CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A003100010001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 38
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 17, 2006
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 27, 1999
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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CONFIDENTIAL
CURRENT
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY
SUMMARY
COPY NO. 7
OCI NO. 0266/61
9 February 1961
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE DOCUMENT NO.
NO-CHANGE IN CLASS. 0
El DECLASSIFIED 25X1
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S 25X1
NEXT REVIEW DATE:
AUTH: HR 70-2
DATE: REVIEWER:
State Dept. review completed
ANT;AJV25X1
TE 1Q351
Y AFR
- , B0
'7oB
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THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECT-
ING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES
WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS,
TITLE 18, USC, SECTIONS 793 AND 794, THE TRANSMIS-
SION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO
AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.
The Current Intelligence Weekly Summary has been prepared
primarily for the internal use of the Central Intelligence
Agency. It does not represent a complete coverage of all
current situations. Comments and conclusions represent the
immediate appraisal of the Office of Current Intelligence.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
9 February 1961
OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST
LAOS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 1
With the occupation of the strategic junction of
Phou Khoun, government forces are planning a move eastward
on he~~ettrong,Y,...de:ffended.,aKon'g=,Le : Pathet Iaao-:.bas's-xarea.L',,
of the Plaine des Jarres; the forces committed to this
movement, however, are believed inadequate. Probing
action has already met strong resistance.
The Chinese Nationalist irregulars who retreated
into northwestern Laos from Burma are not now near any
significant Pathet Lao concentration,
Recent aerial reconnaissance indicates that Route
7 is open to truck traffic from North Vietnam as far
as Ban Ban, some 40 miles inside Laos. Bloc airlift
operations also continued throughout the week to sup-
ply the Kong Le - Pathet Lao forces.
Moscow still has not responded to the British com-
promise proposal on 21 January for the return of the
International Control Commission.
. . . . . . . . Page 4
Mobutu, despite logistics problems and the question-
able reliability of his troops, has begun to implement
plans to retake Stanleyville. His river blockade of
Stanleyville has been effective. The UAR and the bloc
are still unable to send supplies for Gizenga across
the Sudan. Meanwhile, Kasavubu has announced formation
of a new Ileo government to replace Mobutu's commissioners.
However, in view of the absence of representatives from
the Katanga and Stanleyville regimes, it is unlikely to
gain much wider- abheprtanby:.-.that athd K savxabu Mobbtu .
Adminrietratlon4 .
SOVIET PRESS COMMENTARY ON US POLICY . . . . . . . . . . . Page 7
Moscow's first press criticism of the US administra-
tion appeared in Izvestia and Pravda articles of 4 and 5
February. Having permitted publication of the full text
of the President's State of the Union message, the Soviet
leaders probably felt those passages dealing with the
bloc and specific East-West issues called for a response.
First Deputy Premier Kosygin has indicated that Khru-
shchev will return to New York for the UN General Assem-
bly session, which resumes on 7 March.
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9 February 1961
PART I (continued)
CUBA AND THE CARIBBEAN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 9
The Cuban Government continues to be troubled by guer-
rilla activities in the sierra Escambray area, and is now
indicating some concern over the opposition efforts of
Catholic and private school students. Castro's seizure
of the company supplying water to the Guantanamo Naval
Base does not increase the regime's capability to cut
off the water supply or otherwise harass the base. How-
ever, it does enable the Cuban Government to raise water
rates in an effort to obtain additional needed dollars.
The Trujillo dictatorship's economic difficulties
have intensified, and in Haiti the threat of public dis-
orders is increasing. The new civil-military leadership
in El Salvador has succeeded in -curbing leftist elements.
NOTES AND COMMENTS
SOVIET PARTY LEADER DEMOTED . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 1
The appointment of Soviet presidium member Averky
Aristov as ambassador to Poland is considered the
result of political maneuvering among Khrushchev's
lieutenants. Aristov has been relieved of his position
as Khrushchev's deputy on the central committee's bureau
for the RSFSR (Russian Republic), and his formal removal
from the presidium is probably only a matter of time.
Party ziecretary Frol Kozlov and RSFSSR Premier Dmitry
Polyarsky stand to benefit most from. Arisr.ov's reverses. 25X1
SINO-6OVIET RELATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 2
In contrast to the differences expressed openly by the
Soviet Union and China in the period before the Moscow
conference of Communist leaders in November, the two
countries now present an air of cooperation and agreement.
Despite the present stress on the importance of aino-
Soviet solidarity and the attempts to play down differencesy
however, basic disagreements are still indirectly ex-
pressed in commentary from Moscow and Peiping. Should
either party overstep the established limits for debate
and policy, the dispute will almost certainly be renewed
openly.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
9 February 1961
PART II (continued)
PEIPING MOVES TO ALLEVIATE DISCONTENT . . . . . . . . . . Page 4
Food shortages and public discontent have forced
Peiping to make some concessions to the workers and
peasants. These include provision of greater material
incentives, toleration of black markets, and permission
for peasants to cultivate their own gardens. In addi-
tion, negotiations have now been completed for the pur-
chase of about 2,400,000 tons of food grains outside the
bloc. Peiping is concerned about the impression created
abroad by accounts of Chinese food shortages.
NORTH KOREA HALTS REPATRIATION OF KOREANS FROM JAPAN . . . Page 5
Pyongyang has suspended indefinitely the program
under which nearly 55,000 of the 600,000 Koreans living
in Japan have been repatriated to North Korea since
December 1959. Although concern over an influenza epi-
demic in Japan was used as a pretext, it appears that
the reason is the embarrassment caused the Communists
by a sharp drop in applications for repatriation. The
North Koreans, however, are still hopeful that the issue
will afford opportunities for irritating relations
between Tokyo and Seoul, and they probably will resume
the program later this year as a backlog of applica-
tions builds up. 25X1
SOVIET-JAPANESE FISHERY NEGOTIATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . Page 6
The annual talks between the USSR and Japan over
fishing rights in the northwest Pacific began on 4
February. Discussions between Soviet and Japanese offi-
cials preceding the formal negotiations suggest that the
USSR will continue to insist, as it has for several years,
that the Japanese salmon catch be further reduced. Moscow
will probably argue strongly that, in the interest of
salmon conservation, there must be a southward expansion
of the zone off the Kamchatka Peninsula and Kuril Islands
in which Japanese fishing is restricted. 25X1
INDIAN THIRD FIVE-YEAR PLAN TO BE EXPANDED . . . . . . . . Page 7
Revisions in India's Third Five-Year Plan, which will
go into effect on 1 April, will increase the requirement
for foreign loans or grants to at least $5.8 billion.
Less than 25 percent of this amount has yet been assured.
Proposed outlay has been raised to $24.15 billion, largely
as a result of pressures on Nehru and other cabinet members
from political leaders in the Indian states. Although
the plan is more ambitious than ever, Indian leaders,
mindful of next year's general elections, believe it
must be "bold and big" if it is to come at all close to
meeting the country's political and economic requirements.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
9 February 1961
PART II (continued)
IRANIAN ELECTIONS NEARING COMPLETION . . . . . . . . . . . Page 8
The Iranian parliamentary elections in progress since
mid-January and now nearing completion have stimulated
the strongest antiregime sentiment in recent years. The
largest demonstrations have occurred in Tehran, where
university students struggled with the police and de-
manded the overthrow of the Shah. Government-backed
candidates, including 14 "independents," are reported
to have won prearranged victories in nearly all constitu-
encies.
DISCONTENT IN ETHIOPIA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 9
The situation in Ethiopia eight weeks after the abor-
tive coup appears to be deteriorating. Haile Selassie,
preoccupied with handing out rewards and punishments,
still delays forming a new government. Widespread concern
over the fate of Menghistu Neway, the popular rebel leader
whose trial is reportedly imminent, is arousing sympathy
for the rebels. Dissident elements continue to spread
antiregime rumors and to distribute subversive leaflets,
DISSENSION IN FRENCH COMMUNIST PARTY . . . . . . . . . Page 10
Dissension has been developing within the top leader-
ship of the French Communist party (PCF). In mid-January,
accusations of rightist deviation were made against polit-
buro members Marcel Servin and Laurent Casanova. The
dispute centers primarily on their dislike of the PCF's
policy of total opposition to De Gaulle, particularly his
Algerian policy. There is support for the deviationist
views among lower echelons of the party, and Secretary
General Maurice Thorez apparently fears that strong dis- 25X1
ciplinary action would provoke extensive defections.
FINLAND AND THE OUTER SEVEN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 12
Finland&s application to participate in the European
Free Trade Association (EFTA or Outer Seven) will be a
major issue before the EFTA council at the meeting which
opens on 14 February. Although EFTA's members generally
accept the political importance of linking Finland more
closely to the West, they remain concerned over the impli-
cations of President Kekkonen's agreement last November to
extend equivalent tariff advantages to the USSR. There
is little likelihood'. that Kekkonen could renegotiate
his agreement with Moscow even if he were persuaded to try.
