadership or policies. Khru-
shchev warned, "It is not all
the same to us what line is
pursued by this or that leader
and the political forces back-
ing him." He added that the
activities of the "right-wing
groups" in Finland arouse "our
grave concern." After his re-
turn Kekkonen called on those
of his opponents who have no
confidence in the Soviet Un-
ion's "friendship" to withdraw
from the political arena and
be "good losers." Moscow has
thus virtually established a
claim to decide the accept-
ability of Finnish political
leaders, thereby extending to
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
the presidential election its
intervention of 1958 against
the composition of the govern-
ment.
According to the communi-
qud, Khrushchev again emphasized
that the Soviet Government felt
it necessary to hold military
consultations in conformity with
the treaty of 1948. As Kekkonen
explained it in his radio address
of 26 November in Helsinki, this
demand presented Finland with
two choices: either to accept
the Soviet proposal or to strive
to meet Soviet security require-
ments by "political" activity.
In taking the latter course Kek-
konen apparently agreed to en-
dorse Khrushchev's evaluation
of the situation in Northern
Europe.
In the communique, Kekko-
nen agreed that "the arguments
advanced regarding the possibil-
ity of a war's erupting in Eu-
rope are well grounded." Since
the only "arguments" advanced
by Khrushchev were the threat
of West German militarism, this
statement by the Finnish Pres-
ident goes far in accepting the
Soviet thesis. In his 26 Novem-
ber speech, Kekkonen declared
that the "Soviet Union's con-
cern over West Germany's re-
armament is a fact and is, in
the light of history, under-
standable."
Khrushchev probably be-
lieves that these statements,
together with his "concession"
in postponing military talks,
make it extremely difficult for
Helsinki to resist future Soviet
pressure for Finland's adher-
ence to a bloc peace treaty with
East Germany and recognition of
the East German regime. The So-
viet premier, moreover, can still
renew his demand for military
consultations if Finland's ac-
tions in the immediate future
do not satisfy the USSR.
The communique states that
Khrushchev "emphasized" the hope
of the USSR that Finland will
"attentively follow" the devel-
opments in Northern Europe and
the Baltic and "in case of
necessity will bring its con-
siderations on taking appro-
priate measures to the knowl-
edge of the Soviet Government."
Kekkonen subsequently said that
this language meant the initia-
tive for proposing military con-
sultations will henceforth come
"primarily" from Finland.
While Khrushchev probably
has no illusions that Finland
would in fact propose such con-
sultations, the Soviets will
use this commitment as a lever
to maintain pressure on Helsinki
for a more pro-Soviet stand on
the German question. The Finn-
ish Communists promptly adopted
the line that the government
now must pursue a more "active
policy" in Scandinavia.
As a possible result of
the crisis provoked by the So-
viet note, the trade talks in
Moscow ended with agreement
for an increase of approximate-
ly 25 percent in Soviet-Finnish
trade for next year.
The over-all effect of the
Soviet threat to force military
consultations will be a substan-
tial increase in Soviet influ-
ence over both Finnish domestic
and foreign policies. Kekkonen
stated that Moscow accepts Fin-
land's neutrality as part of
Soviet security policy, which
places Helsinki "under obliga-
tion to preserve a foreign
policy that has the Soviet
Union's confidence." Khru-
shchev and Kekkonen apparently
struck an implicit bargain agree: ir...g
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to postpone military consulta-
tions in return for a Finnish
willingness to provide impor-
tant nonbloc support for the
Soviet position on Germany.
The Communist thesis that
neutrality carries an obliga-
tion to support a German treaty
was recently propounded by East
German party leader Ulbricht
when he claimed that a "con-
sistent policy of neutrality"
as applied to the German and
Berlin question "is tantamount
to the promotion of the conclu-
sion of a peace treaty" and es-
tablishment of "normal rela-
tions" with both German states.
Finnish, Scandinavian Reaction
The Finns received the coxa-
munique on the talks with great
relief and generally regarded
the outcome as a great personal
success for President Kekkonen.
They are, however, aware of the
fact that Finland has assumed
the responsibility for taking
the initiative in proposing con-
sultations if the frontier of
the USSR and Finland needs "safe-
guarding." This gives the USSR
an opening to demand that Fin-
land take a stand on interna-
tional issues--even if only to
state that they do not menace
Soviet-Finnish security--rather
than remain silent as in the
past. Satisfaction in being
granted a respite appears, low-
ever, to be stronger than con-
cern over future difficulties.
