CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A003100040001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 43
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 30, 2005
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 27, 1999
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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(CURRENT
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY
SUMMARY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
DIA, State Department review(s) completed.
co
2 March 1961
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CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S 1 / 4 QAj
COPY NO. 71
OCI NO. 0269/61
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THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECT-
ING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES
WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS,
TITLE 18, USC, SECTIONS 793 AND 794, THE TRANSMIS-
SION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO
AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.
The Current Intelligence Weekly Summary has been prepared
primarily for the internal use of the Central Intelligence
Agency. It does not represent a complete coverage of all
current situations. Comments and conclusions represent the
immediate appraisal of the Office of Current Intelligence.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
WEEKLY REVIEW
CONGO
The incursion by Gizenga
forces into the Luluabourg.area
of Kasai Province, which caused
much apprehension in Leopold-
ville, has faded out this week.
UN sources claim that Luluabourg
is a "UN city"; nevertheless
Congolese troops of Mobutu, ac-.
cording to press reports, have
engaged in riots with the local
populace which.have resulted in
more than 40 fatalities. The
UN has confirmed that another
Gizenga force estimated at two
battalions is moving from Ikela
in central Congo toward Coquil-
hatville, capital of Equateur
Province, which the UN reports
virtually unguarded by Leopold-
ville forces. Hammarskjold told
Ambassador Stevenson on 28 Feb-
ruary he did not think recent
military operations in the Congo
had changed the balance of power
among the various factions.
For at least a month, Gi-
zenga's forces.have apparently
operated with relative freedom
in northern Kasai Province. The
population there, which includes
Lumuiriba's own tribe, either is
politically apathetic or fa-
vors Gizenga'S Stanleyville re-
gime. The force that "took"
Luluabourg apparently had rea-
son to expect that Mobutu's
troops would not resist.
The Gizengist withdrawal
began on 27 February, the troops
quitting Luluabourg "like a wave
on sand," some disappearing in-
to the bush after abandoning
their weapons, and some withdraw-
ing to the northeast toward
'Kivu Province.. According to
UN sources, all Congolese troops
have been cleared from the city
and the airport.
According to the Ghanaian
UN commander on the scene, the
officers of the invading force
did not have control of their
men, and the force evidently
dispersed rather than submit to
a. disarmament agreement which
its leaders had negotiated with
the local UN contingent. Gi-
zengist officers involved in
these negotiations and the com-
mander of the pro-Mobutu garri-
son asked for and received UN
protection, although there are
indications that the Leopold-
ville government intends to take
disciplinary action against its
officers. This confusion in
Luluabourg illustrates the de-
pendence of Congolese military
operations on the whims of in-
dividual units.
The Gizenga forces in
Luluabourg, according to eyewit-
nesses, did not have even the
most meager logistical support
--and other Stanleyville columns
operating in Kasai are probably
in a similar condition. Gi-
zenga's over-all supply problem
appears to be precarious.
The expulsion of five Com-
munist journalists from Stan-
leyville on 28 February--al-
legedly because Gizenga was
piqued about not receiving aid
from Communist countries--prob-
ably was intended by Gizenga
to. dramatize his supply situa-
tion.
The Sudanese UN delegate
told an American official on
27 February that Khartoum does
not intend to give way to So-
viet and UAR pressure for trans-
it rights. He said various
devices were being tried, but
would not succeed.
Gizenga apparently re-
mains the dominant figure in
Stanleyville and the city is
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
reported calm. General Lundula,
Gizenga's chief of staff, re-
portedly issued orders on 26
February that anyone molesting
Europeans will be shot, and
Gizenga had earlier decreed
that only the central Stanley-
ville government can order the
death sentence. Gizenga, who
has little tribal support and
has maintained his position
largely through political manip-
ulation, may have weakened it
by defending Europeans.
However, he appears to have
removed some potential rivals.
Benard Salumu, formerly his rep-
resentative in Cairo and more
recently a leading figure in
the Stanleyville regime, is
reported to have fled, presum-
ably as a result of a struggle
for power.
In Leopoldville, the riot-
ing by Congolese army elements
appears to have resulted from
fear both of an impending at-
tack by Gizenga's columns and
the possibility of attempts by
UN forces to disarm Mobutu's
troops. Kasavubu's radio ad-
dress on 27 February in which
he urged resistance to UN
"tutelage" may worsen the al-
ready tense situation between
UN personnel and the Congolese
army, and further attacks on
UN personnel could lead to re-
taliatory action by the UN
force.
In late February, Congo-
lese officials in Leopold-
ville were making frantic ef-
forts to put together a force
with which to oppose Gizenga's
advance. In the event Gizenga's
forces move on Leopoldville,
they would be unlikely to meet
effective opposition in eastern
Leopoldville Province, where
most the the tribes supported
Lumumba.
Acting Defense Minister
Kazadi was trying to raise two
battalions of volunteers in the
Leopoldville area, and report-
edly even asked Albert Kalonji,
head of the South Kasai State,
to send his two battalions of
poorly trained troops against
the Gizenga force in Lulua-
bourg. When this request was
reported to the UN command,
Dayal protested, objecting to
Kalonji's "aggressive posture."
According to UN sources in New
York,Kalonji's troops had taken
up positions near Luluabour
by 27 February.
General Mobutu, with ap-
proximately 1,500 troops, is
in the vicinity of Bumba, pos-
sibly still hoping to advance
into Orientale Province. UN
sources estimate that, although
he has some trucks brought up
by river from Coquilhatville,
he would not be able to carry
out an attack on Stanleyville.
Following a 21 February meeting
with UN commander McKeown, Mo-
butu promised to take up only
defensive positions to prevent
infiltrations from Stanleyville,
but he refused to meet with
Lundula to discuss a cease-
fire and establishment of a
neutral zone. Hammarskjold
thinks there is a chance that
Mobutu and Lundula might join
forces in a military al-
liance against all politi-
cians.
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Mobutu may be planning at-
tempts to reassert Leopoldville's
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
control in Kivu Province. The
American consul in Usumbura re-
ported on 23 February that Mo-
butu troops in plain clothes
had appeared in Ruanda-Urundi,
allegedly on a mission to buy
off the garrisons now controlled
by Gizenga across the Congo bor-
der in Bukavu. The consul com-
ments that this operation has a
better chance of succeeding
than did Mobutu's abortive at-
tempt on 1 January, also from
Ruanda-Urundi, to take over
Kivu Province. Belgium would
be open to further severe cen-
sure should such an operation
take place from Ruanda-Urundi,
which it administers as a UN
trust territory.
Gizenga's apparent mili-
tary successes probably contrib-
uted to the 28 February agree-
ment among Tshombe, Ileo, and
Kalonji.which provides for a
pooling of military forces and
continuing military and polit-
ical consultations. By thus
.tacitly admitting the existence
of Katanga as a separate entity,
Ileo and Kasavubu may have un-
dermined their claim to be the
spokesmen for. the entire Congo.
The agreement is unlikely
to result in much direct mili-
tary support for the Leopold-
ville regime. Tshombe is more
likely to use his troops against
dissident Baluba tribesmen to
maintain his own position.
Within the last two weeks he
has reportedly issued Mauser
rifles and ammunition to many
members of his Conakat party
in Elisabethville and the sur-
rounding villages, but this
action appears to be more an
attempt to raise morale and to
guard against an anti-Conakat
uprising than to increase the
fighting strength of
the Katanga army.
t h e C o n g o However, Tshombe on
28 February denounced
his tacit cease-fire
agreement with the UN
and threatened for
the first time to move
his troops outside of
Katanga.
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Secretary General
iammarskj old describes
his new Congo mandate as
'open ended" regarding
what is to be done and
"indefinite" regard-
ing who is to carry
it out. He remains
cautious in his inter-
pretation of provi-
sions authorizing the
use of force. He be-
lieves that UN troops
could take positions
to keep contending
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUYYA'RY
forces apart and use force to
hold such positions against at-
tack. However, in his view,
UN forces could not initiate
the use of force. Hammarskjold
insists that he must abide by
the limitations set by coun-
tries contributing troops and
cites Tunisian, Ethiopian, and
Sudanese demands that their
troops not become parties to
internal conflicts.
On the basis of this inter-
pretation, UN advisers estimate
that 25 battalions (23,000; men)
are necessary to maintain law
and order. They believe 19
battalions could prevent troop,
movements within the Congo. If
Morocco and Indonesia comply
with Hammarskjold's appeal to
keep their troops there, the UN
force in the Congo will remain
at 19 battalions. Hammarskjold
has requested African states to
supply five or six additional
battalions for use in Katanga,
and apparently is hoping for
three or more battalions from
India. He regards an Indian
contribution as the "key" to
the situation at present.
Hammarskjold has held a
series of meetings with his 18-
member Congo Advisoky Commit-
tee with the over-all objective
of forcing the states represented
on that body to take responsi-
bility as a group for imple-
mentation of the resolution. He
believes that the only way he
can act is by some agreement
among Africans which would off-
set Soviet pressure. By involv-
ing these states in executive
decisions about UN Congo opera-
tions, Hammarskjold probably
hopes to protect his office and
the Secretariat from the inevi---
:tkble attack by UN members should
UN troops ever actually initiate
the use of force.
Hammarskjold does not in-
tend to replace Dayal imme-
diately, although his contract
expires in two weeks. Hammar-
skjold said that Dayal would
have to stay until "we are
around the corner" of the pres-
ent crisis. Hammarskjold's
reluctance to replace Dayal
stems in part from the diffi-
culty of finding a suitable
replacement as well as to his
fear of alienating India. His
requests for several men from
various Asian, and African
countries have been refused by
the governments mainly on the
ground that these men were
needed at home.
Paris is sharply critical
of UN efforts in the Congo and
believes they have only weak-
ened the prestige and strength
of the legitimate government.
Opposed to any expansion of the
UN mandate, and to neutraliza-
tion of the Congolese Army,
Paris advocates strong and im-
mediate support of Kasavubu
and believes the US, Britain,
France, Belgium, and friendly
African countries should act
in concert to build up Kasavubu
so that he could serve as a
lodestone around whom a moderate
central government could be
formed. Though Paris has ceased
its initial direct aid to the
Katanga forces, its extreme
irritation with the UN, its
dislike of US policy, and the
serious threat to Kasavubu,
suggest, that Paris may consid-
er direct aid is imperative.
Khrushchev Letters
Khrushchev's letters of 22
February to Nehru and other.:
heads of government probably
were intended as the USSR's
response not only to Hammar-
skjold's new mandate but also
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to recent US warnings against
unilateral intervention. Khru-
shchev sought to counter the
Security Council resolution by
insisting that the UN operation
has failed and that if the pres-
ent situation continues, West-
ern forces may intervene "be-
hind the facade of the UN."
