CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A003000040001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 55
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 3, 2009
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 8, 1960
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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~ ~~~~ ~QNEIDENTIAL
(CURRENT
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY
SUMMARY
COPY NO. 7?
OCl No. 6088/6Q
8 December 1960
State Dept. review completed ARMY review(s)
completed.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 25X1
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
8 December 1960
CONFIDENTIAL
T H E W E E K I N B R I E F
PART I
OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST
25X1
MOSCOW MEETING CONCLUDES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 1
The three-week-long meeting of world Communist lead-
ers in Moscow in November achieved a 20,000-word statement
designed to preserve a facade of unity despite continuing
evidence of Sino-Soviet disagreement. The conference may
well strengthen Khrushchev's hand in pressing for another
major diplomatic confrontation with the West on Berlin
and Germany. He may believe that Chinese commitment to
a document stressing the overriding importance of con-
tinuing bloc unity will inhibit Peiping for a time from
open attacks on Soviet policy toward the West. The state-
ment, however, also would seem to commit the USSR to main-
tain its present aggressive and uncompromising line in
support of anti-Western Afro-Asian governments and national 25X1
liberation movements, and Khrushchev apparently now intends
to combine a return to negotiations with the West with a
vigorous prosecution of his "anticolonial" policy.
EAST-WEST RELATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . , . , . . Page 4
The Soviet UN delegation is attempting to clear the
way for top-level contacts with the new US administra-
tion at a special session of the General Assembly next
spring. Chief Soviet delegate Zorin has argued'in pri-
vate talks that completion of the debates on such "con-
tentious items" as Tibet and Hungary before the new
administration takes office would create the atmosphere
for a US-Soviet rapprochement. Discussion of disarmament
would, according to this line of suggestion, be carried
over into a special session of the General Assembly to
be attended by the heads of government. The main pur-
pose of such a session from Moscow's viewpoint probably
would be to provide an opportunity for Khrushchev to
meet with the new President and lay the groundwork for
a formal. summit conference later in the year.
FRANCE-ALGERIA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 6
Concern in France over a possible rightist coup at-
tempt in Algeria increased following the sudden flight
of rightist Deputy Pierre Lagaillarde and four others
on trial. for their part in the January insurrection.
Tension in Algiers remains high in anticipation of
De Daulle's 9-14 December Algerian tour, which may
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
8 December 1960
PART I (continued)
spark violent outbreaks or an attempt to set up a
separate "Government of French Algeria." At the UN
the Afro-Asian bloc is pressing for a UN-supervised
referendum in Algeria. 25X1
CUBA AND CENTRAL AMERICA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 7
The joint communique issued on 6 December at the end
of Che Guevara's visit to North Korea endorsed Communist
policy goals. The establishment of Cuban diplomatic
relations with North Vietnam was announced on 2 December,
and relations with Mongolia were announced on 7 December.
Cuba has concluded new agreements with the USSR, one of
which provides for the addition of Soviet members to the
faculty of Havana University. In Central America, El
Salvador continues to offer special opportunities for
Communist subversion; and army unrest persists in Guate-
mala, 25X1
CONGO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 10
Mobutu's capture of ex-premier Lumumba on 2 December
has dealt a major blow to Lumumba's followers and his
Soviet and African allies, several of which have announced
that they intend to withdraw their troops from the UN
command. Lumumba's supporters in Orientale Province,
however, are continuing efforts to expand their influ-
ence in the Congo interior; they may attempt to hold
Belgians as hostages for Lumumba. The ineffectiveness
of the UN command in Stanleyville suggests that the
UN may not be able to prevent clashes between Congolese
Army and pro-Lumumba forces. While Lumumba's followers
in Stanleyville now have some arms and supplies, they
may have difficulties in obtaining their needs in the 25X1
future.
LAOS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . Page 11
The power play of Col.Kouprasith in Vientiane on
8 December appears on the surface at least to be a re-
affirmation of support for Premier Souvanna Phouma
against both the Pathet Lao and the right as symoblized
by General Phoumi's Savannakhet Revolutionary Committee.
Phoumi's forces have crossed the Ca Dinh River and as they
advance along the road toward Vientiane appear to be
meeting little opposition from the defending forces
from the capital. The Soviet airlift of petroleum products
to Vientiane began on 4 December.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
8 December 1960
PART I (continued)
PART II
NOTES AND COMMENTS
25X6
SOVIET TECHNICIANS WITHDRAWN FROM COMMUNIST CHINA . . . . Page 1
It now appears that the USSR last summer withdrew
the majority of Soviet technicians from Communist China.
