CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A003400020001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 47
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 13, 2008
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 27, 1961
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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CURRENT
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY
SUMMARY
COPY NO. ~o
OCI NO. 0303/61
27 October 1961
ARMY & State Dept.
review(s) completed.
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
UNCODED
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P, U, XL I'
T H E W E E K I N B R I E F
(Information as of 1200 EDT 26 Oct)
SOVIET PARTY CONGRESS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 1
The temporary Sino-Soviet truce reached in November
1960 has been shattered by developments at the 22nd; party
congress. The violent Soviet attacks on the Albanian re-
gime have overshadowed the new Soviet party program and
suggest that Khrushchev has chosen this issue to impose
on Peiping a new test of strength in the continuing strug-
gle for leadership of the international Communist movement.
His revival of charges against the antiparty group is in-
tended to link this issue with the "cult of personality"
indictment against the Albanians--and, by implication, the
Chinese--leaders. The proceedings of the congress provide
further evidence that Khrushchev's position as leader of
the Soviet Union is unassailable. Peiping has already in-
dicated that it will defend Albania, but will probably
urge that the matter be settled in private discussions.
Page 11.
The USSR now appears to have placed itself firmly
behind the Ulbricht regime's efforts to force US offi-
cials to acknowledge the right of East German guards at
the Friedrichstrasse checkpoint in East Berlin to exer-
cise control over US-licensed vehicles driven by civil-
ians. As recently as 22 October Soviet officials in Ber-
lin had indicated that the USSR still accepted the US
position that US official license plates are sufficient
identification in so far as East German police personnel
are concerned. At the Soviet party congress, bloc lead-
ers are avoiding polemical treatment of the Berlin and
German issues pending continuation of exploratory talks
with the United States.
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SOUTH VIETNAM a o o a ... o.. 0 0 0.. 0 0 0 o a. Page 15
Viet Cong activity continued at record level last
week, with most incidents occurring in the southern areas.
The Communists are keeping up attacks to disrupt north-
south communications routes, but apparently are still
concentrating on erosion of the Diem government's control
at the village level. Continuing rumors of coup plotting
in Saigon point up discontent in high government and mili-
tary circles. Although there is no evidence of advanced
planning, some elements may be considering the ouster
of P;.?esident Diem as one step toward a solution of the
Viet Cong problem.
Page 16
Souvanna Phouma's efforts to expedite formation of a
coalition government following his meeting with King Savang
last week have encountered new obstacles. Boun Oum has
rejected Souvanna's proposal for another meeting of the
three princes in Xieng Khouang to discuss the composition
of the cabinet, and Phoumi is again voicing doubts as to
whether Souvanna would be able to form a "truly neutral"
government. At Geneva, Western and Communist representa-
tives are still at odds over several key aspects of a
treaty on Laos.
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Sihanouk's diplomatic break with Thailand gives the
Communist bloc another chance to increase its influence
in Cambodia. Sihanouk has previously responded to slights
from Thailand and South Vietnam by increasing his contacts
with the bloc. While he has frequently asserted that he
is anti-Communist and that his country is neutral, he be-
lieves South Vietnam and Thailand are a more immediate
threat than Communism. Saigon and Bangkok view Cambodia
as a weak link in Southeast Asian security.
Page 18
CONGO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 19
Tshombd on 24 October accepted the UN's conditions
for ratification of the 13 October cease-fire agreement
between UN and Katanga forces. Implementation has pro-
ceeded without incident, but strains between these forces
and between Leopoldville and Elisabethville are likely to
remain. Adoula continues bent on bringing Katanga to heel
and, recognizing his own limited military capability, is
pressing for a new mandate for UN forces which would more
clearly support this objective. Gizenga, in Stanleyville
since 6 October, shows little inclination to return to
Leopoldville, and may be trying to rebuild a center of op-
position in his provincial stronghold.
FRANCE-ALGERIA . . . . . . . . . o . o . . . Page 21
Algerian rebel premier Ben Khedda's statement on 24
October offering to renew negotiations with France pre-
sented a new approach to a settlement--immediate agree-
ment on independence without the formality of a referendum.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Apparently anticipating French insistence on a referendum,
however, Ben Khedda expressed willingness to continue work-
ing for a peaceful solution through this means. Should
De Gaulle announce prior to 1 November an intention to re-
sume negotiations, it would have the effect of encouraging
the Secret Army Organization to precipitate violent demon-
strations by Europeans to counter the Moslem demonstrations
scheduled for that date.
. . . . . . . . . . Page 22
Nasir is taking steps to eliminate the potential for
a rightist coup in Egypt and to dramatize his determina-
tion to press ahead with his socialist revolution. In
Lebanon the resignation of strongly pro-Nasir Prime Minis-
ter Saib Salam may bring government changes which will in-
hibit the freedom of Egyptian agents to run subversive op-
erations into Syria from Lebanese territory. The Jordanian
Government staged its burlesque of free parliamentary elec-
tions last week without serious incident, but resentment
continues widespread, especially among the Palestinians
on Jordan's West Bank.
STATUS OF SYRIAN ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH THE BLOC , . . . Page 24
Although the USSR has not yet offered economic or
military aid to the new Syrian Government, Moscow probs.-
blywould extend such assistance if requested. The USSR
apparently will continue work on projects under the $150,-
000,000 economic credit granted prior to Syria's union
with Egypt in early 1958. Damascus has no known outstand-
ing Soviet military aid credits.
BLOC AIRCRAFT SALES IN UNDERDEVELOPED COUNTRIES , . . , . Page 25
The bloc program to aid underdeveloped countries in
establishing and expanding civil air facilities has been
gaining momentum in recent months. Several types of civil
aircraft have been sold to Guinea, Ghana, Mali, Cuba, and
India, and in some of these countries the majority of
transports operating on the national airlines were pur-
chased from the bloc. The underdeveloped countries have
been receptive to bloc offers because of favorable prices
UN DEBATE ON SOUTH AFRICA . o e o 0 . . o o Page 27
The General Assembly's Special Political Committee
began debate on 23 October on the Republic of South Af-
rica's apartheid policy amid strong indications that Ghana
and other African states will succeed in having the assem-
bly call for diplomatic and economic sanctions against the
Verwoerd government. The General Assembly has never voted
to apply sanctions a ainst one of its member states.
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DOMINICAN REPUBLIC . . . . . . . . . . , . . . . Page 28
The recent antigovernment rioting may have heightened
sentiment in the armed forces for suppressing both leftist
and moderate opposition groups and even for the restoration
of a military regime. The government made long-planned
moves against pro-Castro leaders on 22 October but with
only partial success; most of the leaders slated for depor-
tation had gone into hiding. The government has been suc-
cessful in forcing Generals Arismendi and Hector Trujillo
to leave the country, but no change in the position of
General Ramfis Trujillo appears likely in the immediate
future. President Balaguer appealed on 23 October for an
end to political rancor "in this moment of conciliation
and concord,- 25X1
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 29
Rioting has broken out in Bolivia following the impo-
sition of higher prices for gasoline and fuel oil, an often-
postponed measure which the International Monetary Fund has
insisted is essential for 'the stabilization program. The
government, which had evidently been hoping that its re-
cent "discovery" of a revolutionary plot would distract
public attention from the decree, declared a state of siege
in the capital on 21 October and imposed domestic press
censorship. The rioting does not appear to pose an imme-
diate threat to President Paz' administration, but furthei
violence is likely.
BACKGROUND OF THE BLOC'S DISPUTE WITH ALBANIA . , . . . . Page 1
During the past year, the USSR and the satellites
have attempted, through political, economic, and psycho-
logical pressures, to get Albania to conform to Khru-
shchev's international and party policies. In an effort
to compensate for their growing isolation from the Soviet
bloc, Albanian leaders have developed closer relations
with Communist China and have extended economic feelers
to the West.
Domestic dissatisfaction with the Castro regime is
increasing, but is not believed to have reached a level
where it is a serious threat to the government. The anti-
Castro forces now include more people than before from the
lower classes, although the majority in this group still
supports Castro. The Castro regime has a hard core of
fanatical backers and a large and efficient apparatus
of repression.
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NEHRU - 1961 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 8
Nehru, when he returns to the United States on 5 No-
vember, will be eager to explore international issues with
President Kennedy, but the line Nehru takes is likely to be
based firmly on the neutralist policy he has always felt
best served India's national interest. The Indian leader's
emphasis on negotiation and compromise as essential to ease
cold war tensions stems largely from his fear that war
would jeopardize India's economic development. India today
is marked by relative political stability and steady eco-
nomic progress, but regional and religious antagonisms
persist, the ruling Congress party is weakened by faction-
alism and inertia, and the economy will be hampered for
some time by unemployment, inflation, and a scarcity of
industrial power.
Page 12
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
WEEKLY REVIEW
SOVIET PARTY CONGRESS
What was billed in advance
as the congress to outline the
bright future of the USSR and
the "socialist commonwealth"
has been transformed into a
sordid recounting of the strug-
gle between Khrushchev and his
opponents in the party and a
public unveiling of the smolder-
ing dispute between Khrushchev
and his bloc opponents. Khru-
shchev's decision to turn in-
stead to the long-dead ""anti-
party group" issue and the
critical question of Soviet
authority in the bloc is re-
lated to Khrushchev's success
and failure in his dual role
as Soviet leader and head of
the international Communist
movement.
In the former role,.Khru-
shchev is celebrating his
assumption of complete power
in the USSR, where his position
now appears unassailable. His
close political lackeys have
appeared at the 22nd congress
in important roles for no
other reason than their personal
association with Khrushchev--
much in the manner of Stalin's
appointment of his own palace
guard to the central committee.
Khrushchev's review of the
details of the conflict with
the antiparty group, together
with the strictures against
the group by other Soviet
leaders, are intended as a
testimony to the magnitude of
his victory. Equally important,
Khrushchev is also proclaiming
the validity of the policies
which the group opposed. As
leader of the Communist party
of the Soviet Union, Khrushchev
has succeeded in molding the
party, its policies, and its
intended course in his own
image.
If Khrushchev's victory
over the party is complete in-
side the USSR, however, his
position as leader of the
international movement has been
marred by failure. The Chinese
challenge to his authority,
Albania's support for that
challenge, and its own subsequent
and successful defiance of the
USSR had considerably weakened
Moscow's authority in the Com-
munist world. In November and
December 1960 Khrushchev had
been forced to compromise in the
interest of unity, but the fragile
accord that was reached was
clearly regarded by both the
Chinese and the Russians as a
temporary truce rather than a
definitive settlement. Khru-4
shchev apparently has decided
that the time has come to attempt
to redress the balance.
Sino-Soviet Relations
The Soviet leaders' violent
attacks on the Hoxha regime in
Albania, which have completely
overshadowed even the new So-
viet party program at the congress,
suggest that Khrushchev has
deliberately' chosen this issue
to impose on Peiping a new test
of strength in the continuing
struggle for leadership in the
international Communist movement.
With characteristic boldness,
he has moved to turn to his
advantage the embarrassing
situation posed by Albania's
successful defiance of Soviet
pressures to strike a blow at
the Chinese leaders. He is
attempting to place Peiping
on the defensive at the outset
by branding the Albanian leaders
as deviationists, hoping to
confront the Chinese with the
alternatives of acquiescing in
the Soviet indictment or
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SU
reaffirming their support of
a regime declared to be hereti-
cal and threatened with expul-
sion from the "socialist camp."
