CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A003300110001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 49
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 18, 2004
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 28, 1961
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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CURRENT
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY
SUMMARY
COPY NO. 6 OCR NO. 0299/61
28 September 1961
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
DOCUMENT NO.
NO CHANGE IN CLASS. ^
^ DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. G"sjziiiaza TO, TS S ! (q 1b
NEXT R V W BATE:
AUTH: HI 70.2
DATE: ~}0 ~u+nt ~a R[TEE;?~EO:
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ARMY, D, PPP?d Mggscr2V l '12PRi1~1-Ot*79-00927A00 30011000 5
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THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECT-
ING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES
WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS,
TITLE 18, USC, SECTIONS 793 AND 794, THE TRANSMIS-
SION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO
AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.
The Current Intelligence Weekly Summary has been prepared
primarily for the internal use of the Central Intelligence
Agency. It does not represent a complete coverage of all
current situations. Comments and conclusions represent the
immediate appraisal of the Office of Current Intelligence.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
28 September 1961
T H E W E E K I N B R I E F
EAST-WEST RELATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page
The Soviet Union's line on Germany and the Berlin
problem continues to combine an attitude of reasonable-
ness on details and procedures with an unyielding stand
on certain basic issues. Khrushchev, in his talk with
Belgian Foreign Minister Spaak on 19 September, appeared
more conciliatory and flexible than at any time since the
Vienna meeting with President Kennedy. Gromyko has not
yet reflected this line in his talks with Secretary Rusk
or with Lord Home, and Moscow has made further moves in
the military sphere to impress the West with bloc mili-
tary strength and combat readiness. Exercises of the
Warsaw Pact forces have been announced for October and
November. At the UN, the Soviets have continued to ad-
vocate the troika, but there are increasing signs that
the bloc will eventually compromise on an arrangement
for an interim appointment to fill out Hammarskjold's
term, plus appointment of three under secretaries to
act as advisers.
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CONGO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page
UN authorities hope that the cease-fire will lead to
talks between Leopoldville and Katanga representatives for
a political solution in the Congo. Strong antipathy be-
tween the two groups, however, makes an early reconcilia-
tion unlikely. The cease-fire itself is tenuous, with
both the UN and Katangan forces attempting to improve
their military positions. Fears that the Congolese Army
may invade Katanga and unrest among the anti-Tshombu
Baluba refugees camped near the city add to the tension
in Elisabethville.
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LAOS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . Page 7
A new meeting of Boun Oum, Souvanna, and Souphannou-
vong has been agreed upon for early October at Hin Heup,
50 miles north of Vientiane. General Phoumi, while ap-
pearing more receptive toward Souvanna as premier, ex-
pects negotiations on the composition of a coalition gov-
ernment to be protracted, since he intends to make a major
issue of which individuals are "truly neutral." Informal
negotiations at Geneva have resulted in agreement on sev-
eral minor points. The military situation has been rela-
tively quiet. Communist forces continue minor attacks in
scattered areas, but these appear to be primarily in re-
sponse to Laotian Army security operations and Meo uer-
rilla activity.
..
SOU
TH VIETNAM . . . . . . . . . .
. . ... . . . . .. .. Page 8
The increase in Communist guerrilla activity through-
out South Vietnam this month may foreshadow an intensified
military effort by the Viet Cong. Operations by battalion-
size units in the central highlands and the northern part
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of South Vietnam indicate the increased ease with which
guerrillas are being infiltrated from North Vi tnam via
Laos.
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FRANCE , . . . . , . . . . . a e . . . , . , . , . 4 . Page 10
De Gaulle, who is seeking a "national unity" agree-
ment in his effort to reach an Algerian settlement by the
end of the year, has reduced the likelihood of an early
government crisis by announcing that he is about to re-
nounce his special emergency powers and by his efforts
to re-establish contacts with party leaders. Neverthe-
less, the public is becoming impatient over the delay in
reaching an Algerian settlement, labor is restive,over
wages, and new farm demonstrations may occur when the
government's agricultural bill is debated shortly after
parliament reconvenes on 3 October. 25X1
ALGERIA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 11
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Moslems vxere killed. 25X1
The bitterness of European settlers in Algeria,
which is being exploited by the rightist Secret Arm
Organization A has r ea h d a point where
I nother coup attempt is
likely unless the Ums ea ers are captured soon. The
OAS has called for a series of demonstrations against
De Gaulle, which could provoke Moslem counterdemonstra-
tions. De Gaulle has described the situation as'"explo-
sive," and said he would not be surprised to see new
disorders in which "lar a numbers" of Europeans and
AFGHANISTAN-PAKISTAN , , . . . , . . . o o . . . . e . Page 14
Neither Afghanistan nor Pakistan has shown a willing-
ness to make concessions to help resolve the present im-
passe. Both countries have continued to strengthen their
military positions along the border, but the intent on
both sides appears to be defensive. Afghanistan insists
that it will not use the Pakistani route for foreign trade
until the Pushtoonistan dispute is settled. The result-
ing disruption of supply lines threatens to force the
termination of construction work on major American aid
projects in the near future. 25X1
GHANA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 15
Nkrumah's abrupt removal last week of British offi-
cers from command positions in Ghana's military forces
underscores his progressive estrangement from the West.
Nkrumah and his influential left-wing advisers appear more
eager than ever to accept aid from the Sino-Soviet bloc
following Nkrumah's recent extended visit to nine bloc
comt.?ieas, The expected departure of most of the British
officers will remove an important stabilizing factor in
Ghana and may encourage some discontented native officers
to make common cause with disaffected political elements.
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28 September 1961
BLOC ECONOMIC OVERTURES TO BRAZZAVILLE GROUP . . . . . . . Page 16
The Soviet Union and some of the European satellites
have recently reiterated their readiness to provide aid
and to expand trade with the 12 African nations associated
in the so-called Brazzaville group--all moderate former
French territories. This month Soviet officials held
discussions in Moscow with an economic delegation from
the Congo Republic (Brazzaville). A mission from Niger
which visited Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Ru-
mania received assurances of bloc aid, largely in the
form of technical assistance. 25X1
BLOC ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH INDONESIA . . . . . . . . Page 17
Soviet military aid has overshadowed bloc economic
activities in Indonesia during the past year, but the trade
and economic aid program remains important to Soviet poli-
cy in the area. Several recent aid agreements with the
East European satellites have boosted total bloc economic
aid to Indonesia to more than $600,000,000. The bloc has
usually agreed to Djakarta's requests and has come to
assume the major foreign assistance role in Indonesia's
ambitious eight-year development plan which began this
year. The plans now being formulated will eventually in-
volve the bloc in nearly every sector of the Indonesian
economy.
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MOSCOW SHAKES UP CIVIL POLICE COMMAND . . . . . . . . . . Page 18
Kremlin dissatisfaction with the performance of the
regular civil police during the current crackdown on eco-
nomic crimes has led to the dismissal of internal affairs
ministers in eight of the Soviet Union's 15 republics.
In several instances those ousted have been replaced by
officers of the secret police (KG)?. Although regular law
enforcement is the responsibility of the Internal Affairs
Ministry (MVD) in each of the republics, the KGB has been
given responsibility for enforcing those new laws which
provide t
he death sentence for embezzlement and specula- 25X1
_
RURAL REORGANIZATION IN COMMUNIST CHINA . . . . . . . . . Page 20
Peiping is easing controls over farming as one measure
to revive agricultural production. The peasants are being
allowed greater freedom to engage in side occupations,
cultivate private plots, and sell part of their output
on free markets. Peiping is returning to an incentive
wage system reflecting the amount of work performed rather
than the time spent on the job. These measures cannot
by themselves, without better weather and more fertilizer,
be expected to pull agriculture out of its slump.
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SHARPENING CHURCH-STATE CONFLICT TN POLAND .. . . . . . . .. Page 21
Recent steps by Poland to assert its control over
religious instruction have placed the Roman Catholic Church
in open and direct opposition to the regime; the Polish
Episcopate has bluntly reaffirmed its intention to con-
tinue such instruction without submission to state regu-
lation. The regime is well aware of the powerful public
support for Cardinal Wyszynski and may be disposed to com-
promise the ?ssue temporarily. 25X1
YUGOSLAVIA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 23
Belgrade is trying to counteract the negative reaction
in the West to Tito's support of Soviet foreign policies
at the conference of nonaligned nations. Yugoslav offi-
cials have implied to Western diplomats that the speech
did not signal a change of policies and that Belgrade
still maintains impartial positions.
tON F 1AL
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. . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 24
Opposition leaders are "considering" President Bala-
guer's offer to include them in a coalition government, but
a leader of the largest opposition group has indicated that
his group will not accept. The special OAS subcommittee
is nearing the end of its stay in the country and is pre-
paring to report on the critical issue of whether condi-
tions now warrant any relaxation of the OAS sanctions
against the regime. The opposition would regard any eas-
ing of the sanctions as equivalent to US abandonment of
the Dominican people to a tyrannical regime. The govern-
ment, on the other hand, maintains that failure to lift
the sanctions promptly would demonstrate the futility of
the liberalization program and lead to a military coup.
F_ I
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MEXICO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 25
Recent revolutionary outbreaks in central and south-
eastern Mexico have led the Lopez Mateos government to take
strong action against all suspected antigovernment activity.
The administration remains uncertain as to which elements
actually organized the outbreaks; it will probably blame
certain recently active church-supported rightists, but
in so doing will seek to avoid providing political advan-
tage to the leftists. Violent uprisings have been rare
in recent decades in Mexico; those this month involved
at least 60 deaths.
. . . . . . . . . . . Page 27
Preside pt Joao Goulart appears to have strengthened
his political position during the past three weeks, despite
CONFIpENTIAL
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
28 September 1961
the constitutional amendment of 2 September transferring
the executive power in Brazil to a prime minister. Prime
Minister Tancredo Neves appears to be working with Gou-
lartrather than competing for power. Goulart's public
statements have been cautious and devoid of radicalism;
however, he has appointed a Communist as his private sec-
retary, and several of his other appointees have Communist
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THE WEST INDIES FEDERATION . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . Page 28
Jamaica's decision to withdraw from the West Indies
Federation leaves Trinidad's Premier Eric Williams, often
antagonistic toward the United States, the dominant figure
in the area. While Trinidad now may follow Jamaica's ex-
pected course of seeking separate independence, London
considers it possible that Trinidad may join the smaller
islands in an Eastern Caribbean federation. Williams may
also use the collapse of the Federation as a pretext to
seek renegotiation of the defense areas agreement con-
cluded last February with the US. 25X1
PROBLEMS OF THE BELGIAN GOVERNMENT . , . . . . . . . . . . Page 29
Recent developments in the Congo, particularly the
UN action against Katanga and the exodus of white set-
tlers, will probably stimulate strong right.-wing criti-
cism of the Socialist and Social Christian coalition
government of Prime Minister Lefevre and Foreign Minis-
ter Spaak when parliament reconvenes early next month.
The coalition, formed in April after the parliamentary
elections, is expected to survive, however, chiefly be-
cause there is no practical alternative. 25X1
SPECIAL ARTICLES
SINO-SOVIET BLOC AID TO AFRICA .
Africa now accounts for 12 percent of total Sino-
Soviet economic assistance extended since 1954. However,
of the more than $500,000,000 in bloc aid thus far ex-
tended to African countries, less than 5 percent has
actually been delivered. The bloc aid program in Africa
(excluding Egypt) 'began in late 1958 and early 1959 with
the provision by Czechoslovakia and Poland of small medi-
um-term credits to Ethiopia and Guinea for hospital and
railroad' equipment. In mid-1959, the Soviet Union ex-
tended relatively large lines of credit to both those
African countries for general economic development. In
the two years since then, the program--in which all the
major bloc countries now are participating--has grown
both in size and scope and now includes military as well
as economic assistance. More than half the aid extended
by the bloc to underdeveloped countries in 1961 was for
African countries.
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SUDANESE PRESIDENT ABBOUD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 7
General Ibrahim Abboud, who begins a state visit to
the United States on 4 October, has been President of the
Sudan since 1958, when he led a successful army coup. De-
spite initial successes in the economic field, the Abboud
regime has never gained broad public support and is under
pressure from a group of civilian politicians to restore
constitutional government. During his visit to the US,
Abboud, in addition to seeking a general increase in Amer-
ican aid, will probably try to obtain a dramatic "impact"
project, which he can use to increase his prestige. Per-
sonally oriented toward the West, Abboud has nevertheless
pursued an official policy of neutralism, designed primari-
ly to keep the Sudan in good standing with Afro-Asian coun-
tries.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY:',1URY
WEEKLY REVIEW
EAST-WEST
The position Khrushchev out-
lined in his statements on Ger-
many and Berlin to Belgian
Foreign Minister Spaak on 19
September was more flexible than
any he has adopted since he in-
tensified the Berlin crisis after
the Vienna meeting with President
Kennedy. Khrushchev apparently
was seeking to convince Spaak
that formal negotiations by the
four powers could lead to a com-
promise solution which would
protect the Western position in
Berlin but allow the Soviet
Union a free hand to proceed
with a peace treaty with East
Germany. According to Spaak's
report to the NATO Council, the
Soviet premier contended that
he understood Western views on
Germany and Berlin and had no
desire to impose the Soviet
position that a treaty should
be signed with both German
states.