The letters repeated most
of the points contained in the
Soviet Government's statement of
14 February on the Congo, with
the, addition of a renewed demand
that Hammarsjkold be replaced
by a three-man executive organ
representing the West, the Com-
munist bloc, and the neutral-
ists. Khrushchev charged, "It
is Hammarskjold who killed Lu-
mumba," and declared, "We can-
not tolerate a UN secretary gen-
eral branded with this abomi-,-.
nable murder
The Soviet premier avoided
a direct attack on the United
States, but he warned certain
unnamed "statesmen in the West"
that a "big stick" policy is
"rife with mortal danger for
those who pursue it." Khru-
shchev's proposal to replace the
UN operation by a commission of
African states is an attempt to
align the pro-Gizenga Casablanca
powers--Ghana, Guinea, Mali,
Morocco, and the UAR--with the
USSR. Nkrumah had earlier pro-
posed reconstituting the UN force
into an African military command
for the Congo and now intends to
present his plan personally to
the UN General Assembly session
scheduled to reconvene on 7
March. A 22 February communique
signed by the Casablanca powers
meeting in Accra called for re-
organization of the UN Congo
forces and their subordination
to an African command.
Khrushchev's proposed com-
mission, which would deal only
with the "legal government" of
Gizenga,would have the tasks of
supervising the removal of the
"aggressors," ensuring the ter-
mination of "all forms of for-
eign intervention," and creat-
ing conditions for "normal ac-
tivities by the Congolese Gov-
ernment and parliament."
By publishing Khrushchev's
letter to Nehru, Moscow may
hope to head off an Indian de-
o send combat troops to
the Congo. Nehru and Defense
Minister Menon are apparently
thinking in terms of a brigade-
size unit (about 3,000 men).
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Efforts by Vientiane to
reach a reconciliation with
Souvanna Phouma probably will
be resumed following his re-
turn to Phnom Penh on 1 March
from a week of consultations
with his "government" at Xieng
Khouang and with other supporters
in Laos. The evident hardening
of Souvanna's attitude, however,
is a complicating factor.
Souvanna has advanced three
possible solutions to the Lao-
tian crisis: creation of a co-
alition government including
Pathet Lao representation, de-
pendent on withdrawal of "Ameri-
can troops" from Laos; creation
of a "neutral, nonpolitical"
government, presumably composed
of civil servants acting under
the King; or the early convening
of a 14-nation conference--as
suggested by Sihanouk--to organ-
ize new general elections in
Laos which would be supervised
by a commission appointed by
the conference.
Souvanna's determination
to press the Laotian Govern-
ment on this issue is reflected
in the tough statements issued
under his name during his stay
in Xieng Khouang, including a
call for the development and
consolidation of a "powerful
army to liberate all of Laos."
Souvanna was also quoted as
doubtful that the "Laotian
people and Pathet Lao forces
can accept a broadening of the
Boun Oum government. If there
is any broadening, it can only
be with the collaboration of
the Pathet Lao of the govern-
ment which I have set up."
Vientiand's attitude will be
influenced by its irritation over
Souphannouvong's denunciation of
King Savang's neutral nations
proposal and Souphannouvong's
claim that the King is a "pris-
oner of the imperialists." A
government communique issued
on Souphannouvong's statement
--which Souvanna subsequently
echoed--termed it "hostile
to the King's spirit for neu-
trality and harmony which
could have serious conse-
quences for the Laotian
Government's reconciliation
policy."
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
1ao ---2
J INDONESIA
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L,, S?UTM
ttope(VIETNAM
i
CAMBODIA
200
--I
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Burmese Premier U Nu, in
rejecting the invitation for
Burma to serve on a neutral
nations commission, stated that
"acceptance would imply recog-
nition of the Boun Oum govern-
ment, which Burma had not recog-
nized." Nu reiterated Burma's
doubts that Sihanouk's 14-
nation proposal could bring
about tangible- results, and
instead advocated free elec-
tions in Laos under the super-
vision of a neutral nations
commission, on which Burma
would be willing to serve.
The Burmese premier noted
the necessity for the big pow-
ers ; of both East and West
to stay out of the Laotian dis-
put and for the leaders of
opposing "factions" in Laos to
agree on a modus vivendi to
hold such elections.
Both.'Moscow'and Peiping
moved quickly to undercut
King Savang's proposal. Their
immediate response suggests
concern lest favorable in-
ternational reaction to the
proposal deprive the bloc
of the diplomatic initiative
in Laos.
Soviet Ambassador Abramov
in Phnom Penh may have been
instrumental in persuading
Souvanna to go to Xieng
Khouang. While Souvanna had
entertained the idea for some
time, Abramov undoubtedly
tried to impress him with the
urgency of immediately identify-
ing himself with the Xieng
Khouang regime in order to
offset Savang's netural nations
proposal.
In the first authorita-
tive commentary in over a month
on Moscow's conditions for
reaching a settlement in Laos,
a Pravda article on 23 Febru-
ary stressed the need to con-
vene an international conference
before the International Con-
trol Commission (ICC) can re-
sume its activity in Laos. The
article commented obliquely
on King Savang's declaration
by charging that the Boun Oum
government is "flouting the
Geneva agreements, which pro-
vide the only foundation for
peace and security in the Indo-
china area." The article
claimed that the USSR's pro-
posals for dealing with the
crisis have "met with wide-'
spread international response,"
and contended that Britain,
which together with the USSR
chaired the 1954 Geneva Con-
ference, has agreed in principle
that any settlement. should be
based on the Geneva agreements.
Pravda also welcomed Brit-
ain's proposal of 21 January
for reactivating the ICC in
Laos as a "move toward a real-
istic approach." The article
went, even further than Moscow's
earlier official reply--which
suggested that the ICC could
meet in New Delhi--by saying
the ICC "must meet at once."
The bloc's insistence
that any Laotian negotiations
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
or settlement be based on the
1954 Geneva agreements stems
from its conviction that this
approach would guarantee a
major bloc voice in any solu-
tion and provide the best de-
vice for obtaining strong
Pathet Lao participation in any
expanded government of "nation-
al unity" that might be rec'-
ommended' by an international
The most comprehensive
statement of the USSR's posi-
tion regarding a Laotian set-
tlement was made by Soviet
Ambassador Menshikov to Secre-
tary Rusk on 28 February.
Menshikov called Sihanouk's
proposal of "paramount impor-
tance" and said that the 14-na-
tion conference proposed by the
Cambodian leader could fur-
nish the ICC with the addition-
al powers necessary for its
operation. The Soviet ambassa-
dor also noted that US support
for the Laotian King's neutral
nations proposal was actually
an abandonment of the Geneva
agreements and would lead to
the creation of a new commission
for which there is no legal
ground.
Peiping propaganda treat-
ment of the Laotian situation
has contrasted with Moscow's
avoidance of direct criticism
of the US administration.
People's Daily on 25 February
charged that tthe US "has been
stepping up aggression against
Laos" while talking of a polit-
ical settlement. It described
the neutral nations proposal as
"nothing but a US intrigue."
The editorial also drew
attention to the presence of
Chinese Nationalist irregulars
in Laos, and said the US was
planning for "these brigands
to join the civil war." About
3,000 of the irregulars have
taken up residence in Namtha
Province after being forced out
of Burma under pressure from
the Burmese Army assisted by
Chinese Communist forces.
The irregulars issue was
raised somewhat more stridently
in another People's Daily
article on 27 a ruary. ere
Peiping raised the implicit
threat of intervention "if US
imperialism dares to incite the
Kuomintang bandits to join
the Laotian rebel forces."
People's Daily said such a
move would "seriously menace
the security of China's south-
western border"--a menace that
"absolutely cannot be toler-
ated." The commentary also
cited a recent statement by
Kong Le warning that if the Na-
tionalist irregulars are- not
withdrawn, "the Souvanna Phouma
government will take measures
similar to those adopted by the
Burmese Government to eliminate
them."
No Chinese Communist mili-
tary personnel are known to be
in Laos at the present time,
but Peiping is using the pres-
ence of Nationalist irregulars
there as a convenient excuse
for linking Communist China's
national interests more closely
to the Laotian crisis. The
irregulars could be used by
Peiping to justify a military
role in Laos, and the presence
of an old enemy on "China's
southwestern border" would be-
come a likely issue for pro-
longing any international con-
ference in which the Chinese
Communists took part.
General Phoumi, in a press
interview, has denied any in-
tention of using the Nationalist
irregulars in the government's
military effort. He termed their
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
presence "embarrassing" and
said steps are being taken to
resolve the problem.
tionalist China has indicated
willingness to withdraw those
irregulars "subject to its
control," but a substantial
number may not fall into this
category.
The military situation
in Laos continues generally
quiet, but Phouui claims to
have reports that the Pathet
Lao high command worked out
plans with Souvanna Phouma for
a major surprise attack on
Luang Prabang in hopes of cap-
turing the King and installing
the Souvanna regime in the
royal capital. Phoumi, however,
is confident that government
strength in the Luang Prabang
area is sufficient to repel
any attack.
There is no other informa-
tion concerning such enemy in-
tentions, but the logistical
build-up by the Kong Le!- Pathet
Lao forces in the vicinity of
the Phou Khoun road junction
has reached a level sufficient
to support a counterattack on
government troops who remain
bogged down a few miles east Of
the junction.
In the Tha Thom area, gov-
ernment strength is insufficient
to take advantage of the order- 25X1
ly withdrawal of Kong Le -
Pathet Lao forces northward to-
ward Xieng Khouang.
The objective of the 27
February talks between De Gaulle
and Tunisian President Bourguiba
--to open the way for direct
negotiations between France
and the Algerian rebel lead-
ers--has apparently been
achieved. Official French
statements on 1 March implicit-
ly confirm that De Gaulle now
is willing to negotiate with-
out a prior cease-fire. He
hopes to move fast enough to
prevent consolidation of French
rightist opponents of his pol-
icy; this opposition, together
with resistance to negotiations
among factions in the rebel
leadership, threatens an early
settlement.
The 2 March communique is-
sued jointly by rebel "premier"
Ferhat Abbas, Bourguiba, and
the new Moroccan King, referring
to negotiations in the frame-
work of a North African federa-
tion, suggests that Tunisia and
Morocco intend to play a role
in any Algerian negotiations.
Bourguiba's son told US
officials on 1 March that De
Gaulle and Bourguiba "hit it
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
off admirably" and that Bour-
guiba was convinced De Gaulle
"was on the right path." He
said De Gaulle had personally
changed the phrasing of the
communique issued by the two
Presidents from "early evolu-
tion" to read "rapid and posi-
tive evolution." The Tunisians
believe De Gaulle will release
the imprisoned rebel leaders,
headed by Mohammed'Ben Bella,
and open Algerian concentration
camps.