The withdrawal involved several thousand technicians,
including those in key sectors of the economy. The
Chinese have described the action as coercion and com-
plain that it is damaging the economy. 25X1
YUGOSLAVIA'S RELATIONS WITH BLOC UNCHANGED BY MOSCOW
CONFERENCE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 2
Recent friendly gestures toward Belgrade by the USSR
and most of the satellites appear designed to assure Tito
that the condemnation of "Yugoslav revisionism" which is-
sued from the just-concluded Communist conference in Moscow
is not intended to affect bloc-Yugoslav governmental rela-
tions. The gestures also serve as a rebuff to the Chinese
Communists and Albanians, who have deliberately used at-
tacks on Yugoslavia as Indirect criticism of Soviet
policy. The bloc continues disinclined to assist Yugoslav
economic development. 25X1
SPUTNIK VI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 3
On 1 December the USSR placed into orbit its sixth
earth satellite vehicle (Sputnik VI). It is believed
that the vehicle was similar in configuration to Sput-
niks IV and V and that the test objectives, like those
of Sputniks IV and V were directed toward eventual
anned space f
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
8 December 1960
.PART II (continued)
25X1
THE 1961 ECONOMIC PLAN IN RUMANIA . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 5
Rumania is continuing its push toward the ambitious
economic goals of its Six-Year Plan (1960-65) by schedul-
ing for 1961 a 13.5-percent rise in industrial output
and a 19-percent increase in agricultural production.
Most sectors of the economy probably will surpass plans
set for 1960, thus providing a foundation for further
substantial increases in 1961. In agriculture, how-
ever, a very high 1961 target has been necessitated by
inadequate progress in 1960. The extent of benefits
granted the consumer in 1961 will depend on agricul-
tural performance and on the degree of success in the
housing program. 25X1
USSR AND CAMBODIA DECLARE ACCORD ON KEY INTERNATIONAL
ISSUES ,. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 6
The communiqud published in Moscow on 3 December
following discussions between Prince Sihanouk and
Premier Khrushchev reaffirmed Cambodian support of a
number of Soviet positions, including those on disarma-
ment, the admission of Communist China and Mongolia
to the United Nations, and modification of the UN
structure. The communique'also indicates that the
USSR responded favorably, to Sihanouk's overtures for 25X1
increased economic assistance.
SOUTH VIETNAM - NORTH VIETNAM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 7
President Diem has professed concern over reports
that North Vietnam may be preparing overt aggression
against South Vietnam or Laos. He has decided to mo-
bilize additional troops; possibly to emphasize con-
tinued priority of security needs. Reported troop
movements in North Vietnam probably reflect movements
to and from field training areas as well as prepara-
tions for the country's first nationwide conscription.
Hanoi's continued success with Communist guerrillas
25X1 in South Vietnam, however, probably foreshadows in- 25X1
tensification of this mode of warfare.
MIDDLE EAST DEVELOPMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 8
The Sudanese military regime is reported to be con-
sidering acceptance of further Soviet aid but may act
cautiously in order to avoid provoking civil disturbances
or even a coup attempt by conservative political and
military elements. The new Libyan cabinet, after its
first seven weeks of power, appears more susceptible
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"' CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
8 December 1960
PART II (continued
than its predecessor both to pro-Nasir and to anti-
American pressures from various Libyan politicians.
25X1
SOMALI REPUBLIC MOVES TOWARD NEUTRALISM . . . . . . . . . Page 10
With the acceptance of a Soviet ambassador to Moga-
discio and the negotiation of an economic agreement with
the UAR, the Somali Republic seems to be moving toward
a neutralist foreign policy. Pro-Western Premier
Abdirascid apparently is motivated chiefly by a .desire..
to break the republic's complete dependence on Western
economic aid, but there are some influential Somalis
who belbve that the government's entire position is 25X1
too closely identified with the West.