The press and the public
have been silent thus far on
SECRET
the implications of Honka's
withdrawal as a presidential
candidate because of Soviet
displeasure. However, a Social
Democratic leader at a meeting
of pro-Honka supporters in mid-
November--prior to Honka's with-
drawal--raised the question as
to what would stop the Russians
from requesting further assur-
ances regarding Finland's con-
tinued neutrality through the
election of certain candidates
or parties in the parliamentary
elections. The top leaders in
the Social Democratic party
are particularly distrusted
by the USSR, and sentiment is
developing within the party
leadership that several indi-
viduals, including Chairman
Tanner, must resign.
In the Scandinavian coun-
tries, the initial relief over
Moscow's postponement of its
request for consultations on
defense matters is giving way
to an awareness that Finland's
future may well depend on ac-
tions they take in political
and defense matters. Neverthe-
less, the Danish Government ap-
parently hopes by late Decem-
ber to secure parliamentary
approval of the widely debated
Baltic command proposal, which
evisions closer military co-
operation between Denmark and
West Germany. Commenting on
Mosce--`s sharp attacks against
the proposal, a leading Danish
n-irspaper speculates that the
Soviet Union may use Denmark's
final approval as a pretext to
renew pressure on Finland for
cooperation in defense matters.
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Inability of the top lead-
ers of the moderate opposition
groups to control their follow-
ers was a crucial element in
the outbreak of mob violence
in the Dominican Republic on
29 November; it also threatened
to undo the results of negoti=
ations that had brought Presi-
dent Balaguer and opposition
leaders close to agreement on
a political solution. Dr.
Viriato Fiallo--leader of the
National Civic Union (UCN), the
largest opposition group--rec-
ognized the dangers of the UCN.
-inspired general strike launched
on 28 November, but apparently
could not head it off. He evi-
dently felt incapable of oppos-
ing the strong emotional tide
among UCN members who demanded
a quick end to all vestiges of
the dictatorship, including
the immediate resignation of
Balaguer.
While the strike stimulated
new attempts to reach an agree-
ment between the President and
the opposition, it made an ulti-
mate solution more difficult by
creating additional cleavages
between the opposition and the
military. UCN radios, before
they were shut down on 28 Novem-
ber, accused military leaders
of siding with "the forces of
reaction" remaining in the gov-
ernment. Only a few days ear-
lier the same military officers
had been hailed as liberators
for ousting the Trujillos. The
movement of tanks and troops
through the streets of the
capital in an effort to main-
SECRET
tarn order on 28 and 29 Novem-
ber increased tension and hos-
tility against the military.
The military, on the other
hand, considered the strike
a breach of faith by the op=-
position and a "grab for pow-
er" by illegal means.
General Rafael Rodriguez
Echevarria, ranking cabinet
member and constitutionally
first in the line of succes-
sion, appears to control the
armed forces and remains a key
but ambiguous figure. Under
his direction, the military
gave strong support to Bala-
guer's position during the
general strike, and Rodriguez
personally disclaims any ambi-
tion to become president.
Nevertheless, in the absence of
an effective.civil government
with opposition participa-
tion, he has felt obliged
to take several actions nor-
mally reserved for civil gov-
ernment.
Rodriguez appears to ex-
aggerate the Communist issue
in domestic developments, giv-
ing Communists responsibility
for the intransigence of the
UCN and the popular unrest.
Some members of the OAS group,
which concluded its latest
visit to the country on 26
November, fear that Rodriguez
may be "another Trujillo in
the making" who is using
the Communist issue to achieve
his personal ambitions.
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Tshombe's defiant response
to the UN resolution of 24
November--which rejected Katan-
ga's claim to independence and
authorized the UN to use force
in ousting Tshombe's merce-
naries--poses the threat of
new clashes between Katangan
forces and the UN Command. On
26 November, Tshomb6 charged
that war had been brought to
the Congo by UN members "utterly
ignorant of the Congo," and
warned that Katanga would choose
"annihilation" rather than
capitulate to the UN. The
beating of two senior UN
officials in Elisabethville
by a mob of Katangan soldiers
on 28 November probably stemmed
in part from Tshomb6's efforts
to arouse his followers against
the UN resolution.
ville in northern Katanga.
These forces, moving south
from Kivu Province, have been
under the command of General
Victor Lundula, who has recently
aligned himself with Adoula's
central government, but they
are apparently being directed
by Gizenga without any control
from Leopoldville. The invad-
ing forces appear disposed to
bypass rather than attack Kon-
golo, which with a garrison of
an estimated 1,400 Katangan
soldiers is Tshombe's main
stronghold in the area. Follow-
ing the massacre of the 13 Ital-
ian airmen at Kindu and the
pillage of Albertville by the
invaders, the UN appears to
have assumed some security
functions in the towns the
Congolese have occupied.
