CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A003000110001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 52
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 21, 2008
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 26, 1961
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY
SUMMARY
CON'FIDI
CURRENT
DOE review completed.
COPY NO. 69
OCI NO. 0264/61
26 January 1961
DIA and DOS
review(s) completed.
DOCUMENT v .
NO CHANGE IN :'..ASS.
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"VIEWER:
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
CONFIDENTIAL
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY S _ IFIOE
26 January 1961
THE WEEK IN B;,R IEF
OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST
t1_A
WORLD REACTIONS TO THE INAUGURATION . . . . . . . . . . . Page 1
Reactions to the inauguration of President Kennedy
range from enthusiastic approval in most free world coun-
tries and guarded optimism in. the USSR and European satel-
lites; to criticism and hostility by Peiping and the
Asian satellites. Following Pravda's publication of a
short version of the President's inaugural address, Khru-
shchev told Ambassador Thompson thatit included several
"constructive" points; the next day both Pravda and
Izvestia published the full text. Moscow has given fair-
ly extensive coverage to the new administration; the
heavily worked theme of its commentaries is the'pros-
pect for a "radical" improvement in Soviet-American
LAOS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 4
The military situation in Laos continues to develop
unfavorably for the Boun Oum government, with the Kong
Le - Pathet Lao forces retaining the initiative in widely
separated areas. The government's military reverses were
probably a prime consideration behind its abrupt request
for an on-the-spot SEATO investigation of Soviet and North
Vietnamese aid to the antigovernment forces; an appeal to
the United Nations has been prepared but has not been
formally presented. The Communists show little disposi-
tion to accept any proposal that might lead to an early
cessation of military activities in Laos.
CONGO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 6
The UN force in the Congo faces a reduction of more
than 5,000 men as a result of planned or threatened with-
drawals of contingents supplied by neutralist nations, and
Ghanaian President Nkrumah will be under increasing pres-
sure to maintain neutralist unity by pulling out his 2,000
troops as well. The UAR unit in Equateur Province
probably will depart by 1
February. Meanw e, g-ian military aid to Kasavubu
and Tshombd appears to be increasing, and France also
seems to be allowing its officers to accept requests from
Tshombd to serve as military advisers. The conference
of Congolese leaders which convened on 25 January in
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11 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE' WEEKLY SUMMARY
26 January 1961
PART I (continued)
Leopoldville appears unlikely to accomplish anything ex-
cept to increase the gulf between opponents and supporters
of Lumumba.
Page 8
Cuba now has long-term trade and payments agreements
with all 12 Sino-Soviet bloc countries. Cuban relations
with Yugoslavia, which had been friendly early in the
Castro regime, have become progressively cool as Soviet
influence increased
Antigovernment demonstrations were quickly
suppressed in Havana, and the major government effort
against guerrillas in the Escambray Mountains continues.
EL SALVADOR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 10
The seizure of the Salvadoran government early on
25 January was carried out by military officers gravely
concerned over the deposed junta's failure to take
energetic measures against the Communists. Within a
few hours of the coup,violence erupted in the capital;
further disorders between the military and Communist-
led mobs is anticipated. The army, however, is believed
capable of restoring order.
PART II
NOTES AND COMMENTS
KHRUSHCHEV SPEECH ON MOSCOW MEETING OF WORLD
COMMUNIST LEADERS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 1
Khrushchev's report on the Moscow conference of
world Communist leaders, given on 6 January but not pub-
lished until 17 January, was designed as a vigorous re-
affirmation of Soviet positions in the dispute with
Peiping. The main purpose of the speech was to serve
notice to the Communist movement that despite the
equivocal Moscow declaration of 6 December the con-
ference did not alter the views of the Soviet leaders.
In defending his own position, Khrushchev implicitly
rebuked the Chinese but avoided the use of sharp
language which could provoke the Chinese Communists
into a revival of polemics. The original version of
the speech, however, is reported to have included a
full discussion of the bitter debates with the Chinese
representatives in Moscow. In terms of Soviet foreign
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE' WEEKLY SUMMARY
26 January 1961
PART II (continued)
policy, Khrushchev provided authoritative confirmation
of previous indications that the USSR intends to continue
its aggressive anticolonial line, while at the same time
pressing a campaign for negotiations with the West.
CHANGES IN SOVIET PRESIDIUM EXPECTED . . . . . . . . . . . Page 3
Changes in the Soviet hierarchy appear likely, pri-
marily as a result of Khrushchev's dissatisfaction with
the performance of some of his lieutenants in managing
agricultural production. This, together with other
factors such as growing competition for Khrushchev's
favor and the advanced age and ill health of some
presidium members, could "lead to several changes among
officials immediately under Khrushchev. The 22nd party
congress is scheduled for October 1961, but changes in
leadership may be made sooner.
KHRUSHCHEV'S AGRICULTURAL REFORMS .
. Page 5
In his speech to the central committee plenum on
agriculture last week, Khrushchev set forth in detail
his solution for Soviet agricultural problems. Describ-
ing agriculture as "out of step" with industry and the
demands of the consumer, he spelled out the regime's
intention to improve the standard of living without
sacrificing basic industrial goals.
CHINESE COMMUNIST CENTRAL COMMITTEE PLENUM . . . . . . . . Page 7
The communique of the recent Chinese Communist cen-
tral commitee plenum confirms that economic difficulties
have forced Peiping to adopt less ambitious programs for
agriculture and industry. Agricultural production will
be stressed in 1961, even at the cost of slowing the
growth of heavy industry; investment priorities ap-
parently will be revised to give some relief to con-
sumers. Although placing primary blame for the retrench-
ment on "natural calamities," leaders are seeking scape-
goats for their own mismanagement and will probably purge
some lower level officials. The central committee plenum
also passed a resolution approving the results of the
Msocow meeting of world Communist leaders; the language
of the resolution implies that the Chinese will con-
tinue to advocate a more militant strategy than Moscow
favors but, like the Soviets, want to refrain from
polemics.
YUGOSLAVIA PAROLES DJILAS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 10
Milovan Djilas, heretical author of The New Class and
-one-time confidant of.Yugoslav President Tito, was released
from prison on 20 January, probably on the condition that
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JGI_I[G 1
CURRENT INTELLTGENCE.WEEKLY SUMMARY
26 January,~1961
PART II (continued)
he would not engage in political activity or publish
material unfavorable to the regime. Tito, under a variety
of domestic and foreign pressures to free Djilas, believes
that his release will have few repercussions:; within Yugo-
slavia, although there are elements in Yugoslavia which,
like Djilas, favor a faster pace of domestic liberaliza-
tion.
DISCONTENT WITHIN SEATO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 11
The failure of SEATO members to agree on joint action
on Laos has disappointed the organization,' Asian members
and led them to believe that the alliance has lost much
of its value. Although no other member has yet followed
Thailand's lead in calling for a SEATO-supported military
effort in Laos, the type of negotiated political settle-
ment on which the British and French are insisting is
causing some uneasiness in the Philippines and Pakistan,
as well as in Thailand. These countries feel that the
Europeans are underrating the strategic threat posed by
the Communists in Laos and are deserting their less power-
LAUD REGIME IN AFGHANISTAN .
The gradual weakening of Prime Minister Daud?s posi-
tion may give Moscow new opportunities to extend its in-
roads in Afghanistan. Daud's strong leadership has been
undermined recently by the failure of his health and by
disagreement within the royal family over policy toward
Pakistan. Any successor regime would probably lack firm
leadership and make for instability which the USSR
could exploit.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
26 January 1961
PART II (continued)
FRANCE-ALGERIA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 13
increased rebel activity has dampened
some of the initial enthusiasm in French circles, and
claims by each side that the other is responsible for
continued terrorism could still jeopardize negotiations.
Meanwhile, De Gaulle is continuing with a limited imple-
mentation of his plan for creating provisional govern-
ment institutions in Algeria.
FRENCH COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 15
The rapid evolution of the relationships between
France and its former colonial possessions in Africa
has outmoded the formal organisms devised in 1958 to
implement the French Community. Negotiations now under
way with four African states will measure France's
success in seeking to maintain its influence in Black
Africa without insisting on a rigid framework which
the Africans might view as a limit to their sovereignty.
Bilateral agreements along the lines of those France has
reached with Cameroun--a former trust territory which
was never a member of the French Community--may now be
the only formal tie Paris can salvage from the original
community concept.
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26 January 1961
KHRUSHCHEV--THE SOVIET PUBLIC IMAGE . . . . . . . o . . . Page
Although a number of developments in domestic and
foreign policy last year--such as the summit collapse
last spring, the stresses in Sino-Soviet relations, and
agricultural difficulties--provided the material for politi-
cal controversy among Soviet leaders, Khrushchev's control
has emerged apparently undiminished. One sign of his
dominance was the great effort by his lieutenants and
propagandists to enlarge his public image as the leader
singularly endowed.to prosecute the aims of the Soviet
state. The new version of the leader cult is probably
not only a reflection of the actualities of Kremlin poli-
tics but a political factor in itself which inhibits any
genuine challenge to his authority,
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THE OUTLOOK FOR BRAZIL UNDER QUADROS , , , > . . . . . . Page 10
Janio Quadros, who will be inaugurated President of
Brazil on 31 January, only ten days after returning from
a three-month trip to Western Europe, will be the first
chief executive in 30 years to take office as a representa-
tive of that country's traditional "out" parties. The
problems of transition will be intensified by Quadros'
lack of formal ties with any of the parties in his
sponsoring coalition and by Brazil's impending
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
26 January 1961
PART III (continued)
balance-of-payments crisis, which demands early. decision
on economic and fiscal policy. In the search for ways
to alleviate the financial crisis, Quadros may seek a
US loan, but he is likely to be much more aggressive and
independent than past Brazilian presidents in dealing
with Washington.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
26 January 1961
OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST
WORLD REACTIONS TO THE INAUGURATION
Moscow has given extensive
coverage to the President's
inauguration and subsequent ac-
tivities of the new administra-
tion, with the main emphasis on
prospects for an improvement of
Soviet-American relations and
the international climate.
The focal point of Soviet
reporting has been the exchange
of messages between Khrushchev
and the President, both of which
were given front-page treatment
in the Soviet central press.
Soviet propagandists asserted
that the exchange of telegrams
was more than mere courtesy and
should be considered as a good
omen for future approaches to
important international issues.
Khrushchev's telegram was inter-
preted as new proof that the
USSR is taking the initiative
in improving relations, and
the President's reply was de-
scribed as prompt, friendly,
and favorable.
On 21 January Pravda ran
a short version of the Presi-
dent's inaugural address, with
significant passages omitted.
Khrushchev, however, told Am-
bassador-Thompson that morning
that he had read the speech,
had found many "constructive"
points, and would have the
press publish the full text.
Pravda and Izvestia subsequently
did so. Soviet commentaries
have singled out passages which
are interpreted as signifying
a policy of negotiations on
disputed issues. The Soviet
press has also cited American
press reports that the President
and various cabinet members,
spend two days discussing for-
eign policy questions and re-
lations with the USSR in par-
ticular. TASS published a short
account of the President's press
conference statements on the
release of the RB-47 crew mem-
bers and on U-2 flights.
Although Soviet treatment
of the change in administrations
is apparently intended to con-
vey a general impression of
optimism, the sparse editorial
comment is more cautious in
forecasting future policies in
any detail. The dominant theme
of the commentaries is that the
American people expect the new
administration to set a new
course in its relations with
the Soviet Union.
Pravda attributed to the
American people a hope that
President Kennedy will "cease
adventurist" foreign policies,
including provocations against
the USSR, and fulfill his "prom-
ise" to negotiate with the
Soviet Union. The article took
a wait-and-see attitude on wheth-
er these hopes will be justi-
fied and cited various and "of-
ten contradictory" views among
Americans concerning the new
administration's future policy.
Both Pravda and propaganda com-
mentators Have referred to "dif-
ficulties" inherited from the
outgoing administration and the
continued presence of powerful
"specters," specifically citing
reports that influential cir-
cles favor breaking off the nu-
clear test ban talks.