Khrushchev probably antici-
pated that the Chinese would,
in fact, have no choice but to
respond to his challenge because
Chinese silence in the face of
the Soviet assault would rep-
resent a major victory for
the Soviet party and confirm
its unquestioned supremacy in
the "socialist world." He
hopes to exploit Peiping's sup-
port of the Hoxha regime, which
he has accused of "departing
from the generally agreed line
of the whole world Communist
movement" and reverting to
Stalinist practices, to dis-
credit Peiping's claims to a
co-equal voice in determining
world Communist strategy and
orthodoxy, and to demonstrate
China's complete isolation in
the "socialist commonwealth."
Khrushchev also hopes the out-
come of this new phase of the
Sino-Soviet contest will make
it more difficult in the future
for Peiping to challenge Soviet
leadership and to develop a
rival center of authority.
Although Khrushchev in any
event would have felt obliged
at the party congress to take
up the question of Albanian de-
fiance, the concentrated vio-
lence of the assault on the
Hoxha regime far transcends
the immediate issue of Soviet-
Albanian relations. It clearly
points to a decision to force
a showdown with the Chinese on
carefully chosen terrain on
which Khrushchev believes he
will command a heavy advantage.
The replacement of Soviet
political, military, and
economic influence in Albania
by the Chinese posed a challenge
to Moscow's authority and
control in the Soviet bloc and
the international Communist
movement which could not be
ignored indefinitely. The
failure of the Soviet attempt
to overthrow the Hoxha regime
in the summer of 1960 was a
serious setback for the USSR
which had far-reaching implica-
tions for its hegemony in
Eastern Europe. China's sub-
sequent actions in extending
strong political support and
increasing economic assistance
to the Albanians made an eventual
Soviet counter-offensive inevitable.
Khrushchev now has decided that
the opportune moment has arrived
to reassert the unquestioned
supremacy of the Soviet party
over the bloc and the world
Communist movement.
He may believe China's
grave economic difficulties and
agricultural disasters have
reduced Peiping's ability to
resist Soviet political pressure.
The Chinese industrialization
program was seriously disrupted
by the withdrawal of the Soviet
technicians, and the USSR has
declined to extend any significant
assistance over the past year.
Chou En-lai, however, intimated
in his speech to the Soviet
congress that the firmness of
China's ideological position
would not be affected by its
need for Soviet economic as-
sistance. He asserted,as Chinese
leaders have since the Soviet
withdrawal of technicians in
1960, that China could surmount
its current difficulties by
relying on the "work of our own
hands."
Despite Chou En-lai's
calculated displays of dis-
pleasure, Khrushchev has gone out
of his way to make a cynical
display of politeness to-the
Chinese delegation in Moscow.
His motivation is probably two-
fold: by ostentatiously shaking
Chou's hand after his speech
and seeing him off at the air-
port, Khrushchev hopes to make
it appear that his attacks are
really against Albania and not
China, and these gestures provide
him with a basis for later claiming,
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY .$U ItY
if it becomes necessary, that
he "did everything possible"
to maintain Sino-Soviet unity.
At the same time, Moscow has
made it clear that Chinese
behavior has not been that of
a "comradely" country. A tele-
cast of the congress proceedings
on 19 October showed Chou shak-
ing hands with Kozlov and
Kosygin, ignoring Khrushchev
who stood between them.
Chou En-lai's reproach of
Khrushchev at the party congress
for airing the Albanian issue
and his early departure from
Moscow reflect the Chinese
leaders' recognition of the
gravity of the Soviet challenge.
Chou was met at Peiping airport
by Mao Tse-tung and seven other
politburo members--apparently
a deliberate move to show ap-
proval of Chou's stand at the
congress and to demonstrate
Chinese solidarity. The members
of the Chinese delegation who 1
remained at the congress are
currently touring Leningrad,
probably awaiting the outcome
of politburo deliberations in
Peiping to hammer out the
details of the Chinese response.
The decision now being
worked out in Peiping may fol-
low the lines set forth in a
Chinese Foreign Ministry docu-
ment sent last January to
embassies for their guidance.
It noted that since bloc unity
was to be the regime's basic
objective in 1961, the Chinese
would not take the initiative
to reopen the debate but would
not back down if again con-
fronted with "erroneous thinking
inside the international Com-
munist movement." It specifi--
tcall y a f f firmed that Peiping would
give "all-out" political and
economic support to Albania.
Chou En-lai's remark in
his brief speech to the party
congress that "open and one-
sided" criticism of a fraternal
party could not be regarded as
a serious Marxist-Leninist
approach was a clear rebuke of
Khrushchev. His further in-
sistence that the principle of
consultation and full equality
among bloc members should be
observed suggests the course
that Peiping will probably adopt
in its defense of Tirana. This
course will incorporate the high
moral stand urged by Chou in
March 1957 to "reserve differences
while upholding solidarity." If
Khrushchev continues to force
the Albanian issue, however,'.the
Chinese appear ready to respond
with the belligerence that
characterized their arguments
at the height of the Sino-Soviet
dispute in 1959 and 1960.
There are indications, in
fact, of a developing view in
Peiping that Khrushchev has
already pressed matters to the
point where a strong response
is necessary and that any further
effort to cover up the dispute
would be futile. Up to 26
October, the Chinese while making
their sympathies for Albania
clear, had given little press or
radio coverage to the Moscow
conference, where attacks on
Albania were the order of the
day. On 26 October, however,
People's Daily publicized the
full e l a - 1 s of the charges
against Albania made by Khru-
shchev and delegates from other
Communist parties, along with
the angry reply. of the Albanian
central committee.
The next phase of the
contest may be a post-congress
meeting of bloc parties or all
Communist parties, and Chou
En-lai may return to Moscow
after his consultations with
Mao, as Pravda staff members have
claimed, Reactions from other
Communist leaders provide an
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
indication of the probable
groupings that would develop at
an international Communist
meeting.
The European satellites,
Mongolia, and most Western
Communist parties have associated
themselves clearly and forceful-
ly with the Soviet attack on
Albania. The European satellites
in their domestic propaganda
have made it clear that the
preferred course would be for
Albania to demonstrate the
proper contrition and thus
maintain bloc unity, but they
have also indicated the improb-
ability of such a course and
have begun to prepare public
and party opinion for whatever
actions may be taken against
Tirana. Ulbricht's accusation
in his speech on 20 October
that Albania bad "grossly vio-
lated ...joint decisions of the
Warsaw Pact" suggests that
Albania may even be formally
expelled from that body.
Many of the Asian parties,
however, have failed to give
the Soviet Union this kind of
support and have indicated
varying degrees of reserve.
On the basis of TASS summaries
--which may not reflect all the
nuances of the delegates' remarks
--it appears that North Korea
and North Vietnam among the
bloc parties declined to echo
the Soviet charges against
Albania. The Indian, Indonesian,
and Japanese parties have also
been silent on the Albanian
issue. The North Koreans, how-
ever, and perhaps some of the
others as well, carefully
hedged their silence on Albania
with intimations of their
interest in seeing a spirit of
compromise and concession in
Tirana.
"Antiparty Group" Charges
A major purpose of Khru-
schev's revival of charges
against the Soviet antiparty
group is to establish a clear link
between this issue and the "cult
of personality" indictment against
the Albanian--and, by implication,
the Chinese--leaders. The speeches
by Khrushchev and his top colleagues
have centered on accusations that
the antiparty group "fiercely
opposed" de-Stalinization and
desired a return to the repressive
measures of the Stalin era.
Malenkov, Molotov, Kaganovich,
and Voroshilov have been charged
with personal responsibility for
many of Stalin's crimes.
In addition, the antiparty
group is indicted with failing to
assess correctly the international
scene, and the examples of their
failure bear a striking resemblance
to the positions held by the
Chinese and Albanian leaders.
Molotov, for example, was con-
demned by Mikoyan for opposing
the policy of peaceful coexistence
and for conceding the inevitability
of war. Mikoyan's assertion that
Molotov regarded peaceful co-
existence as the temporary absence
of war and opposed personal meet-
ings of top leaders of Fast and
West is close to a description
of charges against Mao's advocacy
of a militant interpretation of
peaceful coexistence. Thus the
present leadership's condemnations
of the policies which Khrushchev
defeated in the USSR when he
foiled the plots of the anti-
party group are but thinly veiled
attacks on the vestiges of those
same policies which continue to
exist in Communist China and
Albania.
Pains are being taken,
however, to deny that resurrec-
tion of the antiparty group
issue reflects a fresh challenge
to Khrushchev's leadership. First
Deputy Premier Kosygin said,"We
are doing this now to show again
to the party and the people where
the personality cult can lead....
We want the lessons of history
never to be forgotten." Leonid
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Ilichev, the party's agitation
and propaganda boss, made it
clear that criticism of the
"cult of personality" should
not be confused with the
authority of present leaders.
He flatly warned that the party
would do its utmost to protect
the authority of those who were
"devoting all their energies"
to the cause of Communism.
This treatment is clearly
designed to strengthen Khru-
shchev's position as the supreme
authority of Communist orthodoxy
in the coming contest with
Peiping by attempting to disarm
in advance any Chinese counter-
claims that Khrushchev himself
is vulnerable to the same
charges he has directed against
the antiparty group. At the
same time, the attacks on the
old Stalinists have the effect
of demonstrating to the Soviet
people how much better off they
have been under Khrushchev and,
indirectly, to pay tribute to
the man who prevented a return
to Stalinist terror by smashing
the group.
Both this and the open
adulation of Khrushchev are
aimed at bolstering still
further the image of the Soviet
party chief as the legitimate
successor to Lenin. Virtually
all congress speakers have
contributed to the burgeoning
"cult of Khrushchev." To
date, the high point in the
adulation of Khrushchev is
Defense Minister Malinovsky's
reference to Khrushchev as
"our supreme commander-in-chief"--
an appellation no Soviet leader
has enjoyed since Stalin assumed
the title "Generalissimo" in
the early days of World War II.
Foreign Policy Implications
While it is too early
to assess the effects of this
new demonstration of bloc dis-
unity on Soviet tactics on Berlin
and Germany, there is no indica-
tion that it will cause Khrushchev
to reduce his demands on the
Western powers or retreat from
his intention to sign a separate
peace treaty with East Germany.
The relaxation of his year-end
deadline on a treaty will give
Khrushchev greater freedom of
maneuver in dealing with the
West, but it is unlikely that
this move was dictated by his
decision to join issue with
the Chinese on Albania and the
"cult of personality."..
Khrushchev has firmly
restated his commitment to the
peaceful coexistence strategy,
which includes negotiations and
contacts with Western leaders.
Any retreat from this general
line would be interpreted
throughout the Communist world
as a concession to the Chinese.
The high stakes involved in this
intra-bloc struggle, however,
may well compel Khrushchev to
subordinate policy considerations
vis-a-vis the West to the over-
riding demands of prosecuting
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
his new drive against the
Chinese Communists.
Economic Developments
Economic discussion at
the congress has continued
to center on problems of
efficient planning and manage-
ment of the large and complex
construction program. Kosy-
gin's speech proposed some
new measures to increase
the efficiency of the con-
struction program. The
program has long been ham-
pered by the fact that the
construction material and
production equipment industries
have not kept pace with
the volume of building;
moreover, the system has
failed to provide incentives
for timely completion of
projects. Investment has
been spread thinly among too
many projects instead of
being concentrated on the
important ones; as a result,
construction is prolonged.