The UN resolution is not
directed specifically to the
problem of Gizenga's~secession-
ist activities in Kivu and
Orientale provinces. In con-
centrating on Katanga, however,
it reflects the prevailing
opinion in Leopoldville, where
most of Adoula's supporters
regard Tshomb6 rather than
Gizenga as the main threat to
Congo unity. The Security
Council resolution once more
confronts Tshombe with the
threat of a "two-front war" in
which he will have to resist
new UN pressure for the evac-
uation of his white volunteers
at the same time that he is
confronted with Gizengist in-
cursions from the north.
the
offensive launched by Gizenga
has overrun the towns of
Kabalo, Nyunzu, and Albert-
According to a senior
UN official in Elisabethville,
UN forces there will be under-
manned from around 4 to 14 De-
cember, while Swedish and Irish
battalions are being rotated.
The consulate observes that
it would appear impossible for
the UN Command to take offen-
sive action against Tshomb6
in the next several weeks, and
that the UN may even be pressed
to maintain security in the
Elisabethville area.
In accordance with its in-
tention of bolstering its 15,000-
man Congo force, the UN announced
on 22 November that the UN Com-
mand would be reinforced by an
800-man Ghanaian battalion.
The UN, however, has balked at
Ghana's insistence that its
contingent not be based anywherc25X1
except in Leopoldville without
clearance from Accra. Accra's
interest in seeing its troops
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vwe
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
UN
2750
? Kamina
Kapangi 0
Selected road
It- Selected airfield
Kasongo "k
Lul ou~g Kongo c
bOULA Kabalo
Lul
UN
2930
STATUTE MILES 400
I 1
32053
based in Leopoldville suggests
that the Ghanaian contingent
may once again be politically
active in support of leftist
elements in the Congo.
In Stanleyville,_ the flood-
ing of'the Congo River has posed
a threat to public health and
has aggravated the province's
long-standing economic dislo-
cations. Public security is
also precarious, with Congo-
lese Army soldiers in the area
seemingly responsive neither
to Gizenga nor to Lundula. An
early return to either politi-
cal or economic stability in
the area appears unlikely.
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UN 1340
,scattered
UN 1390
scattered
KQlwezi 7r'" '1
k . Jadotville
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
FRANCE-ALGERIA
Secret talks between France making extreme demands, and then
and the provisional Algerian accept partition of Algeria in
government (PAG) are reported
still under way, but there is
increasing evidence that both
sides are coming to recognize
that any agreement reached
would be difficult if not im-
possible to implement as long
as the anti-Gaullist Secret
Army Organization (OAS) commands
support from the bulk of the
European settlers in Algeria.
The OAS already seems to exer-
cise effective control in sev-
eral areas, a situation which
could develop into de facto
partition regardless of what
Paris decides.
In a 24 November conversa-
tion with US Embassy officers,
rebel information minister Yazid
said the PAG considers the mat-
ter of Ben Bella's hunger strike
"settled." Yazid, asserting
that the PAG would not demand
the outright release of Ben
Bella or the other rebel lead-
ers held by the French, said
that the PAG now regards the
prospects for successful nego-
tiations with the French as ex-
cellent. Both French Interior
Minister Frey and Socialist
leader Guy Mollet reportedly
said last week that secret ne-
;otiations with the PAG were
proceeding satisfactorily.
However, there are indi-
cations that the PAG is becom-
ing increasingly convinced that,
because of the strength of the
OAS and the erosion of Paris'
control in Algeria, the PAG has
little chance of being actually
installed in Algiers in the
near future, and that it would
therefore be a mistake to fol-
low through on negotiations.
the PAG would still have
to fight the OAS before it
could rule Algeria. Conse-
quently, Boumendjel reportedly
reasons, the PAG should cause
the negotiations to fail by
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1 Dec WEEKLY REVIEW Page 9 of 25
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order to win a base from which
to rally the Moslem population
to its support and to carry on
military action against the re-
maining Europeans.
Mollet--predicting that
the Algerian situation will
reach a climax within the next
two months--believes that the
French Government's security
situation in Algeria is un-
tenable and that the PAG real-
izes it could not take over 25X1
OAS-controlled Algiers and Oran.
Meanwhile, the effective-
ness of De Gaulle's campaign
to rally the support of the
French armed forces is not yet
clear. The 3,000 or so offi-
cers and men from France and
abroad whom he addressed at
Strasbourg on 23 November gave
his plea for national unity on
the Algerian issue what initial
reports described as a "mixed"
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
reception.
Some quarters have expressed
the view that the assembly of so
many officers to remind them of
their duty may in the long run
boomerang so far as public opin-
ion is concerned in providing
evidence of the regime's weak-
ness vis-a-vis the military.
The publicly expressed opposi-
tion to De Gaulle last week
by Marshal Juin and the re-
serve officers' association
will reinforce this view.
