CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A003200110001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 33
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 3, 2005
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: July 6, 1961
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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CONFIDENTIAL
CC~fJCT
CURRENT
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY
SUMMARY
COPY NO. 71
OCI NO. 0287/61
6 July 1961
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
DOCUMENT NO. t -f
NO CHANGE IN CLASS. ^
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S (D 25X1
NEXT REVIEW CP. i E:'~ I99c
AUTH: HR 701-2
DATE: 20'/,Q
CONFID
AL
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State Department review completed
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THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECT-
ING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES
WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS,
TITLE 18, USC, SECTIONS 793 AND 794, THE TRANSMIS-
SION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO
AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.
The Current Intelligence Weekly Summary has been prepared
primarily for the internal use of the Central Intelligence
Agency. It does not represent a complete coverage of all
current situations. Comments and conclusions represent the
immediate appraisal of the Office of Current Intelligence.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
6 July 1961
EAST-WEST RELATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 1
Moscow's most recent reiteration that a German peace
treaty "must be signed this year" was contained in the
Soviet - North Vietnamese communiqud of 4 July. The Soviet
leadership, however, has continued to provide signs of
its interest in keeping open the possibility of nego-
tiations on Berlin and Germany. This was evident in
the Soviet handling of the exchange of messages with
the US on Independence Day; moreover, there was an unusu-
ally large turnout of top Soviet leaders at the American
Embassy reception in Moscow on 4 July. In the US-Soviet
disarmament talks, which will be resumed on 17 July in
Moscow, the Soviet representative has repeated his
position that further negotiations in a new forum would
be desirable only if agreement is reached on a state-
ment of the goals for these talks, including an agreed
"program" for complete disarmament. The Soviet note
of 5 July on the nuclear test ban negotiations strongly
reaffirmed the Soviet position and charged the US with
preparing a justification for resuming tests.
I
LAOS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 3
Bloc delegates at Geneva are pressing for considera-
tion of drafts on Laotian neutrality and are refusing
to discuss Western control proposals. The contending
factions in Laos continue to mark time while awaiting
further talks between the three princes on the forma-
tion of a coalition government, and a recent effort
to revive the Namone talks proved unsuccessful. Mili-
tary activity remains at a low level, but scattered
guerrilla actions continue and small-scale enemy attacks
were reported to the north of Vientiane and Pak Sane.
FRANCE-ALGERIA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 6
The violent demonstrations by the Moslems in Algeria
in response to the PAG's call for a day of "national
struggle" against partition of Algeria give strong
backing to the PAG's refusal either to discuss parti-
tion of Algeria or to consider separation of its
Saharan territories. The demonstrations serve as a
warning of the tactics the PAG could use to oppose an
actual French attempt at partition, which De Gaulle's
recent speeches have suggested would be his next move
if negotiations fail. Increasingly skeptical that new
talks would be productive, the PAG reportedly is again
preparing to bring the Algerian issue before the UN
in September.
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6 July 1961
KUWAIT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 8
It is unlikely that Iraq will attempt military
action against Kuwait in view of the substantial British
military build-up there. However, Qasim might make a
dramatic gesture such as the severance of diplomatic
relations with Britain or nationalization of the Iraq
Petroleum Company. Arab criticism--echoed by the bloc--
of the British military intervention is increasing;
at the UN, both the USSR and the UAR have demanded
that British troops be withdrawn from Kuwait.
SOUTH KOREA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 10
Maj. Gen. Pak Chong-hui, architect of the 16 May
South Korean military coup, now has established himself
openly as the strong man of South Korea. On 3 July he
ousted Lt. Gen. Chang To-yong, a potential source of
opposition, and three other officers of doubtful loyalty
to himself from the ruling Supreme Council of National
Reconstruction. There are indications that Pak may
next attempt to reduce the influence of younger officers
who supported his rise to power but who he may feel are
trying to impose their own views rather than follow
his direction. Such a move by Pak could precipitate
a bitter and possibly violent struggle.
CONGO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 11
Leopoldville politicians have still not adopted a
common front on the policy to be followed toward the
Stanleyville and Elisabethville regimes. Interior
Minister Adoula is pressing for an early reconvening of
parliament, but Mobutu and Foreign Minister Bomboko are
advocating "further consultations" among anti-Gizenga
politicians. The Katanga parliament, meanwhile, has
repudiated most of the agreements made by Tshombd in
Leopoldville. Reports of political collaboration be-
tween Tshombd and Mobutu, who will visit Katanga
shortly, are contributing to unsettle the atmosphere
CUBA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 12
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
6 July 1961
EAST GERMAN DISCONTENT . . , , . o . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 14
The East German people are showing concern that
Ulbricht's signature of a separate peace treaty with the
USSR will destroy any chance for German reunification,
curb East German access to West Berlin, and mean the
continuation of their drab living standard. Food
supply difficulties appear to have intensified long-
standing dissatisfaction with Ulbricht among middle-
and low-level party functionaries, who reportedly
attribute the shortages to the regime's agricultural
policies. Industrial workers in some districts appear
unresponsive to regime propaganda. At the party central
committee meeting of 3-4 July the regime moved to meet
these problems by assigning high priority to the im-
provement of the living standard and instituting a
shake-u in the to economic planning apparatus.
CROP AND LIVESTOCK PROSPECTS IN THE USSR . . . . . . . . . Page 16
Prospects for Soviet agriculture in 1961 appear to
be better than average. An unusually mild winter and
a favorable spring should assure a good winter grain
crop in the European USSR, and larger herds and better
feed supplies point to a somewhat better year for the
livestock industry than 1960. Prospects for spring
grain, however, are still uncertain, particularly in
the important Ne it moisture re-
serves are low.
YUGOSLAV FOREIGN MINISTER TO VISIT MOSCOW . . . . . . . Page 17
Yugoslav Foreign Minister Popovic will begin a visit
to the Soviet Union on 7 July at a time of uneasiness
in bloc-Yugoslav relations. Moscow probably will make
a special effort to gain support for its policy on Ger-
many, and may hope to influence the neutralist conference
this September in Yugoslavia. The USSR will not find
Popovic easy to deal with, primarily because Belgrade's
hand has been strengthened by the neutrals' increased
ability during the past year to act collectively on
the international scene.
COMMUNIST CHINA'S 40TH PARTY ANNIVERSARY . . . . . . . . Page 18
Peiping played down the celebration of the 40th
anniversary of the founding of the Chinese Communist
party on 1 July, probably primarily because of its
domestic economic difficulties did not permit it to
indulge in the claims of achievement customary on such
occasions. It does not appear that the USSR will pro-
vide the help Peiping needs to solve its economic prob-
lems; the communique signed on 19 June at the conclu-
sion of the Sino-Soviet economic talks indicates that
neither side was satisfied with the results and that
economic relations have not been restored to their
former state,
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6 July 1961
PEIPING ACCENTS PEACEFUL APPROACH TO TAIWAN ISSUE . . . . Page 20
Chinese Communist leaders have seized several oppor-
tunities recently to re-emphasize Peiping's peaceful
approach to the Taiwan issue. Mao Tse-tung, for example,
has asserted that he has no intention of "shooting his
way into a strong point like Taiwan,"and a leading
foreign policy spokesman has declared that Peiping does
not intend to take the island by armed force since such
a course might lead to world war. However, in pursuing
this "peaceful" tactic--probably dictated by recogni-
tion of the present limitations of its strength--Peiping
does not preclude the use of force if a suitable occasion
should arise.
