CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

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• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
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• Publication Date: October 19, 1999
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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'` Ir- I TI'AL
CURRENT
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY
SUMMARY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
COPY NO. 64
OCI NO. 0280/61
18 May 1961
S 25X1
/'990
DATE: I 1$_R REVIEWER:
N_.X'I R V E\.: . TE
AUTH: HR 70--'
DEC~.ASSIFI: D
T
DOCUMENT NO.
NNO CHANGE_ IN C! ASS.
C FIE TIAL
State Department review completed RECORD
Ai;Iiiv~
AGENCY
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THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECT-
ING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES
WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS,
TITLE 18, USC, SECTIONS 793 AND 794, THE TRANSMIS-
SION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO
AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.
The Current Intelligence Weekly Summary has been prepared
primarily for the internal use of the Central Intelligence
Agency. It does not represent a complete coverage of all
current situations. Comments and conclusions represent the
immediate appraisal of the Office of Current Intelligence.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
WEEKLY REVIEW
LAOS
The 14-nation Geneva Con-
ference on Laos began on 16 May
after several days' delay oc-
casioned by a dispute over the
seating of a delegation repre-
senting the Communist-dominated
Pathet Lao, which demanded an
equal voice in the proceedings
with the royal government and
the so-called "government" of
3ouvanna Phouma. After a for-
mula had been worked out among
the great powers which permit-
ted seating of all three group;
the royal delegation received
instructions from Vientiane to
boycott the conference so long
as the Pathet Lao group was
seated or unless the legality
of the Boun Oum government was
explicitly affirmed by the con-
ference.
Vientiane's attitude may
stem in part from General Phoumi~s
bitterness over the trend of
events. He told an American Em-
bassy officer on 15 May that the
United States "says one thing
and does the other." He asserted
that for months the United States
took a strong position against
allowing the International Con-
trol Commission (ICC) to return
to Laos, opposed any 14-nation
conference, and stood firmly
against Pathet Lao participation
in the government. He said that
he had recently told the King
that he was forced to follow
blindly the American line but he
had no idea where it would lead.
Communist Tactics
Moscow's preconference
tactics were designed to gain
Western acceptance of the Pathet
.Lao on a basis of equality with
the Vientiane regime and the Sou-
vanna Phouma group. Gromyko
told Secretary Rusk that since
no coalition government could
be formed prior to the opening
of the conference. it would be
necessary to seat representa-
tives of the "three existing
forces" in Laos. Gromyko added
if the US had any doubts about
the reality of the Pathet Lao
movement,"we had only to look
at a map."
The USSR has apparently
now decided that it would be ad-
vantageous to delay negotiations
on a coalition government, al-
Moscow may believe that its
efforts to establish the equal-
ity of the Pathet Lao represent-
ation with those of the Vientiane
government and Souvanna Phouma
will improve the prospects of
achieving a government heavily
weighted in favor of the bloc.
Soviet propaganda is depicting
US agreement to equal represent-
ation for all three groups as a
"retreat." Soviet leaders prob-
ably consider the cease-fire
agreement--signed by all three
Laotian factions--and the Vien-
tiane government's agreement to
meet at Namone in Communist-held
territory to discuss political
and military questions as other
significant steps in the attempt
to assert parity of the three
sides.
The Soviet Union is attempt-
ing to turn to its own advantage
whatever differences it has with
Communist China. A series of cal-
culated leaks in widely separated
areas of the world in near-identical
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-
Muong' 1oun
rabay~~ ' ....... A---.--.O S
1 Muong Soui Ban
Po uj Khoun lame s
Jurres Xleng Khou
STATUTE MILES 200
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
language have characterized
both the US and Chinese posi-
tions as "extreme" and picture
the Soviet posture as one of
reasonableness. Soviet spokes-
men have hinted nevertheless
that their government can con-
Peiping's foreign minister,
in his opening day speech at
Geneva on 16 May, keynoted what
will probably be a continual
barrage of Chinese Communist at-
tacks against the US alliance
structure in Southeast Asia.
Terming SEATO the "root of ten-
sion" in the area, Chen Yi de-
manded it be dissolved and con-
demned US policy not only in
Laos but in Thailand and South
Vietnam as well.
chairmen--the USSR and the UK--
asking that "urgent measures"
be taken to prevent US "aggres-
sion" in South Vietnam. An ed-
itorial on 13 May in the offi-
cial party journal Nhan Dan
urged the participants in the
present Geneva conference to
consider the US role in South
Vietnam. While these appeals
may foreshadow a North Vietnam-
ese effort to introduce this
item on the Geneva agenda, Hanoi
has not repeated this request in,
subsequent propaganda.
Southeast Asian Participants
Laos' neighbors participat-
ing in the conference--Thailand,
South Vietnam, Cambodia, and 25X1
Burma--all take a serious view
of the crisis, fearing an im-
minent Communist takeover.~___1
Reflecting the "united
front" which Soviet spokesmen
had promised, Gromyko, in his
more temperate and seemingly
reasonable speech to the confer-
ence on 17 May, also denounced
SEATO's role in Laos. Claiming
that inclusion of Laos in the
SEATO treaty's "sphere of ac-
tion" directly contravened the
1954 Geneva Agreements, Gromyko
asserted that "this can no
longer be tolerated." Together
with the expected insistence on
retention of a veto power over
the activities of the ICC, the
concerted Communist attack on
SEATO set the tone for their
future attempts at the conference.
North Vietnam during the
week also bitterly attacked US
assistance for South Vietnam's
war against Communist guerrillas.
The North Vietnamese foreign
minister on 12 May addressed a
letter to the 1954 Geneva co-
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Thailand is attending the
conference with great reluctance
and reservations. The Sarit re-
gime has long advocated a mili-
tary solution to the Laotian
crisis, including SEATO inter-
vention if necessary. Sarit's
reported interest in an expan-
sion of trade with the USSR is
one of several recent indica-
tions of a possible Thai drift
toward neutralism stemming in
part from dissatisfaction with
American policy on Laos.
The negotiations among the
Boun Gum government, the Sou-
vanna group, and the Pathet Lao
began in Namone on 13 May. In
the first session, cease-fire
documents were signed formal-
izing the de facto cessation of
hostilities generally prevailing
throughout the country.
After two unproductive ses-
sions devoted to agreeing on an
agenda, the three groups on 17
May agreed to discuss at the
next meeting, scheduled for the
19th, the possibility of forming
a coalition government and es-
tablishing a tripartite military
group to help the ICC regulate
the cease-fire. It was also
agreed that Phoumi, Souvanna,
and Pathet Lao leader Souphan-
nouvong should meet as soon as
possible, but no definite time
or place was set. Despite this
progress in narrowing down the
agenda, negotiations on the for-
mation of a coalition government
and regulation of the cease-fire
are likely to be protracted.
18 May 61
The Military. Situation
The military situation has
remained generally quiet during
the past week, although scat-
tered enemy artillery fire and
guerrilla fire continue. A mixed
Pathet Lao, Kong Le, and North
Vietnamese force is continuing
to exert pressure on an isolated
Meo partisan garrison at Pa
Dong, southwest of the town of
Xieng Khouang.
resuming the war."
would "be held responsible for
Both the Pathet Lao and
Kong Le, now described as a
brigadier general, have broad-
cast statements taking note of
the presence of South Vietnamese
troops on Laotian soil. Kong
Le warned that if they were not
immediately withdrawn and if the
Laotian Army attacked "liberated"
areas along Route 9, the "US
imperialists and their lackeys"
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A force of some 3,600 army
troops and marines led by Maj.
Gen. Pak Chong-hui, deputy com-
mander of South Korea's Second
Army, seized Seoul on 16 May
and deposed the government of
Prime Minister Chang Myon.
Pak's group professes friend-
ship for the United States and
a desire to eliminate official
corruption and strengthen the
national economy, after which
it will purportedly return the
government to civilian authority.
Pak, a former officer in
the Japanese Army, joined the
South Korean Army in 1946. Two
years later he was sentenced to
ten years' imprisonment for
Communist activities, but he
was recalled to service at the
outbreak of the Korean war in
1950. He is not known to have
re-established his former Com-
munist contacts.
The revolutionary junta
has declared martial law and
named a temporary all-military
cabinet. All major population
centers are believed quiet, and
the city of Taegu reportedly has
been returned to civilian au-
thority. In Seoul, leftist news-
papermen reportedly have been
arrested and all suspected Com-
munists ordered taken into custody.
Lt. Gen.Yi Han-lim, com-
manding general of the First
Army, which is deployed along
the Demilitarized Zone facing
North Korea, is holding his men
in position and has declared
that he "and all his officers
and men support the military
revolution."
Army Chief of Staff Lt.
Gen.Chang To-yong has accepted
the chairmanship of nak's Mili-
tary Revolutionary Committee.
Chang said he did so with the
understanding that there would
be no mass punishment or vio-
18 I' Ia y 61
lence against individuals, that
a new cabinet would be formed
composed of the best men avail-
able, and that troops would be
withdrawn from the capital city
"at the earliest opportunity."
He noted that the committee
agreed to the last condition
provided troops remained until
the position of the United
States toward the coup was
clear.
Following`.the-',takeover, Prime
Minister Chang failed to rally
any support for his administra-
tion. On 18 May he announced the
resignation of his government
over Seoul radio. This action
has provided a cloak of legality
for the coup and opened the way
for transitional measures within
.a constitutional framework.