Khrushchev said the USSR
would guarantee East German
execution of any agreement on
Berlin which the four powers
could work out prior to negotia-
tions on the peace treaty. He
stated that he was prepared for
what he called a compromise--
the signing of two treaties
which would contain some common
clauses, including recognition
of present German frontiers;
some provision for subsequent
study by the two Germanys of
formulas for unification; and
a four-power accord on Berlin.
Such an accord, Khrushchev
indicated, could either appear
in parallel treaties or be
incorporated in a separate East
Germany peace treaty concluded
by the bloc alone. He claimed
that in this way Moscow would
guarantee the Berlin accord
without requiring Western recog-
nition of the East German regime.
Khrushchev ruled out any
discussion of the status of East
Berlin. He also maintained that
the West must reach an agreement
with East Germany over access
arrangements, but at the same
time he said,"Berlin is not too
important."
As to timing, Khrushchev
indicated no sense of urgency
and mentioned no final date,
provided there were no "long,
drawn-out" discussions on Ber-
lin.
Khrushchev's presentation
and his focus on the possibility
of "compromise" seem tailored
to appeal to those within the
Western alliance who favor for-
mal negotiations as early as
possible. Spaak indicated to
the British ambassador in Mos-
cow that he believed he has been
invited to Moscow because Khru-
shchev knew he favored negotia-
tions. In keeping with this
general line, Khrushchev's letter
to Nehru, released on 22 Septem~
ber, maintained that the USSR
was prepared for negotiations
"any time, and place, and at any
level," and attempted to create
the impression that the West
opposed "serious negotiations."
Although the idea of two
peace treaties--to be concluded
by the Western powers with Bonn
and by the bloc with East Ger-
many--was included in the aide-
memoire given President Kennedy
in Vienna and repeated in the
Soviet note of 3 August, Khru--
shchev's explanation of the link
between a separate settlement on
Berlin and the conclusion of a
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peace treaty is a new aspect:,,;
designed to overcome Western
objections to a unilateral
turnover of controls by main-
taining a semblance of the status
quo. This alternative, however,
would be consistent with Khru-
shchev's demand that the status
of Berlin be "normalized" and
with his refusal to agree to
perpetuate Western occupation
rights. He probably feels that
incorporation in an East German
treaty of a four-power agreement
and a guarantee on access would
reduce the risks of concluding
a separate peace treaty with
East Germany and would consti-
tute! at least ;tacit: Western
consent to a separate treaty.
Khrushchev's statement that
the USSR would be willing to ne-
gotiate on a zone of limited or
controlled armaments in Europe
is calculated to appeal to Spaak
and other European leaders who
have long held that a security
arrangement in Central Europe
should be taken up in connection
with the German question.
this approach in his discussions
with Secretary Rusk and with
Lord Home in New York. In an-
swer to Home's question on the
possibility of a Berlin access
arrangement which would be
written into a separate peace
treaty, Gromyko replied with
five conditions: respect for
East German sovereignty, agree-
ment with the East Germans, end
of the occupation status, de-
militarization in Central Europe,
and recognition of the Oder-
Neisse border.
Gromyko, however, was vague
in answering Secretary Ru'sk's
question on whether the Soviets
excluded a broader approach than
that indicated by Gromyko. In
this way Gromyko apparently in-
tended to hold the door open to
a continuing exchange. Khru-
shchev told the French ambassa-
dor in Moscow that he realized
there would have to be some
"give and take" in any discus-
sions on Berlin and Germany.
Military Measures
Khrushchev apparently sought
to meet Western opposition to ne-
gotiating under a threat or ul-
timatum by playing down any spe-
cific deadline and stressing anly
that the talks should not be
protracted. Khrushchev has not
mentioned a deadline in recent
public statements, and threats
of a separate treaty have also
been omitted in several of Khru-
shchev's latest pronouncements.
Despite Khrushchev's more
conciliatory line, Foreign Min-
ister Gromyko did not reflect
Moscow announced on 25 Sep-
tember that Warsaw Pact forces
would conduct exercises in Octo-
ber and November. These exer-
cises are a logical and -cons'ist-
ent.' development of Moscow's ex-
tensive efforts over the past
two months to impress the West
with the strength and combat
readiness of the Soviet and
bloc forces. The Soviet announce-
ment,'.,which' stated the exer-
cises would be held in the
"territory of the Warsaw treaty
countries," follows the decision
at the meeting of the Warsaw
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Pact defense minsters on 8-9
September to work out "practical
measures" to strengthen the de-
fense of the bloc countries.
Hammarskjold's Successor
Although Moscow has con-
tinued to advocate the troika
plan for replacing the UN sec-
retary general, there is in-
creasing evidence that the So-
viet bloc will eventually agree
to an interim appointment to
fill out Hammarskjold's term,
which expires in 1963. The bloc
delegates probably intend to in-
crease their efforts to arrange
for the appointment of three
under secretaries--one each from
the bloc, the West, and the
neutral nations--to act as ad-
visers without a veto. In this
way Moscow would probably hope
to claim growing recognition of
the concept of three power blocs
in the world and of the necessity
to reflect this division in the
UN structure. By insisting on
the full troika plan as an in-
itial position and indicating
opposition to certain candidates,
Moscow probably also hopes to
induce neutral delegates to put
forward a compromise candidate
acceptable to the USSR.
Gromyko in his UN speech
made only a passing reference
to the troika plan, denied that
there was any constitutional
crisis in the UN, and insisted
the question be settled in the
Security Council. A member of
the Rumanian delegation, com-
menting on Gromyko's speech,
said that what the USSR wanted
at this time was a candidate
for temporary secretary general
who would be acceptable to the
bloc. Permanent Soviet UN rep-
resentative Zorin is reported
to have proposed to the three
Western powers that a four-man
directorate be selected, with
one person to serve as the chief
of the secretariat and the other
three to act as assistants.
Reaction to President's Address
The bloc has been mildly
critical of the President's
speech, with most of the crit-
icism directed against his
disarmament proposals. Moscow
asserts that the proposals fail
to provide "either for the abo-
lition of arms and armed forces
or for the banning of nuclear
weapons, or for the liquidation
of military bases. Moscow
also criticizes the President
for referring to the Laotian
situation as a threat to peace
while not "saying a word" about
Algeria, Angola, or Southwest
Africa. The President's remarks
on Germany are reported briefly
but without direct commentary.
During the past week, two
incidents have occurred involv-
ing East German efforts to con-
trol US military personnel
traveling on the Berlin-Helmstedt
Autobahn. On 21 September police
halted two US enlisted men in
civilian clothes traveling in
a car with military plates,
and detained them at Potsdam
police headquarters. After six
hours, a Soviet officer appeared
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
and the men were released. On
25 September, an air force staff
sergeant was halted at a road-
block outside Berlin while en
route to Helmstedt in a private
vehicle with military plates.
East German police--who were
handing out fines to most of
the cars on charges of speeding
--ordered the sergeant to pro-
duce his identification, refused
his request for a Soviet officer,
and forced him to return to
Berlin. On the second try, he
drove through to Helmstedt.
The institution of increased
patrolling by US military police
after the first incident drew
a strong protest from Marshal
Konev demanding immediate cessa-
tion of the patrols, on grounds
that they violated "the agree-
ment pertaining to communications
controls, under which the con-
trol for communications between
the Federal German Republic and
West Berlin is placed in the
hands of the Soviet command."
The broad reference to Soviet
retention of communications
controls is unusual in that it
makes no allowance for existing
East German control of West
German traffic.
In an effort to maintain
pressure on the matter of air
access to Berlin, Soviet authori-
ties in the Berlin Air Safety
Center (BASC) used an Allied
protest against the harassment
of a British European Airways
plane on 22 September by Soviet
fighter planes to transmit: the
following day a demand that
Western flights submit flight
plans Promptly, that they state
the estimated time for crossing
the East German frontier, and
that they adhere to the "re-
quirement" of flying under 10,-
000 feet.
West Germany
Despite official Washing-
ton reassurances that US policy
on Berlin and Germany remains
unchanged, West German spokes-
men of the leading political
parties have expressed "great
uneasiness" over statements
attributed to influential Ameri-
can officials about accepting
the "reality of the two Ger-
manys." A Foreign Ministry
official told US representative
in Bonn that publicity at this
time regarding possible Western
concessions has "dismayed the
German public" and created dis-
trust of the strength of the
alliance even before negotia-
tions have begun or any con-
cessions actually been made.
The influential Hamburg
newspaper Die Welt asserted
on 25 September that various
concessions apparently under
consideration by the United
States such as de facto recog-
nition of East Germany came
"dangerously close to Soviet
demands." The newspaper also
noted that there was quite a
difference between offering
such concessions at the end
of Berlin talks, when they might
offer the only chance to keep
Berlin free and avoid war,
and offering them at the open-
ing phase of negotiations
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
The cease-fire in Katanga,
which began on 21 September, has
generally been observed by both
Tshombe and the UN. The first
move in the direction of a pris-
oner exchange took place on 26
September, when two UN officials
arrived in Elisabethville to
participate in a four-man com-
mission which will oversee the
cease-fire.
The cease-fire to date has
been highlighted by charges from
each side of bad faith and armi-
stice violations by the other.
Although the cease-fire provided
for a freeze on troop movements
in Katanga, each side has taken
steps to increase its military
strength. The UN has made no
secret of its efforts to develop
an air capability which would
neutralize Tshomb6's ubiquitous
-Fouga jet. The first four of
fourteen jet fighters requested
by the UN arrived in Leopoldville
from Addis Ababa on 27 September.
There are unconfirmed reports
that Tshomb6 has already received
the first of ten twin-engine
Dornier light transports-- equipped
with bomb racks and other.
military equipment--ordered in
Europe. A US Air Force officer
in Northern Rhodesia reported
on 23 September that a Katangan
aircraft had arrived in Ndola
to pick up eight Rhodesian,, Bel-
gian, and South African merce-
naries for service in Katanga.
Morale in Tshomb6's forces
appears to be generally satis-
factory. Four African lieuten-
ants defected to the UN on 23
September, but they appear to
have been members of a contin-
gent of junior officers who have
posed a disciplinary threat to
Tshomb6 since their return from
training in Belgium. The US Con-
sulate reports that the character
of the white element in Tshomb6's
army appears to be changing, with
the hitherto dominant Belgian
element giving way to Rhodesian
and rightist French volunteers.
UN authorities apparently
hope that the cease-fire will
provide an opportunity for direct
talks between Tshomb6 and the
central government. Khiari stated
on 26 September that he believed
"there was a possibility of a rec-
onciliation based on Tshomb6's
acceptance of a high post--such
as minister of defense--in the
Leopoldville government. Such
hopes ignore the increasingly
hostile attitude toward Tshomb6
in Leopoldville. The Gizenga
faction would probably block
any move to bring Tshomb6 into
the central government.
Tshomb6 has reiterated his
willingness to negotiate with the
central government, but has not
hacked down on his oft-repeated
insistence on Katangan independ-
ence and the necessity of a UN
withdrawal from Katanga. On 27
September, Tshomb6 stated that
he had urged Adoula to meet him
for talks in neutral territory.
Widespread anti-Tshomb6
sentiment in Leopoldville has
prompted Premier Adoula to move
two battalions of Congolese Army
troops to Luluabourg in prepara-
tion for an "invasion" of Katanga
if one is required. Rumors of
invasion, together with hunger
and unrest within the Baluba
refugee camps near Elisabethville,
have added to the insecurity in
Katanga.
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CONFIDENTIAL
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY GLARY
UN officials in Elisabeth-
ville have admitted to a US
Embassy officer that they badly
underestimated the Katangans'
will and ability to resist, but
nonetheless persist in their
optimism. The embassy official
characterized UN authorities as
UN
3160
UN 925
scattered
The Adoula government has
rebuffed efforts by bloc and
radical African diplomats for-
merly accredited to the Gizenga
regime in Stanleyville to trans-
fer operations to Leopoldville
without obtaining new accredita-
tion. A Foreign Ministry bulletin
Tsh i kapa
Bakwanga?
00 United Nations Forces*
--Selected road
N
940
-+-+ Selected railroad Does not include support troops or
Selected airfield units in the process of redeployment.
minimizing the African role in
the resistance 'and.blaming the
fighting on a few hundred whites.