Japanese observers view Prime Minister Ikeda's talks
with President Kennedy as the beginning of a period of
full-fledged participation in world affairs that will
require Japan to accept increased international responsi-
bilities. Press coverage of the visit was unusually
favorable; most of Japan's political observers believe
the trip has improved Ikeda's domestic position.
Page 22
EARLY INDEPENDENCE SEEN FOR KENYA . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 23
London's announcement on 28 June that a new constitu-
tion for Kenya will be discussed this year suggests that
early independence is being considered for the East Afri-
can colony. In an attempt to secure the cooperation of
African political parties, the British probably will soon
release Jomo Kenyatta--the hero of Kenya's Africans who
has been under detention for seven years for his alleged
role in managing the Mau Mau terrorist movement. However,
Kenyatta's return to active political life would intensify
fears among the minority tribes of Kikuyu domination,
bring about the eclipse of some relatively moderate
leaders, and cause many Europeans and Asians to leave
the colony.
GREEK POLITICAL SITUATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 24
Passage of a new electoral law by Parliament on 23
June has introduced pre-election atmosphere in Greece.
The government may schedule elections for this fall; in
any event, they must be held by May 1962. The new law
provides for a system of "reinforced proportional
representation" for the forthcoming election but stipu-
lates that all subsequent elections will be held under
a majority system favored by the present government.
The moderately conservative party of Premier Karamanlis
remains the strongest political force in Greece, followed
by the Communist-front EDA. The non-Communist opposi-
tion is fragmented, and some of its leaders may collabo-
rate with EDA.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
WEEKLY REVIEW
EAST-WEST RELATIONS
Moscow's handling of the
exchange of telegrams with the
US on Independence Day appears
to have been intended as a sign
of the Kremlin's interest in
keeping open the channel of
communication established at
Vienna, despite the strident
Soviet line on Berlin. Although
Khrushchev's telegram to the
President referred to the
"urgent solution of problems"
left by the war--i.e., Germany
and Berlin--his greeting adopted
a cordial tone, referred favor-
ably to the Vienna meeting, and
concluded with the assertion
that "the Soviet and American
peoples by right must go down
in history" as having made a
"decisive contribution" to
peace.
The turnout of the top
Soviet leaders at the American
Embassy reception on 4 July and
Khrushchev's public display of
conviviality also suggest an
effort to keep tension over
Berlin below a level which would
foreclose the chance of nego-
tiations.
Soviet officials in pri-
vate remarks had earlier pointed
to the possibility of negotiat-
ing on Berlin. Arkady Sobolev,
a top Foreign Ministry official
and former ambassador to the
UN, told the British ambassador
that a hopeful sign was the
fact that both Khrushchev and
the President on the same day
had made references to nego-
tiations. In a brief discussion
with Ambassador Thompson, Deputy
Foreign Minister Firyubin and
his wife, presidium member
Furtseva, indicated their con-
cern over the Berlin situation
but stated that it was necessary
to be "sensible" about the prob-
lem. Furtseva also told the
Canadian ambassador that it was
necessary to settle the Berlin
problem this "or next" year.
a treaty with Germany must be
concluded this year. The joint
Soviet - North Vietnamese com-
muniqud of 4 July stated that
further postponement was in-
tolerable and that a treaty
"must be signed this year."
Soviet and most European
satellite commentaries on the
President's statement on Ber-
lin have also adopted the general
line that negotiations have become
a distinct possibility, as a re-
sult of the President's remarks
and Khrushchev's speech of 28 June.
Both Radio Moscow and the
TASS account published in Pravda
highlighted the President's
"allegation" that the Soviet pro-
posals were a threat to European
and American security and that the
United States was determined to
defend its vital interests in Ber-
lin. Equal prominence, however,
was given to the President's re-
ported willingness to discuss the
issues. Warsaw speculated that a
conference would materialize, prob-
ably at the foreign ministers' level.
Soviet press reporting of
Western reaction to Khrushchev's
28 June speech also gave the
impression that attention was
focusing on negotiations over
Berlin. Pravda's editorial of
30 June made this point by stating:
"It is now the turn of statesmen
of all interested countries to
find mutually acceptable solutions
by means of negotiations."
In the final sessions be-
fore recessing until the next
meetings in Moscow on 17 July
the Soviet representative at
the Soviet-American disarmament
discussions adhered closely to
his earlier position. He
reiterated that negotiations
in a multilateral forum would
be desirable only if agree-
ment were reached on a
Moscow, however, has main- program for complete and
tained its public position that general disarmament.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
In a final lengthy recapitula-
tion of Moscow's position, So-
viet chief representative `Lorin
stressed that the best way to
proceed would be to consider
specific proposals, that com-
plete and general disarmament
was the only solution, and that
the USSR remained prepared to
accept any US controls if the
Soviet disarmament scheme were
accepted.
In answer to a series of
US questions, Zorin provided
some evidence that the Soviet
objective was a general state-
ment along the lines of the In-
dian resolution submitted at the
last General Assembly. He in-
dicated that this resolution
might provide common ground for
an agreement, if the United
States was prepared to work on
both a full treaty and certain
initial measures without preju-
dicing the goal of complete
and general disarmament. He
asked whether the US could ac-
cept the Indian resolution or at
least part of it.
This line suggests that
when the talks resume in Moscow
the USSR may intend to propose
a dual approach. The Soviets
previously have hinted that they
might be inclined toward two
sets of disarmament talks, cov-
ering initial measures in one
conference and a complete treaty
in the other. Such an approach
would be used by Moscow as an
opportunity to support the pro-
posals to incorporate the nuclear
test ban as a first step in the
context of general disarmament,
and thereby attempt to prolong
the current negotiations in
Geneva.
The Soviet note of 5 July,
replying to the US note of 17
June on the nuclear test ban
negotiations, strongly reaffirmed
the uncompromising Soviet
stand and charged the US with
attempting to delay indefinitely
the conclusion of an agreement
not only on nuclear testing but
also on general disarmament.
In a long polemic, Moscow accused
the US of being interested
only in preparing a justifica-
tion for resuming tests.
The note contended that
the US made a nuclear test ban
a preliminary condition to gener-
al. disarmament in order to dis-
rupt negotiations on both issues.
It further claimed that hopes
for a re-examination of the ''ob-
structionist" policy of the pre-
vious US administration had not
been justified.
On the issues involved,
the note repeated the same gen-
eral line of the Vienna memoran-
dum of 4 June and defended the
Soviet "troika" proposals. It
contained no indication that
the USSR would break off the
Geneva talks at this time.
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The Communist bloc is con-
-Lin.uing to represent the Zurich
communique as evidence of a
significant reconciliation of
the three rival Laotian factions
and is pressing at Geneva for
acceptance of the statement as
an "official" declaration of
Laotian neutrality. In an ap-
parent effort to sidetrack any
discussion of Western control
proposals for Laos, Soviet dele-
gate Pushkin on 29 June proposed
to the senior UK delegate that
the conference consider neutral-
ity drafts.
The Polish representative
followed up by calling on the
conference in an address on 30
June to adopt the Zurich deci-
sions as the basis for a dec-
laration of neutrality. Commu-
nist China?s Foreign Minister
Chen Yi on July forcefully
underscored the bloc's conten-
tion that discussion of neutral-
ity drafts be the next order
of business.
