CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

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• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A003200070001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
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• Document Page Count: 38
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 27, 2006
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 19, 1999
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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6D C,U%377 ;140AL
CFFRG;
CURRENT
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY
SUMMARY
COPY NO.
OCI NO.0283/61
8 June 1961
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE DOCUMENTNO. r
NO CHANGE IN CLASS. ^
-I DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S C~ 25X1
NEXT REVIEW DATE: /990
AUTH: HR 70-2
r -~ q / / DATE:-?Oj / tz
State Dept. review completed
7TIAL
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THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECT-
ING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES
WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS,
TITLE 18, USC, SECTIONS 793 AND 794, THE TRANSMIS-
SION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO
AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.
The Current Intelligence Weekly Summary has been prepared
primarily for the internal use of the Central Intelligence
Agency. It does not represent a complete coverage of all
current situations. Comments and conclusions represent the
immediate appraisal of the Office of Current Intelligence.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
T H E W E E K I N B R I E F
LAOS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 1
The fall of Pa Dong, principal base of loyal Meo
troops, will probably be followed by further efforts on
the part of Pathet Lao - Kong Le forces to eliminate Meo
positions inside their lines in Xieng Khouang Province.
General Phoumi has arrived in Nice, where he expects to
be joined by Boun Oum for possible talks with Souvanna
Phouma and, Souphannouvong. At Geneva, where the con-
ference is in indefinite recess following the fall of Pa
Dong, Communist bloc spokesmen have sought to blame the
West for lack of progress in the conference, and Soviet
delegate Pushkin has reiterated the bloc stand that the
issue of guarantees for Laotian neutrality must precede
consideration of further ICC control of the cease-fire.
SOVIET PROPAGANDA TREATMENT OF VIENNA MEETING . . . . . . Page 5
Soviet statements on the talks between the President
and Khrushchev stress the frank and useful exchange of
opinion and the "prime significance" of the decision to
maintain contacts. This suggests that one of Khrushchev's
aims in Vienna was to renew high-level talks with the US
as a necessary prelude to negotiating outstanding issues.
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 6
General "Ramfis" Trujillo has moved quickly to fill
the vacuum created by the death of his father, the
country's absolute ruler for 31 years. The government
is making a strong effort to convince world opinion that
it is respecting civil rights at home and is prepared to
rejoin the inter-American community as a member in good
standing. All indications are that the regime is in full
control throughout the country
few grounds for hope, however, that Ramfis will ease
police state controls except temporarily for tactical
purposes, or that President Balaguer has the courage
of ability to act independently.
CONTROVERSY IN BRAZIL OVER QUADROS POLICIES . . . . . . . Page 8
While President Quadros' gestures toward the Sino-
Soviet bloc have hitherto aroused only limited concern
within Brazil, a more extensive controversy now has
arisen over several recent moves which verge on de facto
recognition of East Germany. The secretary general of
the Foreign Ministry has resigned, the press is sharply
critical of the President, and at least a segment of the
military appears restive. Tension has been heightened
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
by Quadros? order for the arrest of Marshal Lott, de-
feated candidate in the 1960 presidential campaign.
The war minister opposes the arrest, but an attempt by
the military to overthrow the administration is unlikely
at this time.
SOUTH KOREA . . . o . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 9
Maj. Gen. Pak Chong-hui is consolidating his con-
trol over South Korea's military regime. He reportedly
will head the Standing Committee that is expected to
exercise control in the Supreme Council for National
Reconstruction. Lt. Gen. Chang To-yong, while re-
taining the largely titular posts of chairman of the
Supreme Council and chief of cabinet, has been removed
as army chief of staff, defense minister, and martial
law commander. The regime remains hostile to any
suggestion for an early return to civilian government.
Prime Minister Amini's reform program now is pro-
ceeding at a slow pace. Arrests for corruption are con-
tinuing, but no trials have yet been held. The minister
of agriculture is pushing land distribution, and the
government has put pontrols on more than 200 luxury im-
ports. A Foreign Ministry official has expressed con-
cern over growing neutralist sentiment in Iran. Several
members of the government are pressing for Iran's with-
drawAlfrom CENTO; one cabinet minister has submitted
his resignation over this issue.
. Page 10
CONGO . a . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 11
Gizenga's reported willingness to attend a meeting
of parliament in Leopoldville probably stems from mis-
givings over his isolation from the mainstream of Congo
events, as well as from doubts regarding long-term
prospects for his regime.
Negotiations between Leopoldville
and Elisabethville concerning the terms under which
Katanga would "rejoin" the Congo reportedly began
in late May.
CUBA . . .
Cuba's nickel production, which has declined con-
siderably since the expropriation last fall of US-owned
processing facilities, probably will be expanded under
a long-term Soviet technical assistance program for the
Cuban nickel and cobalt industries, announced in Havana
on 1 June. A recent speech by Che Guevara gives a new
indication that all political groups in Cuba may soon
be fused into a single "party of the masses" with Fidel
Castro as its secretary general. Such a union has long
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
8 June 1961
been an aim of the Cuban Communists. The government
reportedly is taking further security measures following
an increase in acts of sabotage.
FRANCE-ALGERIA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 13
Paris is showing concern over the upsurge of rebel
terrorism in France and Algeria--particularly over the
participation of Moslem deserters from the French Army--
and may retaliate by ending the unilateral one-month
cease-fire it initiated on 20 May. The PAG has shown
no inclination to call off the terrorism or to disavow
it publicly. Little progress seems to have been made
on substantive issues at the Evian negotiations. The
French Government has announced a change in its four
major military commands in Algeria, naming Lieutenant
General Charles Ailleret as commander in chief.
SOVIET-UAR RELATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Following up Khrushchev's criticism of Nasir in
front of a UAR parliamentary delegation last month,
Pravda has attacked two UAR government-controlled news-
papers for anti-Soviet statements, and inflammatory
Arabic broadcasts from Moscow have alleged UAR mis-
treatment of local Communists. In response Nasir
has launched an extensive propaganda campaign against
the USSR and made two official requests that Moscow
"correct" its broadcasts. Soviet leaders, long ir-
ritated by Nasir's suppression of Syrian Communists,
are apparently displeased by Cairo's recent move
toward improving relations with the US, and by Nasir's
initiative--together with Tito--in arranging a neutral-
ist summit conference. Soviet economic aid and mili-
tary deliveries to the UAR apparently have not been
affected by the current exchange.
Page 15
ANGOLA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 16
Rebel activity continues in northern Angola; Portu-
guese troops seem to have made no progress in gaining
control of rural areas. Holden Roberto's Angolan People's
Union (UPA)--with headquarters at Leopoldville--claims
to have achieved notable military successes
vairy is continuing between the UPA and the Communist-
influenced Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola--
based at Conakry.
ZANZIBAR . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . Page 17
The emergence of the Communist-infiltrated Zanzibar
Nationalist party(ZNP) 'as the most prominent political
group in Zanzibar following legislative elections on 1
June has been accompanied by large-scale rioting between
Arabs and Africans. The prestige and power of the Arab
Sultan of this British protectorate is swiftly declining,
and British policy, is under increasing attack by both
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Atabs and Africans. Before the election, ZNP leader
All Muhsin denounced the presence of an American soace-
vehicle tracking installation on the island.
CHINESE COMMUNIST TRADE DEVELOPMENTS . . . . . . . . . . Page 18
Political considerations continue to have a strong
influence on Peiping's trade policies, but domestic eco-
nomic difficulties are such as to overshadow other
factors in determining the direction and magnitude of
Chinese foreign trade. The agricultural failures of
the past two years have led to unprecedented grain im-
ports from the West and to a severe reduction of China's
export potential. The resultant cutback in imports of
industrial goods and services, together with internal
problems and the continued absence of Soviet technicians,
has forced a slowdown of industrialization. The impact
of this year's trade adjustments has fallen most heavily
on the bloc, and Peiping still has not reached agreement
on several important bloc trade protocols for 1961.
Although Imports from both bloc and nonbloc sources
have been cut to the minimum, Peiping is being forced
to use its holdings of precious metals acid..foreiign, ax-
SOVIET COMMUNIST PARTY MEMBERSHIP . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 20
Khrushchev recently cited figures on the expected
attendance at the 22nd party congress this October which
corroborate earlier indications that party membership has
increased from 8,708,000 in 1959 to an all-time high
of about 9,500,000. The expanded party membership and
unprecedented size of the forthcoming congress are
the result of Khrushchev's reliance on the party as
the major instrument of control and his use of en-
larged party forums as sounding boards. In view of
recent exposes of incompetence and corruption in the
party, however, the congress may stress higher stand-
ards of admission in the new party rules and draw on
they large number of candidate members to strengthen
SOVIET GOOD-WILL MISSION TO LATIN AMERICA . . . . . . . . Page 21
The USSR is sending an eight-man mission including
trade, cultural, and scientific representatives to visit
a number of Latin American countries in late June or
early July. Although the mission will concentrate on
exploring the possibilities of increasing Soviet trade
and cultural relations with Latin America, it probably
will also urge the establishment of diplomatic rela-
tions, particularly with Brazil and Ecuador.
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8 June 1961
SPECIAL ARTICLES
TAIWAN'S PROSPECTS FOR A SELF-SUSTAINING ECONOMY .