Pravda and Izvestia, how-
ever, summarized American press
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peace treaty "between the two
German states" or a settlement
of the Berlin question. The
Albanian press, like the Chi-
nese, is trumpeting, that the Presi-
dent's remarks and the first
acts of his administration prove
that the nature of American
"aggressiveness" has not. changed.
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
26 January 1961
reports and editorials which
forecast a, period of active
diplomacy to establish a basis
for future negotiations; a New
York Herald Tribune article was
quo eff othe a ect that the
new President does not intend
to be forced into an unprepared
and premature summit conference.
In sharp contrast to Mos-
cow's hopeful outlook, Communist
China and the Asian satellites
greeted the inauguration with
harsh and bitter words, charac-
terizing it as a "poor show
stage-managed by the big US
monopolies." Using the same
line toward the incoming ad-
ministration they adopted after
the election, Peiping, Pyongyang,
and Hanoi saw no chance for a
change in basic US policy--
especially the "aggressive US
actions" in Taiwan, South Korea,
and South Vietnam.
Except for the Albanian,
all of the East European chiefs
of state wired congratulations
to the new President. The Poles,
Czechs, and Rumanians, however,
did not release the text locally.
All of the satellite news agen-
cies reported the inauguration,
drawing heavily on the TASS
version, but apparently none
carried very extensive excerpts
from the President's address.
The Rumanians have eschewed
editorial comment of any kind.
Most of the satellites
have followed Moscow's example
in giving the new administration
the benefit of the doubt. Their
comment appears more austere than
that of the Soviets, however,
with editorialists venturing
bitterly critical post-mortems
of the previous administration's
foreign policies. East German
media have complained that the
President failed to mention a
Western Europe
Non-Communist comment in
Western Europe and Latin Ameri-
ca on the inaugural address is
universally favorable, much of
it highly laudatory. Some caution
is expressed that good words must
be transformed into good deeds.
West German political
leaders and press especially
hailed the President's assurances
that the United States is pre-
pared to pay any price to pre-
serve liberty--Major Brandt not-
ing that this is the kind of
language understood and re-
spected in West Berlin. The US
Mission in Berlin reported that
West Berliners are highly opti-
mistic over the new administra-
tion. Berlin political leaders
have expressed great admiration
for the new cabinet selections
and expect new "vitality and
dynamism" in foreign policy.
The left-wing socialist
press in Italy hailed the ev-
idence of a "new spirit" in
America, and even the Communist
press there and in Scandivania
bestowed its cautious approval.
Latin American commentary
centered on what it takes as
evidence that the Kennedy ad-
ministration will pay more
attention to problems of west-
ern. hemisphere countries, a-
long with underdeveloped countries
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26 January 1961
generally. Chilean Foreign
Minister Vergara described the
inaugural address as "lofty and
notable," and Bolivian Presi-
dent Paz Estenssoro observed
that it was a speech "of high
intellectual content."
In a conversation with an
American Embassy official,
Venezuelan Foreign Minister
Falcon, a former ambassador to
Washington, described the ad-
dress as a great document.
The influential Venezuelan
minister of mines and hydro-
carbons; one of President.
Betancourt's most trusted ad-
visers, stated that the inau-
guration heartened the under-
developed countries and gave
the world hope for the rescue
of the United States Government
from the "interests which have
lately been managing it."
Fidel Castro, in his 20
January speech, set the cue
for Cuba's reaction by express-
ing some "hope" that the new
administration may correct at
least some of "the great errors
of the outgoing administration."
Castro said the inaugural ad-
dress had "some positive as-
pects," but "our attitude will
be one of waiting--waiting for
events because deeds are al-
ways more eloquent than words."
Subsequent comment by the con-
trolled press and radio in.
Cuba has emphasized that the
first test of the new admini-
stration's intentions will be
what it does with respect to
the "bands of war criminals
and counterrevolutionaries
organized by the Central In-
telligence Agency to attack
Cuba."
The Trujillo dictator-
ship also sees some hope of a
change in past US support of
sanctions imposed by the OAS
against the Dominican Republic.
A radiobroadcast on 23 January
commented that the inauguration
of President Kennedy is a cause
for some optimism, but warned
that "the 35th president of
Yankeeland has demonstrated
neither tact nor skill in se-
lecting" his foreign policy
advisers and he will thus be
handicapped in correcting past
US "errors."
The Indian press welcomed
the inaugural address. The
Hindustan Times commented that
it a prom- a of "a new touch
of toughness as well as resil-
ience in dealing with problems,
and of youthful vigor and im-
aginative insight in exploring
solutions."
Public media in Japan have
given mass coverage to the in-
auguration, and editorial and
official reaction is highly
favorable. Commentators wel-
comed the President's emphasis
on policies to help solve Afro-
Asian problems, and see the
change in administrations as
holding promise of progress,
rather than continuation of
a "passive" attitude. Japan's
largest and most influential
paper, Asahi Shimbun, expressed
the hope that - tlPresident would
gradually free Japanese-US rela-
tions from military ties.
Reactions throughout non-
Communist Southeast Asia have
been generally favorable. In
Cambodia, press coverage was
moderately heavy, and the Phil-
ippine press received the in-
augural activities with enthu-
siastic approval.
In Indonesia, both National-
ist party Chairman All
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26 January 1961
Sastroamidjojo and Communist
party Chairman Aid it saw "new
hope" for the world as a result
of the inaugural address.
Sastroamidjojo, however, re-
gretted the lack of a more
positive statement against
colonialism. Aiditqualified
his approval by noting,"It
cannot be taken for granted
that Kennedy's past actions
are A 'sure guarantee' that such
hopes will be realized." Aidit
found the new cabinet funda-
mentally no different from the
previous one., but added, "We
must see what this cabinet does
before making an evaluation."
Arab news media in general
were reserved about the foreign
policies the new administration
will adopt, hoping that Presi-
dent Kennedy will eschew the
support of Zionism and Israel
which they identify with former
Presidents Truman and Eisenhower.
The Israeli press, in contrast,
expressed hope that the Presi-
dent will "keep his promises"
of a friendly policy toward
Israel and will"safeguard Is-
rael's vital interests" in
moving to establish peace in
the Middle East.
The semicontrolled Moroccan
and Tunisian news media have
supplied one of the few African
comments received thus far on
the inaugural address. El Amal,
daily organ of Tunisia's ru ing
Neo-Destour party, described
the speech as a "source of great
satisfaction and an optimistic
omen for humanity." It ex-
pressed regret, nevertheless,
that President Kennedy had not
spoken with "greater energy and
greater frankness" about aid
to peoples fighting for their
independence.
munist danger."
In a generally complimentary
commentary on the speech, the
nationalized Moroccan radio chose
to interpret certain passages as
implying a belief that the "old
imperialism is trying to take on
another guise." Referring to
the Congo, it urged the Presi-
dent to stop the "complicity of
US policy in the crimes being
committed in the name of West-
ern solidarity and under the
pretext of opposing the Com-
The military situation con- only remaining position of any
tinues to develop unfavorably importance in the province.
for the Boun Oum government. Retention of Tha Thom is es-
In southern Xieng Khouang Prov- sential to block any enemy ad-
ince, government troops are
maintaining a precarious hold
on Tha Thom, with its airstrip,
but the position is under heavy
attack by the combined forces
of Captain Kong Le and the Com-
munist-dominated Pathet Lao.
Since the Plaine des Jarres
fell to antigovernment forces
on 1 January, government forces
have been gradually forced south-
ward toward Tha Thom, now their
vance south of Pak Sane. Tha
Thom would also be a point of
departure for any future drive
to retake the Plaine des Jarres.
The other main locus of
fighting during the past week
has been along the Vientiane -
Luang Prabang road (Route 13).
A government column has been
moving northward from Vang Vieng
toward the Pathet Lao strong-
hold of Muong Kassy, where a
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26 January 1961
combined Kong Le - Pathet Lao
force had been expected to make
a strong defensive stand. Late
press reports indicate, however,
that the government may have
captured Muong Kassy.
North of the Phou Khoun
road junction between Route 13
and Route 7, which leads to-
ward Xieng Khouang, government
and enemy forces appear to be
building up for an important
clash. A government force'of
two infantry battalions is fac-
ing a Kong Le - Pathet Lao
force estimated at about one
battalion supported by artil-
lery. Control of the road,junc-
Luang Prabang until Muong Sai
is captured.
Faced with the deterio-
rating military situation, the
Boun Oum government has request-
ed an on-the-spot SEATO inves-
tigation of Soviet and North
Vietnamese aid to the Kong Le -
Pathet Lao forces. It has also
prepared a parallel appeal to
the United Nations but has not
yet officially approached Ham-
marskjold. Mindful of the tran-
quilizing effect a UN Security
Council inspection produced in
the fighting in 1959, the gov-
ernment probably hopes that the
presence of foreign observers
tion, now in enemy hands, is
essential to the government for
any drive eastward on the Plaine
des Jarres and to the defense
of Luang Prabang against any
enemy thrust from the south.
A Pathet Lao attack on
Muong Sai, to the north of
Luang Prabang, appears to be
developing. Government com-
manders have committed a siz-
able number of troops to the
defense of Muong Sai, apparent-
ly believing that the Pathet
Lao will not move south on
would again relieve,
if not stop, enemy
military pressure,
permitting the Laotian
Army to regain the in-
titiative.
Vientiane's claim
on 21 January that
three North Vietnamese
regiments had entered
southern Laos was ap-
parently intended to
underscore the urgency
of the situation. The
allegation is appar-
ently unfounded.
Quinim Pholsena,
the self-styled "act-
ing premier" in Sou-
vanna Phouma's absence
of the "lawful govern-
ment" of Laos, may soon be joined
at Xieng Khouang Town by other
members of the erstwhile Sou-
vanna government. A Soviet IL-
14 reportedly was to have left
Phnom Penh on 26 January carry-
ing "all other" members of the
Souvanna government except Sou-
vanna himself and former Finance
Minister Inpeng.
The passengers on this pro-
jected flight will probably con-
sist of those cabinet members
and other Souvanna followers
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26 January 1961
who fled to Rangoon last
month at the same time Souvanna
took refuge in Phnom Penh. The
most prominent members of this
party are former National Assem-
bly President Peng Phongsavan,
who in recent months had grav-
itated to an extreme leftist
position, and former Health
Minister Kamsouk Keola. The
group recently proceeded from
Rangoon to Phnom Penh via Kunming
and Hanoi.
Souvanna's role in their
apparent decision to return to
Laos is unclear, but in any
event their presence will tend
to give more substance to the
hitherto rather shadowy "lawful
government" of Laos claimed by
the Communists to be operating
in areas controlled by the Kong
Le - Pathet Lao forces.
The Communists continue to
show little disposition to ac-
cept any proposal that might
lead to an early cessation of
military activity in Laos. De-
spite their call for return of
the International Control Com-
mission (ICC), they are backing
away from practical application
of this concept, and it appears
there is little hope that a
21 January British proposal to
reactivate the ICC will be ac-
cepted.
This, proposal was addressed
to the USSR, as the USSR and
Great Britain are cochairmen of
the 1954 Geneva Conference
which ended the eight-year war
in Indochina. Under the terms
of the Geneva Agreements, sep-
arate ICCs were established in
Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam to
maintain peace in the area and
ensure compliance with the a-
greements. On 21 January, the
British proposed that the ICC
for Laos be reactivated--it
adjourned in 1958--through the
agency of the King of Laos as
"head of state" and thereby
avoid the question of recogni-
tion of competing regimes. Both
Boun Oum and Wuinim Pholsena
have criticized the British
proposal.
The USSR has made no formal
reply to the British but, dur-
ing the past week, Soviet For-
eign Ministry officials have im-
plied to Western diplomats that
Any International Control Com-
mission would have to receive
new instructions from an inter-
national conference. Thus, while
the Soviet Union probably will
avoid outright rejection of the
British proposal, it is likely
that Moscow will counter by
stressing the need to first con-
vene another conference along
the general lines of the 1954
Geneva meeting before any agree-
ment on ICC is reached. Such a
conference would provide the Com-
munists with a forum for anti- 25X1
American invective and with the
opportunity to procrastinate on
a settlement in Laos.