With the cooperation of
President Yun Po-sun, Lt. Gen.
Chang appears to be working for
a transfer of power to a nonparty
government composed of civilians
and some military officers. There
is some indication that Pak Chong-
hui,might agree to such an ar-
rangement.
Initial Communist propaganda
reaction reflected a lack of
first-hand information on the
coup--North Korea, for example,
announced the event some six
hours after it had taken place
and then was forced to rely on
Seoul press statements as news
sources. Subsequently, however,
Pyongyang denounced the coup
leaders as "flagrantly reaction-
ary" in a statement expressing
hope that things may yet develop
to the Communists' advantage.
While hailing Chang Myon's down-
fall, the statement depicted
South Korean troops as "deceived
and misled" and urged them to
take "internal problems firmly in
their hands." Moscow and Peiping
also have labeled the coup group
reactionary.
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As the'first moves of Ir-a---
nian Prim9Minister All Amini's
program~, to eradicate corruption,
four general officers and 40
civilian officials have been
arrested and 300 army officers,
including 33 generals, have
been retired. Th6ge arrested
include General Haj Ali Xia,
former chief of ifitelligence for
the Supreme Commander's Staff;
General Zarqam, former minister
of finance; General Alavi Moqa-
dam, a former minister of in-
terior; and General Nevessi,
head of the Fisheries Adminis-
tration. These men have long
been identified in the public
mind with some of the more fla-
grant abuses of position.
The Shah told the'American
ambassador on 13 May that he
felt the charges of corruption
against governmerltufficials
were highly exaggerated but
that arrests of those believed
guilty were necessary to calm
the situation. They would be
tried and if found guilty would
be punished. If they are found
innocent, he said, the people's
anger would be directed not
against the Crown but against
the minister of justice.
The Shah stated that he
would support Amini's programs
but would not become a figure-
head. The power id Iran has al-
ways resided in the Crown, he
said, and must continue to do so.
Commenting on the rime minister,
the Shah remarked that Amini
now is relatively popular be-
cause he has been dut of public
office for some time. He added
that this popularity would
diminish as Aminj. failed to meet
the demands of thdae now sup-
porting him.
Amini himself appears in-
creasingly confident that he
will be able to counteract any
moves the Shah may make to at-
tempt to retain power, and as-
serts that the Shah is "fin-
ished" as an absolute monarch.
much of the public dissatis- 25X1
faction stems from the intrigues
and business manipulations of
the royal family.
On 17 May the Shah left
for an official visit to Norway
with a party of 19. Except for
the Queen, none of the royal
family accompanied him, although
the Shah's twin sister, Princess
Ashraf, left the country a few
days earlier. Princes Gholam
Reza and Abdol Reza, together
with Prime Minister Amini and
Minister of Court Ala, have
been appointed as a regency coun-
cil until the Shah returns in
about a week.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
The rebel Provisional Al-
gerian Government (PAG) is en-
tering into formal negotiations
with France on 20 May without
having achieved the preliminary
understanding it had sought.
The PAG had hoped that the se-
cret talks which have been going
on since February would iden-
tify areas of agreement on cer-
tain major issues before the
formal meetings ,o ened .
Paris reportedly has not
explained to the PAG whether it
intends to use the negotiations
to arrange a cease-fire and set
conditions for a referendum or,
as the rebels prefer, to nego-
tiate an over-all statute for
Algeria. Despite their "lip
service" to a completely free
referendum, the rebels would
distrust its results in view of
the presence of military forces
and the difficulty of defining
the different, choices. Presi-
dent de Gaulle, moving beyond
his previous references to ne-
gotiating aYcease-fire and con-
ditions for a referendum, sug-
gested in;~a speech on 8 May the
possibility of a joint French-
PAG endorsement, prior to the
referendum campaign, of an inde-
pendent Algeria with close ties
to France.
The problem of Algerian
sovereignty is expected to be-
come troublesome at an early
stage. The rebel negotiators will
be under considerable pressure
to accept nothing less than
French recognition of their fun-
damental right to exercise sov-
ereignty over all of Algeria,
including the Sahara,- and the
areas of dense European coloniza-
tion. Tunisian, Swiss, and other
moderate advisers are recommend-
ing to the PAG that it limit its
demands and give priority to
consolidating its political au-
thority in the country.
PAG Deputy Premier Belkacem
Krim will head the well-balanced
and competent rebel delegation
at Evian. His serious illness
in March now is thought to have
been a major factor in the reb-
els' refusal to begin formal
talks on 7 April as originally
planned. Krim commands the re-
spect of the "military" faction,
and his participation should im-
prove prospects that the rebel
fighters will abide by any agree-
ment reached at Evian. De
Gaulle has indicated that as
soon as formal negotiations be-
gin he will remove another rebel
deputy premier, Mohammed Ben
Bella, from his confinement in
a military fortress. This move
would be likely to facilitate
the negotiations, since Ben Bella
is both level-headed by tempera-
ment and highly respected as an
original leader of the rebellion.
Meanwhile, sporadic vio-
lence continues in both France
and Algeria, and tight security
precautions are being maintained.
The technical ease with which
plastic bombings can be carried
out makes it extremely difficult
for the police to catch the per-
petrators, and in some instances
there may be active police sym-
pathy for the European extrem-
ists. Grenade-throwing and
knife-wielding Moslems are only
slightly less difficult to ap-
prehend. Large-scale demonstra-
tions in support of the PAG
have occurred recently in a
number of Algerian cities, with
as many as 2,500 Moslems partic-
ipating in one instance.
to the FLN."
The problem is aggravated
by the disruption of security:.
services in the purges of high
officials following the April
military. revolt with the result-
ing confusion and" lowered morale.
Do Gaulle must -still Xac.e the fact
that many army officers remain 25X1
bitterly opposed to any negotiated
settlement "turning Algeria over
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
a merger of Cuba's Popular
Socialist'.(Communist) party (PSP)
and Castro's 26th of July Move-
ment is expected to be completed
sometime prior to this summer's
celebrations of the Castro move-
ment's eight anniversary. The
26th of July organization exists
virtually in name only at pres-
ent, and the Communist party
has in fact exercised a consid-
erable degree of control over
all Cuban political, economic,
and social institutions for some
time.
The Communists have here-
tofore preferred to cultivate
the impression that the PSP sup-
ports the general revolutionary
program of the Castro movement
but remains separate from it.
Party leaders have acknowledged,
however, that the amalgamation
of all existing Cuban political
organizations in a single polit-
ical party is a fundamental Com-
munist goal and a prerequisite
for the organization of the
Cuban state along "socialist"
lines.
In a speech to members of
Cuba's "literacy brigades" on
14 May, Castro reiterated his
pledge to eradicate all illit-
eracy from the country during
the current revolutionary "year
of education." He said that so
far some 60,000 young Cubans
were registered as teachers who
would fight illiteracy in rural
areas, but added that 100,000
such teachers were needed in
order to win "as brilliant a
victory over ignorance as our
armed forces won over the mer-
cenaries." He also said that
the government plans to provide
full scholarships for some 40,-
000 students in Havana alone,
following the return of the
Cuban literacy brigades to the
capital in November.
The gov-
ernment's recent Wholesale ar-
rests of suspected anti-Castro
elements--many of whom have not
been released yet--and the in-
creased emphasis on the forma-
tion of an elaborate informant
network probably precludes'any
sustained and effective internal
opposition activity in the im-
mediate future.
Meanwhile, Cuba is contin-
uing its policy of seeking to
influence public opinion in the
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
hemisphere in its behalf. A
number of students from other
Latin American countries now
are in Cuba, apparently without
the approval of their govern-
ments, A Cuban good-will mis-
sion headed by Foreign Affairs
Under Secretary Carlos Olivares
plans to visit Mexico, Brazil,
Ecuador, Chile, Bolivia, and
other Latin American countries,
The Cuban Government is continu-
ing to court the support of the
Velasco regime in Ecuador, al-
ready the Latin American regime
most favorably disposed toward
Castro.
The continuing arrival in
Cuba of merchant ships from
Sino-Soviet bloc countries since
late last year indicates that
the bloc intends to meet its
scheduled deliveries to the
Castro regime, Bloc and bloc-
chartered vessels are constantly
in Cuban waters,
ages to Cuba and well over 400
dry-cargo vovaees in the other
Sugar and petroleum re-
quirements make up the bulk of
the tonnage to be moved. Ful-
filling the contracts to sup-
ply more than 4,000,000 tons
of petroleum and to buy 4,000,-
000 tons of sugar in 1961 will
require roughly 300 tanker voy-
directions
CONGO
Leaders of major Congolese
political factions are trying
to strengthen their positions
in anticipation of a reconvening
of parliament, The Coquilhat-
ville meeting of the Leopold-
ville regime and its allies has
published a proposal for a con-
stitutional revision to be dis-
cussed by the legislators, and
Kasavubu has called for a meet-
ing of parliament when the
conference is over.
The constitutional proposals
worked out at Coquilhatville
envisage the creation of a
"Confederation of the United
States of the Congo," In an
attempt to bridge the gap be-
tween those Congolese who
support a unitary state and
those who favor a weak union
of largely autonomous tribal
units, the proposals would
set up a cumbersome struc-
ture which superimposes a
strengthened central execu-
tive on the tribal groupings
approved in principle two
months ago at Tananarive. The
American Embassy in Leopold-
ville comments that the draft
constitution "tries to be
all things to all men" and
leaves many ambiguities to
be decided later.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Neither Gizenga nor the Katanga
regime has participated in the
Coquilhatville talks, and it is
unlikely that any draft would
be initially acceptable to both
of them.