The Taiwan government took a series of measures dur-
ing the past year in an, effort to encourage investment
and achieve self-sustaining economic growth. Industrial
development, based on Taiwan's substantial supply of
cheap, competent labor, has been inhibited by persist-
ent budgetary deficits caused largely by defense
spending, which accounts for half the government's
total annual outlay. The industrialization problem
is becoming more acute because of the rapid popula-
tion increase and rising food consumption. Experts
are in agreement that last year marked Taiwan's
transition from a rice-surplus to a rice-deficit
area.
MISSILES IN SURFACE FORCES OF THE SOVIET NAVY . .
The. development of missile weapons has led the USSR
to make broad changes in the navy's surface forces and
to introduce a number of new classes of ships. These
ships apparently are designed primarily to attack surface
targets rather than aircraft and thus, in terms of mis-
sions and equipment, are significantly different from
their Western counterparts. Several factors, including
air defense weaknesses on missile ships, indicate that
the units completed thus far are intended to operate
mainly in areas where they can be protected and sup-
ported by land-based aircraft.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
WEEKLY REVIEW
LAOS
The fall of the Meo strong-
hold at Pa Fong, which has been
the primary target of Pathet
Lao - Kong Le forces since the
3 May cease-fire proclamation
in Laos, will probably be fol-
lowed by efforts to wipe out
all loyal Meo pockets of re-
sistance in Xieng Khouang Prov-
ince. The base, which has long
been subject to artillery fire
and probing attacks, came under
heavy bombardment and by the
afternoon of 6 June was pene-
trated by enemy forces. Fight-
ing continued into that night,
when government troops began to
withdraw. They are regrouping
at positions several miles
south and west of Pa Dong, with
headquarters about seven-miles
southwest of that village. Gov-
ernment losses in the action
are not yet fully known.
A 5 June statement broad-
cast by the Pathet Lao radio
and attributed to the National
Military Committee, on which
both Pathet Lao and Kong Le
forces are represented, had de-
nounced the proposal that In-
ternational Control Commission
(ICC) observers be established
at Pa Dong. The statement
called for "destruction of the
bandits" which the Pathet Lao,
strongly supported by bloc
propaganda, claims have been
dropped into the Pa Dong area
since the cease-fire was pro-
claimed. It declared that an
ICC presence in southwestern
Xieng Khouang Province would
be "illegal" and that the safety
of an observer team could not
be guaranteed.
This sharp reaction re-
-flects the importance the Pathet
Lao attaches to the elimination
of Meo units behind its lines.
These tribal forces, a part of
the regular Laotian army, are
Vientiane's most aggressive
fighters and their continued
existence would enable Vien-
tiane to claim enclaves in
Xieng Khouang Province in
any negotiations for a settle-
ment.
Laotian Leaders in Europe
General Phoumi left Vien-
tiane on 6 June for Nice, where
he expects to be joined by Pre-
mier Boun Oum for possible talks
with Souvanna Phouma and Sou-
phannouvong under the sponsor-
ship of Sihanouk. Souvanna and
Souphannouvong left Xieng Khouang
for Geneva on 2 June traveling
by way of Hanoi, Peiping, and
Moscow. It seems unlikely that
such talks would result in any
early reconciliation of the
widely divergent posi-
tions.
Outlining his strategy for
the proposed meeting to Ambas-
sador Brown in Vientiane
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Lao Kay
Lai Chaus
Phong Saly
Dien Bien
h
u
B U R\M A N~m:fiia's ?... P
Pa. ?Muong- t
Dong Ban "..Tha Thom
Ta Viang:
k Sane Kam Keu
INDONESIA
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8 June 61 WEEKLY REVIEW
Muong Sai: 'Nam Bac':
Muong Houn?
Luang Prabang
;...,..A...... L S
Muong Sou
-s+~ hana
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
before his. departure, Phoumi
stated that he would insist on
reaching agreement on a cease-
fire and on the type of guaran-
tees necessary for Laotian neu-
trality before agreeing to dis-
cuss the formation of a govern-
ment of national unity. Phoumi
added that the Neo Lao Hak Sat
(NLHS) would have to be repre-
sented in any such government
or "there could be no peace in
Laos."
Phoumi also hopes that
Souvanna, away from the Pathet
Lao influence in Xieng Khouang,
may prove more flexible and that
he will be able to sound him out
alone on his views of a genuine-
ly neutral and independent
Laos. Phoumi is inclined to
give some substance to reports
of friction between Souvanna
and the NLHS.
On his departure for Ge-
neva Souvanna told Western news-
men who interviewed him at the
Plaine des Jarres airfield that
he wants neutralism, not Com-
munism, for Laos and that he
had so informed Communist lead-
ers abroad. Despite ostensible
control of the Plaine des Jarres
by Kong Le forces, the newsmen
felt that an attempt had been
made to conceal preponderant
Communist influence in the area
during their presence.
The Namone Talks
The tripartite talks at
Namone have made no further
headway, and the meeting sched-
uled for 5 June was canceled.
The 7 June session led only to
agreement in principle by the
military subcommittee that ICC
observers could be permitted
at unspecified points, a device
to paper over failure to agree
on how extensive ICC observa-
tion should be. The NLHS and
Souvanna delegates appear to
be stalling, and little of
substance is likely to take
place until the outcome of
the anticipated meeting be-
tween Laotian leaders in
Europe is known.
Minor skirmishing has con-
tinued in scattered areas of
Laos; the Pathet Lao - Kong Le
forces remain in a position to
resume large-scale attacks should
negotiations break down.
The Geneva Conference
The conference on Laos at
Geneva now is in indefinite re-
cess following the fall of Pa
Don g .
Communist bloc spokesmen
at Geneva this past week blamed
the US and its allies for hold-
ing up the progress of the con-
ference and accused the West of
blocking any substantive dis-
cussion of the 17 May Soviet
proposals for a Laotian settle-
ment. On 5 June Soviet dele-
gate Pushkin reiterated the
bloc's position that the con-
ference must begin negotiations
on the question of Laotian
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
neutrality guarantees before
considering further controls
for the ICC in Laos. He called
upon the Western delegations to
"advance your own proposals" if
the Soviet draft documents are
"unsuitable."
Pushkin said the French
delegation had precluded any
meaningful discussion of its
23 May draft proposals when it
added that a draft protocol
dealing with the ICC would be
submitted later to the confer-
ence. The French draft protocol,
which was proposed on 6 June,
would broaden the investigatory
powers of the ICC and will al-
most certainly be rejected by
the bloc as constituting un-
warranted interference in Lao-
tian internal affairs. Peiping
has already said as much and
has called the proposal "a big
step backward" from the 1954
Geneva agreements. The Chinese
maintain that the two Soviet
proposals should be the only
items for conference consid-
eration.
In his speech of 5 June,
Pushkin once again made it clear
that any on-the-spot investiga-
tion of cease-fire violations
by the ICC will have to be based
on an "understanding" between
it and the contending factions
in Laos. Soviet insistence on
this point and Moscow's con-
tinued reluctance to reach agree-
ment with the UK on the question
of further instructions to be
sent to the ICC reflects the
desire to gain time for the fur-
ther consolidation of Pathet Lao
forces in the Xieng Khouang
area, thereby strengthening the
Communists' hand in negotiating
a political settlement.
The bloc delegations also
realize that any agreement to
increase the ICC's authority at
this time would strengthen the
Western powers' insistence on
effective control machinery as
an essential part of a politi-
cal settlement. Pushkin charged
that the 'Vestern position on
instructions to the ICC is
really designed to "predeter-
mine" the powers of the com-
mission even before "all as-
pects of the Laotian problem
have been discussed."
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SOVIET PROPAGANDA TREATMENT OF VIENNA MEETING
Soviet statements on the
talks between the President and
Khrushchev stress the frank and
useful exchange of opinion and
the "prime significance" of the
decision to maintain contacts.
Soviet spokesmen and bloc propa-
ganda have implied that further
meetings between the President
and Khrushchev as well as new
high-level negotiations will be
arranged.
This line had been dictated
by Moscow's pre-conference theme
that further talks would prob-
ably be necessary, since the
Vienna meeting was only to ex-
change opinions and important
problems could not be solved in
two days. Khrushchev took this
position in his arrival state-
ment, and Soviet editorial com-
ments in Pravda have carefully
pointed out that the talks were
not expected to be negotiations
with specific settlement in mind.
Since the conclusion of the
talks Moscow has adopted the
line that the results have opened
the way for a lessening of in-
ternational tensions, provided
the US draws the proper conclu-
sion. A broadcast to Soviet
audiences on 4 June asserted
that the "matter now rests with
the other side." Khrushchev in
his departure speech on 5 June
also implied that the effect on
specific issues would depend on
the US. A Pravda editorial on
7 June emphasized that the So-
viet people expect the talks to
be followed by "concrete deeds"
and pledged that the Soviet
Union would do its part. Pravda
articles by special correspond-
ents in Vienna gave the impres-
sion that the talks had been
useful, that they disappointed
the "cold warriors," and that
they went off better than ex-
pected.
Thus far, Soviet press com-
ments have carefully avoided any
discussion or evaluation of the
substantive results or an as-
sessment of the President. Khru-
shchev, however,
was impressed by the President's
intelligence, understanding of
problems, and firmness. At one
point Khrushchev used the word
"tough." Soviet officials in
Vienna have been taking a sim-
ilar line in talks with Western
correspondents.