Bourguiba apparently-re-
frained from pressing De Gaulle
for a detailed timetable, but
Bourguiba Jr. had the impres-
sion that a De Gaulle - Abbas
meeting was a definite possi-
bility. The younger Bourguiba
thought secret contacts had
already begun.
Originally De Gaulle made
a cease-fire a precondition of
political talks with the rebels,
but he has increasingly blurred
this demand. French Minister
of Information Terrenoire's
public statement on 1 March,
following De Gaulle's report to
the babinet of his talks with
Bourguiba, implicitly confirms
that De Gaulle how has dropped
the demand. Terrenoire omit-
ted any reference to a cease-
fire when he:announced that
the government was ready to dis-
cuss the conditions of a self-
determinat ion vote with the
various Algerian political fac-
tions, particularly the rebels.
Rebel leaders have maintained
that they will not accept any
form of cease-fire before nego-
tiations are completed.
De Gaulle has also public-
ly maintained that the Algerian
rebels are not, representative
of Algeria and that he could
discuss Algeria's future only
with all factions there. Ac-
cording to Bourguiba, De Gaulle
now admits that the rebels rep-
resent "nine tenths" of Alge-
rian sentiment.
The first public reaction
from the Algerian rebel side was
an announcement by Abbas in
Rabat, made in conjunction with
Moroccan King Hassan II and
Bourguiba, that "no obstacle
should stand in the way of di-
rect negotiations" between
Paris and the rebel government.
The three called for an inde-
pendent Algeria within the
framework of a North African
federation, the so-called
"Magreb" federation uniting
Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia.
The Magreb idea is an old
one among North African leaders.
The idea of such a federation,
linked to France, has appealed
to De Gaulle and is probably
viewed by him as a possible
vehicle for "selling" Algerian
independence to France. Com-
petition between North African
leaders, however, has heretofore
prevented any serious progress
toward attainment of a federation.
Bourguiba's son said De
Gaulle was conducting a "one-
man show" on Algeria and did
not even fully inform Premier
Debre or Foreign Minister Couve
de Murville on the contents of
his talks with Bourguiba. De
Gaulle reportedly "silenced"
Debre's various objections at
Rambouillet.
An outstanding example of
the obstacles to an early set-
tlement is the question of con-
trol of the Sahara and recent
French moves concerning the area.
Debre, on a visit to the Sahara
just prior to the De Gaulle -
Bourguiba talks, stated publicly
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
that France intended to remain
there and that the Sahara be-
longed to none of the neighbor-
ing-territories. Paris on 1
March announced a fourth nuclear
test to be held there soon, and
the'- French military headquar-
ters for the Sahara is being
moved from Algiers to Reggane,
the nuclear test site.
In Algeria, European set-
ler extremists have stepped up
a campaign of bombings, and at
least 17 Europeans--veterans or
reservists--have been arrested
as members of a "French Algeria"
maquis. Serious Moslem rioting
has recently occurred in Oran.
Further obstacles to negotiations
are indicated by Bourguiba Jr.'s
statement that he thought there
was some resistance to them with-
in the rebel leadership. Rebel
leaders have claimed they are
under heavy pressure from Moscow
and Peiping and that they intend
to be tough in negotiations.
The death on 26 February
of King Mohamed V, who had been
the only significant force for
unity and stability in Morocco,
seems certain to inaugurate a
new period of political turmoil.
Mohamed's 31-year-old son has
moved speedily to solidify his
rule as Hassan II. He immedi-
ately ordered military and se-
curity units to enforce order
and already is reported seeking
to form a government of "nation-
al union."
The principal challenge to
Hassan's authority as a theoret-
ically absolute monarch is the
National Union of Popular Forces
(UNFP), a strong, left-wing
nationalist-labor group led by
a collegium of young intellectu-
als who demand a constitution
and government responsible to
the people. Among its leaders
are former Premier Abdallah
Ibrahim; former Deputy Premier
Abderrahim Bouabid, who now is
serving as its organizing secre-
tary general; former resistance
leader Mohamed el-Basri; Mehdi
Ben Barka, student leader and
self-exiled former tutor of the
new King; and Mahjoub Ben Seddik,
dynamic secretary general of
Morocco's most powerful labor
organization, the 600,000-mem-
ber Moroccan Labor Union.
A predominantly urban or-
ganization, centered in Casa-
blanca and Rabat, the UNFP has
during the past nine months been
strengthening its organization
and seeking supporters in the
army and in areas where it was
weakest. That much organiza-
tional work remains to be done
was implicit in comments by a
member of the UNFP secretariat,
who expressed the "left's uni-
versal dismay at the death of
the King, which could not have
occurred at a worse time." He
told an American official that
the opposition prefers to wait
suggesting some seven to ten
days, or roughly the period of
state mourning--rather than
take immediate action against
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Hassan. He also stated that
the UNFP will "invoke the name"
of the dead king to try to
counter Hassan's expected ex-
ploitation of the respect and
affection Moroccans held for his
father.
Hassan will rely principal-
ly on the 30,500-man army, of
which he has been chief of
staff, but whose loyalty to him
has yet to be tested. The army
is undergoing an internal crisis
caused by friction between na-
tionalistic but disorganized
young officers and senior of-
ficers--among whom are the new
King's closest military advisers
--who gained their experience
in the French Army.
Hassan may also count on
a measure of support, at least
initially,, from the conserva-
tive Istigial party, which on
28 February called on "all na-
tional organizations to unify
their ranks to work for the
realization of the national ob-
jectives of Mohamed V," and
urged the "wholehearted and
widespread allegiance of the
nation to King Hassan II." The
palace-created and pro-monarch-
ist Popular Movement will be
the most likely vehicle for en-
listing rural and tribal backing
for Hassan, although it lacks
dynamic leadership.
Morocco's foreign policy
under Hassan probably will con-
tinue to be formal-"nonalign-
ment." Although Hassan was
considered to be personally
pro-French--in fact he was ac-
cused by his opposition of
having "sold out" to France--
he has sought contacts with
Moscow and Cairo. Hassan so-
licited from the USSR the re-
cent gift of Soviet jet air-
craft and is reported to have
initialed during Soviet Presi-
dent Brezhnev's visit to Moroc-
co last month an agreement for
Soviet economic aid. He seems
likely to make further arrange-
ments with the Sino-Soviet bloc.
At the same time he may press
for new concessions from the US .
and France in, connection with base
arrangements made in 1959 7 and 1960
and probably will intensify pres-
in northern Morocco.
sure for the evacuation of the
3,000 Spanish troops, remaining
Cuba's recent cabinet
changes are aimed at organizing
the economy more efficiently
and paving the way for an an-
nounced one-billion-dollar
five-year industrialization
program. Plans announced on
24 February for the creation of
three new ministries and the
reorganization of other eco---
nomic administrative bodies
were reportedly fashioned by
Cuban and Czech technicians in
Prague. The new economic order
conforms closely to the Com-
munist pattern for state con-
trol of the economy. The
National Bank of Cuba, now to
be headed by former Commerce
Minister Cepero Bonilla, will
issue all currency and function
as the government's fiscal agent
in all domestic and international
financial affairs.
Che Guevara, former presi-
dent of the National Bank and
now chief of the new Ministry
of Industry, has apparently
strengthened his position as
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Cuba's chief economic adminis-
trator, since the national pe-
troleum and mining institutes
and the sugar mills have been
transferred to his ministry.
The 27 February attempt on his
life--evidently the second such
attempt within the last four
months--underlines the importance
with which anti-Castro elements
regard him.
In an apparent change of
tactics toward other Latin Am-
erican governments,. the Castro
regime delivered a lengthy
letter on 24 February to the
remaining Latin American diplo-
matic missions in Havana in-
sisting that Cuba harbors no
intentions of exporting its rev-
olution. Reiterating the fa-
miliar charges that the United
States plans aggression against
Cuba, the letter reportedly im-
plied Castro's approval of the
current Ecuadorean proposal
for jbiht Latin -American
mediation df US-Cuban dif-
ferences.
The note followed by only
12 days Castro's speech alleging
US aid to anti-Castro elements
and claiming Cuba's right to
spread its revolution abroad.
Cuba probably hopes to reduce
the possibility of solid Latin
American support for collective
action against it.
The '.'first regional Latin
American plantation workers'
conference" in Havana, sched-
uled to begin on 3 March, is at-
tracting delegates from other
Latin American Communist parties
and Communist-front organiza-
tions as well as observers from
Soviet bloc countries.
Anti-Castro forces are con-
tinuing their activities through-
out Cuba, despite government
claims that major resistance
centers have been, or are about
to be, eliminated. Government
forces have claimed the capture
of about 900 rebels in the
Sierra Escambray area, where
Havana previously estimated
that fewer than 1,000 counter-
revolutionaries were concentrated.
Reports of new engagements with
guerrillas indicate, however,
that considerable numbers remain
at large.
Unconfirmed reports of es-
capes and defections of prominent
persons are circulating among
opposition elements. According to
recent press reports, former
labor chief David Salvador--an
opportunist who turned against
Castro and was captured while
seeking to leave the island in
November 1960--has fled Cuba 25X1
with a number of followers from
his antigovernment "30 November
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1
SECRET.
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
The over-all combat effec-
tiveness of Soviet commands in
East Germany (GSFG), Poland
(NGF), and Hungary (SGF) has
been increased during the first
year of Khrushchev's "demobi-
lization program." While mili-
tary forces within the USSR
have been reduced, manpower of
the Soviet forces in Eastern
Europe has been maintained at
the approximate level of 1959.
No line units were disbanded
or transferred from these ex-
terior commands. These forces
have been strengthened by the
continued introduction of
improved tanks, guns, and air-
craft; in the GSFG, several
conventional artillery and
antiaircraft artillery units
have probably been replaced by
missile units.
Although these forces have
a nuclear weapons delivery capa-
bility, there is no evidence
of local stockpiling of nuclear
warheads. Such warheads could
be readily airlifted from the
USSR.