Gizenga seems willing to
consider a reconvening of par-
liament--he had been assidu-
ously cultivating uncommitted
legislators--but he has rejected
Kasavubu's terms. Reiterating
his claim that he heads the
"legitimate central government,"
Gizenga has announced his selec-
tion of Kamina, in Katanga
Province, as the locale for the
meeting and has suggested that
the area's security be guaran-
teed by troops from Ghana,
Guinea, Mali, the UAR, Sudan,
Togo, and India. Of these
states, only India and Ghana
have troops in the country at
present. Kasavubu probably
would resist the dispatch to
the Congo of contingents from
such radical supporters of
Gizenga as Guinea, Mali, or the
UAR, and Leopoldville radio has
announced that "no delaying
tactics will prevent" the re-
opening of the legislature.
It is questionable whether
the Ileo government nominated by
Kasavubu would be approved in a
reconvened parliament. Voting
patterns will be determined large-
ly by tribal loyalties, bribery,
and the whim of the individual
legislator, and several members
of both houses are unknown quan-
tities. Gizenga's strength in
both houses probably has increased
somewhat since early April, when
it was estimated he had 16 sup-
porters in the 83-member Senate
and 25 in the 137-member Chamber
of Deputies. However, the num-
ber of Ileo's nominal supporters
probably remains somewhat larger.
The issue would ultimately be
decided by the presently uncom-
mitted legislators.
In an apparent effort to
put an end to divergent atti-
tudes in Stanleyville, Gizenga
arrested several moderates in
his "central government" and in
the Orientale provincial regime.
In addition to some of the
ablest civilian officials, those
arrested include two offi-
cers from Gizenga's armed forces
who had been involved in the
recent negotiations with Leopold-
ville military leaders. One of
the officers was subsequently
released. Although there has
been no reaction to the arrests
in Stanleyville so far, sympathy
for the moderates' conciliatory
attitude toward Leopoldville re-
portedly was widespread, and op-
position to Gizenga might in-
crease both among the populace
and within the army.
In Katanga, the Elisabeth-
ville regime is ingratiating it-
self with the UN, apparently
because officials there fear an
attack from Leopoldville. The
ruling triumvirate, headed by
Interior Minister Munongo, has
also agreed to disband Katanga's
white mercenary army units.
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Munongo probably feels that in
addition to removing a source of
friction between his regime and
the UN, the disbandment of the
"White legion" removes a
potential source of armed
opposition.
Belgian Foreign Minister
Spaak informed the American
ambassador on 16 May that Congo-
lese Foreign Minister Bomboko
had written Brussels to request
the withdrawal of most of the
Belgian advisers in Katanga.
Spaak said a list of such ad-
visers who should be withdrawn
at once is being made up and
would be communicated to Elisa-
bethville and Leopoldville. He
added that this policy would
create an adverse reaction with-
in Belgium, but he stated his
belief that those who wanted to 25X1
maintain the Belgian predomi-
nance in the Congo were com-
pletely wrong.
MIDDLE EAST DEVELOPMENTS
The UAR military exercise
which began on 9 May is still
in progress, but no large-scale
troop movements have been ob-
served. Israel
pegan
routine unit-scale..spring maneu-
vers of its own about a month
earlier than usual. Maneuvers
involving three brigades are
to be held beginning about
the first of June, and the
call..-up of reserves to partic-
ipate in them may already have
begun.
exercise and the political sit-
uation in Jordan. If the UAR
moved to seize control of Jor-
dan either by force or clandes-
tine action, the Israeli Govern-
ment would consider military
intervention--at least the oc-
eupatibn?-of Jordan's west bank.
King Husayn's hold on
power has been weakened by the
adverse reaction among almost
all Jordanians to his plan to
wed an Englishwoman about 25
May.
The Israeli Government has
been somewhat concerned both
about the scope of the UAR
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
UAR press and radio have
made no concentrated effort to
exploit Husayn's marriage plan.
Indeed, Cairo newspapers are
speculating-`Fthat a meeting be-
tween Nasir and Husayn may be
Iraq
The most significant of
several changes announced on 14
May in the Iraqi cabinet was the
replacement of the leftist minis-
ter of guidance, Faysal al-Samir.
This post has been taken over by
Minister of Education Ismail Arif,
who is expected to purge the
Guidance Ministry of pro-Commu-
nist elements, much as he has
already purged the Education Min-
istry. The government has pre-
viously acted to suppress the
activities of Iraqi Communist-
front groups one after another;
the most recent instance was an
order by Military Governor Abdi
that the offices of the Iraqi
Peace Partisans be closed.
The three new cabinet ap-
pointees are colorless, second-
string technicians; no first-
raters appear to be willing to
accept cabinet appointments
because of Qasim's erratic
personality and the widespread
public disillusionment with his
regime. 25X1
UAR-USSR
Over the last two weeks,
the UAR press and radio have
played down criticism of the
United States and made some ob-
lique criticisms of the Commu-
nist bloc.
Communist China has bought
almost 5,000,000 tons of grain
for delivery in 1961 and has
expressed its intent to buy an
additional 5,000,000 tons--from
Canada--for delivery during 1962
and"1963; Of the three-year
total, worth $600,000,000, about
500,000 tons are presently in-
tended for re-export to cover
Chinese commitments to Albania,
Cuba, and Ceylon.
The latest purchase of
750,000 tons of wheat from Aus-
tralia brings the total from that
country for delivery in 1961 to
2,150,000 tons, and further
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUM19ARI
long-term contracts are still
under discussion. Of the 7,000,-
000 tons of grain to be pur-
chased from Canada, just over
2,000,000 tons will be delivered
this year. In the 1960-61 food
year, it is estimated that China
had roughly 115,000,000 tons of
grain available for consumption
as food.
Communist China in 1961 will
for the first time become a net
importer of food, and food ex-
ports will be down sharply from
the usual levels. As a result,
it has cut other imports dras-
tically to compensate for reduced
export capabilities and to pay
for food imports. In addition,
China is selling silver bullion
and obtaining short-term credits
from the grain sellers and from
Hong Kong banks to restrict the
drain on its limited supply of
foreign exchange. There is no
evidence of gold sales by the
Chinese, but these would be al-
most impossible to detect if the
USSR were marketing the gold for
them. Canada has apparently
agreed to allow the Chinese to
pay 25 percent down and the
remainder in nine months follow-
ing each shipment of grain; Aus-
tralia has also given credits of
up to a year for the most recent
grain purchases.
Aid extended by the USSR
has not been generous consider-
ing the seriousness of China's
present difficulties. In the
Sino-Soviet trade protocol signed
on 7 April the Soviets announced
a loan of 500,000 tons of sugar
to China and deferral of repay-
ment of China's short-term cred-
its from the USSR, a factor which
should ease somewhat the problem
of financing the current grain
purchases. There is no evidence
that the Soviets have loaned
China foreign exchange to fi-
nance these purchases. Although
the trade protocol did not in-
clude foodstuffs among the com-
modities which China would ship
to the USSR, it is possible that
China will continue to,export
some food, but with a minimum
of publicity.
Food shortages in China
are especially severe now--the
last month before the summer
harvest--and reports of serious
malnutrition are being received
from many parts of the country.
The decline of already low nutri-
tional standards is contributing
to a rising incidence of disease
and to a general debilitation of
the population. As a consequence,
the efficiency and morale of the
labor force is probably at the
lowest level since the Communists
consolidated their power in the
early 1950s, a factor which will
retard economic recovery.
The continued drought in
North China, probable reductions
in wheat acreage, an apparently
heavy winter kill, and a recent
late-season cold wave damaging
to crops in several provinces
have dimmed prospects for an
early harvest. While the heavy
emphasis on bad weather in the
Chinese press is a convenient
means of shifting blame for the
food shortages away from the re-
gime's policies, evidence of con-
tinued poor growing weather has
been confirmed by weather mon-
itoring services of the US Gov-
ernment. Chinese agriculture
has also suffered, however, from
inept organizational changes and
general mismanagement.
Although Peiping has re-
treated from the extremes of the
leap forward and has practically
abandoned the commune, the govern-
ment faces a major task in re-
building the morale of the peas- 25X1
ant and obtaining the where-
withal to offer incentives for
(Prepared by ORR)
renewed effort.
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The rate of conversion of
Soviet collective farms (kol-
khozes) to state farms (sov-
khozes) was sharply stepped up dur-
ing 1960 and 1961, despite in-
dications during the preceding
two years that the USSR intended
to proceed slowly in this field.
While this would appear to in-
dicate a change in Moscow's at-
titude toward state farms in
the development of socialized
agriculture, articles in au-
thoritative journals have re-
cently reaffirmed Khrushchev's
1958-1959 position that the two
types of farm organization will
continue to exist side by side
for some time to come and have
criticized local officials for
"indiscriminate" conversions.
It is believed, therefore,
that the future status of the
collective farm system, long a
key practical and ideological
issue, apparently continues to
be disputed at high levels with-
in the regime. The problem of
merging collective and state
farm property into a uniform
Communist property is to be in-
cluded in the new party program
which Khrushchev will present
to the 22nd party congress in
October.