The 20,000-man UN force
in the Congo faces a reduction
of more than 5,000 as a result
of planned or threatened with-
drawals of contingents sup-
plied by neutralist nations.
Guinea's 700-man unit is sched-
uled to leave on 2 February,
and both Morocco and the UAR
have asked the UN to provide
facilities for the repatriation
of their units--which number
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
26 January 1961
L UN
o icia s have as ed US
assistance in meeting
the 1 February deadline
set by Cairo and have
stated that the battal-
ion;'s equipment would
be airlifted at the same
time in order to give
the UAR Government no
opportunity to renege.
The UN has asked India.
Ethiopia, Sudan, and
Iran to furnish re-
placements for the de-
parting units, with
little response to date.
25X1
3,000 and 500, respectively--by
the end of January. Indonesia
has also stated that its battal-
ion of 1,100 men will be with-
drawn but has set no date.
The growing disillusion-
ment of other neutralists with
the UN Congo operation will
place increasing pressure on
Ghanaian President Nkrumah,
who is the only member of this
group who has maintained his
commitment to the UN. Nkru-
mah apparently believes that
Ghana and the other supporters
of Lumumba could wield greater
influence if their forces were
to remain in the Congo. How-
ever, his allies probably will
attempt to persuade him to re-
verse his stand and pull out
his 2,000 troops.
The UN is moving with
alacrity to evacuate the UAR
unit from Equateur Province
Pressure on Khartoum is
likely to increase as a result
of the emergency meeting of the
Afro-Asian Solidarity Organiza-
tion's executive committee on 23
January. The committee urged
that governments which have es-
tablished diplomatic relations
with the Congo send their mis-
sions to Stanleyville and recom-
mended that Afro-Asian countries
with troops in the Congo place
them at the disposal of the
"lawful government in Stanley-
ville." A committee was estab-
lished to coordinate aid to the
Congo--comprised of representa-
tives of 13 countries, including
the USSR,Communist China, and
the UAR.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
26 January 1961
Meanwhile, Brussels ap-
pears to be stepping up its aid
to the governments in Leopold-
ville and Elisabethville. A
Belgian Foreign Ministry offi-
cial told American representa-
tives that defense personnel
had helped to screen a group
of Belgian recruits who subse-
quently were flown to Elisabeth
ville. Tshombd reportedly is
also recruiting troops through
German veterans' organizations.
According to reports in Leo-
poldville, more than 100 Bel-
gian officers now are serving
with Mobutu's forces.
France also seems to be
allowing its officers to accept
requests from Tshombd to serve
as military advisers. According
to press reports, a rightist
With the conclusion of five-
year trade and payments agree-
ments with Albania on 19 Janu-
ary, Cuba now has reached such
agreements with all 12 Sino-So-
viet bloc countries. Tirana
was the last stop of a Cuban
mission that had been traveling'
to all bloc capitals since last
October. Seven bloc countries
--the USSR, Communist China,
Czechoslovakia, East Germany,
Hungary, Rumania, and Bulgaria
--now have granted Cuba a total
of $245,000,000 in credits. Che
Guevara, who headed the mission
during the first two months, ne-
gotiated the multilateral pay-
ments agreements in Moscow under
which the bloc coordinates its
economic relations with Cuba.
colonel was granted a long leave
of absence recently for this
purpose and is scheduled to ar-
rive in Elisabethville late this
week with several other officers.
The Leopoldville conference
of Congolese leaders which con-
vened on 25 January seems
unlikely to accomplish anything
except to increase the gulf be-
tween opponents and supporters
of Lumumba. The conference has
been boycotted by Gizenga and
his associates; thus, it prob-
ably will fail to contribute
significantly to a solution of
the country's political problems.
However, it may produce some
greater degree of coordination
between Congolese in Leopold-
ville and Tshombd's regime in
Katanga.
The volume and tenor of
Soviet propaganda on Cuba has
declined over the past week,
but a number of press items
have appeared reporting "solidar-
ity-with-Cuba meetings" in var-
ious Soviet factories.
Meanwhile, Latin American
governments are considering
means of dealing with the Cuban
problem. Though six of them had
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
26 January 1961
already broken or suspended dip-
lomatic relations with the Castro
regime before the United States
took this step on 3 January,most
of the others feel that further
steps should be the result of a
multilateral decision through
the Organization of American
States (OAS). Nevertheless,
Venezuela, Colombia, Panama,and
Uruguay have in recent weeks
either expelled Cuban ambassa
dors or announced the withdrawal
of their ambassadors from Havana.
Several governments have urged
an early special meeting of for-
eign ministers to deal with the
Cuban problem.
sent two cabinet min-
isters to Costa Rica in mid-Jan-
uary to seek support for such
a move. Apparently, however,
Costa Rican President Echandi
opposed pressing for a meeting
now and favored adding the Cuban
problem to the agenda of the
11th Inter-American Conference,
now scheduled to open in Quito
on 24 May.
The resumption of executions
of anti-Castro activists in Cuba,
including students and labor
unionists, has aroused the ma-
jority of the diplomatic corpsin
Havana. A five-nation committee
of the diplomatic corps was
selected on 23 January to re-
quest clemency for the ac-
cused.
remaining in Havana had initiated[ munist-led goon squads and the
the action. While this diplo-
matic pressure is unlikely to
have any notable success, con-
tinued violations of human rights
by the regime will further hard-
en Latin American opinion against
Castro.
On the domestic scene, the
Cuban Government and its con-
trolled press and radio continue
the "wait-and-see" attitude to-
ward the new administration in
Washington adopted in Fidel
Castro's 20 January speech.
Cuban militiamen, mobilized to
resist the "invasion" Cubans
had been told to expect momen-
tarily since 31 December, were
sent back to their jobs. Cubans
are being told that they have
won a "bloodless battle" against
"imperialism" and must now fight
to win the "battles" of produc-
tion and against illiteracy.
On 21 and 22 January, Fidel
Castro met with officers of the
National Agrarian Reform In-
stitute (INRA). "Production
goals" for 1961 were set, and
Castro subsequently announced
several plans for agriculture
in the coming year, including
the establishment of special
tracts on each cooperative farm
for the training of children.
He also announced plans for an
exchange program under which
1,000 young Soviet farmers
would come to Cuba and Cuban
youths would go to the USSR
"to increase the knowledge of
our farmers."
At least two public anti-
Castro demonstrations have
occurred in the past several
days. On 17 January, a demon-
stration by about 350 electri-
cal workers who had been fired
from their jobs for participat-
ing in an anti-Communist dem-
onstration last month quickly
snowballed into a protest march
by over a thousand workers be-
fore it was dispersed by Com-
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26 January 1961
police
A second demon-
stration by some 100 women carry-
ing signs saying "end the exe-
cutions of our sons" was dis-
persed by the police in front
of the ;presidential palace on
23 January.
An earlier attempt by stu-
dents to protest the executions
of their fellow. students is be-
lieved to have resulted in par-
tial student strikes in some
cities outside of Havana. Castro,
in a 24 January speech, reiter-
ated his vow to subject anti-
government activists to "the most
implacable persecution imaginable."
The major government ef-
fort against guerrillas in the
Escambray Mountains continues.
Government forces- may well have
suffered some local set-
backs in the area, and the
willingness of the "volun-
teer" militiamen to fight
against odds has been questioned
by American service attaches
recently returned from. Cuba.
The seizure of the Sal-
vadoran government early on
25 January was carried out by
military officers gravely con-
cerned over the deposed junta's
failure to take energetic
measures against the Communists.
Within a few hours of the coup,
violence erupted in the capital,
and further disorders between
the military and Communist-led
mobs are anticipated. The
army, however, is believed capa-
ble of restoring order.
According to the American
Embassy, all army garrisons
immediately supported the coup.
Colonel Anibal Portillo, army
chief of staff, and Lt. Col.
Julio Rivers, commandant of the
command and staff school, were
chosen by the officers to head
the new regime. These officers
selected as the additional junta
members three civilians all of
whom are identified as political
conservatives. They are Dr.
Jose Antonio Rodriguez Porth,
a pro-US lawyer and former
dean of the University's law
school; Dr. Jose Enrique Val-
iente, a prominent physician
and former vice dean of the med-
ical school; and Dr. Feliciano
Avelar, also a professional man.
The embassy reported that
a roundup of Communist leaders
was under way immediately after
the coup. Former President Oscar
Osorio, who engineered the 26
October coup, and all but one
member of the deposed junta were
detained early on 25 January.
The remaining junta member, Dr.
Fabio Castillo, who is believed
to have been sympathetic to the
extreme leftists, went into
hiding.
A challenge to the new
authorities arose within a few
hours of the coup when a mob
estimated at 1,500 gathered in
front of the presidential palace
shouting in favor of the de-
posed junta and against the
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
26 January 1961
military and calling for a gen-
eral strike to protest the coup.
The Communists, who had three
months of unrestricted freedom
to build up mass support, may
succeed in instigating grave dis-
orders, and further bloodshed may
result.
There still remains some
danger of a split in the army, as
Osorio retains some military sup-
port. If the new regime should
turn to the extreme right and be
impelled to resort to strong re-
pressive measures, the Communists
could eventually enhance their
influence by exploiting the re-
sulting grievances of moderates
and non-Communist leftists.
Before the coup, some
officers had advocated hold-
ing congressional elections
as soon as possible, and the
new junta issued a statement
shortly after taking over that
one of the purposes of the
coup is to achieve "constitu-
tionality" as soon as possible.
The detention of Osorio, how-
ever, raises some question as
to whether the promised elec-
tions are to be free and open
to all non-Communist parties.
Osorio had been in the process
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which appeared to have wide back-
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
26 January 1961
PART II
NOTES AND COMMENTS
KHRUSHCHEV SPEECH ON MOSCOW MEETING OF WORLD COMMUNIST LEADERS
Khrushchev's report on
6 January, published in the
Soviet party journal Kommunist
on 17 January, was intended to
stand as the definitive Soviet
interpretation of last November's
Moscow conference of world Com-
munist leaders. Khrushchev
vigorously reaffirmed his party's
position on the issues in dis-
pute with Peiping and made it
clear that the conference did
not alter the views of the So-
viet leadership.
Probably timed to comple-
ment the short and formal 18
January Soviet central commit-
tee resolution on the results
of the conference, the speech
took a more forthright position
in dealing with the major ques-
tions of doctrine and policy
than the often equivocal Mos-
cow declaration of 6 December.
The handling of the various
issues indicates continuing
areas of disagreement with Pei-
ping and suggests that Moscow
is determined to make no im-
portant concessions to the Chi-
nese.
In effect, Khrushchev de-
fended the validity of his for-
eign policy and reaffirmed
that the only correct and prudent
course under, conditions of a
nuclear stalemate is a policy
of limited risks to achieve
political gains. As he put it,
"We always seek to direct the
development of events in a way
which ensures that, while de-
fending the interests of the
socialist camp, we do not pro-
vide the imperialist provoca-
teurs with a chance to unleash
a new world.war."
continues to run in favor of
the socialist camp,Khrushchev
stressed that the general stra-
tegic line and tactics of world
Communism depend on correct
evaluation of character of the
balance of power. While reit-
erating the standard proposi-
tion that the bloc is the "deci-
sive factor" in world affairs,
he warned that imperialism re-
tains "great strength"; under
these circumstances, he implied,
the bloc cannot undertake the
extremely militant, revolution-
ary program advocated by Pei-
ping. As Khrushchev put it,
"To win time in the economic
contest with capitalism is
now the main thing."
Againstthis backdrop, Khru-
shchev went beyond the Moscow
declaration in discussing pol-
icy toward the West. He stated,
"Our party considers the
policy of peaceful coexistence,
which has been handed down to
us by Lenin, to be the general
line of our foreign policy."
This statement takes on added
significance in light of East
German party leader Ulbricht's
acknowledgment that the term
"general line" provoked a dis-
pute at the Moscow conference.
The term did not appear
in the final declaration, and
Ulbricht indicated that the
Soviet party had attempted to
extract recognition from Pei-
ping of such a bloc-wide "line"
and acceptance of the disci-
pline-it would impose on Chi-
nese policies. Thus, in effect,
Khrushchev made it clear that
the USSR's basic foreign policy
would not be adjusted to ac-
commodate the Chinese.