He observed, however, that Katan-
gans, with no support from Euro-
peans, resisted heavy UN attacks
on the fit t day of the fighting,
and areas exihi:la tegi, as the whites
by their "victory" over the UN.
UN
1500
UN
3300
of 23 September-, which noted the
presence in Leopoldville of dip-
lomats from the USSR, Czechoslova-
kia, Poland, Mali, and the UAR,
stated that these countries could
install their missions only after
having followed "normal diplomatic
procedure.."
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UN
1875
25X1
 Approved For Rele`rse 2005/04/2 3+N'e~j 0927A003390110001-5
CONFIDENTIAL"
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
LAOS
In their meeting at Namone
on 27 September, the Vientiane
group and the delegation repre-
senting Souvanna and the Pathet
Lao agreed on a new meeting of
Souvanna, Souphannouvong, and
Boun Oum. The site agreed
upon--Hin Heup, about 50 miles
north of Vientiane--represents
a concession by the government,
which had been insisting on
Luang Prabang. However, the
dividing line between the op-
posing forces runs through Hin
Heup, and the timing of the
meeting and its precise location
within the town apparently re-
main to be decided.
Phoumi, in conversations
with Ambassador Brown on 26
September, appeared to have
adopted a more lenient view of
Souvanna. While commenting that
the depth or sincerity of Phoumi's
apparent conversion could not
be measured, the ambassador
states that Phoumi gave every
impression of a sincere desire
to reach agreement with Souvanna
on a government under Souvanna's
leadership. Phoumi did, how-
ever, say that negotiations on
the governments composition
would be protracted, as he would
make a major issue of which in-
dividuals were "truly neutral."
In earlier talks with Am-
bassador Harriman--following
the Harriman-Souvanna discus-
sions in Rangoon--Phoumi had
stressed his belief that Souvan-
na was too beholden to the Com-
munists to make a suitable pre-
mier. Phoumi declared that if
a peaceful solution proved im-
possible and the Vientiane
government were attacked, he
would defend himself and hoped
"in any event" he could count
on support from the United
States. Ambassador Harriman
received the impression that
Phoumi had no real intention of
pursuing serious negotiations.
Phoumi's current more re-
ceptive attitude could be merely
a tactical maneuver to shift the
onus away from himself for the
lack of progress toward a polit-
ical settlement.
King Savang also disclosed
his lack of confidence in Sou-
vanna to Ambassador Harriman,
but said he would be willing to
appoint Souvanna premier if he
were the choice of the three
princes.
Negotiations continue be-
tween Souvanna~and Western rep-
resentatives on a formula for
a coalition government balanced
'between left and right. Souvan-
na is still insisting on drawing
heavily from his supporters in
Xieng Khouang for the "moderate
center" but has indicated he
would consider enlarging this
group to include more persons
outside his circle.
Meo units in Xieng Khouang
Province continue their harass-
ing activities despite enemy
efforts to suppress them. Vien-
tiane army units are making sec-
tor sweeps in an effort to con- 25X1
solidate their positions but are
encountering stiffer resista
At a meeting on 26 Septem-
ber the Geneva conference rati-
fied a number of minor points
which had been ironed out dur-
ing discussions between the UK
and Soviet delegates as co-chair-
men of the conference. Included
among these points was a com-
promise draft dealing with the
repatriation of foreign mili-
tary and civilian prisoners in
Laos. The draft provides that
all prisoners will be handed
over to their respective govern-
ment representatives "for pro-
ceeding to the destination of
their choice."
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 Approved For Refse 2QQ 4
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
On 22 September, Soviet
delegate Pushkin had refused
to hold a scheduled meeting of
the conferees, despite his
prior agreement to do so. He
bitterly criticized the US re-
fusal to accept promptly the
Soviet draft on repatriation.
The UK delegate has speculated
that at the time, the Chinese
Communists were probably crit-
ical of Pushkin's decision to
proceed with a meeting of the
conference without having' ob-
tained prior Western acceptance
of the Soviet draft.
Communist propaganda con-
tinues to charge that the US
and Vientiane are preparing
for an increase in hostilities.
The increased scale of
Communist guerrilla activity
throughout South Vietnam this
month may foreshadow an inten-
sified military effort by the
Viet Cong. In addition to pre-?
viously reported attacks by
Viet Cong forces estimated at
two battalions on outposts in
Kontum Province near the Lao-
tian border and on Phuoc Vinh,
capital of Phuoc Thanh Province
just north of Saigon, a Commu-
nist force in similar strength
on 18 September overran a small
garrison and three villages
near the government stronghold
at Ban Me Thuot, southern gate-
way to the minority tribal re-
gions of the central high pla-
teau. Battalion-size units
also carried out four separate
attacks between 17 and 19 Sep-
tember in the northern prov-
inces of Quang Nam and Quang
Ngai, the largest actions in
that area to date. Stepped-
up activity also continues in
areas close to Saigon, includ-
ing the kidnap-ransom during
the past week of an Australian
technician.
This acceleration suggests
that the Communists are enter-
ing a new stage in their sub-
versive efforts, possibly hop-
ing in the near future to erode
public confidence in the regime
and facilitate another coup
attempt. The attacks may be
intended in part to keep govern-
ment forces off balance and
divert Diem's troops from the
southernmost provinces--still
the main Communist stronghold--
where South Vietnamese Army
sweeps in recent months have
caused heavy Viet Cong losses,
The activity in the central
highlands, and particularly in
the north, indicates the in-
creasing ease with which the
Communists are infiltrating
from North Vietnam through
Laos.
One Viet Cong battalion
involved in a recent attack in
the north was equipped with
weapons of US rather than
French origin. This fact, plus
the reported statement of its
captured commander to the ef-
fect that the unit made a two-
day march from the west, indi-
cates the entire battalion
may have entered from Laos.
A Viet Cong prisoner captured
in Saigon said he had entered
by way of Laos and Cambodia in
June with a 250-man unit trained
in North Vietnam.
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Qvz~llllll
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t
CONFlDENTIA .3
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Communist Guerrilla Activity in South Vietnam
Quang Tri, VIETNAM
Hue.
L A O S
T urane
j.uang Nam
C A M B O D I A
SOUTH VIETNAM
,Ban Me Thuot
PHNOM PENH (10
Tay Ninh
Phuoc
? SAIGON
Cap Saint-Jacques
Site of large-scale Viet Cong attack,
September 1961
Major areas of Viet Cong concentration
26 SEPTEMBER 1061
American Army intelligence
estimates Viet Cong strength
in South Vietnam at 16,500,.,of"
whom about 8,500 are considered
well-trained, full-time regu-
lars organized into at least
29 battalions which operate as
100
J
Phan Rang.
elite striking forces. The re-
maining 8,000 are probably
partly trained and equipped
guerrilla companies and pla-
toons, operating in their home
province or district under full-
time cadres.
'CONFIDENTIAL
Amos
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25X1
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CONF.DEM
De Gaulle, who reportedly
is seeking a "national unity"
agreement in his effort to reach
an Algerian settlement by the
end of the year, has reduced the
likelihood of an early government
crisis by announcing that he is
about to renounce his special
emergency powers and by efforts
to re-establish contacts with
party leaders.
By late summer, virtually
all the "representatives of the
nation"--the parties represented
in parliament, labor unions, farm-
er organizations, and various
other groups--appeared strongly
dissatisfied with the present
government system because they
feel they are being deprived of
their normal functions. De
Gaulle's popularity. among the
masses, however, was virtually
undiminished; the crowds during
his 21-24 September tour of
south-central France were large
and enthusiastic, despite the
call by the farm organizations
and many local officials for a
protest boycott.
censure the unpopular Premier
Debr6 and overthrow his govern-
ment, it also restores the Presi-
dent's right to dissolve parlia-
ment when it does so.
De Gaulle next initiated a
series of talks on 25 and 26 Sep-
tember with the leaders of virtu-
ally every political party except
the extreme right and extreme left.
According to the account put out
by the Gaullist Union for the New
Republic, he suggested a "national
unity agreement" until the end of
the year, when he hopes to have
some solution for Algeria. While
the parties remain critical of the
government, they may accept "nation-
al unity" for a limited period of
time and agree to postpone a censure
motion against Debr6.
A member of the Socialist
delegation said De Gaulle told
his group he had no intention of
changing his government at this
time but intimated that if he
achieves an Algerian solution
soon, he might dissolve parliament
and call new elections for the
spring of 1962.
When this month's special
session of parliament on the
farm problem collapsed into a
constitutional feud between the
National Assembly and the govern-
ment, De Gaulle's advisers coun-
seled closer contacts between
him and the country's political
representatives. On 20 September,
the President announced his in-
tention of renouncing by the end
of the month the special powers
which were instituted after themili-
tary mutiny in Algeria last April
and which have in recent weeks
been openly attacked by the depu-
ties. While this concession re-
stores parliament's freedom to
The French people are almost
completely behind De Gaulle's
policy of withdrawing from Algeria.
Minister for Algerian Affairs Louis
Joxe commented on 14 September that
they would support anything De Gaulle;
wants. However, they do not under-
stand why it is taking so long to
get a settlement. De Gaulle's
scheduled nationwide address of
2 October may include major new
proposals on Algeria and a new
appeal for the united backing of
the country.
In addition to political
restlessness, France in the next
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 Approved Fceelea~p?~QQ 41100920033001 10001-5
lsopaagw
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
few months faces the prospect pending passage of new legisla-
of potentially serious labor tion, now scheduled to come be-
and farm unrest. While the fore parliament early in the fall
h
economic situation is generally
excellent, income in some sec-
tors--notably agriculture and
nationalized services--is sub-
standard. On 27 September there
were brief but widely supported
strikes by miners and railroad
workers. The possibility of
labor violence will remain as
long as the government restricts
wage raises and social benefits
while productivity is being in-
creased.
Farmers demanding a return
to parity prices, better mar-
keting arrangements, and social
security improvements staged
demonstrations early in the sum-
mer. Tenuous peace was restored
session; other concessions, suc
as higher milk prices, have re-
cently been granted.
Debr6 stated on 14 September
that no solution would satisfy
the farmers now because the prob-
lem is a structural one and will
remain difficult for six or eight
years until expanding industrial
development absorbs the excess
manpower now on the farms.
Although many farmers reportedly
have a "pathetic faith" that par-
liament will solve their problems,
the two major farm organizations
claim they are prepared to resume
demonstrations if their demands
are not satisfied.
25X1
The bitterness of European
settlers in Algeria, which is
being exploited by the rightist
Secret Army Organization OAS)
has reached a point where
another coup attempt is e y
unless the OAS leaders are cap-
d The OAS has called
oon
t
Violence by Europeans could
provoke counterdemonstrations by
Moslems. De Gaulle himself re-
portedly told a Socialist party
delegation on 26 September that
the situation in Algeria is "ex-
plosive" and that he would not
be surprised if there were new
disorders in which large numbers
.
ure s
upon all opposed to De Gaulle's of Europeans and Moslems were
policies to stage a series of I killed.
demonstrations, two of which
have already produced rioting
in Algiers. The climax of these
demonstrations is scheduled for
2 October--the day De Gaulle will
make a television address on
Algeria and other matters.
25X1
25X1
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 Approved For.,Release 2005/04T~~C1K-DP79-009203300110001-5
CONFIDENTIAL
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
25X1
April coup attempt the French
Army has been regarded by the
Europeans as an occupying force.
Conscripts, whose refusal to
support the generals was
largely responsible for the
failure of the April insurrec-
tion, are being insulted and
ostracized. Some have even
been killed by irate Europeans.
Many sources in Algeria
feel that a showdown battle be-
tween the government and the
OAS in Algeria is imminent, and
they are not confident that
the government will win. Re-
ports indicate that although
the OAS penetration of metro-
politan France is proceeding
slowly, it has made great prog-
ress in Algeria. The arrest
there of 225 OAS members on the
night of 12-13 September does
not appear to have reached the
leaders; there are indications
that ex-Colonel Godard is now
in active control of the OAS,
with ex-General Salan merely
a figurehead.
The bulk of the European
population is probably giving
at least tacit support to the
OAS, even though response to
the 25 September order to dis-
play the OAS flag was not im-
pressive. Both Salan and Go-
dard have reportedly been seen
in Algiers, and Salan is said
to move "from army post to army
post" while the CRS is "very 25X1
careful not to catch up with
him." Such a situation implies 25X1
complicity
The OAS apparently intends
ultimately to precipitate mob
action that would swamp the
security forces, feeling that
"you cannot arrest 300,000 people."
