CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A003300020001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 42
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 29, 2006
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 18, 1999
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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CONFIDENTIAL
CURRENT
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY
SUMMARY
COPY NO. 76
OCI NO. 0290/61
27 July 1961
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
DOCUMENT NO.
NO CH LGE IN CLASS. ^
^ BECLASSiFIED
CLASS. C l',NGED TO: TS Soo
I T FkV W BATE:
AUTi: HR 70-2 25X1
DATE: I TA
"7NT1AL25X1
State Dept. review completed
-1
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THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECT-
ING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES
WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS,
TITLE 18, USC, SECTIONS 793 AND 794, THE TRANSMIS-
SION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO
AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.
The Current Intelligence Weekly Summary has been prepared
primarily for the internal use of the Central Intelligence
Agency. It does not represent a complete coverage of all
current situations. Comments and conclusions represent the
immediate appraisal of the Office of Current Intelligence.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
27 July 1961
T H E W E E K I N B R I E F
EAST-WEST RELATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Top Soviet leaders have shown an increased interest
in sounding out Western views on Berlin and have taken
the initiative in arranging for contacts with high-level
Western officials. Ambassador Thompson feels that the
Kremlin hopes to avoid a further rapid build-up of ten-
sions. The ambassador also feels that before the Soviet
party congress Khrushchev will take the initiative on
securing agreement on a date for negotiations even if
the talks commence after the party meeting. Initial So-
viet reaction to the President's speech of 25 July
concentrated on charges that the US was using the "so-
called threat to Berlin" as a pretext for continuing
NORTH AFRICA
Page 1
... Page 3
The Bizerte crisis may result in a change in Tunisia's
foreign policy orientation. Tunisia is reintegrating it-
self into the Arab world, and Asian-African as well as
Sino-Soviet bloc support is likely to encourage anti-
West tendencies which Bourguiba has heretofore held
in check. The Bizerte aftermath threatens De Gaulle's
Algerian policy and France's relations with its former
territories in tropical Africa, and may give a new
impetus to anti-Gaullist plotters. However, French-
Algerian negotiations resumed on 20 July,
CUBA . . . . . .
. Page 7
The new "united party of Cuba's socialist revolution,"
announced by Fidel,Castro on 26 July as including all po-
litical, military, and other organizations, will probably
be controlled by the Popular Socialist (Communist) party,
which is expected to maintain its hard core as a separate
entity. Speeches by regime leaders during the 25-26
July celebrations followed familiar lines and held no
surprises. Six MIGs were put on public display for the
first time on 25 July. No serious Castro-inspired
incidents occurred in other Latin American countries on
the Cuban anniversary.
CONGO . .
. . . . . . 0 . . . . . . . . 0 . a . . . . . . Page 9
Gizenga's supporters at the parliamentary session in
Leopoldville have shown considerable strength, although
they are not assured of being able to form a government.
Katanga's efforts to achieve a rapprochement with Gizenga
and the Soviet bloc are unlikely to elicit a favorable
response at this time. However, the American Consulate in
Elisabethville believes that Katangan Interior Minister
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CONFIDENTIAL
27 July 1961
Munongo, who-has assumed most of Tshomb 's powers, is con-
cerned over the rebuffs Katanga has experienced from the
West and is not bluffing in his overtures to the Gizengists
LAOS . ? s . . . . . . . . . a . . . a . 6 . . . . . , . . Page 10
Formation of a coalition government still appears re-
mote. Projected talks in Phnom Penh between Boun Oum
and Souvanna Phouma probably will provide little impetus
in view of Souphannouvong's boycott. At Geneva, the
Communist bloc has taken the position that no agreement
can be reached on questions involving internal aspects
of Laotian security until a coalition Laotian delegation
is formed. The military situation in Laos remains gen-
erally quiet, but both sides continue to prepare for
the possibility of resumed hostilities.
EAST GERMAN REGIME SEEKS TO DETER REFUGEE FLIGHTS . . , , Page 13
The flow of refugees to West Berlin during July has
reached the highest rate in recent years. A growing
number of East Germans are escaping now in fear that
their access to the West through Berlin will become
more difficult in the near future. Between 1 and 26
July,. 22,758 persons were registered at the West Ber-
lin refugee center. To counter this rise, the regime
has resorted to additional police measures.
FURTHER SOVIET ARMS AID FOR INDONESIA . . . . . . . . . . Page 15
As a result of negotiations held in Moscow in early
June, Soviet military assistance commitments to Indonesia
have been increased by more than $75,000,000, raising
the total since mid-1960 to over $600,000,000. The
increase is accounted for in part by the USSR's agree-
ment to provide surface-to-air missiles to the Indone-
sian Air Force and by a large rise in expenditures for
training. Equipment contracted for earlier this year
has begun arriving in Indonesia; two TU-16 jet medium
bombers were ferried from the USSR in late June. A ship-
ment of MIG-19 jet fighters along with other arms and
equipment may be delivered by the end of this summer.
BLOC ACTIVITIES IN WEST AFRICAN CIVIL AIR SERVICES . . . . Page 15
Aid for the establishment and operation of national
commercial air services is becoming an increasingly im-
portant part of the bloc's activities in West Africa.
Soviet- and Czech-made aircraft will soon be the major
carriers on air lines in Guinea, Ghana, and Mali.
SOUTH KOREA'S ECONOMY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 17
South Korea's military government is striving to over-
come the dislocation of business and agriculture which
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
27 July 1961
followed the 16 May coup. The political stability of
the regime will continue, however, to be affected by
the country's basic economic weakness. The regime,
which until recently concentrated on the elimination of
corruption and profiteering, is proposing a five-year
development plan and a program of spending which appear
beyond available resources.
NATIONALIZATION IN THE UAR
. Page 17
Five decrees issued by President Nasir on 23 July
have all but eliminated private enterprise as an important
economic force in Egypt and Syria. Almost 400 enter-
prises--including all of the UAR's larger firms--were
either nationalized outright or brought under effective
government control.
PORTUGAL'S AFRICAN DIFFICULTIES .
. . . . . . . . . . . Page 19
Portugal's continuing difficulties in Angola are em-
phasized by its mid-July decision to raise troop strength
there to double the number considered necessary in May.
In Portuguese Guinea, armed clashes have recently occurred
between Lisbon's troops and nationalist insurgent elements
based in Senegal, which on 25 July severed diplomatic re-
lations with Portugal.
EUROPEAN HEADS OF GOVERNMENT MEETING . . . . . . . . . . . Page 21
The heads of government of the six Common Market
(EEC) countries who met in Bonn on 18 July sufficiently
submerged basic differences over European political
unity to announce a program to strengthen EEC politi-
cal ties. The program is essentially a victory for
De Gaulle's "confederal" approach--even though he has
made some tactical concessions and the Benelux coun-
tries in particular remain suspicious that he is under-
cutting existing EEC institutions and weakening Con-
tinental ties with NATO. Drafting of the proposed Euro-
pean "statute," or constitution, a lengthy process at
best, will be further complicated by Britain's expected
application for EEC membership.
BRITISH LABOR PARTY TRENDS . . . . . . . . . . . . ... . . Page 22
A substantial shift since last year in trade union
voting on unilateral British nuclear disarmament assures
endorsement of Gaitskell's pro-NATO policy at the Labor
party conference this fall. This growing sentiment for
Labor party unity comes at a time when Britain's wor-
sening economic situation has brought the first sub-
stantial decline in the Macmillan government's popular
standing since the 1959 general elections
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27 July 1961
NEW AGRARIAN GOVERNMENT IN FINLAND . .
. . . 0 . . . Page 23
Premier Miettunen's minority Agrarian government,
formed after a reconvened parliament proved unable to
agree on a coalition, contains six new members but will
probably pursue the same policies as its predecessor,
seeking to reassure the USSR of Finland's strict
neutrality. The new cabinet is generally expected to
serve until the mid-1962 parliamentary elections.
SPECIAL ARTICLES
LONG-TERM ECONOMIC PLANNING IN THE USSR . . . . . . . . . Page 1
The USSR's long-awaited 20-Year Plan for economic
development apparently is to be published on 30 July
as part of the new draft program of the Communist party
of the Soviet Union. The plan will be hailed as the
blueprint for catching up with the US economically and
for carrying the USSR across the threshold of communism.
It will try to provide for more systematic programing
for long-range development and to correct economic in---
efficiencies attributed to the lack of continuity in
previous planning practices.
25X1
TRENDS OF OPINION IN THE SOVIET YOUNGER GENERATION . . . . Page 4
Soviet youth as depicted in current Russian litera-
ture in the main accepts the political and social system
in which it finds itself but is unresponsive to the creed
upon which the system is based. The philosophically
minded seek a more satisfactory reason for existence
than is offered in the slogans of the Communist party.
Others are increasingly frank in demanding material
benefits now, in place of the vague rewards of the
Communist future. In an effort to deal with apathy to-
ward Soviet slogans the regime has tried to increase
discipline among the youth by raising requirements for
labor training in the educational system' and Komsomol
activity has been stepped up. But neither of these
actions seems to have strengthened youth's allegiance
to official party goals.