Pushkin agreed to meet with
British and Canadian delegates
on 2 July to review the latest
instruction to the Internation-
al Control Commission (ICC) from
the Geneva co-chairmen, but he
maintained stiff opposition to
any change in the note and in
fact reserved the right to with-
draw it because the UK had
stopped the message in trans-
mission. The note, which was
the result of weeks of wrangling
over the ICC's lack of equipment
to carry out its task in Laos,
provided that materiel and trans-
pormation for the commission
would be supplied by the three
Laotian factions. This aspect
of the agreement, to which the
Canadians raised strong objec-
tions, would in effect give the
Pathet Lao forces a veto over
the movement of the ICC.
The Chinese Communist an-
nouncement on 3 July that Chen
Yi was being recalled to Pei-
ping stated that he would return
to Geneva at "any time conditions
warrant it." In his farewell
address to the conference Chen
warned that the present state
of affairs "must not continue
any longer" and urged the con-
ference "to proceed to substan-
tive negotiations." He said
Western efforts to set up ef-
fective controls in Laos amounted
to "procrastination," which he
said "will never ensure a peace-
ful situation."
The contending factions in
Laos continue to mark time while
awaiting further talks among
the three Laotian princes on
the formation of a coalition
government. The delay in the
return of the various leaders
from Europe makes it unlikely
that talks can be resumed be-
fore mid-July at the earliest.
Souvanna Phouma has delayed
his departure from Paris for an-
other week to undergo an opera-
tion, while Souphannouvong,
stopping over in Moscow, Peiping,
and Hanoi, is unlikely to reach
the rebel headquarters in Xieng
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Khouang until this week end.
Prime Minister Boun Oum, the
first of the leaders to return,
arrived in Vientiane on 30 June
and General Phoumi on 4 July
Luang Prabang J.
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following his visit to Washing-
ton.
On his arrival in Vientiane,
Boun Oum told the press that,
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
after his concessions to Souvanna
and Souphannouvong in the Zurich
communique, it now was up to
the opposition to show a "con-
ciliatory" spirit. General
Phoumi later claimed to the
press in Bangkok that it had
been agreed at Zurich that nei-
ther Souvanna nor Souphannouvong
would be suitable as premier of
a coalition government as both
have been "too much involved"
in the situation; this asser-
tion, however, is unsubstan-
tiated by any other reports on
the meeting.
During brief stopovers in
Bangkok en route to Vientiane,
both Boun Oum and Phoumi held
consultations with Marshal
Sarit, who presumably argued
for a hard line by the Vientiane
government. There is evidence
that Thai leaders view the sit-
uation in Laos with increasing
alarm, and Ambassador Young,
returning to Bangkok after a
four-week absence, found the
climate of opinion noticeably
gloomier.
At a ceremonial reception
the King took the ambassador
aside to inform him that there
was considerable confusion in
the Thai Government and that
the country was in danger.
Premier Sarit also recently
told the ambassador that he
fears the effects of the Laotian
situation may overtake Thailand
before programs to strengthen
the country have any impact.
Foreign Minister Thanat has pre-
dicted that Laos will be lost
to the Communists if the Zurich
communique is implemented and a
coalition government organized
under Souvanna; he also told
the ambassador that "SEATO is
all but lost."
The Laotian government,
Pathet Lao, and Souvanna dele-
gations assembled informally at
Namone on 3 July in an effort
to revive the stalemated politi-
cal and military talks, but were
unable to resolve their differ-
ences over whether the ICC
should be permitted to attend
the sessions. The Souvanna
group has disputed the govern-
ment's contention that an agree-
ment to seat the ICC at the talks
had been reached at Zurich. No
temporary compromise could be
reached, but another meeting
is scheduled for 7 July.
Military action during the
past several days has been
limited to minor skirmishes,
generally resulting from mopping-
up activity by the opposing
sides in their areas of control.
The most noteworthy actions have
been several probing attacks
against government positions
about 30 miles north of Vien-
tiane and the occupation by
anti-Vientiane forces of one
post 30 miles north of Pak
Sane.
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FRANCE-ALGERIA
Recent PAG actions indi-
cate that French threats to
partition the country have only
stiffened the resolve of the
provisional Algerian government
(PAG) to maintain the indivisi-
bility and territorial integrity
of Algeria and the Sahara The
demonstrations against parti-
tion-staged in response to the
PAG?s call for a day of "na-
tional struggle" by Moslems in
Algeria--also serve as a warn-
ing of more drastic use of the
Moslem masses should France
attempt to carry out its threat.
The PAG communique on 1
July stated that partition "would
signify an indefinite prolonga
tion of the waro..and, far from
guaranteeing the position of
the Europeans in Algeria, would
compromise their future defini-
tively." French settler reac-
tion has been obscured by the
Moslem demonstrations.
Ahmed Boumendj el , one
of the PAG negotiators, stated
on 26 June that the PAG antici-
pated no change in the French
position and expected that re-
sumed talks would last at most
only a few days and then be
definitely abandoned. He said:
that it was clear that the French
would not accept the establish-
ment of a truly independent Al-
gerian state which included the
Sahara.
AG was prepared to make signif-
icant concessions on bases,
rights for European, and eco-
nomic cooperation, but could
never agree to the "amputation
of four fifths of Algeria."
Top PAG leaders, meanwhile,
have left for Morocco, Libya,
the UAR, Mali, and Guinea in an
effort to try to counter the
French position that the dis-
position of the Sahara must be
decided by all adjoining states.
PAG premier Ferhat Abbas went
to Rabat, minister of armaments
Ab.delhafid Boussouf is sched-
uled to visit Bamako and Conakry,
and deputy premier Belkacem
Krim has gone to Tripoli and
Cairo.
They will probably suc-
ceed in obtaining strong state-
ments of support from the non-
Saharan states--the UAR and
Guinea--as they did from Saudi
Arabia. However, the border
states--particularly those un-
der Arab rule--are likely to do
no more than soften their par-
ticular demands until an Algerian
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settlement is reached and ac-
cord public gestures of sup-
port. The PAG, incensed par-
ticularly by Tunisian President
Bourguiba's public stand that
the Sahara is an "African prob-
lem," is probably also trying
to muster sufficient support to
force Bourguiba to modify his
position. The US Embassy in
Tunis notes that, since no com-
muniqu6 was issued following
the 1 July PAG meeting with
Tunisian leaders, it is doubt-
ful that any understanding was
reached.
Paris has for some time
conceded the inevitability of
eventual independence for an
Algeria minus the Sahara. Since
the recess of the Evian negotia-
tions, France has attempted--
notably with De Gaulle's remarks
on regroupment and his announce-
ment that withdrawal of army
divisions was to begin--to force
the issue and get the search for
PAG statements that their a settlement moving again. The
"foreign ministry" would. prob- public admission on 4 July by
ably move from Tunis to Cairo-- the French information director
"where contacts with Eastern in Algiers that FLN support
and Arab states would be easier" among the Moslems is "total"
--is not only a measure of PAG
irritation with Tunis, but also
suggests some hardening of the
PAG position. The departure
of the PAG leaders on their mis-
sion to the Sahara border states.
points up their refusal to make
concessiois and also suggests
they feel that time is on ti- sir
side and teat intern_a ti cna]_
opinion will in the long run
support them.
reinforces earlier indications
by the French that they tacit-
ly accept the PAG as the spokes-
man for the Moslem population,
although formal French recogni-
tion is rigidly denied.