Although the OAS has issued tracts
"deploring" European attacks on
Moslems, its hard-core leaders may
be inciting intercommunal violence
on the premise that the ensuing
There are an estimated French repression of the Moslems
35,000 troops and security forces would be so bloody as to prevent
in the greater Algiers area,
but one report states that only
the gendarmerie and the Repub-
lican Security Companies (CRS)
are completely loyal to the
government. Even the CRS was
slow to control Europeans who
staged an "Arab hunt" in Algiers
on 12 September. Although the
officers responsible have re-
portedly been disciplined, this
casts doubt on whether the CRS
would fire on rioting Europeans,
especially since two thirds of
the CRS forces are said to have
been born in Algeria. The at-
titude of the army would be un-
since the
certain if it were called upon
to fire on a European crowd.
early resumption of negotiations
with the provisional Algerian
government (PAG).
De Gaulle intimated to the
Socialist party delegation that
French representatives are in
contact with the PAG to set a
date and choose a place for new
negotiations. De Gaulle report-
edly stated, however, that he
would want to be sure progress
can be made before entering any
new talks, and rebel premier Ben
Khedda is reported to feel that
the PAG cannot politically sur-
vive another failure of public
negotiations.
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 Approved Foi%ReleasQQ S'/0 E2''RDK09203300110001-5
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Some French officials are
said to fear that an early re-
as regulars in or auxiliaries
with the French Army, the PAG
would probably object that it
was in effect an extension of
the French Army and hardly im-
partial. On the other hand,
the French military, who have
been concerned for some months
over the loyalty of such troops,
would almost certainly feel
that severing those Moslems
from their normal army environ-
ment would subject them to
rebel propaganda and thus in-
fluence the electorate. Even
the idea of a mixed French-
rebel force was rejected earlier
this year by one of De Gaulle's
most trusted officers, the then
commander-in-chief in Algeria,
General Gambiez.
serious effects on the settlers
in Algeria and possible repercus-
sions in France unless time is
allowed for the inflamed Euro-
pean-Moslem situation in Algeria
to calm down. De Gaulle reiter-
ated to the Socialists, however,
the idea that some sort of settle-;
meat of the Algerian problem--
whether partition or the estab-
lishment of a provisional
executive body--will have been
reached "by the end of this
year.
The Socialists quoted
De Gaulle as envisaging next
the establishment of a transi-
tional "central power" supported
by a 50,000-man "local" Moslem
force. The idea of a "local"
police force was first advanced
by De Gaulle in a 5 September
press conference at which he
asserted that the establishment
of an Algerian state could "nor-
mally" stem only from the proc-
ess of self-determination--a
referendum and elections--which
should occur under a "provisional
Algerian power" rather than un-
der French authority and which
would be supported by its own
"local police force." This ar-
gument was designed to meet PAG
objections to a referendum con-
There is little likeli-
hood that the proposed
50,000-man force could han-
dle the internal security
situation in Algeria. The
disposition of the regular
French forces during and
after formation of the new
force would also pose major
problems. If the French
forces were retained in
Algeria to keep the lid
on Moslem and European ter-
rorism during the self-deter-
mination period, there would
be little or no prospect
of PAG cooperation to fa-
cilitate the transition of
power. If, however, De Gaulle
seemed intent on withdrawing
large numbers and the pres-
ent racial tension showed
signs of getting out of
control, his officers--most of
whom already disagree with his
Algerian policy--would probably
ducted in the presence--even if
only for the purpose of assuring
security--of the approximately
400,000 French forces in Algeria.
The actual composition and
functions of any "local" force
have been a matter of speculation
for some time. If personnel of
the force were drawn entirely
from those Moslems now serving
resist him.
25X1
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 Approved For?lis
e QJIPtiEA'LOO927AQe33OOllOOOl-5
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
AFGHANISTAN-PAKISTAN
Neither Afghanistan nor
Pakistan has shown any willing-
ness to make concessions to help
resolve the present impasse,
Both countries have continued
to strengthen their military
positions along the border, but
the intent on each side appears
to be defensive. Kabul trans-
ferred some tank units from the
capital to the Khyber Pass; area,
following the build-up of in-
fantry and artillery units in
early September. The Afghans
are reportedly calling up a
new class of 20,000 draftees
and have ordered 2,000 techni-
cally trained reservists to
report for duty.
The Pakistanis, who depend
primarily on the quasi-military
Frontier Corps to maintain
border security, have apparently
deployed parts of two units
of the corps closer to the
border in Bajaur, north of the
Khyber Pass. A group of several
hundred Afghan-sponsored tribal
irregulars has moved into this
region but has engaged only in
localized skirmishes,
Afghanistan insists that
it will not use the Pakistani
transit route for its foreign
trade again until the Pushtoon-
istan dispute is settled. The
disruption of supply lines
threatens to force the termina-
tion of construction work on
major American aid projects in
the near future.
Kabul is beginning to make
new arrangements to handle
trade which normally crosses
Pakistan. A Soviet trade rep-
resentative is in the southern
part of the country to buy local
commodities, including the fruit
harvest, a major export crop
usually marketed in India and
Pakistan, The Afghans are also
encouraging Western shippers
to send trade and aid shipments,
which formerly came in through
Pakistan, by way of the rela-
tively expensive transit route
across Iran as well as via the
USSR.
The government of Pakistan
has issued a press statement
noting that Afghanistan's re-
fusal to accept shipments cross-
remains closed.
SUI,,b
C Fort Sardem II
PAKISTAN
ing Pakistan has resulted in
congestion in Pakistan's port and
railway facilities and has dis-
rupted regular traffic. This
may be intended to prepare the
way for suspending facilities for
shipments to Afghanistan and di-
verting warehouses and rolling
stock to other uses if the border
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AND -\
j' KASHMIR
~ISr.~rus Irr ,ro}?rrel
RAWA PINDI
25X1
 Approved For$,eleaser2005/ - 79-0092749'b3300110001-5
CONFIDENTIAL
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
President Nkrumah's abrupt
removal last week of British
officers from command positions
in Ghana?s military forces under-
scores his progressive estrange-
ment from the West. Nkrumah and
his pro-Communist advisers--such
as Minister for Presidential
Affairs Adamafio, who now seems
to be the most influential Ghana-
ian after Nkrumah--appear eager
to accept almost any assistance
offered by the Sino-Soviet bloc.
Nkrumah himself is said to have
returned from his recent extended
visit to bloc countries apparent-
ly convinced that the USSR rep-
resents the "wave of the fu-
ture."
Nkrumah is known to have
been sensitive to hints, notably
from Nasir, that, the British
position in the Ghanaian Army
would limit Ghana's role in the
projected "African high command"
of the Casablanca group. The
timing of his action, however,
appears to have been determined
largely by anger over recent
actual and presumed British
activities in Africa. One focus
of this anger has been the ob-
jections voiced by Britain to
the UN's military intervention
in Katanga; the controlled
Ghanaian press even accused
London of having plotted
Hammarskjold's death. In addi-
tion, Nkrumah apparently be-
lieves that local British com-
mercial interests encouraged
the recent wave of strikes in
Ghana--a line promoted publicly
by Adamafio and other leaders
of the regime's left wing.
This suggests that other moves
aimed at reducing the former
colonial power's presence in
Ghana may be imminent. British
civil servants in the Ghanaian
Government and the British-owned
firms would be the most likely
targets of such moves.
Nkrumah's action will prob-
ably have adverse effects on the
capabilities of Ghanaian forces
if, as seems likely, most of the
approximately 230 British offi-
cers in Ghana now elect to leave.
Relatively few Ghanaians are
qualified to hold a rank above
the new chief of staff of the
9,000-man army, has been char-
acterized as an ineffective op-
portunist who commands little
respect from fellow officers
or the rank and file. The change-
over may eventually lead some of
the Ghanaian officers who have
expressed unhappiness with
Nkrumah's policies to join dis-
affected political elements.
No matter how many British
officers remain, the changes in
their status will facilitate
Nkrumah's plans to accept bloc
military assistance. He can be
expected to press ahead with the
program--devised during his Soviet
visit but vigorously opposed by
Alexander and some Ghanaian
officers--to send as many as 400
Ghanaian cadets to the USSR for
long-term training in all three
services. He may accept bloc
military advisers--reportedly of-
fered by the Soviet military mission
which visited Ghana last winter.
The Ghanaian leader also
seems determined to step up
implementation of development
projects agreed to by the bloc--
such as the Bui dam--and to
conclude new economic arrange-
ments. A delegation is sched-
uled to leave for the bloc
shortly to discuss specific
projects as well as new credits
required to finance them. Ghana
has received about $110,000,000
in bloc credits, and Nkrumah
reportedly requested additional
sums ranging from $14,000,000 to
$56,000,000 from each of the nine
bloc countries he visited.
Recently there have been in-
dications that right-wing lead-
ers--including K. A. Gbedemah,
removed on 28 September as minis-
ter of health--have been moving
toward a showdown over Nkrumah's
increasing alignment with the
bloc and Adamafio?s position.
One report suggests that Gbed-
emah, as of 24 September, was
actively soliciting support
from the opposition party for 25X1
a plan aimed at deposing Nkru-
mah, apparently through parlia-
mentary action.
that of lieutenant; General PiNNFJD~041 f1L
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 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY BURY
The Soviet Union and some
of the European satellites have
recently reiterated their readi-
ness to provide aid and to ex-
pand trade with the 12 African
nations associated in the so-
called Brazzaville group--all
moderate, former French terri-
tories. This month Soviet of-
ficials held discussions in Mos-
cow with an economic delegation
from the Congo Republic (Brazza-
ville), and a mission from Niger
which visited Poland, Czecho-
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The Congo Republic, by send-
ing a mission to the USSR, has
became the first of the Paris-
oriented Brazzaville group to
display an interest in Moscow's
standing aid offer. The mission
included the ministers of plan-
ning and public works and members
of the parliament.
25X1
slovakia, Hungary, and Rumania
received assurances of bloc aid,
largely in the form of technical
assistance.
Shortly after these former
French colonies achieved inde-
pendence in 1960, missions from
several bloc countries including
Communist China visited most of
them. The bloc representatives
are known to have made prelim-
inary offers of economic aid to
the Central African Republic
(CAR) and the Malagasy Republic,
and attempted to discuss trade
with several others. The CAR
declined Soviet offers to build
a railroad from the CAR capital
at Bangui to the Chad border, to
construct an airfield capable of
handling jets, and to provide
machinery for the cotton indus-
try of .the Central African can.
Republic. The soviet delegation
which visited the Malagasy Re-
public reportedly offered to
build a sardine factory as an
aid project but was also rebuffed.
Niger's "good-will" mission,
headed by the minister of indus-
try and trade, was promised tech-
nical aid from Czechoslovakia and
Hungary and was assured that Po-
land and Hungary would send dele-
gations to Niger to discuss other
economic assistance. Rumania
offered to send a mission to
Niger to establish "concrete"
ways of developing economic
relations. Communiques on the
Niger mission's visits to these
four European satellite countries
stated that means of expanding
trade had also been discussed.
Two other members of the
Brazzaville group, Dahomey
and Senegal, recently announced
their intention to send dele-
gations into the bloc. Daho-
mey will send a group led by
its vice president to the USSR,
Czechoslovakia, Poland, and
Communist China, and the prime
minister of Senegal is sched-
uled to go to the USSR next
month. (Prepared
by ORR) 25X1
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
BLOC ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH INDONESIA
Soviet military aid has over-
shadowed bloc economic activi-
ties in Indonesia during the past
year, but the trade and a44,ipror
gram rema ins an equ l'l'y impo ant
arm of the Communist offensive
Several new aid agreements have
been signed recently, boosting
total bloc economic aid to more
than $600,000,000. Moscow's
readiness to supply whatever
military equipment Djakarta re-
quests--including-:guided missiles
.--is duplicated innthe economic
sphere, and the bloc has come
to assume the major foreign
assistance role in Indonesia?s
ambitious eight-year develop-
ment plan which began this year.
Eventually the bloc will be
active in nearly every sector
of the Indonesian economy.
Nearly half of the $117,500,-
000 in Soviet economic aid exc~:
tended prior to 1960 has been
used, and most of the remainder
is committed to projects for the
eight-year plan. The Asian
Games stadium complex--where
the USSR has concentrated its
efforts So fare-probably will
be finished in time for the
opening events next year.
Construction-,).of a 400-mile
road Network on Kalimantan ("(Borneo)
was extremely slow in getting
under way; about 100 Soviet tech-
nicians are slated for the work.
Other Soviet projects being
implemented under the old, aid
agreements include an iron and
steel works, a technological
institute, a superphosphate
plant, and two mechanized farms.
The $250,000,000 Soviet
line of credit extended in early
1960 has been partially allo-
cated for a metallurgical works
on Kalimantan, an integrated
hydroelectric and aluminum proj-
.ect in north Sumatra, and several
smaller :undertakings. Work
on one of the two atomic re-
actors the USSR is to set up
in Indonesia recently began in
Jogjakarta, and a gift hospi-
tal is to b * started in early
1962.