The Soviet propaganda pic-
ture suggests that Khrushchev's
aim in Vienna was to justify
the value of renewed high-level
talks with the US as a necessary
prelude to negotiating outstand-
ing issues, particularly Germany.
This was suggested by a Pravda
editorial while the talks were
in progress. Pravda asserted,
in a somewhat defensive tone,
that "the necessity of meetings
of this kind now beginning in
Vienna is understandable to
everyone who soundly evaluates
the balance of powers in the in-
ternational~arena." The editorial
also claimed that public opinion
showed an "overwhelming major-
ity of mankind approved the re-
newal of contacts at the summit
between the leading statesmen of
the West and East."
The Soviet propaganda line,
particularly for domestic con-
sumption, suggests that Khru-
shchev is committed to a favor-
able appraisal of the meeting,
when he reports publicly. On
25 May, for example, at a public
lecture in Moscow the speaker
left the impression that the
meeting would be a success and
that US-Soviet relations, after
interruptions, were about to re-
turn to the atmosphere before
U-2.
Chinese Communist Reaction
Peiping has reported the
final communique but has not
issued any original comment on
the outcome of the Vienna talks.
The Chinese have, however, re-
printed summaries of foreign
commentaries on the Vienna meet-
ing which presumably express
Chinese views. One such article
--entitled, "Summit Welcome,
But Struggle Is the Main Thing"
--makes the Chinese point that
the US is always "forced" into
summit meetings and after-
ward acts in its "old ag-
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC
The composition of the
Dominican Government has remained
essentially the same following
the assassination on 30 May of
Generalissimo Rafael Leonidas
Trujillo, absolute ruler of his
country since August 1930. Gen-
eral "Ramfis" Trujillo, the
dictator's 32-year-old son who
returned from Europe immediate-
ly after his father's death,
was named head of the joint
chiefs of staff of the Dominican
armed forces on 1 June. The ap-
pointment was unanimously ap-
proved by the rubber-stamp Con-
gress. Indications are that
the regime is in full control
throughout the country.
Ramfis'appointment to the
highest armed forces post places
him in a position of power compar-
able to that of his late father.
However, he does not have the
respect of numerous older of-
ficers, who resent his youth,
his rashness, and has reputation
as an international playboy.
Ramfis will almost certainly
have to rely on continued force
to maintain his position. His
clique of personal supporters,
who also share his hatred of
the United States, include some
of the most radical and ruthless
elements in the regime.
American Consul Dearborn,
after a conversation with Presi-
dent Balaguer on 4 June, com-
mented that the President is
"showing some spunk" but is still
far from being an independent
agent. Although Balaguer seemed
to be sincere in expressing his
desire to create democratic con-
ditions in the country, he ap-
peared uncertain whether Ramfis
would permit him to do so. The
consul believes the President
may ask for US military support
if his program is obstructed.
Balaguer, had
threatened to resign rather than
accede to a request from "the
armed forces" to expel Roman
Catholic bishops Reilly and
Panal.
Ramfis, other members of
the Trujillo family, and close
associates probably realize that
they stand to lose everything
if they permit a significant de-
gree of free opposition. There
are few grounds for hope that
Balaguer has the courage or
ability to assume any role other
than his accustomed one as a
lackey for those exercising real
power.
Government leaders are mak-
ing A strong effort to convince
international opinion that the
regime no longer merits the
police state label. The pres-
ence of American newsmen has
served as a brake on police ex-
cesses that terrorized the dis-
sidents immediately after the
assassination. Some of those
arrested have apparently been
released.
The presidential decree
of 6 June canceling the army
commission of John Abbes is
clearly designed to dissociate
pres'ent leaders from this hated
symbol of police brutality. It
is too soon to know whether
this move has any real signifi-
cance; last year Abbes was re-
placed as head of the Military
Intelligence Service (SIM) for
similar reasons, but he continued
as de facto head of the organ-
ization and was most recently
observed in SIM headquarters on
2 June.
Indications of loyalty to
the Trujillo family have been
observed among low-income groups
in the capital as well as in
the countryside, where units of
a peasant militia were observed
on 4 June performing patrol
duties with considerable enthu-
siasm. It is among the usually
inarticulate lower classes that
the "father image" of the late
dictator had its greatest
strength. Middle-class elements
with at least some formal educa-
tion, from which future Domini-
can governments will have to
draw '.their personnel; are
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believed to be largely anti-
Trujillo.
Ramfis Trujillo is known
to harbor deep resentments
against the United States, and
if he and other government lead-
ers fail in their current effort
to obtain at least passive US
support, he is likely to resume
his earlier efforts to reach an
accommodation with the Soviet
bloc and in any other way avail-
able to him to try to undercut
US influence.
Communist-Cuban Exploitation
Communists and pro-Castro
groups among the thousands of
Dominican exiles abroad are al-
ready seeking to exploit the
dictator's death and may well
obtain covert assistance from
the Castro regime.
On 2 June, leaders of the
Dominican People's Socialist
(Communist) party in Cuba issued
a statement warning of an impend-
ing "imperialist maneuver" de-
signed to prevent the Dominican
people from establishing an "in-
dependent and democratic" re-
gime. The statement was trans-
mitted the next day in English
by the official Czechoslovak
news agency.
In response to a request
for comment on the assassination,
Raul Castro said that Cuba should
"do no more than listen, look,
and keep quiet." He also implied
that the US Government had been
involved in the assassination
because Trujillo had outlived
his usefulness to "imperialism,"
which wished to use Dominican
territory as x base against the
Cuban revolution. He termed
"ridiculous" several reports that
he was preparing a Cuban expedi-
tionary force to invade the Do-
minican Republic. Other Cuban
coverage of the Trujillo death
has been extensive and similar
in content to the younger Cas-
tro's remarks.
Proposed Inter-American Action
Venezuelan President Betan-
court, in a conversation of more
than four hours with Ambassador
Adlai Stevenson on 4 June, urged
a series of OAS actions "up to
and including possible collective
military action" to bring down
the Dominican regime. The prec-
edent thus established, he said,
could later be employed in Cuba.
With respect to the Cuban plan,
he proposed an OAS foreign min-
isters' meeting after the inter-
American economic conference in
Uruguay in July, The OAS con-
ferees would give the Castro re-
gime 90 days to dissociate it-
self from the Sino-Soviet bloc,
observe civil liberties, and
hold free elections. If Castro
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
did not comply, the foreign min-
isters would again convene to
apply the same sanctions against
Castro that had been imposed
against the Dominican regime.
The American ambassador in
Bogota, after lengthy conversa-
tions with Colombian President
Lleras Camargo and his foreign
minister, reported on 5 June
that Colombian leaders had hoped
that the extermination of Tru-
jillo would be followed by a pop-
ular, democratically oriented
uprising, and were disappointed
when such a movement failed to
develop. Colombian leaders doubt
that Ram'f:s will change the old
order and feel that Balaguer is
not a promising liberal leader.
Bogota apparently prefers to
assess the internal Dominican
situation further before decid-
ing on any action to be taken.
CONTROVERSY IN BRAZIL OVER QUADROS POLICIES
President Quadros of Brazil Secretary General Leitao
has made repeated gestures to- da Cunha, an old-line Foreign
ward the.Sino-Soviet bloc since Ministry official, has resigned,
his inauguration in January. stating that he planned a year's
These gestures and his policy leave of absence from the dip-
toward Cuba have been criticized lomatic service. Afonso Arinos
by the clergy, a prominent state also threatened to resign but
governor, some newspapers, and apparently consented to stay
some of the military, but the on; he told the press that the
public has not seemed concerned. exact terms of "the document"
Brazilian conservatives have in- were unknown but that "it is
sisted that he was expanding not a diplomatic agreement,be-
diplomatic and commercial rela- cause Dantas has no authority
tions with the bloc merely to to conclude agreements."
conciliate the country's lef L-
ists and-Communists and that The resignation of Leitao
his basic conservative orienta- da Cunha has aroused public con-
tion was indicated by his do- troversy in Brazil, with edi-
mestic economic austerity pro- torial reaction predominantly
gram. in his support and critical of
Dantas and Quadros. A group
Quadros' policy toward East of military officers--although
Germany, however, has caused primarily discontented with
considerable, concern in the Igor- 'Quadros' mil.itary'appointments
eign Ministry, because several and his economic austerity pro-
of his moves seemed to verge on gram rather than his foreign
de facto recognition. Quadros policy--is taking advantage of
on 24 May-ifistructed Foreign the , controversy to present griev-
Minister Afonso Arinos to invite ances to Quadros at this time.
the East German trade minister
to visit Brazil. Joao D.:zntas, Discontent among these of-
Quadros' crony and emissary, has fice,rs--who appear to be men
been visiting Eastern Europe who held high posts under the
to expand commercial relations previous administration--has
there. The Brazilian Foreign been heightened by Quadros' or-
Ministry had apparently assured der for the arrest of Marshal
West Germany of a friendly Bra- Lott, defeated candidate in the
zilian policy, but public an- 1960 presidential campaign, for
nouncement that Dantas had signed making a political statement.
a trade agreement with East Ger- They undoubtedly feel that Lott,
many has undercut this policy. as titular bead of the opposition,
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
should be permitted greater lee-
way in making political comment
than other military figures.