INDIA'S FOOD SITUATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 9
New Delhi's success in expanding annual production
of food grains by more than 35 percent during the two five-
year plans undertaken since 1951 will almost certainly
strengthen the ruling Congress party's position in the
nationwide elections scheduled for next winter. A build-
up of reserve stocks under PL-480 imports from the
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
27 July 1961
United States and New Delhi's vigorous efforts to main-
tain the upward trend in food production appear to have
established some basis for stability in the food pic-
ture. However, the vagaries of weather in any given
year will remain an uncertain factor,
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I _
CONFIDENTIAL
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
WEEKLY REVIEW
EAST-WEST RELATIONS
Moscow appears to be mark-
ing time on the Berlin question,
probably pending a full assess-
ment of the Western position as
set forth in the President's
speech of 25 July. The absence
of high-level comment on the
President's previous statement
on Berlin at his press confer-
ence of 19 July, together with
the routine denunciations of
the Western notes of 17 July,
suggests that the Soviet leaders
are carefully weighing their
next move and their reply to
the Western notes.
The TASS report of the
President's address adopted the
line that the President had
added "his share to the cam-
paign of whipping up war hyste-
ria." The speech was character-
ized as "bellicose" and further
proof that the US was using the
"so-called threat to Berlin as
a pretext to further the arms
race." TASS emphasized that
the President "admitted" that
the US bad actually started the
build-up of armaments "immediate-
ly after inauguration." The
TASS account reported all six
defense measures outlined by
the President, and devoted con-
siderable attention to the Pres-
ident's statements on negotia-
tions.
Top Soviet leaders have
indicated an increased interest
in sounding out Western repre-
sentatives. President Brezhnev
solicited the Norwegian ambas-
sador's opinion on the general
international situation and NATO
policies in a recent interview.
Presidium member Kozlov did
likewise in a conversation with
Ambassador Thompson. When the
Berlin question was mentioned,
however, the Soviet leaders did
not pursue the matter. Appar-
ently at Soviet urging, Italian
Premier. Fanfani is to arrive in
Moscow on 2 August. The Soviets
27 July 61
also took the initiative in in-
viting Ambassador McCloy to visit
Khrushchev on the Black Sea.
The bloc position, as con-
tained in a series of speeches
and statements last week, con-
tinues to feature the themes of
readiness to negotiate but pre-
paredness to deal with any West-
ern military moves. Khrushchev,
for the first time in recent
weeks, passed up the Berlin is-
sue in a speech honoring the
visit of the Sudanese premier.
However, in his greetings to the
World Youth Forum, which opened
in Moscow on 25 July, Khrushchev
accused the West of creating a
"hotbed of war" by refusing to
conclude a peace treaty and re-
solve the Berlin problem.
Speaking at a Polish recep-
tion on Poland's national day,
Kozlov warned that the bloc had
enough modern weapons "to re-
buff a new march to the East."
He emphasized that the USSR would
like a joint solution of the Ger-
man question with the Western
powers, but cited Khrushchev to
the effect that Moscow would not
engage in endless talks. The
Khrushchev-Brezhnev congratula-
tory telegram stated that the
Polish and Soviet people were
fighting for the elimination of
the remnants of the last war by
"immediately signing a peace
treaty with Germany." Polish
party leader Gomulka echoed this
line in a speech on 21 July and
stated that the bloc would con-
clude a separate peace treaty
"toward the end of the year" if
the West rejected "our out-
stretched hand." East German
politburo member Norden asserted
that a peace treaty would be
signed this year. Bulgarian
Premier Yugov referred to the
"earliest" conclusion of a peace
treaty. The hardening of the
Soviet propaganda line was also
evident in an unusual attack on
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
De Gaulle by a Pravda "observer"
the by-line used to signify the
endorsement of the top leader-
ship. De Gaulle was accused
of following in Adenauer's wake
and playing the role of Musso-
lini to Adenauer's Hitler.
Despite the strident tone
of Soviet and bloc statements
and the continuing emphasis on
the "war psychosis" in the US,
the Soviet leaders probably hope
to avoid a series of moves and
countermoves which would force
a further build-up of tensions.
This is reflected in the con-
tinued complaints by high Soviet
officials that the West is de-
liberately creating a crisis
atmosphere, and distorting the
Soviet position. Ambassador
Thompson believes that before
the party congress in October
Khrushchev will move to bring
about an agreement on negotia-
tions, even if the date might
be fixed for after the congress.
He also believes that the acute
political embarrassment of the
refugee flow and the Soviet re-
luctance-to sanction drastic
measures against it will pro-
vide further incentives for
Khrushchev to initiate a move
for negotiations.
Information on Khrushchev's
talks with Yugoslav Foreign Min-
ister,P?povic earlier this month
suggests that expectations of
Western disunity over Berlin
and pressures within the West
for negotiations are among the
principal considerations shaping
Khrushch.ev's current stand.
Khrushchev appeared confident
of his Ability to settle the
Berlin question on his terms,
because of a conviction that
"sensible Western statesmen"
would not permit the issue to
develop into a conflict. Khru-
shche,v also seemed convinced
that current US policy was being
set by Adenauer and did not
represent:"real" US interests
and that US interests in Berlin
are mainly a matter of prestige.
He also assured Popovic that
31 December was not a deadline,
and the USSR would be willing
to continue negotiations, pro-
vided the talks were not dragged
out "indefinitely."
The stress on negotiations
continues to appear in Soviet
propaganda and in unofficial
statements. Pravda urged on 21
July that the issues be resolved
at the negotiating table.
~ A So-
viet Foreign Ministry official,
in a conversation with a US
Embassy officer, also implied
that there was room for a com-
promise settlement. He stated
that the question of the bound-
aries of Germany was more im-
portant than the question of
Berlin, although a decision was
needed on the latter. He re-
ferred to the northern, south-
ern, and eastern boundaries,
presumably meaning Western ac-
ceptance of the Oder-Neisse
line and the Czech frontiers.
In anticipation of the
neutralist conference in Bel-
grade in September, the Soviet
charge in Djakarta on 24 July
presented the Soviet position
on Berlin to the Indonesian
Foreign Ministry. This move
is consistent with Moscow's
attempt to influence Yugoslav
opinion during the visit of
Yugoslav Foreign Minister Popovic
earlier this month . 25X1
27 July 61 CONFIDENTIAL
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
NORTH AFRICA
Bizerte
President Bourguiba ap-
parently will seek another meet-
ing of the UN Security Council
to charge that France has failed
to comply with the council's
22 July resolution urging an
immediate cease-fire at Bizerte
and the withdrawal of forces to
positions held before hostil-
ities began on 19 July. Before
the tenuous truce was effected
on Sunday, French forces had
secured all access routes to
their base complex. A formal
cease-fire has yet to be ar-
ranged because the French base
commander and the Tunisian pro-
vincial governor, who have been
charged with securing an agree-
ment, have not agreed on a site
for the meeting. France is re-
ported to have suggested a
"neutral spot" outside Bizerte
for the meeting.
Bourguiba may have in-
tended to forestall a similar
move by the USSR when he stated
on 25 July that he wanted an-
other meeting of the Security
Council. An American UN offi-
cial had a hint on 24 July from
Georgy Arkadyev, highest rank-
ing Soviet national in the
Secretariat, that the USSR
might call for another council
meeting. This official estimates
that if the French do not comply
promptly with the council reso-
lution, there will be a further
meeting on 28 July "and a special
General Assembly session next
week."
Hammarskjold, who arrived
in Tunis on 24 July at Bour-
guiba's invitation, is reported
hopeful that he can persuade
both the Tunisians and the
French to conform to the reso-
lution, in which case "it would
not be too difficult for the
parties to reach a negotiating
posture." Negotiations, however,
would be complicated both by
fears of reprisals by the siz-
able French colony in Bizerte
and by Tunisian action in de-
taining and expelling French
citizens and seizing French
properties throughout Tunisia.
Bourguiba on 25 July re-
newed his demands that France
evacuate the base and reit-
erated his appeal for foreign
volunteers, citing a need for
guerrilla fighters, technicians,
and arms to augment his crippled
army. The return of the 3,100
Tunisian troops from the Congo
will boost morale, but Bour-
guiba feels a need for something
more than pledges of solidarity
and is seeking at least a token
international force.
There is still no evidence
that Tunisia is soliciting Sino-
Soviet bloc assistance, despite
the fact that Tunisian officials
--including Ambassador Habib 25X1
Bourguiba, Jr., in Washington?
have hinted that Tunisia mi ht
turn to the Soviet Union.
The Bizerte crisis and
Bourguiba's feeling that the
West betrayed him at this junc-
ture are expected to be reflect-
ed in a modification of his
policy of pro-Western nonalign-
ment, 'and anti-Western tenden-
cies which Bourguiba has here-
tofore held in check are likely
to emerge. Although he has
sought to remain aloof from
Middle Eastern entanglements
and has quarreled bitterly with
Nasir, he is now committed to
resume full membership in the
Arab League and to re-establish
diplomatic relations with the
UAR. Renewal of these ties,
however, is not likely to elim-
inate wholly the suspicion with
which Arab leaders generally re-
gard'Bourguiba and his aspirations
&A-r-11 &AWINOr
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Estimated Ground Force Strength
in Bizerte 1400-1600
Total Regular Tunisian Ground
Forces 21,500
Air and Navy 2,500
(insignificant capability)
T U N I S I A
? Infantry
Paratroops
Armored Reconnaissance
? Anti-aircraft (automatic weapons)
Transportation
Ef] Company
rl~ Battalion
rL~ Regiment
2 Marine Infantry
3 Marine Infantry
2 Foreign Legion
3 Foreign Legion
9 Chasseurs
356 Mobile Gendarmes
IDENTIAL
8 Hussard
2,500 estimated)
(Ground Forces Reinforcements
20 July to date- 2,900 estimated)
French Naval Forces
1 Aircraft carrier ("Arromanches")
I Light anti-aircraft cruiser ("Colbert")
1 Cruiser ("De Grasse")
2 Destroyers
5 Patrol craft
21 Mine sweepers
2 Auxiliary vessels
Total shore personnel 1,200
French Air Forces
2 Squadrons Jet Fighters (24 Mystere IV-A)
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
to become a leading Arab and
African statesman.