Following up preliminary
negotiations initiated by In-
donesia last year, several of
the European satellites have of-
fered new aid credits. Bulgaria,
Poland, and Hungary have ex-
tended a total of about $65,000,-
000 in long-term credits this
year, and Czechoslovakia has
pledged an unspecified amount
of aid. These credits will be
used for such industrial proj-
ects as mining enterprises, ore-
processing facilities, and chemi-
cal plants, and for deliveries
of merchant ships, transport
equipment, and other industrial
goods. East Germany, which has
expressed its willingness to
supply a variety of industrial
plants, may also extend more aid.
An Indonesian missionhheaded
by the minister of basic industry
visited Rumania recently to seek
implementation of an accord reached
last June envisaging further
Rumanian aid, particularly in the
petroleum industry, A credit
agreement probably was signed
during the visit, and Rumania
may provide. technical assistance
in petroleum exploration And in
building new oil installations.
In its first entry into the
Indonesian petroleum field, the
USSR has agreed to train 100
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Indonesian oil workers at its
Baku oil fields. Other bloc
gestures have been made sug-
gesting a readiness to extend
massive technical assistance
for the Indonesian petroleum
industry.
Having patched up its re-
lations with Indonesia, Commu-
nist China early this year de-
cided to reopen a $30,000,000
long-term credit offer which
had been suspended since 1959.
An agreement signed in April
committed Peiping to build
a number of textile installa-
tions. Work is due to begin
this year, and some 120 Indo-
nesians are to be sent to
China for training.
foreign trade, but its share
will increase considerably over
the next decade as a result of
heavy repayment obligations on
both economic and military credits.
A concerted effort is under way
to boost trade with Indonesia
in rubber, copra, hemp, spices,
and other tropical products not
generally available in the bloc.
A greater bloc interest
in Indonesia's mineral and metal
resources is indicated by the
terms of a recent Czech agree-
ment for aid in mining and
processing ores. Repayment is
to be in the form of future
production from the projects,
and Prague will have first
choice in purchasing the
processed ores and metals for
10 to 15 years after the re-
The bloc now accounts for
about 10 percent of Indonesia's
payment period.
(Prepared by ORR)
MOSCOW SHAKES UP CIVIL POLICE COMMAND
Moscow's dissatisfaction
with the performance of the
regular civil police (the mili-
tia) during the current crack-
down on economic crimes has led
to the dismissal of internal
affairs ministers in eight of
the Soviet Union's 15 republics.
In several instances those
ousted have been replaced by
officers of the secret police
(KGB). Although regular law
enforcement is the responsibility
of the internal affairs ministry
(MVD) in each of the republics,
the KGB has been given respon-
sibility for enforcing those new
laws which provide the death
sentence for embezzlement and
speculation.
After Beria's purge in 1953,
the MVD was stripped of its best--
qualified personnel and steadily
25X1
declined in power. These moves
had an adverse effect on police
morale. Furthermore, the aboli-
tion of the central Ministry of
Internal Affairs in January 1960
left normal police work with less
central direction and authority.
This state of affairs, com-
bined with other "liberaliza-
tions" effected by Khrushchev
since 1953, appears to have
brought about a radical change
in the attitude of the public
toward the MVD_militia. Hated
and feared in the Stalin era,
it now is regarded with in-
difference or open contempt.
Complaints of inefficiency on
the part of the militia have
been more frequent, press
themes. since the onset of
the anticrime drive early this
year.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Such a casual attitude to-
ward the nation's chief organ
of normal law enforcement is by
no means limited to the ordi-
nary citizenry. In the Kirgiz
Republic last year, party :leaders
gave the Internal Affairs Minis-I-
try to Mukhamet Isayea, who had
just been fired as an oblast
first secretary for ,"improper
leadership." Khrushchev bit-
terly criticized this situation
at the central committee plenum
last January; Isayev was im-
mediately removed from his post
and thrown out of the party.
On 1 September it was belatedly
revealed that he had been sen-
tenced to a year in prison for
fraud,
Those MVD chiefs who have
been dismissed in seven other
republics, although not charged
with malfeasance, clearly failed
to ensure the kind of -law en-
forcement the Kremlin expects.
In the Russian Federation (RSFSR),
for example, Internal Affairs
Minister Nikolay .Stakhanov was
fired after the apprehension
of two gangs of currency specu-
lators in Moscow, two "attacks"
on police precinct stations in
Vladimir Oblast, and press as-
sertions that the militia was
unwilling or unable to eliminate
"lawlessness" in Kuybyshev. On
18 September both the MVD chief
and the chairman of the Supreme
Court in Turkmenistan were dis-
missed for failing to "deal
harshly enough" with major:,
economic crime in that republic.
Stakhanov was succeeded
by Vadim Tikunov, who had been
deputy chairman of the Soviet
KGB. The new head of the Georg-
ian MVD is also a secret police
officer, and in both Kirgizia
and Kazakhstan, native ministers
of internal affairs have been
replaced by Russians apparently
brought in from the KGB apy.
paratus.
These moves will further
strengthen, the hand of the KGB
in the wgr'.against economic crime.
Moscow may not only be trying
to bring about a major improve-
ment in the performance of the
militia but also implying to
those who contemplate the com-
mission of less serious economic
crimes that they., too thay ultimate-
ly run afoul of.-the :jecret police.
There are signs that the
anticrime drive will become even
more intense. On 14 September a
plenum of the USSR Supreme Court
called on all courts throughout
the country to "strengthen the
application of the decree of 5
May"--the death sentence--and
the recent party congress in
Azerbaydzhan warned that republic's
MVD chief, the state prosecutor,
and the Supreme Court that they
could expect "urgent corrective
measures" if they failed to im-
prove their unsatisfactory work.
Still other MVD officials are
likely to be removed and new
legislative measures taken as
Khrushchev seeks by all available
means to reduce the embarrass-
1ng.l3r,,, high and economically
harmful rate of crime in the
Soviet Union.
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RURAL REORGANIZATION IN COMMUNIST CHINA
By easing bureaucratic
controls over farming as part
of the current reorganization
of rural life, Peiping hopes
to regain some of the ground
lost in the ill-advised and
poorly managed "leap forward"
of 1958-60. Greater freedom
is being granted the peasants
for side occupations and culti-
vation of private plots as well
as in the development of free
markets to handle the resulting
products. To boost incentives,
a return to a wage system re-
flecting the amount of work
performed rather than the time
spent on the job is being
stressed. Production units
are to set work norms realists=
cal1y, evaluate wage points
according to the importance of
the job, and award bonuses and
penalties based on performance.
In continuation of the re-
treat from the centralized
authority and bureaucratic ex-
cesses of the communes, Peiping
is endorsing the "right of
self-determination of the pro-
duction team." An editorial in
People's Daily on 8 September
argues that the teams best under-
stand "the lessons of production
failures during past years" and
are most familiar with the farm-
ing conditions of their areas.
The article states that each
team has the right to make
its own decision on such matters
as location and choice of plant-
ing; employment of manpower;
schedule of sowing; amount of
seeds to be sown; and amount
of fertilizer to be applied.
Peiping apparently has
come to realize that central
direction in routine farming
operations contributed to the
poor harvest of the past two
years. Contradictions between
party policy and local conditions
were in fact acknowledged by
a recent article in Shanghai's
Liberation Daily, which noted
that o-FT n 77'0' 'dies and tasks
formulated by the higher author-
ities are not suitable to local
conditions." As a result, it
was admitted, there has been con-
fusion among the party workers
over their respective responsi-
bilities "to the party and to the
people."
The regime continues in
official announcements to retain
the three-level concept of
rural organization--the commune,
the production brigade, and the
production team. In general,
however, the commune now is an
empty concept, the brigade is
the basic financial and accounting
unit, and the team--comprising
30 to 40 households--is the
operational unit in cultivation
work. The team is apparently
being subdivided into smaller
units, called "work squads,"
which will do the actual farming.
The team sets quantitative
and qualitative norms for the
various tasks, and the individual
peasants receive work points
according to fulfillment of these
norms. Teams are admonished
to refrain from "indiscreetly
reshuffling" manpower in the
squads or changing work and
land assignments.
The retreat on the farm
front does not mean that Peiping
has abandoned hopes for the
commune, but the timetable has
been drastically altered. The
party journal Red Flag stated
recently that T`a re a ively long
period" will be needed to con-
solidate and stabilize the three-
level system before there can be
a "gradual" movement toward
ownership by the communes "in
the future." Meanwhile, the
brigade will be primarily re-
sponsible for ownership and dis-
tribution in rural areas, with
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
the production team sharing in
ownership of some land, animals,
and farming implements.
Although individuals are
to be permitted land for their
private use and will be allowed
to follow sideline occupations,
Peiping insists that this must
not encroach on the collective
economy. The products of this
private activity may be ex-
changed at rural markets within
limits set by the government.
The loosening of controls,
decentralization of authority,
and improved incentives
are inadequate in themselves
to pull the economy out of the
agricultural slump, but
they are realistic antidotes to
the mismanagement and ineffi-
ciency spawned by the regime's
earlier programs. Over the long
I run, however, agriculture needs
better weather, an increase in
the application of fertilizers,
better management, and greater
i rewards for the labor force.
While the concessions now
being granted should help rectify
administrative difficulties,
it is most unlikely there will
be any prompt revival of en-
thusiasm. Malnutrition has
taken its toll during the past
year and a half, and consider-
able time may be required to
rebuild the health and restore
the morale of ':the peasantry,
especially in view of the
fact that the food supply
is expected to be no
better next winter than
last, and may even be
worse. (Pre- 25X1
pared by ORR)
SHARPENING CHURCH-STATE CONFLICT IN POLAND
Under a regulation issued
by the Ministry of Education
on 19 August, the Polish Govern-
ment now claims the right to
supervise religious instruction,
which is to be conducted at
specified locations designated
as "catechism points." Classes
in religion are to be limited
to two hours weekly. Only
licensed priests or lay instruc-
tors may conduct the courses,
and they will be paid by county
governments. Members of reli-
gious orders are to be barred
from teaching, as are priests
whom the regime considers
"immoral" or who allegedly have
used religion classes for "polit-
ical purposes." Failure to
comply with these.rules or to
register a "catechism point"
with the authorities will re-
sult in "legal punishment."
This regulation comes a
few months after the regime,
without any significant op-
position from the church, banned
the teaching of religion in
schools and permitted it
only in church buildings and
private homes. The regulation
opens a new area of conflict
between church and state, which
for some time have been dead-
locked on questions of birth
control and taxation.
Cardinal Wyszynski, the
Polish primate, declared on 26
August that the church would
not accept the controls over
religious instruction, which
he said violated the 1957 church-
state modus vivendi and in-
truded on the authority of
the bishops. His statement
was followed by a meeting of Polish
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bishops at Jasna Gora Monastery
near Czestochowa in late Au-
gust to draft a pastoral letter,
which was read on 2 September.
The pastoral letter re-
affirmed the Episcopate's in-
.tention to continue offering
religious instruction without
submitting to administrative
regulations or inspection by
the Ministry of Education. It
made clear that the church
intended to choose its own
teachers, including members of
religious orders. The assembled
bishops issued a private in-
struction to all priests, monks,
and nuns ordering them not to
seek'a license to teach re-
ligion or to accept payments
from the state. A few priests
apparently had signed contracts
embodying the new restrictions,
but some of them reportedly re-
tracted their signatures after
receiving the bishops' in-
structions.
Meanwhile, church authori-
ties sent letters of protest
to the premier, the marshal of
the Sejm (parliament), and
the director of the Office for
Religious Affairs.
The strength of the church's
reaction apparently has had a
somewhat moderating effect on
regime officials,
Although the Mixed Church-
State Commission-was scheduled
to meet officially for the first
time in 16 months during Septem-
ber, no session has been held.
There had been hope in church.
circles that the regime's will-
ingness to participate in such
a meeting indicated a desire to
ease the tensions of the past
two years between church and
state.,
Other pressures continue,
particularly against the Catholic
University at Lublin, which is
threatened with extinction by
taxation or with becoming es-
sentially, a school for clerics
--without the participation of
its present large numbers of
secular students.
Although the regime will
not renounce its purpose of con-
trolling religious instruction,
it is aware of the possibilities
of disturbances and demonstr
tions if it presses too fast.
Since the Episcopate has taken
such an openly adamant position
on the question of control of
religious education, it is
possible that a temporary com-
promise may be reached in th
next few weeks. Such a compromise
would be embodigd in one of the
amorphous church-state understand-
ings which have no legal force and
do not bind either side to re-
nounce its ultimate goals,
Since March, Cardinal
Wyszynski has on several oc-
casions demonstrated the extent
of the support he commands among
the Polish people. His health,
however, reportedly is poor; now
60, he appears to have been incapacitated
for short periods at least three
times since last December. Wyszyn-
ski's death or permanent inability
to function as primate could
seriously impair the strength and
effectiveness of the Episcopate.