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CURRENT IN1`ELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
9 February 1961
PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES
"GUIDED DEMOCRACY"AND THE INDONESIAN COMMUNIST PARTY . . . Page 1
President aukarno of Indonesia in 1957 rejected .
parliamentary government as incapable of solving Indonesia's
problems. h3ince then he has controlled affairs under the
slogan of "guided democracy." He draws his principal
support from two sources, each in conflict with the other--
the Communist party and the anti-Communist army. He main-
tains his position by balancing these groups while relying
upon his great popularity with the mass of people. The
Communists have been given only advisory posts at the
national government level. Despite some discontent among
the Communists over cooperation with Sukarno, they have
benefited by supporting him; and since his foreign policy
does not conflict with wino-Soviet bloc interests, they
can be expected to continue their support.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
9 February 1961
OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST
Vientiane forces on 4 Feb-
ruary occupied the junction of
Routes 13 and 7 just north of
Phou Khoun, opening the western
approach to the enemy-held
Plaine des Jarres area. Kong
Le - Pathet Lao troops, after
several days of delaying action,
apparently offered little re-
sistance to the final move on
the crossroads. Artillery fire
probably was the government's
major asset in retaking this
important position.
Nearly half the force which
occupied the Phou Khoun junc-
tion is to be left behind to
guard against enemy counterat
tacks.
leven
the entire force would be bare-
ly sufficient to capture the
Plaine des Jarres.
Phoumi reportedly hopes to
retake the Plaine des Jarres
within a week, but is likely to
find it a formidable objective.
His overoptimism suggests that
he may not be prepared for any
surprise resumption of offen-
sive operations by enemy forces.
The Kong Le - Pathet Lao force
which abandoned.Muong Kassy and
Phou Khoun is believed to have
withdrawn along Route 7 virtual-
ly intact. Other forces in the
Plaine des Jarres area have had
over a month to prepare their
defenses, and their supply posi-
tion has been steadily improved
by the Soviet airlift. Route
7 between the crossroads and
the Plaine des Jarres runs
through rugged terrain highly
suitable for ambushes.
Substantial numbers of
Kong Le - Pathet Lao troops con-
tinue to block the southern ap-
proaches to the Plaine des Jarres
in the vicinity of Ban. Ta Viang,
and the government airstrip at
Tha Thom has recently been re-
ported under sporadic shelling
by 120-mm. mortars. The govern-
ment has managed to reinforce
Tha Thom, however, making its
hold on this position some-
what less tenuous than previous-
ly. Elsewhere in the country,
sporadic Pathet Lao harass-
ment of isolated government
posts continued during the
week.
In Phnom Penh, Souvanna
Phouma recently told the Brit-
ish ambassador that he hoped to
make a "brief visit" of one or
two days to Phong Saly and Xieng
Khouang to see "troops and min-
isters loyal to me." The ambas-
sador received the impression
that Souvanna was set on going
as soon as possible. Afterward
Souvanna plans to visit Saigon,
New Delhi, Cairo, Paris, London,
and Moscow but to return to
Phnom Penh "if Sihanouk permits."
The Cambodian leader reported-
ly opposes Souvanna's plans to
go to Laos. Sihanouk apparent-
ly fears this may ruin chances
for his proposed 14-nation con-
ference to deal with the Laotian
crisis.
Souvanna's recent state-
ments to the press reveal an in-
creasingly bitter attitude to-
ward the United States for al-
leged "double-dealing."
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9 February 1961
Souvanna to date has not
acknowledged the Pathet Lao
radio's claim that he had des-
ignated Khamsouk Keola as "act-
ing premier" in Xieng Khouang,
to be assisted by Quinim Phol-
sena and Tiao Sisoumang.
ouvanna s pu is references
to his "ministers" in Laos,
moreover, imply that Khamsouk
and the others are authorized
to act in his reha1f on Laotian
soil.
The Pathet Lao and the
"lawful (Souvanna) government"
have announced formation of a
"joint administrative commit-
tee" for Luang Prabang Province,
bringing to three the number of
provinces having such coalition
governments. A provincial
coalition was established in
Xieng Khouang early last month,
and a similar body was created
--on paper at least--in Pathet
Lao - controlled Sam Neua Prov-
ince last fall, before the
Souvanna government in Vien-
tiane was ousted. Phong Saly
may be the next area to re
ceive such an administration.
The Chinese Nationalist
irregulars who retreated into
northwestern Laos in the wake
of a Burmese Army offensive
late last month appear deter-
mined to settle down there.
In their present location
in Nam Tha Province, the ir-
regulars are not likely to come
into significant contact with
the Pathet Lao, who are not be-
lieved to have important strength
in the area. For the moment at
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
9 February 1961
least, Phoumi would probably not
be inclined to accept any offer
by the irregulars to'.play an ac-
tive role in the fighting. He
is doubtless not averse, how-
ever, to permitting them to
stay where they are for future
use. Quoting Hong Kong news-
papers and Western press agen-
cies, Peiping has broadcast re-
ports of the irregulars' pres-
ence in Laos.
The Boun Oum government
capped a six-week anti-French
campaign on 5 February by
"symbolically" taking over
Seno base in southern Laos.
The 300 French military per-
sonnel at Seno, apparently on
instructions from Paris, of-
fered no resistance. However?,
the French have reserved their
position on Seno, claiming that
the Geneva agreements of 1954
gave them control of the base;
they show no sign of being pre-
pared to withdraw. Protracted
and possibly acrimonious nego-
tiations will be required be-
fore the status of Seno is clari-
fied. In the meantime, feeling
between the Laotians and'.the
local French is running big'-,.
The bloc still shows lit-
tle disposition to negotiate
a prompt end to the civil war.
Moscow continues to delay its
reply to Britain's 21 January
proposal that reactivation of
the International Control Com-
mission (ICC) be discussed with
the King of Laos; Peiping, pub-
licizing speeches made at a 2
February rally, is on public
record opposing any compromise
with Western formulas,
The Peiping rally was small
by Chinese standards--attend-
ance was "over 1,000"--but it
gave Foreign Minister Chen Yi
a forum to restate his govern-
ment's position on Laos. This
position has shifted somewhat
since late December, when Pei-
ping, like Moscow and Hanoi,
called for immediate reactiva-
tion of the ICC. Now Chen Yi
states that, "in view of the
changed situation in Laos,"
even to reactivate the ICC, it
would be necessary first to con-
vene an "enlarged" Geneva con-
ference. There is no change,
however, in the Chinese posi-
tion that regardless of what
action is taken to solve the
Laotian crisis, it must be
taken "only by contacting and
cooperating with the lawful
government headed by Prince
Souvanna."
In his rally speech, Chen
Yi also drew attention to So-
viet support for pro-Communist
forces in Laos--support he de-
scribed as a "'righteous action."
Chen Yi did not say how this
support was being delivered--
the USSR does not admit it is
operating an airlift--and his
remarks may have been in-
tended to justify his own
offer of support if re-
quested by the "lawful gov-
ernment." Soviet assist-
ance was mentioned again
by Hanoi in a 7 February
broadcast of a recent inter-
view with Kong Le, who ex-
pressed his thanks for as-
sistance given by "the So-
viet Union and other social-
ist countries."
Airlift operations into
Laos continued throughout the
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
9 February 1961
week. The Plaine des Jarres
area apparently now is being
25X1 supplied overland via Route 7.
Aerial reconnaissance
25X1 ___indicates that the,
road is open to truck traffic
between the North Vietnamese
border and Ban Ban, some 40
miles inside Laos. There are
reports that as many as 75
trucks are carrying'supplies
from North Vietnam to the
Pathet Lao over this route.
While this road could be-
come an important Communist sup-
ply route, a major effort would
be required to keep it passable
during the rainy: season, which
will begin in about two months.
The Pathet Lao now have
Soviet 85-mm. field guns in
addit onto 105-mm. howitzers
emy soldiers who surrendered
in the Phou Khoun area reported
that there .were two 105-mm.
howitzers and two 120-mm.
mortars there and that two
Pathet Lao platoons at Ban
Na Nan were equipped with
four 85-mm, artillery nieces
of Czech manufacture.
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CONGO
Mobutu has begun a two-
pronged offensive against the
Gizenga regime in Stanleyville.
A northern movement is to take
off from Bumba in Equateur
Province and proceed to Stan-
leyville via Buta. Preparations
were noted on 7 February at Leo-
poldville when more than 50
trucks--some containing ammuni-
tion--were loaded on barges in
areas sealed off to nonofficial
traffic. Some 290 troops, rein-
forcements. for forces already
at Bumba, were scheduled to
leave by river late on 7 Feb-
ruary, while an additional 185
troops, 34 trucks, and at
least four antiaircraft guns
are being shipped to Lisala.
Mobutu has left for Bumba and
If plans to be away from Leopold-
ville for about two weeks.
The other movement will
use 300 troops which reportedly
left on 7 February for Lulua-
bourg; from there, they are to
advance to Stanleyville through
Lodja and Ikela. Mobutu, how-
ever, faces serious logistic
problems, and the reliability
of his troops is questionable,
particularly in connection with
the Luluabourg. route.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUi?.ARy
9 February 1961
Meanwhile, in Leopoldville
President Kasavubu on 9 Feb-
ruary announced the formation
of a new government to replace
Mobutu's.commissioners. The
Republic of the
Kibwe, the deputy pre-
mier of Katanga, in-
crease their influence.