Should the bilateral nego-
tiations be resumed, Paris will
probably continue to refuse to
turn over Algeria to the PAG
without the formality of a ref-
erendum. An agreement between
France and the PAG would permit
both to support acceptance of
the transfer in a referendum
campaign. An agreement satis-
factory to France would provide
at least minimal military base
rights and assure political
guarantees to European settlers
and pro-French Moslems. T-71
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
KU/iAIT
The British military build- summer heat--inherent in re-
up in Kuwait, which began with taming its forces there for
the landing of marine commandos any considerable period and
from the carrier Bulwark on 1
July, has reached substantial
porportions. London announced
on 6 July that the movement of
British troops into Kuwait had
been completed but that some of
the heavy equipment following
by sea will arrive later. Brit-
ish strength in Kuwait now is
greater than Iraqi strength in
the Basra - Ash Shuaybah area
of Iraq. Moreover, the regular
Kuwaiti armed force of about
1.200 men has been sunnlemented
It appears unlikely under
these circumstances that Qasim
will attempt a military move
against Kuwait. An official
statement issued by the Iraqi
Foreign Ministry on 3 July
claimed that Iraq had never in-
tended to use any but peaceful
methods to "restore its legiti-
mate rights in Kuwait." The
statement categorically denied
that Iraq had concentrated troops
anywhere and accused British
"imperialism" of "-'spreading and
fabricating reports" to justify
the presence of British troops
in the Persian Gulf area "under
the pretext of protecting the
Kuwaiti sheiks against an imagi-
nary invasion."
Qasim, however, may soon
undertake a dramatic anti-Brit-
ish gesture of a different sort.
Among the possibilities would
be government-organized demon-
strations against the British
Embassy in Baghdad, severance
of diplomatic relations, or a
move to nationalize the Iraq
Petroleum Company.
London maintains that its
forces will be withdrawn from
Kuwait at the Ruler's request
but does not anticipate that
the crisis will subside suf-
ficiently for such a request
to be made until after 14 July--
the third anniversary of Qasim's
revolution. Britain now is
considering its next moves,
particularly the many problems--
including Kuwait's extreme
whether it would be advisable
for a UN or Arab force to re-
place them.
Most of the Iraqi people,
including a number of anti-
Qasim elements, have come to
believe that Qasim's claim to
Kuwait is valid and, if only
for nationalistic reasons,
they think that their country
should eventually absorb Kuwait.
Most Arab governments 25X1
on roue 25X1
to oppose Iraq's rig to
annex Kuwait. However, Arab
criticism of the British mili-
tary presence is increasing,
and the UAR has announced that
it will not proceed with its
plan to sponsor Kuwaiti member-
ship in the United Nations
until British troops are with-
drawn. Arab League efforts to
mediate the Iraqi-Kuwaiti dis-
pute have so far achieved lit-
tle; the "emergency" meeting
of the league has been post-
poned until 12 July.
Kuwaiti representatives who
arrived in New York on the eve-
ning of 4 July began presentation
of their case before the UN Se-
curity Council on the following
day. An extraordinary session
of the Council on 2 July had heard
arguments expounded by Iraqi
and British delegates.
Soviet propaganda has fol-
lowed up its initial factual
account of the Kuwaiti crisis
by accusing Great Britain of
stepping up tension throughout
the Arab world by its provoca-
tive action, and at the 5 July
UN Security Council session, the
Soviet delegate called for the
"immediate withdrawal" of British
troops from Kuwait. Moscow radio,
meanwhile, continues to broadcast
official denials from Baghdad of
any Iraqi troop concentrations
near the Iraq-Kuwait border.
In contrast to the rest of
the Communist bloc, Peiping in
effect took a public stand against
Iraq in a message of 29 June wel-
coming Kuwait's independence. The
Chinese were apparently surprised
and concerned by the speed of the
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
UK troops' entry into Kuwait
and decided that the main thrust
of their propaganda should be
the exploitation of Arab fears
of returning British influence.
A 4 July Peo le's Dail editor
Tial joined tthe rstothe bloc
in condemning Anglo-American
"imperialist intervention" in
Kuwait. The editorial reaffirmed
Chinese support for Kuwait's in-
dependence, but declared that
there were "two sides" to the
"complicated" issue, which should
be settled by peaceful negotia-
tions among the Arab countries
concerned.
SECRET
NEUTRAL
ZONE
ARABIA
6 JULY 1961
Road
Railroad
Oil pipeline
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SOUTH KOREA
The ouster of Lt. Gen.
Chang To-yong from the South
a:(orean military junta on 3 July
was a major move by Maj. Gen.
Pak Chong-hui to establish his
undisputed control of the pres-
ent military' regime. Chang, al-
though largely a figurehead,
was a potential rallying point
for opposition to Pak.
Chang's removal was quick-
:Ly followed by the arrest of
three other members of the rul-
ing Supreme Council for Nati.on-
l Reconstruction (SCNR) whose
loyalty to Pak was doubtful
nd the removal from active
duty of 40 general officers of
the army, navy, air force, and
marine corps.
In an obvious attempt to
discredit the former civilian
government, the regime has pub-
licly accused former Prime Min-
ister Chang Myon, who is South
Korea's leading Roman Catholic
layman, and 11 of his polit-
ical associates of being Com-
munist collaborators. A prec-
edent has been established for
similar action against in-
tellectuals and students.
There are indications that
Pak may next attempt to reduce
the influence of the clique of
younger field-grade officers
in the SCNR who were prominent
with him in the planning and
execution of the 16 May coup.
The 40 officers removed
were largely rear-echelon dead-
wood or had undesirable politi-
cal affiliations.. Some had
been involved in past corrup-
-.ion, and the regime announced
that all ha.d "voluntarily" re-
tired to make way for the promo-
t.:ion of junior officers.
Pak's brother-in-law,
national security boss Lt. Col.
Kim Chong-pil, is a leader of
the impatient reform-minded
younger element. As the head
of the recently formed central
intelligence agency, Kim has
been moving to consolidate in
police-state fashion all security
affairs under his and presumably
Pak's control. However, his
loyalty to Pak is uncertain.
Inasmuch as some of Pak's strong-
est support has dome from the
younger officer group, an
attempt to reduce their power
could precipitate a bitter and
possibly violent power struggle
within the junta. 25X1
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Moderate Leopoldville poli-
ticians still have not adopted
a common front on the policy to
be followed toward the Stanley-
ville and Elisabethville re-
gimes. The reconvening of par-
liament has consequently been
further postponed, and an early
meeting seems unlikely. Kasavu-
bu on 5 July signed an order
convening parliament on 15 July;
however, the provision that the
two houses will hold their ac-
tual first session on a date to
be set by their outgoing presi-
dents is expected to result in
further delays.
There is growing friction
among Mobutu, Foreign Minister
Bomboko, and Interior Minister
Adoula--who have been dominating
the Leopoldville political
scene. Adoula, who seems to
have the broadest parliamentary
support of any Congolese, has
been advocating an early meet-
ing of parliament. He has told
American officials he hopes to
reach a compromise with Gizenga,
in which the Stanleyville lead-
er would accept a minor role
in a new government.
Mobutu and Bomboko, how-
ever, seem doubtful that the
moderates can control the legis-
lature, particularly if Katanga
maintains its present separatist
course and refuses to attend.