The war minister is resisting
Quadros' arrest order, but,an
attempt by the:military to over-
throw Quadros is unlikely at
this time.
The controversy may lead
Quadros'to greater caution but
is not likely to produce a sub-
stantial modification in his
foreign policy. In an effort
to confuse the issue he may step
up the investigation of foreign
news agencies which he initiated
in late May through his leftist
minister of justice. As gover-
nor of Sao Paulo Quadros in-
stituted numerous legal actions
against journalists and news-
papers critical of him and his
administration.
Maj. Gen. Pak Chong-hui,
the architect of last month'e
military coup in South Korea,
appears to be moving cautiously
to consolidate his control of
the ruling junta. He reportedly
will become chairman of the
seven-man Standing Committee that
is likely to emerge as the focal
point of power in the unwieldy
32-member Supreme Council for
National Reconstruction (SCNR).
Pak's intelligence chief, Lt.
Col. Kim Chong-pil, has seized
government dossiers containing
information compromising poten-
tial opponents, including SCNR
chairman Lt. Gen. Chang To-yong.
On 6 May the Supreme Coun-
cil announced that Chang had re-
signed as army chief of staff,
defense minister, and martial
law commander but would continue
as chairman of the Supreme Coun-
cil and chief of cabinet. The
latter posts have little real
power.
The regime also announced
on 6 May that retired Lt. Gen.
Sin Ung-kyun, former vice-min-
ister of defense and onetime am-
bassador to Turkey, and Lt. Gen.
Kim Chong-o would succeed Chang
as defense minister and army
chief of staff respectively.
Both are regarded as generally
competent. Prior approval was
obtained from the UN commander
for Kim's appointment.
The Supreme Council on 6
June promulgated the law of
Emergency Measures of National
Reconstruction, which "legalizes"
its usurpation of power and in
effect suspends these provisions
of the present constitution
dealing with civil rights and
the ousted National Assembly.
The regime is consid- 25X1
ering the eventual adoption of
a new constitution providing for
a strong executive patterned on
that of the French Fifth Republic.
most respected newspaper, were
summarily arrested on 4 June for
headlining President Yun Po-sun's
"hopes for an early transfer of
At the same time, spokesmen
for the regime have vigorously
denounced public speculation on
the timing of a return to civil-
ian government. The managing
editor and one reporter of Tonga
Ilbo, South Korea's largest
power" and implying that the
President believed a return to
cibilian authority was desirable
prior to the opening of the 16th
UN General Assembly in September.
The incident indicates the re-
gime's hypersensitivity to the
timing of such action and pro-
vides further evidence that the
junta's limited relaxation of
martial law and censorship is
lar el? window dressing. 25X1
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Prime Minister Amini is
continuing his efforts to put
his reform program into effect,
although at a somewhat slower
pace. He and Minister of Agri-
culture Arsanjani have elabo
rated on their basic program of
eliminating corruption, dis-
tributing land, and improving
the economic situation. Amini
is reported to be greatly en-
couraged by the Shah's support,
and he hopes, by frequent consul-
tations with him, to sustain
the Shah's determination to
carry on with reforms.
In a speech to provincial
agricultural directors on 3
June, Arsanjani said the hold-
ings of the big landlords would
not be confiscated but would be
paid for in government bonds.
He added, "After these people
have engaged in other pursuits,
they will realize they are being
useful to themselves as well as
to the country." The landowners
will probably view payment in
bonds as the equivalent of ex-
propriation, however, as there
is no bond market in Iran and
little faith in the economic
future of the country.
In a new effort to halt the
drain on foreign exchange, the
government instructed banks that
no letters of credit would be
issued for over 200 luxury im-
ports, including passenger cars,
radios, refrigerators, washing
machines, air conditioners, and
alcoholic beverages. Amini an-
nounced that this would save'the
country $50,000,000 a year.
Arrests for corruption
are continuing, but at a
slower pace and with lesser
known officials. Thirteen
former officials now are under
arrest; none has yet been
tried.
An under secretary of the
Foreign Ministry has told the
American ambassador that he is
concerned over the growing
neutralist sentiment in Iran
and that members of Amini's
government are pressing him to
withdraw from CENTO. The Shah
and Amini, however, appear
united on maintaining Iran's
membership; Amini has publicly
expressed his support for the
organization.
yet.
Minister of Mines and In-
dustries Gholam All Farivar,
who is also director general
of the Afro-Asian Solidarity
Society in Iran, has submitted
his resignation, saying that
he believes Iran must be neu-
tral and withdraw from CENTO.
Prime Minister Amini has not
accepted the resignation as
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY ,'SVMMARY
Gizenga's reported willing-
ness to attend a meeting of
parliament in Leopoldville sug-
gests that major Congolese fac-
tions are favorably disposed
in principle toward a federa-
tion as outlined at the'Coquil-
hatville conference, Negotia-
tions between Elisabethville
and Leopoldville concerning
the terms under which Katan-
ga would "rejoin" the Congo
reportedly began in late
May.
Gizenga's decision prob-
ably stemmed from misgivings
over his isolation from the
mainstream of events in the
Congo, as well as from doubts
regarding long-term prospects
for his regime. Although he
still claims to represent the
legal Congolese government,
the refusal of the Kivu provin-
cial assembly to give a vote
of confidence to his hand-
picked provincial president
was a serious setback. In
addition, Gizenga continues
to have difficulty controlling
his troops.
The American Embassy has
observed that Gizenga, by at-
tending parliament, probably
could sow dissension in the
ranks of the moderates, but
that it is a moot question
whether he could gain power for
himself. `'Gizenga's concilia-
tory posture, however, may be
designed in part to gain time
and impress his troops with his
dediration': to a`.. united'. Congo. ,.
Leopoldville Premier Ileo
has advised foreign diplomats
that only President Kasavubu
is empowered to call parlia-
ment into session, and that
parliament must meet in Leo-
poldville. He added that
the Leopoldville government
planned to obtain, through
the UN, foreign specialists
to prepare a new constitu-
tion based on agreements
reached at Coquilhatville on
a 20-state federation. Ilco
stated that the new consti-
tution would be submitted to
the populace for ratification
by referendum; he added, how-
ever, that the present parlia-
ment would continue even after
the adoption of a new con-
stitution, since the country
was too unsettled for new elec-
tions.
The situation in Kivu
Province remains unclear. Oppo-
sition to the provisional gov-
ernment of Adrien Omari by local
Bashi tribesmen appears to have
resulted in clashes with pro-
Gizenga troops in which at least
100 Bashis died.
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CUBA
A Cuban-Soviet agreement
providing for long-term mate-
rial and technical aid from the
USSR to the Cuban nickel and
cobalt industries was signed
in Havana on 1 June. Minis-
ter of Industries Che Guevara
announced that the Soviet aid,
which he said would total about
$100,000,000, was aimed at
making Cuba the world's second
largest nickel producer. Most
of the aid is expected to go
to the facilities at Nicaro,
owned by the US Government
but expropriated by the Castro
regime in October 1960. Cuba
has one of the largest proven
nickel reserves in the world.
Its 1959 production was esti-
mated at 19,000 tons. Produc-
tion declined considerably,
however, after the Nicaro fa-
cilities were seized.
Although the USSR is at
present the world's second
largest nickel producer--after
Canada--the development of the
Cuban nickel industry would en-
able the bloc to reduce its
present substantial nickel im-
ports from other countries. Cu-
ban nickel oxide already is be-
ing shipped to several bloc
countries, including the Soviet
Union and Communist China.
During a television talk on
4 June, Armed Forces Minister
Raul Castro expounded on the
growing role of the "Boards of
Coordination, Execution, and
Inspection" (JUCEI) in planning
and regimenting Cuban economic
activities on the provincial
level. He stressed the impor-
tance of the JUCEI groups in
"building socialism" by serving
as the intermediaries between
"top planning for the whole na-
tion" and the groups which ex-
ecute such plans. Revealing that
some Cubans have reacted nega-
tively to the new organizations,
Castro berated "those still in
Cuba who think they know it all
and do not want to be inspected
or supervised."
Minister of Industries Che
Guevara told a re- 25X1
cent student meeting in Havana
that "real unity" of all Cuban
revolutionary organizations al-
ready exists and "the only thing
lacking is the formation of the
party with Fidel Castro as its
secretary general." The union
of all political parties and
"revolutionary mass organiza-
tions" has long been an aim of
the Communists' Popular Socialist
party (PSP), the only organized
political party in Cuba, and
would give the regime the mass-
based political organization it
now lacks. Long-time PSP leader
Carlos Rafael Rodriguez recently
observed that the new united
party--which clearly would be
controlled by the Communists--
would be formed by 26 July of
this year, the eighth anniver-
sary of the Castro movement's
fight to gain power in Cuba.
The Castro regime is re-
portedly stepping up arrests
and repression in the wake of
what appears to be an increase
in sabotage and other opposi-
tion activities within Cuba,
according to refugees who left
the island recently. The ref-
ugees assert that bomb explosions
are heard nightly in the capi-
tal once again, and sabotage
of sugar mills and public
buildings has been reported in
other parts of the island, The
Cuban Ministry of Communications,
in what may be a related move,
had intercepted and censored US
mail released to the naval base
at Guantanamo on 1 June.