Soviet units in Eastern
Europe are highly trained,
Soviet Forces in Eastern Europe
Estimated Strength
Soviet Northern Southern
r`up Forces Group Group
I
~~xxaa~~ 1
L?J 1
l` Wittstock`
'1r Fuerstenberg 4
Gross Doelln' EP
l er:
EAST
Magd burg Glau' Z?ss en/W?e(sdorf
REPUBLIC J
f
(GSFG) (N (SGF)
336,000 Troops 44,000 T ops 65,000 Troops
Motorized Rifle Divisions ............10 ...................... .1,.. ,,,..............1
Tank Divisions ....................... 10.......................1.....................3
Heavy Tanks ...................... 1,120.....................95...... .......... 285
Medium Tanks ................... 4,600............... ....475.. 980
Artillery Pieces .................. 5,800..............._.,,.22 ,,.................420
Jet Fighters ......................... 24...................308.... ............ 216
Jet Light Bombers ................112................., 000-..........,....... 60
CZECHOSLOVAKIA
No Soviet Units
31628
Group of It Army o Tank Air Air'
Forces Army Army Corps
I Surface-to-Surface Missile I Surface-to-Air Missile
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RUMANIA
No Soviet Units
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
well-equipped forces, maintained
at a~ higher level of combat
capability than the Soviet av-
erage, and relatively immune
to some of the short-term fluc-
tuations in policy that affect
Soviet forces elsewhere. The
GSFG has been essentially an
armored strike force with ap-
propriate infantry, artillery,
and tactical air components.
It is well organized and' equipped
to . conduct. either.offensive:'
action into Western Europe or
a mobile defense of its own
area.
In Hungary, the recent
conversion of a rifle division
into a tank division suggests
that the forces there are no
longer serving primarily in an
occupation capacity--their
function since the 1956 revolt.
This force, by its present com-
position and disposition, forms
a southward extension of the
GSFG and increases the Soviet
capability for ground combat
into or against Central Europe
and the Mediterranean region.
The force in Poland is organ-
ized to protect Soviet communi-
cation routes across that coun-
try.
The deployment of surface-
to-air missiles (SAMs) in East
Germany, begun in 1959, was
continued during 1960. Six
6-launcher Guideline SAM sites
are believed operational now;
four of these, however, have
probably been transferred to
East German Army control. The
GSFG probably also acquired a
short-range surface-to-surface
.missile (SSM) capability during
the last 18 months. Reports
of tank-borne "rockets,'.' which
may be either the 150-nautical-
mile (n.m.) ). Scud 5SM or. the
Frog unguided rocket
There is also evidence
that the Soviets have longer
range missiles--the 350-n.m.
or the 700-n.m. Shyster SSM--
in East Germany.
Equipment modernization
in the three external commands
appears to follow a common pat-
tern. The best information of
progress is from the GSFG, which
now has replaced about 70 per-
cent of its authorized number
of medium tanks with the new
T-54, has received about 4,400
of its 7,000 authorized armored
personnel carriers (some of the
newer tracked amphibious type),
and has instituted a reorgani-
zation of artillery units (in-
cluding emphasis on larger
caliber antiaircraft guns).
Rapid accretion of general-
purpose vehicles in recent months
is believed to have brought the
command to full strength in
this category.
Soviet tactical air ele-
ments in East Germany, Poland,
and Hungary--particularly the
24th Tactical Air Army of the
GSFG--have increased their com-
bat capability through the ac-
quisition of new classes of
fighters and through improve-
ments in support and weapons
systems.
Training of both the ground
and air elements in the three
Eastern Europe commands is in-
tense and realistic. In the
GSFG, it culminates annually
in combined maneuvers at high
levels, during which simulated
atomic strikes are employed by
both sides. Displacement train-
ing for missile units appears
to have taken place in 1960 for
the first time. In field train-
ing, great stress is laid on the
rapid crossing of water obsta-
cles, for which new techniques
and equipment have been intro-
duced.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
SOVIET AGRICULTURAL REORGANIZATION
Moscow during the last week
formalized the reorganization of
agriculture agreed on at the
January central committee ple-
num. According to a resolution
of 20 February, the Ministry of
Agriculture--already weakened
by the abolition of Machine
Tractor Stations (MTS) in 1958
and later the loss of its plan-
ning and supply functions--will.
lose most of its remaining func-
tions. It will be chiefly re-
sponsible for, carrying out: ; prac-
tic$liresearch,andidissemibating
tbe..results. At the local level,
the=_ria,ietry will; establish
model. farms in each rayon.
The State Planning Commit-
tee (Gosplan) will take over the
ministry's responsibility for
state farms, forestry, and ir-
rigation projects and may in
addition have some supervisory
power over collective farms,
Among its duties is "analysis
of the implementation of cur-
rent agricultural production
plans and...of the financial
affairs of state and collective
farms." The Central Statistical
Directorate will prepare the an-
nual and quarterly accounts of
the::state and collective farms,
a function formerly performed by
the ministry.
A separate resolution ap-
proved the structure of the new
Agricultural Machinery and Sup-
ply Union. This organization
will supply equipment, spare
parts, fertilizer, and other
needs to the state and collec-
tive farms and will be respon-
sible for the repair and test-
ing of agricultural equipment.
It will also handle some of the
functions of the old MTSs. The
former MTS chief, P. S. Kuchumov,
has been appointed chairman of
this union.
2 Mar 61
On 25 February Moscow an-
nounced creation of a State
Committee for Agricultural
Procurements to be chaired by
Deputy Premier N. G. Ignatov.
This committee will control
the collection of agricultural
products through a system of
"contracts" with state and col-
lective farms. The regime un-
doubtedly hopes that the new
system, by concentrating state
procurement in a single agency
with a widespread network of
local agents, will give greater
control over state purchases
and reduce illegal practices
at the local level. The former
State Committee for the Procure-
ment of Grain Products has been
abolished.
Control over that portion
of farm produce which is not
procured by the state will al-
so be tightened. According to
a decree, also issued 25 Feb-
ruary, consumer cooperatives
will step up purchases of the
"surplus" output of collective
farms and collective farmers
in order to sell it locally at
prevailing prices. This will
put greater pressure on col-
lective farms to sell this sur-
plus through quasi-official
channels rather than directly
on the collective farmers' free
markets.
Another decree was issued
on 22 February to increase the
planned state allocations for
rural electrification during
1961-65. This is in line with
Khrushchev's January plenum
statement calling for an in-
crease in state agricultural
investment over the original
Seven-Year-Plan goals. This
investment, which remained low
in 1959 and 1960, is to be in-
creased primarily in irrigation
and electrification projects.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
According to the original
Seven-Year-Plan directive, the
major share of agricultural in-
vestment was to originate from
collective farm funds rather
than from state resources. Much
of the irrigation and electri_,--
fication construction was to be
carried out by intercollective-
farm enterprises without the
aid of state funds. The excel-
lent 1958 harvest swelled the
income of collective farms and
thus generated a high level of
collective farm investment in
1959, but poor harvests in 1959
and 1960 undoubtedly led to lower
investments in 1960, and the out-
look for 1961 is not promising.
Thus the regime may have turned
to state resources to offset
the probable underfulfiliment
of collective farm investment.
The adoption of a new wage
system for state farm workers--
a part of the over-all adjust-
ment of wages, hours, and work
norms throughout the state sec-
tor--follows considerable criti-
cism during the past two years
of the system adopted in 1958.
In the past, state farm work-
ers were paid for fulfilling
their daily work tasks without
regard to quantity or quality
of the end product. Under the
new system wages will be com-
puted on the basis of all three
of these considerations.
The system of awards to
workers has been improved and
new wage scales set up for ma-
chine operators, who will re-
ceive bonuses for timeliness
of field operations and for the
proper care of machines.
Presumably, the new wage
system will mean an over-all
increase in the wages of the
state farm worker since an ad-
ditional 260,000,000 rubles
have been allocated in 1961
for the readjustment in wages.
The new system will require
a more conscientious effort
from the worker and may also
divert his attention from
his own private plot. 25X1
ORR)
(Prepared by 25X1
COMMUNIST CHINA SLOWS INDUSTRIALIZATION PROGRAM
Recent statements from Pei-
ping bear out previous indica-
tions that Communist China has
been forced to reorient and slow
down its industrialization pro-
gram as a result of two con-
secutive years of bad harvests,
the withdrawal of Soviet tech-
nicians last summer, and the
economic dislocations created
by the "leap forward." Another
problem which probably contrib-
uted to the apparent retrench-
ment is the deterioration of
China's balance of payments.
By 1960, the regime's pre-
occupation with increasing the
volume of industrial output
had created serious problems
within industry. It is esti-
mated that the gross national
product was only about 3 per-
cent higher than in 1959 as
against an expected increase
of about 13 percent, that .'
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
industrial production was 8 per-
cent below plan, and that indus-
trial investment actually de-
clined,
No details concerning a
revised plan have been forth-
coming, but statements on in-
dustrial construction policy in
1961 indicate that scheduled
rates of growth have been sharp-
ly reduced. The first such
statement was by economic plan-
ner Po I-po in Red Flag. The
main effort in Ti u ial con-
struction "for the next two or
three years," he wrote, will
be to consolidate the gains al-
ready made, to reinforce lag-
ging sectors, and to improve
the quality of output of indus-
try as a whole. The rate of
investment in heavy industry is
to be reduced, according to Po,
so that agriculture, light in-
dustry, mining, and transporta-
tion can catch up. Industrial
investment may in fact again
decline in 1961 if this is
done..
Po stated that, within
heavy industry, efforts will
be concentrated on "an all-out
campaign to complete construc-
tion projects." He is probably
alluding to projects on which
work stopped when Soviet tech-
nicians were abruptly withdrawn.
He said priority will be given
to projects urgently needed,
those easiest to finish, and
those which will have an im-
mediate effect on the economy.
This suggests that Soviet tech-
nicians are not expected to
return at least for the pres-
ent, and that completion of
Soviet aid projects already
started--the core of Peiping's
industrialization program--will
occupy Chinese technicians for
some time.
A People's Daily editorial
on 11 February said that pro-
duction of new prestige items,
such as large turbogenerators
and complex machine tools, prom-
inently featured during the
"leap forward," is to be de-
layed. This would enable Chi-
nese industry to concentrate on
the production of essential
anxiliary equipment and spare
parts which formerly were im-
ported from the bloc.
A reduction of capital im-
ports has been necessary be-
cause of shortages of export-
able agricultural products.
People's Daily implies, however,
that Peiping is going beyond
this necessary reduction. The
regime appears to have re-
oriented its industrialization
program so as to rely more on
its own resources and less on
technological assistance from
the bloc.
The new policies signal
the end of China's efforts to
industrialize at breakneck
speed. Whether they consti-
tute merely a tactical retreat
remains to be seen. A top-level
Soviet economic delegation is
now in Peiping for negotiations
on future trade and economic
relations between the two coun-
tries. There are indications
that some sort of preliminary
agreement preceded the dele-
gation's arrival in Peiping,
and that both parties hope to
stem the deterioration in eco-
nomic relations which resulted
from political differences be-
tween the two governments. The
question now is whether Peiping's
apparent retreat from some of
its more unorthodox economic
policies will elicit further
Soviet financial or technical
(Prepared by ORR)
assistance.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
NORTH VIETNAM CHANGES
Pham Van Dong, one of North
Vietnam's top party leaders and
a veteran diplomat, has resigned
as foreign minister, a post he
had held concurrently with the
premiership for more than five
years. Dong is still premier,
however, and it is unlikely
that the move signals any major
shift in Hanoi's foreign policy
in the immediate future. His
successor, party central com-
mittee member Ung Van Khiem,
had been deputy foreign minister
for the past six years and prob-
ably has had an important voice
in foreign affairs.
