CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A003200010001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 42
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 28, 2006
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 19, 1999
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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CURRENT
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY
SUMMARY
COPY NO.
OCI NO. 0277/61
27 April 1961
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
III OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
25X1
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS s 0 25X1
f NEXT REVIEW DATE: __.1 gQ-
AUTH: HR 70-2
DATE:&4945:,F REVIEWER:
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THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECT-
ING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES
WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS,
TITLE 18, USC, SECTIONS 793 AND 794, THE TRANSMIS-
SION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO
AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.
The Current Intelligence Weekly Summary has been prepared
primarily for the internal use of the Central Intelligence
Agency. It does not represent a complete coverage of all
current situations. Comments and conclusions represent the
immediate appraisal of the Office of Current Intelligence.
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27 April 1961
LAOS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 1
Both sides in Laos have accepted the Geneva co-
chairmen's call for a cease-fire; however, agreement
has not yet been reached on implementation procedures,
and the fighting continues. The Communists apparently
intend to procrastinate to enable the Pathet Lao forces
to tighten their hold on the country in an effort to
force Vientiane to accept terms which would ensure
virtual Communist control of a coalition government. Com-_
munist forces now are believed capable of taking key
Laotian towns following major new gains in the Vang
Vieng area and north of Luang Prabang. Souvanna Phouma,
acting in ever closer harmony with the Pathet Lao, con-
tinues to use the title of Laotian premier and has
agreed to! the establI_Jnment, of full diplomatic relations
with Communist China.
FRANCE-ALGERIA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 4
The overwhelming strength of De Gaulle's popular
backing in France played a major role in his victory
over the French military insurrection of 22-25 April
in Algeria, and will be interpreted by him as a new
mandate to hasten a negotiated settlement of the six-
year-old Algerian rebellion. The rebel Provisional
Algerian Government (PSG) in Tunis showed concern that
the insurrection might succeed, and now appears ready
to move quickly toward n_egotiati.ons. Meanwhile, the
Paris government, usii-(g the emergency powers assumed by
Dc G:..ulle on 23 April, is pressing an energetic roundup
of civilian as i3 mil liar. y participants in the
insurrection and any who may have indirectly
aided it.
'CONGO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 5
The political conference at Coquilhatville has ap-
parently failed following the walkout of Katangan Pres-
ident Tshombd. Although details concerning Tshombd's
arrest are unclear, his detention may damage his pres-
tige in Katanga and stimulate plotting among his op-
ponents. A majority of the Congo's political leaders
still appear anxious to resolve the long-standing
political crisis
Kasavubu's agreement to permit
a return of UN forces to Matadi has improved relations
between Leopoldville and the UN Command.
CUBA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 7
Castro has accelerated his drive to round up all
potential anti-Castro elements in Cuba. There are
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
27 April 1961
indications that Havana is conducting a purge to rid
the government of elements which might turn against
it in any new insurgent offensive. The Cuban Govern-
ment is expected to stage an official victory cele-
bration on 1 May which will be attended by delegations
from many bloc and Latin American countries. Comment
of Latin American officials on President Kennedy's
20 April address has been favorable, and government
leaders in several countries have already stated
that multilateral action to meet the Communist threat
in Cuba must be undertaken soon.
BLOC STATEMENTS ON BERLIN AND GERMANY . . . . . . . . .
Top-level Communist statements on Berlin and Germany
over the past two weeks suggest that Moscow is preparing
. Page 11
the groundwork for a formal proposal to renew negotiations
on these issues. Khrushchev told Walter Lippmann on 10
April that the USSR would raise the German question
soon, and an "Observer" article in Izvestia on 20 April
said that "all reasonable time limits have expired" for
the conclusion of a peace treaty and a revision of
Berlin's status. The article reiterated that the USSR
would conclude a separate treaty with East Germany if
no agreement were reached on a treaty with the two
Germanys; it mentioned no deadlines, however. East
German party leader Ulbricht in speeches on 21 and 23
April also stressed the necessity of a peace treaty
and the conversion of West Berlin into a demilitarized
free city.
NUCLEAR TEST BAN NEGOTIATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 12
The chief Soviet delegate to the Geneva talks has
indicated in press interviews and private conversations
that Moscow will make no new compromise proposals to
break the deadlock over vital aspects of the control
system. He outlined three Soviet positions on which
there could be no compromise: a maximum of three in-
spections annually in the Soviet Union, a maximum of
15 control posts on Soviet territory,and?atripartite
council to administer the control apparatus. At the
conference sessions, the Soviet delegation has sought
to undercut Western objections relating to a possible
Soviet veto on inspections by stating this issue
would not arise in the tripartite council if there were
an agreed annual quota of inspections.