MOROCCO AND MAURITANIA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 11
Morocco's success--thanks to the USSR's veto--in
keeping Mauritania out of the United Nations will be
played up by Rabat as proof that King Mohamed V's regime
is accomplishing its national objectives. Morocco, hav-
ing won a respite, may postpone any attempts to employ
guerrilla tactics in Mauritania and resort to strengthen-
ing pro-Moroccan political groups and subverting officials
within the Mauritanian Government,
GREEK GOVERNMENT FACES DOMESTIC DIFFICULTIES . . . . . . . Page 12
The parliamentary opposition in Greece, led by the
Communist-front United Democratic Left (EDA), has been
publicly accusing cabinet ministers of corruption and
of collaboration with occupation forces during World
War`II. Price increases have led to new wage demands
and strikes, one of which led to violence. With general
elections anticipated next year, the badly splintered
non-Communist opposition continues futile negotiations
to create at least one party which could provide an
effective alternative to the present government.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
8 December 1960
PART II (continued)
ICELANDIC GOVERNMENT FACING LEFTIST ATTACK . . . . . . Page 14
Iceland's Conservative - Social Democratic coalition,
which has been in office since November 1959, is under
mounting attack from the Communist-dominated opposition
Labor Alliance party, and may soon face grave labor dif-
ficulties, possibly even a general strike. The govern-
ment's economic program, designed to arrest the persistent
inflation, has been moderately successful but needs more
time for its long-range reforms to become fully effective.
The Communist elements, which also control the Icelandic
Federation of Labor, had previously anticipated that the
program's "austerity" features would lead to the govern-
ment's collapse without their- resorting to strikes. 25X1
VENEZUELA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 15
By applying strong security measures, the Venezuelan
Government on 2 December ended an eight-day period of
violence primarily centered in Caracas and spearheaded
by leftist students and other pro-Castro elements.
President Betancourt's containment of the unrest
demonstrated his support among moderates and the
majority of the armed forces. The government be-
lieves :Lt has indications of Cuban involvement and
of further Dominican plotting. The radical opposition
can be expected to exploit any opportunities to provoke
further trouble. 25X1
RURAL VIOLENCE IN COLOMBIA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 16
Since taking office in August 1958 President Lleras
has treated as a priority problem the anarchy and violence
in Colomiba's rural areas that have caused an estimated
250,000 deaths over the past 12 years. The unrest
springs largely from a complex of agrarian grievances,
regional rivalries, and long-standing antagonisms between
Colombia's Liberal and Conservative parties, but Commu-
nists and pro-Castro elements are actively endeavoring 25X1
to exploit it. Growing party difficulties in Congress
have stymied Lleras''- efforts to deal with the situation
through agrarian and tax reform legislation.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
8 December 1960
PART III
PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES
SOVIET AGRICULTURE ON THE EVE OF THE DECEMBER PLENUM . . . Page 1
The Soviet cental committee plenum on agriculture,
which convenes in Moscow on 13 December, will be faced
with the problems arising from the second successive crop
year in which little or no progress was made toward meet-
ing goals set by the Seven-Year-Plan (1959-65) for in-
creasing agricultural production. Discussions at the
plenum may reveal the government's intentions for any
changes in agricultural price and wage policy, invest-
ment and equipment allocations, regional specialization,
and the pace toward complete socialization, or even for
a major reorganization in agricultural administration.
Many party and government leaders will be subject to rebuke
for agriculture ?s , poor showing` this year. 25X1
POTENTIAL RIVALRIES IN THE NORTH VIETNAMESE POLITBURO . . Page 4
There are in the North Vietnamese Communist party the
basic elements which could produce a power struggle when
70-year-old President Ho Chi Minh is no longer in control.
While still in good health, Ho seems to be making a
special effort to provide for a smooth transfer of power.
He has replaced Truong Chinh as second in command by
former guerrilla leader Le Duan. This places Le Duan
in a position to succeed to the leadership. Circum-
stances favor Ho's choice, but Truong Chinh is not
likely to subside without a struggle for power with
25X1 Le Duan.
THE AGRARIAN REFORM ISSUE IN LATIN AMERICA . . . . . . Page 8
The confiscatory land reform program of the Castro
regime in Cuba has coincided with growing agitation for
similarly radical programs in other Latin American coun-
tries. In almost all these countries there is great
rural poverty, and in most of them a high percentage
of the best land is owned by an elite which exercises
considerable national power. In Ecuador and Peru,
which have made little progress in land reform, pro-
Communist agitators are actively exploiting the issue--
as they are also in northeastern Brazil A comprehen-
sive reform program is under way in Venezuela, while
Mexico, Bolivia, and Guatemala undertook. extensive
land redistribution before the appearance of Castro.