Exuding confidence that
the trend of international events
Khrushchev also went fur-
ther than the declaration in
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
26 January 1961
restating Moscow's intention
to engage the West in further
,high-level talks. Unlike the
declaration, Khrushchev reiter-
ated his previous judgment that
some elements in the West un-
derstand the danger of war and
accept the need for coexistence.
Building on this premise, he
extended the Moscow statement
by reaffirming that "socialist
states" strive for "negotia-
tions and agreement" with capi-
talist countries, and.seek to
"develop contacts" with capi-
talist statesmen. Presidium
member Suslov, who delivered
the formal report on the con-
ference to the Soviet central
committee plenum on 18 January,
elaborated on Khrushchev's re-
mark and specifically pointed
out that these contacts should
be between heads of states and
governments.
Khrushchev supported the
correctness of his approach
by going into some detail on
the consequences of modern war.
After discussing the hundreds
of millions who would perish
in such a war, he called for
a "sober appraisal" of the con-
sequences as a necessary ele-
ment in mobilizing the strug-
gle to prevent war.
He also reaffirmed that
the USSR is ordinarily opposed
to local wars because of the dan-
ger that they might expand--a
risk Peiping minimizes. As for
one category of local wars,
however,'i.e., "liberation" wars
such as the Algerian rebellion--
Khrushchev stated his view, in
apparent agreement with Peiping,
that such wars are indeed in-
evitable as long as imperialism
exists. He pledged that the
bloc will give aid to such
"liberation" forces.
specifies Algeria, the Congo,
and Laos. However, the speech
evaded the question--on which
the Chinese have charged Khru-
shchev with timidity--of whether
bloc support to "liberation"
forces will go so far as to
risk military clashes with the
West. Similarly, in distin-
guishing a fourth category of
wars--"national uprisings" such
as Castro's--and in stating
his expectation of and favor
for such uprisings, Khrushchev
declared that such wars must
not become wars between states,
but he evaded the question of
what risks the bloc *ill take.
He was particularly careful
not to categorize the Laotian
situation.
Khrushchev defended at
length his policy of wooing
the nationalist leaders of
underdeveloped countries, even
at the cost of sacrificing the
local Communist parties there.
The Chinese have accused him
3f exaggerating the importance
of the neutralists (e.g., Nehru,
'Vasir, Sukarno), and have urged
less Soviet aid and more of an
effort to bring these leaders
down. Khrushchev seems willing
to move a little faster toward
making pro-Soviet "national
democracies" (e.g., Cuba) of
the neutral nations, but still
not as fast as Peiping wishes.
As for the tactics of
Communist parties in the West,
Khrushchev reaffirmed a grad-
ualist program for these par-
ties, envisaging lengthy prep-
aration---through "democratic"
movements--for eventual rev-
olution. The Chinese have
argued that "revolutionary
situations" exist today in
Western Europe and should be
exploited.
The speech reinforced
earlier indications that Moscow
will pursue a more aggressive
program in all "colonial" areas
--among which Khrushchev .
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In the latter part of his
speech, Khrushchev discussed'
the question of the discipline
of the world Communist movement,
the underlying issue in the
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26 January 1961
Sino-Soviet dispute. Khrushchev
insisted that the "unity" of
the movement is of "foremost
importance," and he reiterated
that the Soviet party recog-
nizes the "equality" of other
parties and does not regard it-
self as the "center" of the
movement.
He followed this, however,
by making clear that the Soviet
party does indeed wish to be
regarded as the principal party
and as the spokesman for the
bloc, and in effect he advised
the other parties to get rid of
those who sympathize more with
Peiping than with Moscow. Sev-
eral parties at the November
conference had supported the
Chinese on some issues, and
many other parties were neutral
or split.
Khrushchev, in conclusion,
addressed himself directly to
the Chinese, whom he condemned
elsewhere in the speech, with-
out naming them, for persistent
"dogmatism and sectarianism."
He reminded them that Sino-So-
viet "unity" is necessary to
"disappoint" and confound com-
mon enemies. Here and else-
where he indirectly admitted
that the Moscow conference did
not resolve Sino-Soviet dif-
ferences and may actually have
made them worse.
Although Khrushchev
quoted liberally from the Mos-
cow declaration as testimony to
the extent of agreement reached,
the US Embassy has received
reports that the original ver-
sion of the speech contained
sharp criticism of the Chinese.
Khrushchev is reported to have
bitterly castigated the Chinese
leaders and stated that al-
though they were "stupid,"
it was necessary to reach agree-
ment with them.
He also reportedly pre-
sented a full review of the
sharp debates between the Soviet
representatives and the Chinese.
He is said to have read to the
meeting of party functionaries
in the Kremlin the main parts
of Liu Shao Chi's attack on So-
viet policy as well as his own
reply and concluded with the
statement,"This is what happened
--you can .fudge for yourselves."
A new shake-up in the So-
viet top leadership appears
likely, primarily as a result
of Khrushchev's dissatisfaction
with the performance of some
of his lieutenants in managing
agricultural production. This,
together with other factors
such as growing competition for
Khrushchev's favor and the ad-
vanced age and ill health of
some presidium members, could
lead to several changes in the
Soviet hierarchy immediately
under Khrushchev. The 22nd
party congress is scheduled
for October 1961, but the
changes in leadership may be
made sooner.
The central committee took
the first step toward the impend-
ing shakE-up by adding two new
candidates to the party presi-
dium at the recent plenum on
agriculture. Fifty-year-old
Gennady Voronov, party chief
in Orenburg Oblast--a major
grain-producing area--and 46-
year-old Viktor Grishin, trade
union boss, are the first addi-
tions to the presidium since
Russian Republic Premier Dmitry
Polyansky and Ukrainian party
chief Nikolay Podgorny were
brought in in June 1958. Since
that time four members--Bulganin,
Belyayev, Kirichenko, and Voro-
shilov--have been dropped. The
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26 January 1961
fended" the Ministry
of Agriculture; he no
doubt now regrets the
position he took then
in the controversy
over the proper role
of the ministry. His
future may be in the
balance.
VORONOV
new men were probably not'added
simply to fill existing vacan-
cies,however; they are pre-
sumably being groomed to re-
place full. members whose tenures
appear insecure.
In particular, Podgorny,
who became a full member only
last May, now appears to be on
probation, if not actually on
the way out. Khrushchev several
times interrupted Podgorny's
speech at the plenum with sting-
ing rebukes and sharp criticism
for mistakes in agricultural
administration in the Ukraine.
During his own speech, Khrushchev
again criticized Ukrainian af-
fairs in terms suggesting a
severe political estrangement
between him and the Ukrainian
party organization which he once
headed and which was one of his
strong political assets in the
post--Stalin struggle for power.
The Ukrainian leadership, until
now one of the most stable in
the Soviet Union, thus seems
slated for a "time of troubles."
Belorussian party chief
Kirill Mazurov, a candidate
member of the presidium, es-
caped sharp barbs at the plenum,
but Khrushchev noted deficiencies
in Belorussian agricultural
production and had very little
good to say about the republic.
Moreover, Mazurov, in a Pravda
article of 11 December, -de-
:.CET
Grishin, who succeeded
Shvernik as head of the Soviet
trade unions in 1956 and also
became a vice president of the
World Federation of Trade Unions,
may be slated again to replace
Shvernik as trade union "rep-
resentative" in the party presid-
ium. His appointment to the
presidium is probably intended
to enhance his stature in in-
ternational labor circles and
may signify Soviet plans for a
more active role in that field.
Initially, however, Grishin has
been given the task of mobiliz-
ing the vast trade union organ-
ization behind Khrushchev's new
program for increasing agri-
cultural production.
Voronov made his career
as a professional party official
but served as deputy minister
of agriculture for two years
before assuming party leader-
ship of Orenburg Oblast in the
New Lands area of the Russian
Republic in 1957. The oblast
has made notable agricultural
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
26 January 1961
achievements during his tenure
--a strong factor in his se-
lection for membership on the
party presidium. His back-
ground and success in this
field make him a likely candi-
date to be given responsibility,
under Khrushchev, for party
supervision of agriculture.
KHRUSHCHEV'S AGRICULTURAL REFORMS
In a speech to the central
committee plenum last week,
Khrushchev presented detailed
remedies for the USSR's agri-
cultural problems. Describing
agriculture as "out of step"
with industry and the demands
of the consumer, Khrushchev
made more explicit the regime's
intention to improve living
standards without sacrificing
basic industrial goals. He
called for an increase in
agricultural investment, intro-
duction of new material incen-
tives for improving quality
and quantity of farm production,
a comprehensive program to re-
vamp the Ministry of Agriculture;
and creation of new agencies
for supplying farms with ma-
chinery and for regulating
purchases of farm products.
He thus confirmed that So-
viet agriculture has made un-
satisfactory progress toward
achieving the 70-percent in-
crease in gross output called
for by the Seven-Year Plan
USSR: NET AGRICULTURAL OUTPUT
1950-100
01 , I I I I I I I 1 1
1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960-
10125 4 PRELIMINARY ESTIMATE
(1959-65). The USSR claimed
that grain production in 1960
was 133,000,000 metric tons.
However, an examination of weath-
er and crop conditions suggests
that 100,000,000 tons--about
the same as in 1959--would be
a more realistic figure. In
general, agricultural produc-
tion in 1960, as in 1959, re-
mains at about the level of
1958, the base year of the plan.
Industrial production, on the
other hand,. is well ahead of
schedule--Soviet officials claim
a 22-percent increase in the
past two years.
This disproportion was
the basis for Khrushchev's
call for increasing investment
in agricultural machinery, ex-
panding irrigation, and increas-
ing production of fertilizers
and other agricultural chemicals
---to be financed by channeling
resources from industrial pro-
grams which are exceeding planned
goals. Financed in this manner,
the increased resources for
1965
PLAN
26 JANUARY 1961
SECRET
agriculture will not
alter industrial goals,
and are intended to
cut into industrial
output by something
less than the total
amount by which 1965
industrial goals are
expected to be ex-
ceeded. As in the
past, the total in-
vestment program will
overwhelmingly favor
heavy industry.
Khrushchev made
the USSR Ministry
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26 January 1961
of Agriculture chiefly re-
sponsible for practical re-
search work and the dissemi-
nation of results. It is to
be responsible for scientific
research institutes; seed
development and production;
veterinary services, including
breeding and quarantine; tech-
nical agricultural publications.
The ministry was told to sup-
port,specialists and to expose
so-called experts whose claims
are based on nothing more than
having "eaten potatoes at a
canteen." This calls to mind
party utterances last year
which affirmed the key role. of
party organizations but warned
against "petty" interference
in the work of specialists.
. The full extent to which
the ministry is to be divested
of administration of state and
collective farms is not known.
However, the ministry, already
weakened by the Machine Tractor
Station reform in 1958 and the
later loss of its planning and
.supply .functions,now is to lose
control over machinery repair
and state purchases of agricul-,
tural products.
Khrushchev announced the
formation of an elaborate na-
tional organization--an "all-
union association"--to supply
equipment, spare parts, ferti-
lizers, and other needs to the
collective and state farms.
This organization is to coor-
dinate production plans for
these items with the State
Planning Commission (Gosplan)
and the factories, taking re-
quests from farms into account.
The association is to be
hierarchical in structure, with
representatives from the na-
tional to the local level.
In addition to supplying
farms, the local agencies are
to control the repair and test-
ing of farm equipment. The prob-
lem of supplying the many enter-
prises which have been built
jointly by collective farms dur-
ing the past several years was
not explicitly covered in Khru-
shchev's speech; the associa-
tion may have been given this
responsibility.
A second new agency, called
State Committee for Procurements,
is to be established to control
collection of agricultural prod-
ucts through a system of con-
tracts with collective and state
farms. It will also check up
on individual farm performance
and be charged with informing
responsible officials of short-
comings. This organization
could lead to improved planning
and a reduction in statistical
falsification--a widespread
practice, judging from reports
at the plenum.