Algerian Support
Leaders of the provisional
Algerian government (PAG) have
made strong public statements
condemning the "French aggres-
sion" against Tunisia, pledged
Algerian solidarity with their
Tunisian brothers, and imple-
mented their 21 July offer of
men and equipment to assist
Bour uiba.
These PAG moves are, how-
ever, designed more to display
solidarity and to establsh a
future bargaining position
against Bourguiba's Saharan
claims than to indicate a real
intent to become embroiled in
Bourguiba's struggle with the
PAG leaders m pr o-r
knowledge of Bourguiba's inten-
tions in forcing the Bizerte
issue and privately are opposed
to his actions and apparently
not too displeased with the
"thrashing" given him by the
French.
Repercussions in France
Foreign Minister Couve de
Murville on 24 July called the
situation at Bizerte "very
serious." He noted some French
officials feel that the "con-
trived" origin of the affair
was not adequately reflected
in the UN debate and that the
image of a small country as
the victim of aggression was
allowed to blur Tunisian re-
sponsibility. Moreover, the
airlift repatriation of Tu-
nisian troops from the Congo
in UN-chartered American planes
appears to Paris as an example
of France's friends' helping
another country in an operation
against France.
In addition to the dangers
of renewed hostilities and to
the rising international crit-
icism of France's position,
the Bizerte affair threatens
to undermine De Gaulle's Al-
gerian policy and France's
close relations with its for-
mer colonies in tropical Africa.
The US Embassy in Paris be-
lieves that domestic opinion
is bound to question the futil-
ity of negotiating- with the
Algerians and to wonder about
the value of a regime whose
policy leads it into this sort
of contradiction. Bourguiba's
action has in effect forced
De Gaulle to depart, at least
temporarily, from his decoloni-
zation policy, which has been
seriously criticized by army
and civilian rightist opposi-
tion elements.
Meanwhile, there are fur-
ther indications of the extent
of military and rightist op-
position to De Gaulle. In-
terior Minister Roger Frey
told Ambassador Gavin on 19
July that he regarded the army
as "the most serious problem"
confronting France. This state-
ment was made prior to the
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Bizerte episode, which the em-
bassy believes has probably in-
creased the number of officers
willing to listen to rightist
plotters who argue that Bour-
guiba, a supposedly "good" Arab,
has demonstrated the essential
untrustworthiness of Arabs in
general and the danger of rely-
ing on any agreements with them,
particularly with the PAG.
The French-Algerian Talks
The talks between the French
and Algerians which resumed at
Lugrin on 20 July, though ob-
scured by the clash over Bizerte,
have continued despite initial
fears that the Bizerte issue
might provoke one side or the
other to call another recess.
Both sides, after some initial
sparring, have apparently agreed
on an agenda and a method of
work. This agreement almost
certainly is due to France's
willingness to discuss the
Sahara issue--it was discussed
on 25 July and is scheduled to
be continued on 27 July--which
heretofore it has refused to
do, maintaining that the Sahara
was a question apart from any
Algerian settlement.
It is still not clear just
how far the French are willing
to go to meet the PAG demand
for recognition of the terri-
torial integrity of Algeria:
including the Sahara, but the
PAG has consistently held that
once this was recognized, it
saw no major obstacles to a
fairly rapid settlement.
According to the PAG,
France has indicated a willing-
ness to discuss the economic
and joint exploitation of the
Sahara to which the PAG had
agreed, although it indicated
it wanted to discuss the
Saharan issue within the con-
text of the question of Al-
gerian sovereignty and terri-
torial integrity. The PAG
has reportedly regarded the
French threat to exclude the
Sahara from an Algerian settle-
ment as a greater threat than
partition and has indicated
that it realized it must bargain
to obtain sovereignty.
The PAG maintains that
"something can be worked out" on
the question of guarantees for
European settlers, but it in turn
must have firm guarantees in the
transition period and during a
referendum, including curbs on
the French Army and the "ultras,"
which it fears may again try to
thwart De Gaulle. It adds that
a de facto halt in PAG military
and terroristic operations may
be possible "if an agreement is
in sight."
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Algerian rebel leaders say
the threat to partition northern
Algeria is a bluff which the
French know could never be car-
ried out. This ostensible dis-
missal of partition is probably
more bluster than real convic-
tion, suggesting that while the
PAG will continue to stand firm
on Algerian control of the Sahara,)
the threat of partition is prob-
ably exerting pressure on it to
modify its position on other. issues,
The PAG DOW reportedly in-
tends to hold a meeting of the
62-member National Council of
the Algerian Revolution (CNRA)
in Tripoli in the first or second
week of August regardless of the
state of the talks, The CNRA
meeting would require the attend-
ance of most of the PAG awe oti-
~atino team.
CUBA
Fidel Castro's speech, in
which he announced the amalga-
mation of Cuban political, mil-
itary, labor, and other reg ime-
c;ontroll.ed organs into a single
"'united party of Cuba's social-
1st revolution," featured the
-two-day celebrations of his 26
July anniversary, He declared
that the unity drive had
started some months ago and
still has not been finally con-
:?uded, The speeches of Castro
and other regime leaders fol-
lowed familiar lines and con--
7-a fined no surprises. The crowds
assembled to hear the speeches
on 26 July, estimated by the
press to number 200,000, were
smaller than those on some simi-
lar occasions in the
past.
The new "unified" political
organization has long been ad-
vocated by Cuba's Popular So-
cialist (Communist) party (PSP),
which has been the only effec-
tive Politic,-i party in exist-
ence during Castro' s two and one-
ha If years in fl'oWer The PSP
wi.II probably control the new
mass organizatic,rn, and will
probably a:is" maintain its rel-
atively small hard core as a
separate entity.
The celebrations, which
:lea Lured on 25 July the first
public display of six of Cuba's
newly acquired MIG jet aircraft,
were publicly termed Cuba's
"first socialist 2Gth of July"
and were dominated by expres-
sions of support from the Sino-
Soviet bloc..? Guest of honor
Yuri Gagar;tn publicly pledged
the "armed help of the Soviet
people" in Cuba's "fight to-r.,
freedom and independence."
There was no development
on 26 July to justify the fears
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
that bad been expressed in world and taught it the path
several other Latin American of its redemption."
countries that pro-Castro
agitators would use the Cuban
anniversary to cause disturb- Although many foreign gov-
ances elsewhere in the hemisphere. ernments sent specially accred-
There were, in fact, well pub- ited delegations to Havana for
licized anti-Castro demonstra- the 26 July events, there is
tions among Mexican students evidence that some Western na-
and in Panama. tions refused to send represen-
tativeas
In addition to the pres-
ence in Cuba of Yuri Gagarin
and special delegations from
several bloc countries, the
bloc's observation of the an-
niversary was made evident
through messages of congratu-
lation' to Castro from Khru-
shchev, Chou En-lai, and other
Sino-Soviet leaders. The mes-
sages contained the customary
assurances of "'friendship" with
Cuba and included stereotyped
pledges of "assistance" to the
Cubans in the event of "im-
perialist aggression."
Cuban propaganda media
reacted enthusiastically to
the visit of Gagarin and other
indications of Soviet "soli"
darity" with Cuba, One Havana
broadcast stated. "We cannot
forget that our victory of to-
day and all victories of the
Cuban revolution are the fruit
and the genuine product of the
great international revolution
which started in October, which
caused Russia to become the
cradle of socialism, and which
elevated the proletariat of the
Hundreds of Castro sym-
pathizers and representatives
of pro-Communist labor and po-
litical organizations from
other Latin American countries
were brought to Havana at Cuban
expense to take art in the
celebration 25X1
at least some of the
ne ega es will remain in Cuba
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Recent information from
Leopoldville confirms that Gi-
zenga's forces are making a
strong showing at the current
session of parliament, although
they are not assured of being
able to form a government. The
past week has been highlighted
by efforts by the Katanga lead-
ership to break out of their
political isolation by means of
a rapprochement with Gizenga
and the Soviet bloc.
The American charge in Leo-
poldville reports that the situ-
ation in parliament is extreme-
ly fluid. A Gizengist has been
elected president of the lower
house., but a moderate has been
chosen as head of'the Senate.
Although the Stanleyville group
has demonstrated considerable
strength, there are indications
of rivalry between Gizenga and
the head of his parliamentary
delegation, Christophe Gbenye.