The ability of
the Stanleyville re-
gime to oppose Mobutu's
military activities
may be reduced as a
result of his river
blockade and the re-
sultant acute gasoline
shortage. Mobutu as-
serts that disaffec-
tion already ex
lots : athong .Gl-
zenga's troops in.
eastern Kivu Prov-
inca. Gizenga
has been. unable. to
.market the cot-
ton and palm oil
crops of his area.
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premier-designate is Joseph
Ileo,who was appointed in a'
similar capacity last summer
to replace Lumurnba. Ileo's
-cabinet has many holdovers from
previous governments but fails
to include any representatives-
of the Katanga or Stanleyville
regimes. It is not likely,
therefore,to gain any greater
acceptance by the neutralist.
and Communist nations than the
Kasavubu-Mobutu administration.
Furthermore, Kasavubu's action
may cause a split'with Mobutu,
whose attitude toward the new
cabinet is unknown.
In. addition, the coopera-
tion of Katanga Province with
the Leopoldville regime may be-
come more difficult in the fu-
ture if rabid seces-
C o 'n go sionists like Jean
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
9 February 1961
So far Gizenga has re-
ceived no significant assist-
ance because of the Sudan's re-
fusal to allow the UAR and the
bloc to send supplies across
its territory. On 7 February
the Sudan warned that it would
not permit any overflight, even
a Red Cross mission, not sanc-
tioned by the UN.
Gizenga's adherents prob-
ably stand to gain some equip-
ment left by the UAR battalion
in Equateur Province when it
was withdrawn from the Congo
in early February, The UAR
battalion reportedly took out
some 7 tons of equipment less
than was shipped in.
At the United Nations there
has been a widely favorable re-
sponse to Hammaskjold's pro-
posals, which include the neu-
tralization of Congolese fac-
tions. Most Afro-Asian nations
believe his ideas are a "step
in the right direction," but
they generally stress the need
for the early release of Lu-
mumba. Nigeria would make the
UN responsible for law and order
and permit the release of all
political prisoners. In addi-
tion, the Nigerians emphasize
the-urgency of recalling par-
liament prior to the formation
of a new, broadly based federal
government.
In private conversations
Soviet representative Zorin
has expressed doubts that Hammar-
skjold's proposals would work
and insisted that Lumumba's
immediate release and the with-
drawal of all Belgians from
the Congo were prerequisites
for any solution of the Congo
situation. Britain, France,
and Belgium have reservations
over the new proposals because
of concern that Kasavubu's
position may be undermined.
Brussels and Paris appear
to be getting more deeply in-
volved in the internal Congo
situation. Paris did not pre-
vent French Colonel Trinquier
from accepting an appointment
as head of the Katangan armed
forces, requiring only that he
first retire from the French
Army.
Subsequently French offi-
cials have indicated that Paris
opposes service by Frenchmen in
Katangan forces and pointed to
a recent amendment of the na-
tionality code allowing depriva-
tion of French citizenship for
serving in foreign armies. Of-
ficials said that the government
was also opposed to the recruit-
ment activities of Katangan
agents in France but made no
mention of any plans to curb
them.
Meanwhile, Trinquier's re-
marks in a 4 February press
conference that it is impossi-
ble to unify the Congo suggest
that his influence may weaken
Tshombe's willingness to main-
tain even his present tenuous
contacts with Leopoldville and
thus further complicate the
problem of inducing Katanga to
participate in a federated Con-
golese state.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
9 February 1961
SOVIET PRESS COMMENTARY ON US POLICY
Moscow's first direct press
criticism of President Ken-
nedy's administration appeared
in Izvestia and Pravda articles
of 4 and 5 February. Having
permitted publication of the
full text of the President's
State of the Union message,
the Soviet leaders probably
feit those passages dealing with
the bloc and specific East-West
issues called for a response.
The critical tone of these
commentaries probably was de-
signed to convey the impression
that- the Soviet leaders believe
the United States has failed to
respond adequately to their
in i1: ial overtures for improving
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the next move is up to the United
States.
Both articles and a simi-
lar commentary in the weekly
magazine Life Abroad found fault
with the address. It wa said
to repeat "cold war echoes" and
to have failed "to renounce old,
worn-out ideas." The main criti-
cism was directed against the
defense measures announced and
the statements on arms control,
which Izvestia described as
avoiding the question of "ef-
fective disarmament." Both
papers attacked the statements
on the aspirations of world
Communism and the references to
the situation in Cuba.
Izvestia commented that al-
though a President's message
reflected a "passing" awareness
of the crucial stage in inter-
national relations, the US
must now draw the "appropriate
conclusions." Pravda cautioned
against any judgment 'of US pol-
icies on the basis of the "first
steps" taken by the US and as-
serted that only time will tell if
the administration intends to
embark on a new course in for-
eign policy.
The Soviet press on 3 Feb-
ruary carried lengthy and largely
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accurate reports of the Presi-
dent's press conference on 1
February. Quotations of his re-
marks on a meeting with Khru-
shchev and on Berlin policy
were repeated verbatim.
Extensive press and tele-
vision coverage of the Presi-
dent's economic message to Con-
gress was utilized to,present
only negative sides of the US
economic situation. Soviet bloc
commentaries on the President's
special message to Congress
on the US balance of payments
and gold reserves pointed out
that he failed to deal with the
main cause of the difficulties
--"unproductive military expendi-
tures" to maintain foreign bases
and support "puppet regimes."
Soviet reports of Secretary
Rusk's first press conference
included his statement that the
release of the RB-47 crew mem-
bers did not mean that all prob-
lems between the US and the USSR
had ceased to exist.
The propaganda pattern de-
veloped by the USSR and the
European satellites since the
inauguration features relative-
ly factual coverage of state-
ments by US officials, some in-
dication of optimism over fu-
ture Soviet-American relations,
but a skeptical over-all tone.
This combination reflects con-
flicting policy pressures on
the Soviet leaders; they wish
to create a favorable climate
for the advancement of their
objectives through negotiations
with the West, but at the same
time to avoid too favorable
an estimate of US"intentions--
which might intensify the dis-
pute with the Chinese.
Moscow will probably main-
tain a conciliatory position on
the official level, but at the
same time reply critically to
US statements on the bloc's in-
ternational posture and on
specific East-West problems. In
contrast to the criticism in
the Izvestia article of 4 Feb-
ruary, the Soviet note on the
same date, agreeing to a post-
ponement of the Geneva talks,
omitted the standard Soviet
position that the USSR pre-
ferred to expedite matters and
was agreeing only as a conces-
sion to the US. Instead,Mos-
cow noted the US desire to
reach a successful conclusion
to the talks.
Soviet spokes-
men have indicated that Khruhchev
would attend the regular assembly
session and would expect to meet
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Despite Castro's seizure
of the company which controls
the water supply of the Guan-
tanamo Naval Base, there is still
no indication that he will at-
tempt to use force against the
base. The action does not en-
hance Cuba's ability to cut off
the water supply to the base.
However, it will enable the
Cuban Government to raise water
rates in an effort to obtain
additional needed dollars.
During the television in-
terview on 1 February Foreign
Minister Roa reaffirmed an
earlier Castro statement that
Cuba would seek the recovery of
Guantanamo through the channels
of international law. The Cuban
contention, according to Roa,is
that the 1903 US-Cuban contract
for. the lease of the base is
invalid because Cuba was not
then on "an equal footing with
the United States." Also, Roa
said, Cuba did not agree to the
lease of its own free will,
"because the Cuban people were
coerced by a system of govern-
ment imposed from abroad."
The Castro regime during
the past week stepped up its
propaganda attacks on the US
administration A broadcast
assailed the US action'in pro-
viding $4,000,000 for Cuban
refugees in the United States,
saying that since the previous
administration had allotted
only $1,000,000 to the "coun-
terrevolutionaries," President
Kennedy was "four times more
the enemy of Cuba" than was
his predecessor. President
Dorticos told a teachers' rally
in Havana on 4 February that
the intensification of coun-
terrevolutionary? activity by
the Roman Catholic clergy and
private school students was
closely connected with the US
action.
The teachers' rally was
convoked by the government in
an attempt to counter the grow-
ing opposition efforts of
Catholic students and private
educational institutions. The
regime's attacks on these groups
probably foreshadow a takeover
of all Cuban private schools.
Students at private second-
ary schools and colleges through-
out the country apparently par-
ticipated in large numbers in a
"strike" staged on 6 February
as a protest against the execu-
tion of counterrevolutionaries
by government firing squads.
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9 February 1961
Acts of sabotage. and coun-
terrevolutionary guerrilla ac-
tivity continue to be reported,
and there has been conflicting
information on the progress of
the campaign by militiamen to
isolate and liquidate anti-
Castro forces in the Sierra
Escambray area of Las Villas
Province.
A major fire in a Havana
tobacco plant on 6 February
causing damage estimated at
several million dollars was ap-
parently the result of a sabo-
tage operation.
Newspapers and radio sta-
tions have begun a full-scale
propaganda offensive to mobi-
lize "volunteers"--including
women and children--to harvest
the first "people's crop" of
sugar cane. A shortage of
cane cutters, which has put the
harvest behind schedule, has
resulted from the government's
mobilization of the militia
against the alleged US"invasion
threat" during most of January.