In 1960, after two years
of a relative lull in conver-
sions, the number of state farms
increased from 6,500 to 7,400,
according to Soviet statistics,
while the number of collective
farms declined. Although col-
lective farms remain the dom-
inant institution in Soviet ag-
riculture--accounting for about
60 percent of the total sown
acreage in 1960--they are rapid-
ly disappearing in certain areas
of the country. In Tselina
(New Lands) Kray, for example,
the number of collective 'arms
decreased from 412 to .L7 in
BACKGROUND
State farms differ from collective fames in
four ways: (1) the collective-rather than the
state--nominally owns all of the farm's productive
assets other than land--such as machinery and tools;
(2) the state farm receives its capital directly
from the state budget, the collective largely from
the profits of its own operation; (3) the collec-
tive farmer's wages are more dependent on the suc-
cess of the crop than are those of the state farmer;
(4) collective farm produce is sold both at collec-
tive farm markets and state stores, whereas state
farm produce is sold only at state stores.
the first two months of 1961,
while state farms increased from
506 to 682. The sown acreage,
number of cattle, and number of
workers in the state sector in-
creased sharply at the expense
of the collective sector.
The Seven-Year Plan adopted
in January 1959 had provided for
only modest increases in invest-
ment in state agriculture, but
in 1960 state investment rose
20 percent. The state farms in
1960 exceeded the level of their
share in the delivery of grain
and milk to the government
planned for 1965, while collec-
tive investment declined.
Communist doctrine has
usually argued that large-scale
state-owned farms are more ef-
ficient than collective farms
and closer to the Communist
ideological ideal of a single
form of "all-national" property.
Sovkhozes became the dominant
form in the New Lands opened by
Khrushchev in 1954, and begin-
ning in 1956 he has repeatedly
urged that rings of specialized
state farms be set up around
cities to supply them with milk
and vegetables. Throughout the
USSR, conversions of kolkhozes
to sovkhozes reached a peak in
1957, but were virtually halted
in 1958-1959 after the bumper
crop of 1958.
Khrushchev strengthened the
collective farms in 1958 by
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USSR: DISTRIBUTION OF TOTAL SOWN AREA
SECRET
0
collective farms state farms private plots
* also includes other state agricultural enterprises--about 2% of total acreage
In the last decade there has been a sharp decline in the number of
collective farms through consolidations and conversions to state farms.
(units, end of year)
1950 1
953
1958 1959 1960
Collective Farms 121,400 91
,20
0 67,700 54,600 45,100
State Farms 4,988 4
,85
7 6,002 6,496 7,386
turning farm machinery over to
them. His speech to the 21st
party congress in 1959 and the
Seven-Year Plan adopted at that
congress envisaged a mixed ag-
ricultural system in which kol-
.khozes would continue in "peace-
ful competition" with sovkhozes
for some time to come and would
be raised gradually to the
level of "all-national" property.
Disappointing harvests in
1959 and 1960, however, made it
difficult for weak kolkhozes
to pay for the machinery trans-
ferred to them in 1958 and to
provide the peasant with suf-
ficient incentives. Some econ-
omists began to argue that
conversion to state farms was
the best solution to the prob-
lem of economically backward
kolkhozes. Local officials,
apparently with support at least
as high as the agricultural min-
istries of some republics, be-
gan to speed up the pace of
conversions to state farms.
The recent establishment in a
number of republics of state
farms ministries indicates that
this renewed emphasis on state
farms was probably directed
from the center.
Since the fall of 1960,
however, articles have again
appeared in party and economic
journals arguing that the time
has not yet'come for an all-out
conversion drive. They point
out that the kolkhozes can still
contribute significantly to in-
creased agricultural output and
that massive conversions would
require heavy state investment.
The first secretary of the Georg-
ian Communist party and others
have recently condemned local
officials for converting kol-
khozes into state farms in 25X1
order to shift to the state the
burden of improving agricultural
production.
(Prepared jointly wi
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
The long-awaited trial of
persons allegedly involved in a
plot to overthrow the Hoxha re-
gime opened in Tirana on 15 May.
Ten conspirators have pleaded
guilty to six charges, including
involvement in a plot, armed re-
volt, and passing information
to foreign powers. They are ac-
cused of serving the US, Greek,
and Yugoslav intelligence serv-
ices, but in actuality the plot
uncovered late last summer prob-
ably was inspired and organized
by the USSR in an attempt to
remove the Albanian leaders who
have aligned their country with
Communist China. Thus the trial
is an expression of Hoxha's de-
fiance of Moscow.
Although reports have claimed
that as many as 250 individuals
in the party, government, and
military were implicated in the
plot, only the ten are being
tried. Terri Sejko, said to be
leader of the plot, is the prin-
cipal defendant. Until his ar-
rest, he held the rank of vice
admiral and was deputy commander
of the Albanian Navy.
The only other prominent de-
fendants are Tahir Demi, quietly
ousted last fall as chairman of
the Elbasan district People's
Council, and Halim Xhelo, who
was an important figure in the
internal security apparatus un-
til 1957, when he was apprehended
attempting to flee to Greece,
Xhelo, for unknown reasons, was
spared arrest at that time and
subsequently has served as head
of the army sports office. The
regime is now using the attempted
flight to try to lend credibility
to its charges of Greek involve-
ment in the alleged plots.
Two of the other defendants
are known to have held responsi-
ble party or security jobs in
the early 1950s in the Konispol
area adjacent to the Greek bor-
der where many of the activities
of the conspirators allegedly
took place. The two most prom-
inent figures removed from their
party positions last fall, Liri
Belishova and Koco'Tashko, are
not among the defendants. Three
others have a military back-
ground.
The Conspiracy
Details of the plot have
not yet been fully developed in
the testimony, but the general
outlines are clear. The first
two defendants, Tahir Demi and
.Nasho Gerxho, claimed that as
far back as 1951 the Greeks and
the Yugoslavs had been working
with their leader, Sejko, and
others who had subsequently fled
Albania, including a one-time
party central committee member,
General Panayot Plaku (who fled
in 1957). The conspiratorial
group allegedly had sought for
years to work within the Alba-
nian Workers (Communist) party
against the Hoxha regime and in
favor of the Yugoslav "revision-
ists." Those charged were said
to have argued in 1956 that the
Hoxha regime was not implementing
the bloc's policy of friendship
toward Tito.
Demi also testified that
Sejko was responsible in 1958
for passing to the Greeks in-
formation about the Albanian
Navy and that Sejko had plans
to involve the navy in an inter-
national incident which would
give Athens and Belgrade an
excuse to condemn Albania be-
fore the United Nations.
The most important task of
the group, however, according to
the testimony, was to encourage
dissidence among the people
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in the hopes that an armed up-
rising scheduled for September-
October 1960 would have popular
support. The US, Greece, and
Yugoslavia allegedly were to in-
tervene with armed forces to aid
the insurrection. When the prose-
cution inquired as to what pro-
gram the conspirators intended
to follow if their uprising were
successful, Demi said that the
"dregs" of the Albanian people
--presumably "revisionist" and
anti-Communist exiles in Yugo-
slavia and in the West--would
run the country, and that Gen-
eral Panayot Plaku would most
likely head the government.
Regime Intentions
The trial is intended to
,justify once again to the Alba-
nian people the regime's foreign
policy which has provided the
common ground for its support of
Communist China in the Sino-So-
viet dispute. The Hoxha regime
has always manipulated the peo-
ple's fears of potential Yugo-
slav and Greek aggression to
justify the need for its harsh
internal system, little changed
since Stalin's days.
The major--although implicit
--theme of the trial, however,
appears primarily to be anti-So-
viet. By tracing the conspiracy
back to 1951, the regime is in
effect demonstrating that its
assessment of Tito's Yugoslavia
has been correct all along, while
Khrushchev was in error in his
rapprochement with Tito in 1955-
57, his denunciation in 1956 of
the 1948 Cominform Resolution
outlawing Yugoslavia, and his
decision to pursue "peaceful co-
existence" with non-Communist
states. The indictment, for ex-
ample, attempts to show that the
US, Greece, and Yugoslavia "at
no time have... interrupted their
18 May 61
SEC.
hostile activities in the politi-
cal, ideological,or military
fields."
The testimony implies that
the conspiracy's pro-Yugoslav
activities in 1956--essentially
in harmony with bloc policy at
the time--were traitorous. In
this regard, Taho Sejko, then
editor of the leading regime
daily paper, Zeri i Popullit,
has been linked in the testimony
with the conspirators. By so
doing, the regime is implying
that the
expressions of
Albania's
limited
de-Stalinization
that
appeared
in
the press at
that
time did
not
reflect the
"true"
position
of
the regime.
The trial is also an ex-
pression of Hoxha's continued
defiance of the Soviet bloc on
another account, There is
reason to believe that Moscow
warned the Albanians in February
against holding any anti-Yugo-
slav trials. Neither Moscow
nor its satellites have ever
referred to the conspiracy.
Impact of the Trial
The trial will not only
serve to widen the fissure be-
tween Tirana and Moscow, it
probably will also result in
a severing of Albanian-Yugoslav
diplomatic relations. Yugo-
slavia, according to the Al-
banian radio, threatened in
late March to "review" its
relations with Tirana if Alba-
nia held a trial. While Pei-
ping might then break its ties
with Yugoslavia, Moscow and
its satellites probably would
not follow suit. Thus, the
facade of bloc unity--as es-
tablished at the November con-
ference of Communist leaders--
would be overtly disrupted.