The senior UN representa-
tive, Sture Linner, has stated
that he is concerned about the
security situation in Leopold-
ville, in that General Mobutu
on 25 July had demanded virtual
operational control of Leopold-
ville airport. Linner fears
that if things do not develop
as Mobutu desires, he will en-
deavor to block the return of
Gizenga's deputies to Stanley-
ville.
The American Consulate in
Elisabethville has characterized
Katanga strong man Munongo as
"hot bluffing" in his threat to
deal with the Gizengists and the
Soviets, even though any such
rapprochement would be against
his personal convictions. The
reaction in Elisabethville to
Munongo's demarche reportedly
was one of regret that Western
and UN pressures had pushed the
Katangans to such extremes. 'There
is, however, no information to
confirm Munongo's claim of 24
July that Gizenga has replied
favorably to a Katangan bid for
a rapprochement, or that the
USSR had offered "peaceful aid"
to Katanga. Belgian Foreign
Minister Spaak has quoted the
Soviet ambassador to Brussels
as assuring him that the USSR
would never support Tshombe or
Munongo, and that it was con-
tinuing its unequivocal support
of Gizenga.
Tshombe's exact status in
Elisabethville remains unclear.
Although the British consul has
stated that he saw him on 22
July, at which time his health
seemed improved, Tshombe has
not made a public appearance
since 11 July. The British con-
sul quoted Tshombe and Munongo
as reaffirming Katanga's willing-
ness to attend parliament after
a preliminary "summit" confer-
ence. While Tshombe's and
Munongo's remarks suggest that
they are in basic accord on
policy matters, the Belgian con-
sul general believes Tshombe
has been stripped of consider-
able powers. There continue to
be reports of unrest in the
Katangan army.
Reports concerning Gizen-
ga's possible attendance at
parliament are contradictory.
An American Embassy officer who
visited Stanleyville reports
that Gizenga's illness appears
real, but that the Yugoslav,
UAR, and Soviet charges have
all urged him to lead his par-
liamentary delegation in Leo-
poldville. Gizenga may be con-
cerned about maintaining the
security of his Stanleyville
stronghold in the face of con-
tinuing friction with the Orien-
tale and Kivu provincial govern-
ments~and unrest in his army. For-
eign Minister Spaak believes
that unless Gizenga is satisfied
with the "Gizengist" coloration
of the new Congo government, he
will simply continue his separa-
tist regime in Stanleyville.
The past week has brought
a considerable bolstering of
the pro-Gizenga diplomatic
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
contingent in Stanleyville. A
chartered aircraft, flying in
from Cairo, brought three
Czech diplomats to reinforce
the Czech Embassy in Stanley-
The factions led by Boun
Oum, Souvanna Phouma, and Sou-
phannouvong have drifted further
apart since last month when they
reached agreement in principle
at Zurich to form a coalition
government. A new factor in
the situation is the split that
has at least temporarily devel-
oped between Souvanna and Sou-
phannouvong over procedures for
implementing a coalition.
Souvanna, who returned to
Phnom Penh from Paris on 22 July,
has invited Boun Oum and Sou-
phannouvong to meet with him
there to arrange the division
of portfolios and designation
of a premier preparatory to go-
ing to Luang Prabang to receive
royal approval. Boun Oum ac-
cepted, but Souphannouvong is
opposed to going to Phnom Penh
on the grounds that since agree-
ment in principle already ex-
ists, representatives Of the
three leaders can handle the de-
tails at Namone. Souvanna's
stated reason for preferring
Phnom Penh as a discussion site
--his health--has some basis,
since he is recovering from what
apparently was a fairly serious
operation performed during his
recent stay in France.
Souvanna appears somewhat
dismayed by this new show of
Souphannouvong's intransigence,
which last March forced him to
reverse an agreement reached
with General Phoumi in Phnom
Penh on the outlines for reach-
ing a reconciliation in Laos.
Souvanna undoubtedly is also
disturbed by indications that
his political lieutenants are
coming increasingly under Com-
munist influence.
Souvanna has instructed
Quinim Pholsena, his freewheel-
ing representative at Geneva,
to conduct himself in a neu-
tral manner. He is making ar-
rangements with Air Laos and
the French to acquire his
own plane and pilot to lessen
the dependence of his re-
gime on Communist bloc trans-
port. He is also in the proc-
ess of organizing. his own po-
litical party in Xieng Khouang,
which will compete for sup-
port with the pro-Communist
Neo Lao Hak Sat party. Nev-
ertheless, his ability to
take a meaningful independent
stand is problematical.
Despite the Vientiane
government's readiness to
meet with Souvanna in Phnom
Penh, it apparently is
not yet reconciled to
having him become premier.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
General Phoumi, who displays
much more confidence now than
at the time of the Zurich con-
ference, apparently is in no
Lao Kay
' Phong Saly-
m od to make concessions.
Tliiere seems to be little coor-
dination imp Vientiane on what
strategy to adopt in the talks
NAMTHA , ??ti"r ^-...
Mu?Ang Sai Nam Bac'
I.'4: Sam eua
Luang Prabayrg%))...... ... \~ w
.
.per.
,MuangSouL Arp_ e^
Phou houn;
Muong assy
Va gyreng
f 1 moni
TH(AI L A N
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
with Souvanna, which are still
contemplated despite Souphan-
nouvong's negative attitude..
Phoumi, confronted by conflict-
ing power interests in his own
ranks, has remarked that he is
having more trouble working out
a position with his own govern-
ment than he expects to have
with Souvanna.
King Savang arrived in
Vientii .ne on 25 July for discus-
sions concerning formation of a
coalition government and has
agreed to accept full powers en-
abling him to appoint a new gov-
ernment without reference to
the National Assembly. The as-
sembly is expected shortly to
pass an amendment to the con-
stitution to give the King this
authority. Savang, however,
continues to resist Phoumi's
importuning that he assume the
premiership himself, realizing
that the Pathet Lao would never
accept such a solution.
The military situation con-
tinues to be characterized by
scattered skirmishes, ambushes,
and localized movements of op-
posing forces. Phoumi, uncon-
vinced that a political solution
can be found, is working on con-
tingency plans for resumption of
hostilities after the rainy sea-
son ends in November.
Phoumi, meanwhile, is en-
gaging some of his forces in
"an'ti-guerrilla" clearing opera-
tions, principally in Luang Pra-
bang Province,' Although these
operatiofls are still limited,
the trend hems to be toward an?
increasingly large scale, in-
volving se `oral companies in
a single mission. A Pathet Lao
broadcast of 21 July, quoted
by Hanoi radio, complained that
from 3 May to 30 June "rebel
troops of the Savannakhet group"
had occupied fifteen strong
points of the "patriotic Laotian
forces" in Vientiane and Luang
Prabang provinces.
Although the Geneva con-
ferees have reached agreement
on the order in which various
sections of the neutrality and
.control drafts will be consid-
ered, the Soviet delegation, ha,s
maintained its position that it
will withhold agreement to any
item which would commit a future
Laotian government on any aspect
of neutrality obligations. In
preliminary talks on the proce-
dure to be followed by the con-
ference, the USSR has maintained
that in the absence of a single
.united Laotian delegation no
agreement can be reached in a
discussion, of questions which
involve the future course of
action of the Lao government.
This stand is consistent
with the bloc's contentions that
the Zurich talks set the keynote
for resolving all internal as-
pects of the Laotian situation
and probably reflects the Commu-
nists' belief that by gaining
acceptance in principle of this
position, they will be able to
restrict future conference de-
liberation on the substantive
issues of control. The bloc's
adamancy on this point also re-
flects?optimism that future
talks between the three princes
will ultimately lead to the for-
mation of a coalition government
favorable to Communist interests
and one which will stanchly re-
fuse-.tpi:, ;ccept?:any control-
mechanism over which it does
not Okercise a final veto.
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EAST GERMAN REGIME SEEKS TO DETER REFUGEE FLIGHTS
The 'flow of refugees to
West Berlin during July has
reached the highest rate in
recent years, as an increasing
number of East Germans have
decided that they should flee
now, rather than risk having
access to Berlin denied to them
at a later date. Between 1 and
26 July, 22,758 were registered
at the West Berlin refugee
center.
To counter the rising
flow, the regime has resorted
to additional police measures.
On 21 July, the US Mission in
Berlin observed a general
tightening of police controls
on the East - West Berlin sec-
tor border and at elevated
railroad (S-Bahn) stations in
East Berlin adjacent to the
sector border. While these
measures were probably intended
to discourage attendance at
the Evangelical Church's All-
German Congress (Kirchentag)
which ended on 23 July, they
were also designed to cut the
refugee flow into Berlin, and
apparently continue in effect.
Travelers arriving in West
Berlin on 25 July via the
Hamburg-Berlin expressway re-
ported that they had been
halted about 25 miles outside
the city and requested to show
their identity cards before
proceeding.
In an effort to intimidate
potential defectors, the East
German regime has launched a
propaganda campaign against
the "slave trade" in refugees
allegedly carried out by West
German and American "head
hunters" in West Berlin. Simul-
taneously they conducted a
campaign denying reports of food
shortages in East Germany.
In the opinion of Am-
bassador Thompson in Moscow,
the USSR has been reluctant to
sanction unilateral East German
action to put an end to the
refugee flow, because it is un-
willing to advertise the weak-
ness of the Ulbricht regime,
and believes that such action
would weaken the bloc's position
in negotiations with the West.