NORTH VIETNAM'S POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC PLANS FOR 1961 .
. Page 14
North Vietnam's political plans for the coming year,
as they were presented to the National Assembly last week,
give high priority to the drive to unseat South Vietnam's
President Diem. On the economic side, speeches at the
assembly underscored the regime's intention to begin
an industrialization pro ram and to push the socializa-
tion of agriculture.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
27 April 1961
ANGOLA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 15
Rebel activity in northwestern Angola is continuing,
and logistic difficulties apparently are impeding Portu-
gal's efforts to strengthen its security forces in the
province. Unless order is quickly restored in the
disturbed area, much of the coffee crop will be lost and
the slump-ridden internal economy may break down. Angolan
exile groups are continuing their competition for inter-
national support; several Communist-supported organiza-
tions from various Portuguese territories recently met
in Casablanca to set up a coordinating body and
Angolan People's Union leader Holden Roberto fears
that this body will be able to seize the initiative
from his group.
JAPAN'S NEW SOURCES OF OIL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 17
By exploiting its offshore oil concession in the
Persian Gulf and expanding its purchases from the USSR,
Japan will reduce its dependence on Anglo-American petro-
leum. These new sources probably will provide less than
6 percent of requirements this year, but may supply
as much as 35 percent by 1963. Japan's need for petro-
leum is rapidly expanding; imports rose 41 percent in
CONFUSION IN INDIAN COMMUNIST PARTY GROWS. . . . . . . . . Page 18
The recent congress of the Indian Communist party not
only failed to resolve the differences between party lead-
ers but apparently also intensified the sense of frustra-
tion and !,confusion among all factions. While neither the
extreme "nationalists" nor the moderate leadership gained
a clear victory, the limited results of the congress
constituted a setback for the left-wing extremists and
indicated that the party will continue to be guided by
the "peaceful, parliamentary" policy adopted in 1958.
REBELS SURRENDER IN INDONESIA . . . . . . . . . . . Page 19
The surrender since early April of some 8,000-
10,000 armed rebels in North Celebes has virtually
ended the three-year-old insurgent movement in that area.
In Sumatra, an estimated 9,300 insurgents are still
operating. The decision of the North Celebes rebels
to surrender apparently resulted from their inability
to obtain outside assistance and from the government's
offer of amnesty.
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27 April 1961
Page 20
Belgium?s new Social Christian - Socialist coalition,
which has extensive support, must cope with pressing eco-
nomic problems such as fiscal reform and economic growth.
Foreign Minister Spaak is expected to exercise strong
control over foreign and defense policies. While the
new government's policies toward the Congo and the UN
may be more liberal and cooperative than those of its
predecessor, the Belgians are increasingly resentful
of being blamed for all the confusion in their former
colony,
THE ECONOMIC OUTLOOK IN VENEZUELA . o . . 0 0 . . Page 21
The Venezuelan Government's failure to check th
country's three-year economic decline leaves President
Betancourt increasingly vulnerable to attacks from
both the right and the left. Influential business and
professional groups have become increasingly critical
of the administration?s ineffectual financial measures
and of the adverse effects of its restrictive policies
toward the foreign-owned oil industry.
Castro factions again displayed their potential for
promoting unrest by staging several recent demonstra-
tions in support of the Cuban regimen
ARGENTINA. , e < o e e , o , , e o , o , e , e , , , , , o Page 22
President Frondizi?s removal of Economy Minister
Alsogaray, who has been Argentina's virtual economic
czar and the main force behind the US-backed stabiliza-
tion program, was probably intended primarily to counter
popular discontent over the drop in real wages and
industrial production. Frondizi?s public line is that
the action merely signified the completion of the initial
phase of the stabilization program and that the program
would be completed with new emphasis on expanded eco-
nomic development.
WEST INDIES FEDERATION . e o< e o 0 o e o o e, e a,, e Page 23
At the West Indies constitutional conference opening
in Trinidad on 2 May, Jamaica?s Premier Norman Manley will
press for adoption of his provisions for a weak federation;
he has threatened to withdraw from the federation if his
demands are not met. Since Jamaica has over half the
federation's population and accounts for the greater part
of its economic strength, a compromise is likely. The
conference is a preliminary to talks later in the month
in London to set an independence date in 1962-.