Press and military circles
are apparently taking seriously
rumors that, if negotiations
with the PAG are not resumed,
Minister for Algerian Affairs
Joxe will be replaced by Armed
Forces Minister Messmer. It
is speculated that the way
would then be clear to appoint
as defense minister the retired
chief of staff for national
defense, General Paul Ely, whose
prestige might succeed in re-
storing the unity of the armed
forces behind the regime.
The uneasy situation pre-
vailing in Saigon has been
sharpened by unprecedented edi-
torial attacks on the US in the
government-controlled press.
The press campaign charges the
US with "imperialist" ambitions
and stresses South Vietnam's
own resources in the fight a-
gainst the Communists. The cam-
paign is reported to have been
largely instigated by Diem's
brother and chief political
adviser, Ngo Dinh Nhu, whose
pervasive influence in the gov-
ernment apparatus has made him
the chief target of local crit-
ics of the present regime.
Restiveness among the South
'Vietnamese military command may
be reaching a critical stage.
Several ranking officers appear
convinced that the reforms which
they regard as necessary for a
victory over the Viet Cong can
be brought about only through
a coup d'etat. In a conversa-
tion with American military
representatives on 24 November,
the commander of South Vietnam's
field forces, Major General
Duong Van Minh, and his deputy,
Brigadier General Le Van Kim,
stressed the continuing inade-
quacies in command and intelli-
gence operations and stated
that the next few months could
be decisive in South Vietnam's
"extremely grave" situation.
The deputy commander of the
Third Corps Zone (the southern
part of the country) recently
told the US assistant army
attache that plans to bring
about changes in the govern-
ment are nearing completion
and that "something" would be
done very shortly.
Although there was a de-
cline in reported Viet Cong
activity last week and govern-
ment forces claim some tactical
successes, there has been no
discernible change in the gradu-
ally deteriorating security sit-
uation. The military chief of
the Mekong delta province of
Dien Hoa recently stated that
the Viet Cong controls about
half his area, commands the
:Loyalty of about half its peo-
ple, and is able to land up to
300 men almost anywhere along
the coast without detection. As
evidence of the increasing in-
filtration of North Vietnamese
in his province, he cited the
growing brutality of the Viet
Cong, a new battle technique of
concentrated heavy-weapons fir-
ing, and the reinforcement of
existing Viet Cong units in the
area. 25X1
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SECRET
Failure of the rival fac-
tions to agree on mutually sat-
isfactory security arrangements
for the projected meeting of
the three princes in Vientiane
has led Souvanna Phouma, sup-
ported by Souphannouvong, to
propose that the talks be held
at the site of their last meet-
ing in early October--Hin Heup,
a village located at the front
lines. Souvanna suggested that
the meetings begin on 1 December.
indicated his willing-
ness o add three non - Xieng
Khouang neutralists to his "neu-
tralist center group," but de-
clared that the addition of a
fourth would be "difficult."
Souvanna expressed general agree-
ment with the view that integra-
tion of the armed forces should
precede national elections, ob-
serving that he was "not going
to have elections while the
Pathet Lao had armed forces
wandering around."
Soviet Ambassador Abramov
has had talks. with Phoumi, Boun
Oum, and Ambassador Brown in
Vientiane. He told Phoumi that
the USSR desired a "neutral in-
.dependent" Laos and was prepared
to offer substantial economic
help to the new government. He
remarked that a team of Soviet
technicians was in Xieng Khouang
in order to establish an elec-
trical plant. Abramov reiterated
the USSR's desire to avoid a
resumption of hostilities and
stressed that a coalition gov-
ernment headed by Souvanna Phouma
was the best possible solution
to the Laotian problem. He in-
dicated that he would remain in
Vientiane for several days and
implied that he would be willing
to use his influence with the
Xieng Khouang faction to bring
about an early agreement on the
formation of a coalition govern-
ment.
Anti-government units have
initiated probing actions in
the areas surrounding Nam Tha
and Luang Prabang as well as
farther south in the region
northwest of Thakhek. Laotian
army forces have continued local
clearing sweeps in the northern
provinces, and Meo units con-
tinue their harassment of enemy
activities in the Plaine des
Jarres.
The USSR has stepped up
its efforts At Geneva to reach
an early compromise agreement.
On 21 November Soviet delegate
Pushkin proposed that the US,
the UK, France, India, the USSR,
and Communist China "sit around
the conference table" until an
agreement is reached. All the
unsettled issues are now under
specific negotiation: at Geneva.
Pushkin continued to demand that
any conference declaration must
take explicit note of the abrogation
of the SEATO protdcol-for Laos.
Although final agreement
has almost been reached on the
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Or
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