However, almost everywhere in Latin America, public
pressure for further land reform provides the left
with a popular issue for exploitation. 25X1
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
8 December 1960
PART I
OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST
MOSCOW MEETING CONCLUDES
The paramount achievement
of the three-week meeting of
Communist leaders in Moscow in
November was a 20,000-word state-
ment which appears to represent
a tactical accord to preserve
a facade of unity in the world
Communist movement despite con-
tinuing evidence of Sino-Soviet
disagreement. The formulations,
for the most part, are Soviet
in tone, but on disputed issues
they are matched by a clear or
implicit reservation by the Chi-
nese. The result is a mixture,
but not a reconciliation, of
Soviet and Chinese positions on
issues on which they have dis-
agreed and apparently continue
to disagree.
In terms of the Sino-Soviet
dispute the document apparently
solves nothing, since, even more
than the Moscow Declaration of
1957, it can be cited in support
of very different positions.
Content of Moscow Statement
While heavy stress is laid
on the continuing importance
of maintaining bloc unity, each
party has managed to express
enough of its own views in the
wordy and diffuse statement to
assure that within that unity
it can maintain independence of
action in a given situation.
Much of the document is a
reaffirmation of positions on
which Moscow and Peiping, as
well as the other Communist par-
ties, have long agreed. It re-
affirms the parties' common
views on the rapid growth in pow-
er and influence of the bloc,
the decline of world capitalism,
the disintegration of the colo-
nial system, the aggressive char-
acter of imperialism, the menace
of Western policies, the impor-
tance of avoiding a split in the
bloc, and the certainty of an
eventual Communist triumph. The
agreed positions represent strong
cohesive factors in the Sino-
Soviet relationship as well as
in the Communist movement, and
still appear to be stronger than
the divisive factors.
The divisive factors, how-
ever, remain and will probably
soon return to prominence. On
the issue of war and peace, the
statement repeats Khrushchev's
views on the destructive nature
of thermonuclear weapons and the
terrible consequences of general
war in which "hundreds of mil-
lions will die," but leans to-
ward the Chinese position in
emphasizing imperialist prepara-
tions for such a war and makes
much of the Chinese insistence
that increasing "vigilance" is
necessary in the face of this
"danger."
In dealing with the funda-
mental issues in dispute between
Moscow and Peiping, the statement
in most cases either contrives
awkward formulations which com-
bine the Soviet and Chinese po-
sitions on a given issue or re-
lies on ambiguities which blur
or evade the point.
The statement confirms the
thesis of the preventability of
world war while capitalism still
exists--advanced by Khrushchev
at the 21st Soviet party congress
and not previously confirmed by
the Chinese--but places the "pos-
sibility" further into the future.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
8 December 1960
It further defers to the Chi-
nese position that all other
types of war cannot be ruled
out until socialism is finally
triumphant. The document re-
affirms the Sino-Soviet agree-
ment that general war can be
avoided, but it evades the Chi-
nese contention that local wars
may be necessary and even de-
sirable.
A graphic illustration of
the attempt to maintain an out-
ward appearance of unity while
still disagreeing is presented
in the section on relations with
the West. At one point, the
declaration combines the Soviet
and Chinese approaches by stat-
ing that "Communists must un-
flaggingly work among the masses
to prevent underestimation of
the possibility of peaceful co-
existence and at the same time,
to prevent underestimation of
the danger of war." While the
statement advances the Soviet
claim that the struggle for
peace is the "most vital" task
and the long-range economic
competition will be decisive,
it supports the Chinese view of
the United States as the "main
enemy of..-.the world" and, with
emphasis of the Chinese variety,
castigates the policies of West-
ern imperialist nations.
On other key issues, the
document is also ambivalent.
In its discussion of the rela-
tive dangers of "revisionism"
and "dogmatism and sectarianism,"
the statement allows the Chi-
nese to continue attacking So-
viet positions on the pretext
of discussing Yugoslavia, and
the Russians to continue attack-
ing Chinese positions on the pre-
text of discussing a theoretical
danger. Although it affirms
that the Soviet party is "the
mutually acknowledged vanguard
of the world Communist movement"
and the "most experienced and
tempered unit," it acknowledges
as well the "full equality"
of all parties in the move-
ment.