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27 April 1961
SPECIAL ARTICLES
TUNISIAN PRESIDENT BOURGUIBA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 1
Habib Bourguiba, who is soon to visit Canada, the
United States, and Britain, is Tunisia's outstanding
political leader; he aspires, however, to recognition
as a prominent African statesman, especially as leader
of the Maghreb (North Africa). Sympathetic to the West
and firmly anti-Communist, he has felt it necessary and
wise to yield to internal pressures and to adopt a
policy of nonalignment. He has established diplomatic
relations with the USSR, Czechoslovakia, and Poland.
COMMUNIST CHINA'S INFLUENCE IN NORTH KOREA . .
. . Page 5
North Korea has supported Communist China on a number
of issues in the Sino-Soviet dispute. As a nation deter-
mined to industrialize at maximum speed and as a country
with unsatisfied territorial claims, North Korea was
strongly attracted by China's "leap forward" and commune
programs in the fall of 1958 and more recently has sided
with Peiping in opposing Khrushchev's policy of relax-
ing international tensions. Developments during and af-
ter the Moscow conference of world Communist leaders last
November, including North Korea's explicit recognition
of Communist China as co-leader of the Communist bloc,
confirm the existence of strong bonds between these two
Asian Communist countries.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
WEEKLY REVIEW
LAOS
All parties in Laos--the
Boun Oum government, Souvanna
Phouma, and the Pathet Lao--
have accepted the appeal of the
Geneva co-chairmen for a cease-
fire, but agreement has not yet
been reached on the time or
place for negotiations to ar-
range for implementing machinery.
Souvanna and Kong Le, re-
spectively, have proposed po-
litical and military talks with
representatives of the "Savanna.
khet group" to begin in enemy-
held Xieng Khouang on 28 April.
The pre-emptory tone of these
proposals, which were issued in
the name of the "Laotian govern-
ment," and the suggestion of an
obviously unacceptable site may
be for purposes of maneuvering,
but could also be intended to
stall negotiations.
Vientiane has issued a dec-
laration calling for a cease-
fire to be effective at noon on
28 April, and General Phoumi has
proposed a meeting of opposing
military leaders in Luang Pra-
bang on the same date to discuss
necessary arrangements. Vien-
tiane's step, delayed by Ph,oumi's
desire to avoid an appearance
of weakness, should help to pin
down Communist intentions. How-
ever, even if the Pathet Lao ac-
cept, various pretexts could be
used for dragging out the nego-
tiations, thereby enabling the
Communist forces to further con-
solidate their position.
Kong Le - Pathet Lao forces
are continuing to apply pressure
27 Apr 61
against Phoumi?s forces on sev-
eral fronts, On 23 April., gov-
ernment troops withdrew from
Vang Vieng, north of Vientiane
on Route 13. Enemy pressure
now is building up against new
defensive positions hastily pre-
pared by government forces be-
low Vang Vieng at a point about
45 miles north of Vientiane.
Meanwhile, enemy attacks con-
tinue against government block-
ing forces north of Phou Khoun
junction. On 26 April, after
several days of enemy artillery
fire, government troops abandoned
Muong Sai, some 60 miles north
of Luang Prabang.
South of the Plaine des
Jarres, Kong Le - Pathet Lao
forces are pressing mopping-up
operations against pockets of
Meo guerrilla forces. In cen-
tral Laos, the situation re-
mains critical, although strong
enemy forces located 15 miles
east of Thakhek so far have not
pressed their advantage against
generally weak government de-
fending 'forces .
General Phoumi believes
the enemy objective is to cap-
ture such key centers as Luang
Prabang, Vientiane, Thakhek,
and Pak Sane before a cease-fire
is implemented. Since such
moves would risk Western inter-
vention, it seems more likely
that the enemy will confine its
efforts to capturing key ap-
proaches to these centers as
a means of strengthening its
bargaining position. With the
Laotian Army near collapse,
however, the enemy forces may
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CU E.7N INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
.'EMK
LMuong Soui
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WEEKLY REVIEW
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
be tempted to press their ad-
vantage, which could .lead `to ~a
request from Vientiane for ex-
ternal assistance.
Souvanna Phouma, on the
final lap of his world tour,
arrived in Hanoi on 26 April.
Since his Moscow visit, he has
traveled in the company of
Pathet Lao leader Souphannou-
vong, his half-brother. Their
growing rapport has begun to
blur the distinction Souvanna
formerly drew between his "gov-
ernment" and the Pathet Lao.