In the city of Guantanamo, mu-
nicipal police have reportedly
been ordered into the cane
fields.
The Colombian Government
is under increasing domestic
pressure to break diplomatic
relations with Cuba, partly be-
cause of the belief that Cuban
agitation has encouraged the
rising violence in rural areas
of the country. Peru, Paraguay,
Nicaragua, Guatemala, Haiti,
and the Dominican Republic al-
ready have broken or "sus-
pended" diplomatic relations
with Havana.
Dominican Republic
government is on the point-of
bankruptcy, largely because
of Trujillo's long-continuing
transfer of his and the govern-
ment's assets abroad for his
Few Dominicans interpret
Trujillo's financial manipula-
tions as evidence that he is
preparing to flee the country
soon. In fact, Trujillo's pres-
ent political activities suggest
that he feels confident of his
position. His main hope of early
improvement in the economic sit-
uation lies in the sugar crop
now being harvested and in the
maintenance of legislative ar-
rangements governing its market-
ing in the United States. Under
a law which expires on 31 March,
the Dominican Republic obtains
more than 200,000 tons of the
former Cuban sugar quota with
its premium of more than 2.5
cents per pound over the world
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9 February 1961
market price.. It gets the same
premium on its own quota.
US officials in Ciudad
Trujillo report that both the
regime and dissident elements
view congressional action on
the Cuban "windfall quota" as
the critical test of US policy
toward Trujillo, and that the
reaction of the dissidents will
be strongly adverse to the US
if the "windfall" is continued.
The consul general believes
that if it is canceled Trujillo
may break consular relations
and expropriate American-owned
firms.
The consul general be-
lieves Trujillo's general pol-
icy will be one of unrelenting
efforts to replace representa-
tive Latin American govern-
ments with dictatorships, con-
tinued violation of human rights
in his own country, and the en-
couragement of Communist-type
propaganda and commercial con-
tacts with the Soviet bloc.
The recently reported in-
tensification of Dominican plot-
ting against Venezuelan Presi-
dent Romulo Betancourt is prob-
ably based on Trujillo's be-
lief that his relations with
the US will not improve substan-
tially until Betancourt has been
removed from the scene. Tru-
jiilb's view is that Washington
works against his dictatorship
in cooperation with Betancourt
because Venezuela's help is
needed against Castro and be-
cause the US must protect large
private investments in the Ven-
ezuelan oil industry.
President Duvalier appears
to be shifting from persuasion
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to his customary terroristic
tactics in his efforts to end
the opposition-supported stu-
dent strike, the most open
challenge to his authority in
his three years in office.
Early this month he also re-
sumed his attacks on the Roman
Catholic Church, which he ac-
cuses of supporting the stu-
dent strike. A bishop was
forcibly removed from his
diocese on 3 February by the
military after a mob, apparent-
ly with government sanction,
looted his residence and of-
fice.
El Salvador
The five-man civil-mili-
tary directorate that took
power on 25 January has at
least temporarily curbed pro-
Communist elements. The
armed forces apparently con-
tinue united and are reported
determined to "run the show"
until a new government has been
elected. They have reiterated
their promises of free elections
this year and economic reforms
to improve the lot of the peas-
ants. There are, nevertheless,
indications of a widespread feel-
ing that one military government
.has simply replaced another.
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9 February 1961
Averky Aristov, 57-year-
old member of the party pre-
sidium, has been relieved of
his post as Khrushchev's deputy
in the central committee's
Bureau for the RSFSR (Russian
Republic), which supervises
party affairs in the Soviet
Union's largest republic. He
has been sent to replace Petr
Abrasimov as ambassador to
Warsaw.
This move, which appears to
be the outcome of competition
among Khrushchev's lieutenants,
deprives Aristov of a place in
the Kremlin inner circle and
marks another sharp setback in
his political career. Party
Secretary Frol Kozlov, current-
ly thought to be Khrushchev's
chosen successor, and RSFSR Pre-
mier Dmitry Polyansky appear to
be the principal beneficiaries
of Aristov's demotion.
death and was sent to a remote
provincial post. He was re-
called to Moscow in 1955 as a
party secretary and in June
1957--when Khrushchev won his
victory over Malenkov, Molotov,
and Kaganovich--was again made
a member of the party presidium.
By December 1958 Aristov
had become Khrushchev's only
deputy,,on the RSFSR.bureau. In
the reshuffle of the Soviet top
.leadership last May, however,
he was relieved as party secre-
tary "to devote full time to his
duties as deputy chairman of
the RSFSR bureau." This pre-
sumably was a prelude to his
current demotion.
Aristov continued to be,
active in RSFSR affairs through
last fall, and the republic
was credited at the recent
party central committee plenum
with relative success in agri-
culture as compared with other
republics. There have been
only minor criticisms of the
work of the RSFSR bureau.
Aristov, apparently an
effective organizational spe-
cialist, was in a position to
strengthen his personal authority
among the influential profes-
sional party functionaries in
the RSFSR. If unchecked he
might have been able to develop
a party machine strong enough
to pose a serious obstacle to
any attempt by Kozlov to take
over undivided control of the
Soviet Union when the question
of the succession arose.
By October 1952, Aristov
had worked his way into the
inner party circle around Stalin,
but he lost out in the shake-up
in March 1953 following Stalin's
Gennady Voronov, one of
the candidate members elected
to the party presidium at the
central committee plenum in
January, replaced Aristov as
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
9 February 1961
deputy chairman of the RSFSR
bureau. As a newcomer, he
probably will be in no position
to challenge Polyansky's au-
thority in the RSFSR. Pol-
yansky has been increasingly
in the public eye, visiting the
provinces and acting as prin-
cipal spokesman for the repub-
lic, and he may have resented
sharing authority with Aristov.
Abrasimov, who had been
ambassador to Warsaw since Sep-
tember 1957, said
a he was returning o
ministerial job or to "party
work."
SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS
In sharp contrast to the
bitter and open differences ex-
pressed by the Soviet Union and
China in the period before the
November conference of world
Communist leaders in Moscow,
the two countries today are at-
tempting to preserve an air of
cooperation and agreement that
belies the significant and basic
disagreements which still exist.
Comments from both countries
continue to stress the impor-
tance of Sino-Soviet solidarity,
and in Laos, where points of
friction might be expected to
arise, there appear so far to
be no significant disagree-
ments.
During the period when the
ideological dispute was most
acute, Moscow and Peiping stopped
reprinting texts of important
speeches and resolutions adopted
in.the other country. Since
November, however, the Soviet
Union has reprinted the text
of a December People's Daily
editorial on the significance.
of the November meeting and an
incomplete text of the Chinese
central committee resolution
on the meeting.
For their part, the Chinese
have reprinted Khrushchev's Jan-
uary speech, Suslov's report to
the Soviet central committee on
the meeting, and at least parts
of that body's resolution. Since
all this material contained
clearly, differing views on how
the struggle against imperialism
should be conducted and on other
disputed issues, it seems prob-
able that a decision to reduce
the total blackout of opposing
opinion was one of the agree-
ments reached at Moscow in No-
vember.
It is likely that the
image of Chinese-Russian friend-
ship will be given even greater
emphasis during the celebrations
on 14 February of the 11th an-
niversary of the signing of the
Sino-Soviet Friendship Treaty.
By insisting that Sino-Soviet
solidarity is the "core" of the
whole Communist movement, how-
ever, the Chinese are in effect
warning the Soviet Union that
it must give Chinese views seri-
ous consideration. They empha-
sized that they will "defend"
the Moscow statement, just as
they "defended" the 1957 Mos-
cow declaration--in fact they
used it to support their arguments
in the dispute. Peiping thus
appears to be giving notice that
it is free to challenge those
aspects of Soviet policy with
which it disagrees.
Taking their cue from Khru-
shchev's 6 January speech on the
conference, Soviet commentaries
have stressed those aspects of
the statement which reflect the
positions maintained, in the
face of Chinese criticism, be-
fore November. In that speech,
Khrushchev went beyond the
Moscow declaration-in discussing
policy toward the West; he re-
stated his intention to engage
the West in further high-level
talks and developed the rationale
behind this intention.
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Peiping, probably reflect-
ing its continuing fear of high-
level Soviet-US negotiations
which might result in some sta-
bilization of the world situa-
tion and a consequent reduction
in tension, has been trying to
keep pressure on Khrushchev to
act in accordance with the mil-
itant tone adopted at the con-
ference. The Chinese seem to
feel that the declaration com-
mits the world Communist move-
ment to Peiping's tougher ap-
proach to world events. They
have not, however, returned to
the polemics which marked Sino-
Soviet relations prior to the
November conference.
Three major statements in
1961--a Red Flag article of 1
January, the Chinese Communist
party's resolution on the Mos-
cow meeting adopted on 18 Janu-
ary, and a People's Daily edi-
torial of 2J2 January on the
party resolution--all underline
those aspects of the Moscow
declaration favorable to Pei-
ping's militant precepts. While
all three articles indicate that
the basic dispute between Pei-
ping and Moscow remains unset-
tled, the People's Daily edi-
torial uses t a rongest lan-
guage in making Peiping's points.