T
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
A delegation led by Nan
Han-then, head of Communist Chi-
na's international trade pro-
motion committee, is on a tour
of several South American coun-
tries. Nan scored his first
success last week when President
Quadros agreed to the establish-
ment of a "nonofficial" Chinese
Communist trade office in Bra-
zil. This will be Peiping's
first permanent representation
on the South American continent.
Nan has held out the promise of
substantial trade between the
two countries, and Brazil has
agreed to send an economic dele-
gation to Peiping in the near
future.
However, Chinese Communist
trade with Latin American coun-
tries has--with the exception
of Cuba--been small, and neither
the visit nor the trade office
is likely to lead to any great
expansion of Sino-Brazilian
trade. Peiping's objective
therefore is probably more po-
litical than economic. It has
found the signing of trade
agreements or the opening of
trade offices to be a useful
wedge in establishing political
relations. The initial diplo-
matic recognition of Peiping
in the Middle East (by the UAR)
and in North Africa (by Morocco)
followed this pattern.
Such tactics have not al-
ways worked, however, largely
because of the intrusion of the
"two Chinas" issue, as in Japan
in 1958 and Lebanon in 1960.
Han reiterated to the Brazilians
Peiping's willingness to estab-
lish diplomatic relations if
Brazil breaks its ties with the
Chinese Nationalist Government.
The Quadros administration
has been making strong efforts
since its inauguration last
January to expand economic re-
lations with both Communist and
non-Communist countries, and
Quadros has made equivocal state-
ments as to his alignment with
the United States. Peiping is
not likely to gain early recogni-
tion, however, since Quadros ap-
parently prefers to space out
his announcements of dramatic
changes in foreign policy. He
has indicated that the re-es-
tablishment of relations with
the USSR will precede the estab-
lishment of relations with Com-
munist China.
Nan's group, nevertheless,
hopes to repeat its Brazilian suc-
cess in other parts of South
America. It has accepted an in-
vitation to Uruguay from an un-
official trade promotion organ-
ization, and it apparently will
then visit Argentina, which re-
cently sold China 20,000 tons
of grain. The Chilean foreign
minister also has agreed to
an unofficial visit by the
Chinese.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
SOMALI REPUBLIC LOOKS TO SOVIET UNION FOR AID
Prime Minister Abdirascid,
in response to an invitation
from the Soviet good-will mis-
sion which visited the Somali
Republic last month, will head
a large delegation to the USSR
for a visit beginning next week.
Abdirascid, a moderate who is
considered friendly to the West,
was initially reluctant to make
the trip but apparently concluded
that the prestige aspects would
improve his government's chance
of winning a clear-cut victory
in the referendum next month
to approve the country's first
constitution. The referendum
would in effect extend the gov-
ernment's term in office for
five years. The government is
meeting vigorous opposition
from the Communist-oriented
Great Somalia League (GSL) as
well as from the dominant party
in the northern region--former-
ly British Somaliland.
The Soviet delegation
traveled extensively during its
nine-day stay and was particu-
larly active in Somalia's north-
ern region, where political
leaders organized an unusually
warm welcome. This action was
more a reflection of hostility
to Abdirascid and the govern-
ment-supported referendum than
of real friendship for the So-
viet visitors. The leader of
the delegation nevertheless
took advantage of the friendly
atmosphere and announced that
Moscow would give "full consid-
eration" to development projects
in the area and expressed an
interest in opening a consulate
in Hargeisa, the regional cap-
ital. Moreover, he curried
the favor of two Somali minis-
ters from the northern region--
both of whom have consistently
opposed the prime _ministeres
policies--by inviting them as
well to visit the Soviet Union.
The Abdirascid delegation--
which will include high-ranking
officials in the ministries of
agriculture, education, health,
and foreign affairs, and perhaps
the army commander--can be ex-
pected to follow up the prelim-
inary agreements enumerated in a
joint communique issued at Moga-
discio on 9 April at the conclu-
sion of the Soviet visit. The
communique called for the early
signature of cultural and trade
agreements between the two coun-
tries and stated that Moscow
would "examine favorably" a
Somali request for a long-term
development loan. The Soviet
delegation delivered a letter
from Abdirascid to Khrushchev
in which the Somali leader re-
quested assistance in the con-
struction of ports, dams, and
an international airport, the
development of processing in-
dustries and an information
service, and the construction
and equipping of hospitals and
schools,
The US Embassy in Mogadiscio
estimates the cost of Abdira-
scid's "shopping list" at be-
tween $50,000,000 and $100,000,-
000. Although the USSR prob-
ably will agree to conclude gen-
eral economic and cultural agree-
ments, it is not likely to re-
spond with aid of the magnitude
requested by Abdirascid or to
offer arms--particularly in
view of its commitments in
Ethiopia. The most likely aid
offer will be a modest line of
credit under which individual
projects will be negotiated.
The prospects for trade between
the two countries are limited
by the Somali Republic's weak
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weak export potential. The
banana crop--the country's lead-
ing export--is largely committed
by trade agreements with Italy
and the UAR at premium prices.
After the Somali Republic
became independent last July,
Moscow, Prague, and Peiping
promptly established embassies
in Mogadiscio. Albania,Bulgaria,
and Hungary also arranged last
year to set up diplomatic mis-
sions, but their representa-
tives have not'yet arrived. Two
Czech technical experts are in
Hargeisa to study the progress
of technical education in the
country. Last February Prague
reportedly offered to build,
equip, and staff a technical
school in the republic at a
cost of about $1,400,000.
A meeting in Cairo to pre-
pare for the heads-of-state con-
ference sponsored by Tito and
Nasir will probably be held in
early June. Representatives
from some twenty "nonaligned"
countries are expected to at-
tend, The preliminary inquiries
contained in a joint note from
the Yugoslav and UAR leaders to
17 Afro-Asian and four Latin
American nations last April have
received generally favorable
responses. The delegates in
Cairo will consider the agenda,
time, and place for the "'neu-
tralist summit" meeting.
Little difficulty on se-
lecting the time and place is
expected, The conference will
probably be held sometime prior
to the next United Nations Gen-
eral Assembly session in Sep-
tember; Belgrade is the likely
site. The agenda and the ques-
tion of what constitutes non-
alignment will probably stir
long discussions, however, and
could do much to prevent the
establishment of the solid neu-
tralist front which Tito and
Nasir hope to achieve.
Asian meeting.
Premier Khrushchev prob-
ably has strong reservations over
Tito's prominent role; although
Yugoslavia and the USSR agree
on many current international
issues, Belgrade has used its
prestige to promote among the
uncommitted states its own type
of "socialism"--declared "revi-
sionist" by the bloc. Peiping,
which is omitted from the guest
list, doubtless will regard the
conference as a setback to its
hopes for the early convention
of a second Bandung-type Afro-
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Francois Duvalier on 22
May begins a new six-year term
as President of Haiti as the re-
sult of the elections on 30
April in which all legislative
candidates were Duvalier fol-
lowers and Duvalier's name ap-
peared at the top of all ballots.
Duvalier still has two years
remaining in the term to which
he was elected in October 1957,
and the generally apathetic elec-
torate was not aware that it
was voting for a president.
However, Haitian newspapers an-
nounced on 9 May that Duvalier
was "re-elected" by more than
1,321,000 votes; the total vote
in the 1957 presidential elec-
tions was about 940,000.
On 7 April a presidential
decree dissolving the old bi-
cameral legislature was an-
nounced, following a press cam-
paign justifying the action on
a constitutional technicality.
An electoral law pre-dating the
1957 constitution by several
months provided that the terms
of office of lower house members
were to expire in April 1961,
while members of the upper house
--elected under the same law--
apparently were to remain in of-
fice until 1963. Last month's
election was decreed ostensibly
for the sole purpose of choosing
a new 58-member unicameral legis-
lature, as specified by the 1957
constitution.
Duvalier may claim that
his second term will be the first
to which he was elected under
the 1957 constitution, since it
was officially adopted two months
after he took office. The last
three elected Haitian presidents
were ousted by combined public
and military action after they
tried to extend their terms
beyond their constitutional
length, but they made their
attempts closer to the :-erld
of their legal terms than has
Duvalier.
18 May 61
Haiti, with a population of about 3,500,000,
is one of the poorest of the Latin American coun-
tries; its per capita gross national product was
about $65 in 1959, one of the lowest in Latin Am-
erica. US grant aid in 1960 totaled ~D'11,500,000.
Haiti has an illiteracy rate of 90 percent--highest
in the hemisphere. Haitian history is marked by
alternating periods of dictatorship and anarchy;
the complete collapse of governmental authority
in 1915 led to 19 years of occupation by the itS
Marines. The present regime, which assumed power
in 1957 after the fall of five governments during
the previous year, has favored Haiti's black
masses against the small mulatto elite.
Duvalier, who assumed the
presidency following a year of
intense political instability,
has governed with a mixture of
paternalism and despotism char-
acteristic of other strong Hai-
tian presidents. Army Chief of
Staff Merceron apparently
acquiesces in Duvalier's con-
tinued rule, but the rest of the
4,700-man army is largely apathet-
ic. Its loyalty and military
effectiveness are open to
question, largely because of
the President's creation of his
own civilian militia as a polit-
ical counterweight to the regu-
lar armed forces and because of
his policy of weakening and
dividing the army leadership.
Well aware of Haiti's military
weakness and its geographic
vulnerability to intervention
from either Cuba or the Domini-
can Republic, Duvalier has
pursued a policy of extreme
caution regarding any involvement
in Caribbean disputes.