Moreover, the problem of choosing
his successor could aggravate
existing divisive tendencies within
the Polish church hierarchy which
he now keeps under control,
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Belgrade is seeking to
counteract the negative reaction
in the West to Tito's thorough
support for Soviet foreign
policies in his speech to the
conference of nonaligned nations
of 3 September. Yugoslav offi-
cials have implied to Western
diplomats that the speech did
not signal a change of policies
and that Belgrade still main-
tains impartial positions.
A well-informed Yugoslav
Foreign Ministry official implied
to Ambassador Kennan on 19
September that Tito was draft-
ing a letter--soon to be made
public--to Khrushchev urging
a cessation of nuclear tests.
The Foreign Ministry offi-
cial added that the conference
was a setback for the Soviets,
since it had clearly established
that the nonaligned states
were free of Moscow's control.
He also claimed that Tito's
interview with Italian newsmen
on 10 September was, in effect,
a challenge to Soviet control
of foreign Communist parties,
since Tito had enjoined these
parties to espouse the policies
laid down at the Belgrade
conference.
On 18 September, a Yugoslav
trade union offical told a
US Embassy officer that Yugoti'
slavia had turned down an in-
vitation to attend the recent
meeting of the World Federation
of Trade Unions in East Germany
because attendance would have
been inconsistent with Belgrade's
nonaligned status.
Yugoslav propaganda organs
,are contributing to the effort
by resuming attacks on bloc
states. On 10 September, the
authoritative Belgrade daily
Borba carried an article from
its Moscow correspondent which
depreciated the Soviet economic
planning apparatus. On 15
September, Belgrade complained
bitterly about Soviet publica-
tion of a book attacking "Yugo-
slav revisionism" and asked:
"What is the meaning of this
systematic activity against
Yugoslavia, which only a few
days ago was. described by the
first secretary of the CPSU as
a socialist country?"
In a similar vein, East
Germany has been criticized
for not giving publicity to a
visiting Yugoslav ballet troupe,
Czechoslovakia for not giving
enough coverage to the non-
aligned conference, and
Bulgaria for coveting Yugoslav
Macedonia.
Yugoslavia is engaging in
particularly heated propaganda
exchanges with the Chinese
Communists and Albanians; in
sharp contrast to the other
bloc states, China and Albania
are charging Tito with working
for the West at the Belgrade
conference. On 19 September,
Belgrade concluded a trial of
persons accused of plotting to
annex to Albania the Albanian
minority region of Yu oslavia.
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DOMINICAN REPUBLIC
Political developments in
the Dominican Republic are al-
most at a standstill pending a
decision by opposition political
groups on President Balaguer's
offer of 19 September to accept
them`in.a coalition government.
Similarly pending is the report
of the special OAS subcommittee
now in the country to ascertain
whether present conditions
warrant any relaxation of OAS
sanctions against the regime.
The opposition groups want
the sanctions continued, or even
intensified, to make, the regime
restore civil liberties; they
would regard any easing of the
sanctions under present circum-
stances as equivalent to US
abandonment, of the Dominican
people to a tryannical regime.
The government maintains that
failure to lift the sanctions
promptly would demonstrate the
futility of Balaguer's liberali-
.zation program and lead old-
line military officers to seize
the government. Government
leaders also emphasize the
dangers of a deteriorating
economic situation with an un-
employment rate variously
estimated at vetween 30 and
50 percent of the labor force.
Opposition leaders have
agreed with President Balaguer
to "consider" his offer to accept
them in a coalition government
and are negotiating among them-
selves on the concessions they
would demand. Among the chief
obstacles is Ramfis Trujillo's
continued control of the basic
elements of power in the re
gime.
Ramfis appears to be groom-
iing a: successor--presumably
Maj. Gen. Fernando Sanchez.
The 33-year-old Sanchez, pres-
ently chief of staff of the air
force, has been a close companion
of Ramfis since childhood. Some
officers resent his rapid promo-
tions; he also suffers from
army and navy resentment of
the air force, toward which
Ramfis has shown special favor-
itism.
Opposition leaders would
probably view Sanchez' assump
tion of Ramfis' job as a shift
signifying no real change; they
have named several high-ranking
officers who. would be acceptable
to them in the post, but most
of these are probably in the
category of older officers,
many of whom have been retired
since May.
Lt. Col. Simmons, US
military liaison officer
in the Dominican Republic,
reports that General San-
chez is actually Ramfis'
de facto chief of staff
and, although he is nomi-
nally beacr of the air force,
his authority extends over
the other services. Simmons
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25X6
25X6
considers Sanchez "quite capable
of engineering an authoritarian
coup," and notes the apparent
absence of any moderate, progres-
sive leadership among the of-
ficers on active duty in the
armed forces.
The military power center
is at San Isidro Air Base, the
air force headquarters about
eight miles outside the capital
where the air force ground unit
--the country's only significant
mobile tactical force--is based.
The army, on the other hand,
is actually an oversize gen-
darmerie, fragmented into
company-size garrisons through-
out the country. The navy is
not a cohesive force and would
probably count for little in
any power struggle.
An additional obstacle to
Balaguer's plan for a coalition
The Lopez Mateos government
is taking strong action against
all suspected antigovernment
activity as a result of a series,
is his intention of accepting 25X1
the opposition groups on an
equal footing with the discredited
official political machine, the
Dominican Party.
Gangs armed with sticks
and lead pipes are making a
growing number of attacks on.
oppositionists. In the past
these gangs have been associated
with Arismendi T5~ujlllo, Ramfis'
ruthless and politically ambi-
tious uncle. Although they were
disarmed early last summer at
Ramfis' insistence, there have
been recent rumors of their
renewed activity.
25X1
IBalaguer
is seri-
25X1
ously considering a
New York to address
trip to
the UN
General Assembly in
an effort
to publicize the progress in
his democratization program.
25X1
of apparently coordinated revolu-
tionary outbreaks in central and
southeastern Mexico in mid-
September. There is some basis
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in fact for the administration's
explanation that economic con-
ditions in rural areas are so
bad that ignorant and desperate
peasants are susceptible to
antigovernment agitation.;.
This official line, however,
was belatedly offered after
strenuous efforts to minimize
the extent of the outbreaks.
Violent uprisings have been
relatively rare in recent
decades in Mexico; those this
month involved at least 60
deaths.
When 75-year-old retired
General Celestino Gasca was
arrested before the uprisings
occurred, the administration
described him as a nearly
harmless chronic revolutionary
and intimated that his plot was
smashed. After the outbreaks,
he was induced to confess re-
sponsibility for at least one
of them and charged with several
other serious crimes. Gasca
has had both leftist and right-
ist ties. He was arrested with
arch-conservative Jorge Siegris,
head of Mexico's discredited
Sinarquista movement, so. the
government will probably link
Gasca with the rightists, in-
cluding the moderately con-
servative party of National
Action, chief among Mexico's
unimportant opposition parties.
The government remains uncer-
tain, however, as to which
elements actually organized
the outbreaks.
The most obvious political
activity in Mexico recently has
been by rightists, backed by the
Catholic Church, against Castroite,
Communist, and other leftist
forces. Although the rabid anti-
clericalism of the Mexican Revo-
lution has noticeably abated in
the past 20 years, the US army
attache reports that resumption
of political activity by the
church has already resulted in
a marked anticlerical reaction.
This has helped leftist elements
in their efforts to gain polit-
iea5.! support. The attachefbe-
lieves that some clerics have
contributed to the church's vul-
nerability by extending their
efforts beyond a purely anti-
leftist campaign with the evi-
dent motive of regaining politi-
cal power for the church.
The government apparently
fears that any crackdown on
rightists may help the leftists,
led by former President Lazaro
Cardenas, to exploit the strong
appeal of anticlerical and
revolutionary traditions in
Mexico. Perhaps as a precau-
tionary measure against such
tactita, it reportedly has
already arrested several Commu--
nist,party members in connection
with the uprisings
25X1
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Brazilian President Joao
Goulart appears to have strength-
ened his political position
steadily during the past three
weeks, despite the constitution-
al` amendment of 2 September
transferring executive power
to a prime minister. Prime
Minister Tancredo Neves seems
to be working with Goulart
rather than competing for power.
Goulart and his political allies
have dropped their campaign for
an early plebiscite to rescind
the constitutional amendment,
In the distribution of
cabinet posts on 8 September,
the President apparently failed
to secure the lucrative Public
6Norks Ministry portfolio for
a member of his Labor party,
but men from his home state of
Rio Grande do Sul have been
appointed to several key eco-
nomic posts, including the
presidencies of the Bank of
Brazil and of the Economic De-
velopment Bank. The head of
the President's civil"household"
--a post normally reserved for
the chief political "fixer"--
is Professor Hermes Lima, who
criticizes the US economic
system but insists that Brazil
must align itself with the
United'States politically. Pro-
US Antonio Balbino, former gov-
ernor of Bahia, is also acting
as political assistant to Gou-
lart. The strongly anti-Com-
munist General Amaury Kruel has
been appointed head of the mili-
tary"household."
The Brazilian Communist
party (PCB) and Peasant Leagues
leader Francisco Juliao are re-
ported hopeful of actions and
appointments by the new adminis-
tration which will allow them to
increase their influence. Goulart
has appointed Raul Riff, a Commu-
nist party member, as his private
secretary. The new attorney gen-
eral, Evandro Lins, who accompanied
Goulart on his recent trip to Pei-
ping has a long record of support-
ing Communist causes, has attended
Communist international meetings,
and has acted as legal counsel
for Communists, although he appar-
ently has not been active in such
matters in the past five years,
The new chief of police in Brasil-
ia, army Colonel Carlos Cairoli,
is also reported to have Commu- 25X1
nist associations.
Goulart's initial public
statements have been devoid of
radicalism. In a message to
Congress concerning the econom-
ically depressed northeast,
for instance, he recommended
that the development program
for the area include the cre-
ation of small, individually
owned farms and be free from
all political and partisan
influence. Goulart's address
on 23 September to a large
reception,which included a
sizable Communist=led student
and labor group, was generally
cautious, although he did
emphasize his association with
Getulio Varga--Brazil's one-
time dictator and self-styled
"father of the poor."
25X1
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THE WEST INDIES FEDERATION
Jamaica's decision in the did, in which event Britain
19 September referendum to with-
draw from the West Indies Fed-
eration has occasioned a series
of London visits by West Indian
leaders--starting with Federal
Prime Minister Adams on 25 Sep-
tember--to confer with Colonial
Secretary Macleod on future
prospects for the area. The
vote, which is expected to
mean an early move toward sep-
arate Jamaican independence, is
a severe blow to the prestige
of Jamaican Premier Manley, who
had campaigned hard for federa-
tion. It leaves Trinidad's Pre-
mier Eric Williams, who has
often shown bitter hostility
toward the United States, the
dominant figure in the: area.
British officials consider
the Jamaican voters' decision
final and see Trinidad's atti-
tude now as crucial. Williams
has said that his country would
leave the Federation if Jamaica
would be left with three sep-
arate groups: Jamaica, Trinidad,
and the smaller islands.
London thinks it at least
possible, however, that Trinidad
might consider joining the small-
er islands in an eastern Carib-
bean federation if that federa-
tion's financial and economic
position were underwritten by
Britain. The American consul
in Trinidad reports that Gover-
nor Hochoy also believes some-
thing along this line might
develop, but only if the leaders
of the small islands take the
approach with Williams that he
is in effect "a new Moses lead-
ing the people out of the wilder-
ness."
US officials in Trinidad,
however, believe it unlikely
that Williams would join with the
smaller islands in any such group-
ing, since Trinidad's own inter-
ests would prevent its assuming
West Indies Federation
PUERTO
RICO VIRGIN Anguilla
fr. ISLANDS Barbuda OCEAN
St. Christopher- .'. Antigua
and Nevis- ? Guadeloupe
Montserrat- C~'
`Dominica
C Martinique
Of Lucia
St. Vincent, Barbados
Grenada,'
BRITISH
GUIANA
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the economic burdens of the
other units. Williams' silence
so far on the referendum re-
sult and his refusal to meet
with Adams prior to the latter's
departure for London has
strengthened the impression
that he intends to seek Trin-
idad's independence as soon as
possible. As the key figure
in the situation now, however,
he can afford to bide his time
and may continue to avoid tak-
ing a public position until
after his country's elections
scheduled for later this fall.