Kosygin repeated some
of the standard admonitions
of the past: planning of new
construction will be closely
linked with the provision
of supplies of materials
and equipment; funds must be
earmarked primarily for proj-
ects about to be completed;
new projects will be allowed
only when similar projects,
already under way, have suf-
ficient resources for their
completion; incentive awards
will be tied to the completion
of projects.
Kosygin also indicated
some new measures may be
tried. To ensure timely
receipt of equipment at con-
struction sites, payment may
be withheld until the equip-
ment is actually placed
in operation. He also sug-
gests as an "experiment" a
transition from budgetary
financing of capital invest-
ment to long-term credits.
Funds could therefore be
firmly earmarked for specific
construction projects rather
than parceled out in an-
nual plans. Kosygin's re-
marks imply that the con-
struction authority will be
charged interest for the
credits in order to stimu-
late rapid completion of
projects.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SdJIM1, RY
Since 15 October, the U1-
bricht regime has made a syste-
matic effort to force US offi-
cials to acknowledge the right
of East German guards at the
Friedrichstrasse checkpoint in
East Berlin to exercise control
over US-licensed vehicles driven
by civilians. At the outset,
Soviet authorities appear to
have made an attempt to disso-
ciate themselves from the East
German actions; on 25 October,
however, the USSR indicated that
it was firmly backing the East
German claims.
US officials maintain that
US official license plates are
in themselves sufficient identi-
fication as far as the East Ger-
mans are concerned. In accord-
ance with long-established prac-
tice and US rights under the
occupation agreements, tine US
takes the position that only So-
viet officials may control move-
ments of US personnel, whether
uniformed or not. In contrast
to the Americans and the French,
the British have been in the
habit for several years of flash-
ing identification documents when
requested, but they have never
actually handed them over to the
East German guards.
Sector Border Incidents
The first serious incidents
occurred on 15 October, when
East German guards on four oc-
casions refused to pass US-
licensed vehicles operated by
civilians. In one case, they
subsequently permitted one ve-
hicle to pass the checkpoint
after a uniformed driver took
the wheel.
On 17 October, US political
Adviser Howard Trivers called
upon the Soviet political ad-
viser, Lt. Col. Lazarev, to pro-
test the incidents and outline
the US case. Lazarev, unusually
courteous, said Soviet authori-
ties lacked adequate descriptions
of US official license plates.
He thought everything would be
all right if US authorities
would supply complete sets of
descriptions and photographs
of plates currently in use by
US personnel. He said he would
undertake to see that facsimiles
were provided to East German
authorities at the Friedrich-
strasse checkpoint as well as
to Soviet officials at the
Marienborn checkpoint on the
Autobahn.
In the light of Lazarev's
implicit recognition of Western
rights of free circulation in
Berlin, Trivers after the
meeting immediately forwarded
the necessary information on
US license plates.
Despite Lazarev?s assurances
to Trivers, further incidents
occurred in which East German
sector border guards refused
to permit US civilians to pass
through the Friedrichstrasse
checkpoint without showing
identification,
On 22 October, the East
Germans demanded identification
from E. Allen Lightner, assistant
chief of the US Mission in Ber-
lin, After long delays and fail-
ure by the East German guards to
summon a Soviet officer, as re-
quested by Lightner, the American
commandant in Berlin dispatched
an armed escort of US military
police to escort Lightner into
East Berlin. Lightner and his
escort twice went into the Soviet
sector and withdrew.
Soon afterward, Lazarev
arrived at the Friedrichstrasse
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Elevated railroad (S-Bahn)
Subway (U-Bahn)
Soviet sector of Berlin
S-Bahn tracks torn up
at these points
Note: West Stasken area of West
Berlin was turned over to Soviet
control in 1945 by the British in
return for Gross Glienicke area
needed to expand Gatow airport.
AUTHORIZED BORDER CROSSING POINTS
MEMBERS OF DIPLOMATIC CORPS
AND OCCUPATION FORCES ONLY
8. Friedrichstrasse
WEST GERMANS ONLY
3. Bornholmerstrasse
9. Heinrich Heine Strasse
WEST BERLINERS ONLY
5. Chausseestrasse
6. Invalidenstrasse
10. Oberbaumbruecke
13. Sonnen Allee
ORIGINAL CROSSING POINTS
OF 13 AUGUST NOW CLOSED
I. Kopenhagenerstrasse
2. Wollankstrasse
4. Brunnenstrasse
7. Brandenburger Tor (Gate)
II. Puschkin Allee
12. Eisenstrasse
14. Rudowerstrasse
Authorized East Germans and East Berliners presum-
ably can cross at any Border Points still open.
checkpoint and conferred with
the US provost marshal. Lazarev
admitted that the East Germans
had made a mistake and that it
would be corrected. Lightner
then drove his car across the
sector border and returned,
without escort or hindrance.
The following day the East
German news agency carried an
announcement of the Interior
Ministry attacking US authorities
for the incident of the pre-
ceding day. It stated that the
regime?s police are under in-
structions to permit foreigners
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CURRENT INTELL:[GENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
to pass only after showing their
passports and claimed that "per-
sons in civilian clothes"..were
trying to evade these regula-
tions without "proving" member-
ship in the Western occupation
forces
On 24 October, East German
guards on two occasions turned
back US-licensed vehicles driven
by officials in civilian clothes.
On the second occasion, the US
provost marshal drove to the
scene but was unable to induce
East German police to let the
automobile pass. The following
day the East Germans again
halted a US vehicle. When the
US provost marshal demanded a
Soviet officer be summoned im-
mediately, the East German guard
declared that the regime does
not recognize US license plates.
Trivers then telephoned So-
viet headquarters to demand a
Soviet officer. A new Soviet
political adviser, Col. Alekseyev,
arrived, accompanied by.Lazarev.
Alekseyev took a belligerent
tone with US officials from the
outset. He told the US provost
marshal that the East German
government had made a decision
not to recognize license plates
of US forces and repeated this
assertion to Triversm Lazarev,
moreover,, denied he had given
Trivers assurance on 17 October
of no further difficulties.
When the US provost marshal
warned that an armed escort
would be sent to shepherd the
American vehicle into Berlin,
Alekseyev declared: "No, you
won't!" Nevertheless, US
military police escorted the
car into East Berlin and back
without interference.
Major General Watson, Ameri-
can commander in Berlin, saw
Soviet commandant Solovyev that
afternoon to protest the series
of incidents. Solovyev strongly
backed East Germany's claim to
the right to exercise controls
at the sector border and main-
tained that Soviet authorities
cannot influence or interfere
with East German actions there.
He rejected General Watson's
contention that the license
plate was adequate identifica-
tion and demanded that civilians
henceforth show their identi-
fication documents.
While Watson was conferring
with Solovyev, the East Germans
halted two US Army sightseeing
buses and demanded that the
civilian occupants identify
themselves. Although the East
Germans heretofore have asked
for identification from such
clearly marked vehicles, they
have not actually denied entry.
On 26 October, the East
Germans again attempted to deny
entry into East Berlin to a US-
licensed vehicle, and again mili-
tary police escorted the car from
the Soviet sector.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Bloc Comment on Berliai
In contrast to the bellig-
erent behavior of the Commu-
nists at the Berlin sector
border, Soviet and bloc leaders
have continued to follow Khru--
shchev's lead in avoiding ex-
tensive polemical treatment of
Berlin and Germany pending fur-
ther exploratory talks with the
US in Moscow. In his speech
to the party congress on 25
October, Foreign Minister Gromyko
stressed that the Soviet Union
would spare no efforts to "find
a common language with the
Western powers on the question
of a German peace treaty." At
the same time he warned that
the bloc would conclude a peace
treaty with East Germany if it
proved. impossible to reach
agreement with the Western
powers. His statements on So-
viet policy also reflected the
more moderate line toward the
West which marked Khrushchev's
initial address on 17 October.
Gromyko emphasized that So-
viet foreign policy had been
successful because of its "flex-
ibility and desire to take into
consideration the interests of
partners in talks." He also
claimed that the meeting between
President Kennedy and Khrushchev
in Vienna was "one of the most
outstanding events o our time,"
and went to some lengths to
point up "the great importance"
the Soviet Government attached
to the state of its relations
with the US.
Both First Deputy Premier
Mi.toyan and East German party
leader Ulbricht stressed the
urgency of a peace settlement
with Germany but without men-
tioning a deadline. Like Khru-
shchev, Mikoyan and Ulbricht
claimed that there had been
some shifts in the position of
the West, and Mikoyan attributed
this to Khrushchev's efforts.
Ulbricht stated that "it is a
very good thing" that tallL;s
had begun between the US and
USSR. He warned, however, that
Paris and Bonn aimed at post-
poning negotiations in order
to gain time for equipping West
Germany with atomic weapons.
In line with the general de-
emphasis of Berlin at the Soviet
party congress, the Polish and
Czech party leaders, Gomulka
and Novotny, in their speeches
mentioned these issues in a
brief pro forma manner.
A Soviet official in Paris
who returned from Moscow on 20
October told an American repre-
sentative that the question of
access to Berlin could easily
be solved by a four-power agree-
ment guaranteeing free access.
He stressed that this was of
minor importance to the "main
interest" of the USSR in obtain-
ing a peace treaty with both
Germanys, which would confirm
the Oder-Neisse line and recog-
nize the existing border between
East and West Germany. While
he noted the importance of an
early four-power foreign minis-
ters' conference, the Soviet
spokesman also stated that the
conference could not be called
to deal only with Berlin but
should have as its main purpose
the preparation of a German peace
conference.
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1"01 ~%w
NORTH VIETNAM
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Public uneasiness in Saigon
over the Viet Cong problem has
been increased by the succession
of guerrilla successes over the
past two months, the govern-
ment's sudden declaration of
a national emergency, cancella-
tion of the 26 October National
Day celebrations, and the pub-
licity given the Communist
torture-murder of South Vietnam's
liaison officer to the Inter-
national Control Commission.
Communist Guerrilla Activity in South Vietnam
JLoc Ninh
Jay Ninh
Major areas of Viet
Cong concentration
-f--+- Railroad
Rood
%,,~ 4(onIauIY
Cho Con'
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Several top officials are
becoming more openly critical
of Diem's methods of rule and
apparently feel that reforms
must be forced on him. Vice
President Tho commented to the
Taylor mission that popular
morale could easily be revived
if the government worked prop-
erly.
Viet Cong activity during
the week ending 20 October sur-
passed the previous week's
high, with most incidents occur-
ring in the southern prov-
inces. Reports--still uncon-
firmed--that guerrilla forces
are concentrated around the
Saigon area may be related
to the rumors of coup plots
as well as of intended raids
by terrorists in connection
with the National Day period.
Rail sabotage near Phan
Thiet on 22 October and a re-
ported attack at An Kh6, on
the highway linking Pleiku in
the central highlands with the
coast at Qui Ngon, point to
a continued drive by the Viet
Cong against north-south land
communications. The Viet
Cong's failure to hold key
points gained in large-scale
actions suggests that these
are still largely diversionary
raids and that the Communists
continue to concentrate on
erosion of government control
at the village level.
Boun Oum's rejection of
Souvanna's proposal for a meet-
ing of the three princes in
Xieng Khouang has dimmed pros-
pects for the early establish-
ment of a coalition government
in Laos. General Phoumi ex-
plained this action on the
grounds that the royal govern-
ment had made "all concessions
possible" toward the achieve-
ment of a satisfactory coali-
tion, and that it was "now up
to Souvanna to form a govern-
mento" Once again, Phoumi,
convinced that Souvanna is dom-
inated by the Pathet Lao, is
doubting the wisdom of forming
a Souvanna-controlled coalition
government and would prefer
to postpone--or, if possible,
prevent--the creation of such
a coalition.