Khrushchev's call for a
"cooperative society" to buy
farm good not sold directly
to the state indi-
cates a further de-
crease in the impor-
tance of the collec-
tive-farm markets, one
of the few vestiges
of free enterprise
in the USSR.
"How is livestock production?"
SECRET
Khrushchev re-
affirmed many of his
pet agricultural meas-
ures at the plenum.
These included programs
to increase corn acre-
age drastically and to
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
26 January 1961
cultivate the marginal lands
of. Kazakhstan and Western Si-
beria--the New Lands program.
He also emphasized material
incentives for farmers and the
importance to production of
widely disseminating the experi-
ence of outstanding workers.
Khrushchev's long-standing am-
bition to change the Soviet
Union's farm villages into
model agricultural cities with
apartments, parks, and modern
plumbing is apparently not to
be pushed beyond the suggestion
stage at this time.
CHINESE COMMUNIST CENTRAL COMMITTEE PLENUM
Between 14 and 18 January
the Chinese Communist party cen-
tral committee met in plenary
session for the first time since
August 1959. The plenum's com-
muniqu6 reveals that economic
difficulties have forced Pei-
ping to adopt less ambitious
programs for agriculture and
industry and to inaugurate a
mass campaign to bolster popu-
lar morale.
The long hiatus between
plenums--party rules call for
at least two a year--may have
stemmed from Peiping's reluc-
tance to admit that the general
lines of its domestic policy
had failed to cope with eco-
nomic problems and from indeci-
sion as to what to try next.
The 1959 session, although it
marked a retreat from the gran-
diose economic goals set up
under the "leap forward" program,
had also insisted that a "leap
forward" was possible and had
set in motion a campaign against
the ''right opportunists"--con-
servatives within the government
and party , who advocate more prag-
matic policies.
Consolidation and Readjustment
The decisions taken at the
current plenum constitute a much
sharper swing to the right.
While the communique defensive-
ly argues that during the last
three years much progress has
been made industrially and that
the rural communes have proved
their effectiveness as eco-
nomic and political units, con-
solidation and readjustment
are to be the dominant economic
themes for 1961. "Natural
calamities" on an unprecedented
scale are blamed for the re-
trenchment.
Economic policy pronounce-
ments include an enhanced role
for agriculture--now described
as the foundation of the econ-
omy--and reduced priorities for
heavy industry. The two con-
secutive years of poor harvests
have forced' the Chinese to
strengthen agriculture even at
the cost of slowing the hither-
to rapid growth of heavy in-
dustry.
The scope of capital con-
struction in 1961 is to be re-
duced and more care paid to
raising standards and filling
the gaps. Heavy industry, after
three years of almost exclusive
concentration on quantitative
goals, now is expected to raise
the quality and variety of pro-
duction, to economize on raw
materials, and to lower costs.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
26 January 1961
Peiping claims that 1960, the I
third year of the leap-forward
campaign, maintained the rapid
rate of industrial growth of
the two previous years. The
average given for gross in-
dustrial output over 1958-60,
however, implies that indus-
trial output grew by about 18
percent in 1960, well below the
planned goal of 29 percent.
Rapid growth in industrial
production during the leap for-
ward was achieved at the cost of
inadequate maintenance of machin-
ery and equipment, disruption of
planning and coordination, and
excessive demands on the labor
force. A period of consolidation
would allow the Chinese to
redress the balance of the
economy and prepare for fur-
ther rapid growth in the fu-
ture.
The decision to increase
production in light industry
indicates concern over the de-
teriorating standard of living.
The use of incentives as a means
of raising labor productivity
came into disfavor during the,
creation of the communes, and
subsequent efforts to restore
them have been handicapped by
a short supply of food, clothing,
and other consumer goods. It
now appears that the Chinese
are ready to revise investment
priorities to give at least
temporary relief to the con-
sumers and to prepare a firmer
foundation for long-term growth
by strengthening agriculture.
The communique took note
of opposition to the regime's
policies from "unreformed
landlord and bourgeois elements."
Peiping thus served notice of
its hypersensitivity to criticism
and its determination to deal
harshly with dissenters. The
scope of the current crisis,
however, is too great to fix
the blame entirely on the weather
and "evil" elements. Peiping
therefore has once again placed
a large part of the onus on the
long-suffering party cadres
which have "misunderstood" the
correct line. These cadres were
charged with failing to grasp
the fine distinctions between
socialism and communism and the
necessity of paying more to
those who work more--concepts
first muddied by the top lead-
ers themselves.
The central committee's
communique announced a major
"rectification" campaign to
educate the cadres in the cor-
rect policies and to "weed out"
those "few" corrupt elements
which have infiltrated the party
and economic organizations. The
rectification campaign is a
favorite device of the Chinese
Communist party to make certain
that the cadres continue to toe
the line; through study and
self- and group-criticism, "mis-
takes" of the past are brought
to light and the "correct" pol-
icy drummed home. In a major
campaign such as this promises
to be, the drive takes preced-
ence over other items of busi-
ness and is to be conducted
in the glare of full pub-
licity.
The number of persons who
will actually be disgraced or
purged will probably be rela-
tively small. The communique
spoke of only a "few" unreformed
elements, and the references to
cadres who have "misunderstood"
the regime's intentions were
fairly tolerant, acknowledging
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
26 January 1961
that they had been "good-willed
and well-intentioned." There
was no indication in the com-
munique that the purge would
reach into the top leadership.
Those who are disgraced on the
provincial and lower levels,
however, will provide Peiping
with badly needed scapegoats,
and the fear of being labeled
an "unreformed element" will
effectively stifle criticism of
Peiping's policies.
The plenum communique also
announced that six regional
bureaus of the central committee
will be established throughout
China to strengthen leadership
over local party committees on
the provincial and municipal
level. The regional bureaus are
identical with those dissolved
in June 1954, following charges
of a conspiracy led by two re-
gional leaders to overthrow
the party center.
In the six years since, an
attempt has been made to admin-
ister policy directly from Pei-
ping to the provincial level.
The problems involved in this
methoa, however, are such that
the officials in Peiping must
either burden themselves with
many relatively petty details or
delegate .to the provincial lead-
ers responsibility which they do
not seem capable of handling.
Hence the decision to return to
the regional bureaus, despite
the central leadership's aware-
ness of the risk that regional
factionalism could grow once more.
The plenum also passed a
resolution approving of the Moscow
meeting of Communist parties
held in November 1960. (See also
first item in Part Ii.) At sev-
eral points the resolution im-
plies that the Chinese party will
continue to advocate a more mil-
itant strategy than Moscow cur-
rently favors. Like the Moscow
declaration itself, it leaves
Peiping free to challenge the
Soviet position. Specifically,
Peiping promises "in the resolu-
tion to "defend" the 1960
Moscow declaration "just as it
defended" the 1957 Moscow dec-
laration, which the Chinese ac-
tually used in support of their
arguments in the dispute. Never-
theless, the emphasis on the im-
portance of Sino-Soviet "unity"
--declared to be in the "funda-
mental interests" of the two
countries--suggests that Peiping
will refrain, for a time at
least, from polemics with
Moscow.
A People's Daily editorial
of 22 January on ze resolu-
tion is cast in stronger lan-
guage than the resolution it-
self. Urging "unyielding
struggle" against imperialism
and support for revolutionary
forces everywhere, the editori-
al expresses particular satis-
faction that the "fundamental
principles and revolutionary
spirit of Marxism-Leninism,
in which the Chinese Commu-
nists and Communists in other
countries have for many
years persisted, are clearly
reflected in the Moscow state-
ment." US officials in Hong
Kong regard the editorial as
perhaps Peiping's most em-
phatic affirmation to date of
its satisfaction with the suc-
cesses it scored at the Mos-
cow meetin .
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CUI,RENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
26 January 1961
YUGOSLAVIA PAROLES DJILAS
On 20 January, the Tito
regime released from jail Milo-
van Djilas--once the Yugoslav
Communist party's leading ideol-
ogist--after he had served
four years of a ten-year sen-
tence for writing "hostile propa-
ganda." Djilas was placed on
probation, presumably until
1966, and now is living in Bel-
grade. The regime's action
appears to have been timed to
attract a minimum of foreign
attention, coming as it did al-
most simultaneously with the
US presidential inauguration.
In 1954 and 1955 Djilas,
until then a member of the Yugo-
slav party's inner circle and a
favorite of Tito's since parti-
san days during World War II,
publicly attacked the party line
and vigorously advocated greater
internal freedom and a two-party
system for Yugoslavia. Because
of Tito's desire to deal with him
leniently, Djilas was not jailed
at that time, but in December
1956 he was sentenced to three
years in prison following his
DJILAS
statement to the American press
that the Hungarian revolution
was the "beginning of the end
of Communism." He was retried
in 1957, after the publication
of his heretical book, The New
Class, and given an additional
seven-year sentence.
In exchange for his release,
Djilas apparently promised to
refrain from political activity
or publication of material un-
favorable to the regime, but he
did not have to denounce his
previous attitudes.
J Last March] I he
was taken to Belgrade for an
operation which the regime
claimed was a normal appendec-
tomy; sources of the US Embassy
in Belgrade, however, say that
something more serious, perhaps
stomach cancer, was involved.
Djilas' rheumatism was also
aggravated in prison. The re-
gime's decision to release him
at this time may have been
motivated in part by a desire
to deprive him of the martyrdom
he might have achieved had he
died in prison.
Despite claims by some Yugo-
slav leaders in the past year
that Djilas could not be freed
because his following in the
Yugoslav party and public might
then pose a threat to the sta-
bility of the regime, his re-
lease probably will not have
immediate internal repercussions.
Support within the party for
Djilas appears inconsequential;
Vladimir Dedijer, the only
party leader openly to stand by
Djilas, was stripped of his rank
and now is out of the country--
studying in Great Britain with
the regime's permission. Should
Djilas outlive Tito, however, he
might--in any struggle for
L.
1
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
26 January 1961
succession--serve as a rallying
point for those elements in
Yugoslavia which favor a faster
pace of domestic liberalization.
The regime has avoided
giving the impression that it was
succumbing to Western pressures
for Djilas' release, and at the
same time it has been reluctant
to antagonize the bloc by free-
ing such an arch "revisionist."
It is unlikely, however, that
such considerations played a
major role in handling the prob-
lem.. Belgrade's efforts to
enhance its prestige in the
West and to develop closer ties
with European Socialist parties
had been hampered but not
seriously damaged by Djilas'
imprisonment--many of those
parties, for example, sent dele-
gations last spring to the
congress of Yugoslavia's mass
organizations.
Similarly, the Djilas
heresy has been only one of
many irritants between Belgrade
and the bloc. His release
probably will stimulate only
limited unfavorable comment from
Moscow. On the other hand, the
Yugoslav regime's primary op-
ponents, Tirana and Peiping,
can be expected to emphasize
once again--not entirely to
Belgrade's displeasure--that 25X1
Djilas' release demonstrates
Belgrade's accommodation with
Western "imperialism."
DISCONTENT WITHIN SEATO
The Southeast Asia Treaty
Organization (SEATO) appears
.headed for a crisis over the
organization's proper role in
the Laotian situation. The
American ambassador in Bangkok
reports that SEATO morale is low
and that the organization may
be "fatally discredited" unless
some action is taken soon in
Laos. Assurances that the
United States intends to live
up to its SEATO commitments
have failed to eliminate the
fears of Asian members that they
are being deserted by their
Western 611i'es.
bitter against Britair, and France
and feel these countries are
ignoring the strategic threat to
Thailand posed by the civil
warfare in Laos.
The Thai Government, which
has no other defense alliances,
has been frustrated in its de-
mand for effective SEATO sup-
port to the Boun Oum govern-
ment and General Phoumi. The
Philippines, too, is becoming
restive with the inaction of the
organization. Although no other
member state in SEATO is pre-
pared to follow Thailand in re-
commending military support to
the Laotian Government at this
time, the Thais are particularly
The Thai Government sees
as the ultimate outcome of the
Laotian crisis the establishment
of a Communist regime on its
northeast border--an economically
depressed area where a North
Vietnamese refugee minority
threatens to serve as a ready-
made fifth column. Bangkok
is convinced that any compromise
solution--the neutralization of
Laos or a coalition government
including the Pathet Lao--would
merely be a prelude to the total
loss of Laos to the Communists.