The Chinese appear to have
had some success in gaining a
greater voice in Communist pol-
icy formulation by committing
the USSR, as in the 1957 declara-
tion, to hold bilateral and bloc-
wide consultations. The current
declaration goes somewhat beyond
this and adds, that when points
of dispute arise between par-
ties, the leadership of the par-
ties involved will, if necessary,
hold meetings and consultations
to arrive at joint views. On
the other hand, Moscow has gained
a commitment from the Chinese
to adhere strictly to agreed
positions and to bring their
disputes to private meetings
instead of lobbying in the open
press and international bodies.
Subsequent comment by Pei-
ping and Moscow will clarify
the intention of each regime to
abide by the spirit of unity
evoked in the Moscow statement.
Initially the two regimes have
stressed this solidarity, but
a comparison of the first ed-
itorial comment by Pravda and
People's Daily reveals diver-
gency of emphasis, with Moscow
ignoring the blatant anti-
American parts of the declara-
tion and Peiping stressing the
attack on imperialism and plac-
ing more emphasis on militancy
in describing the guidelines
laid down in Moscow.
Atmosphere at Moscow Meeting
The indecisive and inade-
quate statement which issued
from the Moscow meeting was the
result of fierce infighting. In
his four-hour speech, Liu Shao-
chi is said to have accused
Khrushchev of trying to turn
the "socialist camp into a paper
tiger" and to have claimed that
Khrushchev's letter to Presi-
dent-elect Kennedy showed that
he has learned nothing from
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
8 December 1960
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events of the last half-
year.
KhrUShchev "flew off the handle
several times against the Chi-
nese," who "made him madder by
sitting stonily and then repeat-
ing exactly what had made him
so mad to begin with."
Several parties are said
to have supported the Chinese
in varying degrees, with the
Albanians providing the strong-
est support. The atmosphere
became so heated, however, that,
although the Albanians sided
with the Chinese, they succeeded
in annoying both sides. Soviet
presidium member Suslov at one
point told Albanian first secre-
tary Hoxha to "shut up," and
the Chinese suggested that he
could do his talking some other
time.
Bloc Relations With West
In addition to its atten-
tion to doctrinal questions and
the problem of discipline in the
international Communist movement,
the Moscow statement represents
a program for action in foreign
affairs. In this respect, the
over-all effect of the-Moscow
conference may well be to
strengthen Khrushchev's hand in
pressing for another major dip-
lomatic confrontation with the
West on Berlin and Germany.
The declaration specifical-
ly confirms that "Communists
seek... the solution of controver-
sial international questions by
means of negotiations" and warns
that the "political quarrels be-
tween states must not be settled
by war." Such statements, coupled
with the reaffirmation of Mos-
cow's predominance in the bloc
and among Communist parties,
will probably be interpreted by
Khrushchev as at least tacit
Chinese consent to his plan of
engaging the West in another
round of top-level negotiations.
In addition, in dealing with
such East-West issues as Khru-
shchev's proposal for complete
and general disarmament and the
prohibition of nuclear weapons
and cessation of tests, the
declaration raises the Soviet
position to the level of offi-
cial bloc policy objectives.
Since these issues have played
a central role in Khrushchev's
summit diplomacy, the USSR ap-
pears to have gained by implica-
tion Chinese and bloc approval
to reactivate the campaign for
a summit meeting. Khrushchev
may well feel that by committing
the Chinese to the continuing
importance of bloc unity, Chi-
nese adherence to the declara-
tion will inhibit Peiping from
attacking Soviet diplomacy dur-
ing pre-summit negotiations.
That Khrushchev intends to
go forward with such negotiations
is indicated by conversations
Ambassador Thompson had with
Mikoyan and Kosygin on 6 Decem-
ber. Ambassador Thompson noted
that he had been surprised to
learn from the statement that
the United States was a "strong-
hold of reaction." Kosygin
pointed out that this was a
Communist party statement and
said that the Soviet Government
was not only prepared but anxious
to reach agreements and estab-
lish good relations with the
United States.
In a later conversation,
Thompson was told by Mikoyan
that the strong attack on the
United States had been a con-
cession to the Chinese, who had
proved to be "a tough negotiat-
ing partner." Mikoyan emphasized,
however, that this did not in
any way change the Soviet Un-
ion's desire to have, good
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
8 December 1960.
relations with the United
States. Other Soviet officials
gave the appearance of being
both embarrassed and concerned
by the anti-US tone of the
statement.