Duvalier's position has im-
proved since the collapse in
early March of a four-month
student strike which constituted
the most troublesome threat to
his regime since its inaugura-.'.
tion, and it is unlikely that
the President's maneuver to gain
re-election will stimulate im-
mediate action by his poorly
organized oppositiOn. However,
this year's unfavorable harvest
prospects for coffee--Haiti's
chief foreign exchange earner--
could weaken the country's al-
ready poor economic position and
encourage plotting against the
government.
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SPECIAL ARTICLES
DE GAULLE AND FRENCH FOREIGN POLICY
French foreign policy un-
der the Fifth Republic is con-
ditioned by De Gaulle's long-
range historical perspective,
which emphasizes national armed
force and traditional diplomacy
and has as a firm aim restoring
France to the status of a world
power. This has provided con-
sistency and direction in the
formulation of policy but has
complicated France's relations
with its allies. At the same
time, however, De Gaulle has
shown a pragmatic willingness
to adjust his tactical position
when necessary.
Over-All East-West Relations
De Gaulle sees the West's
relations with the Communist
bloc in terms of a continuing
geopolitical struggle between
historic national entities;
thus giving little weight to
ideologies, he has termed Com-
munism a transient phenomenon
in the history of Russia. Prior
to the 1960 summit conference
there were definite indications
that De Gaulle hoped for prog-
ress toward an East-West de-
tente. He maintained that co-
operation between East and West
was possible and would be es-
pecially beneficial if begun in
the field of joint aid to under-
developed countries.. Khrushchev's
visit to France in March 1960
apparently reinforced De Gaulle's
belief that the Soviet premier
was an able and moderate man
g?iiding his country away from
the aggressive policies of the
past.
The ensuing summit failure
did not touch De Gaulle's basic
contention that a detente is in
the nature of things. Two weeks
later he opened a press confer-
ence with the observations:
"Man, limited by his nature,
is infinite in his desires. The
world is thus full of oppos-
ing forces.... Competition of
efforts is the condition of
life. Our country finds itself
confronted today with this law
of the species, as it has been
for 2,000 years." Although ob-
viously disappointed, De Gaulle
said that France "took note of
the outcome with composure,"
and added, "What was necessary
yesterday will still be neces-
sary tomorrow." He also as-
serted that the methodical steps
of traditional diplomacy are
more valuable than the "tumul-
tuous exchanges of public
speeches."
De Gaulle's propensity to
view the evolution of East-West
relations in an extremely long-
range context and his willing-
ness to present his concepts
publicly have resulted in state-
ments that others have inter-
preted as demonstrating less
than complete devotion to the
Western alliance. Harking back
to the French-Russian alliances
during the two World Wars, for
example, he has averred: "There
has never been, between the
French people and the Russian
people, at any time, any natural
opposition, any litigation of a
political nature."
De Gaulle speaks deliber-
ately of "Russia" rather than
the Soviet Union and ignores the
iron curtain with his definition
of "Europe" as extending "from
the Atlantic to the Urals." As
a result of these views, French
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
policy on several specific
East-West issues--such as dis-
armament and a divided Germany
--reflects concern for particu-
lar national interests more than
regard for the over-all East-
West balance.
Although De Gaulle often
alludes to this long perspective
in the same paragraph with, for
instance, a castigation of cur-
rent Soviet penetration in Af-
rica, he seems to have no dif-
ficulty keeping the two separate
in his own mind. More impor-
tant, his immediate tactics in
matters of specific East-West
differences are formulated on
the basis of what exists today,
rather than what may be tomorrow,
regardless of how valid he may
feel his concept of tomorrow is.
Bilateral relations between
France and the Soviet Union il-
lustrate De Gaulle's pragmatism.
In general he has kept relations
cool and correct. Even Khru-
shchev's visit resulted in only
a routine communique and in the
Soviet premier's diplomatic un-
derstatement that on major is-
sues French and Soviet views did
not "fully coincide." Both
equally correct. Although De
Gaulle has said publicly that he
believes the best interests of
those countries lie in close
ties with Western Europe in some
sort of economic union, present
relations are limited largely
to cultural exchanges and a
small, stagnant trade pattern.
The emergence of Communist
China as a major power appears
to fascinate the French, and
there is among them a strong be-
lief, shared by De Gaulle, that
a deterioration of Soviet-Chi-
nese relations is inevitable.
De Gaulle has publicly called
attention to the "yellow multi-
tude which cannot be kept within
its limits" and which "must one
day spread into the expanses
around it." Nevertheless, the
Foreign Ministry has more re-
cently cautioned against basing
Western policy on intrabloc dif-
ferences.
France does not recognize
the Peiping government and has
made no move to expand relations
beyond permitting occasional un-
official visits by left-wing
political figures and some stu-
dent exchanges. Paris has pri-
vately admitted that the ques-
tion of Chinese representation
sides have deliberately restrains in the UN is under study, but
their propaganda during periods a Foreign Ministry spokesman re-
of East-West tension. Paris, cently stated that the China
despite its standing general
threat to break diplomatic rela-
tions with the governments rec-
ognizing the rebel Provisional
Algerian Government (PAG), moved
quickly to minimize the conse-
quences of Khrushchev's de facto
recognition of the PAG last year
Trade with the USSR since
De Gaulle came to power has re-
mained relatively constant at
only 5 percent of total French
foreign trade, even though the
Soviet Union has repeatedly
sought to step up its purchases
of French industrial products.
French relations with the
European satellites have been
problem was of paramount con-
cern to the US, and that France
would follow the lead of the
US on it.
Almost every major policy
decision taken under De Gaulle
has included the ultimate ob-
jective of strengthening France's
role in the Western alliance.
This aim is reflected in a series
of decisions over the last three
years dating from his initial
moves to impose political sta-
bility, through the highly suc-
cessful program to strengthen
and expand the French economy,
to the continuing progress toward
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
an Algerian solution and ulti-
mately "complete decolonization."
The earnestness with which De
Gaulle views France's place as
one of the three Western nations
with world-wide responsibilities
and his persistent pressure to
build France to a position of
power commensurate with this
image have produced numerous in-
stances of French intransigence
and pique on matters of free
world policy.
The drive for recognition
and treatment as a full partner
of the US and Britain has been
most pronounced in De Gaulle Is
demands for closer tripartite
coordination of global policy
and strategy and in his reluc-
tance to see what he considers
great-power responsibilities
fall, either by default or de-
sign, to other organizations or
states. Although French sug-
gestions that tripartite co-
ordination be formalized in a
permanent secretariat have been
muted in recent months, the de-
mands for continuous coordina-
tion--both before and after West-
ern policy has been formed--are
reiterated regularly in public
and private policy statements
by all levels of the :French Gov-
ernment.
Whatever De Gaulle's de-
sires for France throughout the
world, it is on Europe that his
greatest hopes are centered.
Since the end of World War II
he has called for a strong Eu-
rope capable of playing a role
as the "third force" in the
world and at the same time of
directing the power of Germany
into constructive channels that
would not threaten France. This
double goal for France and Europe
has led De Gaulle, despite his
repugnance for supranational in-
stitutions, to push ahead rapid-
ly with the integration of the
European economy. He has also
urged regular political consul-
tations among the six members
of the European Economic Com-
munity.
De Gaulle regards close po-
litical and economic relations
between France and West Germany
as the basis for a strong Europe.
Although he has given firm sup-
port to West Germany in the
face of bloc threats to West
Berlin, there are indications
that in order to assure West
Germany's firm attachment to
the present European and Atlantic
alliances, De Gaulle would pre-
fer to see the division of Ger-
many maintained, even if this
meant recognition of the East
German regime and a changed
status for West Berlin.
The NATO Alliance
In his conceptual frame-
work of world power formations,
De Gaulle considers NATO in its
present- form outmoded and unable
to cope with the diverse nature
of the Soviet threat. He would
like to see the Western military
alliance extended in order to
prevent the free world from be-
ing "outflanked" in Africa and
the Middle East, and he appar-
ently envisages that basic pol-
icy decisions in such an alliance
would be made by the three
Western great powers--the US
speaking for the western hemis-
phere, the UK speaking for the
Commonwealth, and France speak-
ing for a politically coordinated
Europe and a bloc of friendly
African states.
De Gaulle's continued op-
position to the integration of
French forces in NATO reflects
his feeling that NATO no longer
offers adequate protection for
French interests in the light
of changed international power
relationships and increased de-
structiveness of nuclear weapons.
There is widespread belief
at the highest levels in Paris
that the US would not use its
strategic weapons against the
Soviet Union in the event of a
Soviet attack on Europe, and
there is an even more intense
belief that the Soviet Union is
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
operating under this assumption.
Consequently, De Gaulle argues
that even a limited French de-
terrent force could inflict suf-
ficient damage on the Soviet Un-
ion to cause the Soviets to
pause before striking Europe.
and would probably prefer to
see Communist China, with its
recognized military strength,
added to the group rather than
have the doors opened to neu-
tral nations in either a voting
or nonvoting capacity.
De Gaulle has therefore
concentrated much of his program
for modernizing the French mil-
itary establishment on building
a national nuclear striking
force. Despite widespread po-
litical opposition, much of it
on economic grounds, be has
pressed ahead with the develop-
ment of nuclear weapons and de-
livery systems primarily to pro-
vide Western Europe with its own
deterrent.