Souvanna's statement proposing
the immediate formation of a
provisional coalition government
to represent Laos at the forth-
coming Geneva conference sug-
gests he may proceed to en-
large his "government" with
Pathet Lao representatives
regardless of Vientiane's
stand.
In joint communiques
issued in Moscow and Pei-
ping, Souvanna endorsed Com-
munist positions on such
issues as peaceful coexist-
ence, Cuba, disarmament, and
the liquidation of colonial-
ism.
The communique issued in
Peiping noted his agreement to
exchange ambassadors with the
Chinese Communists. The Chi-
nese also agreed to build a road
for the Laotians "to facilitate
communication between the two
countries." The location of
this road was not specified,
but the Chinese may be planning
a link between northern Laos
and China via North Vietnam.
Chinese laborers reportedly
were working in February and
early March on a section of
road between the Chinese
border and Lai Chau in North
Vietnam.
27 Apr 61
In a statement on 26 April
Peiping voiced full support for
a cease-fire before convocation
of an international conference
and announced its decision to
send a delegation to Geneva
headed by Foreign Minister Chen
Yi. Peiping expressed agreement
with the Soviet position that
the ICC could exercise the nec-
essary supervision and control
over a cease-fire "pending the
decision of the international
conference."
Peiping's statement also
suggested some of the initial
positions which the Communists
will probably take in the cease-
fire negotiations. The Chinese
declared that to "bring about"
and "ensure" a cease-fire, the
US, Thailand, and South Vietnam
must "immediately" stop assist-
ance to Phoumi and withdraw
their military personnel and
equipment. Peiping, which
claims that Taipei's recent ef-
fort to withdraw Nationalist
irregular forces from the Bur-
mese-Laotian-Chinese border
area was only a "sham," also
insisted that the irregulars
must be disarmed and removed
from Laos at once.
The Soviet Union probably
feels that if negotiations are
undertaken between Phoumi's
forces and the Pathet Lao fac-
tion on the question of a cease-
fire, the Western powers will
attend the conference even if
the cease-fire has not been
formally signed. the USSR
probably believes that Asian
neutralist countries which are
to attend the conference will
bring strong pressure to bear
on the Western powers to con-
vene the conference on 12 May
as scheduled, short of an all- 25X1
out Pathet Lao attack on Luang
Prabang, Vientiane, or a similar
major offensive.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
FRANCE-ALGERIA
The overwhelming strength
of De Gaulle's popular backing
in France played a major role
in Jiis victory over the French
military insurrection of 22-25
April in Algeria, and will be
interpreted by him as a new
mandate to hasten a negotiated
settlement of the six-year-old
Algerian rebellion. The rebel
Provisional Algerian Government
(PAG) in Tunis reacted cautious-
ly during the insurrection, and
now appears ready to move quickly
toward negotiations. Meanwhile,
the Paris government, using the
emergency powers assumed by De
Gaulle on 23 April, is pressing
an energetic roundup of civilian
as well as military participants
in the insurrection and any oth-
ers who may have indirectly
aided it . ,
The PAG reportedly was
ready late last week to issue
a statement of its willingness
to open negotiations on the un-
derstanding that parallel talks
would not be conducted with its
rival, the Algerian National
Movement (MNA), but held up the
statement so as not to hamper
De..Gaulle during the insurrec
tion. The PAG leadership also
showed its great concern over
the possibility that the in-
surrection might succeed by
sending word to Paris that it
would be receptive to any sug-
gestions on steps it might take
to oppose the Algiers junta.
Although Paris and the PAG still
remain divided on many substan-
tive issues, De Gaulle's firm
action against the "French Al-
geria" elements will give the
rebels greater confidence in
his good faith.
The collapse of the in-
surrection "burst the abscess"
of opposition to De Gaulle's
Algerian policy. The road is
open for him to pursue that pol-
icy to its logical end--inde-
pendence of Algeria in~some
form. In the meantime, however,
he must decide whether the
benefits of stepping up mili-
tary operations against-the Na-
tional Liberation Front as a
means of reuniting the French
Army outweigh the danger that
such a step might jeopardize
the favorable atmosphere for
negotiations.
The US Embassy in Paris
comments that French public
opinion rallied to the govern-
ment' ina'a. more determined way
than in either May 1958 or Jan-
uary 1960. The normally apa-
thetic public appears to have
been galvanized by the govern-
ment's dramatic demonstration--
through such measures as arming
civilians and mobilizing loyal
reserve units--of its intention
to counter any insurgent para-
troop