The editorial urges "un-
yielding struggle" against im-
perialism and support for rev-
olutionary forces everywhere,
reiterates that'the US is the
"main enemy," and insists that
the situation in colonial areas
and even in parts of Europe--
Belgium in particular--is ripe
for revolutionary action. It
distorts the Moscow statement
by asserting that the strengthen-
ing of revolutionary forces is
"completely identical" with the
interest of safeguarding world
peace.
The editorial surpasses
other Chinese comment since the
November conference in showing
satisfaction with the work of
the Chinese delegation in Mos-
;cow: Expressing Peiping's be-
lief that the Chinese scored
a victory at the conference, it
states, "We are particularly
glad that the fundamental prin-
ciples and revolutionary spirit
of Marxism-Leninism, in which
the Chinese Communists and the
Communists in other countries
have for many years persisted,
are clearly reflected in the
Moscow statement."
Aside from theoretical
discussions, Peiping has shown
in at least three areas that
it is pulling in the opposite
direction from Moscow. On the
new US administration, Peiping,
while not directly contravening
the Soviet line, has continued
to publicize its uncompromising
views toward the US Government.
Toward Albania, Peiping
continues to demonstrate its
"inviolable" friendship despite
the obvious and public displeas-
ure displayed by the Soviet
Union and the East European sat-
ellites toward Albanian "devia-
tionism." In discussing new
economic agreements recently
concluded with Albania, People's
Daily on 3 February, in an ap-
parent jibe at Moscow, empha
Sizedthe correctness of the
statement in the Moscow declara-
tion that socialist countries
"big and small" have equal rights
and should "support each other."
Finally, Peiping, along
with Albania, has refused to fol-
low the more energetic policy,
pursued by the USSR and the East-
ern European satellites since
December 1960, of seeking to
improve relations with Yugoslavia.
Below the surface calm
achieved by the November meet-
ing, therefore, strong discon-
tent with each other's views
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9 February 1961
continues to exist in Peiping
and Moscow. It can be expected
to erupt when either of the
parties oversteps the limits
within which they have appar-
ently agreed to disagree.
Meager rations and long
working hours have increased
discontent in Communist China,
peasants iiving near Shanghai
and Canton were said to be re-
sorting to all possible arti-
fices to obtain food and to be
making no effort to veil their
dissatisfaction. Party cadres
--who generally receive pref-
erential treatment--were be-
coming increasingly unpopular,
discontent is rising among
cadres, public security offi-
cials, and army personnel, as
their rations have also been
cut.
rumors current in Peiping in
late December that peasant or-
ganizations hostile to the re-
gime have been springing up
throughout the countryside. Ac-
cording to these rumors, some
areas in western China and Tibet
have been "freed" from govern-
ment control.
Although such stories have
undoubtedly been exaggerated,
dissatisfaction has become wide-
spread enough to force Peiping
to make some practical conces-
sions inimical to its basic
philosophy. "Black markets"
are reportedly operating in the
major cities, except Peiping,
allegedly because the authori-
ties fear that closing them
would increase resentment. In-
centives, long neglected because
the top leadership believed that
it could substitute enthusiasm
for material rewards, now are
being re-emphasized. A Kwang-
tung provincial paper stated
in December that "small free-
peasants to
cultivate their own gardens
and to market produce grown on
them in free markets--would be
a long-term policy.
The Communists thus are
countenancing the "bourgeois
tendencies" against which they
inveighed endlessly in the
past.
Even more striking evidence
of the regime's concern about
food shortages is seen, how-
ever, in recent imports of
food. Firm Chinese grain pur-
chases from the free world now
total about 2,400,000 tons,
worth at least $160,000,000,
from Canada, Australia, and
Burma, and further sales are
reportedly under negotiation.
Other information points
toward a sharp reduction in
Chinese agricultural exports
to both bloc and nonbloc des-
tinations this year. The Chi-
nese have informed Ceylon that
Chinese rice will not be
shipped under this year's rice-
rubber pact, but the commitment
will be filled with re-exports
of Burmese rice.
Chinese grain imports, the
increasing petroleum and fer-
tilizer purchases from the West,
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and the expense involved in
moving such large quantities
of cargo have already placed a
heavy burden on China's finan-
cial resources. There are re-
ports that the Soviet Union has
advanced sterling to finance the
Chinese buying spree, but such
a course appears unlikely. Oth-
er possible methods of Soviet
assistance, such as allowing
even further increases in Chi-
na's short-term indebtedness to
the USSR, would be of little
value in easing the pressure on
Peiping, since the desired goods
must come from outside the bloc.
Rather than rely on Soviet
aid, Peiping probably has decid-
ed to stretch its financial
reserves as far as possible.
This may involve gold sales,
perhaps an increase in Chinese
exports to Hong Kong and Western
Europe, and probably a decrease
in imports of certain Western
commodities. Chinese delaying
tactics in current trade negoti-
ations with the USSR and the
European satellites probably
reflect Peiping's moves to
carry out such adjustments in
its foreign trade policy.
The Chinese Communists are
exhibiting considerable sensi-
tivity to the publicity their
economic difficulties are re-
ceiving abroad. Foreign Minis-
ter Chen Yi observed on 4 Febru-
ary that "imperialists and cer-
tain reactionaries are now re-
joicing and taking malicious
delight...but they rejoice too
early. . .the Chinese people will
surely be able to surmount all
difficulties, including natural
NORTH KOREA HALTS REPATRIATION OF KOREANS IN JAPAN
Pyongyang has suspended
the program under which nearly
55,000 of the 600,000 Koreans
living in Japan have been re-
patriated to North Korea. Two
Communist repatriation ships
were scheduled to reach Niigata,
Japan, on 9 February, but their
arrival has been postponed in-
definitely. Although concern
that an influenza epidemic in
Japan might spread to North
Korea is given as the excuse,
it appears that the sharp drop
in applications for repatria-
tion has proved embarrassing to
the Communists, who agreed in
November to accelerate the pro-
gram.
to North Korea. Between Decem-
ber 1959--when the first group
left--and November 1960, an
average of 1,000 Koreans left
Japan each week for North Korea.
Since November, however, the
weekly totals have declined.
For the trip on 20 January, only
669 reported to the repatriation
center at Niigata, although 1,084
applicants had been alerted. New
registrations in January remained
low, but Chosen Soren asserts
that the rate will increase in
April when the weather improves.
North Korea has apparently
had difficulty settling repa-
Chosen Soren, the leftist
federation of Korean residents
in Japan, at one time confident-
ly predicted that over 200,000
Koreans would seek repatriation
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Pyongyang has used the re-
patriation issue to irritate
Japan's relations with South
Korea, which strongly opposed
permitting the Koreans in Japan
to migrate to the Communist
North. Seoul suspended trade
relations with Japan in June
1959 when it was first reported
that the Japanese and North
Korean Red Cross Societies were
nearing agreement on a repa-
triation program. The trade
ban was lifted in April 1960,
as one of the last acts of the
Rhee government.
The repatriation program
is still a potential irritant
in Japanese South Korean
relations, but the problem is,
in effect, being ignored. Seoul
and Tokyo now have agreed to
negotiate on the status of
Korean residents in Japan as
part of their efforts to reach
an over-all settlement of out-
standing differences. Never-
theless, Pyongyang is still
hopeful that the repatriation
issue will afford opportunities
to obstruct a Japanese - South
Korean rapprochement, and it
is likely that the North Koreans
will resume the program later
this year as a backlog of
applications builds up.
SOVIET-JAPANESE FISHERY NEGOTIATIONS
The annual talks between
the USSR and Japan over fishing
rights in the northwest Pacific
began on 4 February. Discus-
sions between Soviet and Japa-
nese officials preceding the
formal negotiations suggest
that the USSR will continue to
insistij,as it has for several
years, that the Japanese salmon
catch be further reduced. The
quota was set at 120,000 tons
in 1957 and has been steadily
lowered--to 67,500 tons in 1960.
The 1960 agreement also enlarged
the zone in which Japanese fish-
ing is prohibited; it now
includes an area Japanese fish-
ing interests considered vital
to their smaller fishing oper-
ations.
The USSR has been concerned
over declining salmon resources
and has attempted each year to
continue the talks for several
months in order to obtain max-
imum concessions. The Japanese
come under pressure from their
own fishermen to reach an agree-
ment in time for the fishing
season, which usually begins
in mid-May.
Since 1959 the United States
has sought unsuccessfully to
obtain an invitation to send an
observer to the annual meeting
of the Northwest Pacific Japa-
nese-Soviet Fisheries Commission.
The Soviet delegation has in-
sisted on an unconditional in-
vitation for a US observer to
attend all sessions, while the
Japanese wished to restrict at-
tendance to certain scientific
sessions. This year the USSR
and Japan have agreed to allow
a US observer for the scientific
and technical meetings. His
attendance at the plenary sea-
ions of the Fisheries Commission,
which begin on 20 February, will
be contingent on a decision to
be reached at the scientific
meetings.
It seems likely that the
Soviet Union is reasonably sure
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
9 February 1961
hlsl area open to Japanese only under restrictions
defined by SovietJapanese fishery treaty of 1956
Additional area prohibited to Japanese
9 FEBRUARY 1981
NAUTICAL MILES
1000
salmon fishing in 1960
UNCLASSIFIED
of proving its case that there
must be a southward expansion
of the zone off the Kamchatka
Peninsula and Kuril Islands, in
which Japanese fishing is re-
stricted.