Khiem probably will give
top priority to the regime's
program for rapid reunification
Of Vietnam. One of the few
prominent figures in the North
Vietnamese regime to have been
born in South Vietnam, he was
a leader of Communist guerril-
la activities in southern Indo-
china for over two decades.
The 50-year-old Khiem has long
been a close associate of party
First Secretary Le Duan. The
two went north together in
1954 after years of clandestine
activities south of the 17th
parallel. Both men have been
linked with the current inten-
sified campaign to unseat South
Vietnam's President Diem.
During the past year, two
others who served with Le Duan
during his guerrilla days have
moved up in the government and
FOREIGN MINISTERS
party structure. Pham Hung and
Le Duc Tho were named to the
party secretariat last Septem-
ber and were the only two in-
dividuals elevated in the po-
litburo order of precedence.
Hung was placed in over-all
charge of the government's agri-
cutural programs last July,
and Tho now may be responsible
for party organization. Le
Duan's success in elevating his
old guerrilla colleagues to high
office attests to his growing
influence in the regime and
bolsters his position as Ho Chi
Minh's most likely successor.
Unlike Pham Van Dong, who
led Hanoi's delegation to the
Geneva and Bandung conferences
and who has traveled widely
throughout the bloc, Ung Van
Khiem is known to have left
Vietnam only twice since World
War II. In the summer of 1955
he accompanied Ho Chi Minh to
Moscow and Peiping, and in 1959
he attended Communist China's
tenth anniversary celebrations.
Now, however, he is slated
to lead a government delegation
to Africa and, as foreign min-
ister, will actively press
Hanoi's campaign for closer
ties with the new African coun-
tries. Guinea and Mali recog-
nized North Vietnam last year,
and Khiem is probably optimis-
tic about his prospects for pro-
moting further diplomatic ex-
changes.
RHODESIAN FEDERATION
In his address to the par-
liament of the Federation of
Rhodesia and Nyasaland on 27
February, Prime Minister Roy
Welensky belligerently thrust
an olive branch at Britain.
Earlier he had threatened to
call a special election on the
issue of independence. In his
speech he denounced Britain's
plans to give the 2,400,00 Af-
ricans of Northern Rhodesia
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greater representation in that
protectorate's territorial leg-
islature--calling it a "half-
baked scheme"--but offered to
participate in new talks on en-
larging that body. He warned
that if London declines this
offer, "it may be necessary to
fight for what we have created
during the last 70 years."
The Macmillan government
has been deeply concerned that
an impasse might develop and
has been under pressure--albeit
declining--from right-wing Con-
servative party backbenchers
for some accommodation with the
Rhodesian settlers. It reacted
quickly to Welensky's sugges-
tion inviting him to London for
discussions. Welensky agreed
to come on 3 March. Neverthe-
less, London has shown no in-
clination to abandon its pro-
African proposals.
Officials in Salisbury an-
nounced on 28 February that they
were demobilizing the national
guardsmen and reservists called
up during the past two weeks
in anticipation of African vio-
lence, and were lifting the
ban on leaves for some 5,000
police in Southern Rhodesia.
London's proposal is to
give the Africans of Northern
Rhodesia approximate legisla-
tive parity with the white set-
tlers--a significant gain over
their present status. The exact
proportion of Africans and
whites in the legislature would
be the subject of later discus-
sions. The Africans have de-
manded a majority in the leg-
islative and executive councils
and are not satisfied with this
approach. However, they have
not resorted to violence, as
had been widely feared.
Kenneth Kaunda of the lead-
ing United National Independence
party and Harry Nkumbula of the
African National Congress left
London in late February, and
are en route to Northern Rho-
desia. With their arrival,
African dissatisfaction--par-
ticularly if London interprets
the proposal to suit Welensky--
may be channeled into strong
protest, possibly including vio-
lence against Europeans in the
copper belt area of Northern
Rhodesia.
The bulk of the Rhodesian
settlers--the 230,000 in South-
ern Rhodesia and the 70,000
in Northern Rhodesia--appar-
ently believe that the North-
ern Rhodesian constitution-
al talks will have a decisive
impact on the future of white
settlement in central Africa.
Therefore, the settler-con-
trolled federal parliament,
as well as the settlers them-
selves, would probably give
Welensky strong backing in
threatening gestures to London.
The conference of prime
ministers of the British Common-
wealth beginning in London on
8 March will be the second in
about ten months, although such
meetings usually are held every
two or three years.
A major reason for a con-
ference at this time is to de-
cide whether South Africa can
remain a member of the Common-
wealth after it becomes a re-
public this spring. Other mem-
bers--including India, Malaya, Ghana,
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Nigeria, Canada, and
Ceylon--are cool to
the idea because of
South Africa's apart-
heid policy in ra-
cial matters.
Prime Minister
Macmillan apparently
intends to make a ma-
jor conciliatory ef-
fort. He hopes to
prevent formal dis-
cussion of apartheid
and thus to avoid
acrimonious exchanges
which could result in
South Africa's ex-
pulsion. Britain for
some time has been
seeking to persuade
other members that
retaining South Af-
rica would make it
BACKGROUND
Seven of the eleven independent members of the British
Commonwealth recognize Queen Elizabeth as head of state and
are governed in the name of the Crown. Three are republics
with a president as chief of state, and acknowledge the Queen
only as head of the Commonwealth. All three have become re-
publics without altering their status as members. Malaya be-
came an independent member as a federation with an elected
Paramount Ruler as head of state. Approval for continued mem-
bership as a republic must be unanimous on the part of the
other members; this approval has always been granted in the
past. Members attaining independent membership in the Common-
wealth since World War II are:
President Prasad
15 Aug 1947
(change approved
1949)
President Ayub Khan
15 Aug 1947
(change approved
1955)
Ceylon
Queen Elizabeth
4 Peb 1948
Ghana
President Nkrumah
6 Mar 1957
(change approved
May 1960)
Malaya
Tungku Syed Putra
31 Aug 1957
Nigeria
Queen Elizabeth
1 Oct 1960
easier to induce it to change
its racial policies and that an
expulsion--unprecedented in the
grouping--would seriously under-
mine Commonwealth ties. Can-
ada's Prime Minister Diefen-
baker apparently is one of the
strongest opponents of South
Africa but has indicated he will
reserve his position pending the
outcome of discussions at the
conference.
Apparently there is an
increasing interest in obtain-
ing Commonwealth-wide under-
standing--if not agreement--
on London's position regarding
major international questions
such as disarmament and nuclear
tests, and on critical areas
such as the Congo and Laos,
possibly in anticipation of a
summit meeting later this year.
In view of the British
position--stated publicly by
Foreign Secretary Home on 8
February--that Communist China
should be admitted to the UN,
London is likely to want to con-
sider tactics to bring this
about. It was the consensus of
the prime ministers' conference
last May that Peiping should be
brought into disarmament discus-
sions, and the Macmillan govern-
ment would undoubtedly like to
obtain Commonwealth views on the
representation question for dis-
cussion with President Kennedy
in April.
The application of Cyprus
for Commonwealth membership for
at least five years will prob-
ably be approved, as will the
request of Sierra Leone for
membership after becoming inde-
pendent on 27 April. The future
structure of the Commonwealth,
particularly the status of the
smaller territories gaining in-
dependence, is also scheduled
for discussion. Further, Mac-
millan will presumably try to
re-establish rapport with Nehru--
London has been irritated with
Indian diplomacy in regard to
Laos, and Nehru is reported
resentful of Macmillan's "par-
tisan" support, of Beliium in
the Congo.
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BRAZIL'S FIRST MONTH UNDER QUADROS
Janio Quadros in the first
month of his five-year term of
office has made a few moves to-
ward closer relations with the
wino-Soviet bloc and has stressed
the need for economy in domestic
administration. The new Brazil-
ian President"has had to spend
considerable time on filling sub-
cabinet posts but is reported
also to have devoted attention
to the programs of each of his
cabinet ministers.
Quadros has made initial
moves in the "truly independent"
foreign policy he proposed on
31 January in his inaugural
address. His administration has
recently announced that it will
support inclusion of the Chinese
representation question on the
UN General Assembly agenda at
the next session, although it
has not yet decided whether to
recognize Communist China or
support its admission- to the
United Nations.
The Foreign Ministry an-
nounced on 23 February that
Brazil will establish relations
with Hungary, Rumania, and Bul-
garia. Renewal of diplomatic
relations with the USSR is also
reported under active considera-
tion. Czechoslovakia and Poland
are the only bloc countries in
which Brazil now has missions.
In addition, Foreign Min-
ister Arinos on 24 February sug-
gested a visit to Brazil by
Marshal Tito in response to a
question by ,a Yugoslav journalist
in Brazil a. to how the two
countries could best expand
relations.
With respect to Cuba,
Quadros has taken no decisive
position, despite his words of
praise for the Castro regime
during the campaign. He has,
however, maintained his position
of opposing collective measures
against Castro. While Quadros
has not as yet publit;ly out-
lined a policy for Africa, he
has indicated his belief that
Brazil could assume the role of
a bridge between the West and
Africa--a belief his predecessor
expressed during 1960. Quadros
proposed on 24 February, for
instance, that a scholarship
program to foster Brazilian
relations with Africa be expand-
ed, despite the country's need
for austerity.
When Brazil refused to
participate in this year's in-
ter-American military exercises
with the United States, a
Brazilian diplomat commented
to an American official that
he believed the decision was
based primarily on Quadros'
desire to establish a neutral
position for Brazil in foreign
affairs. Press reports from
Brazil state that the admin-
istration' is hesitant about
a $100,000,000 loan offer from
the United States and comment
that the new President might
prefer to pull the country out
of its financial hole through
increased business deals with
both East and West.
Quadros has not yet public-
ly spelled out the drastic eco-
nomic measures he apparently
plans, but he has taken advan-
tage of initial enthusiasm for
his administration to lengthen
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
government working hours and
dismiss more than 10,000 polit-
ically appointed government
workers--a step similar to his
first moves as governor and mayor
of Sao Paulo earlier in his
career. Commissions have been
appointed to draw up plans with-
in the next several weeks for
solving specific problems, and
the individual ministries are to
report by 9 March on plans for
30-percent reductions in their
budgets. Quadros probably hopes
that leftists, who are likely
to protest his economic measures,
may be conciliated by his foreign
policy.