The collapse of the Fed-
eration also comes at a time
when Williams has been complain-
ing that Trinidad is being
slighted in the implementation
of the US-Federation Defense
Areas Agreement of February
1961. Although Trinidad remains
legally bound by the agreement,
Williams now may seize on Ja-
maica's departure from the Fed-
eration as a pretext to seek
renegotiation in the hope of
securing more favorable arrange-
ments for Trinidad.
25X1
25X1
Developments in the Congo,
particularly the UN's action
against Katanga and the report-
ed exodus of white settlers
from the area, will stimulate
strong right-wing criticism of
Belgium's coalition government
when parliament reconvenes
early next month. Powerful
economic groups with business
interests in the Congo have
criticized Foreign Minister
Spaak for cooperating with the
UN in reducing Belgian person-
nel there. Spaak told Ambas-
sador MacArthur on 23 September
that he was resisting strong
pressure from the press and
conservative anti-UN elements
in Belgium to blame the UN pub-
licly for the Katanga situation,
but that he could not exaggerate
the seriousness with which the
Belgian Government viewed the
recent events.
Fiscal reform and eco-
nomic expansion are a basic
problem, despite the current
business boom. The government--
a coalition of the Social
Christian party, led by Prime
Minister Lefevre, and Spaak's
Socialist party--is attempting
to terminate, or at least reduce,
deficit spending by reforming
the tax system and curtailing
abuses in social welfare. Fis-
cal reform is a prerequisite
for any program of economic ex-
pansion to stimulate the eco-
nomic growth of the country and
to offset the decline of the
coal industry in southern Bel-
gium, but for divergent reasons
the left wing of the Socialist
party and especially the right
wing of the Social Christian
party have reservations over
the government's objectives.
The finance minister has re-
cently expressed guarded opti-
mism over the possibility of
obtaining parliamentary approval
of his proposed reforms, which
he hopes will put Belgian pub-
lic finance in a healthy condi-
tion in two or three years.
The rivalry of the French-
speaking Walloons in southern
Belgium and the Dutch-speaking
Flemings in the north has be-
come more acute with the in-
creased activity of the Mouve-
ment Populaire Wallon (MPW) a
federalist movement under the
leadership of Andre Renard, a
radical Socialist and former
official of the Socialists'
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
central trade union organiza-
tion, the FGTB. Renard, whose
aim is believed to be the for-
mation of a Socialist Walloon
republic within a federal state,
is seeking to capitalize on the
fears of the Walloon population
that the Flemish majority will dis-
criminate against the area po-
litically and economically. The
Belgian Communist party has al-
ready succeeded in infiltrating
the MPW.
The government hopes to
fix the linguistic frontier be-
tween the two language groups
and is also considering creat-
ing a special commission to
study the question of more cul-
tural autonomy. It is also
planning new economic develop-
ment measures to stimulate the
economy of southern Belgium.
The moderates, however, are sub-
ject to pressure from their ex-
tremist groups. The growing
strength of the MPW, which is
BELGIAN PARLIAMENT
MARCH 1961 ELECTION
largely Socialist, has exerted
a divisive influence on the So-
cialist party and on the FGTB.
Despite the many problems
facing it, the coalition, formed
in April after the parliamen-
tary elections, is expected to
survive, chiefly because there
is no practical alternative.
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SPECIAL ARTICLES
SINO-SOVIET BLOC AID TO AFRICA*
The Sino-Soviet bloc aid
program in Africa began in late
1958 and early 1959 with the
provision by Czechoslovakia and
Poland of small medium-term
credits to Ethiopia and Guinea
for hospital and railroad equip-
ment. In mid-1959, the Soviet
Union extended relatively large
lines of credit to both those
African countries for general
economic development. In the
two years since then, the pro-
gram--in which all the major
bloc countries now are partic-
ipating--has grown both in size
and scope and includes military
as well as economic assistance.
More than half the aid ex-
tended by the bloc to underde-
veloped countries in 1961 was
for African countries. Africa
now accounts for 12 percent of
total bloc economic assistance
extended since 1954.
Economic and Military Aid
Over $500,000,000 in eco-
nomic credits and grants have
been extended to seven African
countries by the Sino-Soviet
bloc for a wide variety of
projects including agriculture
and irrigation, health and wel-
fare, mineral exploitation,
transportation, and industry.
Less than 5 percent of this aid,
however, has been delivered,
and only in Guinea has the pro-
gram made significant headway.
As in other underdeveloped
areas, the bulk of the aid pro-
vided to Africa is from the
USSR, with Czechoslovakia a dis-
tant second. Communist China has
the Egyptian region of the
UAR is not included for purposes
of this article.
extended only two credits in
Africa--one to Guinea and one
to Ghana--but these are of suf-
ficient value to rank China
next to Czechoslovakia in'.im-
portance. Peiping has also
agreed in principle to give aid
to Mali.
In addition to economic
aid, bloc creditors have given
varying amounts of military as-
sistance directly to Mali,
Guinea, Morocco, and Sudan and
indirectly to the Algerian reb-
els. This aid has consisted
largely of land armaments.
Morocco is the only country to
have received military aircraft
--twelve MIG-17 fighters and
two MIG-15 trainers from the
USSR. A recent order by Nkru-
mah to send 400 cadets to the
USSR for military training sug-
gests that an arms aid agree-
ment with Moscow may be under
negotiation.
Bloc aid to the Algerian
rebels has consisted of limited
amounts of military equipment
from the USSR and Czechoslo-
vakia shipped through Morocco,
Tunisia, and Egypt, as well as
some financial aid. Communist
China in 1959 also granted
such aid--some $12,000,000 in
the form of funds and equipment.
Although the bloc supplied
some military aid to the Lumumba
SINO-SOVIET BLOC ECONOMIC AID TO AFRICA
(value in million dollars)
Ethiopia
101.8
11.8
113.6
Ghana
53.4
37.1
19.6
110.1
Guinea
58.1
23.3
26.5
107,9
Mali
48.5
12.5
61.0
SonoS Republic
52.1
5.6
57.7-
Tunisia
27.5
8.0
35.5
Sudan
22.0
22,0
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regime in the Congo in mid-1960,
its efforts to supply the Gizen-
ga forces were unsuccessful.
Small"Amounts of financial as-
sistance, however, reached Stan-
leyville from Communist China,
and possibly from the USSR and
the European satellites as well.
Technical aid--always an
important part of the bloc eco-
nomic and military assistance
programs--has included the pro-
vision of technicians to build,
operate, and maintain facilities
as well as to train local per-
sonnel; the bloc has also pro-
vided scholarships for Africans
to be trained in the bloc. It
is estimated that during the
first six months of 1961 there
were 1,640 bloc economic tech-
nicians in Africa--most of them
Soviet nationals in Guinea--and
60 bloc military technicians
PRINCIPAL AFRICAN EXPORTS TO BLOC, 1960
Commodity
Exporter
Amount
(1,000 metric
tons)
Cocoa Beans
Ghana
37.5
Nigeria
9.4
Sudan
15.9
Nigeria
1.8
Wool
South Africa
20.6
Calcium Phosphates
Morocco
48.0
PRINCIPAL AFRICAN COUNTRIES TRADING WITH
SINO-SOVIET BLOC
Value
(million
dollars)
22.5
5.5
20.0
1.2
14.6
9.5
Value of Bloc Trade
Bloc Trade as % (million dollars)
Total Trade Exports Imports
Ghana
5
22.5
Guinea
33
12.6
Morocco
.5
16.0
Nigeria
3
9.6
Sudan
11
23.6
Tunisia
3
3.9
South Africa
1
18.9
Approved For Release
15.0
22.0
22.7
16.7
16.7
6.7
14.5
in Morocco, Guinea, Sudan, and
Mali. Within the bloc an esti-
mated 80 African nationals are
in military training programs,
1,115 are in academic institu-
tions, and 155 are receiving on-
the-job training. Under re-
cently concluded agreements,
the number receiving bloc train-
ing is scheduled to increase
substantially in the next few
years.
Trade
The growth of bloc-African
economic ties in the past two
years has been accompanied by
an increase in trade. Guinea's
trade with the bloc now accounts
for one third of its total trade.
The bloc in 1960 imported from
Africa over $115,000,000 worth
of commodities--mostly cocoa
beans, palm kernels, rubber,
cotton, fertilizer, wool, pea-
nuts, coffee, bananas, and iron
ore--and delivered about $125,-
000,000 worth of textiles, ce-
ment, foodstuffs, petroleum,
consumer durables, and other
goods. Three commodities--
cocoa beans, cotton, and wool--
made up more than half of all
exports to the bloc in 1960
from independent African coun-
tries. Most of the cocoa beans
were shipped to the USSR, with
the cotton and wool going to
both the USSR and China.
Despite the USSR's curtail-
ment of cocoa purchases, its
trade with Africa probably will
reach a new high this year. Pre-
liminary reports indicate that
exports of Sudanese cotton to
the bloc will be considerably
higher this year than last. In
the first half of 1961, the
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
USSR supplied virtually all of
Guinea's petroleum imports and
unknown quantities to Mali.
Peanut exports under Malian
contracts with the USSR and
Czechoslovakia have also in-
creased.
Under recently negotiated
commercial arrangements, this
upward trend can be expected to
continue. Ghana and the USSR
are expected to sign a new trade
agreement under which the USSR
will promise to take up to
60,000 tons of cocoa by 1965,
almost double that purchased
in 1960, and .China and Ghana
have already signed a five-
year trade agreement providing
for annual exchanges more than
five times the level achieved
in 1960.
Guinea,. one of the first
African recipients of bloc eco-
nomic assistance, is the only
one in which there has been
significant progress in imple-
menting the aid projects. Bloc
economic activities there over
the past year have increased
substantially, and it is ex-
pected that over the next,
much of the $108,000,000 in
bloc aid extended will be used
rapidly. More than half of it
is. from the USSR, and most of
the remainder from Communist
China and Czechoslovakia.
Among the more important
Soviet projects in Guinea are
construction and modernization
of railroad, highway, port, and
airport facilities, and con-
struction of a large technolog-
ical institute and of petroleum
storage facilities. Other
projects range from construc-
tion of hotels to establishment
African Countries
Receiving Sino-Soviet
Bloc Aid
0 Economic aid
go--Military aid
Financial aid
of a large rice plantation..
Most of theseprojects will prob-
ably be completed in the next
two years. Moscow has also
agreed to participate in Guin-
ea's priority Konkour6 River
development plan, but appar-
ently is not yet committed to
build the large dam which the
Guineans desire.
The Soviet Union and sev-
eral of the European satellites
are also helping the Guinean
Government to establish national
service facilities. An airline,
Air Guinea, was formed with
Czech aid and now is operating
with Soviet and Czech-built
aircraft. East Germany is set-
ting up a national printing of-
fice and, along with Czecho-
slovakia and the USSR, is con-
structing three powerful radio
transmitting stations for the
first iGuinean~ - :,natidnb t :+.
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broadcasting facility. Poland
and Hungary are also providing
small amounts of aid o Guinea--
Poland for a state fishing in-
dustry and Hungary for a hydro-
logical survey. The Chinese
Communist aid pr.~ o,gram in Guinea,
in addition to a ni mber of agri-
cultural and light industrial
projects, calls for tt: (_, con-
struction of several san(a,1 ? dams
for electric power and the erec-
tion of the nationa.i assembly
building.
As bloc aid p: c,.: ots in
Guinea have progressed to the
implementation stage, tr:e num-
ber of bloc technicians has in-
creased from about 400 at the
end of 1960 to over 1,200 by
June 1961--an estimated 430
were from the USSR, 620 from
the European satellites, and
the remainder from China. Over
3.35 were working in government
ministries, and almost 200
were teachers. About 570 Gui-
neans are receiving military,
technical, or academic training
within the bicc.
Ghana
The bloc aid program in
Ghana has grown rapidly since
it was initiated in August 1960.
The USSR has announced that it
is prepared to supplement the
development credit it extended
to Ghana last year, and a
Soviet Ghanaian military agree-
ment appears to be in the off-
ing.
To date, five bloc coun-
tries have extended a total of
$110,000,000 in aid to Ghana.
However, most of the projects
enumerated under the various
Approved For Release 2
aid agreements are still in the
preliminary planning stage, and
virtually none of the develop-
ment credits has yet been util-
ized. For the most part, proj-
ects will not begin until 1962.
The only aid actually drawn by
Ghana was some $10,000,000 of
a $13,700,000 credit from the
USSR for purchases of IL-18
transport planes for the na-
tional airline.
Projects earmarked for
Soviet aid include the con-
struction of a 200,000-kilowatt
hydroelectric project at Bui on
the Black Volta River, estab-
lishment of state farms, con-
struction of fish-processing
plants, and development of a
housing project in Accra and
Tema. Under a separate agree-
ment the USSR has also promised
a small nuclear reactor. On
4 September 1961 it was an-
nounced that Ghana and the USSR
had signed a contract under the
credit agreement providing for
Soviet delivery of $2,800,000
worth of tractors and farm im-
plements and for a team of
Soviet specialists to investi-
gate the feasibility of con-
structing a tractor plant and
metallurgical enterprises.