Thompson believes that Moscow
will make an early move for
negotiations, hoping thus to re-
duce the refugee flow to tolera-
ble proportions.
Refugees recently inter-
rogated at West Berlin's Marien-
felde reception center report
that the East German population
is irritated by long-standing
political and economic griev-
ances and current shortages of
dairy products, fruits and veg-
etables, and potatoes. None
of the refugees interviewed,
however, was aware of any or-
ganized resistance group in
East Germany, although some had
heard of minor demonstrations
in certain factories.
In rural areas, however,
unrest and passive resistance
among farmers--with resulting
adverse effects on agricultural
work--have increased. On 21 July,
Ulbricht in a formal address at
Markkleeberg, near Leipzig, for-
mally reiterated the regime's
commitment to full collectiviza-
tion, but indicated that "per-
suasion," rather than overt co-
ercion, was to be used to induce
farmers to work collectively.
The refugee flow includes
an increasing number of "border
crossers"--East Berliners who
work in West Berlin--a group
against which the regime has
imposed economic sanctions in
an effort to force them into
jobs in East Berlin or East
Germany. Several "border
crossers" said that they had
been evicted from their apart-
ments in East Berlin when they
refused to give up their jobs
in West Berlin. Flights of
"border crossers," which had
ranged from 22 to 24 a week in
June and early July, jumped to
60 in the week ending 15 July
and to 181 last week. The regime
nevertheless is intensifying Its
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
campaign against such elements.
Potsdam District has fallen into
line in imposing economic sanc-
tions against "border crossers."
Reportedly there have also been
some arrests on charges of "smug-
;ling."
51
Separate annual statistics for West
Berlin and West Germany not avail-
able prior to 1555.
I I 1
1960
JULY wfiT
3 10 17 24 31 7 14 21 28 7 14 21 28 4 11 18 25 2 9 16 23 30 6 13 20 27 4 11 18 25 1
JANUARY FEBRUARY MARCH APRIL M AY JUNE JULY
(;1~; ~"f )A 11 JULY 1961
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
FURTHER SOVIET ARMS AID FOR INDONESIA
As a result of negotiations
held in Moscow in early June,
Soviet military assistance com-
mitments to Indonesia have been
increased more than $75,000,000,
raising the total since mid-1960
to over $600,000,000, The in-
crease is accounted for in part
by the USSR's agreement to pro-
vide surface-to-air missiles
to the Indonesian Air Force and
by a large rise in expenditures
for training. Equipment con-
tracted for earlier this year
has begun arriving in Indonesia;
two TU-16 jet medium bombers
were ferried from the USSR in
late June and additional de-
liveries will probably be made
shortly. A shipment of MIG-19
jet fighters along with other
arms and equipment may be deliv-
ered by the end of this summer.
In addition to surface-to-
air missiles for several battal-
ions under the new agreement,
the air force had previously
arranged for six of the 20 TU-
16s it is to receive to be
equipped with air-to-surface
missiles and for the 20 MIG-21s
--on order for 1962--to be armed
with air-to-air missiles. The
army also is scheduled under the
original agreement to receive
missiles, probably surface-to-
air, for three battalions; and
the navy has contracted for 12
motor torpedo boats which are to
be equipped with surface-to- 25X1
surface missiles.
new contracts
negotiate y the army, includ-
ing one for 15 K-61 tracked
amphibians, raise its total
purchases from the USSR more
than $30,000,000 to a total of
$122,000,000.
The latest agreement brings
Sino-Soviet bloc military assist-
ance to Indonesia to over $830,-
000,000; over-all economic assist
than $540,000,000
BLOC ACTIVITIES IN WEST AFRICAN CIVIL AIR SERVICES
Aid for the establishment
and operation of national com-
mercial air services is becoming
an increasingly important facet
of the bloc's activities in West
Africa. Such aid provides a
further opportunity for the bloc
to identify itself with the na-
tionalist aims of new African
governments and at the same time
enables bloc nations to enhance
their prestige over a wide area
of the continent. Soviet- and
Czech-made aircraft, familiar
to Africans through their partic-
ipation in the Congo operation,
are now, or soon will be, the
major if not the only aircraft
operated on air lines in Guinea,
Ghana, and Mali. In each of these
countries, recently estab-
lished public air lines are
displacing services formerly
provided by the British and
French.
The IL-18 turboprop, which
has a capacity of from 75 to 100
persons, and the IL-14, with a
capacity of about 24 persons, are
the principal passenger planes
being supplied to Africa by the
bloc. At least 12 IL-18s and
7 IL-14s have been contracted
for by the three West African
states. Other smaller aircraft
being supplied include the AN-2
biplane (used primarily for crop
spraying) and the MI-2 heli-
copter. Credits totaling
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
over $21,000,000 have been ex-
tended by Czechoslovakia and
the USSR for these purchases.
Other types of aircraft
may soon appear in Africa.
Ghana is reported-to have con-
tracted to purchase the AN-12
turboprop military transport
for use in carrying commercial
cargo. It is also rumored that
the Ghanaian officials accom-
panying President Nkrumah on
his current visit to bloc
countries are prepared to dis-
cuss the purchase of jet pas-
senger planet if negotiations
with the West for such aircraft
fall through.
Probably the most signifi-
cant long-run feature of the
bloc program is the provision
of training facilities. Over
125 nationals of Guinea, Ghana,
and Mali are training in the
bloc and reportedly will be
ready in two years to take over
operation and maintenance of
their country's newly acquired
aircraft. In the interim, the
bloc is providing both ground
and aircrews for each of the
planes delivered. An esti-
mated 150 such bloc technicians
are now working in West Africa,
and more are scheduled to ar-
rive soon.
The greatest concentration
of bloc aid for civil air lines
has been in Guinea. Last year
Czechoslovakia extended that
nation a $2,000,000 credit for
the establishment of Air Guinea,
including the purchase of four
IL-14s. These Czech planes
plus two Soviet-built IL-18s,
all operating in Guinea, form
the nucleus of Guinea's air
line. Four Czech experts, one
the director of Air Guinea, are
in Conakry managing the line.
Moreover, the USSR has provided
a $2,100,000 credit for enlarg-
ing and modernizing the airport
facilities in Conakry and has
sent some 20 technicians to the
city 'for this purpose.
27 July 61
Recent developments indi-
cate that in the future Mali
may be a center for bloc civil
air activities in Africa. After
the evacuation of French military
personnel next month the USSR
reportedly expects to use the
airport at Bamako as a central
base for the maintenance of bloc
aircraft ir} West Africa. The
center presumably will service
not only bloc-built aircraft
owned by Air Guinea, Ghana Air-
ways, and Air Mali but also
planes of the Czech and Soviet
airlines during their flights
in the area.
About 50 Soviet technicians
are expected to arrive in Bamako
in the next month to begin this
operation. Such a facility in
Africa would be of great value--
particularly for servicing IL-18s,
which now must make frequent trips
back to Moscow for engine over-
haul. The Czechs had hoped to
take over the operation of the
control towers at the airport,
but final. agreement on this ar-
rangement is 'in doubt. A Czech
has recently been named special
assistant for Malian civil avia-
tion with full responsibility
for all civil air affairs in-
cluding Air Mali.
In March, Mali contracted
with the USSR to purchase two .I,L-
18s, three IL-14s, an unknown
number of AN-2s, and some heli-
copters. Czechoslovakia last
month extended a special credit
of $2,500,000 to Mali, about $1,-
000,000 for the purchase of planes
and $1,500,000 for air training.
Ghana has purchased eight
IL-18s from the USSR, six of
which have been delivered and
are now operating in Africa. In
addition, Moscow earlier presented
Nkrumah with a gift helicopter.
Although the :airport at Accra
continues to be managed by a
BOAC employee, the bloc's influ-
ence there is predominant--about
100 bloc technicians are employed
to service aircraft ac uire-
from the USSR. 25X1
25X1
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'"NOV SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
A paucity of natural re-
sources, severely limited ex-
port potential, and lack of
managerial and technical per-
sonnel will handicap efforts by
the South Korean military re-
gime to promote political
stability by satisfying wide-
spread expectations for im-
proved economic conditions.
A two-month campaign by
the ruling Supreme Council for
National Reconstruction (SCNR)
to eradicate corruption and prof-
iteering has led to the ouster
of 20,000 of the country's
240,000 civil servants, and an-
other 20,000 are expected to be
dismissed. Seventeen leading
businessmen, the core of the
nation's industrial and finan-
cial leadership, have been ar-
rested for illegal accumulation
of wealth--calculated at more
than30,000,Od
through tax
R
evasion, misuse df bank loans,
and political kickbacks. Thir-
teen of those arrested were re-
leased after they offered to
surrender to the government all
their assets, including indus-
trial facilities. It is still
uncertain whether the SCNR will
take over these facilities.
The moves against business-
men and a decree limiting in-
terest rates on loans to 20 per-
cent per annum have resulted in
industrial, commercial, and fi-
nancial stagnation. This decree,
designed primarily to protect
farmers against exploitation
by money lenders, has made farm
credit scarce. The SCNR has
not improved the employment
situation; approximately 25 per-
cent of the labor force is out
of work.