Soviet-Italian trade is
scheduled to increase during
the next five years as a result
of negotiations recently held
in Moscow. A protocol for 1961,
the final year of the current
four-year trade agreement, calls
for a rise in commerce to about
$240,000,000--an increase of
more than 20 percent over 1960.
A new four-year agreement (1962-
65) provides for further annual
increases, with total trade pos-
sibly reaching as much as ',)'500,-
000,000 in 1965. One of the
main benefits Moscow derives
from these agreements is the
acquisition of tankers and ad-
vanced technical equipment.
The USSR's trade with Italy
has developed rapidly since 1958
and by the end of 1961 probably
will exceed by more than $100,-
000,;000 the original over-all
four-year target of some :500, -
000,000. The trade has not
remained balanced as planned
under the 1958-61 agreement,
however, largely because of
Moscow's failure to import its
share of commodities under the
agreement. Apparently in order
to stimulate Soviet buying and
to balance trade, Italy agreed
in 1960 to extend government-
guaranteed five-year credits of
up to $100,000,000. Since the
new four-year agreement also
calls for balanced trade, sim-
ilar financing arrangements may
also have been provided for
under this pact.
During the next five years,
in addition to supplying equip-
ment for the USSR's chemical
industry--in some instances com-
plete installations--Italy will
export 240,000 tons of steel
pipe, "no less than" eight 35,-
000-ton oil tankers, synthetic
rubber, rolled steel, machinery,
and other goods. Soviet de-
liveries apparently will be
limited to oil, coal, ores, pig
iron, wheat, and lumber. The
USSR has been guaranteed a market
for 14 percent of Italy's annual
oil imports through 1965, Thus,
Moscow is scheduled to supply an
average of over 4,000,000 tons
of POL a year.
The new agreement includes
the commodities covered by the
$200,000,000 special barter ar-
rangement signed in Moscow last
fall by Enrico Mattei, head of
the Italian state fuels agency.
In return for 12,000,000 tons
of Soviet :crude and fuel oil
between 1960 and 1965, Mattei
agreed to deliver steel pipeline
equipment and synthetic rubber
to the USSR.
Although trade with the
Soviet Union accounts for only
about 2 to 3 percent of Italy's
total, the growing unfavorable
balance of trade and some
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
unemployment in certain indus-
trial sectors presumably were
instrumental in Rome's decision
to increase its trade commit-
ments with the USSR. Soviet
readiness to purchase chemical
plant equipment, large-diameter
steel pipe, and modern tankers
from other Western industrial
countries probably was a further
stimulus.
The Italian decision to
construct tankers for the USSR
is an important gain for Moscow,
which last fall embarked on an
extensive effort to build up a
modern tanker fleet through the
acquisition of large Western
vessels. Similarly, the sup-
ply of steel pipe will aid the
USSR's program of constructing
pipelines for the transportation
of its oil to its European satel-
lites. In addition, the imports
of chemical plant equipment are
in keeping with the goals of
the Soviet Seven-Year Plan
(1959-65).
(Prepared by ORR)
The Soviet agency Novosti
(News), which was established
on 21 February, combines the
functions!of a press agency
supplementing the official wire
service TASS and an information
agency supplying materials about
the USSR for distribution abroad.
The draft charter states that
Novosti aims, "by the wide cir-
culation abroad of truthful in-
formation about the Soviet Union
and by familiarizing the Soviet
public with the life of people
abroad, to promote in every way
the strengthening of mutual un-
derstanding, trust, and friend-
ship between peoples."
Official statements have
stressed that Novosti is an
"independent information organ
of the mass public organiza-
tions of the USSR," apparently
in the hope that foreign and
domestic audiences will be more
susceptible to pronouncements
from seemingly nonofficial So-
viet sources. Four of these
so-called public organizations
--through which the regime mo-
bilizes support for-.its program
--are sponsoring the new agency:
the USSR Writers' and Journal-
ists' Unions, the Union of So-
viet Societies for Friendship
and Cultural Relations With
Foreign Countries, and the All-
Union Society for Dissemination
of Political and Scientific
Knowledge.
Novosti will open branches
in most foreign countries and
have a "wide network" of for-
eign and domestic correspon-
dents. It will conclude con-
tracts with foreign press,
radio, and television organi-
zations and private individuals
in accordance with the local
laws on distributing Soviet
materials. The branch to be
opened soon in Sweden may ke-
place the existing Soviet In-
formation Bureau and its pub-
lication News From the Soviet
Union.
The council which will
run Novosti consists of the top
officials of the four sponsoring
organizations and of prominent
writers and scientists who have
been active in promoting-Soviet
propaganda in the past. Among
the council members are Pavel
Satyukov--editor of Pravda and
president of the Journalists'
Union--and Aleksey Adzhubey--
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Izvestia editor, Khrushchev's
son-in-law, and co-author of
books propagandizing Khrushchev's
trips through America and Asia.
Appointment to the council of
an expert on underdeveloped
areas, Anushavan Arzumanyan-
who ii-in member of the presid-
ium+-of the Soviet Afro-Asian
Solidarity Committee and di-
rector of the Institute of
World Economics and Interna-
tional Relat iont+- it, one iri-
dication that such areas will
be a particular target of
Novosti.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE IraEKLY SUMMARY
SPECIAL ARTICLES
WESTERN INFLUENCE TN WORLD ORGANIZED LABOR
In the contest for influ-
ence in organized labor, the
free world's largest labor or-
ganization--the International
Confederation of Free Trade
Unions (ICFTU)--has been en-
countering substantial diffi-
culties. This is particularly
true in the underdeveloped
countries of Asia, Africa, and
Latin America, where the ICFTU
could be an influential instru-
ment for initiating some of the
important institutions of Amer-
ican and Western European soci-
ety. In these countries, how-
ever, either the concept of or-
ganized free labor is failing
to take root or emerging unions
are often on the defensive
against Communist infiltration
or government controls.
Part of the ICFTU's dif-
ficulty in meeting these chal-
lenges stems from the internal
frictions and organizational
problems which have long af-
flicted international free la-
bor. These will be principal
topics of discussion at a meet-
ing of the ICFTU's Executive
Board in Brussels on 13 March.
In addition, however, there is
the continuing difficulty of
finding meaningful applications
of Western trade unionism to
The International Confederation of Free Trade
Unions (ICCTU), by far the largest of the free labor
internationals, claims some 138 affiliated national
centers or federations representing about 57,000,000
workers in 103 countries. Next in importance are the
International Trade Secretartats (ITS), now 20 in num-
ber with a total affiliated membership of more than
30,000,000 workers. The smallest of the major inter-
nationals is the International Federation of Chris-
tian Trade Unions (IFCTU or CISC) with about 5,000,-
000 affiliated workers. Most of these are West Euro-
pean, with a scattering of membership in Latin Amer-
tea, Africa, and Asia. IFCTU headquarters is in
Brussela.
pre-industrial societies, where
the ICFTU is hampered by its
own historical development. In-
ternational cooperation among
unions goes back more than a
century, but has involved mainly
unions with similar industrial
backgrounds. Moreover, the dom-
inant elements of the ICFTU to-
day are still unions from the
highly developed economies of
the United States, Britain, and
the Western European continent.
The ICFTU is a product of
the cold war. In 1945, the
major French and British trade
unions and the American CIO
joined with the Soviet trade
unions to form the World Fed-
eration of Trade Unions (WFTU).
During its first two years, the
organization expanded rapidly in
the industrialized countries
and gained world-wide influence.
By 1948, however, Communist
manipulation had provoked a
crisis in the organization. Fi-
nally, in December 1949, the
British Trade Unions Congress
(TUC), the non-Communist unions
on the Continent, and the Amer-
ican CIO and AFL withdrew to
form the ICFTU.
The Cwrmum.ist-dominated World Federation of
Trade Unions (WFTU) claims an affiliated member-
ship of about 90,000,000 workers in more than 75
countries. About 90 percent of its members are
drawn from the state-controlled labor organisa-
tions in the Sino-Soviet bloc, but there are im-
portant free world affiliates such as the prin-
cipal national federations of France (COT), Italy
(CGIL), and Indonesia (SOBSI). .YrpeIled from
both Paris and Vienna, the WFTU presently has its
headquarters in Prague.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Of the 57,000,000 workers
which the ICFTU now claims to
represent, roughly three fourths
are still drawn from Western
Europe and the western hemi:
sphere. Its principal officers
are also Western Europeans--
President Arne Geijer of Sweden
and Secretary General Omer Becu-
of Belgium. Indigenous nation-
als predominate, however, in
the ICFTU?s four regional of-
fices--European (ERO), Asian
(ARO), Inter-American (GRIT),
and African (AFRO) In recent
years, labor leaders from de-
veloping areas have assumed a
larger role in the Brussels
secretariat.
The ICFTU is financed by
affiliation fees and by a one-
cent levy per member on affil-
iates able and willing to pay.
Since 1956; however, "project"
activities have been paid for
by voluntary contributions to
the so-called International Sol-
idarity Fund, the present goal
of which is $10,000,000 for the
period 1961-63. American un-
ions have been asked to supply
$4,000,000 of this, British
$2,500,000, West German
$2,000,000, and Swedish $1,000,-
000.
While international Com-
munism has a single labor in-
strument in addition to the
party apparatus, the ICFTU has
acquired no such monopoly in
the free world. Allied with it
in general objectives but often
competing in practice is the
International Federation of
Christian Trade Unions (IFCTU
or CISC)--like the ICFTU, an
international organization of
national labor federations.
Much more important, however,
are the International Trade
Secretariats (ITS)--the 20 in-
ternational associations of
trade unions in a given craft
or industry in different coun-
tries. They are linked with
the ICFTU vertically through
the affiliation of their constit-
uent, unions with the various
ICFTU national centers, and
laterally through ICFTU-ITS
liaison machinery.
Jurisdictional lines be-
tween the ITS and the ICFTU are
blurred, but the ITS have tra-
ditionally leaned toward prag-
matic trade unionism rather
than political causes. Accord-
ingly, they have lent as-
sistance in organizing, particu-
larly in underdeveloped coun-
tries, extended financial aid
to strikers, and promoted im-
proved labor legislation as a
practical means of protecting
international labor standards.
By comparison, the ICFTU is
less restricted in its approach
and has proclaimed as its aim
"a free society based on free
labor." Thus, during the past
ten years, the ICFTU has under-
taken propaganda campaigns
against international Commu-
nism in general; has protested
against the Franco and Salazar
dictatorships, Castro, and French
colonial policies in Algeria;
and has lobbied against govern-
ment restrictions on or inter-
vention with the collective bar-
gaining rights of labor in such
countries as Japan and Greece.
However, on the practical
side, the ICFTU has also at-
tempted to represent labor in
international organizations,
such as the UN and OEEC, con-
ducted training courses for
budding union leaders, and voted
funds to support the Poznan
strikers and the Hungarian reb-
els.