Bomboko recently persuaded
Kasavubu not to issue a decree
calling for a parliamentary
meeting on 3 July. He has
since modified his position
somewhat but still believes
that extensive negotiations
among the anti-Gizenga forces
are necessary before the legis-
lature can be permitted to
assemble.
Mobutu reportedly feels
that too many concessions have
already been made to the Stan-
leyville regime and is prepared
to take issue with Gizenga on
procedural as well as substan-
tive matters. He stated recent-
ly that he, Tshomb6, and the
premier of Albert Kalonji's
South Kasai state had agreed
that the parliament buildings
in Leopoldville, rather than
Lovanium University on the
edge of the city, should be the
site of the parliamentary meet-
ing. He stated further that
if this should be unacceptable
to Gizenga, the Legislature
should convene without repre-
sentatives from Stanleyville.
Economic considerations
are still putting pressure on
Gizenga to come to terms with
Leopoldville. The Stanleyville
regime has fallen behind in pay-
ments to its troops, and Gizenga
was forced to cancel an Independ-
ence Day parade on 30 June
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because of the shortage of gaso-
line.
The first flight of a pro-
jected airline from Athens to
Stanleyville via Cairo and
Khartoum arrived in Stanleyville
on 1 July. The airline allegedly
is financed by Greek capital
and the gold reserves of the
25X1 Gizen a regime. but
25X1 I believe
that some of the backing came
from the UAR. The airline would
provide the first direct link
between Stanleyville and the
outside world and could furnish
considerable material and moral
support to Gizenga.
The Elisabethville regime
continued its intransigent at-
titude toward Leopoldville on
4 July with a parliamentary
resolution.--passed with less
25X1
than a quorum present--repudi-
ating agreements made by Tshom-
be before he left Leopoldville.
The military agreement between
Tshombe and Mobutu apparently
is still in operation, and Mo-
butu has scheduled a visit to
"his troops" in Katanga next
week.
Tshombe's absence on "dip-
lomatic leave" probably will
preclude any early change in the
Katanga position. In the mean-
time, UN officers who are nego-
tiating with the Katangans over
the retaining of Tshombe's
forces report that Mobutu's rep-
resentatives are doing little
to establish their influence
with the Elisabethville troops.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Using the occasion of a
visit to a new Czechoslovak in-
dustrial and commercial exhibi-
tion in Havana, Fidel Castro re-
marked on 28 June that "we who
have undertaken the road of
socialism are encouraged by all
that they the Czechs7 have
achieved, and we are sure that
our people will follow the same
road victoriously." The Castro
regime's official newspaper
Revolucion said on 30 June
that the Cuban premier may visit
Czechoslovakia in August. This
would be Castro's first visit
to a bloc country.
Foreign Minister Raul Roa
returned to Havana on 30 June
after a 12-day stay in Prague
and a three-day stopover in
Mexico City following his par-
ticipation in the preparatory
conference of nonaligned nations
in Cairo. He was apparently un-
successful in an attempt to ob-
tain an audience with Mexican
President Lopez Mateos
The Cuban delegation at
Cairo, under Roa's aggres-
sive leadership, successfully
pressed to have Mexico,
Brazil, Ecuador, and Bolivia
invited to the forthcoming
full conference, according
to Roa; of these, only Bra-
zil sent an observer to the
Cairo meeting. There is as
yet no evidence that any
of these four nations plan
to attend, however.
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As a result of Soviet
prodding, party leader Ulbricht
since December has followed
certain "soft" policies to-
ward the East German populace
and has refrained for the most
part from harassing West Berlin.
The motives are to reduce pub-
lic antipathy to his regime,
to improve its image abroad,
and especially to reduce the
flow of refugees to West Berlin.
He has encouraged East Germans
to air their grievances by
submitting petitions to the
Council of State, which he
heads, and has removed un-
popular and ineffective offs.-
cials on charges of "sectar-
ianism." Above all, he gave
the people reason to hope for
a steady improvement of their
unsatisfactory standard of
living as well. as for a diminu-
tion of party demands on pro-
fessional men and intellectuals.
Whatever benefits may have
accrued to the regime in terms
of a less restive population,
however, appear to have dis-
sipated quickly with the USSR's
end hopes for German reunifi-
cation, curb East German access
to 1iest Berlin, and mean the
indefinite continuation of
their drab existence.
Contributing to the change
of public attitudes has been
a coincidental period of sharp
--although probably short-term
--food supply difficulties.
The US Mission in Berlin re-
ports that, as a result of the
unsatisfactory food situation
and the threat to West Berlin,
the population reflects a mood
of "profound discouragement."
Middle- and lower-level func-
tionaries of the Socialist
Unity party (SED) are openly
blaming Ulbricht's collectivi-
zation policies for shortages
of meat and dairy products.
Industrial workers are said to
be increasingly unresponsive
to SED propaganda, because of
the regime's inability to satis-
fy their demands for improved
supplies of foodstuffs and eon-
sumer goods.
current demands for a peace j The mission also notes
treaty. The people now are that a question put to Ulbricht
deeply concerned that a separate I by workers at the important
Soviet - East German treaty will Buna chemical plant on 26 June
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
indicated considerable anxiety
as to why the USSR and East
Germany were forcing the
peace treaty issue at this
time.
Ulbricht's "soft" poli-
cies, moreover, have not re-
duced the refugee flow: 19,198
East Germans fled this June,
compared with 17,888 last June.
The combined flow to West Ber-
lin and West Germany during
the first six months of 1961
totaled 103,159, as against
88,506 in the same period last
year.
Ulbricht and his henchmen
are seeking to convince the
population through numerous
public statements that the re-
gime is here to stay, will in-
evitably be recognized by the
Western powers, and will achieve
international recognition as
a United Nations member.
In an effort to alleviate
discontent, the SED central com-
mittee plenum of 3-4 July issued
a communique calling for priority
attention to measures for im-
proving the standard of living,
such as "guaranteeing supplies
of foodstuffs, industrial con-
sumer goods, dwellings, and
services to people."
The plenum also made major
changes in the regime's top eco-
nomic planning apparatus. Pol-
itburo member Bruno Leuschner
has relinquished the chairman-
ship of the State Planning Com-
mission, but he remains a deputy
premier with the task of coordi-
nating economic planning. As
new chairman of the planning
commission, Karl Mewis, former
SED leader in Rostock District,
will be responsible for short-
term planning--a highly vulner-
able spot.
Politburo member Alfred
Neumann, who has had over-all
charge of party cadre matters
since 1957, is to head the new-
ly created People's Economic
Council--in charge of long-term
planning at the Council of Min-
isters level, Erich Apel has
moved from chief of the polit-
buro's economic commission to
become SED central committee
secretary for economic affairs;
he was also made a candidate
member of the politburo.
Neither Mewis nor Neumann
has had previous high-level eco-
nomic planning experience. They
apparently are to use their admin-
istrative talents along with 25X1
Apel and Leuschner to make the
economy
5X1
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
After two mediocre crop
years, prospects for Soviet
agriculture in 1961 appear
better than average. An
unusually mild winter and a
favorable spring should assure
a good winter grain crop in the
European USSR, and larger herds
and better feed supplies point
to a somewhat better year for
the livestock industry than
1960. Prospects for spring
grain, however, are still
uncertain, particularly in the
important New Lands area where
soil moisture reserves are low.
Weather during the remainder of
the growing season will be a
critical factor.