Vientiane forces have
continued limited sweep opera-
tions in northern Laos, and in
the Thakhek region of central
Laos are preparing to mount a
counterattack in an effort to
regain territory recently lost
to the rebels. Meo units have
continued their harassment of
enemy forces throughout Xieng
Khouang Province.
During his talks with Am-
bassador Harriman on 20 October
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?JRRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
0 ssu-mao
C H I N A
NORTH VIETNAM
Savon
Ph `o`u Khou Xieng Khoo
V\ uong Ngar
Pn Dong~.ti
:.
,
Nang Vi-ng Tha Thbm
(''/._t. Ban Hat Bo
Lo S
y KONG LE - PATHET LAO
,KONG LE - PATHET LAO AREAS
GOVERNMENT (MEO) BASE AREAS
ROAD
TRAIL
on the crucial issue of voting
procedure for the International
Control Commission (ICC), So-
viet delegate Pushkin did not
come up with any new draft but
repeated his earlier assurance
that the ICC, by a majority
vote, could initiate investi-
gations. On a related point
he submitted an ambiguous draft
dealing with the manner in which
the ICC is to report its find-
ings.
Pushkin claimed the draft's
ambiguity--attempting to pre-
serve the principle of unanimity
Dong Hoi
Muong ih-
SAVANNAKHEI
4,1
while allowing some provision
for a minority viewpoint--was
calculated to "make it easier
on all sides" to reach agree-
ment. He implied that he was
having difficulties with the
Chinese on the whole question
of the ICC's operations in Laos.
Pushkin, however, tried to
assure Harriman that he would
never go back on any previously
agreed understanding between
them and maintained that the
draft "would not produce any
problems in later practice."
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Cambodia's decision on 23
October to sever diplomatic re-
lations with Thailand resulted
directly from a thinly veiled
public attack on Prince Sihanouk
by Prime. Minister Sarit:', o
Thailand on 20 October. The
Thai Government has closed the
Thai-Cambodian border mili-
tarily and reinforced its bor-
der guard, Cambodia, on its
part, has canceled all mili-
tary leaves and recalled all
military personnel to their
units. The break in relations
gives the Communist bloc another
chance to improve its standing
in Cambodia.
Prince Sihanouk, who con-
siders himself anti-Communist,
is more fearful of Thai and
South Vietnamese aggression
than he is of Communist incur-
sions from Laos and North Viet-
nam or subversion by Communist
China. In his efforts to pre-
serve his country's neutrality,
he usually balances his periodic
outbursts against Western in-
stitutions, such as SEATO, with
criticisms of the Communist
bloc. However, whenever his
relations with his two neigh-
bors become strained, Sihanouk,
who considers the West closely
identified with the interests
of Saigon and Bangkok, tends
to align his country more close-
ly with the bloc.
Since the Geneva Agree-
ments of 1954, both Thailand
and South Vietnam have made no
secret of their view that Cam-
bodia is a weak link in South-
east Asian security. In 1956,
Sihanouk, accusing his neighbors
of trying to strangle Cambodia
economically, accepted a $22,-
400,000 grant from Peiping. In
October, he expelled the Chinese
Nationalist consular representa-
tive from Phnom Penh.
By November 1958, tensions
over a disputed border temple
and Thai criticism of Cambodia's
relations with the bloc caused
Sihanouk to "temporarily suspend"
diplomatic relations with Thai-
land for three months.
During the period leading
to an abortive coup attempt in
early 1959, the bloc's standing
in Cambodia was boosted by ef-
forts of the Chinese Communist
Embassy in Phnom Pehh to keep
Sihanouk informed of South Viet-
namese involvement. Saigon's
revival of South Vietnamese
claims to small islands off the
Cambodian coast in 1960 resulted
in a carte blanche offer of aid
from Peiping in the event of
hostilities. Sihanouk has used
this offer as a diplomatic weap-
on, but so far has refused to
accept bloc military assistance.
Penn Nouth, Cambodia's
first minister, has informed
both the Chinese Communist am-
bassador in Phnom Penh and Am-
bassador Trimble that while
Cambodia seeks no war with
Thailand, if the country is in-
vaded the government will ask
for help everywhere, even from
the "Reds." If Cambodians are
forced to choose, he asserted,
they would rather become "slaves"
to Communist China than to their
enemies, the Thais.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY`,.
Tshombe on 24 October ac-
cepted the UN's conditions for
ratification of the cease-fire
concluded on 13 October be-
tween UN and Katangan forces
The exchange of prisoners has
taken place without incident,
and UN and Katangan forces are
in process of re-positioning
their forces as agreed.
Pressed by Premier Adoula
and the Congo Advisory Com-
mittee, UN officials in New
York insisted that Tshombe
acknowledge: (1) that the
cease-fire agreement did con-
travene existing UN resolutions
on the Congo; (2) that it was
a military agreement without
political implications; (3)
that it applied only to Katanga;
and (4) that it in no way af-
fected the Congo's territorial
limits as previously under-
stood by the UN. These con-
ditions induced Leopoldville
to withdraw its initial re-
jection of the agreement. How-
ever, differences over Article
10, which gave Tshombd the
right to defend himself from
"external" attack and appeared
to neutralize the UN forces in
that event, seem to have been
glossed over.
Strains betuaen Leopold-
ville and Elisabethville are
unlikely to be substantially
lessened. Adoula continues
bent on bringing Katanga to
heel and appears to be working
to obtain a new UN mandate
which would specifically permit
military action by UN forces
to end Katanga's secession.
On 17 October, Foreign Minister
Bomboko argued to UN officials
that the cease-fire strengthened
Tshombb and that Leopoldville
would have to take military
action, since the Adoula govern-
ment could survive only if Ka-
tanga were brought back into
the Congo.
Leopoldville has only
limited military capabilities,
however, and would have enor-
mous equipment and transport
problems in any Katanga
invasion. Successful action
by Leopoldville would require
close support from UN forces.
Pressures for a new, more
"energetic" mandate for UN
forces in the Congo are re-
portedly growing in the UN
General Assembly.
Tshombg, under pressure
from the UN, sent two low-
level emissaries to Leopold-
ville on 18 October to pro-
pose an economic and customs
union and a union of mili-
tary forces with no infringe-
ment on Katanga's existence
as a separate political entity.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Press reports indicate that
Adoula gave them a flat re-
jection, although privately
he may have left the door
open to further negotiations.
Reports from Elisabeth-
ville reflect a high de-
gree of confidence on Tshombe's
part. He reportedly takes
the attitude that if Leopold-
ville or the UN insisted on
a highly centralized govern-
ment, Katanga would say,
"Come and get us." On 18
October, Tshombe's troops
were reported restive, hos-
tile to discipline, and eager
to renew the fight with UN
forces.
Nhil.e Tshombe has not
carried slut his threat to
take military action against
the rebellious anti-Tshombe
Baluba refugees, 30,000 of
whom are camped on the out-
skirts of. Elisabethville,
he has reserved the right
to maintain order "by all
means possible." A tight
Katanga-enforced cordon
rings the camp, and no one
is.permitted to leave except
those who agree to return
home. Clashes between the
Balubas and Katangan forces
are frequent.
The Belgian Government ap-
pears reluctant to apply econom-
ic and financial sanctions
against Tshombe, for example by
holding up tax payments by Union
Miniere to the Katangan govern-
ment. Foreign Minister Spaak
told Ambassador MacArthur that
the legal authority of the Bel-
gian Government to take such
steps would have to be studied.
Spaak said he feared that such
action would cause Tshombe to
nationalize all Belgian indus-
tries in Katanga. Spaak claims
that if the Belgian public should
hold the government responsible
for initiating an action that
caused nationalization, the re-
sult could be "disastrous" for
the government. Spaak argued
that a rapprochement between
Tshombe and Adoula could best
be promoted by a moderate Afri-
can nation or an individual with
an understanding of Bantu psy-
chology.
Gizenga returned to Stanley-
ville on 6 October, presumably for
a temporary stay. Adoula and
Gizengists in Leopoldville have
continued to express concern over
Gizenga's delay in returning.
Leopoldville's suspicions that
Gizenga may be planning new moves
against it will be increased by
the reports on 25 October that his
long-time foe, Orientale Province
head Jean Manzikala, had been
ousted and replaced by Gizengist
Simon Losala.
Gizengists in Leopoldville, headei
by Interior Minister Gbenye,
feared army leader General Mobutu
would arrest and execute them
and were considering withdrawing
to Stanleyville. Gizenga's
success in posing Stanleyville
again as a competing center of
power to Leopoldville would de-
pend in large measure on the aid
he could obtain from his outside
supporters, the Soviet bloc and
radical African and Arab states.
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Algerian rebel premier Ben
Khedda's statement on 24 October
offering to renew negotiations
with France presented a new ap-
proach to a settlement--imme-
diate agreement on independence
without the formality of a ref-
erendum,. Apparently anticipat-
ing French insistence on a ref-
erendum, however, Ben Khedda
expressed willingness to con-
tinue working for a peaceful
solution through this means.
His preference that negotiations
be limited to Algerian independ-
ence and a cease-fire was linked
with a proposed procedure that
might allow for the negotiation
of guarantees for the European
minority and other vital French
interests before an actual dec-
laration of independence.
The program outlined by
Ben Khedda, although a reitera-
tion of the establishment rebel
position, could open the way
for negotiations for independ-
ence and a cease-fire and, simul-
taneously, preparations for a
referendum on the results of
these negotiations. Minister
for Algerian Affairs Joxe indi-
cated to a French parliamentary
committee on 25 October that the
French would stand by President
De Gaulle's three-year-old policy
on a referendum so that all the
Algerian people--not just the
rebel provisional government
(PAG)--could express their de-
sires.
In agreeing to cooperate
in a self-determination refer-
endum, Ben Khedda stressed that
such a process was unnecessarily
time-consuming,since the Algeri-
ans would certainly opt for in-
dependence. By presenting his
preferred solution as designed
to achieve an almost immediate
solution, Ben Khedda was evident-
ly attempting to place on De
Gaulle the onus for continued
hostilities. In arguing that
events have rendered a referen-
dum unnecessary, Ben Khedda was
also alluding to the responsive-
ness of Algerians to the orders
of the rebel government--as evi-
denced by last week's Moslem
demonstrations in Paris, for
which the PAG has claimed credit.
Although Paris has rejected
the details of the rebel propos-
al, the French appear to be en-
couraged by the tone, which may
indicate that substantial agree-
ment has been achieved in secret
exchanges reported to have taken
place in recent weeks. If full-
scale negotiations are resumed
they probably will be conducted
secretly, since both sides re-
portedly feel that another pub-
licized failure would be disas-
trous,
De Gaulle presumably still
intends to visit Algeria to make
some move toward establishing.a
consultative body which would be
the forerunner of the provisional
executive body to-organize the
referendum. According to the US
consul general at Algiers, Joxe
has consulted with presidents
and dice presidents of depart-
mental and regional councils,
apparently in an effort to
convene an Algerian assembly.
The latter would designate a
predominantly Moslem consult-
ative committee, which itself
would later comprise the exec-
utive.