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The announcement on 7 June
of the transfer of G-2, the
Cuban secret police organization
--henceforth to be known as
the Department of State Securi~
ty--to a new Ministry of the
Interior, headed by G-2 chief
Ramiro Valdes, may presage a
further expansion of the Cas-
tro regime's efficient securi-
ty- apparatus.
The part of the Cuban good-
will mission to Latin America
led by special envoy Ramon Aja
Castro is apparently about to
conclude its talks with leaders
of other hemisphere governments.
That portion of the mission led
by Under Secretary of Foreign
Affairs Carlos Olivares re-
turned to Cuba on 2 June after
talking with high government
officials in Mexico, Brazil,
and Ecuador. The chief pur-
pose of the mission appears to
have been to convince Latin
American governments with which
Cuba still maintains diplomatic
relations that the Castro re-
gime poses no threat to the
inter-American system. De-
tails of the discussions, de-
scribed as "successful" in the
Cuban press, remain unclear,
but the emissaries reportedly
were received coldly by some
governments, including those
of Panama, Costa Rica, and
Uruguay.
Continuing incidents of Al-
gerian terrorism during the
Evian talks may lead Paris to
declare an end to its unilateral
one-month cease-fire announced
on 20 May. The rebels, who
denounced the French cease-fire
as a psychological trick and
stated that it was a matter for
negotiation following political
guarantees, has shown no incli-
nation to call off terrorism or
to disavow it publicly. The
French delegation at Evian may
formally demand that the Pro-
visional Algerian Government
(PAG) do so as a condition for
continuing the talks.
Paris is particularly con-
cerned about the reliability of
Moslems in the French Army fol-
lowing a sharp increase in Mos-
lem desertions during the cease-
fire period. Some deserters
joined rebel terrorists in a
recent attack on a French army
post in Algeria, and others
were involved in a five-hour
battle between Moslems and po-
lice in downtown Paris on 5 June.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Police. are reported screening ship--and pledged "respect for
Moslems in metropolitan France, the culture, religion, language,
including those in army units, and personal status" of Euro-
in an Attempt to weed out Al- peans who elect to become
gerian nationalists, citizens of an independent Al-
The PAG may be willing to
break off the Evian talks over
the Sahara issue. Paris set up
a separate administration in
1958 for the Sahara, and: France
maintains that De Gaulle's self-
determination offer applies only
to the Algerian departments.
The PAG has consistently main-
tained that Algerian sovereignty
over the Sahara must be recog-
nized as a first step in reach-
ing any agreed solution. On
2 June the spokesman for the
PAG delegation declared: "The
Algerian people have not
fought for seven years to agree
today to the amputation of
four fifths of Algeria's ter-
ritory,"
The PAG appears to have
strong backing from all its
factions on this point. By
standing firm, it may seek to
avoid internal dissension
over the concessions it is
willing to consider on other
issues.
The PAG showed a degree of
conciliation in the . a June
session dealing with guaran-
tees for the European minority
in Algeria.. It reportedly
promised v, 6-hoice
ship--rul ing ~ out the 17rench
concept o -.'L" dual citizexi-
geria and "a place for Euro-
peans who choose to be for-
eigners."
Direct talks between De
Gaulle and PAG premier Ferhat
Abbas are being rumored as a
step to prevent a breakdown of
the contact between the two
sides. De Gaulle, however,
has previously insisted that
a personal meeting could
only follow an Algerian agree-
ment to stop the fighting.
The French Government on 7
June announced a change of per-
sonnel in the four major mili-
tary commands in Algeria and
named Lt. Gen. Charles Ailleret
to replace Gen. Fernand Gambiez
as commander in chief. Ailleret
has been shifted in quick succes-
I sion since the April generals
revolt from his division command
at Bone to the command of the
Constantine corps and then to the
1 post of assistant to Gambiez.
Although the outgoing gen-
erals were loyal to De Gaulle
during the insurrection, most of
them were held prisoner by the
insurrectibnists,and the govern-
ment probably feels their in- 25X1
ability to take firm action at the
time has cost them the respect
of the forces in Algeria.
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SOVIET-UAR RELATIONS
The current propaganda ex-
change between the USSR and
the UAR appears to have had its
origin in Khrushchev's criti-
cism of Nasir expressed to a
visiting UAR delegation in early
May. The Soviet premier attacked
the UAR for claiming to be a
socialist state but at the same
time jailing Communists, and
asserted that Nasir did not un-
derstand "anything about social-
ism or Communism."
A few oblique criticisms
of the Communist bloc appeared
in the Cairo press soon after
Khrushchev's reported remarks.
The UAR also publicized the
official protest made to Soviet
Ambassador Yerofeyev in Cairo
on 22 May regarding claims by
Moscow's Arabic radiobroadcasts
that the UAR is mistreating lo-
cal Communists. Moscow respond-
ed with a Pravda article on 31
May attacking two UAR govern-
ment-controlled newspapers for
"slanderous statements" against
the Soviet Union and socialism
and, in an implicit threat of
economic reprisals, warned
Cairo not to "cut down the tree
which gives you shade."
The present full-scale
radio and press campaign from
Cairo and Damascus began on 4
June, following repeated Soviet
propaganda attacks against the
UAR's handling of local Commu-
nists. A second protest was
presented to the director of
Moscow radio's Arabic service
by the UAR press attache on 5
June.
Cairo has flatly denied
Moscow's persistent charges that
Lebanese Communist Al-Hilu was
arrested several months ago and
subsequently died in a UAR
prison. Another Arab Communist
--Riyad al-Turk--alleged by
Moscow to have died in prison,
was paraded before a press con-
ference in Damascus on 5 June,
and the Cairo press--which calls
him the "Lazarus of Communism"
--commented he had received
better treatment than the "in-
mates of Siberia." The Cairo
newspaper Al-Ahram reportedly
has sent a radiophoto of Al-Turk
to Pravda and challenged Moscow
to print it.
A1-Jumhuriya, Cairo's
official newspaper, has set the
tone of the UAR anti-Soviet
campaign, claiming that the
USSR is "pushing its nose into
our affairs" and adding that if
Soviet leaders believe they can
impose their views on the UAR
because of the UAR-USSR trade
agreements, "they feed on de-
lusions."
The UAR propaganda campaign
will probably be given another
boost by the report from Syria
on 7 June that security author-
ities have discovered a large
Communist cell in Damascus and
have confiscated a printing press,
typewriters,. and publications.
According to the Damascus press,
the documents found will "expose
Communism to the ugliest scandal
since the establishment of the
Communist regime in Russia in
1917."
Nasir's treatment of local
Communists has been an irritant
to Moscow since his suppression
of the Syrian Communist party
following the UAR merger in
1958. The dispute reached a
peak during 1959 when Khrushchev
and Nasir engaged in a public
exchange of recriminations over
Arab Communism, and the close
political cooperation which had
previously existed between
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
the two was never fully re-
stored.
Soviet leaders apparently
are also displeased by Cairo's
recent moves toward improv-
ing relations with the West,
particularly the US, and by
Nasir's initiative--together
with Tito--in arranging a neu-
tralist summit conference.
Soviet news media
have not commented on the
projected neutralist heads-
of-government meeting or
on the preparatory confer-
ence which opened in Cairo on
5 June.
The US Embassy in Cairo
believes that the Nasir-Tito
cooperation not only may have
produced,:genuine irritation on
the part of Khrushchev but may
also be subjecting him to crit-
icism from Communist theoreti-
cians--particularly in China
and the Arab world--who have
never accepted his thesis that
the bloc should collaborate with
bourgeois nationalists and non-
Communist revolutions.
The revival of Soviet-UAR
polemics during the past month
does not appear to have af-
fected economic and military
collaboration between the two
countries. Major new arms agree-
ments have included T-54 tanks,
artillery, military vehicles,
and MIG-19 supersonic jet
fighters.
Rebel activity in northern
Angola shows no sign of abating.
Although the Portuguese press
continues to claim that Lisbon's
forces have inflicted heavy
losses on the terrotists,
Portuguese control seems re-
stricted to the major towns.
The 16,000 troops in the
province seems to have made
no progress in regaining con-
trol of rural areas. The
rebels continue to sabo-
tage the few transportation
routes.
Holden Roberto and other
leaders of the Angolan People's
Union (UPA) claim that the
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Portuguese base at Toto is in
rebel hands; this assertion has
not been confirmed by any other
source, however.
The UPA does not have tight.
control over the nationalist
bands, and members frequently
participate in attacks for only
a short time before dropping
out of sight or fleeing to the
Congo. Most of the 10,000-odd
Angolan refugees in the Congo
seem motivated more by anti-
Portuguese sentiment than by
allegiance to the UPA or its
rival, the Communist-influenced
Popular Movement for the Libeyra-
tion of Angola (MPLA)--based at
Conakry (Guinea).
Tension apparently contin-
ues between these organization,
although there have been reports
of increasing cooperation. UPA
leaders have been under pressure
to cooperate with the MPLA, and
an MPLA official recently claimed
that an accord had been reached.