Japanese For-
eign Minister Osaka also ap-
pealed to the Soviet fisheries
minister to enter into negoti-
ations with Japan on safe fish-
ing operations. Ile pointed
out that small Japanese fishing
boats operating in the Northern
Pacific are frequently seized
by Soviet authorities for alleged
infringement of the fishery
agreement. The Soviet delegate
replied that Moscow did not
consider the present attitude
of Japan friendly to the USSR
and reiterated the official
Soviet position adopted in 1958:
that such problems could not
be settled until a peace treat
INDIAN THIRD FIVE-YEAR PLAN TO BE EXPANDED
India's recent decision to
raise by $525,000,000 expendi-
tures under the Third Five-Year
Plan, which is scheduled to be-
gin on 1 April, was the result
primarily of pressures on Nehru
and other cabinet members by
politicians-in the Indian states
who have an eye on next year's
national election. Chief bene-
ficiaries of the boost will be
state programs in agriculture,
transport, and power.
All of the increased in-
vestment is earmarked for the
publicly owned sector of the
economy, in which proposed out-
lay now has been set at $15.75
billion. Estimated investment
in and by the private sector--
$8.4 billion--remains the same
as originally forecast but may,
as in the Second Plan, exceed
the estimate. Total outlay for
the new plan now will be $24.15
billion.
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9 February 1961
INDIA
OUTLAY FOR THREE FIVE - YEAR PLANS
(BILLION DOLLARS)
44.15**
=PUBLIC SECTOR
= PRIVATE SECTOR
nance part of the new investments.
He has given no indication, how-
ever, how he expects to cover the
increased foreign exchange costs,
now pushed to at least $5.8 bil-
lion. This entire amount must be
obtained from external sources,
inasmuch as Indian foreign ex-
change reserves, now hovering
around $320,000,000, are as low
as the Indians feel they can
safely be allowed to drop. To
date New Delhi has succeeded in
obtaining foreign aid commitments
FIRST PLAN SECOND PLAN TNIRD PLAN
amounting to less than 25 percent
(1951 ? 36) (1956.'61) (1961-166)
of what full implementation of its
new plan will require.
Finance Minister Desai, who
opposed the increase on the
grounds that it would aggravate
already dangerous inflationary
pressures and raise the foreign
exchange costs of the plan by an
additional $300,000,000, was
instrumental in preventing an
even bigger increase sought by
the states. The states, however,
have been assured that starts
will be permitted on additional
projects during the latter stages
of the plan on a funds-available
basis; these will then be carried
over to the fourth plan (1966-71).
Desai has hinted that in-
creased excise taxes may be im-
posed on "luxury" items to fi-
India will receive more than
one billion dollars'worth of sur-
plus agricultural commodities
from the United States under the
PL-480 program, but the $5.8
billion foreign exchange require-
ment is in addition to this.
With mounting political and
economic problems on all sides,
both Nehru and Desai feel com-
pelled to launch an ambitious and
imaginative program, adjusting
to shortfalls if necessary, rather
than risk not meeting India's
requirements by initially aiming
too low.
The Iranian parliamentary
elections in progress since
mid-January and now nearing
completion have stimulated the
strongest antiregime sentiment
in recent years. The elections,
which ended in Tehran on 4
February, will probably be
finished in the remainder of
the country in a few days, and
the 200-member Majlis may be
organized about the middle of
the month. Government-backed
candidates,~including fourteen
"independents," appear to have
won as planned in nearly all
constituencies. Allahyar Saleh,
a popular moderate nationalist
who is distrusted by the Shah
because he once supported ex-
Premier Mossadeq, was permitted
to win in Kashan in an,attempt
to convince the public that the
elections were free.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
9 February 1961
The strongest protest dem-
onstrations in connection with
the elections have occurred in
Tehran, where university stu-
dents, led by nationalists and
probably with the support of
Tudeh (Communist) elements,
struggled with the police, threw
stones, forced the bazaar to
close, and called for the over-
throw-,. of the Shah. Tehran Uni-
versity and a teachers' train-
ing college have been closed
by the government. A group of
nationalist leaders has taken
asylum in the Senate to protest
the arrest of student leaders.
Student demonstrations have been
getting weaker, but a bloody
clash is still possible and
would do much to increase opposi-
tion to the regime. The general
public apparently has not joined
in the demonstrations.
The cancel-
lation of the elections last
August and the resignation of
Premier Eqbal because of rigging
.at that time apparently led the
public to expect some free choice
in the current round. There are
no indications that the Shah is
again considering canceling the
elections, but he may find it
expedient to remove some provin-
cial governors or high offi-
cials as scapegoats.
potential.
General Bakhtiar, chief of
the Iranian National Intelligence
and Security Organization, who
was instrumental in persuading
the Shah to cancel the August
elections, has chosen to absent
himself from Iran at this time.
This demonstration of noninvolve-
ment in election rigging may sig-
nificantly increase his political
DI'SCONTENT''Ii ETHIOPIA
The situation in Ethiopia
appears to be deteriorating
further; the American ambassador
has characterized it as a "state
of aimless drift." Emperor Haile
Selassie has failed to reassert
his strong personal leadership
and continues to delay naming
a new government. Preoccupied
with security matters duringl.the
eight weeks following the abor-
tive coup, he is being offered
conflicting advice by contending
political factions, each of which
he is said to have encouraged.
Either the Emperor has not yet
decided which group to support,
or he intends to follow his
earlier policy of playing off
one faction against the oth-
er.
Meanwhile, the basic condi-
tions which caused the uprising
persist. The country is extreme-
ly primitive: per capita in-
come is among the lowest in Afri-
ca and the illiteracy rate ap-
proaches 95 percent. The so-
cial structure remains essenti-
ally feudalistic, with the
Amhara tribal aristocracy monop-
olizing the government. The re-
gime's most vocal and potentially
dangerous critics are'among
middle-level government officials
and the growing number of young,
largely foreign-educated progres-
sives who seek rapid social and
economic reforms.
The Emperor appears pri-
marily concerned with pressing
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9 February 1961
charges against those who parti-
cipated in or sympathized with
the recent challenge to his
authority and in rewarding his
defenders. On 6 February four
generals who remained loyal
during the revolt were decorated
and promoted, but the Emperor
has made only one appointment--
a new minister of defense--to
replace the several ministers
killed by the rebels.
over his fate has increased
public sympathy for the objec-
tives espoused by leaders of
the abortive coup. Over 30
persons have been flogged for
"spreading false rumors" in
Addis Ababa; dissident elements
nevertheless continue to cir-
culate antiregime rumors, and
leaflets are being distributed
in the capital seeking support
for the rebel cause.
The American ambassador,
commenting on the upcoming trial
of the popular rebel leader
General Menghistu--former com-
mander of the Imperial Body
Guard--believes that new dis-
orders could break out in Addis
Ababa if Menghistu is condemned
to death. Widespread concern
Dissension has
been developing with-
in the top leadership
of the French Commun-
ist party (PCF). In
mid-January charges
of rightist deviation
were made against
politburo members
Marcel Servin and
Laurent Casanova.
Although the two are
charged with criti-
cizing Khrushchev's
BACKGROUND
Under the Fifth Republic's revised electoral law of 1958, the
French Communist party has lost all but 10 of the 144 seats it
formerly held in the National Assembly, However, it is still the
largest (an estimated 250,000 card-carrying members) party in
France and retains a strong voting appeal. It also provides lead-
ership for the largest labor organisation, the General Labor Con-
federation (CGT). It has had increasing difficulty, however, in
getting the rank and file to follow party directives and it re-
peatedly complains of declining membership. Secretary General
Maurice Thorez, a long-time Stalinist, was temporarily thrown
off balance by de-Stalinization in the USSR. He has, however,
continued to follow the Moscow line and he appears to be firmly
in the good graces of Khrushchev.
policy of peaceful coexistence,
the dispute centers primarily
on their dislike of the PCF's
policy of total opposition to
De Gaulle, particularly with
respect to his Algerian policy.
Support for the deviationist views
is evident among lower echelons
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
9 February 1961
The deviation
charge arose immedi-
ately from disagree-
ment over the PCF's
decision to vote
"no" in the January
referendum on De
Gaulle's Algerian
policy. Servin and
Casanova allegedly
differed with Thorez'
view that De Gaulle,
by attempting to
build a third force
in Algeria, with
which to negotiate
a settlement, was
trying to circumvent
talks with the Algeri-
of the party, and Secretary
General Thorez apparently fears
that strong disciplinary action
would provoke extensive defec-
tions.
Both members of the polit-
buro since 1954, Servin heads
the PCF's Organization Section,
while Casanova handles the
activities of intellectuals
under party control. Casanova
was credited with halting major
defections from the PCF at the
time of the Hungarian revolu-
tion- Both men first came un-
der open attack at a central
committee meeting in January,
but Thorez claims their devia-
tion dates back at least two
years. Official French sources
say they have been excluded from
activities of the politburo since
July 1960; they retain their
membership on that body, however.