Joxe's cabinet director
expressed concern to US
officials last week that the
Algerian riots in Paris would
make negotiations extremely
difficult. He felt that the
riots had created anti-Arab
feeling in metropolitan
France which was producing a
conviction that "the only
thing they understand is
force" and that negotiations
with such people could not
be fruitful. He said this
attitude - would become
firmer if new riots-were to take
place in connection with the
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1 November Algerian "National
Day" observances the PAG appar-
ently intends to conduct in
France as well as Algeria.
The American Embassy's com-
ment on the Paris demonstrations
noted that throughout France
they had aroused indignation
that Paris should be turned into
another Algerian battleground,
shock over the degree of rebel
remote control, and concern
that the situation would degen-
erate to the point of gravely
compromising any Algerian set-
tlement. In addition to regular
police, the government has massed
in Paris 10 Republican Securi-
ty companies and 25 squadrons
of mobile gendarmerie. While
apparently fully capable of con-
trolling further demonstrations
in metropolitan France, the
government is being subjected
to a wave of protest from con-
servative as well as liberal
and leftist political elements
concerning police brutality in
in quelling last week's mani-
festations.
The timing of reported plans
of the anti - De Gaulle Secret
Army Organization (OAS) to create
MIDDLE EAST DEVELOPMENTS
Egypt
Nasir, who had promised
to benefit from his "mistake"
of trusting "reactionary ele-
ments" in Syria, has started
harsh action against the rem-
nants of the wealthy class in
Egypt. He is aiming to
eliminate the base for any
rightist coup and, at the
same time, to dramatize his
massive violence in Algeria in
a desperate effort to prevent
a "liberal" Algerian solution
probably depends on its assess-
ment of the imminence of deci-
sive French moves in this direc-
tion. A belief that negotiations
with the PAG are about to be re-
sumed could lead the OAS to pro-
voke major violence during the
1 November Moslem demonstrations
the PAG appears determined to
stage throughout Algeria. The
US consul general in Algiers
comments that even if the PAG
order for peaceful demonstrations
is initially observed by the Mos-
lems, a few grenades thrown among
the demonstrators by European ac-
tivists could quickly produce the
violence desired by OAS.
Ben Khedda's offer to resume
negotiations is also clouded by
continuing reports of a rift be-
tween the Algerian rebel army com-
manders and the Tunis-based PAG
which has already resulted in
open disregard of PAG orders. Ben
Khedda is reportedly making strong
efforts to effect a reconciliation,
but the possibility remains that
rebel fighters would not accept
a settlement negotiated by the
PAG.
determination to press ahead
with his socialist revolution.
The government has announced
that it has arrested 40 wealthy
civilians and has taken custody
of the property of 167 other
"reactionary capitalists."
Further actions of the same
sort are in process.
In the armed forces, where
anti-regime leaflets have
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
reportedly been circulated and
there have been persistent ru-
mors of coup or assassination
plotting, Nasir apparently has
ordered an extensive security
screening. A number of officers
considered "reactionaries", or
dissidents of some other sort
nave been arrested in what may
be the beginning of a major
snake-up of the officer corps.
In reshuffling his cabinet
last week, Nasir retained the
same men in the key posts but
tightened the organizational
structure considerably. Vice
President Bagndadi, who now
also heads the ministries of
Planning and Treasury, is the
dominant figure in the economic
field. He may get significant
assistance from the new minis-
ter of agriculture, Nagib
Hashad, a capable professional
agriculturalist. Vice Presi-
dent Zakariyya Muhyi al-Din,
also minister of interior,
is again the key man in the
police and security field, in
which he has performed effec-
tively in the past. Despite
rumors that Field Marshal Amir
would be ousted because of dis-
agreements with Nasir stemming
from Syrian secession, he con-
tinues as a vice president and
as minister of defense.
This revised and stream-
lined cabinet has neither a
strong radical nor conservative
slant; it does have some good
technicians and will probably
be more effective than its
rather unwieldy predecessor in
carrying out the socialist pol-
icies already set in Egypt.
Some additional cabinet shifts
SYE CIR!; T
are a possibility, and changes
will be made in the bureaucracy
and in the National Union,
Nasir?s single-party political
system.
Nasir is continuing his
efforts to get a major subver-
sion program under way against
Syria and Jordan. The resig-
nation of strongly pro-Nasir
Prime Minister Saib Salam in
Lebanon and ensuing government
changes may, however, inhibit
the freedom of action of Egyp-
tian agents there to conduct
operations into Syria.
Jordan
Parliamentary elections took
place last week without major in-
cident, although pro-Nasir Jordani-
ans, staged?'a few small demonstra-
tions against King Husayn's govern-
ment. The results having been de-
termined in advance by the govern-
ments screening of candidates,
only 10 to 15 percent of the elec-
torate went through the motions of
voting. At least 57 of the 60 dep-
uties elected are rightists and
supporters of the government.
The resulting resentment is
particularly strong in the West
Bank area, where the Palestinian
population is large, The regime
may find it necessary to rely m,or;,
and more strongly on the army to
preserve its control. Husayn?s
concern over the loyalty of mili-
tary units is suggested by a
report that he gave personal
orders last week for the dismiss,
of 65 officers and men.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
STATUS OF SYRIAN ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH THE BLOC
Although the USSR has
made no offers of economic or
military aid to the new Syrian
Government, it probably would
extend such assistance if re-
quested. Meanwhile, the USSR
apparently will continue work
on the projects scheduled un-
der the existing $150,000,000
economic credit. The agree-
ment providing for this credit
was concluded in 1957 prior to
Syria's union with Egypt in
early 1958. It calls for sev-
eral land-reclamation projects,
plus the construction of some
small plants and factories and
the Latakia-Aleppo-Qamishliya
railroad.
The major project was to
have been a hydroelectric dam
on the Euphrates River, but,
largely 'because of Soviet hes-
itation following the formation
of the UAR and the Iraqi rev-
olution, the project was as-
signed to West Germany earlier
this year. This has made avail-
able about $70,000,000 of the
Soviet credit for other projects.
Some of the European sat-
ellites have in recent years
provided relatively small,
medium-term credits to Syria
for the construction of a
variety of projects, but the
Soviet credit is the only ma-
jor one now available from the
bloc. The larger aid credits
the satellites extended to the
UAR apparently were designated
mainly for the Egyptian region.
One of the new Damascus govern-
ment's criticisms of Cairo is
that, with the exception of the
recent West German credit for
the Euphrates dam, Syria never
benefited from foreign aid pro-
vided to the UAR.
The satellites now prob-
ably would be willing to
increase their commercial credit
extensions to Syria, and some
may offer long-term aid. Total
satellite aid to Syria amounts
to less than $30,000,000.
The new government also
has expressed its dissatisfac-
tion with military assistance
from the bloc under the UAR,
claiming that arms and equip-
ment promised the Syrian re-
gion had been "stolen" by
Egypt. This is an apparent
reference to the Soviet-Syrian
arms deal concluded in early
1958 just prior to the forma-
tion of the UAR. Some naval
vessels, combat aircraft, and
probably certain land armaments
originally ordered by Damascus
were delivered instead to Egypt
at Cairo's request.
Other bloc-UAR arms agree-
ments concluded since 1958 have
been designed basically to de-
velop the armed forces of Egypt.
As a result, Syrian military
circles probably feel there is
a need to make up lost ground
by acquiring new arms supplies--
a "need" which Moscow probably
would be willing to fill if asked.
Between 1956 and 1958, the bloc--
chiefly the USSR--provided Syria
with about $250,000,000 in mil-
itary assistance, most of it
prior to the creation of the UAR.
The Soviet Union and the
other members of the bloc prob-
ably will also seek to revive
trade with Syria. In 1960,
bloc-Syrian trade amounted to
less than $40,000,000, with the
bloc taking about 23 percent
of Syria's exports and providing
about 9 percent Q1. its imports.
The USSR, Syria's chief trading
partner in the bloc, for the
most part exchanged oil for
cotton. (Prepared by
ORR) 25X1
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
BLOC AIRCRAFT SALES IN UNDERDEVELOPED COUNTRIES
The bloc program to aid
underdeveloped countries in
the establishment and expansion
of civil, air facilities has
been gaining momentum in recent
months. Large numbers of sev-
eral types of civil aircraft--
both piston and high-performance
turboprop--have been sold to
Guinea, Ghana, Mali, Cuba, and
India; in the three West African
countries the majority of the
transports operating on the na-
tional lines were purchased from
the bloc.
Such aid, relatively srmiaIi
in value, affords the bloc a
disproportionately large oppor-
tunity to enhance its prestige
and increase its penetration
in some areas of the non-Com-
munist world. Despite the fact
that comparable Western planes
are in many ways superior, the
underdeveloped countries have
been receptive to bloc offers;
this is primarily because the
bloc's prices and terms are
more favorable.
Two types of Soviet high-
performance commercial aircraft
have been sold outside the bloc
thus far--the IL-18, a large
transport capable of carrying
75-100 passengers, and the AN-12
military transport. The IL-18
has been sold exclusively in
Africa, where at least 12 now
are in operation on commercial
routes out of Conakry, Accra,
and Bamako. Additional IL-18s--
reportedly five--ordered by
Guinea will soon be delivered.
The total cost of these planes.
is estimated at approximately
$30,000,000, and presumably all
were purchased on credit.
India has been the princi-
pal customer for the AN-12 and
is using it to airlift equipment
to the Himalayan frontier near
the Sino-Indian border. Orig-
inally India purchased eight
AN-12s plus auxiliary equipment
and spare engines for $21,000,000,
to be repaid over a five-year period
in Indian rupees. These eight have
all been delivered. Despite serious
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problems with the aircraft,
India now has ordered six or
eight more--presumably for the
same operation. One AN-12 has
been purchased by Ghana.
The TJSSR has sold more IL-
14s--light piston transports
with a capacity of about 24
passenger:;--than any other type
of aircraft. India, Cuba, Mali,
and Cambodia have purchased a
total of 41 of these planes from
Moscow. .[n India, 24 rebuilt
IL-14s purchased at a cost of
some $4,500,000 have now been
delivered and are engaged in
limited operations along with
the AN-12; in the northern bor-
der area. Cuba apparently has
contracted for some 12 IL-14s,
but only a few have been deliv-
ered. Cambodia and Mali have
recently received several of
these aircraft and will soon
have them in operation.
The AN-2 biplane also is
being seen in increasing numbers
in the underdeveloped countries.
This plane, which can be landed
in a small space, has numerous
uses, including crop dusting,
cargo and mail transport, and
aerial photography; it is par-
ticularly useful in countries
where communication facilities
are limiteed. The USSR has sold
these planes to Guinea, Mali,
and Cuba.
Helicopters are also be-
coming increasingly popular
because of their adaptability.
The Soviet MI-4 is being ex-
ported to Mali, Cuba, and India.
India's initial doubts about
the capabilities of these heli-
copters apparently were overrid-
SE CRE T
den by the favorable terms
offered.
The USSR has in the
past attempted to interest
underdeveloped countries in
buying its large TU-104 jet
transport, the efficiency
of which is questionable.
This aircraft was offered
to India, Egypt, Iraq, and
Ghana, but no sales were
concluded.
Czechoslovakia also has
supplied several types of civil
aircraft to countries outside
the bloc. An exporter of small
light civil aircraft for many
years, Czechoslovakia has re-
cently been offering a greater
variety of designs on favorable
terms. The Czech variant of
the Soviet IL-14 (neither ver-
sion is any longer in produc-
tion) has been sold to Guinea
on credit terms and now is the
major transport on internal
Guinean air routes. More re-
cently Czechoslovakia extended
a credit to Mali which probably
will be used to buy several dif-
ferent types of Czech aircraft.