In an effort to reduce the
time lag in his program and
lighten the economic burden, De
Gaulle is likely to continue to
seek outside help, particularly
from the United States. His
argument for aid will probably
concentrate increasingly on the
need to improve Western Europe's
nuclear defense, rather than
stating simply that France de-
serves the aid because it has
qualified as a nuclear power.
France's desire to narrow
the gap between itself and those
powers possessing a nuclear de-
terrent has colored its posi-
tion on disarmament. De Gaulle
opposes a nuclear test ban agree-
ment which, given the present
state of French nuclear weapons
technology, would weigh more
heavily against France than the
other nuclear powers. Paris'
main substantive contribution
to disarmament talks--calling
for the control and eventual
elimination of vehicles capable
of carrying nuclear weapons--is
also aimed, at least in part,
at reducing the superiority of
the US and USSR in a field in
which France is notoriously de-
ficient.
France opposes enlarging
the ten-nation disarmament group
De Gaulle continues to re-
gard the world outside of Europe
and the US in terms of spheres
of influence or--as the French
recently labeled them--"zones
of primary responsibility." This
has led France to guard jealous-
ly what it considers its pre-
eminent role in Southeast Asia,
large parts of Africa, and to
a lesser extent the Middle East.
France has acknowledged
the primary US interest in the
Far East and Latin America, al-
though it has shown some inter-
est in strengthening cultural
and economic relations with sev-
eral Latin American states. De
Gaulle has maintained an ex-
tremely close relationship with
Israel, considering that state
the best bulwark for stability
in the Middle East, while at-
tempting to retain some influence
in the Arab states formerly
under French control. France's
effort to interest Tunisia and
Morocco in joining Algeria in a
united Maghreb has as one of its
aims the preservation of French
interests in North Africa--par-
ticularly the Sahara.
France has recently crit-
icized US diplomatic initiatives
in Laos and the Congo. In both
cases the objection has been
that action was taken in an area
of French responsibility without
sufficient prior coordination.
Paris prefers a neutral Laos as
defined in the 1954 Geneva Ac-
cords, which granted France a
primary advisory role in the na-
tion, and would probably welcome
the return of Souvanna Phouma as
bead of a new government. A
Foreign Ministry sbokesman has
remarked that any Laotian policy
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
would have one strike against
it, in De Gaulle's view, if it
were not the product of advance
coordination with France.
French policy in the Congo
illustrates two other aspects
of De Gaulle's long-term view
of international relations. Paris
has steadfastly opposed UN in-
tervention on the legal grounds
that the situation there is an
internal affair of the Congolese
Government, and on the practical
grounds that the UN is ineffec-
tive at maintaining peace in the
world. Keeping peace, De Gaulle
feels, is the responsibility of
the great powers and not the UN,
which he described last month
as carrying with it "the global
incoherence of its tumultuous
and rowdy meetings."
France's Congo policy also
demonstrated Paris' continuing
concern to preserve its influ-
ence in the newly independent
states of former French Africa
and at the same time to limit a
US-Soviet rivalry that would
further entangle the new states
in the cold war. After breaking
drastically with Guinea in 1958
when that country chose inde-
pendence rather than membership
in the French Community, De
Gaulle has acquiesced in most
demands of the new African states
including outright independence.
Direct French economic aid to
the African states in 1960 is
estimated at $200,000,000, and
De Gaulle proudly claims that,
per capita, France spends more
on economic aid than any other
country in the world.
France has military agree-
ments with most of the African
states--involving French aid for
local defense forces and in most
cases base rights for France--
and is encouraging those states
to form a more cohesive polit-
ical bloc which would be useful
to France as a moderating in-
fluence in Africa. This effort
is aimed at building close, in-
formal ties with Africa and pro-
tecting the French "zone of re-
sponsibility" against incursions
by other nations or internation-
al organizations.
De Gaulle and Diplomacy
France's foreign policy is
clearly De Gaulle's foreign pol-
icy. The Quay d'Orsay has had
little role in the creation of
policy, and Foreign Minister
Couve de Murville seems to have
been chosen for his post pri-
marily because he is a loyal
Gaullist and a highly competent
administrator with little in-
terest in pushing his own views.
The Foreign Ministry has at
times been ignorant of decisions
on aspects of government policy,
especially when De Gaulle has
allowed the French military es-
tablishment to act independent-
ly in fields bordering on for-
eign policy. Nuclear aid to
Israel and the military recon-
naissance flights over Libya in
connection with the Algerian
war apparently caught the minis-
try by surprise.
ing De Gaulle's goals for France.
De Gaulle has made exten-
sive use of quiet but astute
personal diplomacy, particular-
ly with European and African
heads of states, to create an
atmosphere of good will which
has eased the way to acceptance
of many of his policies. His
personal magnetism has plainly
overawed some and has convinced
others of his sincerity and real-
ism. The ability to project his
views effectively on a personal
basis, plus the centralization
of foreign policy decision-mak-
ing in his hands, has thus far
resulted in the increasingly
consistent application through-
out the world of a French diplo-
macy firmly aimed at achiev-
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
THE ITALIAN SOCIALIST PARTY
Periodic efforts to break
the near stalemate among the
Italian political parties have
focused on the attempts of
Pietro Nenni and other Italian
Socialists to move the party
away from its earlier alignment
with the Communists to positive
support for the governing Chris-
tian Democrats. Successive
postwar elections have brought
the Communist vote close to a
quarter of the electorate, while
that of the four center parties
now amounts to little over half.
The Socialists currently poll
nearly 15 percent of the popu-
lar vote; if the party switched
its support to the Christian
Democrats and carried most of
its electoral following with
it, the result would be the res-
toration of some real flexibil-
ity in parliamentary government.
The Socialist party has
played a key role, in Italian
politics since the late 19th
century. The Communists split
with the party' in 1921, and
Nenni successfully resisted re-
unification with them in 1934
but concluded a unity-of-action
pact. This pact was reaffirmed
in 1944 but formally abrogated
by the Socialists in 1956.
Moves toward Socialist -
Christian Democratic coopera-
tion have been under way for
over half a dozen years but
still face formidable obstacles.
There are, of course, policy
differences between the two par-
ties, and strongly placed groups
in each are working to prevent
any understanding. Severance
of the surviving ties with the
Communists, moreover, would pre-
sent operating difficulties for
the Socialist party; Socialists
are still allied with the Com-
munists in some 2,000 of Italy's
nearly 8,000 local governments,
as well as in a number of siza-
ble consumer cooperatives, and
these relationships are frequent-
ly important for financing the
Socialist party organization.
The association of Social-
ists and Communists in the CGIL,
Italy's largest labor confedera-
tion, is a greater problem. So-
cialist officials in the CGIL
wield no real power, and many
of them have long resented Com-
munist domination of the organ-
ization. With company unions
and unorganized workers increas-
ing in number, however, trade
unionism as such is at present
on the defensive in Italy, and
the division of the major non-
Communist unions into two con-
federations provides no attrac-
tive alternative to the CGIL
for the Socialists.
Socialist labor leaders
fear that the chief result of
any split in the CGIL at.this
time would be a net loss in
labor's industrial bargaining
power and its ability to bring
pressure on the government. So-
cialist political leaders fear
that such a break would also
lose the party votes unless coun-
terbalanced by pro-labor moves
on the part of the government.
Nenni, who is now 70 and
generally conceded to be one of
the country's shrewdest politi-
cians, apparently had decided
as early as 1951. that Continued
association with the Communists
would never restore his party to
leadership of the Italian left
or put him back into the cab-
inet. He also seems to have be-
come progressively disenchanted
with Soviet Communism.
Following the death of Sta-
lin, Nenni began to extricate
his party from its ties With
the Italian Communists and later
to move toward association with
the Christian Democrats. This
delicate operation was received
with skepticism by the Christian
Democrats--first as to Nenni's
sincerity and later as to his
ability to carry his party with
him. The move has been active-
ly opposed not only by the Com-
munists but also by right-wing
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forces both inside and outside
the Christian Democratic par-
ty--partly because of its ef-
fect on the balance of power
in Italy.
Nenni's basic problem is
to demonstrate to the Chris-
tian Democrats his party's
good faith and to get from
them--in return for parliamen-
tary support--a quid pro quo
substantial enough to persuade
the bulk of his following that
it would be profitable to leave
the Communists. Many party
stalwarts are acutely aware of
what has happened to Giuseppe
Saragat's Democratic Socialist
party since it.formed an alli-
ance with the Christian Demo-
crats in 1947,
Saragat took more than
half the Socialist deputies
with him when he split with
Nenni over continued coopera-
tion with the Communists in
1947. Now,, however, he con-
trols less than a fifth as many
as Nenni's party--partly be-
cause Nenni held on to the par-
ty name and most of the party
machinery, and partly because
Saragat proved unable to push
through reform measures as a
minister in the Christian Demo-
crat - dominated government.
DISTRIBUTION OF VOTE IN ITALIAN
(PERCENT OF TOTAL VOTE)
1948 1953 1956 1958 1960
PARLIAMENTARY PROVINCIAL PARLIAMENTARY PROVINCIAL
Christian Democrats 48.5 40.0 38.9 42.3
Democratic Socialists 7.1 4.5 7.5 4.7
Liberals 2.8*** 3.0 4.2 3.4
Republicans 2.5 i. 6 1.3 1.4
Total Center 0 9 49-1
51.9 51:8
Communists 22.6 23.1
Nenni Socialists 12.7 35.2* 14.7
Total Left 3 0 W._3 35 22 7, 88
vmers 6.1 2.9 2.0
*Communists and Nenni Socialists ran together.