The Thais believe that SEATO
could provide effective material
support to the Laotian Govern-
ment. Thailand, Pakistan, and
the Philippines are prepared to
provide facilities for such
support.
The United Kingdom and
France, however, have little
faith in the effectiveness of
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26 January 1961
the Boun Oum - Phoumi forces and
consider a coalition government
under self-exiled Souvanna Phouma
the best solution to the problem.
They continue to search for a
negotiated political settlement,
whether under a reconstituted
International Control Commission
or an enlarged conference of
interested nations such as has
been proposed by neutralist Cam-
bodia, They have refused thus
far to consider even a stand-by
command structure for a SEATO
military force. Australia and
New Zealand, although less san-
guine regarding a political
solution in Laos, have tended
to follow the British lead.
Failure to agree on joint
action in Laos has disappointed 25X1
SEATO's Asian members, vho
believe the organization has lost
The gradual weakening of
Prime Minister Daud's position
is endangering the stability of
the royal regime in Afghanistan
and may afford Moscow new op-
portunities to extend its in-
fluence there. Should he even-
tually be forced to step down,
the confusion and weakness like-
ly to characterize any succeed-
ing government would leave the
country more vulnerable to sub-
version by the Soviet advisers
and technicians whom Daud him-
self has introduced in large
numbers.
The dominant policy-maker
in the Afghan Government, Daud
is widely regarded by Afghan
officials as the only leader
with enough vigor and strength
of will to maintain internal
stability and national inde-
pendence while pushing ahead
with foreign-assisted develop-
ment programs. The royal fami-
ly's confidence in Daud's judg-
ment and leadership, however,
has been undermined as a result
of Afghanistan's defeat last
September in the tribal clashes
along the Pakistani frontier.
Although the family outwardly
maintains unity, the conflict
between Daud and his brother,
Foreign Minister Naim, contin-
ues unresolved over policy to-
ward Pakistan. The family is
now concerned that new tribal
disturbances this spring may
provoke strong Pakistani coun-
teraction.
M&..ny Afghan leaders, more
cautious than Daud, also doubt
the wisdom of his heavy depend-
ence on Soviet aid for his
economic and military develop-
ment programs. There are now
about 1,300 Soviet technicians
and advisers in the country,
and Daud is apparently counting
on even greater Soviet assist-
ance for his Second Five-Year
Plan to begin in September.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
26 January 1961
25X1
25X1
increased reb-
el military activity has dampened
some of the initial enthusiasm
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
26 January 1961
in French circles, and claims by
each side that the other is re-
sponsible for continued terror-
ism could still jeopardize ne-
gotiations.' Meanwhile, De
Gaulle is continuing with a
limited implementation of his
plan for creating provision-
al.government'institutions in
Algeria.
(most papers
are speculating that secret con-
tacts have already begun.
In speeches prior to the
referendum De Gaulle implied
that he would consider a favor-
able vote a mandate to meet with
the rebel leaders. To encourage
the PAG to negotiate, De Gaulle
may be willing to relax two im-
portant preconditions that have
heretofore prevented a meeting:
he may waive formal agreement to
,a cease-fire by the rebels and
accept a mutual understanding
that both sides will try to
control terrorism and use mili-
tary force only in self-defense.
There are also indications
that De Gaulle will accept only
token representation of other
Algerian tendencies at any
eventual. negotiations. He has
already publicly singled out
the'PAG as a particularly im-
portant factor in the political
negotiations.
The resignation of Air
Force General Maurice Challe,
ranking French officer at SHAPE
and former French commander in
chief in Algeria, will probably
encourage both civilian and
military extremists to re-
double their efforts to try,to
sabotage any negotiations De
Gaulle undertakes. Challe re-
signed in protest,over the gov-
ernment's Algerian policy_,
In the rebel camp, the 16
January PAG announcement of
readiness to begin negotiations
has been followed by confirma-
tory statements on the-part of
two ministers. "Information
minister" Yazid told the US Em-
bassy in Tunis on 17 January
that the PAG was ready to meet
French representatives without
any preconditions or agenda.
Yazid particularly asserted that
the PAG was considering means
of reassuring French residents
of Algeria that their interests
would be respected in an Al-
gerian republic.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
26 January 1961
President Bourgiba of
Tunisia, who regards the con-
tinuation of the Algerian war
as a threat not only to his re-
gime but all North Africa, ap-
pears relieved by the reasonable-
ness of recent French and PAG
public statements. High Tunisian
officials, however, mindful of
their own problems with France,
expect that negotiations will be
lengthy and difficult, with a
transitional stage lasting up
to four years.
Possibly as a show of con-
fidence in what the rebels be-
lieve to be their strong posi-
tion, Ferhat Abbas left Tunis
on 16 January for a two-week
trip to Indonesia, Malaya,Ceylon,
and North Vietnam. The Indo-
nesian charge in Tunis--whose
government has recognized the
PAG--assured the US Embassy on
20 January that Abbas will not
receive anti-French advice in
Djakarta, and that Abbas is pre-
pared to return at any moment
should the French move rapidly
toward negotiations.
Nevertheless, terrorism
and military activity by both
sides have injected a note of
pessimism. An. incident in which
rebel and French military forces
fired across the Tunisian border
and another in which four French
nurses were killed in a rebel
ambush have brought forth strong
accusations from both camps. Of-
ficial statements, however,
have attributed the acts to ex-
tremists and have significantly
added the hope that such indicents
will not stand in the way of
negotiations.
At the same time, De Gaulle
is moving ahead with his referen-
dum-approved plan to set up pro-
visional institutions for Al-
gerian self-government. Decrees
were published on 21 January
setting up regional councils in
Algiers, Oran, and Constantine.
French officials have carefully
pointed out, however, that these
institutions are not meant to com-
promise the future institutions
of Algeria, and there appears to
be no intent to push rapidly
with the establishment of an 25X1
over-all Algerian executive,
which the PAG has strenuously
opposed.
France is seeking to main-
tain its influence in Black Af-
rica without insisting on a
rigid framework which the Af-
ricans might view as a limit to
their sovereignty. Bilateral
agreements along the lines of
those France has reached with
Cameroun--a former trust terri-
tory which was never a member of
the French Community--may be the
only formal tie Paris can salvage
from the original Community
concept.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
26 January 1961
BACKGROUND
Following the constitutional referendum of September 1958,
eleven French African states and the Nalagasy Republic became
autonomous members of the French Community. In early 1959 Sen-
egal and Soudan established the Mali Federation, whose demand
for independence led De Gaulle to acknowledge the right of all
Community states to "international sovereignty." Meanwhile,
Ivory Coast leader Houphouet Boigny had organized the Conseil
de 1'Entente with Dahomey, Niger, and Upper Volta as a loose,
essentially economic grouping. In 1960, all the states nego-
tiated their independence. Some of them signified their con-
tinued adherence to the Community at the time of independence,
but the Entente states and Mauritania opted for 1u11 independ-
ence with the understanding that formal ties would be concluded
with Paris after they were admitted to the UN.
A high French Foreign Min-
istry official recently acknowl-
edged that there are differences
between French and African views
on the community relationship
and said that Paris was not in-
clined to force a clear-cut def-
inition. Continued modifica-
tion is probably to be
expected in top-level
Community institu-
tions, which original-
ly included an Execu-
tive Council made up
of the heads of gov-
ernment of the member
states and certain
French ministers, a
283-member Senate,
and a Court of Arbitra-
tion. Community rela-
tions may soon become
a responsibility of
the Foreign Ministry,
and the Community sec-
retariat may become
the personal secretar-
iat of Community Pres-
ident De Gaulle.
A real test of the
pragmatic approach Par-
is has been relying on
may occur in the field
of economic aid. Ivory
Coast President Hou-
phouet-Boigny's recent
trip to Paris to con-
sult with De Gaulle on
ship in the Community.
Houphouet has cited
the French-Camerounian
relationship as the
model for what he seeks;
that arrangement covers
the economic, military,
diplomatic, and cul-
tural fields, but does
not include Community
membership.
This may result
in demands for similar
status from the five states
which confirmed their Community
membership when they signed co-
operation agreements with France.
Senegal also considers itself
bound by the agreements signed
by France and the now-defunct Mali
Federation of Soudan and Senegal.
French Community
State presently acknowledging
formal membership in the
French Community
cooperation agreements between
France and the four states in
the Conseil de l'Entente suggests
that, when negotiations are re-
sumed in February, Paris may be
willing to continue economic aid
without requiring formal member-
,France has recognized the
advantages it may gain from the
generally moderate foreign pol-
icy the African states have
,pursued in recent months. De
Gaulle publicly praised African
leaders who helped block UN
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
26 January 1961
General Assembly passage of that
section of the Asian-African
resolution on Algeria which the
French deemed the most obnoxious.
Paris was pleased by their ac-
ceptance of nuclear testing in
the Sahara at a time when other
African states are imposing or
threatening retaliatory measures.
Even the Mali Republic,
which officially repudiated the
initial agreements it signed
with France and has recently
moved toward closer political
ties with Guinea and Ghana, main-
tains economic and cultural ar-
rangements with France. The
extent to which France will
try to avoid a situation com-
parable to the rupture of re-
lations with Guinea in 1958 may
become apparent in the manner
in which Paris accedes to Mali's 25X1
recent demand for the
withdrawal of all French
military forces.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
26 January 1961
PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES
KHRUSHCHEV--THE SOVIET PUBLIC IMAGE
Despite Khrushchev's clear-
cut victory over a potent com-
bination of enemies in 1957,
when he carried out a sharp re-
organization of the Soviet Un-
ion's top political command,
there have been persistent
doubts about the essential
strength of his authority. Dur-
ing the past year in particular,
there was widespread speculation
--touched off by a number of de-
velopments in Soviet domestic
and external policy--that Khru-
shchev's power had been weakened
or had at least become subject
to a collective "restraint" im-
posed by other leaders. Even
exponents of the belief that
Khrushchev has taken firm title
to first place in the Soviet
hierarchy concede, in the words
of one of them, that his author-
ity "is not yet independent of
continuous, ever-renewed suc-
cesses."
his subordinates at all levels
and by the hacks of Soviet
propaganda. The prestige con-
ferred on Khrushchev is in part
an outgrowth of the totalitar-
ian mechanism itself, which in-
exorably funnels authority to
a single point. This imbedded
tendency, with its roots in the
Russian past, has probably been
consciously abetted as a means
of furthering the Soviet Union's
drive to expand its authority
on the international scene and
its competition with the Chi-
nese Communists.
Moreover, even in tae face
of Khrushchev's expressed dis-
approval of adulation of lead-
ers--possibly genuinely intend-
ed--there is probably an irre-
sistible urge on the part of
subordinates to ensure them-
selves a place on the leader's
bandwagon.
Certainly, 1960 was not a
year of unqualified success for
Soviet foreign and domestic pol-
icy or of unbroken calm in Krem-
lin politics. The juggling of
the Kremlin hierarchy and the
summit collapse last spring,
the stresses in Sino-Soviet re-
lations, the Soviet premier's
tumultuous behavior at the UN
General Assembly, and the ail-
ments of Soviet agriculture may
well have provided the material
for political controversy with-
in the ruling command. Never-
theless, the sum of the evidence
indicates that the question of
Khrushchev's ultimate authority
is not now at issue within the
Soviet Union.
The Khrushchev Cult
One element in this evi-
dence is the public image of
Khrushchev as the uniquely
gifted and natural leader--an
image persistently developed by
The end product, a new ver-
sion of the leader cult replac-
ing the discarded Stalin cult,
must not only reflect to a fair
degree the actualities of Krem-
lin politics but also have be-
come by now a political factor
in itself. The overwhelming
impression that Khrushchev is
the focal point of the Soviet
state and singularly endowed
to prosecute its aims is not
likely to encourage attempts
to limit his authority or to
increase his tolerance of po-
litical obstacles.