One of the methods used
to popularize bloc planes has
been to give specially outfitted
IL-14s and MI-4 helicopters to
national leaders for their per-
sonal use. During the Bulganin-
Khrushchev trip through Asia in
1955, IL-14s were presented to
the leaders of Afghanistan,
India, and Burma. Since then
the leaders of Egypt, Yemen,
Iran, Guinea, Ghana, Ethiopia,
Cuba, Nepal, and Cambodia have
received such gifts.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
IUN 'DEBATE":ON SOUTH :AFRICA:
The General Assembly's
Special Political Committee
began debate on 23 October on
the Republic of South Africa's
apartheid policy amid strong
indications that the African
states will succeed this year
in their efforts to have the
assembly recommend sanctions
against the Verwoerd government.
Ghana--which spearheaded an un-
successful attempt to do this
last year--has been privately
circulating a draft resolution
recommending breaking off dip-
lomatic relations, imposing an
economic boycott, and closing
ports to South African ships and
aircraft. The draft resolution
also calls for expelling South
Africa from the United Nations,
but the Ghanaian UN delegate
acknowledges that this provi-
sion will probably be dropped
in order to get moderate Afri-
can sponsorship.
against sanctions as they did
last year. An Italian UN dele-
gate says his government consid -
era`x`it essential to avoid solid
Western European opposition to
sanctions as long as a solid
Africani bloc approves such
measures.
The General Assembly has
never yet recommended sanctions
against one of its members. Ac-
tual sanctions were recommended
against Spain in 1946--Spain
did not become a member until
1955--and in 1951 against Com-
munist China. However, on the
initiative of its African mem-
bers, the General Assembly sup-
ported the unprecedented cen-
sure of South Africa for the
hard-hitting speech on 11 Octo-
ber by Foreign Minister Louw
during a general debate.
South Africa's continued
flouting of frequent UN admoni-
tions -on its racial policy,
plus the increasing reluctance
of Afro-Asians to heed Western
counsels of moderation, will
probably lead to nearly unan-
imous Afro-Asian support for
sanctions. The Japanese UN
delegate reports that Tokyo
will probably abstain on the
Ghanaian draft but believes
that most other Asian countries
which abstained last year--
such as India and Pakistan--
will support sanctions this
year. The British UN delegate
reports that Austria and the
Netherlands have decided "for
their own political reasons"
to abstain rather than vote
Chinese Representation
The 16th General Assembly
is likely to recess in mid-
December and resume the session
in early spring to complete its
heavy agenda. Assembly Pres-
ident Mongi Slim plans to-schedule
plenary debate on Chinese represen-
tation for late November or early
December. Ambassador Steven-
son comments that scheduling
plenary debate so close to the
Christmas recess will encour-
age efforts to have the pro-
posed study committee on the
whole problem of Chinese rep-
resentation report back to the
resumed session rather than to
the 17th General AssemblyI 25X1
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Antigovernment rioting that
started on 16 October in Ciudad
Trujillo and spread to other
cities began to slacken after
six days, although there was a
new outbreak of violence on 25
October in Santiago, the second
largest city. According to the
American consul general, the
rioters are mostly revolutionary
minded youths acting without
centralized direction. Student
leaders at the university, as
well as the directors of the
major opposition groups, have
taken no public part in the dis-
turbances, and the consul general
sees no evidence that they have
been clandestinely supporting
the rioters. Public sympathy
was generally with the rioters
at first, but after a few days
there were indications that
some elements of the public were
coming to regard the youths' ac-
tions as foolhardy.
The police showed unaccus-
tomed restraint in the early
stages of the rioting; even af-
ter the clashes became more vio-
lent there was not the wholesale
bloodshed that probably would
have occurred under the old re-
gime. At least four youths were
killed, however, and many were
injured.
The rioting has probably in-
creased pressure in the armed
forces for action against the
opposition and possibly, as in
the aftermath of civil disturb-
ances last summer, for the re-
placement of the Balaguer govern-
ment with a military regime.
SECRET
At present, however, there is
no evidence of plans for an im-
minent military takeover. The
government's replacement of the
unpopular university rector,
whose appointment had sparked
the rioting, may help ease the
tension. According to informa-
tion of 23 Octobe
however, many
o the s u en s are planning
further disorders during the
first two.weeks of November.
The government made long-
planned moves against the pro-
Castro Dominican Popular Move-
ment (MPD) on 22 October but
with only partial success. Gov-
ernment press attacks on the MPD
and fake MPD rallies staged by
government supporters evidently
warned most MPD leaders to go
into hiding.
In an address on 23 October,
President Balaguer announced
the departure from the country
of leading members of the Trujillo
family and appealed for an end
to political hatreds in "this
moment of conciliation and con-
cord." The departure of the
two most prominent of the late
dictator's brothers, Generals
Arismendi and Hector Trujillo,
should improve the political
climate, but no change in the
position of General Ramfis Tru- 25X1
jillo appears likely for the
immediate future.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Rioting broke out in La
Paz on 21 October as a result
of a government decree in-
creasing domestic prices on
gasoline and fuel oil. The
measure has been recommended
by the International Monetary
Fund for more than a year as
essential to the government's
economic stabilization pro-
gram. President Paz has re-
~tedly set a date for is-
su.L the decree, only to post-
pone it as temporarily im-
possible from a political point
of view, The national petro-
leumcompany, which provides
some export revenue and almost
all domestic oil i?equirements,
has been operating at a loss.
The government declared
a state of siege in La Paz
on the first day of the riot-
ing, imposed domestic press
censorship, and reacted to
student participation in riots
by ending the school year for
high schools and universities
throughout Bolivia.
Clashes between govern-
ment supporters and protest
mobs apparently led by rightists
and extreme leftists occurred
on 23 October, despite a pro-
hibition on all demonstrations
under the state of siege. The
mob destroyed offices of the
government newspaper, two po-
lice stations, and one gasoline
station and attacked other
installations. The national
committee of the government
party has authorized its
members to capture subversives
for delivery to the police and
to use firearms in defensive
action.
The government paper announced
on 24 October that some 4,000
members of the rural militia had
arrived in La Paz and more were on
the way. The rural militia are
much feared, particularly by the
rightist urban elements who oppose
President Paz Estenssoro, who was
elected with 70 percent of the
vote in June 1960.
The government had evidently
been hoping that recent news of
political instability would dis-
tract public attention from the
gasoline price issue. Paz on 19
October had ordered the arrest of
a heterogeneous group of rightists
and leftists, accusing them of con-
spiracy against the government.
This was Paz' third major
crackdown against his opposition
this year; the other two--in Feb-
ruary and June--were followed by
decrees of a 90-day state of siege
throughout the country. While
some of the men arrested were prob-
ably involved in the revolution-
ary plotting which is almost con-
stant in Bolivia, opposition
groups have not appeared to have
a firm plan for overthrowing the
government.
The present rioting does not
appear to pose any immediate
threat to the Paz government, but
further violence is likely.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY S RY
BACKGROUND OF THE BLOC'S DISPUTE WITH ALBANIA
East European represent-
atives left the stormy meeting
of world Communist leaders in
Moscow last November more or
less firmly committed to back
Khrushchev in his dispute with
China and its Adriatic ally.
Since then their attitudes to-
ward the Albanians have hard-
ened perceptibly. Khrushchev's
stanchest supporters last fall
and subsequently have been
Poland's Gomulka, East Germany's
tJlbricht, and Czechoslovakia's
Novotny,
Immediately after the 1960
meeting the European satellite
party leaders took steps to
forestall any possible opposi-
tion within their own countries
which might have derived from
the compromise at Moscow with the
Chinese, They also initiated
moves to force Albanian obei-
sance to Moscow. While they
apparently succeeded in achiev-
ing the former aim, they have
thus far failed to accomplish
the latter. The Bulgarian re-
gime crushed an "antiparty
group" which had Chinese sym-
pathies, East European lead-
ers apparently feared internal
party strife of this sort might
erupt on a large scale.
All the pro-Moscow satel-
lites have widely publicized
their stands against "dogmatism
and sectarianism"--that is,
Chinese and Albanian policies--
although the attack on China
appears for the most part to
have been left to the Soviets,
with the East European parties
in a supporting role. In the
case of Albania, however, the
satellites have joined Moscow
in direct attacks. As these
attacks continued, bloc unity
became only a facade, and
Albania now is spoken of pri-
vately by East European leaders
as "Moscow's Cuba,"
On 18 December 1960 U1-
bricht fired the opening shot
at Albania when he publicly
criticized its position at
Moscow. Hoxha answered two
weeks later in a public ad-
dress in which he vowed he
would not bow to pressure on
'matters of principle." In
February 1961, during the Al-
banian party congress, Hoxha re-
affirmed his pro-Chinese atti-
tudes and alluded to the Soviet-
backed coup attempt in Albania
in the summer of 1960. Hoxha
did not directly implicate Mos-
cow, however, charging instead
that the US, Greece, and Yugo-
slavia were behind the move to
overthrow him.
Chinese delegates to the
Albanian congress received
highly preferential treatment
over that accorded other bloc
delegations. Gomulka, offended
by Hoxha's personal attacks on
him in Moscow, sent a delega-
tion headed by a party hack and
discredited Stalinist, Roman
Nowak, who lectured the meeting
on the dangers of dogmatism, For
this affront, the Polish delega-
tion was snubbed in Tirana, and
Polish domestic and foreign
policies were attacked on the
congress floor.
The Albanians and Chinese
have chosen not to participate
in a large number of recent
bloc scientific and technical
conferences. The attendance of
both countries--Albania as a
full member and China as an ob-
server--at meetings of the bloc's
Council for Mutual Economic As-
sistance (CEMA) has been spotty;
they have failed without explana-
tion to appear at a number of
CEMA committee sessions they
would normally attend.
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Albania's independent at-
titude was further demonstrated
when it sent a delegation which
was headed by its defense minim
ister to the Warsaw Pact meeting
held in Moscow on 28 and 29
March and attended by the party
first secretaries and premiers
of all the other East European
states.
On 3 April the bloc's
clandestine radio beamed at
Italy and located in Czecho-
slovakia quoted in advance of
publication an article by Ital-
ian Communist party chief Tog-
liatti, who said, " ..Questions
of internal party life and de-
bate in'Albania seemed to us
erroneous and dangerous...."
Perhaps in reply, Hoxha subse-
quently announced that a trial
of spies and traitors would
soon be held--in effect calling
for the consummation of the pre-
vious summer's purge of pro-
Soviet elements. The trial,
with' transparent anti-Soviet
overtones, was held in May, and
the chief conspirators were sen-
tenced to death.
During a major policy
speech on 6 May, Hoxha again
reaffirmed his position and
castigated his bloc critics.
In an anti-Western portion of
his speech he said that Albania
could defend itself against ag-
gression, but his choice of
words implied a threat from the
East as well as the West.
From 3 to 5 August the
party chiefs of the Warsaw Pact
states met in Moscow to discuss
the Berlin problem. Hoxha sent
only a junior party functionary,
and China, which holds observer
status in the pact, sent no one.
Ulbricht viewed the Hoxha rep-
resentative's rank as a calcu-
lated insult and demanded at the
first session that he leave; the
Albanian returned to Tirana on
the following day.