**Neo-Fascists and Monarchists ran together.
***Liberals and Monarchists ran together.
610501 9
40.3
5.7
4.0
1.3
51.3
14.4
38.9
2.9
8.8
party may throw some former
Monarchist deputies Saragat's
way, but at the cost of alien-
ating certain Democratic Social-
ist voters, at least in the
north. In any case, Saragat's
party is regarded by Italian So-
cialist party leaders as an ex-
ample of the consequences of a
move too far, too soon, to the
right.
At present Nenni must cope
with several factions within
the party. His efforts to make
the party completely independent
are strongly opposed by a left-
wing group led by Tullio Vecch-
ietti and including many pro-
Communists. Nenni is supported
on most issues by a group led
by Riccardo Lombardi, while a
small faction under Lelio Basso
tries to play a balance-of-pow-
er role. Nenni controls most
of the party organization, but
the left-wing faction obtains
funds from Communist sources
and is usually better financed
than he is.
Much of Saragat's labor
following--except for a few
white-collar workers--went back
to Nenni soon after the break,
and others followed later. Since
official Socialist reunifica-
tion negotiations collapsed in
1956, five of Saragat's deputies
and several of his party's pro-
vincial federations have gone
over to Nenni, and it appears
that reunification is taking
place at the grass roots.
In the 1960 provincial
elections the Saragat Social-
ists scored some slight gains.
The collapse of the Monarchist
Nenni's own position now is
somewhat strengthened by the So-
cialists' participation with
the Christian Democrats in the
governments of certain large
cities, including Milan, Genoa,
and Florence. This develop-
ment, which came about early this
year as a result of the local
elections last November, should
in time help the party's fi-
nances as well as its prestige.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
ITALY
DISTRIBUTION OF SEATS ON KEY CITY COUNCILS
FOLLOWING LOCAL ELECTIONS Of 6 NOVEMBER 1960
CHRISTE eN DEMOCRATIC NENNI
DEMOCRATS SOCIALISTS LIBERALS REPUBLICANS COMMUNISTS SOCIALISTS NEO-FASCISTS MONARCHISTS OTHERS
Rome (80 seats) 21
Milan (80 seats) 25
Turin (80 seats) 27
Genoa (80 seats) 27
Venice (60 seats) 23
Florence (60 seats) 22
Naples (80 seats) 21
Palermo (60 seats) 24
SECRET
17 17 5
20 12 2
22 17 4
14 13 3
4 3 -- 20 8 3
19 5 3 30
9 /4 5 5
Nevertheless, at the time
of the Socialist party congress,
from 15 to 18 March, the full
impact of these local alliances
bad not been felt by those
doubting the policy of collab-
orating with the ruling party.
At this congress Nenni, who is
usually a master of ambiguity,
took an unusually direct and
vigorous line against collabora-
tion with the Communists. He
obtained approval of the idea
of Socialist parliamentary sup-
port for a "center-left govern-
ment with a concrete program,"
but with only 55 percent of the
congress behind him.
Nenni therefore must move
carefully because of his slim
majority and the continued
strength of the left wing--
which now has six representa-
tives among the 21. members on
the new party directorate. As
Italy's "Mr. Socialism," Nenni
appreciates that his faction
must hang on to the Italian So-
cialist party and that any split
must be initiated by the left
wing. In view of the rough
treatment given him during the
congress, Nenni probably wants
to see the most extreme of his
opponents leave the party,al-
though some of these would try
to stay and make as much trou-
ble as possible.
That the Socialist voters
generally approve Nenni's grad-
ual moves to the right is sug-
gested by the over-all increase
in the Socialist vote from 1953
to 1960. Estimates as to how
much of the party's electorate
is behind Nenni range from 55
to 75 percent. It is clear,
however, that this support is
in the long run conditional. on
obtaining from a Christian Demo-
cratic government some of the
reform measures his party ad-
vocates.
Sub-leaders in the party
would probably want a few polit-
ical plums such as Jobs in the
government holding company IRI
or in the Fund for Development
of the South, as well as inclu-
sion of Socialist representa-
tives in government missions
abroad. Some of these conces-
sions would, for varied reasons,
arouse opposition in the Christian
Democratic party.
Nenni faces a major problem
in gaining the cooperation of the
Christian Democrats. In most
domestic policies the Socialist
position is close to that of the
Christian Democrats' majority
left wing, led by Premier Fan-
fani and party secretary Moro,
the principal advocates of co-
operation. Like this group, the
Socialists urge controls on se-
curities and exchange, as well
as agricultural reform, nation-
alization of nuclear energy, and
the tightening up of the Italian
tax system.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
To the Socialists the most
important Christian Democratic
platform planks would probably
be: nationalization of energy
--beginning with atomic energy
--which was included in the
program of the 1958 Fanfani
government; establishment of
geographic regions as provided
by the constitution; and a
school bill involving greater
separation of church and state.
To narrow the wide area
of disagreement between the
two parties on school reform,
Nenni has in recent months been
toning down the Socialists'
traditional anticlerical posi-
tion. At least in local and
regional politics, moreover,
familiar considerations of mu-
tual self-interest can evident-
ly go far to overcome ideolog-
ical differences--as is seen
in the capital of Rieti Prov-
ince, near Rome, where left-
wing Socialists and right-wing
Christian Democrats are col-
laborating in this small city
government.
It is in this field of
domestic reform, however, that
Fanfani's progressive program
is most susceptible to the veto
of the influential Christian
Democratic right-wing minority,
supported by the conservative
Liberal party, on whose votes
the government's thin majority
depends. It was in order to
rid himself of this built-in
veto--which has resulted in
inaction on many legislative
reforms and hence feeds the
Communist popular vote--that
Fanfani in April 1960 sought
to form a center-left govern-
ment dependent on the Social-
ists' large parliamentary
vote. This effort was blocked
by the right-wing Christian
Democrats. In the vote of
confidence given Fanfani's mi-
nority government the follow-
ing August, the Socialists ab-
stained--for the first time
in 13 years on a ballot of
this nature--rather than join
the Communists in opposi-
tion.
In the sphere of foreign
policy, the Nenni Socialists
--like Saragat's Democratic
Socialists earlier--originally
opposed NATO but now accept it
as a fact of life. In 1956,
Italy's ratification of the
European Common Market treaties
was actively opposed by the
Communists, while the Socialists
merely abstained. On a number
of more recent questions, rang-
ing from the May 1960 summit
conference to last month's mil-
itary insurrection in Algeria,
the Socialist position has
differed sharply from the Com-
munist. At the same time, the
party maintains an official po-
sition of neutrality between
the US and USSR--although at
the March congress Nenni pub-
licly attacked the subordina-
tion of Italian Communism to
Soviet foreign policy.
The position of the Roman
Catholic Church has been a
strong factor in blocking co-
operation between the Christian
Democrats and Nenni. Now the
church itself appears somewhat
more flexible toward local col-
laboration. Even Genoa's die-
hard Cardinal Siri seems to
have accepted the Socialist -
Christian Democratic govern-
ment in his city as preferable
to the alternative--a Socialist-
COMMUNITY MOVEMENT 1-
DEMOCRATIC SOCIALISTS 17
(PSDI)
INDEPENDENT LEFT 1
87
NENNI
(PSI)
SECRET
VOTE CONFIRMING
FANFANI GOVERNMENT
5 AUGUST 1960
Q SUPPORT
ABSTAIN
OPPOSITION
-VALDOSTAN UNION (UVD)
- LIBERALS(PLI)
.,-:~.,~~,
;N_NEO FASCISTS(MSI ...... J
MONARCHIST
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Communist administration. It
is not clear, however, whether
the Vatican would try to block
collaboration at the national
level by withdrawing support
from the Christian Democrats
with the idea of backing a new,
right-wing, Catholic party.
Powerful forces on both
left and right see their posi-
tions threatened by Socialist -
Christian Democratic collabora-
tion, and the area of maneuver
open to Nenni and Moro in their
efforts to bring it about is at
present limited. Both the
rightist and the Communist op-
ponents of such an alliance
evidently hope to keep the sit-
uation frozen till the 1963 na-
tional elections. Knowing that
Nenni's tactics require legis-
lative issues on which his par-
ty following will be willing
to give the government parlia-
mentary support, rightists both
inside and outside the Christian
Democratic party will probably
try various expedients to keep
such legislation bottled up in
committee.
There is, on the other
hand, considerable dissatis-
SECRET
faction among left-center ele-
ments--Democratic Socialists,
Republicans, and right-wing
Christian Democrats--with Pre-
mier Fanfani's present minor-
ity government. It is little
more than a holding operation
pledged to resign if any of
the four divergent center par-
ties withdraws its parliamen-
tary support. The successes
achieved to date by the pol-
icy of Socialist - Christian
Democratic alliances in city
governments are encouraging
further such moves in local
or provincial administrations
--particularly the regional
government of Sicily--where
political stalemate has long
persisted.
If, as seems likely, the
government lasts until fall,
pressures may then build up
for a new try at an avowedly
reformist national government
of the left-center relying on
external support in parlia-
ment from Socialist party
deputies. The likelihood of
such an attempt may be de-
termined by the outcome of
current negotiations for new
governments in Sicily, Rome,
Venice, and the province of
Milan.
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