Shape of the Khrushchev Image
The central committee ses-
sion just completed provided a
new, vivid demonstration for
the Soviet audience of the
breadth of Khrushchev's au-
thority. The meeting opened
with the announcement that a
party congress, nominally the
Soviet Union's highest tribune,;
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26 January 1961
had been called for next Octo-
ber and that Khrushchev would
present two major reports there,
thus guaranteeing not only that
he will be the dominant figure
at the meeting itself but also
that his name will be prominent-
ly featured in the massive pre-
congress build-up.
Published reports of the
proceedings at the central com-
mittee plenum were themselves
a considerable addition to the
leader image. They pictured
Khrushchev denouncing with al-
most Jovian ire the managerial
sins of top party figures, brush-
ing aside their excuses but
formulas applied to the Soviet
hierarchy and reiteration of
the "collective Leadership"
theme, the vast majority of
party and government officials
as well as ordinary Soviet cit-
izens cannot but be heavily in-
fluenced by the cumulative im-
pact of the Khrushchev cult.
They are exposed to a steady
daily dosage comprised of the
deference paid him publicly by
his lieutenants. the precedence
given him on public occasions,
the attention devoted to him by
Soviet communications media,
and by the kinds-: of ritualis-
tic formulas by which he is
conventionally described.
is difficult
to find a speech by
an important figure
in the regime without
sycophantic passages
or an editorial in the
central press which
does not cite Khru-
shchev as authority
for one or another as-
pect of Soviet policy.
On days when such or-
gans as Pravda and
Izvestia do not fea-
ture the text of a
Khrushchev speech,
their front pages are
weighted down with
pictures of the lead-
er at some public
function and, more
and more, with the
texts of mutual ex-
changes of praise be-
tween him and Soviet
organizations or in-
dividuals who have
distink,,uished them-
selve, in some area
of production.
accepting their fawning compli- The general outlines of
tnents, and repeatedly interrupt- this cult present Khrushchev
ing speakers to give his own de- to the Soviet public in several
tailed prescriptions for agri- aspects: as a pre-eminent inter-
cultural ills. All of this
earned Pra.vda's praise as a
model ofthe "Leninist approach"
but scarcely conveyed a picture
of "collective leadership" to
the Soviet public.
Despite occasional seman-
tic variations in the propaganda
national statesman whose grasp
of the common man's aspirations
is either admired or feared by
other world leaders, as the
true spiritual successor of the
revered Lenin, and as the dy-
namic but flexible architect of
party and government policy.
Presidium member Dmitry Polyansky
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
26 January 1961
attempted to span this whole
spectrum at the recent central
committee meeting:
in the successes
of the international
Communist movement we
must note the leading
role of the Leninist
central committee of
our party, headed by
the outstanding fight-
er for peace, democ-
racy, and socialism--
N:ikita Sergeyevich
In the hands of Nikita Sergeyevich Khrushchev is
and old Indian peace pipe. It was given to the Soviet
premier by Americans in the days of the work of
the 15th session of the General Assembly of the UN
in New York. This gift is recognition of the services
of 'Communist No. 1' in the struggle for peace."
--Ogonyok, No. 51, December 1960.
Outstanding World Figure
The Soviet premier's numer-
ous foreign excursions may not
have been unmixed successes
and their results have probably
been discussed and assessed so-
berly in the Kremlin's inner
councils, but the Soviet prop-
aganda mill has concealed any
misgivings and has invariably
pictured them as resounding per-
sonal triumphs for Khrushchev
and his policy of "peaceful
coexistence." Only one speech
by Khrushchev in the previous
four and one-half years was
given greater treatment by Ra-
dio Moscow than the one he made
following his return to ,vloscow
from the summit failure,. The
US Embassy in ilioscow reported
for the same period an "extreme-
ly high volume of Soviet mate-
rials quoting, praising, or
otherwise calling positive at-
tention to Khrushchev."
Khrushchev's excursion in-
to the UN last fall was accom-
panied by an unprecedented out-
pouring of propaganda support.
Before, during, and after the
General Assembly session, Soviet
media were inundated with re-
ports of nationwide meetings
which invariably expressed en-
thusiasm for Khrushchev's con-
duct, with the texts of his
speeches at the UN, and with
TASS dispatches picturing Khru-
shchev's dominance of the pro-
ceedings and the favorable world-
wide "echo."
Khrushchev. (Stormy
applause) He has won
the respect of work-
ing people all over
the world by his pro-
found knowledge of
life, his bold and
keen posing of prob-
lems, his ability to
orient himself quick-
ly and correctly un-
der difficult circum-
stances, his wisdom,
and his presence of
mind.
This episode in Soviet
diplomacy has, in the after-
math, been unremittingly de-
scribed, in typical examples,
as a further demonstration of
"the impassioned and seething
activity of N. S. Khrushchev,"
of "the indefatigable herald of
peace, the true Leninist, N. S.
Khrushchev," and, more broadly,
as proof of "the consistent
peaceful policy of the Soviet
Government and the purposeful
and tireless activity of the
outstanding champion of peace
and friendship between nations,
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
26 January 1961
Comrade Nikita Sergeyevich Khru-
shchev."
On the Home Front
Although he may feel and
act as though the USSR's world
position is his primary concern,
Khrushchev has at the same time
given away no part of his claim
to a special grasp of domestic
problems. At the January cen-
tral committee plenum he played
to the limit the role of the
stern, broadly informed over-
seer of agricultural affairs,
and the Soviet image-makers
have labored constantly to por-
tray him as a leader of wide-
ranging interests and knowl-
edge, both profound and imagi-
native, but still humble and so-
licitous for the public welfare.
The phrases "as N. S. Khrushchev
has said" and "on the initiative
of N. S. Khrushchev" are staples
of Soviet propaganda and appear
in contexts of all kinds.
The first party conference
held in the newly organized vir-
gin lands administrative terri-
tory, for example, dispatched a
message of greetings to "Nikita
Sergeyevich Khrushchev, the
initiator of virgin lands recla-
mation who daily displays solici-
tude for the development of the
Kazakh virgin land."
Such tributes to Khrushchev
for his part in the virgin lands
and corn-planting programs, with
which he is closely identified,
are commonplace, but the gamut
is much wider. Among other
things, Khrushchev can take
credit, according to presidium
candidate member Korotchenko,
for exercising "an enormous,
beneficial influence" on Soviet
literature and, according to
the chairman of the State Plan-
ning Committee, for "indefat-
igable attention to a fuller
satisfaction of the growing de-
mand of the population for con-
sumer goods." Podgorny, a member
of the presidium and head of
the Ukrainian party, carried
the matter close to its most ab-
surd- level at the opening of the
Kiev subway last November:
The inhabitants
of Kiev know very well
that Nikita Sergeye-
vich Khrushchev was
the initiator of the
construction of the
Kiev subway, and as
its construction pro-
ceeded, we always felt
his attention and the
assistance of the CPSU
central committee and
the Soviet Government.
Leninist Leadership
Khrushchev's carefully con-
structed association with the
image of Lenin has become im-
bedded in the formulas of Soviet
propaganda. References to Khru-
shchev as "the faithful Leninist"
or as "head of the Leninist cen-
tral committee" are standard.
Placing the Lenin hagiology at
the service of the present lead-
ership, Soviet propaganda in-
cessantly reiterates that this
leadership exemplifies a gen-
uinely "Leninist style," that
the "Leninist norms of party
life" and "collective leader-
ship," ignored by Stalin, have
been restored, and that the
party has overcome the "cult of
the leader, alien to Lenin."
The commemoration of Lenin's
90th anniversary in 1960 pro-
duced a flood of literature de-
scribing both his accomplish-
ments and his personal excel-
lence--his modesty, distaste
for sycophancy, and respect
for the opinions of others. The
adulation heaped on Lenin had,
of course, the effect of increas-
ing what he allegedly most de-
tested, the "cult of the lead-
er," and of strengthening, by
association, the Khrushchev
cult.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
26 January 1961
Soviet propagandists seem
to feel no embarrassment in af-
firming the existence of "col-
lective leadership" at the very
moment when their output is in-
creasingly focused on one man,
Khrushchev, nor in setting crit-
icism of the leader cult side
by side with phrases such as
"the central committee headed
by N. S. Khrushchev," "the Pre-
sidium headed by N. S. Khru-
shchev," or "the central commit-
tee, the Council of Ministers,
and N. S. Khrushchev personal-
ly
if, however, any of the
party faithful should detect a
contradiction, they can refer
to the "dialectical" reconcil-
iation provided by the author-
itative text Fundamentals of
Marxism-Leninism. The masses
are the levers of history, this
document declares, and "the
cult of personality contradicts
Marxism-Leninsm." At the same
time, it is pointed out, "the
overwhelming majority of the
masses of the workers are well
aware that the authority and
popularity of the outstanding
leaders of the working class
have nothing in common with
the personality cult.... With-
out leaders who enjoy authority
and who are linked up with the
masses and are popular among
them, there is no organized so-
cialist movement.... The first-
rate leaders of the working
class, who are intimately linked
with the people and who success-
fully conduct the struggle of
the workers for their vital in-
terests and ideals, play an out-
standing role in history and de-
serve the people's love."
Khrushchev no doubt consid-
ers that this description fits
him very well.
For the past two years,
Khrushchev, evidently considering
the domestic front relatively
secure, has been deeply im-
mersed in pressing the USSR's
international ambitions. Atop
an underlying movement of so-
cial and ideological change,
whose long-term political ef-
fects are probably only vaguely
sensed. in the Kremlin as else-
where, the regime's internal ac-
tions have remained centered mainly
on pragmatic, economic objectives.
The failure of Soviet agri-
culture to measure up to expecta-
tions appears to have forced
Khrushchev once again to con-
cern himself directly with an
area of policy which was once
his major interest. In the
interim, however, his involve-
ment in foreign affairs and
lengthy periods of rest, dic-
tated by the state of his
health, have necessarily given
many of the other members of
the party presidium a good share
of the responsibility for the
conduct of political and eco-
nomic affairs at home.
With the question of the
succession always in the back-
ground, these circumstances
have created the ground for
conflicts of ambition within
the hierarchy and for more or
less sudden shifts in the for-
tunes of key figures. More-
over there is still within the
presidium, according to the
best available information,
some room for "give and take"
on important issues and there-
fore an area in which Khru-
shchev is, to a degree, subject
to influence and restraint. How-
ever, the shape of Khrushchev's
present public image, while
only part of the evidence, pro-
vides some measure of his posi-
tion and suggests that his au-
thority is neither threatened
nor diminished.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
26 January 1961
THE OUTLOOK FOR BRAZIL UNDER QUADROS
Janio Quadros, who will be transition will be intensified
inaugurated as President of Bra-
zil on 31 January, only ten days
after returning from a three-
month trip to Western Europe,
will. be the first chief exec-
utive in 30 years to take
office as a representative of
that country's traditional "out"
parties. The problems of
by Quadros' lack of formal ties
with any of the parties in his
sponsoring coalition and by
Brazil's impending balance-of-
payments crisis, which demands
early decisions on economic and
fiscal'-policy. In the search
for ways to alleviate the fi ,
nancial crisis, Quadros may seek
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
26 January 1961
BRAZIL: GOALS OF FIVE-YEAR ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM
1960 *
SELECTED
1955
1960
EL VEE
LEV
UNDER
CATEGORIES
LEVEL
TARGETS
ATTAINED
CONSTR.
ELECTRIC POWER
MILLION KILOWATTS
3.0
5.1
4.5
5.5
PETROLEUM
THOUSAND BARRELS PER DAY
CRUDE
6.8
100.0
78.0
-
REFINING
130.0
330.0
223.0
105
RAILROAD TRACK
23
0
24
7
24
1
NA
THOUSAND MILES
.
.
.
HIGHWAYS STATE AND
THOUSAND MILES INTERSTATE
2.6
o
18.2
10.0
3.5
MARITIME SHIPPING
THOUSAND TONS IN SERVICE
FREIGHTERS
747
1,100
960.0
20
TANKERS
217
535
504.0
40
ANNUAL CONSTR.
(VIRTUALLY
100
49.0
10
CAPACITY
NILI
AUTOMOTIVE VEHICLES
THOUSAND UNITS PRODUCED
TRUCKS
0
80.0
60
0
BUSES
.