Neither Albania-nor China
was represented at the 8-9 Sep-
tember meeting of Warsaw Pact
defense ministers in Warsaw--
suggesting that those countries
no longer participate in pact
activities, at least not on the
same scale as previously.
Albania was the only Euro-
pean Communist country which
sent no special delegate to the
celebration of East Germany's
12th anniversary on 7 October.
The Albanian ambassador in East
Berlin attended the main cere-
monies, but he was seated off
the platform, away from bloc
delegates, and left immediately
after the Chinese representative's
speech.
Bloc Counteractions
The political friction has
affected Tirana's bloc relations
in a variety of ways. Polish
party First Secretary Gomulka
withdrew his ambassador from
Albania last March and has
since made no move to replace
him. In August, the Polish
leader accepted a new Albanian
ambassador to Warsaw after that
post had been vacant for over
a year. Members of the Polish
Communist party reportedly
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have been forbidden to contact
the few Albanian diplomats re-
maining in Warsaw; apparently,
similar restrictions apply to
the Poles in Tirana. All news
about Albania and China must be
cleared with the press depart-
ment of the Polish party cen-
tral committee prior to publi-
cation.
The Soviet Union decided--
apparently in the spring--not
to permit Russians to visit
Albania. No Czechoslovak or
Hungarian tourists have visited
Albania in 1961. Fifty Poles
made a state-sponsored tour
of Albania in May, but Warsaw
has canceled all such trips
scheduled since then. Tours
by bloc nationals to Yugo-
slavia, Albania's archenemy,
still are available for
most satellite citizens except
East Germans.
The Czechs and the East
Germans have withdrawn some of
their technicians from Albania.
Reportedly all Albanian students
in Czechoslovakia returned home
in June, and all Czechoslovak
higher schools have been or-
dered to deny admission to Al-
banian students this fall. Al-
banian students also left
Rumania in June. The Czechs
have granted political asylum
to two Albanian diplomats in
Prague.
Soviet pressure on Hoxha
has been continuous. No Soviet
representative attended the
opening on 1 September of Al-
banian-Soviet Friendship Month
in Albania--a ceremony which
provided the occasion for
Tirana's spokesman to reaf ire
the "correctness" of his party's
line. It has recently become
known that the U33R prohibited
distribution in the Soviet Un-
ion of the Russian-language
Novaya Albaniya late last spring
the main A anian party daily,
Teri i Popullit, and other pub-
lications sal are avail.a'lbl >,
but only in
the
Albanian 'ai3.--
guage, which
derstood in
is
the
not widely
US 311. The
n-
Popullit correspondent
Moscowhas been wJ th. s,..rawni a rd
the Soviet TASS corgi: esp. ,ade._ :,
in Tirana also ray haT to red
borne.
Yugoslavia's T
Yugoslav relations with
the USSR and the rest of Eas'",-. --
tern Europe have not change,-' z: a-
terially because of tti'.r Alba: ian
deviation. The bloc regy,~r;
criticizes Yugoslav
the lastest condemnation ? pnear
in the new Soviet party rc-
gram, which all the satellittes
represented at the current con-
gress in Moscow have of-.-,ad in
approving. Both the USSR and
the satellites, however, have
continued to maintain state-to-
state relations with Belgrade
at varying levels of harmony.
Despite the lack of any real
change in its policy toward
Belgrade, Moscow--and occa-
sionally its satellites, par-
ticularly Poland--maintains
contacts with Yugoslavia in a
manner which often suggests that
a new Yugoslav-Soviet rapproche-
ment is possible. This ;act c
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
infuriates the Albanians and
Chinese, who regard the Yugo-
slavs as enemies of Communism.
Both Albania and Communist
China, nevertheless,have them-
selves continued state relations
with Yugoslavia, but these rela-
tions have at times seemed close
to the breaking point. From
mid-June to mid-August, however,
Albania refrained from its
usual. propaganda attacks on
Yugoslavia.
The Military Situation
Possessing few resources
of its own, Albania is depend-
ent on other countries for mil-
itary aid. In the past, arms
and equipment have been supplied
by the bloc, especially by the
USSR. It is not known whether
military equipment is still be-
ing furnished by these sources,
but one of the major effects
of the dispute has been the
isolation of Albania in terms
of its former military rela-
tions with the bloc.
On 26 May the USSR with-
drew eight of its W-class sub-
marines which had been based
at the Albanian port of Vlone.
Subsequently the Soviets re-
portedly evacuated the naval
base entirely. Both Tirana
and Moscow have expelled each
other.'s'military attaches.
The USSR also sent home a group
of Albanian naval trainees,
and an unknown number of Soviet
military experts were expelled
from Albania in retaliation.
Soviet trade with Albania
has declined considerably since
1960, but the full extent of the
cutback is not known. Some
Russian grain is exchanged for
Albanian petroleum and mineral
raw materials.
East European trade rela-
tions with Albania apparently
also have been maintained, al-
though on a reduced scale. In
return for nickel ore, Czecho-
slovakia has honored a commit-
ment to aid Albania in the ore's
extraction. The Albanians
apparently want to do their own
refining, however, and have ob-
tained aid from China to estab-
1ish an ore processing plant in Arozo.ia.
China has backed up its ally
on the economic as well as the
political front. Last February
Peiping agreed to supply the Al-
banians $125,000,000 in economic
assistance over the next five
years--after Tirana's request
for loans amounting to more than
$160,000,000 (at official ex-
change rates) had been turned
down by the USSR and the Euro-
pean satellites.
Substantial numbers of Chi-
nese technicians have been re-
ported passing through Moscow en
route to Tirana. During the year
ending June 196]., Albanian grain
imports reached a new high of 319,-
000 metric tons. This is four times
more than in previous years; 75 percent
of it was supplied by China, itself hard
pressed for grain.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
THE CUBAN INTERNAL SITUATION
Domestic dissatisfaction
with the Castro regime, spring-
ing from the economic and polit-
ical facts of life in Cuba to-
day, is increasing, but in no
case is it believed to have
reached a level where a popular
revolt seriously threatening
the stability of Castro's gov-
ernment is at hand.
in Cuba genera 1-
y agree that the anti-Castro
forces now include more people
than ever before from the lower
classes--on which the regime
depends for its domestic sup-
port. The majority of people
in this group still support
Castro, however, either because
they have already benefited
more under him than under any
previous government, or because
they still believe his promises
of a materially improved future.
The still-growing numbers
in the vast bureaucracy and the
militia, dependent on the regime
for their livelihood and social
status, furnish another impor-
tant source of support. The
regime maintains a hard core of
fanatical backers and a large
and efficient apparatus of re-
pression.
The Opposition Forces
Opposition activity vir-
tually stopped after the mid-
April landings and the regime's
intense campaign of terror
against all known or suspected
dissidents. Several small guer-
rilla bands are still operating
on the island, however, and
there is evidence that acts of
sabotage are again occurring
sporadically and that individ.1
uals or small groups of govern-
ment troops continue to desert
to the anti-Castro forces.
For the most part, however,
the active opposition is still
handicapped by factionalism and
a lack of organization, a short-
age of supplies, the absence
of a strong leader with Castro's
appeal, and the need for a well-
defined substitute for the Cas-
tro program. The chances of
effective military action against
Castro are constantly fading,
while he continues to build up
well-equipped, well-trained
military and other security
forces.
Public Discontent
Of more significance in
the long run are the numerous
indications of increasing dis-
content and disillusionment
among the public. The people
are beginning to express their
unhappiness with the degree of
regimentation imposed on them,
and regime leaders are publicly
decrying worker absenteeism.
Popular resentment flared
into open demonstrations=.inHavana and several other Cuban
cities in September when the
government banned a religious
procession and was forced for
the first time to resort to
firearms to disperse the riot-
ers. The historically weak
position of the Roman Catholic
Church in Cuba and Castro's ex-
pulsion of more than half of
Cuba.'s clergymen make it unlike-
ly that further major religious
demonstrations will occur.
that grumbling over shortages
of food and other items is be-
coming louder and more wide-
spread. There is no evidence,
however, that Cubans are starv-
ing or that shortages of lard,
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meat, rice, and other products
basic to the Cuban diet will
become severe enough to encour-
age a revolt. The continuing
delivery to Cuba of foodstuffs
and other vital consumer goods
from the bloc, plus an antic-
ipated increase in domestic food
production as scientific growing
methods are enforced under the
state-directed long-range eco-
nomic plan, should prevent cur-
rent shortages from assuming
critical proportions,
Refugee Flights
The flow of Cubans leaving
the island--some by legal means
and a greater number by extra-
legal means--has increased with-
in the past few months. By
August some 700 Cubans had
taken diplomatic asylum in sev-
eral Latin American embassies
in Havana; only recently has
the regime begun to permit some
of these persons to leave Cuba.
More than 15,000 Cubans with
travel arrangements completed
were reported by the US press
to have been affected by the
government?s mid-September
measure requiring new travel
documentation. The number of
Cubans leaving the island clan-
destinely--usually by means of
small, ill-equipped boats--has
risen since last spring.
Regime Reaction
Castro and his lieutenants
are reacting strongly to manifes-
tations of unrest. "Revolu-
tionary tribunals" have inten-
sified their activities, and
firing squads executed at least
26 persons in September alone,
according to press reports,
Military units in Oriente and
Camaguey provinces were placed
on alert in early October, and
other general mobilization meas-
ures were reported on the 17th.
Cuban officials and prop-
aganda media have intensified
their violent anti-US campaign,
charging that the United States
is preparing "a new, larger in-
vasion." This campaign may
stem from a real fear of inva-
sion. It is also probably de-
signed to divert public attention
from local economic and political
problems--a tactic Castro has
used in the past. It may also
presage a Castro effort to dis-
credit the United States by
staging a faked landing in ad-
vance of any OAS consideration
of the Cuban problem.
New Security Measures
The various measures taken
by the regime up to last April
to tighten internal security
under the guise.of temporary
expedients have since that time
become increasingly institu-
tionalized and have assumed the
character of permanent instru-
.ments of internal control. The
most-pervasive of these, the
Revolutionary Defense Committees,
comprise a nationwide informant
network controlled by the Minis-
try of Interior. The goal, an-
nounced on 30 April, of 100,000
committees throughout the
country comprising 500,000
"revolutionary vigilantes"
has, according to government
announcements in early au-
tumn, been substantially
accomplished.
In early June, the regime's
secret police organization
was transferred to a re-
organized Ministry of Interior.
This change probably resulted
in a more efficient and
centralized internal security
apparatus and also in effective
Communist control of this
function. Ramiro Valdes, a
Communist, rose from chief of
the old G-2 to head of the
new ministry.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Simultaneous with the in-
creased efficiency of the in-
ternal security apparatus has
been the development of a con-
certed indoctrination program
described by regime leaders as
a campaign to eradicate illit-
eracy from the nation before
the end of this year and now
frankly characterized by them
as based on "Marxist-Leninist
principles."
Party, Government Reorganization
The political and organiza-
tional structure of the state
is also rapidly evolving toward
a system similar to the party
and governmental structure
found in the Soviet bloc. The
old provincial and municipal
governments are being replaced
by Boards for Coordination.,
Execution, and Inspection
(JUCEI). JUCEI have been
formed since last June in all
six provinces, and subordinate
ones have been set up or are in
the process of formation in the
municipalities. Local and pro-
vincial JUCEI are subordinate
to a national group headed by
Fidel Castro called the JUCE-
PLAN.