Servin and Casanova appar-
ently have argued that the brunt
of the party's attack should
fall on French rightists rather
than on De Gaulle, whom they
regard as "bead of the liberal
faction of the bourgeoisie."
Thorez, however, insists De
Gaulle heads a regime of "nation-
alistic demagogy," controlled
by the "monopolies" and pur-
suing policies leading to
fascism.
An rebel government. They
opposed the PCF's refusal to
join with non-Communist organi-
zations in demonstrations for
a negotiated peace in Algeria.
Casanova was charged with re-
fusing to set up within the
PCPs peace movement a network
of committees for peace in
Algeria.
Thorez has also injected
some elements of the Sino-Soviet
dispute into this case. He has
charged that his two lieutenants
--like the Chinese--oppose:
Khrushchev's peaceful coexist-
ence policy. He stated that
they had approved publication
of an article implying that the
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
9 February 1961
policy of coe>istence had ac-
tually consolidated the "im-
perialist countries."
The PCF Paris daily, L'Hu-
manite, has published extra-c
- is -
of resolutions of regional PCF
organizations supporting Thorez'
position on the nature of the
De Gaulle regime and Algerian
policy. Certain of these ex-
tracts, however, indicated that
Servin and Casanova's views are
shared at lower party echelons.
Thorez, in an obvious ref-
erence to the high party posi-
tions still held by Servin and
Casanova, has stated that "a
comrade may not be in agreement
and may keep his opinions pro-
vided he does not belong to the
leadership." There are indica-
tions, however, that he is try-
ing to persuade the two devia-
tionists to recant, presumably
considering them too prominent
to remain as simple rank-and-
file dissidents. The PCF prob-
ably fears that defections
from the party would result
if strong action were taken
against the two.
The proposed participation
of Finland in the European Free
Trade Association (EFTA or Out-
er Seven) will be a major is-
sure at the EFTA council meet-
ing opening on 14 February.
EFTA's members generally accept
the political desirability--
even necessity--of an associa-
tion arrangement in order to pre-
vent Finland from coming under
increased Soviet economic and
political influence. Ties with
Finland, however, have potential-
ly far-reaching implications
for the Seven as a whole and
for its relations with the bloc,
the Common Market (EEC), and
GATT.
Most of the difficulties
stem from President Kekkonen's
agreement last November to ex-
tend to the USSR the same tariff
treatment Finland would give
its EFTA partners--a concession
he thought necessary to win Mos-
cow's assent. EFTA now seems
to feel that the economic conse-
quences of Kekkonen's agreement
would not necessarily be serious
either for Finland, whose trade
with the USSR is governed by
quotas, nor for EFTA, which is
already keeping track of im-
ports from outsiders with a
certificate-of-origin system.
The political problems of Mos-
cow's "foot in the door" are,
however, proving much more dif-
ficult.
Accordingly, EFTA is lean-
ing toward setting up with Fin-
land a new eight-nation free-
trade area which would be for-
mally separate from EFTA itself.
This elaborate device would be
intended to exclude Finland from
consideration of such sensitive
questions as a possible merger
of the Seven with the Common
Market, which Finland, under
Soviet pressure, might object
to. It would also be intended
to afford members of EFTA proper,
notably Austria, perhaps addi-
tional protection against So-
viet demands for most-favored-
nation treatment such as that
Finland has already conceded.
With respect to the problem
of obtaining from GATT the waiver
Finland would require to give
this privileged position to the
USSR, EFTA countries seem in-
clined either to claim very
"special circumstances" or, if
permitted, simply to ignore their.
GATT obligations.
While continuing to show
irritation with the Finns for
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
9 February 1961
having "caused" these
problems, EFTA is in
turn being privately
criticized for seem-
ing to bend its ef-
forts toward "living
with" the Finno-So-
viet agreement rath-
er than trying to
find real alterna-
tives. The associa-
tion problem is also
becoming increasing-
ly involved in the
rivalry between the
EEC and the Outer
Seven. Accusations
have been heard from
the EEC than. the
EFTA, in pressing the
Common Market to take
a stand on the GATT
issue in advance of
an EFTA-Finnish agree-
ment, is attempting
to shift responsi-
bility in the event
Finland's accession
bid is rejected. Of-
ficials from the
Seven, on the other
hand, have accused
the Common Market of
spreading rumors that
EFTA, which has three
neutral members, is
"soft" toward the
bloc.
There is little
likelihood that Fin-
land could be per-
suaded to make a new
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European Free Trade Association (Outer Seven)
European Economic Community (Common Market)
approach to the USSR in the
event EFTA should decide to
suggest this. The Finns regard
the agreement as the final So-
viet word. Even if they should
return to Moscow, there is a
risk that Moscow might either
impose still harsher terms for
Finland's association with EFTA
or offer Finland alternative
economic concessions which would
tie it even more closely to the
Italy
USSR. Although Kekkonen's do-
mestic prestige would be ad-
versely affected by EFTA's re-
jecting Finland's application,
Kekkonen would probably weather
the adverse criticism by plac-
ing the onus on EFTA, and even
strengthen his position by call-
ing on all Finns to stand
together in the "crisis."
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
9 February 1961
PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES
"GUIDED DEMOCRACY" AND THE INDONESIAN COMMUNIST PARTY
Sukarno, Indonesia's Pres-
ident for the past 15 years, has
since 1957 promoted a "guided
democracy"--essentially a ref-
utation of parliamentary govern-
ment in the Western sense--as a
means of solving Indonesia's
many problems. In imposing
this concept, his principal sup-
port has come from the Commu-
nist party (PKI) and from the
army, which is anti-Communist;
by counterbalancing these op-
posed groups, he has retained
his own pre-eminent position.
The Communists have ben-
efited from their association
with Sukarno and now have the
largest and most vigorous party
in Indonesia. They therefore
are likely to continue to sup-
port him, despite apprehension
among some members that "guided
democracy" conflicts with the
party's ultimate program.
assist the President in formu-
lating policies.
"Guided democracy" also en-
visages a multilevel mass or-
ganization--the National Front--
in which all loyal political
parties and functional groups
are to submerge their identi-
ties and interests and support
the government.
As Sukarno interprets his
concept, the significant socio-
political elements of Indonesian
society--religious, nationalist,
and Communist--must merge. In
order to achieve such a merger
they must work together through-
out the structure of "guided
democracy" from the cabinet to
the village units of the Nation-
al Front,
Beginnings of "Guided
Democracy"
Sukarno sees the goals of
"guided democracy" as national
unity and social justice. These
are to be achieved through a
government-controlled economy,
an ambitious economic develop-
ment plan, suppression of anti-
government guerrilla warfare
and of political elements which
actively oppose "guided democ-
racy," a controlled press, and
the de-emphasis and perhaps
abolition of political parties.
Two anti-Communist parties
which resisted "guided democ-
racy" were dissolved last Au-
gust:: the large Moslem Masjumi
party and the small but articu-
late Socialist party.
The President provides the
guidance, and his cabinet ex-
ecutes the laws which a rubber-
stamp parliament has passed.
The Supreme Advisory Council,
the National Planning Board,
and the Economic Development
Council, along with the cabinet,
Sukarno has always been
interested in mass political
movement. Probably the great-
est influence in his youth was
Tjokroaminoto, a nationalist
leader who combined Communist,
nationalist, and Islamic ele-
ments in one political move-
ment and apparently in one po-
litical philosophy.
In the 1920s, under the
Dutch colonial administration,
Sukarno federated all Indone-
sian nationalist movements. He
constantly emphasized unity and
mass action, asserting that the
independence movement could not
have an Islamic basis, nor should
it await assistance from inter-
national Communism.
Sukarno paved the way for
"guided democracy" during the
closing days of the Japanese oc-
cupation, when Tokyo was prepar-
ing to give Indonesia independ-
ence. In a now famous speech
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
9 February 1961
of 1 June 1945, he synthesized
Western, Islamic, Marxist, and
indigenous village communal
ideas. He outlined five prin-
ciples--the Pantja Sila--which
he proposed as the philosophic
foundation of an independent
Indonesia. The principles are
nationalism, humanitarianism
or internationalism, democracy
or agreement through conferring,
prosperity or social justice,
and belief in God. He stated
that he could compress the five
principles into one--the tradi-
tional Indonesian concept of
"gotong rojong," roughly trans-
lated as mutual cooperation.
The Indonesian Republic,
during the four years of inter-
mittent warfare with the Dutch
which followed the proclamation
of independence on 17 August
1945, operated under a hastily
written constitution which in-
corporated the Pantja Sila and
provided for a highly central-
ized government. With the trans-
fer of sovereignty in late 1949,
European-trained Indonesian
leaders--Sukarno was educated
in Indonesia--who had already
promoted the development of po-
litical parties, succeeded in
establishing a parliamentary
government under a new consti-
tution based on European models.
The multiparty system re-
quired the formation of coali-
tion governments, each badly
hampered by party rivalries and
averaging less than a year in
office. The first national
elections--held in 1955--allot-
ted seats on a basis of propor-
tional representation and per-
petuated the numerous parties.
To end the ineffectiveness
of the government and the con-
tinuing divisive tendencies
within the nation, Sukarno de-
cided to take personal action.
In 1956 he announced that his
visits to the United States,
the Soviet Union, and Commu-
nist China would permit him
to "see both sides and decids
what is best for Indonesia."