JEEPS & UTILITY
0
50.0
44.0
NA
PASSENGER
0
40.0
31.0
TOTAL
0
170.0
135.0
STEEL INGOTS
1.2
2.3
2.3
1
9
MILLION TONS ANNUALLY
.
CEMENT
2.7
4.9
4.5
1.0
MILLION TONS ANNUALLY
FERTILIZER
A
2D
300
590
4 477 7
165
THOUSAND TONS
NNUALLY
* Preliminary eetimat
10123 28
a US loan, but he is likely to
be much more aggressive and in=
dependent than past Brazilian
presidents in dealing with
Washington and the European
powers.
Industrial Development
Brazil's financial diffi-
culties stem in large part from
its efforts at rapid industriali-
zation and its dependence on
the erratic coffee market to
finance this development. Pub-
lic and private investment for
new industrial installations
and related utilities is a
major cause of Brazil's recur-
ring balance-of-payments crisis
and an important, although
secondary, cause of the country's
chronic inflation.
Because foreign exchange
crises and inflation have gone
hand in hand with industrial
growth--which averaged about
10 percent annually during the
past decade--many Brazilians,
including President Kubitschek,
regard them as minor and neces-
sary evils. The gross national
product (GNP) has increased
about 5 percent per year in
"real" terms.
Although Brazil's economic
growth attracted nearly a billion
dollars in American investment
before 1955, the growth rate
received fresh impetus from
Kub-itschek's $6 billion, five-
year development program. This
.program, based on studies by
the now-defunct Brazil-US Eco-
nomic Commission, was aimed
primarily at eliminating bottle-
necks in electric power, trans-
portation, steel, and fuel;
while some of its goals were
unrealistically high, many have
been met and the program has
been instrumental in bringing
industry's contribution to the
GNP up to near equality with
agriculture.'
In 1960, two new industries
moved from the planning stage
,into production--the tractor
industry and the shipbuilding
industry, which is scheduled
to have an annual capacity of
some 150,000 tons by 1963.
The past year also saw the
completion of clearing and
grading on the 1,500-mile jungle
highway from Belem to Brasilia--
which became the federal capital
last April--and the start of
work on the equally ambitious
,highways connecting Brazilia
with the northeast and the
western territories. These
projects--together with the
transfer of the capital itself--
.are all part of Kubitschek's
effort to open up the interior
of the country.
National pride in these
accomplishments is high and
has led to the feeling locally
that Brazil can at last see hope
of fulfilling its "manifest
destiny" as a world power.
The government's heavy
spending to support the price,
of coffee has become the greatest
i single factor in the country's
chronic inflation. It will
place a larger burden than usual
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26 January 1961
on the federal budget in the
1961-62 coffee year, when a
record crop of 35,000,000 bags
is expected. The government-
stored surplus has grown mark-
edly in the past few years,
BRAZIL: SCHEDULE OF PAYMENTS
DUE ON FOREIGN LOANS
1960 $364y2781000
1961 337, 412, 000
1962 318, 849, 000
1963 269. 867, 000
1964 215, 790, 000
1965 159P421, 000
partly as a result of sales
quotas imposed by the Inter-
national Coffee Agreement and
partly because production has
spurted as new trees, planted
after the damaging frosts in
1954, have reached maturity.
In 1959, a bumper coffee
year, the cost-of living in-
creased by 51 percent, aggra-
vated by food-crop failures
and by extraordinary federal
outlays for drought relief and
for completion of the new
federal capital. The rate of
increase in the cost of living
dropped off sharply in 1960
but apparently was well above
the 20--percent average of
earlier years. Continued in-
flationary pressures are ex-
pected this year as a result
of a recent rise in the mini-
mum wage and of pen-
sion increases.
Other new pressures
may be created if
';uadro.s follows
through on his elec-
tion promises of ex-
panded credit for
question by negotiating short-
term deferrals on a number of
foreign debts; the new govern-
ment, however, will have to
come to grips with the problem
almost at once in order to
meet the next crisis, likely
before midyear. Payments of
over $340,000,000 will fall
due this year on foreign loans,
and only slightly less must be
paid next year. These payments
will take about a third of antic-
ipated export revenues, and
fixed requirements for imports
of petroleum and wheat will
absorb another third.
Although past attempts to
expand local production of
wheat and oil have been success-
ful, both efforts now appear to
have reached
in return
Oil imports now cost Brazil
about $200,000,000 per year.
Quadros reportedly sought
a sizable British balance-of-
payments loan during his recent
stay in London and may seek
financing in other European
capitals as well as in the US.
In seeking foreign loans
to cover the mounting balance-
of-payments deficit, the
25X1
IN BRAZIL OUTSIDE
December 1959 67,011 55,015
March 1960 67,375 21,783
June 1960 67,721 14,159
September 1960 67,957 14,159
November 23 1960 67,957 14,168
small :farmers and large-scale
public investment in the chronic
drought areas of the northeast.
Balance of Payments
The outgoing administra-
tion has arranged a brief
breathirg spell for Quadros
on the balance-of-payments
Kubitschek government found
itself under heavy pressure to
adopt an economic reform pro-
gram similar to the program--
backed by the International
Monetary Fund (IMF)--put into
effect by Argentina in early
lD59. Kubitschek in fact took
a number of steps to control
credit and to promote exports
but balked at the 'political
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CONVERTIBLE OTHER
US DOLLARS CONVERTIBLE
19,171 - 17,000 - - 125,329
5,346 - 27,250 114,478
8,666 177 20,750 111,909
17,087. - 9,250 - - 108,461
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26 January 1961
and economic implications of a
true austerity program. He had
the backing of the major indus-
trial associations and of skilled
labor in refusing to take dras-
tic measures.
Quadros, who has indicated
he will. give priority attention
to increasing agricultural pro-
duction, may be less reluctant
than Kubitschek to slow indus-
trial growth. He is also like-
ly to feel that the process of
simplifying the system of mul-
tiple exchange rates should be
accelerated. However, he told
newsmen shortly after his elec-
tion that he is opposed to any
sudden changes that would jolt
the economy, probably mindful
of the extraordinary political
difficulties encountered by
President Frondizi in Argentina.
A decision. to establish a
single fluctuating exchange rate
would involve two basic prob-
lems initially. Wheat and oil
now are imported at preferential
rates, and abandonment of this
practice would result in sky-
rocketing prices for bread and
gasolihe which, on the basis of past
experience, might bring about
strikes and riots. Establish-
ment of the single rate, more-
over, would create an inflation-
ary windfall for coffee export-
ers, who now are entitled to
less than half the free-
market value of their prod-
uct,.
producers in free competition,
a price war would mean scuttling
not only the ICA but also Bra-
zil's pretensions to become a
spokesman for the underdevel-
oped countries.
Until 1957, Brazil was
able to cover a large portion
of the foreign costs of economic
development through trade sur-
pluses. Since, then, however,
an unfavorable trade balance
has added to the country's diffi-
culties. One of the chief
causes has been a drastic drop
in coffee prices and the in-
creasing popularity of soluble
coffee which has prompted
processors to turn to inferior
African grades as a source of
supply. Although coffee accounts
for only about 5 percent of the
GNP, it provides more than half
the country's foreign exchange.
To meet this problem, Bra-
zil has engaged in intensive
promotion of its second-string
exports--cocoa, sugar, iron
ore, manganese, and lumber--and
in 1959 the government pro-
vided additional incentive by
permitting exporters of all
products except coffee and cocoa
to convert their foreign ex-
change earnings at the most
favorable free-market rate.
Like coffee, however, these
products are encountering glutted
markets. Brazil's latest des-
perate measure is the creation
of an export bank to push in-
dustrial exports through offer-
ing credit to potential buyers.
Brazil's search for new
markets and for nondollar
sources of capital goods plus
This windfall, however, wheat and oil has led to plans for
would not permit a competitive more than doubling trade with the
reduction in coffee prices so Soviet bloc. Since late 195.9,
long as Brazil remains committed Brazil signed long-term trade
to the International Coffee
Agreement (ICA) and its rigid
sales quotas; while it is widely
believed that Brazil could un-
dersell even African colonial
agreements with the USSR, Poland,
and Czechoslovakia that would,
if fulfilled, raise Brazil's
trade with the bloc to over 10
percent of its total trade--
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
26 January 1961
compared with about 4 per-
cent in 1959.
The bloc has offered to
supply greatly increased
amounts of POL, wheat, and in-
dustrial goods. Bloc techni-
dians, previously rejected by
Brazil on security grounds,
last year were permitted t-
take part in a survey for a
natural gas plant, to prepare
engineers for operating a caus-
tic-soda factory, and to survey
a possible iron-mining site.
Quadros has indicated he
will expand these ties if
studies reveal that Brazil can
profit thereby.
Foreign Policy
Quadros, who has been
virtually in hiding since his
election on 3 October, has
refused to comment on most
aspects of his intended policies
but has indicated that with
respect to foreign policy he
plans to pursue a more "in-
dependent" course than any
previous Brazilian government.
Quadros held only one
postelection press conference
before leaving for Europe on
27 October, and on his return
to Brazil on 20 January refused
to make any statement for pub-
lication; however,at his 13
October press conference he as-
serted, "The United States must
become convinced that Brazil
in the very near future is to
become a world power." This
theme has been. stressed, by the
Kubitschek government but never
so openly or obviously. Ouadrds'
almost' messianic view of his
role in Brazilian politics has.
.led to speculation that one 9f
his.principal goals may be to
go down in history as the man
who launched-Brazil as an im-
.portant world power.
Brazil may be especially
receptive to gestures of "in-
dependence" at this time, since
most of the press has castigated
the United States repeatedly
for failing to consult Latin
America before breaking re-
lations with Cuba. Public opin-
ion is also smarting over Bra-
zil,'s inability to obtain part
of the former Cuban sugar quota
in the US for the first quarter
of 1961.
Quadros has hedged on his
election promise to re-establish
diplomatic relations with Mos-
cow and to "recognize" Peiping,
possibly to give himself free-
dom on timing and conditions.
Pressure for ties with Moscow
has been building up for
several years, however--espe-
cially in professional and in-
tellectual circles, where the
lack of such ties is seen as
a mark of second-class status
in world affairs. Quadros has
also hedged on.his pre-election
words of praise for Fidel Castro
but has not expressed any hos-
tility toward the Cuban regime.
While Quadros will face
far fewer critical problems
than did Kubitschek--who took
office in 1956 amid the disloca-
tions and scandals that followed
Getulio Vargas' suicide--he will
be confronted by a number of
immediate difficulties. As a
Political lone wolf,
he will have to
seek congressional support where
he can find it. To form a work-
ing majority in the lame-duck
Congress, which still has two
years to run,-he may find him-
self dependent on Kubitschek's
Social Democratic party, even
though the Social Democrats
now are technically in the op-
position.
Quadros may also be-headed
for trouble with Vice President
Joao Goulart., the ambitious
chairman of
the leftist a or party.. Goulart
has been sparring with Quadros
for control.of various govern-
ment agencies as well as the
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
26 January 1961
labor movement; shortly after
the election, the Labor party,
with the third largest represen-
tation in Congress, hinted it
was prepared to obstruct Quadros
to the limit, if necessary.
Presumably an accommodation can
be reached only if Quadros ac-
cedes to Goulart's demands or
can split the Labor party enough
to threaten Goulart's leader-
ship.
Quadros' attitude toward
the illegal but influential
Communist party may be shaped
to some degree by events in
the northeast, where a group
of 'Communist-led Peasant Leagues
has recently begun a new wave of
assaults on sugar plantations.
Brazil's Communist party--which
with a membership of 35,000 is
second in size only to Argen-
tina's among Latin America's
Communist parties--has for
several years been seeking re-
spectability- as a means of re-
gaining legal status. It re-
portedly is awaiting evidence
of Quadros' intended policies
before deciding on its tactics
for the future.
Quadros apparently has
sought advice on virtually all
aspects of Brazil's problems,
but he has been extremely care-
ful to keep his decisions from
becoming known. His three-month
silence has left the public
completely uninformed as to his
probable courses of action and
somewhat apprehensive about his
plans for the transition period.
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