As a long-term solution, the
SCNR has drafted a five-year
economic development program
calling for the establishment
of an industrial base which
would include cement manufacture,
oil and steel production, and
oil refining--all requiring
heavy imports of raw materials.
More immediately, the SCNR is
launching a series of spending
schemes to assist the farmer,
increase the pay of civil serv-
ants, raise veterans' benefits,
expand public works projects,
and finance a mass political
organization. }+
flat ion.
There are signs the gov-
ernment spending program is re-
storing some confidence within
the business community and that
some economic revival is under
way. At the same time, however,
despite governmental econom es,
which include a cutback in Me-
fense expenditures, there are
not enough funds to finance the
official programs. In all prob-
ability the SCNR will have to re-
sort to deficit financing, with
a consequent resumption of in-
NATIONALIZATION IN THE UAR
On 23 July, on the eve of
the ninth anniversary of the
Egyptian revolution, President
Nasir issued five economic de-
crees with the avowed purpose
of "furthering the country's
socialist policy." The decrees
reflect Nasir's intention to
avoid doctrinaire socialism
while moving toward his concept
of a "socialistic, democratic,
cooperative society."
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SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
In Egypt and Syria, 149
companies and organizations of
"a national character" were
completely nationalized. These
include all banks and insurance
companies, both foreign and
locally owned, and most trans-
port, timber, cement, metal,
and some chemical and fertilizer
companies. Payment for seized
property is to be in the form
of long-term government bonds.
Another decree calls for the
government to have majority cap-
ital participation in an addi-
tional 91 companies in both
regions, including at least one
Western-owned oil company (Anglo-
Egyptian Oilfields Ltd.) in
which British interests pre-
dominate.
In addition, the maximum
individual capital participation
in a list of 159 specified in-
dustries is limited to about
$29,000. This is designed
chiefly to break up large enter-
prises owned by wealthy Egyptians.
Other regulations set limits on
profits, order 25 percent of
profits, distributed among the
workers, and institute a sharp-
ly graduated income tax. Other
decrees' issued two days later
limited individual land owner-
ship in Egypt to about 100 acres
--about half the amount allowed
under the 1952 land reform pro-
gram. Thus agriculture continues
to be based on the small family
farm, but is increasingly being
molded into a state-dominated
cooperative pattern.
Earlier decrees had nation-
alized the cotton trade with
other countries, as well as the
concerns handling most other
imports and exports. While com-
panies with interests held by
nationals of other Arab countries
and other foreign nationals were
affected, American firms were
excepted.
Some impetus for the decrees
probably stems from Nasir's de-
sire to eliminate sources of
political opposition, but his
basic motivation appears to be
economic. The UAR President
probably has been heartened and
emboldened by the economic as
well as the political successes
of the revolution. His regime
has halted the the economic de-
cline which had characterized the
Egyptian economy since shortly
after the turn of the century.
Production in all sectors has
increased substantially, and,
despite limited resources and a
burdensome population increase,
per capita gross national prod-
uct has been rising.
The goals'of the UAR's economic
plans have been deliberately set;
high, however, and even with sub-
stantial foreign aid--both
Western and Communist--success
requires a complete marshaling
of domestic resources. The UAR
planners evidently felt that
providing the economic incentives
necessary to ensure full partici-
pation by the private sector
would be too costly or only par-
tially successful. Although the
Egyptian and Syrian business
communities had long expected
Nasir's action, the suddenness
of its execution probably stunned
and angered both groups. Some
opposition can be expected, par-
ticularly in Syria, but this is
not likely to be translated into
effective action. In addition,
the government's success in pre-
vious economic moves suggests
that reaction to the latest de-
crees will have little or no
negative effect on the country's
economic development. 25X1
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*"W 3LUXr, I _"O
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
PORTUGAL'S AFRICAN DIFFICULTIES
Portugal's continuing dif-
ficulties in Angola are empha-
sized by its recent decision to
raise troop strength there to
double the number considered
necessary in May. In Portu-
guese Guinea, armed clashes
have occurred recently between
Lisbon's troops and nationalist
insurgent elements based in
Senegal, which on 25 July severed
diplomatic relations with Portu-
gal. If the disorders in Portu-
guese Guinea become widespread,
Portuguese criticism of the
United States for "encouraging"
African self-determination can
be expected to reach new heights.
V?LT
S
CAMEROOWS
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
The failure of Portuguese
forces to bring the five-month-
old Angola rebellion under con-
trol has led to reassessments
in Lisbon. In mid-May, Colonel
Arriaga, then under secretary
of air, told the US Embassy
the rebellion would be crushed
by early September, a date
which now appears to have been
overly optimistic.
The chief of staff of the
armed forces has gone to Angola
to step up pacification efforts
before the September rainy sea-
son permits the rebels to in-
tensify guerrilla activity.
Portuguese troops are to be re-
inforced from the mid-July
level of about 26,000 to a
strength of 40,000. The air
strength build-up reportedly
includes 12 British-made heli-
copters recently purchased in
West Germany and 12 jet fighter
bombers.
Foreign Minister Franco
Nogueira told the UN subcom-
mittee chairman on Angola last
week that he would provide the
chairman with well-documented
evidence that the UN troops of
Ghana and India trained, armed,
and supplied the terrorists in
the lower Congo. Nogueira
warned that Portugal might find
it necessary to cross over into
the Congo to stop the interfer-
ence at its source.
Portugal has given the sub-
committee chairman access to
some records in Lisbon, but
Salazar told him on 21 July that
the subcommittee would not be
allowed to visit Angola.
Nogueira told the British am-
bassador it would be allowed to
enter when UN subcommittees got
permission to visit Hungary and
South Africa. The subcommittee
is currently drafting its report,
although the chairman believes
that it cannot produce a "real-
istic" report without going to
Angola. The possibility of an-
other Security Council meeting
or even a special session of the
General Assembly will be in-
creased by the submission of a
negative report from the sub-
committee.
Senegal-based elements of
the Portuguese-Guinean national-
ist movement clashed with Portu-
guese forces near the border
with Senegal on at least three
occasions since 18 July. Sene-
gal, claiming violations of its
air space and other "illegal ac-
tivities" on the part of Portu-
gal, broke diplomatic relations
with Portugal on 25 July. Lis-
bon had anticipated trouble in
Portuguese Guinea for many
months but had expected that
border incursions would come
from the Republic of Guinea,
since Sekou Tourd admits expan-
sionist designs. If extensive
terrorism does break out in Por-
tuguese Guinea, anti-US attitudes
in Portugal--already widespread
among officials and the public--
will be intensified.
The Lisbon press has taken
its cue from Premier Salazar's
address to the National Assembly
on 30 June in which he complained
that the US stand in the UN en-
couraged African nationalism.
Ambassador Elbrick reported on
7 July, "There is no question
but that the US is now identi-
fied as public enemy number one."
This attitude presages diffi-
culty for renegotiation of the
Azores bases agreement, which
expires at the end of 1962., 25X1
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
EUROPEAN HEADS OF GOVERNMENT MEETING
After two years of dispute
over various aspects of De
Gaulle's proposals for a Euro-
pean "confederation," the
Common Market (EEC) countries
have submerged their differences
sufficiently to announce agree-
ment on measures designed to
strengthen their political ties.
Meeting in Bonn on 18 July, the
EEC heads of government issued
a kind of manifesto reaffirming
political unification as their
explicit goal and setting up
regular "summit" and ministerial
meetings as a step in this
direction, The six leaders
also instructed an existing
committee to develop a European
"statute," or constitution,
and to examine other measures
intended to promote political
integration.
This agreement is in many
respects a victory for De Gaulle;
Paris is elated, and Brussels
and The Hague--which have been
most suspicious of De Gaulle's
views--are accordingly depressed.
However, a number of observers
believe that both De Gaulle
and his opponents have given
ground. The Dutch, for example,
who steadfastly opposed con-
sideration of defense issues
in a six-nation framework,
have now agreed to participate
in future "little summit"
meetings with an unrestricted
agenda. The French for their
part have agreed to an insti-
tutional and constitutional
approach to the problem of
political cohesion, and pro-
integrationists generally take
comfort that the EEC's parlia-
mentary assembly has been in-
vited to extend its delibera-
tions to the political field.
The unresolved relation-
ship between the proposed new
instruments of policy coordi-
nation and existing EEC institu-
tions, and with NATO in particu-
lar, is apparently causing the
most concern in the Benelux
countries. According to various
accounts of the Bonn meeting,
De Gaulle still seemed disposed
to transfer some EEC functions,
such as joint policy toward
Africa, to the new institutions,
although he apparently retreated
under strong opposition.
De Gaulle cut short his
much-heralded presentation on
European defense because, he
said, the Berlin crisis made a
general defense review inoppor-
tune, but there was reportedly
some disappointment and alarm
over his long-ran a intentions.
25X1
De Gaulle
spoke of the necessity of giv-
ing military planning a "more 25X1
European orientation" and 25X1
minimized the US role in Euro e's
defense,
Given these suspicions,
it seems likely that the forging
of political links among the
EEC countries will continue to
proceed slowly and laboriously,
even though aspects of the De
Gaulle "confederation" now ap-
pear an established part of the
European scene. French offi-
cials themselves acknowledge
that the "battle between the
confederalists and the integra-
tionists" is still unresolved
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
and that the drafting of the
European "statute" is certain
to be a lengthy process.