Despite Khrushchev's evi-
dent desire to continue negotia-
tions with the United States,
the militant anti-Western tone
of the statement would appear
to reduce somewhat the Soviet
premier's freedom of maneuver
and preclude the kind of un-
orthodox tactics employed by
him in 1959 and early 1960.
The declaration also would
seem to commit the 'USSR to main-
tain its present aggressive and
uncompromising line in'support
of anti-Western Afro-Asian gov-
ernments and national libera-
tion movements. While Khru-
shchev soft-pedaled his drive
to expand Soviet influence in
the underdeveloped countries
in the period leading up to the
Paris meeting last May, he
now apparently intends to
combine a return to negotia-
tions with the West with a
vigorous prosecution of his
"anticolonial" policy. Any
slackening of militant effort
in this direction will undoubt-
edly call forth a sharp rebuke
from the Chinese and the
work of this conference would
have to be done again
EAST-WEST RELATIONS
The Soviet UN delegation
is attempting to clear the way
for top-level contacts with
the new US administration at a
special session of the General
Assembly next spring. Chief
Soviet delegate Zorin has argued
in private talks that completion
of the debates on such "conten-
tious items" as Tibet and Hun-
gary before the new administra-
tion takes office would create
the atmosphere for a US-Soviet
rapprochement. Zorin has sug-
gested that, after a Christmas
recess, the assembly reconvene
on 3 January to deal with out-
standing issues, excepting dis-
armament which would be carried
over into a special session of
the assembly to be attended by
the heads of government.
General Assembly President
Boland has decided to convene
the UN General Committee late
this week to consider the Soviet
proposal; this committee can set
the date! for a resumed session
of the present assembly, but it
cannot make a recommendation
with respect to a special session.
The USSR now may be consid-
ering, as Boland speculates, the
possibility of seeking two re-
sumed sessions, the first to con-
sider all the remaining items ex-
cept disarmament and the second
to consider only the disarmament
issue. If the USSR could obtain
a General Committee recommenda-
tion urging the heads of govern-
ment to attend the session on
disarmament, it would achieve
all. the advantages of the.pro-
posal for a special session. The
Soviet delegation has indicated,
however, that at the opportune
moment a resolution will be in-
troduced calling for a special
session.
As often in the past, Moscow
has again turned to the disarmament
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
8 December 1960
issue as the means for advancing
broader Soviet objectives. Mos-
cow apparently feels that a pro-
posal for the heads of govern-
ment to consider the issue of
disarmament would command wide
support in the UN and be diffi-
cult for the West to reject.
The main purpose of such a
session from Moscow's viewpoint
probably would be to provide an
opportunity for Khrushchev to
meet with the new President and
lay the groundwork for a formal
summit conference later in the
year.
The ::Sdvi+et'::pr.emier probably
recognizes that his actions
since the collapse of the Paris
meeting have complicated the
convening of another four-power
conference this spring. A
meeting with Western leaders at
the UN would also provide Khru-
shchev with a justification for
further delaying unilateral
action on the Berlin ques-
tion.
Since the Afro-Asian UN
delegations favored the abortive
five-power resolution of last
September calling for renewed
contacts between President Eisen-
hower and Khrushchev, the USSR
probably feels these states can
be brotg ht into line behind a
proposal for heads of government
to attend a session on disarma-
ment. During negotiations on
the Soviet-Finnish communge of
24 November, Moscow. attempted un-
successfully to gain Finnish
agreement to a statement calling
for a special session on disarma-
ment. The Soviet-Cambodian com-
munique of 3 December contained
the first formal nonbloc en-
dorsement of the proposal for
the special session.
Nuclear Test Ban Negotiations
In the final session of the
nuclear test ban talks, which
recessed on 5 December until 7
February, the Soviet delegate
adopted his usual tactics on
the eve of recess and sought to
create the impression that the
Western powers had prevented
the successful conclusion of a
treaty. Chief Soviet delegate
Tsarapkin stated that the USSR
failed to see the necessity for
a recess but was forced to agree
at the insistence of the US
delegation.