In contrast to the previous
year--when about 20,000,000 acres
had to be reseeded to spring
crops because of winter kill and
spring dust storms--temperature
and precipitation in the Euro-
pean USSR this past winter and
spring averaged well above nor-
mal. The Soviet press has
described the condition of winter
grains as varying from "satis-
factory" to "excellent." Plans
for spring seeding, which was
slowed somewhat by rains in
late April and early May, have
been overfulfilled for most
major crops. The recent rains
have interfered with the culti-
vation of spring crops, however,
and since winter grains in the
Ukraine are unusually tall,
lodging may present a harvesting
problem.
Spring came very early in
the New Lands, and spring seed-
ing, particularly in Tselina
Kray in northern Kazakhstan,
was completed earlier than in
previous years. Precipitation
was near normal during the
winter, but it tapered off in
the spring, and soil moisture
reserves at the end of May were
low. In recent weeks the New
Lands have experienced ex-
ceptionally high temperatures
which have caused a rapid loss
of soil moisture.
The relatively mild, moist
winter and early spring have
aided the Soviet livestock
industry. The Soviets apparent-
ly entered 1961 with a consider-
ably better feed supply and some-
what larger livestock herds than
a year earlier. However, the
total output of meat in the early
months of 1961 was probably less
than during the same period in
1960. According to Soviet re-
ports, production at state
slaughterhouses was 13 percent
below that of the same period
in 1960, when feed shortages
caused distress slaughtering
of livestock. State meat pro-
duction during the first quar-
ter of 1960 was 35 percent above
that of the same period a year
earlier.
There have been reports
this past winter and spring of
food shortages--particularly
of meat. Apparently these
shortages were mainly in quality
foods and were not widespread
or prolonged. Because of the
great improvement in the supply
of all types of food in the last
decade and the regime's promises
of improvements in the living
standard, the average Soviet
citizen probably expects more
and is more likely to complain
of a situation which in former
years he would have accepted
as normal.
(Prepared by ORR)
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
YUGOSLAV FOREIGN MINISTER TO VISIT MOSCOW
Yugoslav Foreign Minister
Popovic will begin a visit to
the Soviet Union on 7 July, the
first such high-level trip since
the regime's trouble shooter,
Vukmanovic-Tempo, journeyed
there in January 1960. Popovic's
trip was originally scheduled
for early May but was postponed
when Soviet Foreign Minister
Gromyko attended the Geneva
conference on Laos. Since then,
Popovic has had a full schedule,
with a visit to The Netherlands
.n late May, attendance at the
preparatory conference of neu-
tral states in Cairo in early
June, and the visit of Italian
Foreign Minister Segni to Bel-
grade in late June.
The Popovic visit comes at
a time of uneasiness in bloc-
Yugoslav relations. While re-
lations at the state level be-
tween Yugoslavia and the USSR
are relatively normal, Belgrade
was piqued by the original post-
ponement of Popovic's, visit, and
recent propaganda from both
states shows much basic animosity.
In early June, a Moscow broad-
cast to Italy thoroughly con-
demned "Yugoslav revisionism,"
and Yugoslavia is currently
publishing Dr. Zhivago despite
past Soviet protests.
In addition, Yugoslavia has
just published a 13-volume col-
lection of Tito's memoires, and
portions thus far excerpted in
Borba, Belgrade's leading daily,
ha-"e portrayed Soviet foreign
policy in the days leading up
to ,Vorld ,Var II in a most un-
favorable light. Presumably,
similarly adverse descriptions
of more recent Soviet policies
will follow. Yugoslavia's re-
l.atons with the other bloc
states, with the exception of
Poland and Fast Germany, range
from poor to bad.
Belgrade probably believes
that Popovic's visit will be
beneficial, nonetheless, as a
source of information and pres-
tige. The Yugoslavs hope to
gain insights into current dif-
ferences among members of the
bloc--particularly the Soviet-
Albanian feud--and will play
up the trip as proof that the
Kremlin cannot ignore Yugo-
slavia's role in international
affairs, no matter how strongly
it condemns Belgrade's "re-
visionism." Popovic may also
hope to learn the extent to
which Yugoslav ideology may be
attacked in the "coming debate
of the theses for the 22nd So-
viet party congress.
The Soviets, for their
part, probably hope to gain
greater Yugoslav support for
their current foreign policies,
particularly on the German ques-
tion, since Yugoslavia is the
only non-bloc state which main-
tains diplomatic relations with
East Germany. Moscow may also
hope to exert some influence
on the neutralist summit con-
ference scheduled to convene
in Belgrade on 1 September.
Shortly after the conclusion
of the preparatory conference
in Cairo, the Soviet charge
paid an urgent call on Tito.
The USSR will not find
Popovic easy to deal with, pri-
marily because Belgrade's hand
has been strengthened by the
neutrals' increased ability
during the past year to act col-
lectively on the international
scene. While Belgrade has re-
iterated its general support of
the Soviet line on Germany and
Berlin, it has disapproved of
the details of Khrushchev's
scheme to reorganize the UN and
of his plan to merge the nuclear
testing and disarmament issues.
The visit will demonstrate to
Moscow that Belgrade's support
cannot be expected on as many
Soviet policies as a year ago.
It could, therefore, exacerbate
Soviet-Yugoslav relations rather
than lead to greater cooper-
ation in international affairs-
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
COMMUNIST CHINA'S 40TH PARTY ANNIVERSARY
Peiping played down the 40th
anniversary of the founding of
the Chinese Communist party on
1 July. Domestic difficulties
--including a dislocated economy
and serious food shortages--orob-
ably loomed large in the re-
gime's decision to avoid a gala
celebration. The keynote speak-
er, Liu Shao-chi, admitted that
"shortcomings in our work" as
well as natural disasters had
contributed to the present "tem-
porary difficulties."
Liu's address was largely
a reaffirmation of past party
programs and provided few indi-
cations of how Peiping proposes
to solve the problems some of its
ill-conceived programs have
raised. Liu endorsed as "abso-
lutely right and entirely neces-
sary" the "three red banners":
the general line, the great leap
forward, and the people's com-
munes--Mao Tse-tung's hurry-up
economic programs which contrib-
uted in large measure to China's
present economic plight and its
strained relations with Moscow.
He revealed no economic goals
for the coming year, calling only
for "all-out support of agricul-
ture" as a way out of the cur-
rent difficulties.
Liu's fairly restrained
and sober account of past his-
tory and of the present situation
was in marked contrast to the
tone of braggadocio adopted in
major speeches several years ago
when the leap-forward programs
were just beginning.
Liu's speech contained only
minimal praise for the Soviet
Union. He acknowledged Moscow's
6 July 61
contributions in experience and
aid and endorsed last year's
Moscow conference. Soviet com-
mentary on the anniversary cited
China's "tremendous" contribution
to the development of the world
Communist movement. Unlike Pei-
ping, however, Moscow did not
give Mao personal credit for
China's success and emphasized
the long way Peiping must yet
go to achieve socialism.
The continuing strain in
Sino-Soviet relations was ap-
parent in the communique issued
in Moscow on 19 June following
the signing of a new agreement
on economic and technical coop-
eration. Conspicuously absent
from the communique were any
details as to the agreement
reached. . Agreement on major:
points at issue would be neces-
sary if anything like the former
schedule for the construction of
large modern industrial facili-
ties by the Soviets in China were
to be met. It may be that nei-
ther party wishes public dis-
closure of what is probably a
significant scale-down of Soviet
economic commitments to China.