He returned from his tour de-
termined to institute his
"guided democracy."
Postwar Communist Party .
The Communist party played
little part in the events sur-
rounding Indonesia's declara-
tion of independence in August
1945. . As , .a result: of Dutch
and Japanese oppression, the
party was small and poorly or-
ganized and had no leaders of
high caliber.
In late 1945 the Commu-
nists--after 20 years under-
ground--re-established them-
selves as a legal party when
the Indonesian Government per-
mitted the formation of political
parties. A Moscow-trained Indo-
nesian, Musso, arrived in Au-
gust 1948 to assume leadership
of the still small and poorly
organized party. He directed
it to work toward establishing
a national front, and particu-
larly toward attracting the
army.
Madiun Revolt
In September 1948, pro-
Communist army elements in Cen-
tral Java, resentful over re-
ports that the government
planned to remove them, seized
the town of Madiun and adjacent
areas. Communist party offi-
cials called on the people to
overthrow Sukarno as a "lackey
of American imperialism."
Sukarno broadcast an ap-
peal to the people to choose
between him and the Communists,
and the army quickly subdued
the rebellion. Most of the
party's leaders fled or were
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
9 February 1961
executed, and the party organ-
ization was reduced to near in-
activity.
The Communists have not
forgotten their mistake at
Madiun. They had placed them-
selves in the impossible sit-
uation of opposition to Sukarno,
a mass leader of extraordinary
skill and symbol of revolution.
In writing the history of the
Madiun revolt, the Communists
later placed the blame on
Mohamed Hatta, who was the
prime minister at the time,
and avoided any mention of Su-
karno.
PKI 1948-1958
The Communist party, de-
prived of its seats in the leg-
islature after Madiun, was re-
instated in December 1949 when
the Netherlands recognized Indo-
nesian sovereignty. Its efforts
at united front tactics were
relatively unproductive until
the spring of 1952, when a com-
bination of political shifts
and rivalries in the chaos of
Indonesian politics produced
greater tolerance for Communist
activity and more opportunities
for it to maneuver.
By 1955, the Communists
had become a first-rank party
when they polled the fourth
largest popular vote--over
6,000,000 votes--in the closely
fought national parliamentary
elections of that year. In the
1957 provincial elections,. which
were never completed, the Com-
munists had become the largest
party in Java, which has 60 per-
cent of Indonesia's population,
and polled over 7,000,000 votes
in Java and Sumatra alone.
These advances can be attribut-
ed not only to official toler-
ance of Communist activity but
also to the party's hard work
and its identification with
Sukarno and his policies.
"Guided Democracy" and the PKI
In 1958, in order to pro-
vide a legal basis for "guided
democracy," Sukarno began ma-
neuvering for the return to the
1945 constitution, which called
for a presidential cabinet and
de-emphasized legislative pow-
ers. The Communists, who were
concentrating on parliamentary
tactics and who anticipated
that another election would
catapult; them into a position
of such strength that they
could demand and get cabinet
participation, at first in-
directly opposed Sukarno. Chair-
man Aidit stated that Indonesia
needed both the leadership of
President Sukarno and the "demo-
cratic parliamentary system."
The PKI encouraged non-Commu-
nist parties to agitate against
the 1945 constitution.
As it became obvious that
Sukarno was adamant, however,
the Communists changed course
and vigorously supported him,
along with other secular par-
ties who feared to offend the
President. Sukarno proclaimed
the 1945 constitution by decree
in July 1959.
During the next 18 months,
Sukarno proceeded to fill in the
structure of "guided democracy."
Approximately 25 percent of the
members of the appointed legis-
lative bodies--the House of
Representatives and the People's
Congress--are either Communist
or susceptible to Communist
direction. The same is true
of the Supreme Advisory Council
and the Economic Planning Board.
Approximately 30 percent of the
members of the executive bodies
of the National Front are sim-
ilarly oriented. The lower
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9 February 1961
levels of this organization
have not yet been selected but
are likely to reflect the com-
position of the executive
boards. Both PKI chairman
Aidit and deputy chairman Luk-
man sit on the 19-member Eco-
nomic Development Council,
which will review the ambitious
Eight-Year Development Plan.
The Communists are not di-
rectly represented in the cab-
inet. Sukarno wants to appoint
them to balance army participa-
tion but thus far has hesitated
to do so over army opposition.
The Communists' presence
in the two legislative bodies
gives the party prestige but
little real influence. Their
work in the advisory councils
seems so far to have had little
effect; the councils' output
has faithfully reflected Sukar-
no's orders. The cabinet, where
the Communists will press for
participation, and the still-
incomplete National Front ap-
pear to be the organizations
with which the party can make
the greatest gains.
Meanwhile the party will
continue to use its influence
as the country's only signif-
icant mass organization to
press Sukarno to expand and ex-
tend his already leftist pol-
icies. Despite the govern-
ment's de-emphasis of political
parties, the Communist party
continues active at the village
level, partly in anticipation of
national parliamentary elections
which are tentatively scheduled
for 1962. Already strong in
the labor movement, it is con-
centrating on organizing the
peasantry and infiltrating the
army and police.
Intraparty Differences
Although cooperation with
Sukarno has increased Commu-
nist strength and prestige, mi-
nority elements in the PKI re-
portedly have voiced discon-
tent over continued support of
"guided democracy." Severe
Communist criticism of the cab-
inet in July 1960 may have re-
flected the influence of these
elements. The army, retaliated
by arresting and interrogating
party leaders, and, in three
outlying provinces, it banned
activities of the party and
front groups.
The party therefore planned
to hold both a central committee
plenum and an emergency party
congress later in the year. The
plenum reportedly was to be
called to resolve growing "in-
ternal contradictions" over
party policy toward the govern-
ment's programs, to examine
whether "people's democracy" is
attainable through "guided
democracy," and to define tac-
tics for the establishment of a
national front.
Before the congress or
plenum could be held, however,
Sukarno began to obstruct the
army's anti-Communist campaign.
During the fall of 1960, party
representatives in the national
congress joined in approving
Sukarno's steps toward imple-
menting "guided democracy." The
party congress was canceled,
and the central committee ple-
num, when finally held in late
December 1960, approved govern-
ment decisions on "guided democ-
racy" and ratified adjustments
in party rules which had been
made to conform with Sukarno's
decree on political parties.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUIMARY
9 February 1961
Party chairman Aidit appar-
ently regards the next phase of
"guided democracy"--i.e., Com-
munist participation in the cab-
inet--as sufficiently similar
to the party's limited goal of
a united front government to
merit the PKI's continued sup-
port.
Sukarno and the Communists
Sukarno regards the Commu-
nist party, with its claimed
membership of 1,500,000, as an
efficient mass-based organiza-
tion which owes much of its suc-
cess and probably its very ex-
istence to its identification
in the public mind with him and
his policies. He presumably
believes that he can use it to
promote. his policies and con-
trol it by threatening to with-
draw his protection. Although
apparently aware that the party
could ultimately threaten his
personal position, he does not
seem to regard it as part of an
international movement which
threatens the country's inde-
pendence.
The Communists, although
aware of the benefits of "guided
democracy," apparently are peri-
odically afflicted with the tra-
ditional Communist fear of los-
ing their identity in a general
movement. More than balancing
this fear, however, is the
party's awareness that it is
not yet in a position to dis-
card Sukarno. Still the key
leader in Indonesia, his power
base is support by the masses,
particularly those of Java,
where the Communists draw their
principal strength.
The party's tactics must
also take into consideration
the Sino-Soviet bloc's over-
all policy toward the President.
The bloc is carefully cultivat-
ing Sukarno by treating him as
a major Asian-African leader,
by strongly supporting his
long-standing claim to Nether-
lands New Guinea, and by ex-
tending large-scale economic
and military assistance.
Sukarno apparently envi-
sions "guided democracy" not
only as a means of reaching
national unity and development
but also as a means of control-
ling those elements which
threaten his own position. As
long as the Communists continue
to support "guided democracy,"
he is unlikely to permit--and
the Indonesian Army is unlikely
to take--oppressive action a-
gainst them. The primary po-
litical question in Indonesia
is: How far will the Communist
party and Sukarno go in exploit-
ing each other and which will
be the loser?
Sukarnl's long-range strat-
egy is the evolution of a mass
movement in which political
identities are merged. Par-
alleling this is the achieve-
ment of an economic "liberation"
for the average Indonesian, who
will owe its accomplishment
to Sukarno. In this utopia of
cooperation and prosperity,
Sukarno believes, the Commu-
nist party and the program will
be overwhelmed and forgotten.
Its members, whom Sukarno re-
gards as more Indonesian than
Communist, will have been
educated to cooperate willing-
ly in a "gotong rojong" society,
and "Indonesian socialism" will
have been achieved.
Meanwhile, Sukarno must
balance the PKI against the
army while at the same time
insisting that the two forces
work together. Although he
would not hesitate to maneu-
ver against the party if he
felt it threatened his posi-
tion, the party is unlikely to
give him reason for doing so
until, confident of support
by the masses, it feels strong
enough vis-a-vis the army to
discard him. The outlook for
the foreseeable future is one
of continued Communist gains,
including participation in
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