Adding to the uncertainty
is the prospect that London
will ask for and eventually ob-
tain some voice in what this
"statute" should look like.
All six EEC leaders joined in
declaring at Bonn their "desire"
that other European states
BRITISH LABOR
A substantial shift in
trade union voting on the issue
of unilateral British nuclear
disarmament now assures endorse-
ment of Gaitskell's pro-NATO
policy by a large majority at
the party conference this fall.
Five of Britain's six largest
trade unions--comprising about
60 percent of the total union
membership and a majority of
the party conference vote--are
now on record in support of
Gaitskell's policy, with three
of them having revised their
stand this year. Only Frank
Cousins' Transport and General
Workers Union maintains support
for unilateralism. The American
Embassy in London cites the
shift in the position of even
many small left-wing unions as
an indication of the "aston-
ishing"improvement in Gait-
skell's position in the party
within the past few months.
Gaitskell has indicated
to US Embassy officials that
he may still have trouble at
the conference on the related
issues of American nuclear
bases in Britain and the basing
of Polaris missiles in British
waters. Several unions which
participate in the European
communities and in the process
of political unification--a
"desire" which London is be-,
lieved preparing to test. Mac-
millan has promised a parlia-
mentary statement on Britain's
intentions toward the EEC on
31 July, and in preparation for
it has called a meeting of the
Outer Seven for 28 Juy.
PARTY TRENDS
now support the official defense
policy continue to demand "an
end to the need" for the bases,
and left-wing Laborites are
emphasizing this in their con-
tinuing campaign to undermine
Gaitskell's position. Gait-,
skell told a US official in
May that party leaders are
being deliberately vague in
their public statements on
those issues. Party neutral-
ists have also begun to exploit
the Macmillan government's an-
nouncement on 12 July that--as
a result of a NATO decision--
a German tank battalion will
receive three weeks' training
in Britain this fall.
The growing sentiment for
Labor party unity comes at a
time when Britain's worsening
economic situation has brought
the first substantial decline
in public support for the govern-
ment since the 1959 general
elections. This could be the
decisive factor in persuading
the Labor rank and file to accept
Gaitskell's plea that this year's
conference be as free as possi-
ble from controversy so that
the British public may see the
party as a cohesive organization
capable of forming a government.
25X1
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
NEW AGRARIAN GOVERNMENT IN FINLAND
Premier Miettunen's minor-
ity Agrarian government, formed
after a reconvened parliament
proved unable to agree on a
coalition, contains six members
not in the previous cabinet but
will probably pursue the same
policies, particularly in seek-
ing to reassure the USSR of
Finland's strict neutrality.
The new cabinet is generally ex-
pected to serve until the mid-
1962 parliamentary elections.
The cabinet crisis was pre-
cipitated by Prime Minister
Sukselainen's resignation fol-
lowing his conviction by the
Helsinki Court of Appeals for
"careless and illegal discharge
of duties" as general director
of the National Pensions In-
stitute. Parliament, called
back from its summer recess on
11 July, negotiated for several
days regarding a broadened gov-
ernment and ended by reconsti-
tuting the Agrarian cabinet
which has been in office since
January 1959.
President Kekkonen appar-
ently continued to oppose in-
cluding the Social Democrats in
view of the cabinet crisis in
1958, when Moscow expressed its
dislike of certain Social Demo-
cratic and Conservative ministers
in the Fagerholm government by
overpowering economic pressure.
The minor democratic parties
such as the Liberals and the
Swedish People's party--presum-
ably with an eye to the parlia-
mentary election in mid-1962 as
well as to next February's pres-
idential election--evidently had
no desire to share governmental
responsibility with the Agrarians
in the meantime.
The new premier, Martti
Miettunen, has been governor of
Lapland since 1958. Untainted
by the Sukselainen scandal; he
is said to enjoy the confidence
of many political groups and
has participated in several
previous cabinets, including
Fagerholm's majority coalition
in late 1958. The five other
new ministers include Defense
Minister Lars Bjorkenheim, who
held that post for a few months
in 1958. One of the nine con-
tinuing members of the govern-
ment is Ahti Karjalainen, Pres-
ident Kekkonen's close associate
who became foreign minister in
June following the death of Ralf
Torngren. As former minister
of trade and industry in the
Sukselainen government Karja-
lainen was largely responsible
for negotiating with the 25X1
USSR on Finland's accession
to EFTA.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
SPECIAL ARTICLES
LONG-TERM ECONOMIC PLANNING IN
The USSR's long-awaited
20-Year Plan for economic de-
velopment apparently is to be
published on 30 July as part
of the new draft program of the
Communist party of the Soviet
Union. The draft was approved
by the central committee on 20
June and is to be published for
discussion prior to its presen-
tation to the 22nd party con-
gress in October. The 20-year
goals, on which Soviet planning
agencies have been working since
1959, will embody the regime's
desire to catch up with the US
economically and to achieve the
state of communism originally
conceived by Marx and elab-
orated upon subsequently by
Soviet ideologists.
Creation of the long-range
plan, however, was rooted in
objectives not directly con-
nected with the transition from
socialism to communism. it
stems from a long-felt need for
a systematic program to guide
long-range development and a
more recent concern for the
economic inefficiencies attrib-
uted to the lack of continuity
in previous planning practices.
Extension of the planning
period to 20 years reflects
the frequently expressed opti-
mism of the Soviet regime in re-
gard to its general economic
situation and suggests confi-
dence in the country's ability
to fulfill the plans at least
for the next five. Long-term
goals, however, can at best be
only imperfect guidelines
since even monthly, quarterly,
and yearly plans must be con-
stantly reappraised and read-
justed to changing conditions
and policies. New technology
and new resources can justify
upward readjustments. A crash
program--the housing program,
for example--can result in the
necessity to lower less urgent
goals. By developing better
planning techniques and better
indicators of economic growth,
Soviet planners hope to make
their long-range goals more con-
crete, better coordinated, and
more likely to be attained.
The Soviet 20-Year. Plan
will become the general frame-
work for coordinated industrial-
ization plans within the entire
bloc. This coordination is to
be achieved through CEMA, the
bloc's Counci' for Mutual Eco-
nomic Assistance, which since
1957 has increased its efforts
to encourage the satellites to
develop complementary economies.
It recently began preliminary
consultations on long-term plan-
ning for area-wide economic de-
velopment through 1980.
Background
Long-range plans in the
past have been limited to indi-
vidual and largely uncoordinated
goals for a few major products
or, at most, a few key sectors
of the economy. The first long-
range plan, worked out under
Lenin's direction in 1920, pro-
vided 10- to 15-year goals for
about 15 industries. The State
Planning Commission (Gosplan)
was created in the following
year, and the long-range plan
soon was overshadowed by current
problems. Further evidence of
long-range planning was not no-
ticeable, except in a few iso-
lated instances, until 1946 when
Stalin presented goals for the
so-called "leading links" of in-
dustry which were to require
three or more five-year plans
for fulfillment.
Major attention to long-
range goals was not evident
again until mid-1955, when an-
nual planning was assigned to
a new agency (Gosekonomkomis-
siya), and Gosplan was given
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
responsibility for 10- and
15-year plans as well as the
more traditional five-year
plans. Soviet leaders in Feb-
ruary 1956, apparently armed
with the results of Gosplan's
new long-range planning, ap-
peared at the 20th party con-
gress with the theme of catch-
ing up with the West. The
trouble encountered by the
Sixth Five-Year Plan (1956-60)
however, which was replaced in
1958 by the current Seven-Year
Plan (1959-65), again focused
attention on current problems
until November 1957 when Khru-
shchev revealed 15-year goals
for steel, petroleum, electric
power, and cement.
Earlier in 1957, in a
speech to the Supreme Soviet
on the industrial reorganiza-
tion, Khrushchev had laid the
groundwork for elevating long-
range planning to something
more than just a few loosely co-
ordinated goals. He called
upon Gosplan to draw up, in ad-
dition to annual and five-year
plans, long-range plans which
would provide the correct cor-
relation of development among
the various branches of the
economy and regions of the coun-
try. On this occasion..also, in
attacking the lack of continu-
ity from one plan period to the
next, Khrushchev established
the basis for the present treat-
ment of annual plans as seg-
ments of five-year plans and
five-year plans as segments of
still larger plans.
Although Gosplan is known
to have done some work on 20-
year goals during 1959, a hand-
ful of goals for 1975 and 1980
which were revealed by the
deputy minister of. construction
of electric power stations in
March 1960 did not appear to be
especially well coordinated.
While repeated references to
the 20-year plan have appeared
since early 1960, none has fur-
nished substantive details.
Lon -Term planning Or ans
In April 1960, responsi-
bility for long-term planning
was switched.from Gosplan to
Gosekonomsovet, an organization
which had been created a year
earlier and which up to that
time seemed to have worked only
on the coordination of economic
research. Gosekonomsovet, to-
gether with the union republic
ministries and departments,
elaborates five- and seven-year
plans as well as longer range
plans: Gosplan's "summary"
sections, such as National Eco-
nomic Plan, Balances and Mate-
rial-Technical Supply, and Labor
and Wages, were transferred to
Gosekonomsovet. Gosplan re-
tained only those sections--
primarily industrial branches--
needed for short-term planning.