It is also possible that no mean-
ingful agreement has yet been
reached and that Soviet economic
activities in China will remain
subject to short-term political
factors.
The only clear-cut state-
ment to date that Soviet economic
assistance to China will continue
at all was made by S. A. Skachkov,
head of the government depart-
ment which handles the USSR's
foreign economic aid programs,
at a reception following the
signing of the agreement. He
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
said the Soviet party and govern-
ment, and Khrushchev himself,
have "paid more attention to
the requests of the Chinese
People's Republic" regarding eco-
nomic and scientific cooperation,
and that the Soviet Government
will provide technical assistance
to the Chinese from 1961 to 1967
in the construction and expan-
sion of "large enterprises" in
the metallurgical, chemical,
oil, and machine-building in-
dustries and in the construction
of hydroelectric power plants.
It appears from this that
the new agreement is to cover
the same period as the former
oone--through 1967--and that it
entails Soviet assistance--al-
though in what form is not
clear--in similar sectors of
China's heavy industry. The
question of Soviet technicians
has been left unanswered, al-
though deliveries of complex
Soviet industrial equipment
would seem to require the pres-
ence of at least some Soviet
t,echni cians .
There is as yet no evidence
that Sino-Soviet economic rela-
tions have improved significant-
ly from the ambiguous state
reached in the winter of 1960-61.
Trade continues, although de-
tailed information on key items
and the quantities involved is
lacking; business activity be-
tween the two countries appears
on the surface to be "as usual";
both parties have been circum-
spect in statements concerning
their economic relations. What
has not been said indicates con-
tinuing strains in the relation-
ship, and suggests that whatever
agreement has been reached was
not achieved easily, was not as
"satisfactory" as both sides
allege, and does not constitute
significant progress in restor-
ing Sino-Soviet economic rela-
tions to their former state of
meaningful cooperation.
On domestic affairs, Liu's
speech disclosed that the Chinese
party now has more than 17,000,-
000 members, an increase of
3,000,000 since 1959. He an-
nounced that Peiping would ini-
tiate a new "study" campaign--
probably involving persuasion
rather than the harsher methods
of "rectification"--in order to
overcome the confusion and loss
of party morale which has re-
sulted from the regime's recent
setbacks. Liu endorsed the
regime's "hundred flowers" policy
toward intellectuals, also a
policy of persuasion. He gave
no indication of Peiping's in-
tention to hold a party congress,
which constitutionally should
be called in 1961.
On foreign affairs, Liu re-
affirmed Peiping's determination
to liberate Taiwan--without speci-
fying a time limit--and repeated
Mao's characterization of Presi-
dent Kennedy as "more dangerous"
than Eisenhower.
The quiet celebrations in
Peiping were attended by Mao and
all of his inner core of lieuten-
ants except Chen Yun and Lin Piao,
Peiping apparently did not invite
guests from other Communist par-
ties. 25X1
pared jointly with ORR
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Chinese Communist leaders
have seized several opportuni-
ties recently to re-emphasize
their "peaceful" approach to
the Taiwan question. This tac-
tic, probably dictated by
Peiping's recognition that at
present it lacks sufficient
armed strength to force its way
onto the island, does not pre-
clude the use of force if a suit-
able occasion should arise.
Peiping's general outlook
on the issue was articulated
most recently by Liao Cheng-chih,
central committee member and a
leading spokesman on foreign
affairs, to a touring group of
Japanese businessme
EE a transcript o ao s re-
mar s was telegraphed to Japan
only after it had been checked
and approved by the Chinese,
According to this transcript,
Liao explained that Communist
China did not intend to try to
take Taiwan with armed force
since it feared such a course
"might lead to a world war." He
assigned no time limit to this
forbearance, but intimated
that it might take "five or ten
or even thirty years" to settle
the issue.
Other top Chinese leaders
have been sounding the same note.
Mao Tse-tung indicated
he had no intention of "shoot-
ing his way into a strong point
like Taiwan." Foreign Minister
Chen Yi is on record with a state-
ment late last year that Com-
munist China "will not start an
attack," Last week, Chen told
a Canadian television interview-
ing team that China hoped to
settle the Taiwan dispute peace-
fully and was actively seeking
such a solution.
In his talk with the Japa--
nese, Liao discussed several
"possibilities" for the eventual
solution of the issue. He assert-
ed that the problem might be
solved by the departure of the
Americans from the island, but
that it would be necessary to
"put pressure" on the US to
achieve this end. There is, in
fact, some evidence that Peiping
is trying to stimulate "pressure"
on the US by free-world nations
which have taken the position
that the continued confrontation
of strong US, Chinese Communist,
and Chinese Nationalist armed
forces in the Taiwan area poses
a serious threat to world peace.
Peiping's public statements
contrast the "peaceful" Chinese
approach to Taiwan with the per-
sistent "aggressive" actions by
the US in the area. To support
this Peiping recently has stepped
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up the number of "serious warn-
ings" on alleged US "intrusions"
into areas claimed by Peiping
and has diminished its military
pressure in the Taiwan Strait.
Communist shelling of the off-
shore islands is at a low point.
There was no artillery barrage
when Vice President Johnson
visited Taiwan in May; in con-
trast, President Eisenhower's
visit a year earlier was greeted
with a shelling of record inten-
sity. In addition, Chinese
Communist air forces have avoid-
ed several recent chances to en-
gage Chinese Nationalist planes
which ventured into mainland
air space, However, this fail-
ure may have been due as much
to technical as political con-
siderations.
sought to convey the impression
that all concessions in the past
on the Taiwan issue have come
from the Chinese side and that
it is time for the US to take
the initiative. Chou En-lai
Peiping has
25X1 a must
agree to withdraw its armed for-
ces from Taiwan and the Taiwan
Strait, Chen Yi told his Cana-
dian interviewers that any set-
tlement of the Taiwan issue
"depends entirely upon the US,"
Peiping probably estimates
that even a partial withdrawal
of US forces would significantly
depress Chinese Nationalist morale
and, perhaps, open the door to a
deal with Taipei on terms favor-
able to Peiping, This "possi-
bility" was discussed by Liao,
who saw a chance that eventually
"all, including Chiang Kai-shek,
will return home." In this
connection, the Chinese Com-
munists continue their routine
propaganda aimed at shaking
Chinese Nationalist confide
their American allies 25X1
ec n
of displeasure in Taipei with the
US over such developments as the
overtures to Outer Mongolia have
probably encouraged Peiping to
think further along these lines.
At the same time, Peiping
remains determined to
avoid any diplomatic action
which might be interpreted
as formalizing the exist-
ing division between Taiwan
and the mainland. The
Communists still refuse
to agree to US sugges-
tions that they renounce
the use of force in
settling the problem,
arguing that Peiping has
every right to use
force in an entirel
domestic matter. 25X1
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
JAPANESE REACTION TO PRIME MINISTER'S US VISIT
The reception accorded
Japanese Prime Minister Hayato
Ikeda during his visit to the
United States and his own forth-
right assertion of Japanese
views on international matters
have received an overwhelmingly
favorable response in Japan.
As a result, Ikeda approaches
a scheduled conservative party
and cabinet reshuffle with prob-
ably greater personal popularity
than when he first assumed of-
fice a year ago.