Tsarapkin contrasted "ex-
cessive" Western demands for
control measures with:;the more
limited control features pro-
posed by the Soviet delega-
tion. However, he said that,
while the Soviet Union would
continue its efforts to reach
agreement, "everything" de-
pended on the position of the
United States.
The relatively moderate
tone of Tsarapkin's statement,
the prompt agreement to a
recess, and his failure to re-
peat recent charges that the
US is attempting to wreck the
conference and resume tests
all suggest that the USSR is
anxious to underline its will-
ingness to continue negotia-
tions with the new US adminis-
tration. 1:
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
8 December 1960
FRANCE-ALGERIA
25X1
Concern in France over a
possible rightist coup attempt
in Algeria has increased fol-
lowing the sudden flight of
rightist Deputy Pierre Lagail-
larde and four others on trial
for their part in the January
insurrection. Tension in Al-
giers remains high prior to
De Gaulle's 9-14 December Al-
gerian tour, which could spark
demonstrations or even an at-
tempt to set up a separate "Gov-
ernment of French Algeria."
Meanwhile, at the UN, the Afro-
Asian bloc is pressing for a
UN-supervised referendum in
Algeria.
Three of the five defend-
ants who failed to report at
their Paris trial on 5 December
are still missing. Lagaillarde
reportedly is in Spain, and the
fifth has surrendered. Reactionto
France to their decision to
jump bond at this time, espe-
cially when the trial seemed
to be going in their favor, has
been almost completely unfavor-
able. Their flight suggests
they feared that De Gaulle's
accelerated pace for a referen-
dum on Algeria would end their
last chance to balk him.
25X1
Meanwhile, Paris is press-
ing ahead with its plans to hold
a referendum--probably on 8
January--on the Algerian pro-
gram, which Premier Debre for-
mally presented to the National
Assembly on 7 December. De
Gaulle will personally take his
case to Algeria on his six-day
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
8 December 1960
trip there, but he will avoid
the major cities, where right-
ist feeling is strongest and
the possibility of demonstra-
tions greatest. De Gaulle's
advisers have warned him of the
danger of assassination during
the trip. In any case, the vis-
it could touch off strikes of
demonstrations that could get
out of control of the police
and security forces.
In view of several reports
that the new delegate general,
Jean Morin, may actually be a
partisan of French Algeria
rather than of De Gaulle's
policy, the possibility cannot
be ruled out that he would fail
to take sufficiently vigorous
measures against any settler
demonstrations, thereby pre-
cipitating a situation favoring
the rightist and military ac-
tivists.
The atmosphere in Algiers
remains quiet but tense. Se-
curity precautions continue to
be discreet, with the security
police remaining out of sight.
Comments and press articles in
Algiers tend to place emphasis
on the honor-breaking aspects
of Lagaillarde's flight, but
there is speculation that he
would not have "crossed the
Rubicon" unless he felt that
the deadline for action was near.
In the UN Political Commit-
tee, Tunisian Ambassador Mongi
Slim opened the Afro-Asian bloc's
campaign for a UN-supervised
referendum in Algeria. The
committee may not complete
action on the issue before the
assembly recesses on 17 Decem-
ber--probably not to reconvene
until late February. There al-
ready is some sentiment for re-
sumed debate after the 8 January
referendum in Algeria. The
states of former French Africa
may exert enough influence to
get General Assembly endorsement
of a resolution recognizing UN
interest in the problem, but
calling for negotiations among
the parties concerned.
25X1
CUBA AND CENTRAL AMERICA
A joint communiqud issued
on 6 December at the end of Che
Guevara's six-day visit in North
Korea contained an unqualified
demand for US withdrawal from
the Guantanamo Naval Base. Pre-
vious references to US with-
drawal from the base by Guevara
and other high Cuban officials
have been carefully qualified.
In the communiqud, Guevara
joined the North Koreans in con-
demning the United States as the
"common enemy of the people of
the world and the sworn enemy
of the Cuban and Korean peoples."
In addition, the Cubans identi-
fied themselves with Pyongyang's
major policy goals. The two
governments also concluded a
series of trade, payments,
technical-cooperation, and cul-
tural-exchange agreements.
On the departure of his eco-
nomic mission from Peiping for
North Korea on 1 December,
Guevara lauded "the world's
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE' WEEKLY SUMMARY
8 December 1960
most progressive and finest
nation" for its aid and encour-
agement to the Cuban revolution
and referred to the trade pro-
tocol and $60,000,000 Chinese
credit to Cuba as example s1?.for
other Latin American countries.