'-ZAN2I BAR
The emergence of the Com-
munist-infiltrated Zanzibar
Nationalist party (ZNP) as the
most important single political
element in Zanzibar following
legislative elections on 1 June
has been accompanied by large-
scale rioting between Arabs and
Africans. The prestige and
power of the Arab Sultan of this
British protectorate is swiftly
declining, and Britain itself
is being increasingly criticized
by both Arabs and Africans.
- j . VlI M.I.Ch.I
~a?NO o R.aO~eo
J. a. Pant. t
NGOLA
E. C., lIIno~
The elections were a rerun
of balloting last January which
had resulted in a virtual stale-
mate between the ZNP--which rep-
resents the ruling Arab minority
--and the Afro-Shirazi party,
spokesman for newly articulate
elements among the 80 percent of
the island's population which is
of African descent. The balance
of power was held by the Zanzi-
bar and Pemba People's party
(ZPPP), which split its support
after its leader sold out to the
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
ZNP. The ZPPP cooperated in
the elections with the ZNP, al-
though their platforms differed;
the two parties now control 13
seats in the 23 member legisla-
ture. As a:.result, Sheik Muhamed
Shamte, leader of the ZPPP, has
been named chief minister of the
coalition government, but ZNP
president All Muhsin, named min-
ister of education, will domi-
nate it.
Chinese Communists have
given money to the ZNP and have
arranged a large number of free
trips to Peiping for party offi-
cials. Soviet infiltration ef-
forts reportedly have been less
direct and apparently aimed pri-
marily at youth organizations,
with offers of scholarships in
the USSR.
The victory of the Arab
ZNP, despite the rapidly grow-
ing political awareness and
strength of the Africans, was
due in large measure to the ZNP's
superior organization. Under-
lying racial hostility between
the two groups, sharpened by
political frictions, seems like-
ly to affect the protectorate's
political situation more seri-
ously as time goes on. The Arab
mniznor ity--some 50,000 in Zanzi-
bar's population of 300,000--
fears that its dominant position
will soon disappear; the new
Arab Sultan, a man who lacks
his predecessor's prestige, has
already been subjected to Afri-
can ridicule.
All Muhsin, who has public-
ly supported Communism, is not
likely to cooperate more than a
bare minimum with the British
or to support moves toward forma-
tion of a federation of East
African territories. Prior to
the elections, All Muhsin strong-
lyy criticized the placing of an
American space-vehicle tracking
station on Zanzibar and the es-
tablishment of an American con-
sulate. He recently asserted
his determination to oppose the
tracking station "unless America
can convince Russia and China of
the innocence of the project."
He has condemned alleged pro-
African interference by Kenva and
Tanganyika politicians in' the
election and stated that Zanzibar
would become an independent re-
public before he would discuss
any possible federation with the
East African states. He has also 25X1
announced that he would not recom-
mend Zanzibar's remaining in the
Commonwealth.
CHINESE COMMUNIST TRADE DEVELOPMENTS
Political considerations
continue to have a strong influ-
ence on Communist China's poli-
cies, but domestic economic dif-
ficulties are such as to over-
shadow other factors in deter-
mining the direction and magni-
tude of its foreign trade. The
agricultural failures of the
past two years have led to un-
precedented grain imports from
the West and to a severe reduc-
tion of China's export potential.
The resultant cutback in im-
ports of industrial goods and
services, together with internal
problems and the continued ab-
sence of Soviet technicians, has
forced a slowdown of industriali-
zation.
Although imports from both
bloc and nonbloc sources have
been cut to the minimum, Peiping
is being forced to use its hold-
ings of precious metals and for-
eign exchange. The over-all
level of imports this year de-
pends primarily on the availa-
bility of export products, but
also on the possibilities for
securing foreign credits.
About two thirds of China's
trade has been with bloc coun-
tries in recent years, and the
impact of current adjustments
necessarily falls most heavily
on the bloc. Trade negotiations
with bloc countries have dragged
on since early '1961,' and: agreements
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
still have not been reached with
Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary,
and Rumania.
The crucial Sino-Soviet
talks on economic and tech-
nical cooperation have been
in progress since February,
first in Peiping and now in
Moscow; there are recent indi-
cations that they may be
nearing completion. Agreements
already concluded with the
bloc seem to be largely in-
terim arrangements devised to
keep goods moving while both
sides assess long-term posi-
tions.
The Sino-Soviet agreement
to extend over five years the
repayment of Peiping's short-
term trade debt to the USSR
removed a major obstacle to
this year's trade, but'unless
Moscow is also willing to
grant new credits, the Chi-
nese must depend even more
than before on the country's
uncertain harvests to fi-
nance imports of industrial
equipment.
The bloc apparently has
made some effort to accommodate
to Chinese economic difficul-
ties,, but, despite protesta-
tions to the contrary, the
relationship continues to be
more businesslike than fra-
ternal. In all probability
Peiping will continue to
rely on bloc trade as the
mainstay of its foreign eco-
nomic relations, but basic
strains in the Sino-Soviet re-
lationship probably will
limit the role of Soviet
aid.
Outside the bloc, Chi-
nese trade has dropped abrupt-
ly from the high level main-
tained during the first half
of 1960, In response to
its agricultural crisis, Pei-
ping's purchasing in the West
has centered on food grains,
plus such essential commodi,
ties as fertilizer and cot-
ton. Current Chinese trade
probes in Latin America and
Japan are largely political-
ly inspired, but they also
reflect China's search for
new markets and sources of
badly needed foodstuffs and
raw materials throughout the
world.
The Chinese are employing
a variety of, means to cope,
with the payments problem
arising from their' purchases
in the West.'Credit facili-
ties granted by Hong Itong
banks and Canadian and Aus-
tralian grain suppliers
have eased the task of paying
for food purchases.
In addition, the Chinese
have sold increasing quantities
of silver in West European mar-
kets, and probably have sold
gold as well. These efforts
have been offset in part by the
reduction in foreign currency
earnings caused by a sharp drop
in exports to Hong Kong and Ma-
laya.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
SOVIET COMMUNIST PARTY MEMBERSHIP
Khrushchev recently cited
figures on the expected attend-
ance at the 22nd party congress
this October which corroborate
earlier indications that party
membership has increased from
8,708,000 in 1959 to an all-
time high of about 9,500,000.
The party is becoming somewhat
more of a mass organization,
despite Lenin's concept of the
revolutionary party as a pro-
fessional elite. Party member-
ship has increased from 3.2 per-
cent of the total population in
1959 to 4.4 percent--the highest
ever.
The marked increase in mem-
bership, which began in 1956,
is probably the result of Khru-
shchev's style of leadership:
his upgrading of the party as
the major instrument of control
and his cultivation of mass sup-
port by drawing more people into
active participation in the re-
gime's programs.
However, it would not be
surprising if the congress
stressed higher standards of
admission in the new party rules
and took steps to replace older
cadres with candidate members
of the party. Comparable peri-
ods of rapid expansion in party
membership in the past have been
followed by a stricter admis-
sions policy and often by a
purge of members whose ideolog-
ical, political, technical, or
personal qualifications were
deemed inadequate. Since 1958,
Khrushchev has been stressing
the need for young, technically
trained cadres, and the increase
in the number of nonvoting dele-
gates expected at the 22nd con-
gress indicates that the candi-
date members number about two
million--three' times the
number at the time of congress
in 1959. Following his revela-
tions of incompetence and cor-
ruption within the party at the
January central committee plenum
on agriculture, Khrushchev has
spearheaded another drive to im-
prove the quality of the coun-
try's agricultural leadership.
In a recent conversation
with Ambassador Thompson, Khru-
shchev said the 22nd party con-
gress would be attended by 4,000
voting and 1,000 nonvoting dele-
gates as well as 1,000 visitors.
The number of voting delegates
expected is more than double
that at any of the three pre-
ceding congresses, and the number
of nonvoting delegates has in-
creased tenfold. Whereas pre-
viously one voting delegate was
elected for every 5,000 or 6,000
full party members, now he will
represent 2,000 party members,
with the same ratio of nonvot-
ing delegates to candidate mem-
bers. A new conference hall
with a seating capacity of over
6,000 is scheduled to be com-
pleted in time for the meeting.
EXPANSION OF SOVIET COMMUNIST PARTY
PARTY MEMBERSHIP PARTY MEMBERSHIP AS A
PERCENTAGE OF POPULATION
4---200
-
-
NO FIGURES
000-
-300
ORTAINANtE
wwn
_0p
0000
8 June 61
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The unprecedented size of
this congress will ensure that
it, like the expanded central
committee plenums in recent
years, will be more than ever a
sounding board for proclamations
by Khrushchev and his lieuten-
ants, rather than the top policy-
making body described in the
party rules. By increasing the
representation at the congress
and the number of guests--who,
as in the past, will include
foreign Communist leaders--
Khrushchev may hope to spur
flagging ideological fervor at
the grass-roots level and mag-
nify his own image as the ideo-
logical arbiter of the Communist
movement.
In accord with this trend
toward increased participation,
the congress will probably
enlarge the size of the new
central committee which it
is to elect. As a result of
current shake-ups and earlier
attrition, less than 50 per-
cent of the central commit-
tee members elected in 1956
are expected to retain their
positions.
SOVIET GOOD-WILL MISSION TO LATIN AMERICA
A Soviet delegation is
scheduled to visit a number of
Latin American countries in late
June or early July.