The prototype JUCEI was
formed in Oriente Province
last spring under the direction
of Raul Castro. According to
a speech on 4 June by the
younger Castro, it consists of
a "provincial congress," a
1,200-member body which is to
convene "two or three times
a year"; a "plenum"--i.e., the
provincial board--which meets
every few months; and other
units, which meet very fre-
quently. Membership is theo-
retically,, representative of
all major economic entities in
the territory of responsibility.
The frequent references to
JUCEI units in the Cuban press,
however, indicate that their
members are drawn exclusively
or almost exclusively from the
ranks of the political machine
the regime now is organizing.
In his 4 June speech, Raul
Castro described the JUCEI as
"instruments for applying plans"
at the local level which had
been decided upon by higher
authority. "Building socialism
without planning is impossible,"
he said, "and contrasts with
the anarchy of the capitalist
economy." Cuban Communist
leader Blas Roca described the
JUCEI on 14 August as "a new
form of state power, a step`
forward in the procedure we
are following for the direct
establishment of the power of
the people over all the country."
Cells of the Integrated
Revolutionary Organizations
TORI), the parallel party ma-
chine now also emerging, are
being organized throughout the
country as the first phase of
an entity that is to be called
the United party of the Cuban
Socialist Revolution. Commu-
nist Secretary General Blas Roca
has been the leading spokesman
for and advocate of the new
political organization. His
public statements foreshadow
a party system'in which member-
ship will be limited to the
elite of the revolutionary
struggle but will, in turn, be
a requisite to holding any po-
sitions of economic or political
importance in the country. It
is clear from the statements
of ORI leaders that the new
party is to be controlled by
the Communists and based on
"Marxist-Leninist principles."
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SR
In his talks next month
with President Kennedy, Jawa-
harlal Nehru will be eager to
explore international problems,
but the line he takes on cold
war issues is likely to be based
firmly on the neutralist policy
he has always felt best served
India's national interest. The
Indian leader's emphasis on ne-
gotiation and compromise as
essential to ease cold war ten-
sions stems largely from his
fear that war--even if localized
--would jeopardize what chance
India has of attaining a reason-
able level of economic develop-
ment,
Nehru, who will arrive on
5 November, has visited the
United States on three previous
occasions (1949, 1956, and 1960)
during his 14 years as India's
prime minister.
"stirring" throughout the country
as the pace of economic growth
quickens and popular interest is
stimulated.
Building on the modest but
substantial achievements of the
First and Second Five-Year Plans,
New Delhi's planners have set
ambitious targets for the "bold
and big" Third Plan (1961-66)
in hopes of raising national
income by 25 percent. In con-
trast to the uncertainty of
previous years, New Delhi this
spring received a tentative com-
mitment from the consortium of
Western nations and the World
Bank--the "Aid-India Club"--
to furnish nearly $2 billion in
aid for the first two years of
the plan, and in addition has
assurances of substantial assist-
ance from Moscow. Total for-
eign exchange requirements for
the plan period are estimated
at nearly $6 billion.
Nehru will be 72 on 14 No-
vember. His power and presence
remains basically undiminished.
While close associates report
that the prime minister is slow-
ing down and that his grip on
the government and party has
loosened, he still shows re-
markable vitality and command
of affairs, large and small,
As Nehru surveys the state
of the Indian Union today, he
probably feels reasonable satis-
faction over the country's rela-
tive stability and steady, if
unspectacular, economic progress.
The over-all picture, as the
Third Five-Year Plan gets under
way and the third national elec-
tions draw near, looks consid-
erably brighter than at various
times of crisis in the 1950sa
Those who have traveled in India
recently have sensed a new
India's chronic food short-
age has been eased by the in-
crease in annual food production
of more than 35 percent during
the First and Second Plans, as
well as by large-scale imports
of US surplus foods. Barring
major weather calamities, the
increasing yields and build-
up of reserve stocks should
provide a basis for further prog-
ress in overcoming this old
problem,
Nehru can also look ahead
to the national elections in
February with reasonable ex-
pectation that his Congress party
will be returned with a com-
fortable majority in Parliament
and safe margins in most state
assemblies, Congress majorities
may be reduced in some cases, but
no opposition party--especially
on the left--appears capable
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
yet of seriously threatening the
ruling party's dominant position
nationally.
The weakened Communists
may manage to hold on to their
10-percent share of the popular
vote but have little hope of
improving their position; the
socialists face eclipse. A
right-of-center Hindu national-
1st' party--the Jana Sangh--
appears to have picked up
strength in certain areas re-
cently, but probably will place
well behind the Congress party
nationally. The conservative
Swatantra (Freedom) party,
founded in 1959 with strong
backing from Indian private
enterprise, has attracted little
mass support and seems unlikely
to improve its position sig-
nificantly.
Problems of Leadership
Major problems remain for
Nehru, however. The outlook for
a successor to him and the pros-
pect of an orderly transfer of
power in the Congress high com-
mand have become obscured in
1961. The death of Home Minis-
ter Pant last March deprived
Nehru of his chief deputy in
government and party and one
of his few remaining close
associates among the old guard.
The subsequent maneuvering for
the office of deputy party
leader--which has been called
"the first war of the succes-
sion"--was halted for the time
being in August when Nehru
created two posts of deputy
leader, neither of which has
yet been :filled.
Nehru has always found it
distasteful to think of an heir,
and he does not favor any of
the remaining most likely candi-
dates. He particularly distrusts
the preponderant conservative
clique led by 65-year-old Finance
Minister Morarji Desai. Nehru
thus limits his moves to check-
mating all contenders, main-
taining that a new national
leader must not be chosen but
must emerge spontaneously through
mass support. Desai's premature
bid for formal designation as
deputy has damaged his prestige
and caused disparate elements
in the high command to join
forces against him, but he re-
tains his place as second-rank-
ing cabinet minister.
The unhealthy condition of
the Congress organization, partic-
ularly at the provincial level,
casts increasing doubt on the
party's ability to maintain its
predominant position without the
vast mass appeal of Nehru's
leadership. Efforts by the Con-
gress high command to rid the organi-
zation of chronic factional
strife, lethargy, corruption,
and casteism have had little
effect. The party's power now
is derived less from vital
leadership and mass support
than from the wealth, social
leverage, and authoritarian
controls it commands.
Among India's internal prob-
lems, the old question of nation-
al unity seems to fill Nehru
with the greatest personal sense
of frustration and foreboding.
His struggle against regional,
linguistic, caste, and especially
religious differences dates even
farther back than his fight for
Indian independence. The mili-
tant agitation for linguistic
and regional autonomy which
developed in many areas of India
during the 1950s, added to the
historic tension between North
and South, raised serious
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
questions about the durability
of India's unity. The recent
resurgence of communal senti-
ment, pitting Hindu against
Moslem and Sikh, challenges
Nehru's basic purpose of achiev-
ing a secular society and en-
dangers the stability he has
maintained since 1947.
In the economic field, Nehru
knows that despite its progress
India has a long way to go be-
fore it is "over the hump,"
Such growing problems as un-
employment, inflation, and scar-
city of industrial power give
considerable cause for concern.
Nehru feels that there may be
just time to get India's econom-
ic development to the "take-
off" stage before the crushing
pressure of an expanding popu-
lation makes it a futile exer-
cise.
Nehru's life-long interest
in international affairs has
developed notions of the world
beyond India which are fairly
fixed. His frequent preoccu-
pation with foreign affairs and
his "meddling" in international
problems have generally been
misconstrued as representing
merely the personal traits of
Nehru the man and his desire
to play the role of internation-
al arbiter; the prime concerns,
however, which have motivated
Nehru's career are directly re-
lated to India and its develop-
ment. The positions he takes
in his official role usually
conform to a consistent policy
line,the sole test of which is
India's national interest. Mor-
al or humanitarian considera-
tions are subordinated.
This premium on national
interest provides a key to the
rationale behind India's posi-
tion on major cold war issues,
and helps explain why New Delhi
acts, or fails to act, as it
does, Nehru is haunted by a
fear that the cold war will
turn hot, resulting in global
economic dislocation that
would bring India's economic
progress to a halt. Thus, to
reduce tension between the ma-
jor powers, whatever its cause,
becomes New Delhi's paramount
need and objective, and this
often overrides questions of
principle, consistency, and
legal right.
Nehru repeatedly calls for
negotiations as the first step
toward a compromise solution
which will solve or at least
cool a crisis. Since he feels
nothing should be done to harden
attitudes and thus raise ten-
sions, he will carefully avoid
making public judgments as to
which party is right and resist
pressure for India to join
internationally in formal find-
ings of guilt. This accounts
in large part for Nehru's re-
luctance in public to go beyond
expressions of "regret" over
Soviet repression in Hungary,
Khrushchev's heavy handedness
at the UN, and Moscow's resump-
tion of nuclear tests.
In seeking to influence
the big powers to compromise,
Nehru pragmatically tends to
work hardest on the side he
thinks most likely to make con-
cessions, without regard to the
merits of either position. The
West often gets the brunt of his
pressure and criticism because,
in the manner of a sympathetic
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
colleague, he expects Western
leaders to be more tractable
and reasonable than the "boorish"
Bolsheviks. He is likely to
concentrate his efforts else-
where only when he is convinced
that a position is not negoti-
able and that a settlement can
result only from concessions
from the other side.
It should be noted that
New Delhi has other reasons for
not wishing to antagonize the
Soviet Government unduly. Nehru
feels the huge Third Plan will
need all the credits he can get
from the USSR. He also feels he
cannot afford to risk losing
Moscow's support on the Kashmir
question.
The Policy in Practice
Nehru's dread of cold war
confrontations and his efforts
at conciliation are illustrated
in India's approach to Berlin,
Laos, the Congo, disarmament,
and the United Nations. Like
many Indians, Nehru lacks a
clear understanding of the Ger-
man question and appreciation
of what is at stake. He is
less concerned with legal rights
than with negotiations, compro-
mise formulas, and a settle-
ment based on present "realities"
in which the interests of nei-
ther side are seriously damaged.
In Laos and Vietnam, Nehru
sees India's role as chairman
of the International Control
Commission as one of neutraliz-
ing and obstructing big-power
intervention, rather than one
of investigating impartially
and fixing guilt without regard
to possible reactions. For
similar reasons, Nehru was will-
ing to abandon Indian precedent
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and give military support to
the UN operation in the Congo.
He estimated that only by
interposing the UN between the
opposing factions could either
cold war power be prevented
from gaining a decisive advan-
tage and a direct clash be
averted. Rajeshwar Dayal, like
Krishna Menon in the UN or at
Geneva, frequently carried the
balancing act well beyond Nehru's
general instructions.
Regional Problems
National interest dictates
a different policy when meeting
a threat affecting India directly.
India readily assumes the role
of a big power in neighboring
Nepal, where privately it feels
intervention is justified in
India's defense. In its border
dispute with Communist China,
New Delhi places prime importance
on the legal rights it minimizes
elsewhere, and stiffly rejects
Peiping's bids to negotiate a
compromise.
Similarly, in India's
dispute with Pakistan over
the Kashmir question, the In-
dian prime minister leans
heavily on legalities, has
repeatedly turned down offers
to negotiate, and refuses to
compromise. Nehru clearly
feels that his country's in-
terests are best served by
maintaining the status quo,
which leaves India with the
lion's share of the disputed
territory. Moreover, with
the elections approaching
and Hindu-Moslem tensions
rising, Prime Minister Nehru
cannot afford to show any
weakness on this issue.
y//_'
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