The Japanese press high-
lighted what it viewed as Ameri-
can recognition of Japan's im-
portance to the free world and
attention to Ikeda's views as
signs that US-Japanese.relations
have entered a new era of partner-
ship. Newspapers described
Ikeda's explanation of Japan's
position on such controversial
issues as Chinese Communist
representation in the UN and
resumption of nuclear testing
as possible only in a "frank
exchange of views" between
equals.
Political commentators wel-
comed the prospect of prior
consultation on major,US policy
shifts as giving Japan equal
standin with US allies in
Europe. They regarded this as
assurance that the Japanese
Government will not be "left
behind" in any review of China
policy, which they considered
the "most important topic" of
the Kennedy-Ikeda. talks.
Several editorial writers
have taken a new tack in point-
ing out that Japan's new inter-
national role will require the
Japanese to accept increased
responsibilities, especially in
extending economic assistance
to underdeveloped countries.
The press previously has sought
equality without acknowledging
that it would involve additional
Japanese obligations.
Editorial interest now is
shifting to the domestic politi-
cal consequences of the visit
as Ikeda faces party and probable
cabinet reorganizations this .
summer. Most Japanese political
observers believe that the trip
has strengthened his hand in
consolidating his political power.
Nevertheless, Ikeda's rivals in
the ruling Liberal-Democratic
party eng;aY?ed in a form of
mild opposition by initially re-
fusin- to be on hand at the air-
port to welcome the prime minister
on his return on 30 June. The
major factional leaders did final-
ly attend, but this should not
be regarded as evidence of
their future cooperation with
Ikeda. Acceptance or rejection
of important cabinet and party
posts in the forthcoming re-
shuffle will be a more reliable
indicator.
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EARLY INDEPENDENCE
Britain's Kenya colony ap-
pears headed toward early in-
dependence, despite recent po-
litical factionalism and in-
stability. Jomo Kenyatta--the
hero of the country's Africans
who remains under detention at
Maralal for his alleged role in
managing the Mau Mau terrorists
--has urged nationalist leaders
to end their political squab-
bling and work together.
On 28 June, British Colonial
Secretary Macleod announced
that a conference would be held
in Nairobi this year to consider
a new constitution for Kenya and
to discuss other pressing prob-
lems. Leaders of Kenya's two
major African parties--in London
to consider revising the organ-
ization which administers inter-
territorial public services in
East Africa--said Macleod had
agreed to consider a plan for
internal self-government under
an African prime minister this
year. Macleod's promise to
study a new African demand for
Kenyatta's release gave rise
to widespread speculation in
London that he would be set
free within a few weeks.
Prior to elections last
February for Kenya's single-
chamber legislature, in which
Africans achieved a majority
for the first time, the two
African parties campaigned for
Kenyatta's freedom and stressed
the importance of maintaining
order. The absence of major
incidents during the elections
led most Africans to believe
that Kenyatta would be released
at once. They were disappointed
and antagonized by Macleod's
announcment that, while Kenyatta
would henceforth be more ac-
cessible to African politicians,
he would not be released until
the security situation improved
and the legislature began func-
tioning satisfactorily.
Following that statement,
the Africans engaged in a period
of political bickering and
maneuvering during which both
parties refused to participate
in forming a government. In
mid-April, however, London per-
suaded the smaller of the par-
ties to form a coalition govern-
ment with European and Asian
support. The other party re-
taliated by pursuing a policy
of obstructionism designed to
topple the "stooge" government;
it walked out of the legislature
during a stormy session and
threatened to boycott that
body.
A few days later, however,
Kenyatta summoned leaders of both
parties to Maralal, where he
admonished them, particularly
those in the opposition, and
stressed unity of action. He
urged the establishment of a
joint consultative committee
under his leadership to coor-
dinate key policy issues in the
legislature, allowing the two
parties freedom of action only
on unimportant issues.
The tenor of Kenyatta's
remarks at Maralal suggests that
he is willing to forego Kikuyu
nationalism, a key factor in the
five-year Mau Mau terrorism:, and
work for the independence of a
united Kenya using parliamentary
methods. All prominent African
leaders and many settlers in
Kenya have indicated a belief
that conditions in the country
will not improve until the re-
lease of Kenyatta, whom African
nationalism has elevated to the
status of near-deity. Neverthe-
less his return to active po-
litical life would intensify
fears of Kikuyu domination among
the minority tribes, bring about
the eclipse of some relatively
moderate leaders, and cause many
Europeans and Asians to leave
the colony.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE `VEEP{LY SUMMARY
GREEK POLITICAL SITUATION
Passage of a new electoral
law by the Greek Parliament on
23 June has introduced a pre-
election atmosphere. There
are reports of possible elec-
toral coalitions and of immi-
nent defection from one party
to another. There is no indi-
cation, however, that the gov-
ernment has decided when to call
elections. The most probable
periods are September-October
1961 or April-May 1962. Greek
national elections are held
every four years, and new ones
must take place by May 1962.
The new electoral law, a
product of long and acrimonious
debate, is described as provid-
ing for "reinforced proportion-
al representation." It requires
two allocations of seats, the
first allocation based essen-
tially on simple proportional
representation. Participation
in the second distribution--
the seats not allocated in the
first--will be limited to those
parties polling a specified
percentage of the total vote:
15 percent for single parties,
25 percent for two-party coali-
tions, and 30 percent for coal-
itions of three or more parties.
All elections after the next
one will be under a majority sys-
tem in which the party gaining
the largest number of votes in
a district wins all seats in
that district.
Having secured the new
law, the moderate-rightist party
of Premier Karamanlis can be
expected to try to regain some
of the support it has lost
since 1958, when it won 170 of
the 300 seats in Parliament
with 41 percent of the popular
vote. Moves anticipated include
settling farmers' debts, raising
prices for agricultural prod-
ucts and wages for urban workers,
and giving widespread publicity
to all government efforts to
lift the standard of living.
Karamanlis also has been reported
contemplating changes in his
government to bring in more ef-
fective leadership. Efforts
to encourage defections by
prominent opposition politicians
reportedly are also under way.
The non-Communist opposi-
tion parties which make up the
political center remain frag-
mented, and the public is ap-
athetic to their attempts to win
support. A provision of the
electoral law that at least
three parties will share in the
second distribution of seats
was publicized by the govern-
ment as a concession designed
to strengthen the center. It
appears more likely, however,
to prevent the unification of
the center and thus may further
weaken the non-Communist oppo-
sition. At least two of the
several center parties appear
hopeful of being the third
party behind the two largest
parties, the government party
and the Communist-front EDA.
In 1958 the parties of the center
won about 34 percent of the pop-
ular vote, but they seem to have
lost much of this support since
then.
EDA, meanwhile, faces the
forthcoming national elections
with a large, well-organized
party and the support of the
proscribed Communist party of
Greece. In 1958, EDA surprised
many Greek political analysts
by winning nearly 25 percent of
the popular vote to become the
major opposition party. In 1952,
the last previous election in
which EDA ran as a single party,
it had captured less than 12
percent of the vote. Today EDA
is estimated to have the support
of at least 30 percent of the
electorate. EDA spokesmen have
called for a popular front--at
least an electoral coalition--
with the center parties to defeat
Karamanlis. No party leader has
yet accepted the offer, but
several are believed negotiating
with EDA. Should no coalition
be formed, several individual
deputies from nationalist oppo-
sition parties may defect to EDA.
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