In May 1961 the Soviet
press announced that a network
of 17 economic areas had been
created. Each area is appar-
ently to have a council for
"planning and coordination,"
presumably subordinate to
Gosekonomsovet--which will have
as its primary task planning for
two- and three-year periods.
The regional councils will also
plan and coordinate long-range
economic development at the
regional level--an administra-
tive level not adequately cov-
ered previously. They are to
formulate proposals for the
basic direction of economic de-
velopment in their respective
areas, for new technological
developments and their effec-
tive introduction into produc-
tion, for the correct distribu-
tion of capital investment, and
for better use of labor and
natural resources. These new
economic areas replace 13 areas
which formerly were used by
Gosplan for planning purposes.
Continuity of Planning
While the planning changes
suggested by Khrushchev in 1957
ti
r% r; r
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
have been slow to materialize,
some progress has been made
toward carrying out his sugges-
tions to remedy the lack of
continuity in planning. The
lack of continuity affects the
industrial process at all lev-
els, because when planning is
on a year-to-year basis, work
schedules are disrupted, sup-
plies of equipment and labor
are uncertain, and enterprise
directors are forced into a
state of suspended animation
at the end of the year await-
ing control figures for the
coming year. If planning for
construction of a chemical
plant, for example, were merely
on a yearly basis, untold de-
lays might result because
equipment for it was not or-
dered sufficiently far in ad-
vance.
In 1959, with the intro-
duction of the Seven-Year Plan,
the timing of the planning
process was shifted to provide
enterprises with approved plans
at the start of the annual plan
period rather than some months
after the plan period started,
as frequently had happened in
the past. The Seven-Year Plan
was divided into annual seg-
ments, each of which was sup-
posed to require only a few
revisions to make it operational.
Nothing more was done toward
achieving continuity, although
the USSR Council of Ministers ex-
amined the problem in December
1960 and decided that if the
planners began working out each
year the main indicators of
the annual plan for the fifth
year following, the economy
could have a constantly func-
tioning five-year plan.
Apparently the task of
transforming annual segments
of the present Seven-Year Plan
into fully detailed, operational
plans has proved to be a greater
chore than envisioned, or per-
haps the unrevised segments for
forthcoming years have not pro-
vided enough guidance to give
the desired continuity in an-
nual plans. In any event, a
high-level planning conference
in March 1961 recommended that
at all planning levels, adjust-
ments should be made in the an-
nual segment two years before
the year in which the segment
become operational. The con-
ference continued to call for
planning agencies to work out
each year the major indexes
for production and capital con-
struction for the fifth year
following. Apparently unwill-
ing, however, to recommend the
abandonment of the traditional
five-year plan, the conference
also recommended that midway
through such a period work
should be started on the next
five-year plan.
The planning process which
will result from these changes
and recommendations will be a
complex one. The formal
20-
Year Plan will presumably incor-
porate four five-year plans each
consisting of five annual seg-
ments. General planning
for
five
years ahead will
be
carried
out
each year and at
the
same
time
the details will
be
set
and
adjustments made
for
two
years ahead. For example, in
1966 planners will be working
on the control figures for 1971
and the detailed outline of the
plans for 1967 and 1968.
Adoption of these practices
should avoid some of the prob-
lems which have caused a lack
of continuity in the past. Their
effect on the over-all quality
of planning, however, is debat-25X1
able, and rl.early the work of
planning organizations. will be
considerably expanded.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
TRENDS OF OPINION IN THE
Soviet youth, as depicted
in current Russian literature,
in the main accepts the polit-
ical and social system which it
has inherited but is unrespon-
sive to the creed on which the
system is based. The philosoph-
ically minded are concerned with
finding a more satisfactory
reason for existence than is of-
fered in the slogans of the
Communist party. Others are
increasingly frank in demanding
material benefits now, in place
of the vague rewards of the Com-
munist future. In an effort to
deal with this unresponsiveness
the regime has sought to increase
discipline among the youth by
raising requirements for labor
training in the educational sys-
tem. Further, Komsomol activity
has been stepped up. But neither
of these actions seems to have
strengthened youth's allegiance
to official party goals.
Despite_Khrushchev's chas-
tisement of Soviet writers in
1957, the nonconformist authors
have continued to try to expand
the province of Soviet litera-
ture. Obedient to Khrushchev's
injunction to leave fault-find-
ing to the party, they have, in
the main, ceased writing the
exposes of Soviet life ii fic-
tional form which enlivened the
literature of the early 1950s,
and have shifted their efforts
to understanding and describing
their fellow man.
The regime has long de-
manded that writers concentrate
on inspiring enthusiasm for the
socialist system and "educating"
readers to conform to its re-
quirements. Efforts to move
beyond the individual's public
duty to the state and portray
his private emotional life are
regarded at best as a waste of
the state's resources and at
worst as subversive. Neverthe-
less, this private emotional
life preoccupies the most prom-
ising of the young Soviet writers,
;7 July 61
SOVIET YOUNGER GENERATION
both because of their own in-
clinations and because of the
enthusiastic response of their
readership.
In the face of harsh stric-
tures from critics, the continued
appearance of such subjective
works in major literary magazines
suggests the existence of a re-
ceptive readership as well as
of editorial boards anxious to
increase circulation. Moreover,
their popularity appears to in-
fect even the more conformist
writers. The more lifelike
characters with which the con-
formists have attempted to meet
the challenge of the nonconform-
ists are often inadvertently as
revealing of Soviet attitudes
as are the work of their rivals.
Together, the two groups of
writers present a picture of
an important element of Soviet
youth as it sees itself.
This picture, however, does
not encompass the large mass of
conformists who accept the sys-
tem as they find it and learn to
live with it. Nor does it re-
flect the extreme nonconformists
whose ideas, too unconventional
for public print, occasionally
circulate in handwritten manu-
scripts or in small groups of
trusted friends. What it does
portray is a middle group of
bright young people from whom
the future leaders will probably
be drawn, and to the regime's
obvious concern, this group ap-
parently is failing to respond
to the dream of a Communist fu-
ture.
Search for Life's Meaning
Within this group, Soviet
youth accepts the system it has
inherited, but apparently finds
the accompanying creed sterile.
It is deeply concerned with find-
ing a reason for existence.
Considering the regime's
40 years of militant atheism,
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SPECIAL ARTICLES
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CONFAL
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
religion surprisingly often is
suggested as a possible answer.
Frequently, it appears as an
early hope which later fails.
In Save Our Souls* by B. S. Lvov,
a son, grie -stricken at the
loss of his father, searches
for the meaning of life. After
the failure of his school and
of a well-meaning but doctri-
naire aunt to help him, he en-
ters a theological seminary but
is disillusioned there also.
In the end he is "rescued" by
the Komsomol. However, the
author makes no pretense that
the Komsomol can provide him
with the answer to his question
Occasionally, religion
turns out to be the answer. In
The Torch a "good" character is
revealed as an able student and
much-decorated hero of World
War II who entered the priest-
hood on his discharge from the
army. "Among the partisans i
saw a priest. He fought and
died like a soldier. He knew
just what to say to people.
After all I have seen during
the war, I too came to know
what to say to people; I came
to understand what it was they
needed most--comfort, that is,
faith. And now I am needed,"
Many other writers portray
the same search without refer-
ence to religion. The 18-year-
old of V. Nikitin's Thaw Lands
goes to the remote po ar reg ins
to "build communism," He is
soon disillusioned: "What common
cause am I serving? What new
life am I building? I am simply
digging trenches,... Is this
what I dreamed of, what I am
meant to do with my life? Why
did I study for ten years?,,..
It begins to appear that I shall
never understand why I am living
.... It is becoming awful."
r~11 novels, short stories, and plays
cited here, with the exception of "Con--
tinuation of a Legend," have been pub-
lished within the last two years.
In The Difficult Test by
N. Dubow, snot er youngs er is
repelled by the deceit and in-
justice in the factory. He is
also shaken by the cynicism and
greed of a prominent party mem-
ber's son. "Greenhorn' Are you
trying to convert me? You
needn't. I know more about com-
munism than you do. They are
still constructing it, but I
have already reached the Com-
munist stage--I receive accord-
ing to my needs. Work! Do you
think I am a beast of burden--
a donkey?"
In his search for a faith,
the "greenhorn" receives under-
standing and sympathy from a
Baptist worker: "The young
don't know what to do with them-
selves. Their daily bread is
assured, but that isn't enough.
Having fed the body, man strives
to feed the soul, but he finds
no spiritual food, so he wan-
ders in the darkness of crude
sensual pleasures. It is im-
possible to quench spiritual
thirst. And this thirst dries
man out, makes him callous and
indifferent to others."
Attempts by the conformist
writers to fulfill this spirit-
ual thirst often appear awkward.
An experienced party leader in
Vasily Aksenov's Colleagues is
asked: "What are those glit-
tering heights (of communism)?
They're too abstract." He
dreams of the future of his
small town in the icy north-
western USSR: "Soon the small
town will become the big town
of Kruglogorsk. Our children
will drive their motors with
atomic energy. And so an end-
less chain of progress will
reach forward into the future;
bright houses with enormous win-
dows will be reflected in the
warm waters of the lake, palms
will wave their branches, and
glass automobiles will speed
back and forth over broad white
highways