With regard to Peiping's tech-
nical assistance commitments to
Cuba, he said 200 Cubans will
come to Communist China in the
coming year for training in
"industrial, agricultural, and
other fields," and that Commu-
nist Chinese technicians will
assist Cuba in building a num-
ber of "farm stations" in the
next few years.
Cuba's controlled press
has praied the Chinese Commu-
nist agreements and has stressed
the solidarity among nations
which have "gained freedom from
imperialism" and the proof
demonstrated by China's assist-
ance to Cuba that "oppressed
peoples everywhere do not stand
alone," The Chinese interest-
free credit is viewed in Cuba
as "a sacrifice and special ef-
fort" at a time when China is
waging "a gigantic struggle to
develop its own economy."
The establishment of dip-
lomatic relations between Cuba
and North Vietnam was announced
on 2 December following the
visit to Hanoi by a member of
Guevara's mission. On 5 Decem-
ber part of the mission arrived
in Ulan Bator, and establishment
,of Cuban-Mongolian diplomatic
relations was announced on 7 De-
cember. Guevara left for Mos-
cow on 7 December to conclude
trade and assistance negotia
tions begun in early November. The
mission is scheduled to visit
East Germany before returning
to Cuba.
Moves have also been made
to strengthen Cuban ties with
the Soviet Union. On 1 De-
cember, Havana announced the
conclusion of an agreement for
the exchange of tourists be-
tween the USSR and Cuba. Groups
of Soviet tourists are to begin
arriving in Cuba on 26 December,
and Cubans are to be offered
inexpensive tours of the Soviet
Union beginning next summer.
An agreement for the exchange
of students and professors was
also announced.
The chairman of the Cuban
University board announced on
3 December, on his return from
ceremonies marking the inaug-
uration of Moscow's Friendship
University,.that Soviet pro-
fessors will soon be added to
the Cuban... faculty. The
faculty, drastically purged
of anti-Communists, is in need
of technically qualified pro- 25X1
fessors.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
8 December 1960
25X1
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A group of Soviet tech-
nicians recently visited the
expropriated US Government -
owned Nicaro nickel mine and
processing plant, according to
a Havana broadcast of 1 December.
The leader of the group is said
to have assured the plant workers
of Soviet assistance in solving
the "technical problems of the
plant."
Several other Latin. American
governments have recently made
or plan to make efforts to reduce
the threat of Cuban propaganda
and subversion in their countrie
Argentina closed Prensa Latins's
offices on 2 December after the
short-lived Peronista rebel at-
tacks on 30 November and after
repeated Cuban efforts to intro-
duce subversive propaganda into
Argentina through this agency
and throe n its aiplomatic mis-
sion.
Meanwhile, Cuba has ordered
the immediate departure of the
Paraguayan diplomatic mission
in Havana because of Paraguay's
resistance to accepting a Cuban
diplomat in Asuncion.
fJ
American Embassy on 1 December
that Cuban consular offices are
thoroughly penetrated by Commu-
nists and that newly appointed
Cuban consuls in Mexico, Chile,
Spain, Jamaica,and other places
are Communists.
Central America
Pro-Castro elements con-
tinue to enjoy unusual opportun-
ities in El Salvador, where the
six-man junta that came to power
on 26 October has still made no
move to crack down on Communist
and other leftist elements which
are engaged in consolidating
their influence in the regime
and in politically important
labor and student groups.
In Guatemala, the army un-
rest responsible for the abortive
military revolt of 13 November
still persists, and a new coup
may be attempted shortly. Two
Guatemalan colonels told an
American Embassy officer on 2
December that the army will
oust President Ydigoras and
assured him that their movement
is not Communist inspired. The
replacement of the unpopular
defense minister on 6 December
may, however, tend to ameliorate
army grievances and might fore-
stall a revolt.
Meanwhile, leaders of the
three strongest opposition
political parties, sensing the
regime's weakness, signed a
unity pact on 2 December in
which they agreed to support
a new regime in which they
would participate. They also
agreed to reject dealing with
"anyone associated with inter-
national Communism."
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7
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
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8 December 1960
CONGO
Mobutu's capture of ex- and apparently now are regarded
premier Lumumba on 2 December, as. hostages for Lumumba's re-
under circumstances which re- lease.
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