Moscow began in late April
to organize the mission and in-
spired reports in the Western
press that First Deputy premier
Kosygin would head it. Sub-
sequently, however, it was re-
vealed that the mission would
be headed by Supreme Soviet
Presidium Secretary Mikhail
Georgadze, a minor official who
has no standing in the top
leadership.
The eight-man mission,
which will include trade, cul-
tural, and scientific represent-
atives, probably will visit
Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, and
Ecuador and possibly Mexico,
Uruguay, and Cuba. They will
concentrate on exploring the
possibilities of increasing So-
viet trade and cultural relations
with these countries butwill also
probably discuss prospects for
establishing diplomatic rela-
tions, particularly with Brazil
and Ecuador.
Khrushchev told the head
of the Brazilian trade delega-
tion in Moscow in early May that
the USSR and Brazil should re-
store diplomatic relations and
that such a move would provide
a strong stimulus to the expan-
sion of trade. During an "un-
official" trip to Ecuador and
Venezuela last March, Soviet
Ambassador to Mexico Bazykin
sought to establish diplomatic
relations with both countries;
he told the press that the
USSR considered that relations
with Ecuador already existed,
lacking only an exchange of am-
bassadors. Since that time
pro-US Ecuadorean Foreign Min-
ister Chiriboga has resigned,
and the USSR may feel that this
clears the way for President
Velasco to establish diplomatic
ties.
Moscow is apparently hav-
ing more success in obtaining
visas this time than in March;
Bazykin managed to visit only
two of the six countries of his
original itinerary. As of late
May, Colombia and apparently
Venezuela had rejected the mis-
sion; Brazil had accepted; Boliv-
ia was apparently willing to
accept reluctantly; and Ecu-
ador was waiting to see what
the others would do. Chile
agreed to permit the entry of
the mission but stipulated that
it would not be received of
ficially.
Among the other Latin Am-
erican nations, Cuba and pos-
sibly Mexico, Uruguay, and Ar-
gentina--the only Latin Ameri-
can countries with resident So-
viet diplomats--would be respon-
sive to a Soviet request for visas.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Western newsmen in Moscow told
the American Embassy in early
May that Mexico had already
agreed and Uruguay was likely
to accepts but there has been
no confirmation of these re-
ports. A high official of the
Peruvian Foreign Ministry
stated recently that his gov-
ernment had not been approached
by the Soviets but would reject
the visit.
The Soviet press has been
paying increasing attention to
Latin America and has been
featuring material supporting
the Soviet thesis that the Latin
American populations are becoming
increasingly impatient with
"exploitation by US monopolists."
Soviet propaganda has recently
contended that there has been
a surge of anti-US feeling in
Latin America which proves the
correctness of the assertion
in last December's Moscow Dec-
laration that "a front of ac-
tive struggle against imperial-
ism has opened in Latin America."
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While agriculture's future
contribution to the economy will
decline in relative terms, Taipei
hopes that at least for several
more years, increases in output
will offset rising food consump-
tion. Taiwan's population is
growing at a rate of 3.5 percent
per year--faster than that of
any other Asian state except
Singapore.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
TAIWAN'S PROSPECTS FOR A SELF-SUSTAINING ECONOMY
The Chinese Nationalist
Government initiated a series
of economic reforms during the
past year to strengthen the
nation's economic base. The
reforms fulfill some of the
provisions of the 19-point
Accelerated Economic Growth
Program adopted about a year
and a half ago. While per-
formance on the "19 Points"
falls short in certain im-
portant respects, actions
taken to encourage investment
and achieve self-sustaining
economic growth within a decade
are not likely to be reversed
as long as they do not conflict
with the defense effort.
Economic growth over the
past ten years has proceeded at
a faster pace in Taiwan than in
most underdeveloped countries.
Progress has been made possible
by American economic aid,averag-
ing 10 percent of Taiwan's an-
nual gross national product
(GNP). Furthermore, extensive
US military assistance has en-
abled the Nationalists to
modernize their 600,000-man
armed forces.
Agriculture
A large share of the eco-
nomic growth has occurred in
agriculture, which accounts for
about 30 percent of GNP, and in
related processing industries.
Since practically all arable
land is cultivated, there is
little room for expanding crop
acreage. Agricultural produc-
tion rose only 1.5 percent in
each of the past two years.
Future growth will require
larger yields through greater
irrigation and improved tech-
niques, more productive seed
strains, and more intensive
application of fertilizers. Up
to four crops a year can be
grown on the same land if opti-
mum practices are employed.
SECRET
Industrial production rose
in 1960 to some 3.5 times the
1950 level. The industrial
sector, including mining, manu-
facturing, and electric power,
now accounts for about 30 per-
cent of GNP.
Because of a paucity of
natural resources other than
coal, limestone, and water
power, Taiwan's attractiveness
to investors, like Hong Kong's,
depends on its utilization of
an abundant supply of cheap and
capable local labor. Approxi-
mately 25 percent of the labor
COMPARISON OF
GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT
Average Annual
(dollars per capita) Growth Rate
1951 1959
350
/
r
210. r
108 TAIWAN
3.7%
91 C. i
66
74 INDIA
1.4%
55
Note: Dollar figures for Communist China were
obtained by applying official exchange rates. If
comparative price levels of the United States
and Communist China were taken into account,
per capita GNP in the latter in 1959 would be
roughly $120.
6105268
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FOREIGN ECONOMIC AID, 1951-1959
(millions of dollars)
official character, including IBRD loans but
excluding equipment. Ford Foundation aid in-
JAPAN
705
force is considered skilled,
with wages lower than Hong
Kong's and considerably' less
than Japan's. In addition,
there is a relatively large
reservoir of technical and
managerial skills.
From 1953 to 1960, total
income on Taiwan increased at
an average rate of 6 to 8 per-
cent per year, or about half
that amount on a per capita
basis. Gross investment rose
to 21 percent of GNP in 1960,
a high figure compared with the
rest of non-Communist Asia.
Taiwan's exports have made
slower progress than national
income, and the trade gap has
actually widened since the early
1950s. Last year, exports of
$162,000,000 paid for only 60
percent of imports; US aid ac-
counted for the remaining $113,-
000,000.
The less favorable trade
picture obscures the significant
gains last year in exports of in-
dustrial goods. The value of
textiles alone increased from
$3,000,000 in 1959 to $21,000,-
000 in 1960. Exports as a whole
failed to make greater headway
because rice declined as a major
export item. Unfavorable weather
--a typhoon in late 1959 and a
severe drought last year--was
the most immediate cause, but
population growth has become an
important factor and will as-
sume increasing importance in
future years. Taiwan in 1960
became a rice-deficit rather
than a rice-surplus area.
Sugar will probably remain
Taiwan's chief export for some
time to come, but there must be
wide-scale industrialization ac-
companied by large increases of
industrial exports if the Na-
tionalists are to balance their
trade, much less achieve a self-
sustaining economic growth.
Rapid population growth makes
the problem particularly acute,
since food will have to become
a major import item.
The greatest single obstacle
to industrialization, apart from
the military threat, is the gov-
ernment's persistent budgetary
deficit. It is estimated that
the central government's over-
all budget deficit this year
will be $20,000,000, not a
particularly large amount com-
pared with other countries but
large enough to retard the eco-
nomic development program.
The biggest problem is de-
fense spending, which currently
consumes about 13 percent of
GNP and 50 percent of central
and provincial government ex-
penditures. In the "19 Points,"
the Chinese Nationalists pledged
to keep defense spending at the
fiscal 1959-60 level in real
terms, but some observers ques-
tion whether this limit has
been maintained. In any case,
future military actions such as
occurred during the Taiwan
Strait crisis in 1958 would
bring on a fresh round of in-
flationary military spending.
The willingness of invest-
ors to put their money in produc-
tion enterprises and the incen-
tive for individual saving rest
in large part on the govern-
ment's willingness to maintain
reasonably stable prices--
something the Chiang govern-
ment has not done. In 1960
SECRET
TAIWAN
855
INDIA
2,575
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
the government did act to check
soaring prices by tightening
credit, but the ensuing squeeze
on private businessmen resulted
in stabilization at the cost of
economic growth.
Toward the end of 1960 and
in the early months of 1961,
there were signs of a lag in new
investment which aroused fears
of a slowdown in economic growth
in 1961. Imports of capital
goods tapered off and a large
portion of US credits available
for industrial development in
1960 went unutilized. Credit
controls moreover would have
lost much of their effective-
ness, had not the United States
allowed the proceeds of economic
aid to accumulate in the banks
instead of being spent.
Most of the 19-percent rise
in the cost of living last year
resulted from the decline in
rice production, due partly to
the government's unrealistically
low prices to the farmers. If
the government had drawn on its
ample foreign exchange reserves
to import rice and other grains,
there probably would have been
no food shortages. Inasmuch as
the authorities plan to stabi-
lize the price of rice through
increased imports in 1961, a
selective relaxation of credit
controls would serve to revive
interest in new investment.
Apart from budgetary prob-
lems, the Chinese Nationalists
have yet to deal seriously with
problems of rapid population
growth; of changing consumption
habits to permit imports of
cheaper grains in exchange for
higher priced rice; of provid-
ing more adequate banking fa-
cilities; and of cutting red
tape for investors. Most ob-
servers feel that government
enterprises, which account for
about 40 percent of all indus-
trial activity on Taiwan, should
for the most part be turned
over to provide investors who
could put them on a more profit-
able, basis.