ICFTU Problems
The extent of the ICFTU's
interests is frequently at the
root of the charge that it is
relatively ineffectual. Add-
ing to the impression of in-
effectiveness, however, have
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY S RY
been the chronic frictions which
have historically afflicted the
cooperative efforts of free la-
bor.
Originating in the conflict-
ing national, political, and
economic interests, and in doc-
trinal differences, these fric-
tions seem so deep-seated as to
cast doubt at times on the basic
assumption of the international
labor movement--the community of
workers' interests. Such con-
flicts have aborted the numer-
ous efforts of recent years to
amalgamate the ICFTU and the
International Federation of
Christian Trade Unions, are re-
sponsible for the uneasy work-
ing relationship between the
ICFTU and the ITS, and are re-
lated to the continuing organ-
izational problems of the ICFTU
itself.
AFL-CIO leaders have fre-
quently charged the ICFTU with
being the preserve of bureaucrats
oriented toward European inter-
ests and ineffective in dealing
with the practical problems of
trade unionism. These European
leaders have in turn resented
what they consider attempted
domination by the Americans,
who are comparative newcomers to
the international labor scene.
While the AFL in particular has
criticized an alleged "Social-
ist orientation" of the Euro-
peans, the latter are skeptical
of the "excessive preoccupation"
with anti-Communism on the part
of the AFL. Asian, African, and
Latin American affiliates have
charged both sides with inatten-
tion to non-Western problems
and mentalities.
As a result of such dif-
ferences, a number of the na-
tional federations have often
sponsored foreign promotionalac-
tivities without 'reference to the
ICFTU. In Africa, for example,
the operations of the AFL-CIO
and the British TUC have been
frequently uncoordinated, com-
petitive, and even recrimina-
tory.
The AFL-CIO has accused
the TUC, with its program of
"grass-roots gradualism," of
restraining the development of
unions which support national-
ist independence movements. The
TUC has charged the AFL-CIO of
indiscriminate anticolonialism,
of discouraging sound trade
union development, and of "buy-
ing" and corrupting trade union
leaders. Often public knowledge,
these accusations have natural-
ly been utilized by the USSR
and by neutralist-inclined Af-
ricans to discredit the ICFTU
as an "instrument of Western
imperialism."
In large degree, these
cross-currents were the source
of the bitter struggle last
summer which resulted in the
forced retirement of former
ICFTU Secretary General Olden-
broek, his replacement by
Becu, and the agreement to
reorganize the ICFTU headquar-
ters. This reorganization
has yet to be fully effected.
However, it is to be discussed
again at the 13 March ICFTU
Executive Board meeting, and
the effectiveness of the ICFTU
as an instrument of free world
labor solidarity may hinge on
the meeting's outcome.
Asia and Latin America
The lack of unity and pur-
pose has had especially deplor-
able consequences in those
areas where industrialization
is just beginning. Despite
such achievements as the es-
tablishment of the Asian trade
union college in Calcutta, the
ICTFU and free labor as a
whole have both lost ground
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in non-Communist Asia in the
past few years. In areas where
a market economy does not yet
exist, unions are extremely
weak; in Japan, India, and the
Philippines, there is serious
division in the ranks of free
labor; in Indonesia and Japan,
there are strong pro-Communist
or neutralist unions; and in
Pakistan and Indonesia, govern-
ment restriction or manipula-
tion of labor organizations is
a growing threat.
ICFTU leaders themselves
have recognized their problems,
as evidenced by the remarks of
Geijer and Becu when they at-
tended the ICFTU-ARO Fifth
Asian Regional Conference in
Manila last fall. Becu bluntly
declared that free trade union-
ism has failed to keep pace
with Asian industrialization
and population growth, that
union membership has failed to
increase, and that affiliated
unions have accomplished little
by way of concrete benefits for
their members.
Becu placed much of the
blame for this on the affiliated
unions, but ARO has been poorly
organized to give them help.
Like the parent ICFTU, ARO has
been troubled by petty internal
frictions, and only recently has
it moved to eliminate bureau-
cratic deadwood.
In Latin America, the sit-
uation of the ICFTU and its re-
gional organization, ORIT, is
comparably complicated, and the
outlook in a number of areas for
free trade unionism also bleak.
Established in January 1951,
ORIT is historically the suc-
cessor to the AFL-sponsored
Pan-American Federation of La-
bor, and AFL influence in ORIT
has been correspondingly large.
About 75 percent of ORIT's
worker membership and a great
portion of its funds come from
its US and Canadian affiliates,
while most of its expenditures
are in Latin America.
Immediately following its
foundation, ORIT-ICFTU concen-
trated on informational and
educational activities, in which
fields it has had some success.
More recently, it has undertaken
more direct assistance to the
local labor movements, and since
1957--in conjunction with the
ITS--has turned more toward or-
ganizational programs. These
efforts are still on a small
scale--as of mid-1960, ORIT had
in its direct employ five pro-
fessional organizers.
Even these limited opera-
tions have been handicapped by
conflicts and differences among
the ICFTU, ORIT, and the AFL-
CIO. Always claiming a high de-
gree of autonomy, ORIT has
strongly resisted "intervention"
by the Brussels secretariat, and
has charged that bypassing on
the part of the ICFTU-,and ITS
has hurt ORIT's prestige with
its affiliated national centers.
ICFTU leaden s have 'responded--to
these charges by claiming':
ORIT is a "declining influence"
in Latin America, in part be-
cause it is widely regarded
there-as a creature of the
AFL-CIO--an allegation exploit-
ed by the "Communists?Peronistas,
and the International Federa-
tion of Christian Trade Unions."
Domination of ORIT by la-
bor leaders in the United States
and the organization's allegedly
benign attitude toward dictators
were the burden of Castro's com-
plaints in taking the Cuban trade
unions out of ORIT in November
1959. The same pretexts have
been used for the efforts of the
Communist-dominated and most im-
portant labor confederation of
Chile to attempt to launch a
single, unified hemisphere la-
bor organization unaffiliated
with either' the ICFTU or
WFTU.
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These proposals for a
"neutralist" organization of
Latin American labor have con-
cerned ICFTU leaders almost as
much as Communist infiltration
efforts. President Geijer in
a recent article speculated on
the potential danger that unions
outside the ICFTU, together with
pro-Castro organizers and the
"Peronist/Fascist movement,"
might be able to make common
cause with the Communists on
an anti-American platform.
Africa
Serious as these problems
may be, however, many trade
union leaders have recently
come to regard Africa as their
foremost challenge--where, until
1957, the ICFTU was largely in-
active and where, since then,
its internal conflicts have be-
come most evident.
For the past several years,
control of the emerging African
trade unions--closely allied
with nationalist and independ-
ence movements--has been a con-
test ostensibly among the ICFTU,
the CISC, the WFTU, and a group
of neutralist unions. This
four-way struggle is more ap-
parent than real, however, since
the CISC--representing some
240,000 workers in French-speak-
ing Africa--shares the general
objectives of the ICFTU,and
the two are moving toward a
more cooperative approach.
Moreover, while the neutral-
ists, following the lead of
the Ghanaian and Guinean unions,
nominally oppose ties with
either East or West, they have
been tactically allied with
the Communists in opposing the
ICFTU.
International Communist
labor's entry into Africa dates
from 1945, when unions within
Britain and in metropolitan
France were still affiliated
with the WFTU. Although those
indirect ties between WFTU and
the African unions were broken
in 1949, WFTU continued to op-
erate within the various unions
and gained great good will by
supporting national and anti-
colonialist union leaders.
During the past year, WFTU and
the bloc have sharply stepped
up their work among African
trade union leaders and, in
the opinion of the AFL-CIO's
Irving Brown, have also made
noticeable progress at the grass-
roots level.
Despite the WFTU foothold,
the ICFTU has moved slowly and
ponderously to strengthen its
African organization. Its first
African regional conference was
not held until January 1957,
and while it was agreed to es-
tablish three area offices as
the basis for an African re-
gional office (AFRO), only one
of these was operative as late
as March 1960--and that largely
due to the efforts of Tom Mboya
of Kenya. At the second ICFTU
regional conference in Lagos
in November 1959, AFRO's con-
stitution was drawn up and a
preparatory committee established.
Nevertheless, not until the third
regional conference in Tunis
last November was the constitu-
tion finally ratified and the
initial appointments made.
The establishment of AFRO
was opposed at every step by
the militant neutralists, in-
spired initially by the UAR-
sponsored Afro-Asian People's
Solidarity Conference of late
December 1957 and early Janu-
ary 1958, and by the subsequent
All-African People's Conference.
Leadership of the neutralist
movement has passed successively
from the largely Egyptian Inter-
national Confederation of Arab
Trade Unions to Sekou Toure's
UGTAN, based in Conakry, and then
to Nkrumah's Ghanaian Trade
Union Congress.
With the general line
that the African unions should
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sever ties with both the ICFTU
and the Y!'FTU, the neutralists
have held rival conferences
and propagandized against the
ICFTU as a mere tool of London
and Washington. At the same
time, the neutralists have ac-
cepted informal support and fi-
nancial assistance from WFTU
which, for example, is appar-
ently underwriting Toure's new
"African Workers' University"
in Conakry.
While the neutralists thus
far have failed to organize
their All-African Trade Union
Federation (a constituent con-
ference is now scheduled for 8
ray) and there are signs of
disunity in the neutralist camp,
the ICFTU's task in Africa is
nonetheless a difficult one.
There have been similar signs
of competition and disunity
within AFRO, and strenuous ef-
forts are being made to dis-
credit pro-ICFTU leaders like
Mboya--who, under the pressure,
has seemed lately to take a
more equivocal stand. More-
over, AFRO seems likely to be
judged both by what it can
contribute in concrete support
to its affiliated unions and
by the recognition it can give
to the emotional appeal of
pan-Africanism. It is ques-
tionable whether it can give
this recognition effectively,
in view of the long- ring
divisions in the ICFTU itself
over colonial issues.
That the ICFTU encounters
these manifold problems is in-
dicative in one sense of the
significance of its operations
and the importance of its oc-
casional successes. As a pri-
vate organization conducting a
world-wide operation, it is
unique, and to its credit it
has given practical assistance,
training, assistance, and coun-
sel to its affiliates. It has
also reflected the aspirations
of underdeveloped countries for
economic advancement and polit-
ical independence.
In important respects,
moreover, the problems of the
international free trade union
movement--particularly in the
world's developing areas--are
a reflection of the problems
of the free world itself--in-
eluding the burden of the
colonial past and the strength
of the Communist competition.
The problem of "nonappli-
cability" of free trade union-
ism to situations where mass
poverty ij the rule and a mar-
ket economy does not yet exist
is also a problem shared by
other Western institutions.