A total of $37,000,000 in
credits has been provided to
Ghana by Poland, Czechoslovakia,
East Germany, and Hungary for
construction--in which the four
satellites plan to participate--
of numerous small light indus-
trial plants. China in August
of this year extended a credit
of $19,600,000 to Ghana for un-
specified equipment and techni-
cal assistance.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Of a total of 205 bloc
technicians estimated to be in
Ghana in June 1961, almost all
were sent from the USSR for op-
eration and maintenance of air-
craft. This number has been
increased somewhat in recent
months by an influx of techni-
cians for survey work. The
number of Ghanaians training
in the bloc--some 435 as of
June--may increase substantially
in the near future. Several re-
cent developments--such as the
announcement that about 150
Ghanaians will soon go to Mos-
cow for training as pilots and
engineers for civil aircraft
and the decision to send a large
number of cadets for military
training--indicate that progress
is being made toward Nkrumah's
announced goal of sending 3,000
to the bloc for training.
Ethiopia
Ethiopia was the first
African country to receive bloc
aid. During the period Novem-
ber 1958 to July 1959, the USSR
and Czechoslovakia extended a
total of almost $114,000,000 in
aid--more than any other Afri-
can country has received to date.
Since that time, however, the
program has been practically at
$10,000,000 from Czechoslovakia
has not even been obligated for
specific projects. The few
projects mentioned for Soviet
aid--anoil refinery at Assab,
a geological survey, a metal-
lurgical survey, and a gold ore
processing plant at Adola--have
not progressed beyond the prelim-
inary planning state.
About 120 bloc economic
technicians are in Ethiopia,
and about 20 Ethiopian students
are studying in the bloc.
Mali, which received bloc
aid only this year, is becom-
ing an increasingly important
target in the bloc economic of-
fensive in Africa. In the last
seven months it signed aid agree-
ments with Czechoslovakia and
the USSR covering some $57,000,-
000 in credits for a wide variety
of projects including bloc par-
ticipation. Czechoslovakia has
promised to help construct plants
for production of flour, tex-
tiles, bicycles, and agricultural
machinery, as well as to provide
hospital equipment. The Soviet
Union's $44,400,000 share of the
credit covers mineral prospect-
ing, navigational development of
a standstill. Only about the Niger River, railroad improve-
$4,000,000 of the aid extended ments, and construction of a
has been drawn--half in the form training center, a cement plant,
of convertible currency from the and a stadium. Both Czechoslo-
USSR, and half for Czech hospital vakia and the USSR have extended
equipment and supplies and for credit for the purchase of civil
construction-of a technical school
at Baherdar-Giyorgis being given
as grant aid by the USSR. A Malian mission now is in
i Peiping, and announcement of an
Most of the remaining aid agreement with Communist
$100,000,000 from the USSR and China is expected.
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Other Aid Recipients
Tunisia in November 1960
received an $8, 000, 000 credit
:from Poland, of which $1,600,000
has been obligated for a metal
products factory, and in August
1961 a $27,500,000 credit from
the USSR for the construction
of three dams and a technolog-
teal school. Czech and Bulgarian
technicians have been active in.
Tunisia this year in connection
with equipment maintenance and
city planning.
The general framework was
:laid for greater economic ties
(between the bloc and t-~e Somali i
Republic this year with the pro- I
vision by Czechoslovakia and
the USSR of credit facilities
amounting to about $56,000,000
for as yet unspecified develop-
ment projects and commodities. j
In addition the USSR has prom-
ised to build hospitals, a
.printing plant, a school, and 1
,a radio station on a grant
basis, and Czechoslovakia will 1
,contribute a technical school.
cently arrived in Mogadiscio un-
der these agreements. About 50
Somali students are in bloc
academic institutions,
Sudan was given a $22,000,-
000 credit by the USSR last July
for construction of canning fac-
tories, granaries, several tech-
nical educational centers, and
an agricultural research center.
Sudan also has sent a large
number of academic students to
the bloc.
Several developments indi-
cate that, in addition to bloc
military aid, Morocco may soon
also receive economic aid. An
economic and technical coopera-
tion agreement concluded in
May suggests possible Czech
aid for a sugar refinery, tex-
tile plants, and a mineral
processing plant. Soviet tech-
nicians are studying the port
areas of Alhucemos and Tangier
in connection with a proposed
shipyard,
Although Nigeria has not
yet received any aid from the
bloc, during the Nigerian fi
nance minister's recent tour:
of the bloc several countries
expressed willingness to make
aid available.
Outlook
The bloc's intention to
continue to expand its partic-
ipation in African develop-
ment plans is indicated by
the recent overtures to ini-
tiate programs in the Congo
(Brazzaville) Republic, Niger,
Nigeria, and Morocco. As ex-
isting aid agreements are im-
plemented, moreover, bloc ac-
tivities in Africa will be
greatly intensified. In the
next year a large influx of
bloc technicians and increased
deliveries of machinery and
equipment, particularly to
Ghana and Mali, can be expected.
Military assistance will prob-
ably also increase, not only
to those countries which have
already received it but to
other countries which indicate
receptivity.
Bloc-African: ?ttade un-~?
doubtedly will grow. Bloc ex-
ports to African countries will
become more diversified and
include more machinery and
equipment. Also more of Afri-
ca's agricultural commodities
will probably be sold in the
bloc markets, particularly if
world market conditions de-
teriorate.
(Prepared by ORR)
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25X1
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CONFIDENTIAL
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKL,'Y 8TJ'M~iARY
BUDAN'E6E ~RES'IDENT ;ABBOUD
General Ibrahim Abboud, who
begins a state visit to the US
on 4 October, has been 1?Gresident
of the Sudan since 1? November,
1958, when he and a group of
other senior army officers
seized control of the govern-
ment in a bloodless coup. Ab-
boud took full control, retain-
ing his command of the army
and assuming three additional
positions; president of the
newly created Supreme Council
of the Armed Forces, prime
minister, and minister of de-
fense.
Abboud appears to be a
sincere patriot, disgusted by
the corruption among the civil-
ian politicians, convinced that
nonparty government is best for
the country, and aware that the
anmy is one of the few instru-
ments capable of bringing about
a change. On assuming power,
he was quick to emphasize that
the military government was
transitional and that its goal
was to restore political and
economic stability.
At the time of the coup,
the Sudan was facing an eeono ~-
ic: crisis. Unrealistic polar ?~
Gies had priced Sudanese cotton
out of the world market, and
the country had a large stock-
pile of unsold cotton and a
shortage of foreign exchange.
The new government brought its
cotton prices down and sold
off the surplus. It also
stepped up a number of impor-
tant agricultural development
projects stalled by the general
economic paralysis and took a
few steps in the field of in-
dustrial development, but has
yet to initiate an over-a11
plan.
Abboud has been critical
of the level of American aid to
tl~e Sudan, and undoubtedly wi?11
seek during his visit to have
it raised. In discussing the
trip with the American ambassador,
a number of Sudanese off icials
have emphasized heir need to
demonstrate to the Sudanese
people that the visit has pro-
duced tangible benefits. The
military regime has never gained
broad public support, and~Abboud
will probably try to obtain-same
sort of dramatic "impact" pro~-
~ctL.which he can use to in-
crease his prestige.
Background and Personality
Abboud was born in 1900 in
the Red Sea village of whammed
Qol. He completed his secondary
education in 1914 and entered the
engineering school of the Gordan
Memorial College. In 1917 he
entered the military school in
Khartoum and a year later was
graduated and commissioned
second lieutenant in the engineer
cops. Abboud first served
with the Egyptian Army but trans-
ferred to the Sudan Defense
Force (SDF) when it was organ-
ized in 1925. During World War
II he served in the Eritrean and
North African campaigns. After
the war he rose steadily in
rank and in 1948 was placed in
charge of the Sudanese Camel
Gorps. In 1954 he was promoted
to major general and made deputy
commander of the SDF; in 1'.956? -,25X1
he became commander-in-.chief .
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKY,Y SUMMARY
Foreign Policy
Abboud is oriented toward the
~Yest .beCause~?of .,t~xe turn's ecoh.omic
anc~ ~~o~.;~t;i;:;~.I:, t.~.es with I3ri;t;p.a.n
hid Isis own close association
wx~h they Briti:~h ;~nl,litaxy': He
has sough, ~lio~ve~+er, to avoid
former Prime Minister Khal~.~l's
policy of close alignment and
ha,s proclaimed an official
,policy of "neu.tralis~n" for the
Sudano In practice, his has
been a policy of "timid neu-
tx~?alism" apt best, designed
primarily to keep the Sudan in
good standing with the Afro-
Asia.n nations, while avoiding
a.~ny kind of internation~]. in-
vol~vement
Abboud has particularly
tried to improve the Sudan's
relations with Egypto In 1959
the two countries reached an
amicable settlemznt on the
question of the distribution
of the Nile waters. Nasir, in
turn, has indicated both pub-
licly and privately that he
regards the Abboud regime as
the best that can be hoped for
in the Sudan, and his inter-
ference in Sudanese politics
has decreased markedly since
Abboud came to power. In 1960
the two leaders exchanged state
visits, and relations between
them are cordial.
The military government
has given an increasing amount
of vocal support to nationalist
and independence movements
throughout the world, but has
avoided aligning itself with
the more radical neutralist
states. In the case of the
Congo, Abboud, while condemning
"imperialist maneuvering;" has
stanchly supported the UN effort
and refused to a11ow Antoine
Gizenga's foreign backers to
ship supplies across the Sudan
tp Stanleyville.
Abboud has generally taken
a dim view of the various "neu-
tralist" conferences; he declined
invitations to both the Monrovia
and Casablanca conferences and
accepted a bid to the xecent
Belgrade meeting only when it
appeared that his absence
would be conspicuous. After
Abboud returned to Khartoum,
Ambassador Moose expressed to
h'im dismay at the mild reaction
among the Belgrade delegates
to the USSR's resumption of
nuclear testing. Abboud 's
rely was, "How could we have
reacted strongly to the Soviet
action? Our speeches had al-
ready been ~,vritten." Abboud
is primarily a military man
and seems to have a limited
understanding of international
affairs. One observer commented
that the Sudanese leader tends
to be swayed by the "last man
through the door."
Abboud has made an effort
to even the balance in the
Sudan's East-West relations and
to stem domestic criticism of
pro-Western moves by estab-
lishing closer official rela-
tions with the Sino-Soviet bloc.
In duly he made a ten-day state
visit to the USSR during which
he concluded a $2,000,000 eco-
nomic agreement providing far
the first Soviet aid to the:,Sudan.
Although he was critical of
certain aspects of the trip,
it appears that he was genuinely
impressed by his red-carpet
treatment, and since his return
the Sudanese press has been
filled with articles praising
the USSR.
,;
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Opposition to Abboud's gov-
?rnment in recent months has
centered among the old civilian
politicians seeking to oust the
military regime and regain
power. Led by Siddiq al-Mahdi,
Imam of the influential 1, 500, -
000-member Ansar religious sect,
the politicians have presented
a series of notes demanding
that the military rulers take
immediate steps to restore
civilian government. The Su-
preme Council at first ignored
the notes, but when the opposi-
tion's tactics became increas-
ingly bolder and were threaten-
ing to leeld to civil disturb-
ances, the government arrested
l~ of the opposition leaders.
Although the Mahdi was not
among those arrested, he was
warned to discontinue all
,political activity.
In a showdown with the gov-
e rnment, the Mahdi could prob-
ably cause considerable trouble
by calling out his Ansar follow-
ers, many of wl~r~m are armed,
albeit px~imiti;v~]1_y .. He has,
however, been reluctant to giv?
a signal which could lead to
c.ivi:l sti*i,fe,; and despite urging
by a number of his followers
that he take mare vigorous
action in support of his demands,
the Mahdi has been attempting
to settle his dispute with the
government through negotiations.
He is reportedly planning to
meet with representatives from
the government in the near
future. Abboud may try to plae~,
Cate him by agreeing to broaden
civilian participation in the
military government.
As long as Abboud continues
to command the support of at
least a majority of the army,
it is unlikely that the politi-
cians will be able to overthrow
him. Moreover, parliamentary
rule, which had only a brief
history in the Sudan, could count
on little more public support
than Abboud and would probably
break down quickly as the poli-
ticians renewed the bitter feud-
ing which marked the pre-Abboud
period. Opposition to Abboud
can be expected to increase, how-
ever, if he fails to~ make at least
a gesture toware re-establishing
25X1
constitutional-government,
r v w
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