Progress
A number of Nationalist
leaders know what must be done
and have cooperated enthusias-
tically with American officials
to provide a healthier invest-
ment climate. Foremost among
these is Premier Chen Cheng,
who has worked hard to hold
down military spending and em-
phasize economic development,
often over strong opposition.
Chen recently hit hard at
stodgy bureaucratic attitudes,
declaring, "If there are more
people who still believe in the
saying 'the more I do, the more
mistakes I make; the less I do,
the less mistakes I make; and
if I do nothing, I make no mis-
takes,' then I want to state
emphatically that unless we
change our concepts radically,
we cannot even maintain our
present economic status. We
might as well forget about ac-
celerated economic growth."
Chen failed last year to
prevent the Legislative Yuan
CONSUMPTION AND INVESTMENT RATES AS
PERCENTAGE OF GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT
1951 -1959
COMMUNIST TAIWAN
CHINA
Aggregate of consumption and investment exceeded 100
percent where there was a net inflow of resources. Con-
sumption and investment rates were fairly stable over the
period except in Communist China, where annual con-
sumption declined from 90% in 1951 to 68% in 1959 and
investment rates rose from 11% in 1951 to 31% in 1959.
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25X1 B JUNE 1961
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
from approving what he consid-
ered an excessively high pay
increase for civil servants,
but he recently denied the cus-
tomary one-month bonus at the
lunar New Year.
Other leaders who recog-
nize the need for a bold at-
tack on Taiwan's economic prob-
lems are Minister of Finance
C. K. Yen; K. Y. Yin, vice
chairman of the Council for US
Aid, chairman of the Foreign
Exchange and Trade Control Com-
mission, and chairman of the
board of the Bank of Taiwan;
and K. T. Li, secretary general
of the Council of US Aid and
head of the Industrial develop-
ment and Investment Committee.
This committee already has
achieved many things: (1) re-
vision of the Investment Law
in 1959 and enactment of the
Investment Incentive Act in
1960, which among other things
provides for tax holidays for
new productive enterprises,
reduction of corporate income
taxes from 33 percent to 18
percent, and reduction of per-
sonal income taxes to a maximum
of 40 percent; (2) simplifica-
tion of entry and exit proce-
dures and post-entry security
checks; (3) passage of regula-
tions permitting the orderly
discharge of surplus employees;
(4) simplification of land---.ac-
quisition procedures for plant
sites; and (5) steamlining of
licensing and administrative
procedures.
Outlook
So far, investor response
has been discouraging; the only
significant investment since
the inception of the program
has been by an American firm for
the manufacture of antibiotics.
Another American firm recently
decided to produce pharmaceuti-
cals on Taiwan, however, and
PER CAPITA PRODUCTION OF SELECTED ITEMS IN 1959
INDIA
TAIWAN
COMMUNIST
CHINA
JAPAN
UNITED
STATES
Crude Steel
12
33
44
396
1,062
,(Ibs.)
Coal
245
73
1,135
1,126
4,790
(lbs.)
Crude Oil
.08
Neg
.42
.03
15
(barrels)
Electric Power
42
296
61
1,030
4,800
(KWH)
Cement
36
218
40
411
757
(Ibs.)
Paper, machine-
1.5
18
5.6
52
169
made
(Ibs. )
Chemical
.6
11
1.3
31
89
Fertilizers
-
(lbs.)
Cotton Cloth
16
16
12
33
54
(linear yards)
Grain, incl.
463
549
621
524
2,317
tubers
(Ibs. )
Note: The relatively favorable figure for Communist China in the last category is offset
by the fact that grains and tubers account for a much larger part of the people's d+ut than
in the other countries. Moreover, there were probably large net exports.
many inquiries are being re-
ceived from abroad.
Self-sustaining growth with-
.in a decade is not an impossi-
bility for Taiwan, even at the
present level of defense ex-
penditures. In practice, per-
formance is likely to fall be-
low this mark. The process of
obtaining large-scale investment
will be a lengthy one, in view
of the military situation and
the government's past failures.
The key to success is prob-
ably Chiang's attitude toward
fiscal responsibility. While
he embraces the idea of economic
development, he does not follow
fiscal problems closely, nor has
he always backed his premier in
holding down expenditures. More
important than balancing the
budget, in Chiang's mind, is
returning to the mainland and
looking after his troops, includ-
ing thousands of ineffective
soldiers.
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Despite a relatively late
start, the surface forces of the
Soviet Navy have made consider-
able progress in missile devel-
opment, particularly with sur-
face-to-surface weapons. Ap-
parently presaging the develop-
ment of missile ships, Soviet
naval doctrine underwent broad
changes in 1955 which were soon
reflected in official and semi-
official pronouncements on the
role of naval ships and in a re-
direction of naval construction
programs. The Soviet press in
1956 began. giving considerable
publicity to the role of mis-
siles in naval warfare, and the
first Soviet guided-missile ship
was commissioned in 1958.
Destroyers
destroyers, designated the
Krupnyy class. The first of
these were completed at the
Black Sea port of Nikolaev in
1958. Six are probably oper-
ational: two in the Northern
Sea Fleet, three in the Baltic,
and one in the Pacific. Two--
possibly four--are under con-
struction.
This destroyer is 454 feet
long and displaces 4,130 tons.
It has two Kildin-type launch-
ers, one forward and one aft,
and is believed to carry 18
short-range missiles of the sur-
face-to-surface cruise type.
The Krupnyy, generally a ship
of advanced design, is the first
destroyer in any navy with a
main battery consisting solely
of missiles.
This first missile ship, a
Kildin-class destroyer, was built
in the Black Sea. Four such
ships are believed operational:
two in the Black Sea, one in
the Baltic, and one in the
Pacific.
This class has the hull of
a Kotlin-class destroyer and
other similar characteristics:
a length of 415 feet, a maximum
speed of about 38 knots, and an
endurance of about 5,500 miles
at 18 knots. It differs from
the Kotlin mainly in having a
single large launcher mounted
on the stern, a missile-handling
deckhouse just forward of
the launchers, and missile-
associated electronic equip-
ment. It is estimated to carry
eight surface-to-surface cruise-
type guided missiles with
maximum effective ranges of
about 110 miles.
Concurrent with construc-
tion of the Kildin-class de-
stroyer, Soviet engineers and
shipbuilders designed and
started construction on larger
KILDIN-'25X1
GUIDED-M..,uif
DESTROYER
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The Krupnyy may be succeed-
ed by yet another class of mis-
sile-equipped destroyer. A new
class of ships, designated Kynda,
is under construction at the
Zhdanov shipyard in Leningrad.
Two units observed have charac-
teristics of a destroyer, but
may be larger than the Krupnyy.
Soviet destroyers equipped
with guided missiles differ from
those of the West in that they
are designed to provide a sur-
face-to-surface missile-attack
capability rather than serve as
antiaircraft screening units.
Their primary mission probably
is to oppose carrier strike
forces, but their relatively
weak shipboard antiaircraft de-
fense suggests that most such
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
and Komar-class motor patrol
KOMAR-CLASS boats, were first sighted in
MISSILE-CARRYING Leningrad in 1959. Units of
MOTOR TORPEDO BOAT the larger, ( PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS ) the Osa, have four
large, above-deck, missile-
carrying structures, all of them
probably launchers. Osa-class
boats displace about 200 tons,
are about 140 feet long, and
have a maximum speed of about
32 knots. Komar-class units,
a later development, are "P-6"
torpedo boats with torpedo
tubes removed and two launchers
added. They displace about
60 tons, are 83 feet long,
and have a top speed of about
45 knots.
At least 20 guided-missile
motorboats are deployed in the
close to the mainland, where they
could be supported by land-based
aviation. Secondary missions may
include shore bombardment, sup-
port for ground forces, and deep
support for amphibious landings.
operations would be conducted
Baltic, with others probably
in the Black Sea and Pacific
fleets. Little is known about
the missile systems used on
these boats.
Cruisers
Despite speculation that
operational cruisers of the So-
viet fleet are being or soon
will be equipped with missile
systems, there is little evidence
of this. The one exception is a
Black Sea cruiser which report-
edly has a missile-launching
installation, possibly for test
purposes.
If the USSR adds other
missile cruisers to its navy,
it is more likely to convert
existing cruisers than to build
new ones. Cruiser construction
was halted in 1956, and at least
four partially completed Sverd-
lov cruiser hulls were scrapped
in 1960.
Motorboats
Two unusual, small, mis-
sile-carrying units, the Osa-
The USSR currently has a
number of types of sea=borne sur-
face-to-surface missiles and may
have one surface-to-air type in
development; most, if not all,
of these missiles are radar
guided. The known surface-to-
surface missiles are cruise
types and appear to have been
developed specifically for naval
use. There is no evidence that
ballistic types are carried on
any naval surface unit, although
adaptations of some ground-force
weapons could probably be in-
stalled easily. Cruise-type
missiles are primarily intended
for use against mobile targets,
although they could also be
used for short bombard-
ment.
The range of destroyer-
launched missiles frequently
can be extended beyond the
radar horizon of the destroyer 25X1
--about 30 miles--through the
use of airplane or helicop-
ter radar tracking.
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