Finally, while union interna-
tionals have an important role
to play in creating a climate
in which unions can thrive,
they are limited in the extent
to which they can associate
themselves with governmental
programs to achieve this--if
they are to remain "free" and
are to preserve their right to
oppose the W"'FTU on grounds it
is government controlled.
Many observers would none-
theless conclude that the in-
ternational free trade union
movement has aggravated its own
problems. It has tolerated in-
efficient and frequently divided
bureaucracy; national rivalries
have been magnified rather than
moderated; petty personality
conflicts have become major
disputes; and even the richest
of affiliates have seemed nig-
gardly in their contributions
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The UN General Assembly
resumes its 15th session on 7
March beset by political crises
and financial difficulties
which some members believe en-
danger the organization's exist-
ence. The 99-member assembly
now is dominated by groups of
neutralist, underdeveloped, and
politically immature states
whose control of votes far ex-
ceeds their capability or will-
ingness to implement the very
peace and security operations
they demand of the United Na-
tions.
UN financial resources are
strained by the costs of spe-
cial operations such as those
in Palestine and the Congo. The
regular UN budget, together
with the special operations,
will total more than $200,000,-
000 in 1961. The UN comptroller
estimates that as of 31 March
the UN will need an additional
$10,000,000 in cash to make
necessary minimum disbursements.
Many UN members are in ar-
rears on their regular assess-
ments, and seven--Bolivia, Na-
tionalist China, Ethiopia,
Honduras, Hungary, Paraguay,
and the UAR--may lose their
right to vote at the resumed
session because the amount each
owes exceeds assessments for
two full years. Other states--
including France and those of
the Soviet bloc--have refused
to pay their assessed share of
the special operations.
and six European satellite
leaders, attended the first
half of the 15th General As-
sembly. This pressure led to
a protracted general debate--
a period at the opening of the
assembly when chiefs of delega-
tions present policy statements
for their governments. This
prevented the assembly from
getting down to regular business
until late in the session. More-
over, many members temporized
because of the impending US
elections. As a result, only
a few items were disposed of
by 21 December, when the ses-
sion recessed.
The 17 new members, all
former dependent territories,
swelled the ranks of the Afro-
Asian bloc and resulted in a
voting imbalance that put the
Western states on the defen-
sive. The most significant in-
stance was the assembly's en-
dorsement on 28 October of an
anticolonialist declaration by
a vote of 89 for, none against,
and nine abstentions--by Aus-
tralia, Belgium, the Dominican
Republic, France, Portugal,
Spain, South Africa, Britain,
and the United States. Ambas-
sador Stevenson reported on 11
February that recent conversa-
tions at UN headquarters showed
that US influence and prestige,
especially among Asian and Afri-
can members, were severely damaged
by a series of votes during the
first half of the session which
seemingly put the United States
in the colonialist camp.
More than 20 heads of gov-
ernment, including Khrushchev
The 15th assembly has also
recognized the right of the Al-
gerian people to self-determina-
tion and independence, called
for negotiations between Italy
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
and Austria over the South Ti-
rol, and elected three new mem-
bers to the Security Council.
The assembly's economic and so-
cial committees completed their
work, while the legal and budge-
tary committees have only a few
items left. Items left over for
the resumed session are primar-
ily political in character, with
anticolonial and East-West issues
predominating.
There is growing specula-
tion among UN members that such
contentious issues as disarma-
ment, Hungary, and Tibet might
be postponed until the regular
16th session. Members argue
that such action would shorten
the 15th session and, by avoid-
ing debate on cold-war items,
also contribute to a favorable
climate for any US-Soviet meet-
ing. However, Khrushchev's re-
cent letter to Nehru indicates
Moscow intends to continue to
attack Hammarskjold and the com-
position of the UN Secretariat.
Africa
Although the situation in
the Congo has been heatedly de-
bated, no resolution has been
passed and the issue was left
in abeyance when the current
session recessed. The delega-
tion of President Kasavubu,how-
ever,was seated in early Decem-
ber. The Security Council on
21 February issued a strong man-
date for the UN operation in
the Congo. Should the council
not be able to carry this out
effectively, the assembly would
almost certainly take up the
issue at once. UN operations
in the Congo also will affect
debate on other African and
"colonial" issues.
On 20 December 1960 the
General Assembly established
a three-member commission to
go to Ruanda-Urundi--a UN
trust territory administered
by Belgium--to observe condi-
tions in the territory and
assess prospects for independ-
ence. To this end elections
there were postponed by Bel-
g Mum at the urging of its
allies and the United Nations.
Comments by a member of the
commission indicate that its
report to the General Assem-
bly will be critical of
Belgian administration.
In the plebiscite in the
trust territory of British
Cameroons on 11 and 12 Febru-
ary, Northern Cameroons voted
to become part of Nigeria and
Southern Cameroons chose to
join the Republic of Cameroun,
formerly under French adminis-
tration. 'there probably will
be a heated debate when the UN
plebiscite commissioner makes
his report to the General As-
sembly; Cameroun has lodged a
vehement protest with the
United Nations against the
manner in which British author-
ities organized the plebiscite
in the north, and Foreign
Minister Okala intends to
raise the issue at the resumed
session. .
Two items involving the
Union of South Africa and its
racial policies will give the
anticolonialists a field day.
Discussion of apartheid and
the treatment of Indians in
South Africa may well be vitri-
olic and lead South Africa to
withdraw from this session, if
not from the UN.
Just before the 15th ses-
sion recessed, 11 African states
submitted a resolution calling
for General Assembly endorse-
ment of Mauritania's application
for admission to the UN. The
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
application--strongly opposed
by Morocco, which claims the
territory--was vetoed by the
USSR by linking the admission
of Mongolia with Mauritania.
Discussion of the issue could
lead to strong pressures on
the United states to concur in
the admission of Mongolia and
to exert influence on Nation-
alist China to forego its veto
of Mongolia--a territory Taipei
considers part of China.
Middle East
During the resumed session,
the secretary general will make
his fourth annual report on the
UN Emergency Force (UNEF) in
Palestine. Proposals to dis-
band UNEF or reduce its size
are likely to be raised, par-
ticularly in view of the UN's
budgetary problems. Removal of
the force could lead to re-
newed fighting between the UAR
and Israel. The Soviet bloc
and the countries in the Middle
East which benefit from the
presence of the force have re-
fused to pay their assessed
share of the costs.
Discussion of the report
of the UN Relief and Works
Agency (UNRWA) for Palestine
refugees invariably turns into
an Arab-Israeli debate on the
Palestine problem as a whole.
During the first part of the
session the Arabs insisted on
a resolution calling for a
change in the composition of
the Palestine Conciliation
Commission and for the appoint-
ment of an administrator for
refugee property in Israel, No
agreement was reached with the
Arabs, who will continue to
press Western UN members for
what they call a less pro-
Israeli policy. Arab feeling
is running high on this issue.
Arab members have raised
the question of independence
for Oman, a major interior
area in the British-protected
Sultanate of Muscat. Britain
would prefer that the item not
be discussed, but the Arab
League at a 4 February meeting
announced that the question
would be pursued vigorously.
For the tenth consecutive
year, the General Assembly will
discuss the Korean question.
The new government in Seoul is
committed to the past policy of
reunification of Korea through
"genuinely free elections un-
der UN supervision." However,
renewed public interest in re-
unification following the April
revolution has increased sup-
port in South Korea for limited
contacts with North Korea. Such
public speculation has led
many neutrals to seek ways of
getting the UN to establish
these contacts and may lead to
determined efforts to invite
North Koreans to the debate as
a first step.
The difficulty of keeping
the Tibetan issue alive in the
UN stems from the fact that
discussion must be confined to
Chinese Communist violation of
human rights. Going beyond
this aspect of the problem would
raise juridical and political
questions that would lessen sup-
port'for Tibet's complaint and
might prevent any action at all
by the assembly. The Dalai Lama,
however, would like to have the
UN affirm the self-determination
of the Tibetan people and even ap-
point an investigating committee.
Although the assembly de-
cided in October to shelve the
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
question of Chinese UN repre-
sentation for the duration of
the session, it did so by the
slimmest margin since 1951.
Peiping's supporters may there-
fore attempt to reopen the is-
sue. Nationalist China, more-
over, may lost its right to
vote unless it makes a payment
of more than $1,000,000 toward
its overdue assessments before
the session resumes. The UN
Charter provides that the Gen-
eral Assembly may permit a de-
faulting member to vote only
if failure to pay is due to
"conditions beyond the control
of the member."
Taipei will almost cer-
tainly lose its seat on the UN
Economic and Social Council
(ECOSOC) , although the five
permanent members of the Secu-
rity Council have traditionally
been re-elected when their
three-year terms expire. Thir-
teen ballots failed to break
the deadlock between the lead-
ing candidates, India and Bel-
gium, for the remaining vacant
seat; the issue therefore was
postponed until the resumed
session. Nationalist China
polled only eight votes on the
last ballot thrown open to ad-
ditional contenders.
Nine disarmament resolu-
tions remain on the table for
the resumed session, although
three relatively noncontentious
resolutions were adopted in the
first session (two calling for
cessation of nuclear tests and
one directed against dissemina-
tion of nuclear weapons).. The
establishment of a substitute
for the ten-nation Disarmament
Committee, which the Soviet bloc
denounced after walking out of
the Geneva negotiations last
June, is one of the major prob-
lems to be solved before
negotiations can be resumed. On
the broader question of formulat-
ing directives for the new fo-
rum,the Soviet Union will prob-
ably press for the adoption of
the "compromise" Indian resolu-
tion,which endorses the Soviet
proposal for a single treaty
calling for "general and com-
plete" disarmament.
It is also possible that
the USSR will renew its call
for a special session of the
General Assembly to be attended
by the heads of government to
discuss disarmament.
The UN special represent-
ative on Hungary, Sir Leslie
Munro, has submitted his report
to the General Assembly, and it
should provide the basis for
discussion of the Hungarian
question. However, the admis-
sion of new members to the UN
with no great interest in this
problem and the increasing tend-
ency of many other members to
attach little if any importance
to the issue has eroded support
for the West's position. In
addition, Hammarskjold believes
that "we have nothing to gain
from debating Hungary" and that
to help the Hungarian people we
should "switch off the light."
Support is also dwindling
on the question of the creden-
tials of the Hungarian UN del-
egation- It has been seated
only provisionally each year
since
1956,
but
this
does
not
affect
vote.
the
right
to
speak
and
The Soviet complaint on
alleged US aggressive inten-
tions-,-an aftermath of the U-2
and RB-47 incidents--has been
dropped. Also remaining is the
Cuban complaint about US inten-
tions to attack the island.
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